Avignon and Its Papacy, 1309–1417

Avignon and Its Papacy, 1309–1417

Popes, Institutions, and Society

Joëlle Rollo-Koster

ROWMAN & LITTLEFIELD

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Rollo-Koster, Joëlle.
Avignon and its papacy, 1309–1417 : popes, institutions, and society / Joëlle Rollo-Koster.
pages cm
Includes bibliographical references and index.
Summary: “Through a blend of political and social history, the author tells the tale of the transplanted
papacy in Avignon, bringing to life the fourteenth-century capital of Christianity”— Provided by
publisher.
ISBN 978-1-4422-1532-0 (cloth : alkaline paper) — ISBN 978-1-4422-1534-4 (e-book) 1. Avignon
(France)—History—14th century. 2. Avignon (Papal city)—History—14th century. 3. Avignon
(France)—Population—History. 4. Avignon (Papal city)—Population—History. 5. Catholic
Church—France—Avignon—History. 6. Catholic Church. Curia Romana—History. 7. Catholic
Church—Europe—Bishops—Appointment, call, and election—History. 8. Schism, The Great West-
ern, 1378–1417. 9. Papacy—History. I. Title.
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 I would like to thank URI Center for the Humanities
and the University of Rhode Island Division of Research and
Economic Development for their support at the various stages
of this book.

My thanks also to Anna Bennett and Joe Pearson for their patient reviews
and editorial comments.

This book is dedicated to my girls, Zézé, Auriane, Laudine,

and my beautiful chocolate Lab, Léa, gone too soon.
 Contents

Author’s Note xi
Maps xiii
Introduction 1
Notes 15

1 Early Popes 23
Before Clement: Boniface VIII, Philip the Fair, and Rome 24
Clement V: French Puppet or Able Diplomat? 32
The Past Catching Up: Boniface and the Templars 33
Why Not Return to Rome? 40
Centralization: John XXII 44
Satanic Beginnings 46
The Franciscan Poverty Debate and Its European Implication 48
Beatific Vision 54
Monasticization: Benedict XII 56
Staying in Avignon 59
Notes 62
2 Papal Monarchy 69
How to Be Pope: The Papal Monarchy of Clement VI 70
Clement VI and Rome: Cola di Rienzo 74
Clement VI and Joanna of Naples 75
Clement VI and Italy: Milan and Louis of Bavaria 78
Clement VI: Arbiter of the Hundred Years’ War 79
The Arrival of the Black Death 82
Clement VI: The Humanist 84
Lawyer and Conqueror: Innocent VI 86
The Lands of St. Peter 89
The Hundred Years’ War: Poitiers and Its Aftermath 93
The Free Companies in Provence 98
Holy Roman Empire 102
Notes 104

vii
viii Contents

3 Returning to Rome 109

Urban V 110
A Fastidious Man 112
How to Eliminate the Free Companies 115
The Emperor’s Visit 117
The Castilian Situation 119
Returning to Rome 121
The Last of the Avignon Popes: Gregory XI 128
Florence and the Pope: Toward the Break 130
Florence and the Pope at War 133
The Interdict 138
Returning to Rome 140
Notes 146
4 Constructing the Administration: Governance and
Personnel 149
Governance and Finance: Avignon 154
Apostolic Chamber 155
Chancery 165
Penitentiary and Rota 167
The Pope’s Household 169
The Administration’s Mark on Avignon 176
Cardinals 179
Notes 185
5 Avignon: The Capital and Its Population 189
Avignon’s Governance and Administration 191
Citizens and Courtiers 194
Avignon’s Urban Landscape 199
Avignon’s Parishes and Their Social Topography 207
To Live in a Medieval Capital City 228
Notes 234
6 The Great Western Schism and Avignon 239
Why a Schism? 240
The Early Years 249
Continuation 260
Toward a Solution 269
Effects and Results 273
Notes 283
 Contents ix

Conclusion 287
Notes 291
Additional Bibliography 293
1: Early Popes 293
2: Papal Monarchy 297
3: Returning to Rome 300
4: Constructing the Administration 302
5: Avignon: The Capital and Its Population 304
6: The Great Western Schism and Avignon 305
Index 307
 Author’s Note

Throughout the manuscript, French names have been standardized to

“de” if followed by patronymics and “of” if followed by toponymics;
thus Charles of Blois, Robert of Anjou, but Jacques de Molay. I have
respected the Italian form of spelling.

xi
Maps

xiii
xiv Maps
 Introduction

“When the Good Lord comes to doubt about the world, he remembers
that he created Provence,” the great French poet Frédéric Mistral
(1830–1914) is said to have offered in praise of his beloved homeland.
Few other words better celebrate the region that hosted the papacy for
the one hundred years that closed the Middle Ages. The French South-
east, open to the rest of the world via its Mediterranean shores, the broad
highway of its Rhône River, and the byways of its Alpine passes, became
the papal residence first by historical accident in 1309 but later by choice.
The following pages tell the tale of this transplanted papacy at Avignon,
the city the popes transformed into their capital. It is the tale of an institu-
tion growing and defending its prerogatives, of men both high and low
who produced and served its needs, and of the city they built up togeth-
er. As I reconsider the Avignon papacy and the Great Western Schism
(1309–1417) within the social setting of late-medieval Avignon, I hope to
recover some of its urban texture, the fabric of its streets, the noise of its
crowds and celebrations, and a bit of its people’s joys and pains.
The story of Avignon and its inhabitants is crucial to our understand-
ing of the institutional history of the papacy in the later Middle Ages.
Between 1309 and 1378, seven popes ruled the Western Church from
Avignon (French today but Provençal territory until 1348, when Pope
Clement VI bought the city from the Countess of Provence). Pope Grego-
ry XI returned the papacy to Rome in 1377, but his subsequent death in
March 1378 and the tumultuous Roman election of his successor in April
shattered the unity of the Church in the Great Western Schism
(1378–1417). The increasing dissatisfaction of the cardinals after the elec-
tion of Urban VI led the majority to withdraw their support from him and
to elect a challenger, Clement VII. Both popes considered themselves
legitimate. The two contenders established rival courts, and Christendom
split into a divided obedience. Clement VII and his court resettled in
Avignon while Urban VI remained, sometimes tenuously, in Rome.
The Avignon papacy and the Schism encouraged fundamental institu-
tional changes in the history of early modern Europe—effective central-
1
2 Introduction

ization linked to fiscal policy, efficient bureaucratic governance, court

society (société de cour), and conciliarism—but the dubious legitimacy of a
divided and non-Roman papacy has cast a shadow over the entire period.
The Schism only fueled the scathing criticism of Petrarch, who himself
grew up near Avignon in the early years of the fourteenth century. His
judgment that “the worst of all things are there in Babylon on the fierce
banks of the Rhône where the infamous prostitute fornicates with the
kings of the earth” has echoed throughout history. 1 His fame stigmatized
Avignon and its popes. With his flair for invective, the negative effect of
Petrarch’s acid-tongued propaganda against the papal capital city has
taken centuries to undo. Indeed, the scholarly consensus today concern-
ing papal Avignon differs little from Petrarch’s. How could someone
possibly show interest in a topic dismissed by the father of humanism in
these kinds of disparaging terms?
Now I am living in France, in the Babylon of the West. The sun in its
travels sees nothing more hideous than this place on the shores of the
wild Rhône, which suggests the hellish streams of Cocytus and Ache-
ron. Here reign the successors of the poor fishermen of Galilee; they
have strangely forgotten their origin. I am astounded, as I recall their
predecessors, to see these men loaded with gold and clad in purple,
boasting of the spoils of princes and nations; to see luxurious palaces
and heights crowned with fortifications, instead of a boat turned down-
ward for shelter. We no longer find the simple nets which were once
used to gain a frugal sustenance from the lake of Galilee, and with
which, having labored all night and caught nothing, they took, at day-
break, a multitude of fishes, in the name of Jesus. One is stupefied
nowadays to hear the lying tongues, and to see worthless parchments
turned by a leaden seal into nets which are used, in Christ’s name, but
by the arts of Belial, to catch hordes of unwary Christians. 2

Several centuries passed before, in 1866, a single author, Alphonse

Daudet, took up the challenge of rehabilitating the city and its popes; but
again, as it had been with Petrarch, Avignon was fictionalized. In one of
his short stories, The Mule of the Pope, Daudet offers a caricature of papal
Avignon joyous to the point of insouciance, peaceful and industrious—in
fact, a city that never was. 3 At both ends of the spectrum, from the four-
teenth to the nineteenth centuries, Petrarch and Daudet constructed the
city as though inhabited by dramatis personae, both authors inserting a
large dose of fiction into their contrived representations.
 Introduction 3

For more than six hundred years, historical scholarship concerning

the fourteenth century has either neglected the Avignon papacy or vil-
ified it as a French puppet—immoral, worldly, and materialistic in out-
look. As Daniel Waley astutely remarks, the Avignon papacy has been
treated until recently as an inconvenience, detrimental to Rome and the
papacy in general. Surveys of papal Avignon have been close to nonexis-
tent. And it seems that very few ever questioned the sources fabricated
by Petrarch, Giovanni Villani, and their like, chroniclers whose basic
interest was to defend a Roman papacy regardless of the location of the
papacy, either in Rome or elsewhere in Italy. 4
With such historical polarization, the work of a single author, Étienne
Baluze (1630–1718), needs to be highlighted for his contribution to Avi-
gnon’s reevaluation. This seventeenth-century scholar, an antiquarian
and director of the rich and impressive private library of Jean-Baptiste
Colbert, was the first to attempt a somewhat historical approach to the
Avignon papacy, by focusing on source work. For many decades long
after his death, he remained the sole scholar to edit documents related to
the Avignon papacy. Born in Limousin in the French Southwest (like
many of the Avignon popes), Baluze used his in-depth knowledge of
archives to collect fourteenth-century documents that recounted the lives
of the popes; these became the two volumes of his Vitae paparum avenio-
nensium published in 1693. 5 Baluze was not intrinsically interested in the
Avignon papacy per se; rather, this specific work evolved from his gener-
al interest in manuscripts related to Christian institutions of the Middle
Ages. He produced a great many editions of Christian documents, texts,
and treatises, and his edition of the lives of the Avignon popes seemed a
natural continuation of his monumental endeavors. Yet with one caveat:
the Avignon papacy was still an unwelcome bête noire, and in 1698 the
volumes were put on the Index (the Catholic Church’s list of prohibited
books). Despite censorship by the Catholic Church, Baluze’s edition of
the popes’ lives stood (and still stands) as the foundation of modern
studies of the Avignon papacy before the opening of the Vatican
Archives in 1881.
In 1917, Guillaume Mollat masterfully edited Baluze’s Vitae paparum.
Mollat extended Baluze’s two-volume edition with an additional two that
enlarged and analyzed the sources Baluze had utilized. 6 As Mollat notes,
Baluze never worried about a rigorously scientific approach to his edi-
tion, never identifying, for example, the provenance of his material. Ba-
4 Introduction

luze’s critical apparatus was close to nonexistent. Quite uncritically, he

simply collected together various “lives” for each pope, which he orga-
nized sequentially. Thus, each pope had a first, second, or third life, each
authored by various medieval chroniclers. Mollat’s task was to identify
and check Baluze’s sources (original material from the royal collections
and from Colbert’s library, the Sorbonne, the Abbey of Saint-Denis,
transcriptions of Vatican material done by Cardinal Casanata, and other
material from elsewhere) and to analyze the sources’ reliability, utility,
and content. To complete the edition, Mollat clarified ambiguities, filled
voids, and added documents that he found during his research. 7 Thus
was born the four-volume edition of the popes’ lives, the foundation of
all subsequent work dealing with the Avignon papacy.
The opening of the Vatican Archives in 1881 and the knowledge de-
rived from that rich collection initiated a marked change of perception:
literary and somewhat amateur interest was slowly replaced by a histori-
cal narrative reliably grounded in true archival research. The German
School of Rome, led by Heinrich Denifle and Franz Ehrle, produced
seven volumes of documentary editions concerned largely with texts
dealing with the Avignon papacy (Archiv für Literatur und Kirchenge-
schichte des Mittelalters). 8 Their focus fell on ecclesiastical, intellectual, in-
stitutional, and theological sources. During roughly the same period, the
first volumes of the Analecta Vaticano-Belgica appeared, a series published
by the Institut historique belge de Rome, from 1906 to 1987. These editions
concerned the institutional history of dioceses in the medieval and early
modern periods that today form Belgium. In the Middle Ages, they in-
cluded Brussels, Cambrai, Liège, Thérouanne, and Tournai. 9
This early interest in the institutional history of the Avignon papacy
led logically to a study of its financial history. In 1911, Karl H. Schäfer
began his transcription of the most important apostolic financial records
regarding the Avignon papacy in his Vatikanische Quellen zur Geschichte
der päpstlichen Hof- und Finanzverwaltung (1316–1378) for the Historischen
Institut of the Görres-Gesellschaft. 10 The records of the Apostolic Chamber
opened a window into the day-to-day life of the papal court. Expenses
were itemized around several categories that evolved with each pope but
generally dealt with the sustenance and functioning of the court. The
kitchen, bread, and wine office itemized purchases of food, drink, and
medicine; the stables’ registers recorded expenses related to transporta-
tion and horses. All in all, within these categories scribes noted additional
 Introduction 5

expenses relating to the purchase of wax, paper, clothing, fabrics, arts,

jewelry, and the papal library, for example. Apostolic scribes also re-
corded the salaries of curial servants, alms, and finally all expenses relat-
ed to construction and war. Historians discover invaluable information in
these records—from the payments going to cobblers for making the pon-
tiffs’ red slippers, to physicians’ salaries and the medication they ordered
for certain popes, to the very names of the papal laundresses, messen-
gers, and purveyors of wheat, wine, and fishes. Over the years, historians
have refined the edition of these expense registers, but the early German
editions remain the first points of reference for any basic research. The
exploitation of these financial records was complemented in 1899 with
the initiation of the project of the French School of Rome. If the Germans
focused on finances, the French opted to decipher the papal correspon-
dence and began publication of the papal letters; to date, their research
has produced some fifty-four volumes of the Registres et lettres des papes
du XIVme siècle. 11 As we will see later, the papal correspondence evolved
somewhat with each pope but remained organized around two poles,
internal politics and external diplomacy. There always remained the larg-
er division between secret and curial letters for diplomacy and sensitive
correspondence and communal letters for internal nominations and re-
sponses to petitions.
Ironically, the wealth of archive material is itself the result of the
effective administration of the Avignon papacy. Because popes knew that
they would not remain forever in exile from the Eternal City, they re-
quested that administrative documents be archived twice, creating the
so-called Avignon paper registers, the Registra Avenionensia, and the Vati-
can parchment registers, or Registra Vaticana. The chancery systematically
recopied in the Vatican registers what was contained in the less durable
paper registers. After Innocent VI’s reign (1352–1362), recopying became
less systematic, only privileging items deemed more important, such as
papal bulls. Still, this double record keeping allowed for better conserva-
tion of the material. If registers were lost in transport between Avignon
and Rome, the odds were good that other copies existed. The registers
provided raw material to a small number of scholars (primarily French)
who, between the two world wars, produced scores of “local” studies
that remain invaluable even today.
Interest in major archives like the one at the Vatican sparked system-
atic and thorough research in local repositories, such as the communal
6 Introduction

and departmental archives of the Vaucluse (to which Avignon belonged).

Gustave Bayle, Robert André-Michel, Robert Brun, Léopold Duhamel,
Joseph Girard, Léon-Honoré Labande, and Pierre Pansier pored over lo-
cal material, and their names still today find an honored place in the
bibliography of any work concerning papal Avignon. Gustave Bayle was
an early antiquarian (and something of an ethnologist, too), one of the
first to draw from the communal archives. Relying on a methodology
akin to folklore studies (he was, for example, interested in women’s histo-
ry, medicine, and prostitution), he integrated this approach to his reading
of the medieval past and paved the way for a future social and cultural
history of the city. 12
During a brief career cut short by the outbreak of World War I, Robert
André-Michel (1884–1914) turned the keen eye of a trained social histo-
rian to studying the papal capital. 13 He published a series of articles on
Avignon’s first clock, the building of its surrounding walls, and its de-
fense against the companies of mercenaries (the infamous routiers). 14 A
few years later, Robert Brun (1896–1978) became one of the first economic
historians of the Middle Ages. Brun focused on commercial exchanges
operated mainly by the Italian merchant class of Avignon. In his research,
he understood quite early the great importance of the Pratese archives,
the documentary history of one of Avignon’s most famous merchants,
Francesco di Marco Datini. 15 These archives became over time a research
focus for his understanding of the economic history of the Middle Ages. 16
On a different spectrum, one more closely aligned with archival studies,
Léopold Duhamel (1842–1922) initiated a long trend that eventually
bound the office of archivist closely to the city’s history. A professional
archivist/paleographer, he directed important French archives, including
those of the département of Vaucluse, of which Avignon is a part. He also
directed the archives of the départements of Vosges and Corsica, organiz-
ing and classifying documents in his charge, compiling several invento-
ries and repertories. Besides compiling the first inventory of the commu-
nal archives of Avignon, he also edited other series detailing the modern
period, for example, Répertoire numerique détaillé de la série L: Administra-
tion révolutionnaire, 1790–1800. 17 His impeccable knowledge of the
archives allowed him to publish several books on the pope’s palace,
architecture, and art. But more importantly, he is the one who facilitated
the move of the papal archives from the Préfecture de Vaucluse into the
pope’s palace (in fact, an old chapel of Benedict XII), where they remain
 Introduction 7

today. A few years later he convinced the communal authorities to grant

him control of the communal archives; little by little, the departmental
archives of Vaucluse grew into a research center investigating all aspects
of Avignon and the papacy.
Another scholar associated with the preservation of the city’s history
is Joseph Girard (1881–1962). He is identified above all with the Musée
Calvet, which he directed for some forty years before becoming the con-
servator of the pope’s palace. The museum was a semi-independent insti-
tution founded and supported by the eighteenth-century physician and
collector Esprit Calvet (1728–1810). Still open today, the museum pre-
serves a collection of stone architectural remains (musée lapidaire), paint-
ings, and ironworks. Of interest for the history of Avignon, the museum
acquired under the leadership of Girard a large collection of manuscripts
emanating from Avignonese antiquarians and historians (fonds of the
Abbé Requin, Léon-Honoré Labande, and Pierre Pansier). 18 Active with
the Académie de Vaucluse (the quintessential academia for erudite schol-
ars), Girard focused his scholarship on cataloguing his museum and writ-
ing a history of Avignon’s monuments. 19 Léon-Honoré Labande
(1867–1939) is also closely associated with the Calvet Museum. He was a
chartiste, that is, a graduate of the prestigious École des chartes, which still
prepares France’s conservators and archivists to this day. In 1890, La-
bande was named conservator of the Musée Calvet and of the Bibliothèque
d’Avignon, a position that allowed him to examine all of Avignon’s manu-
scripts deposited in the communal library. His work culminated in a
comprehensive catalogue of the manuscripts in France’s public libraries
(Catalogue général des manuscrits des bibliothèques publiques). He spent much
of his career as conservator of the archives and library of Monaco Palace
(1906–1939). While in Avignon, Labande’s scholarship focused on textual
documentation and urban archaeology, and it extended to the periods
both before and after the papal sojourn, so he broadened the scope of
research interest in the city from the thirteenth to the fifteenth centuries. 20
The last antiquarian/historian to be considered is Pierre Pansier
(1864–1934). An ophthalmologist and chief surgeon at Avignon’s hospi-
tal, Pierre Pansier’s initial interest in the history of his profession grew
into an insatiable appetite for the city’s history at large. I cannot cite here
his immense bibliography, and I would be hard pressed to offer a selec-
tion of his most relevant work, signaling in my footnotes only the books
that pertain closely to the present study. 21 Pansier worked on everything
8 Introduction

from medieval doctors to repentant prostitutes to the history of the city’s

streets. He is the first source that historians interested in Avignon turn to
(even if sometimes some of his transcriptions are erroneous). We can note
that early in his career he joined Joseph Girard to discuss the history of
the Temporal Court of Avignon, the judicial institution that monitored
the lay population of the city. 22 He produced scores of articles in the
Annales d’Avignon et du Comtat Venaissin and the Mémoires de l’Académie de
Vaucluse.
Avignon advanced from the realm of merely local and antiquarian
studies when four French historians—Léon Mirot, Guillaume Mollat,
Charles Samaran, and Yves Renouard—opted to focus their research on
the Avignon papacy. Léon Mirot (1870–1946) was an archivist and
paleographer trained at the École des chartes, a member of the French
School in Rome, and a conservator at France’s National Archives. Like
Robert Brun, he focused on the Italians active in France and Provence. Yet
unlike Brun, who researched the well-known Florentines of Avignon,
Mirot studied the Lucchese families who settled abroad, such as the Spia-
fame. 23 Note that Mirot also published one of the first manuals of histori-
cal geography of the modern period, a topic dear to the Annales School. 24
Mirot’s interest in the Avignon papacy led him to a study of the papal
return to Rome in 1376 25 and most importantly to transcribe and edit the
letters of Pope Gregory XI. 26
Guillaume Mollat (1877–1968) left an immense body of scholarship,
including seminal works about Avignon’s history such as the first com-
prehensive survey of the Avignon papacy and (as seen previously) the
edition in four volumes of Étienne Baluze’s lives of the Avignon popes
(Vitae paparum Avenionensum), still the standard work in the field. He
edited the papal letters of four popes, John XXII (sixteen volumes), Clem-
ent VI (four volumes), Urban V (one volume), and Gregory XI (one vol-
ume). 27 His intimate knowledge of the archival material survives in
countless articles in the Revue d’histoire ecclésiastique, Provence Historique,
and the Mémoires de l’Académie de Vaucluse. 28 Although his interest re-
mained institutional, he never shied away from addressing the men who
worked within the system and, to a lesser extent, Avignon curial society.
Although Mollat was a member of the clergy, he trained at the École
française of Rome under the direction of another ecclesiastic, the famous
Church historian Louis Duchesne (1843–1922). Mollat pursued his re-
search even while fulfilling his priestly functions, traveling back and
 Introduction 9

forth between Rome and France, where he served as chaplain in Mont-

martre and vicar of Notre-Dame de Passy. 29 Guillaume Mollat’s interest
in the men who administered the curia, papal justice, and finances paved
the way for the next generation of scholars. 30 One of Guillaume Mollat’s
closest friends was Charles Samaran (1879–1982); together in 1905 they
published the first study of the Avignon popes’ finances. 31 The extraordi-
nary longevity of Charles Samaran (he died at 104) made him the dean of
Avignon historiography, whose work influenced the next wave of eco-
nomic historians like Yves Renouard (1908–1965) and Jean Favier
(1932–2014). Samaran was a humanist in the old sense, a true erudite
scholar, a Renaissance man with a deep literary culture and the perfect
mastery of Latin so dear to the École des chartes. 32
The study of papal finances pointed to a few truisms. When the papa-
cy moved to southern France in 1309, it was still a Roman curia. Even if
accused of being manipulated by the French crown, the curia comprised
individuals still labeled “followers of the Roman court,” despite where it
was located. The highest echelons of papal government were French, but
a large segment of the bureaucratic and financial institution was in the
hands of Italian nationals. It was a fact that the French papacy kept close
ties with Italy if only because of the large tracts of land it needed to
reconquer in order to consolidate its papal states in the area. Conquest
and war meant funds, and Italian bankers ran papal finances on a daily
basis.
The last historian of the mid-twentieth-century group of economic
historians, Yves Renouard, understood this and clearly linked papal Avi-
gnon to Italy. Yves Renouard may be considered the first modern eco-
nomic historian. In a 1971 review, Brown University’s Italianist David
Herlihy underscores Renouard’s originality, his mode of thought that
privileged administrative sources: “The novelty of Renouard’s work in
administrative history was his shift of emphasis from the theoretical
functions of the various papal offices to the practical operations of the
papal government. He sought to explore, as he says in the Études, ‘the
reality, the life, which is usually covered or masked in the official
texts.’” 33 In 1968, the sixth section of the École pratique des hautes études
compiled two volumes containing the majority of Yves Renouard’s arti-
cles (approximately seventy of them) completed between 1934 and
1965. 34 These articles serve as an introduction to his scholarship. Re-
nouard navigated between three poles of interest—the Avignon papacy,
10 Introduction

Italian cities, and the French Southwest—all of which he linked with the
Italian merchants who traveled from one to the other. As David Herlihy
explains, “To judge from his first publication he [Renouard] had been
concerned initially with the political and institutional history of the papa-
cy in the Avignon period, but with characteristic alertness he soon recog-
nized the value of these archives for economic history. These documents
were the basis of his thesis, published in 1942, on the relations of the
Avignon papacy with the banking companies of Italy.” 35 Renouard’s the-
sis, Les relations des papes d’Avignon et des compagnies commerciales et ban-
caires de 1316 à 1378, and its continuation, Recherches sur les compagnies
commerciales et bancaires utilisées par les papes d’Avignon avant le Grand
Schisme, made him the foremost specialist on the Avignon merchant
class. 36 His work led him to conduct a survey of medieval businessmen
and to write another history of the Avignon papacy. 37 Renouard thus
became the second historian, after Guillaume Mollat, to synthesize the
era. Studies of the Avignon papacy became important enough to be trans-
lated into English—in 1963 for Guillaume Mollat 38 and 1970 for Yves
Renouard. 39 To date, the best survey in English of the Avignon papacy
remains Patrick Zutshi’s chapter in the sixth volume of The New Cam-
bridge Medieval History, which deals with the years 1300 to 1415. 40
Fourteenth-century Avignonese records lend themselves to historical
demographic analysis and quantitative studies, a growing methodologi-
cal trend in the 1960s. Once the papal administration settled in Avignon
in the early fourteenth century, it organized its services based on local
resources. For example, curial officers in charge of finding shelter for
curialists compiled lists of available housing. Throughout the period,
these assignation and taxation records tracked lodging locations as well
as rent charged and paid to property owners. These registers, now
housed at the Vatican, were completed with lists of all expenses encoun-
tered by the curia. Such accounts offer a glimpse into the day-to-day
administration of the curia, from data relating to tax collection by the
Apostolic Chamber, to food and clothing purchases, to the making of
knives, medicine, laundry lists, and names of mercenaries defending the
palace and city walls. Record keeping was rigorous and surprisingly well
developed for the time. 41 Any person who had a transaction with the
curia could expect to have his or her name recorded by papal scribes.
Using scores of these documents, Bernard Guillemain, in his 1962 book La
cour pontificale d’Avignon: Étude d’une société (1309–1376), wrote the first
 Introduction 11

social history of the fourteenth-century curia. 42 His contemporary, Jean

Favier, published in 1966 a study of the papal finances during the Great
Western Schism (1378–1409). 43 Both works (each close to one thousand
pages long) remain impossible to ignore for any study of papal Avignon.
Bernard Guillemain describes in minute detail the members of the
papal government and bureaucracy as well as the numerous immigrants
(cortisiani or curiam romanam sequentes, “the followers of the Roman
court”) attracted to the city by the presence of the popes. He identifies the
geographical origins and occupational activities of these curialists and
other immigrants, who had hoped to better their lives within the walls of
the Provençal city by offering their services to the curia. Because of its
scope, Guillemain’s study of the city during the first seventy-five years of
the fourteenth century became a landmark in the social history of medie-
val Avignon even though it contains some errors. 44 For his part, Jean
Favier pursued the analysis of the trademark of the Avignon papacy, its
growing financial and administrative centralization, a trait already noted
by Guillaume Mollat, Yves Renouard, and Bernard Guillemain. Les fi-
nances pontificales à l’époque du Grand Schisme made Favier’s career, which
culminated with his nomination as keeper of the French National
Archives. 45 Les finances remains notable today because it is the sole mono-
graph focused on Avignon during the Great Western Schism. Favier used
his study as a means to direct attention to the financial structures of the
papacy, essential for its survival during this period of trouble, but also to
the men who ran the institution. Like Guillemain’s, his social approach
linked religion, politics, and economy to society. He framed his metho-
dology around preoccupations of human interest, focusing on the tax
collectors, money changers, and merchants without whom church
government would not have functioned, as well as on the means by
which it functioned. All in all, Guillemain’s and Favier’s socioeconomic
studies presented the papal city as one of the great medieval metropol-
ises, worthy of being placed on the historical map alongside Paris, Flor-
ence, and London.
In 1979, there appeared under the leadership of Sylvain Gagnière the
first and only synthesis of the history of the city throughout the ages, the
Histoire d’Avignon. 46 Each chronological chapter was authored by a spe-
cialist of the period. Sylvain Gagnière came to history by way of archaeol-
ogy. The son of a wealthy family, he abandoned a promising career in
industry after World War II to pursue his interest in archaeology. A re-
12 Introduction

searcher at the Centre national de la recherche scientifique and specialist in

Provence’s prehistory, he eventually became conservator of the Palais du
Roure (a fifteenth-century palace built by a Florentine exile, Piero Baron-
celli) and of the pope’s palace. In that capacity, he initiated several dig-
ging campaigns subsequently documented in published reports and
eventually leading to the first in-depth study of the papal palace. 47 Quin-
tessential historian of the palace, he founded the Société des amis du Palais
des Papes that is still active today with meetings and a journal, the Annu-
aire de la Société des amis du Palais des Papes. He may be the sole modern
historian who gave his name to a street in Avignon. There is a Rue Pierre
Pansier, but it is in Carpentras!
Since Bernard Guillemain, Jean Favier, and Sylvain Gagnière, the glit-
ter of Avignon’s archival wealth has attracted more French historians,
mainly disciples of the École des chartes and the Annales School. Anne-
Marie Hayez for the former, and Jacques Chiffoleau for the latter, contin-
ue to be their best representatives. Anne-Marie Hayez’s immense knowl-
edge of the archives and their content makes her the ideal interlocutor for
anyone interested in the Avignon papacy. This study is deeply indebted
to her many publications on taxes and gabelles, the construction of the
palace, papal life, and fourteenth-century Avignonese citizens. She has
edited countless numbers of papal letters and is responsible for several
volumes of papal correspondence published by the École française of
Rome, especially regarding Urban V and Gregory XI. 48
Anne-Marie Hayez also edited an important volume indispensable for
the knowledge of medieval Avignon, the Terrier Avignonnais de l’évêque
Anglic Grimoard. 49 Administrative documents (usually labeled terrier or
censier) offer an abundance of information on property ownership with
detailed descriptions of people and geography. Medieval ownership is a
complicated concept somewhat incomprehensible to the modern mind.
People owned vacant and arable lands, houses, courtyards, vineyards,
and gardens that they or their forefathers had bought from a “lord.” The
“owners” could dispose of their property at will with a caveat; they
needed to recognize a right of ownership to that same “lord” or his suc-
cessors. That right of “direct” ownership to another entity was material-
ized through the payment of a yearly tax, a cens (hence the word censier
or terrier for the listings) to the person (a descendant or his representa-
tive, often called procurator). Usually that legal persona, or “lord,” was
an institution, a diocese, a cathedral chapter, an abbey, a convent, or a
 Introduction 13

monastery. Well-organized lordships compiled registers that listed and

counted the parcels, whether lands, houses, or vineyards, and listed their
payment due dates in currency and in kind. Hayez edited one of the most
important terriers, compiled under the directives of the bishop of Avi-
gnon, Anglic Grimoard, by a certain Sicard du Fraisse between 1366 and
1368. Further, she appends an important biographical apparatus to the
individuals listed in the terrier, allowing thus a clear identification of who
was where in 1360s Avignon. The work is an invaluable tool.
Anne-Marie Hayez’s husband, Michel Hayez, is also a historian of
Avignon. While director of the Archives of the Vaucluse, he edited a
guide to the archives, essential when navigating the massive documenta-
tion contained there. He also produced other repertories of archival mate-
rial unrelated to the Avignon papacy. 50 He was a coeditor, with his wife
and other collaborators, of the École française edition of Urban V’s letters,
and he also coauthored several articles with his wife. 51 As sole author, he
produced two articles on the departure of the popes from and their re-
turn to Avignon. 52 Their son, Jérôme, is continuing the familial involve-
ment with the papal city. Chargé de recherche at the Institut d’histoire mod-
erne et contemporaine, he has focused his research on the epistolary ex-
changes between Avignon and Italy, producing an anthropological study
of medieval migration. 53
Among contemporary historians, Jacques Chiffoleau has become the
French specialist on the city’s religious history and justice. He produced
two groundbreaking studies in the 1980s: La comptabilité de l’au-delà: Les
hommes, la mort et la religion dans la region d’Avignon à la fin du moyen âge,
and Les justices du pape. 54 La comptabilité is a study based largely on notari-
al archives and testaments from which Chiffoleau measures the impact
that crises of the time—plague, war, and immigration—had on religious
mentalities. He evokes a world of familial isolation where deep ties of
kinship gave way before interclass marriage, the alliances of friends and
neighbors, and the abruptly truncated nuclear family—in sum, the birth
of modern kinship structures. Les justices du pape uses Vatican and com-
munal material (for the most part) to survey the many justices—or, rath-
er, judicial systems—that ruled Avignon. Two additional French histo-
rians have focused on Avignon as well. Jacques Rossiaud has published a
study of medieval prostitution and of occupations related to the Rhône
River (boatmen and longshoremen), while Daniel Le Blévec has studied
charity and the assistance given to the poor in the Avignonese region. 55
14 Introduction

In spite of the dominance of French scholars in the field, a few En-

glish-speaking modern historians have been attracted to the Avignon
papacy and its capital city. Richard C. Trexler started his career with a
study of the Liber divisionis, a census of Avignonese immigrants in 1371,
researching a thesis that examined the strained relations between Flor-
ence and Avignon that led to the 1376 papal interdict over the city. 56
Daniel Williman has researched papal chamberlains and the Apostolic
Chamber. 57 And a few papal biographies have appeared in English: So-
phia Menache authored a life of Clement V, Diane Wood concentrated on
Clement VI, and Paul Thibault wrote about Gregory XI. 58 I will return to
them while addressing specific popes. Most recently, the Avignon papa-
cy has resurfaced to prominence somewhat. Other scholars have inten-
sively studied the sources, and their research has led to new studies,
often fresh perspectives considered through a social and cultural lens. I
will engage them in the discussion that follows.
In this work, I attempt to rehabilitate the effectiveness of papal
governance and to recover the creativity and civic dynamism of the peri-
od. The significant contribution of this study resides in its retrieval of the
complex interrelationship of court and city, enlarging what might other-
wise be a narrowly institutional approach within the wider perspective of
a newer urban history. This is not the rhetorical Avignon of Dante, Pe-
trarch, St. Catherine of Siena, or Bridget of Sweden, but the day-to-day
Avignon of popes, bureaucrats, and merchants. The first three chapters
survey the history of the seven popes of Avignon. These chapters canvass
the many issues they dealt with, whether internal or external, and how
each pontiff responded. Contrary to older assumptions, there is little
doubt that the popes of Avignon defended papal authority rather than
acquiescing to the French crown. Many of them were experienced diplo-
mats whose skill at temporizing with somewhat arrogant rulers could
mistakenly be perceived as complacency. The fourth chapter elucidates
the many innovations of Avignon’s papal administration, the veritable
founder of what we would call today “red tape.” Since papal government
implanted itself in the city, the chapter also scrutinizes the relationship
between administration and Avignon’s space and topography. The fifth
chapter addresses directly how city and pope related and the effect of the
court’s arrival on Avignon’s physical and social topographies. The last
chapter addresses the birth and history of the Great Western Schism as it
connected to Avignon’s policies and society.
 Introduction 15

The Avignon papacy was notable for its economic efficiency—for ex-
ample, it organized and centralized tax collection, money changing, and
banking. Yet institutions are nothing without the people who create and
run them. The story of the city and its inhabitants is knitted into the
institutional history of the papacy. So this volume examines not only the
popes and the people of their courts (cardinals, chamberlains, tax collec-
tors, Italian merchants, scribes, papal messengers, and the myriad bu-
reaucrats necessary for the curia’s functioning) but also the laboring
classes drawn to the city to provide the many ancillary services necessary
for the court’s comfort, from butchers and fruit sellers to cooks, from
shoemakers to laundresses. Late-medieval Avignon experienced tremen-
dous demographic and spatial growth within a short time, forcing the
city to face early some of the issues that typically affect modern capitals:
unchecked immigration, urban sprawl, social tensions and geographic
segregation, health and hygiene issues, poverty, and widespread prosti-
tution, to name a few. The aim of this volume is to give readers a vivid
sense of what it was like to live in the crowded fourteenth-century capital
of Christianity even as we survey the history of the popes and their court.

NOTES

1. Robert Coogan, Babylon on the Rhone: A Translation of Letters by Dante, Petrarch,

and Catherine of Siena on the Avignon Papacy (Madrid: José Porrúa Turanzas, 1983), 13.
2. “Petrarch’s Letter to a friend, 1340–1353,” in Readings in European History, ed.
James Harvey Robinson (Boston: Ginn, 1904), 1:502.
3. “He who never saw Avignon in the time of the Popes has seen nothing. Never
was there such a city for gayety, life, animation, and a succession of fetes. There were,
from morning till night, processions, pilgrimages, streets strewn with flowers and
carpeted with magnificent tapestries, cardinals arriving by the Rhone, with banners
flying; gayly bedecked galleys, the soldiers of the Pope singing in Latin on the squares,
and the bowls of mendicant friars: and then, from roof to cellar of the houses that
crowded humming about the great Papal palace, like bees about their hive, there was
the tick-tack of the lace-makers’ looms, the rapid movement of the shuttles weaving
gold thread for the vestments, the little hammers of the carvers of burettes, the key-
boards being tuned at the lute-makers, the songs of the sempstresses; and, overhead,
the clang of the bells, and always a tambourine or two jingling down by the bridge.
For with us, when the common people are pleased, they must dance and dance; and as
the streets in the city in those days were too narrow for the farandole, the fifes and the
tambourines stationed themselves on Avignon Bridge, in the cool breezes from the
Rhone; and there the people danced and danced, day and night. Ah! the happy days!
the happy city! Halberds that did not wound, state prisons where they put wine to
cool. No famine; no wars. That is how the Popes of the Comtat governed the people;
that is why the people regretted them so bitterly.” Alphonse Daudet, Alphonse Daudet’s
16 Introduction

Short Stories, trans. George Burnham Ives (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1909),
47–48.
4. Daniel Waley, “Opinions of the Avignon Papacy: A Historiographical Sketch,”
in Storiografia e Storia: Studi in onore Eugenio Duprè Theseider (Rome: Bulzoni, 1974),
1:175–188.
5. Étienne Baluze, Vitae paparum avenionensium, hoc est, Historia pontificum romano-
rum qui in Gallia sederunt ab anno Christi MCCCV usque ad annum MCCCXCIV, ed.
Guillaume Mollat (Paris: Letouzey et Ané, 1914), 4 vols. The text has been recently
digitalized following the edition of Guillaume Mollat, making it easily accessible. See
http://baluze.univAvignon.fr/v1/read_index.html.
6. A first volume focused on the lives of the popes collected from various medieval
manuscripts ranging between 1305 and 1394 (appended with Baluze’s notes), and a
second volume contained the various documents that Baluze used for his notes.
7. Mollat explains his rationale and edition in Guillaume Mollat, Étude critique sur
les Vitæ Paparum Avenionensium d’Étienne Baluze (Paris: Letouzey et Ané, 1917).
8. Heinrich Denifle, O.P., and Franz Erhle, S.J. (eds.), Archiv für Literatur und Kir-
chengeschichte des Mittelalters (Berlin: Weidmannsche Buchhandlung, 1885–1890), 7
vols.
9. Ursmer Berlière, Suppliques de Clément VI (1342–1352): Textes et analyses (Rome:
Institut historique belge, 1906); Arnold R. Fayen, Lettres de Jean XXII (1316–1334):
Textes et analyses (Rome: M. Bretschneider, 1908), 2 vols.; Alphonse Fierens, Lettres de
Benoit XII (1334–1342): Textes et analyses (Rome: M. Bretschneider, 1910); Ursmer
Berlière, Suppliques d’Innocent VI (1352–1362): Textes et analyses (Rome: M. Bretschnei-
der, 1911); Alphonse Fierens, Suppliques d’Urbain V (1362–1370): Textes et analyses
(Rome: M. Bretschneider, 1914); Karl Hanquet, Ursmer Berlière, Hubert Nelis, Marie
Jeanne Tits-Dieuaide, Pervenche Briegleb, and Arlette Laret-Kayser, Documents relatifs
au grand schisme: Textes et analyses (Brussels: Institut historique belge de Rome, 1924), 7
vols.; Philippe Van Isacker and Ursmer Berlière, Lettres de Clément VI (1342–1352):
Textes et analyses (Rome: Institut historique belge, 1924); Alphonse Fierens and Camille
Tihon, Lettres d’Urbain V (1362–1370): Textes et analyses (Rome: Institut historique
belge, 1928); Ursmer Berlière, Les collectories pontificales dans les anciens diocèses de Cam-
brai, Thérouanne et Tournai au XIVe siècle (Rome: Institut historique belge, 1929);
Georges Despy, Lettres d’Innocent VI (1352–1362): Textes et analyses (Brussels: Institut
historique belge de Rome, 1953); Camille Tihon, Lettres de Grégoire XI (1371–1378):
Textes et analyses: Documents relatifs aux anciens diocèses de Cambrai, Liège, Thérouanne et
Tournai (Brussels: Institut historique belge de Rome, 1958), 4 vols.; Micheline Soenen,
Lettres de Grégoire XII, 1406–1415: Textes et analyses (Brussels: Institut historique belge
de Rome, 1976); Marguerite Gastout, Suppliques et lettres d’Urbain VI (1378–1389) et de
Boniface IX (cinq premières années, 1389–1394): Textes et analyses (Brussels: Institut histo-
rique belge de Rome, 1976); Jeannine Paye-Bourgeois, Lettres de Benoît XIII (1394–1422)
(Brussels: Institut historique belge de Rome, 1983); Monique Maillard-Luypaert, Let-
tres d’Innocent VII (1404–1406): Textes et analyses (Brussels: Institut historique belge de
Rome, 1987).
10. Karl-Heinrich Schäfer, Die Ausgaben der apostolischen Kammer unter Johann XXII
nebst den Jahresbilanzen von 1316–1375 (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 1911); Die
Ausgaben der apostolischen Kammer unter Benedikt XII, Klemens VI und Innocenz VI (Pa-
derborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 1914); and Die Ausgaben der apostolischen Kammer unter
den Päpsten Urban V und Gregor XI (1362–1378) (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh,
1937). These editions concern the Vatican Archives introitus et exitus series.
 Introduction 17

11. The full edition of the letters is as follows: Jean XXII (1316–1334), Lettres com-
munes (Paris: BEFAR, 1904–1947), 16 vols.; Jean XXII (1316–1334), Lettres secrètes et
curiales relatives à la France (Paris: BEFAR, 1900–1972), 4 vols.; Benoit XII (1334–1342),
Lettres communes (Paris: BEFAR, 1902–1911), 3 vols.; Benoit XII (1334–1342), Lettres
closes, patentes et curiales se rapportant à la France (Paris: BEFAR, 1899–1920); Benoît XII
(1334–1342), Lettres closes et patentes intéressant les pays autres que la France (Paris: BE-
FAR, 1913–1950), 2 vols.; Clément VI (1342–1352), Lettres closes, patentes et curiales se
rapportant à la France (Paris: BEFAR, 1925–1961), 3 vols.; Clément VI (1342–1352), Let-
tres closes, patentes et curiales intéressant les pays autres que la France (Paris: BEFAR,
1960–1961); Innocent VI (1352–1362), Lettres closes, patentes et curiales se rapportant à la
France (Paris: BEFAR, 1909); Innocent VI (1352–1362), Lettres secrètes et curiales (Paris:
BEFAR, 1959–forthcoming), 5 vols.; Urbain V (1362–1370), Lettres secrètes et curiales se
rapportant à la France (Paris: BEFAR, 1902–1955); Urbain V (1362–1370), Lettres com-
munes (Paris: BEFAR, 1954–1989), 12 vols.; Grégoire XI (1370–1378), Lettres communes
(Rome: BEFAR, 1992–1993), 3 vols.; Grégoire XI (1370–1378), Lettres secrètes et curiales
relatives à la France (Paris: BEFAR, 1935–1957); and Grégoire XI (1370–1378), Lettres
secrètes et curiales intéressant les pays autres que la France (Paris: BEFAR, 1962–1965). The
letters are now available in an online database; see Ut per litteras apostolicas/Lettres
Pontificales/Papal Letters online (Turnhout: Brepols, 2005).
12. See, for example, Gustave Bayle, “Une bourgeoise Avignonnaise au moyen-
âge,” Mémoires de l’academie de Vaucluse (henceforth MAV) 6 (1886): 295–306; “Habi-
tudes somptuaires des Avignonnais au moyen-âge,” Bulletin historique et archéologique
de Vaucluse 5 (1883): 311–335, 431–452; and 6 (1884): 455–474; “Les médecins d’Avignon
au moyen-âge,” Annuaire de Vaucluse (1882): 1–102; “Notes pour l’histoire de la prosti-
tution au moyen-âge dans les provinces méridionales de la France,” MAV 6 (1886):
233–245; “Un trésorier général de la ville d’Avignon au XIVe siècle: La messe de la
concorde,” MAV 9 (1889): 137–163.
13. American readers may be familiar with him through his young wife, Rose-
Marie Ormond André-Michel, favorite model of her uncle John Singer Sargent. Like
her husband, she died young, a tragic death following German bombardments of
Paris.
14. Robert André-Michel, “Les premières horloges du palais pontifical d’Avignon,”
Mélanges d’archéologie et d’histoire (henceforth MAH) 29 (1909): 212–224; “La construc-
tion des remparts d’Avignon au XIVe siècle,” in Congrés archéologique de France (Avi-
gnon, 1909): 341–360; “La défense d’Avignon sous Urbain V et Grégoire XI,” MAH 30
(1910): 129–154; “Anglais, bretons et routiers à Carpentras sous Jean le Bon et Charles
V,” in Mélanges d’histoire Louis Halphen (Paris, 1913), 341–352; “Avignon au temps des
premiers papes,” Revue historique 118 (1915): 289–304; “Le palais des papes d’Avignon:
Documents inédits,” Annales d’Avignon et du Comtat Venaissin 1–2 (1917–1918): 3–42.
15. Robert Brun, “Quelques italiens d’Avignon au XIVe siècle: Naddino di Prato
médecin de la cour pontificale,” MAH 49 (1923): 219–236; Avignon aux temps des papes:
Les monuments, les artistes, la société (Paris, 1928); “A Fourteenth-Century Merchant of
Italy: Francesco Datini of Prato,” Journal of Economic and Business History 2 (1930):
451–466; “Notes sur le commerce des objets d’art en France et principalement à Avi-
gnon à la fin du XIVe siècle,” Bibliothèque de l’École des chartes (henceforth BEC) 95
(1934): 327–346; “Annales Avignonnaises de 1382 à 1410 extraites des archives Datini,”
Mémoires de l’institut historique de Provence 12 (1935):17–142; 13 (1936): 58–105; 14 (1937):
5–57; 15 (1938): 21–52 and 154–192; “Notes sur le commerce florentin à Paris à la fin du
18 Introduction

XIVe siècle,” Cooperazione intellettuale 6 (1936): 87–96; “Notes sur le commerce des
armes à Avignon au XIVe siècle,” BEC 109 (1951): 209–232.
16. See, for example, Jérôme Hayez and Diana Toccafondi, eds., Palazzo Datini a
Prato: Una casa fatta per durare mille anni (Florence: Edizioni Polistampa, 2012), 2 vols.;
and http://www.istitutodatini.it/schede/archivio/eng/arc-dat1.htm.
17. His inventories are as follows: Léopold Duhamel, Inventaire-sommaire des
archives communales antérieures à 1790 de la ville d’Avignon (Avignon: Impr. P. Bernard,
1906); Inventaire-sommaire des archives communales antérieures à 1790 de la ville d’Avignon:
série AA (Avignon: impr. de P. Bernard, 1906); with Paul Achard, Félix Achard, and
Claude Pintat, Inventaire sommaire des archives communales antérieures à 1790 de la ville
d’Avignon: Grandes archives (Avignon: Archives départementales, 1863); with Félix
Achard, Inventaire-sommaire des archives départementales antérieures à 1790: Vaucluse:
Archives civiles: Série B (Paris: P. Dupont, 1878); Inventaire sommaire des archives départe-
mentales de Vaucluse séries C et D (Avignon: F. Seguin, 1913); Inventaire sommaire des
archives communales antérieures à 1790 supplément à la série E (Epinal: Veuve Gley, 1867);
with Léo Imbert and Jacques de Font-Réaulx, Inventaire sommaire des archives départe-
mentales du département de Vaucluse: Série G: Archevêché, chapitre, cathédrale, séminaire et
Inquisition d’Avignon (Avignon: Archives de Vaucluse, 1954); with Aimé Autrand and
Jacques de Font-Réaulx, Répertoire numérique des archives municipales d’Avignon: Docu-
ments de l’ époque révolutionnaire (Avignon: Archives de Vaucluse, 1955). He then pro-
duced a registry for the notarial archives, with Les archives notariales d’Avignon et du
Comtat Venaissin (Paris: A. Picard, 1895). The rest of his production concerning Avi-
gnon related more specifically to art and architecture; see Les origines du palais des papes
(Tours: P. Bousrez, 1883); Les oeuvres d’art du monastère des Célestins d’Avignon (Caen: H.
Delesques, 1888); Inventaire du trésor de l’église métropolitaine d’Avigon au XVIe siècle
(1511–1546) (Paris: Impr. Nat, 1880); Les architectes du palais des papes (Avignon: Seguin
frères, 1882); and Les origines de l’imprimerie à Avignon: Note sur les documents découverts
(Avignon: Seguin frères, 1890).
18. In archival practice, a fonds represents “the entire body of records of an organ-
ization, family, or individual that have been created and accumulated as the result of
an organic process reflecting the functions of the creator”; see http://www2.archivists.
org/glossary/terms/f/fonds.
19. Joseph Girard, Musée Calvet de la ville d’Avignon: Catalogue illustré (Avignon:
Musée Calvet, 1921); Catalogue des tableaux exposés dans les galeries du Musée-Calvet
d’Avignon (Avignon: François Seguin, 1909); Histoire du Musée Calvet (Avignon: Impr.
Rullière, 1955); Avignon: Histoire sommaire, guide des monuments (Avignon: Dominique
Seguin, 1923); with F. Detaille and Adolphe Detaille, Avignon: Ses monuments, ses hôtels,
ses trésors d’art (Marseille: F. Detaille, 1931); Les Baroncelli d’Avignon: Publications de
l’institut méditerranéen du Palais du Roure: Avignon, Fondation Flandreysy-Espérandieu
(Avignon: Palais du Roure, 1957); Évocation du vieil Avignon (Paris: Les éditions de
Minuit, 1958).
20. Léon-Honoré Labande, Catalogue général des manuscrits des bibliothèques publiques
de France (Paris: Plon, 1894); Les Doria de France, Provence, Avignon et Comté Venaissin,
Bretagne, Ile-de-France et Picardie: Études historiques et généalogiques (Paris: A. Picard,
1899); Le palais des papes et les monuments d’Avignon au XIVe siècle (Marseille:
Detaille, 1925), 2 vols.; Avignon au XVe siècle (Marseille: Laffitte Reprints, 1973); Avi-
gnon au XVe siècle: Légation de Charles de Bourbon et du Cardinal Julien de La Rovère
(Marseille: Laffitte Reprints, 1975); Avignon au XIIIe siècle: L’évêque Zoen Tencarari et les
Avignonais (Marseille: Laffitte, 1975).
 Introduction 19

21. Pierre Pansier, L’oeuvre des repenties en Avignon du XIIIe au XVIIIe siècles (Paris:
H. Champion, 1910); Les palais cardinalices d’Avignon aux XIVe et XVe siècles (Avignon: J.
Roumanille, 1926–1931); Dictionnaire des anciennes rues d’Avignon (Avignon: J. Rouma-
nille, 1930); Les Boucicaut à Avignon (1371–1490) (Avignon: J. Roumanille, 1933).
22. Joseph Girard and Pierre Pansier, La cour temporelle d’Avignon aux XIVe et XVe
siècles: Contribution à l’étude des institutions judiciaires, administratives et économiques
d’Avignon au moyen-âge (Paris: H. Champion, 1909).
23. Léon Mirot, Études lucquoises (Paris: Imprimerie Daupeley-Gouverneur, 1930).
24. Léon Mirot, Manuel de géographie historique de la France: Quarante-trois cartes hors
texte (Paris: A. Picard, 1929).
25. Léon Mirot, La politique pontificale et le retour du Saint-Siège à Rome en 1376 (Paris:
É. Bouillon, 1899).
26. Léon Mirot, Guillaume Mollat, Henri Jassemin, and Edmond René Labande,
Lettres secrètes et curiales du pape Grégoire XI (1370–1378) relatives à la France, extraites des
registres du Vatican (Paris: De Boccard, 1935).
27. Guillaume Mollat, Les papes d’Avignon (1305–1378) (Paris: V. Lecoffre, 1912); Jean
XXII, Lettres communes analysées d’après les registres dits d’Avignon et du Vatican, ed.
Guillaume Mollat (Paris: De Boccard, 1904–1946), 16 vols.; Clément VI, Lettres closes,
patentes et curiales se rapportant à la France publiées ou analysées d’après les registres du
Vatican, ed. Eugène Déprez and Guillaume Mollat (Paris: De Boccard, 1910–1961), 3
vols.; Clément VI, Lettres closes, patentes et curiales, intéressant les pays autres que la
France, publiées ou analysées d’après les registres du Vatican, ed. Eugène Déprez and
Guillaume Mollat (Paris: De Boccard, 1960–1961); Grégoire XI, Lettres secrètes et curiales
intéressant les pays autres que la France, ed. Guillaume Mollat (Paris: De Boccard,
1962–1965); Urbain V, Lettres secrètes et curiales du pape Urbain V (1362–1370) se rappor-
tant à la France, ed. Paul Lecacheux and Guillaume Mollat (Paris: A. Fontemoing, 1902).
28. For example, Guillaume Mollat, “Les changeurs d’Avignon sous Jean XXII,”
MAV, series 2, 5 (1905): 271–279; “Les conflits de juridiction entre le maréchal de la
cour pontificale et le viguier d’Avignon au XIVe siècle,” Provence historique 4 (1954):
11–18; “Contribution à l’histoire de l’administration judiciaire de l’église romaine au
XIVe siècle,” Revue d’histoire ecclésiastique 32 (1936): 877–928; “Contribution à l’histoire
de la chambre apostolique au XIVe siècle,” Revue d’histoire ecclésiastique 45 (1950):
82–94; “Deux frères mineurs Marc de Viterbe et Guillaume de Guasconi au service de
la papauté (1363–1375),” Revue d’histoire ecclésiastique 50 (1955): 1092–1096; “La diplom-
atie pontificale au XIVe siècle,” In Mélanges Louis Halphen d’histoire du moyen-âge (Paris,
1951), 507–512; “Fin de la carrière du cardinal Pierre d’Estaing (1376–1377),” in Acadé-
mie des inscriptions des belles-lettres (Paris, 1956), 422–425; “Grégoire XI et sa légende,”
Revue d’histoire ecclésiastique 44 (1954): 873–877; “Miscellanea avenionensia,” MAH 44
(1927): 1–11; “Réglements d’Urbain V sur les insignes des sergents d’armes, des porti-
ers et des courriers de la cour pontificale,” In Mélanges Eugenes Tisserant (Paris, 1964),
165–169; “Les relations politiques de Grégoire XI avec les siennois et les florentins,”
MAH 68 (1956): 335–376; “Les vacances à la cour pontificale au XIVe siècle,” MAH 65
(1953): 215–217.
29. For his eulogy see, Henri-Charles Puech, “Éloge funèbre de Mgr Guillaume
Mollat, membre libre de l’Académie,” Comptes-rendus des séances de l’Académie des in-
scriptions et belles-lettres 112.2 (1968): 160–161, and another eulogy by his dear friend,
the centenarian scholar Charles Samaran, in Comptes-rendus des séances de l’Académie
des inscriptions et belles-lettres 112.2 (1968): 245–249.
20 Introduction

30. See Guillaume Mollat and Jean Glénisson, L’administration des états de l’église au
XIVe siècle: Correspondance des légats et vicaires généraux Albornoz et de la Roche,
1353–1357 (Paris: De Boccard, 1964).
31. Guillaume Mollat and Charles Samaran, La fiscalité pontificale en France au XIVe
siècle (Paris: A. Fontemoing, 1905).
32. Robert-Henri Bautier, “Notice sur la vie et les travaux de Charles Samaran,
membre de l’Académie,” Comptes-rendus des séances de l’Académie des inscriptions et
belles-lettres 127.4 (1983): 581–604.
33. David Herlihy, “Yves Renouard and the Economic History of the Middle Ages,”
American Historical Review 76.1 (1971): 129.
34. See the review of this publication by Philippe Braunstein, “Yves Renouard,
Études d’histoire médiévale,” Annales: Économies, Sociétés, Civilisations 24.5 (1969):
1183–1186.
35. Herlihy, “Yves Renouard and the Economic History of the Middle Ages,” 129.
36. See Yves Renouard, Les relations des papes d’Avignon et des compagnies commer-
ciales et bancaires de 1316 à 1378 (Paris: De Boccard, 1941); Recherches sur les compagnies
commerciales et bancaires utilisées par les papes d’Avignon avant le Grand Schisme (Paris:
Presses universitaires de France, 1942).
37. Yves Renouard, Les hommes d’affaires italiens au moyen-âge (Paris: Colin, 1949); La
papauté à Avignon (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1954).
38. Guillaume Mollat, The Popes at Avignon, 1305–1378, trans. Janet Love (London:
T. Nelson, 1963).
39. Yves Renouard, The Avignon Papacy, trans. Denis Bethell (Hamden: Archon,
1970).
40. Patrick N. R. Zutschi, “The Avignon Papacy,” in The New Cambridge Medieval
History, ed. Michael Jones (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), vol. 6,
653–673.
41. For a detailed discussion of this administration, see Aux origines de l’état moderne,
le fonctionnement administratif de la papauté d’Avignon, actes de la table ronde organisée par
l’École française de Rome, Avignon, 23–24 janvier 1988 (Rome: École française de Rome,
1990).
42. Bernard Guillemain, La cour pontificale d’Avignon: Étude d’une société (Paris: De
Boccard, 1962).
43. Jean Favier, Les finances pontificales à l’époque du Grand Schisme (1378–1409) (Paris:
De Boccard, 1966).
44. See Joëlle Rollo-Koster, The People of Curial Avignon: A Critical Edition of the Liber
Divisionis and the Matriculae of Notre Dame la Majour (Lampeter, GB, and Lewiston, NY:
Edwin Mellen, 2009), 39–72 for a discussion and criticism of Guillemain’s analysis of
the Liber Divisionis.
45. In 2006, after a brilliant career and multiple interests within the medieval peri-
od, Favier returned to the Avignon papacy with the publication of a new synthesis, Les
papes d’Avignon (Paris: Fayard, 2006). He died in August 2014.
46. Histoire d’Avignon, ed. Sylvain Gagnière (Aix-en-Provence: Édisud, 1979).
47. See Sylvain Gagnière, Le palais des papes d’Avignon (Paris: Caisse nationale des
monuments historiques, 1965); Les pierres utilisées dans la construction du palais des papes
(Avignon: Maison Aubanel Père, 1966); with Jacky Granier, Contribution à l’étude du
palais des papes (Avignon: Imprimerie Rullière, 1966). More recently, Dominique Ving-
tain has offered a new history of the building with Avignon: Le palais des papes (La
Pierre-qui-Vire: Éd. Zodiaque, 1998).
 Introduction 21

48. Urbain V, Lettres communes analysées d’après les registres dits d’Avignon et du Vati-
can, ed. Marie-Hyacinthe Laurent, Michel Hayez, Anne-Marie Hayez, Janine Mathieu,
and Marie-France Yvan (Paris: De Boccard, 1954–1989), 12 vols.; and Gregory XI, Let-
tres communes analysées d’après les registres dits d’Avignon et du Vatican, ed. Anne-Marie
Hayez, Janine Mathieu, and Marie-France Yvan (Rome: École française de Rome,
1992–1993), 3 vols.
49. Anne-Marie Hayez, Le terrier Avignonnais de l’évêque Anglic Grimoard: 1366–1368
(Paris: CTHS, 1993).
50. Michel Hayez and Claude-France Rochat-Hollard, Guide des archives de Vaucluse
(Avignon: Archives départementales, 1985); Claude-France Rochat-Hollard, Françoise
Chauzat, and Michel Hayez, Répertoire numérique des archives communales d’Avignon
antérieures à 1790 déposées aux Archives départementales (Avignon: Conseil général de
Vaucluse, 1995).
51. See, for example, Anne-Marie Hayez and Michel Hayez, “L’hôtellerie Avi-
gnonnaise au XIVe siècle à propos de la succession de Siffrede de Trolhon (1387),”
Provence historique 25 (1975): 275–284; “Juifs d’Avignon au tribunal de la cour tempo-
relle sous Urbain V,” Provence historique 23 (1973): 165–173; and “Les saints honorés à
Avignon au XIVe siècle,” Mémoires de l’academie de Vaucluse, series 7, 6 (1985): 199–223.
52. Michel Hayez, “Avignon sans les Papes (1367–1370, 1376–1379),” in Genèse et
début du grand schisme d’occident, ed. Jean Favier (Paris: Éditions du CNRS, 1980),
143–157; “Le retour à Rome du pape Grégoire XI,” Bulletin mensuel de l’académie de
Vaucluse, 93 (Avignon, 1976).
53. Jérôme Hayez, “La maison des fantômes: Un récit onirique de ser Bartolomeo
Levaldini, notaire de Prato et correspondant de Francesco Datini,” Italia medioevale e
umanistica 47 (2006): 75–192; “Tucte sono patrie, ma la buona è quela dove l’uomo fa
bene: Famille et migration dans la correspondance de deux marchands toscans vers
1400,” in Éloignement géographique et cohésion familiale (XVe–XXe siècles), éd. Jean-
François Chauvard et Christine Lebeau (Strasbourg: Presses universitaires de Stras-
bourg, 2006), 69–95; “Le rire du marchand: Francesco Datini, sa femme Margherita et
les gran maestri florentins,” in La famille, les femmes et le quotidien, XIVe–XVIIIe siècles :
Textes offerts à Christiane Klapisch-Zuber, ed. Isabelle Chabot, Didier Lett, and Jérôme
Hayez (Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne, 2006), 407–458; “Un facteur siennois de
Francesco di Marco Datini: Andrea di Bartolomeo di Ghino et sa correspondance
(1383–1389),” Opera del Vocabolario italiano: Bollettino 10 (2005): 203–397; “Le carteggio
Datini et les correspondances pratiques des XIVe–XVIe siècles;” and “L’archivio Dati-
ni, de l’invention de 1870 à l’exploration d’un système d’écrits privés,” Mélanges de
l’École française de Rome, moyen âge-temps modernes 117 (2005): 115–222; “La voix des
morts ou la mine de données: Deux siècles et demi d’édition des correspondances
privées des XIIIe–XVIe siècles”; and “Les lettres parisiennes du carteggio Datini:
Première approche du dossier,” Mélanges de l’École française de Rome, moyen âge-temps
modernes 117 (2005): 257–304; “Avviso, informazione, novella, nuova: La notion de
l’information dans les correspondances marchandes toscanes vers 1400,” in Informa-
tion et société en Occident à la fin du Moyen Age: Actes du colloque international tenu à
l’Université du Québec à Montréal et à l’Université d’Ottawa (9–11 mai 2002), ed. Claire
Boudreau, Kouky Fianu, Claude Gauvard, and Michel Hébert (Paris, 2004), 113–134;
“‘Veramente io spero farci bene . . .’: Expérience de migrant et pratique de l’amitié
dans la correspondance de maestro Naddino d’Aldobrandino Bovattieri, médecin tos-
can d’Avignon (1385–1407),” Bibliothèque de l’École des chartes 159.2 (2001): 413–539.
22 Introduction

54. Jacques Chiffoleau, La comptabilité de l’au-delà: Les hommes, la mort et la religion

dans la region d’Avignon à la fin du moyen âge (Paris: De Boccard, 1980); Les justices du
pape (Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne, 1984).
55. Jacques Rossiaud, Le Rhône au Moyen Âge: Histoire et représentations d’un fleuve
européen (Paris: Aubier, 2007); Medieval Prostitution: Family, Sexuality, and Social Rela-
tions in Past Times (New York: Blackwell, 1988); Daniel Le Blévec, La part du pauvre:
L’assistance dans les pays du Bas-Rhône du XIIe siècles au milieu du XVe siècle (Rome: École
française de Rome, 2000), 2 vols.
56. Richard C. Trexler, “A Medieval Census, the Liber Divisionis,” Mediaevalia et
Humanistica 17 (1966): 82–85; Spiritual Power: Republican Florence under Interdict (Leiden:
Brill, 1974).
57. Daniel Williman, Records of the Papal Right Spoil, 1316–1412 (Paris: Éditions du
centre national de la recherche scientifique, 1974); Bibliothèques ecclésiastiques au temps
de la papauté d’Avignon (Paris: Éditions du centre national de la recherche scientifique,
1980); The Right of Spoil of the Popes of Avignon, 1316–1415 (Philadelphia: American
Philosophical Society, 1988); Calendar of the Letters of Arnaud Aubert: Camerarius Apostol-
icus 1361–1371 (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1992); The Letters of
Pierre De Cros, Chamberlain to Pope Gregory XI, 1371–1378 (Tempe: Arizona Center for
Medieval and Renaissance Studies, 2008).
58. Sophia Menache, Clement V (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998);
Diana Wood, Clement VI: The Pontificate and Ideas of an Avignon Pope (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1989); Paul R. Thibault, Pope Gregory XI: The Failure of
Tradition (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1986).
 ONE
Early Popes

If any common thread links the popes who resided at Avignon in the
fourteenth century, it is their attempt to preserve their institutional legiti-
macy as successors of St. Peter even while they resided away from the
traditional Christian capital, Rome. Legitimacy was constructed both ad-
ministratively and politically. In our first three chapters, we survey each
pope’s career in view of his effort to promote and centralize papal au-
thority, while chapter 4 is dedicated to the Avignon papacy’s success at
centralizing its administration and tax collection. Erroneously labeled the
first Avignon pope, Clement V perhaps has suffered more abuse than any
other pope of the period. To begin with, he was accused of having
brought the papal court to Avignon to please Philip IV the Fair, the king
of France (r. 1286–1314), henceforth initiating the so-called Babylonian
Captivity. In fact, Clement did not settle his court in Avignon, nor is there
any evidence that he ever had intended to do so. A transient pope wait-
ing for the right moment to reclaim his Roman residence, Clement had no
intention of remaining either in France or in Avignon (which, incidental-
ly, was not French at the time). Stigmatized as a puppet of the king of
France, Clement deserves better than his egregious reputation. 1 At a pre-
carious moment for the Church’s liberty, Clement perceived that a pre-
tended passivity might counterbalance the impatience and arrogance of
Philip the Fair. The pope tempered as much as he could the grandiosity
of the king of France, who, in the words of an Aragonese ambassador,
claimed to be at once “king, pope, and emperor” and who conceived of
his office in terms of absolute independence. 2 The chronically sick Clem-

23
24 Chapter 1

ent may have been frail, but his timidity, evasiveness, and restraint were
signs of the diplomatic talent that made him a match for the ambitious
Philip. Rather than allowing Philip to grossly manipulate him, Clement
responded with the weapons available to him. He temporized. He de-
fended the interests of the Church throughout two great crises: the
French demonization of his predecessor, Pope Boniface VIII, and the
downfall of the Knights Templar. But most of all, Clement used his posi-
tion to advance his own priority, the reconquest of the Holy Land. Some
historians have argued that his crusading agenda dictated most of his
policies. 3 Seen in that light, Clement did not break with tradition; rather,
his policies were largely in line with those of most medieval popes.

BEFORE CLEMENT: BONIFACE VIII, PHILIP THE FAIR, AND ROME

In large part, the history that preceded him directed Clement’s actions.
Since Pope Urban II and the call of the First Crusade in 1095, the quest for
Christian Levantine territories gave medieval popes moral leadership
throughout Europe. The initial success and subsequent failure of the cru-
sades kept the papacy in a position to intervene more or less at all levels
of Christian society. In the words of the late Yves Renouard, a foremost
historian of the Avignon papacy: “Christian Europe had been feudally
united to the papacy when western kings had sworn oaths of vassalage to
the popes.” 4 The Roman pontiff regulated the newly formed universities
that taught dogma to the Dominican friars, who maintained orthodoxy in
Christendom, as Franciscans served the new urban population of western
Europe as spiritual guides. In addition to the Church’s control over relig-
ious and moral matters, the crusading effort led popes to promote taxa-
tion for the ongoing conquest, levying tithes in most European countries.
Eventually kings appropriated these levies, but they still needed to nego-
tiate their release by the pope. This advantageous position led the papacy
to arbitrate international politics and assert and centralize its authority.
It is traditional when describing the thirteenth-century papacy to em-
phasize the pope who revolutionized it, Innocent III (r. 1198–1216). He is
often considered the most powerful and most successful of medieval
popes. Innocent positioned himself as Vicar of Christ (more than a mere
successor of St. Peter), and with his theory of the two swords, one relig-
ious and one temporal, he allowed ecclesiastics to discipline sinning lay-
men (because the religious sword always overpowers the temporal one).
 Early Popes 25

In this way, he defended his intervention in all secular affairs. Innocent

kept track of all great secular rulers of his times, kept them in check, and
inserted himself in their undertakings. He was able to moderate France’s
and England’s encroachment on ecclesiastical taxes, he managed to con-
trol the nomination of the Holy Roman emperor, and he let papal domin-
ion over central Italy generally dictate his external policies. The pope
never hesitated in calling crusades against his opponents, as he did
against Emperor Frederick II, and enmeshed religious with secular con-
cerns—as in the case of the Albigensian Crusade or the intrigues sur-
rounding the Sack of Constantinople during the Fourth Crusade. It is true
that no other medieval pope succeeded like Innocent.
To minimize secular intervention in religious affairs, he and his suc-
cessors commissioned legal treatises implying that canon law affirmed
the far-reaching claims of papal power. The early thirteenth century es-
tablished the protocol of canonical papal elections (again to minimize
secular interference) as the papacy regained control over ecclesiastics,
taxing clergymen for their nominations. A tax of one third of yearly reve-
nues was enacted whenever a bishop or abbot acceded to their benefice
(servitium commune). Popes staffed or “provisioned” benefices when they
(and no one else) named their holders; they offered dispensations, that is,
waivers to candidates for ecclesiastical positions who did not meet re-
quirements of legitimacy, and they reorganized and expanded the curia.
Later popes of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries did not alter this
policy. But the greatest success of fourteenth-century popes was to cen-
tralize and control their government and develop efficient tax collection
like no popes had before them.
Not all thirteenth-century popes were as successful as Innocent. In
Rome, arguments over the appropriate limits of communal versus papal
sovereignty sometimes led to short papal exiles in Viterbo or Anagni,
Orvieto or Rieti. As the popes became physically estranged from their
city, so papal rituals of accession became detached from their Roman
setting. Ceremonies closely linked to Rome, like the pope’s enthronement
in St. Peter’s or his episcopal possession of the Lateran, lost symbolic
ground to a papal coronation that could take place anywhere. Like their
fourteenth-century successors, thirteenth-century popes relied on close
kin and on their households to rule papal territories. They also central-
ized their ecclesiastical administration to strengthen their grip over their
26 Chapter 1

own government. We see, then, that fourteenth-century popes brought to

conclusion innovations that had their origins a century earlier.
The culmination of papal influence came with Clement’s predecessor,
Boniface VIII (Benedetto Caetani), who ruled between 1294 and 1303. 5
Boniface VIII thought that he could establish an absolute “papal monar-
chy,” a kind of super imperium over kings, as Innocent III had aimed to
do at the start of his century. Boniface’s public and spectacular failure
eventually taught his successors the pitfalls to avoid. Drawing on the
advances made by his predecessors, Boniface VIII attempted to impose
his conception of an absolute papacy on the monarchies of his time. With
the canonization of St. Louis in 1297 and the foundation of the first Ro-
man Jubilee in 1300, Boniface’s successes testify to his political intelli-
gence. 6 As demonstrated by Agostino Paravicini Bagliani, the pope’s
heightened sense of his role was reflected in the greater reliance on the
symbolic representation of the pope’s persona and the care taken of the
body of the pope. The pope surrounded himself with medical doctors to
sustain his good health. Likewise, he banned the long-standing practice
that allowed the evisceration and dismemberment of corpses for multilo-
cational burials. The goal of his now famous bull, Detestande feritatis,
aimed at preserving the unity and integrity of the pope’s body, a fitting
metaphor for the ecclesiastical body. Boniface also multiplied his symbol-
ic presence in the many statues that portrayed him, often wearing his
newly designed triple tiara. 7 On the other hand, Boniface had the misfor-
tune to follow Celestine V (r. 1294), the only medieval pope to resign
voluntarily, making his successor an easy target for blame in that dubi-
ous affair. As they circulated rumors of Boniface’s role in Celestine’s
decision (defamatory words reinforced by Boniface’s imprisonment of
Celestine after he stepped down), the pope’s enemies pressed for Celes-
tine’s canonization.
Philip the Fair’s own heightened conception of his kingship halted
Boniface from establishing a firmer hold on the European monarchies.
The long-lasting skirmishes and war between France and England neces-
sitated an increase in governmental revenues. Philip opted to tax his
French clergy directly, without the pope’s permission. Boniface re-
sponded in 1296 with his bull Clericis laicos, which forbade clerical taxa-
tion without papal consent under the threat of excommunication. Philip
responded by preventing taxes raised in France from reaching Italy.
 Early Popes 27

By 1297, Philip found support for his antipapal campaign among the
traditional enemies of the Caetani pope, the members of the Colonna
family. They attacked the papal treasury on its way to Rome from the
pope’s favorite summer residence in Anagni. As a result, Boniface back-
tracked, allowing Philip’s taxation of the clergy in exceptional circum-
stances. In 1301, Philip the Fair intervened again in ecclesiastical affairs,
this time imprisoning Bernard Saisset, the bishop of Pamiers, who had
been sent to protest the king’s anticlerical measures—Philip invested
bishops and relentlessly taxed the clergy. Boniface responded with his
1301 bull Ausculta Fili, demanding the king change his ways. In 1302
Boniface took his quarrel with Philip a step further, publishing in Unam
Sanctam the strongest statement a pope had ever made on the primacy of
a pontiff over secular rulers:
Urged by faith, we are obliged to believe and to maintain that the
Church is one, holy, catholic, and also apostolic. We believe in her
firmly and we confess with simplicity that outside of her there is nei-
ther salvation nor the remission of sins . . . of the one and only Church
there is one body and one head, not two heads like a monster; that is,
Christ and the Vicar of Christ, Peter and the successor of Peter. . . . We
are informed by the texts of the gospels that in this Church and in its
power are two swords; namely, the spiritual and the temporal. . . .
Certainly the one who denies that the temporal sword is in the power
of Peter has not listened well to the word of the Lord commanding:
“Put up thy sword into thy scabbard” [Mt 26:52]. Both, therefore, are in
the power of the Church, that is to say, the spiritual and the material
sword, but the former is to be administered for the Church but the latter
by the Church; the former in the hands of the priest; the latter by the
hands of kings and soldiers, but at the will and sufferance of the
priest. 8

In startling terms, Boniface here defined the primacy of spiritual over

temporal power and the deference of temporal power to the spiritual.
Philip responded swiftly. The pope was declared a heretic (in return, he
excommunicated Philip), after which Philip sent his counselor Guillaume
de Nogaret to Anagni to capture Boniface and seize his treasury (Septem-
ber 1303). Nogaret raised enough commotion for the inhabitants of Anag-
ni to allow his entry and sack of the papal treasury. He seized the pope,
intending to bring him back to France on charges of heresy, simony,
sodomy, and illegitimacy. Since his predecessor, Celestine, had resigned
in 1294 and not died in office, charges of electoral manipulation were
28 Chapter 1

brought against his own election. Boniface was held by his French cap-
tors for some three days before Anagni’s citizens had a change of heart.
Much has been traditionally made of the violence the pope suffered dur-
ing his captivity; it would seem that the pope might have been hit once
(perhaps during his initial capture) by one of his Roman opponents.
Saved by the townspeople, Boniface died of shock a month later, in Octo-
ber 1303. A letter of William of Hundleby describes the affront:
At dawn of the vigil of the Nativity of the Blessed Mary just past,
suddenly and unexpectedly there came upon Anagni a great force of
armed men of the party of the King of France and of the two deposed
Colonna cardinals. Arriving at the gates of Anagni and finding them
open, they entered the town and at once made an assault upon the
palace of the Pope. . . . Many of them heaped insults upon his head and
threatened him violently, but to them all the Pope answered not so
much as a word. And when they pressed him as to whether he would
resign the Papacy, firmly did he refuse—indeed he preferred to lose his
head—as he said in his vernacular: “E le col, e le cape!” which means:
“Here is my neck and here my head.” . . . The soldiers, on first breaking
in, had pillaged the Pope, his chamber and his treasury of utensils and
clothing, fixtures, gold and silver and everything found therein so that
the Pope had been made as poor as Job upon receiving word of his
misfortune. Moreover, the Pope witnessed all and saw how the
wretches divided his garments and carted away his furniture, both
large items and small, deciding who would take this and who that, and
yet he said no more than: “The Lord gave and the Lord taketh away,
etc.” 9

The violence of the events in “the Outrage at Anagni” in September 1303

is, of course, representative of the rancor produced by the growing pains
of nation-states attempting to break free from centuries-long traditions. It
is also prime evidence of Philip the Fair’s callousness. But these events
also need to be contextualized within a purely Roman setting. One can-
not comprehend the actions against Boniface, and his successors’ motiva-
tions in staying away from Italy, and the eventual move of the papacy to
Avignon, without first discussing Rome.
Since the mid-twelfth century, in an attempt to mitigate the growing
powers of the patrician aristocracy and papacy, a republic (that is, a
commune with an elected senate housed at the capitol) had won the right
to rule Rome nominally. The city was divided into fourteen rioni (re-
gions); these had originally elected senators to represent their interests,
 Early Popes 29

but in fact aristocratic clans controlled these regions. One of the major
aims of the commune was to wrest temporal governance of the city from
the papacy. In order to do so, the commune aligned itself with the Holy
Roman emperor for support, turning itself to Ghibelline allegiance, the
name given to the supporters of imperial rule in Italy. Partisans of papal
control of the city and other Italian states were labeled Guelphs.
The Roman political situation was so precarious that popes sometimes
had to fight the republic to gain entrance into their city. Rome was essen-
tial for papal liturgical functions, including the pope’s consecration and
coronation. Thus, occasionally popes aligned themselves with the Holy
Roman emperor in order to regain the city. By the end of the twelfth
century, all powers were more or less reconciled in a treaty that allowed
Romans to elect their own magistrates, the emperor to name the prefect
of the city, and the pope to hold rights over his territories. This situation
did not last long. In 1197 Pope Celestine III replaced the Senate with two
senators and a council that he named. From then on, the pope’s control of
the commune, and hence of the middle class, was perceived as a threat to
the aristocracy, who in 1255, for example, attacked the capitol. But as a
rule, horizontal social alliances were not as disruptive as vertical ones.
Clans, regrouping aristocratic magnates, and their clienteles directed Ro-
man political life. And since the Church employed many of the magnates’
descendants, it is difficult to disentangle the politics of the aristocrats
from that of the Church.
Throughout the Middle Ages, the city of Rome had a long tradition of
insurrection tied to its political situation. The medieval popolo minuto
(commoners) fought the aristocratic barons and the papacy. Both latter
groups were politically intertwined with popes, usually chosen from the
ranks of the aristocracy. These families, of which the Annibaldi, Colonna,
Conti, Orsini, Frangipani, Pierleoni, and Savelli were the oldest, con-
trolled land in the city and the Roman countryside (known as the Lat-
ium). Each clan’s leader solidly defended his lineage’s interest, guiding a
system of clients that served his “house” when needed. These barons
controlled a mass of “hands” available to serve at their whim, fighting
other clans when needed. Clans were used to staff the city and church
government; they rivaled each other in power but also rotated among the
highest offices as bishops, cardinals, and popes. While the rotation of
power among them maintained a status quo that allowed their differ-
ences to explode in the frequent quarrels that marred the peace of the
30 Chapter 1

city, they resented the establishment of new “houses,” such as Boniface’s

Caetani, for example.
Barons controlled various quarters of the city and constantly wrestled
for space, making the city a precarious place to govern. These networks
of allegiances and territorial rivalries endangered the seat of the papacy
and the popes themselves. Clients fought territorial wars for their pa-
trons, a situation that greatly imperiled Roman and papal stability as
ecclesiastics from the Roman baronage embroiled the Church in these
neighborhood quarrels. The Savelli were established on the Aventine; the
Colonna on Monte Citorio and the Quirinal; the Frangipani on the Pala-
tine; the Orsini on Monte Giordano; and Pierleoni on Tiber Island. Clans
also occupied the ancient monuments: the Conti controlled the Market of
Trajan; the Frangipani and Annibaldi fought for the Colosseum; the Sav-
elli, Pierleoni, and Orsini took turns occupying the Theater of Marcellus;
and the Frangipani controlled the Arches of Titus and Constantine and
the Via Sacra and also fortified monuments of the Septizonium toward
the Great Circus. The Colonna occupied the Baths of Constantine and the
Mausoleum of Augustus (that previously had been held by the Orsini).
The Orsini possessed the Mausoleum of Hadrian (Castel Sant’Angelo)
and controlled the Tiber. Although Roman clans thrived in their quarrels
and accepted the traditional rotation of power among themselves, they
balked at the interference of new blood or foreigners within their rival-
ries.
By the end of the thirteenth century, three families overshadowed the
others: the Orsini, positioned north of the city; the Colonna, east; and the
new players in this drama, the Caetani, who held Anagni and eastern
portions of Rome on the road to Naples but did not control strong alli-
ances within the city. Originally rooted in Pisa, the Caetani’s only success
had been the short-lived but tumultuous election of Pope Gelasius II in
1118. Gelasius had been seized by the Frangipani (of Ghibelline alle-
giance); eventually freed by the Romans, he escaped to his homeland of
Gaeta and reclaimed Rome with the support of the Normans, but was
forced into exile once again by the Frangipani.
Boniface VIII’s turbulent years resembled his forefathers’ and demon-
strate how the lack of a local supporting power base endangered papal
rule in Rome. The Caetani owed their success in establishing Boniface on
the papal throne to an alliance with the Orsini. That partnership aggra-
vated the Colonna, who in turn instigated a war of propaganda against
 Early Popes 31

Boniface and eventually joined the French in their antipapal attacks. 10 By

the late 1290s, the rivalry between the Caetani and Colonna was inten-
sified by the fact that the new pope used the papal treasury to buy lands
in the Pontine Marshes for the Caetani. Stephano Colonna paid his family
back on May 3, 1297, when he robbed the papal treasury upon its return
to Rome from Anagni. 11 Boniface’s response was to hold hostage the two
Colonna cardinals (Giacomo and Pietro) until their cousin returned the
funds, which he eventually did. After this episode, Colonna wrath
against the pope turned virulent. They accused Boniface of heresy, simo-
ny, and illegitimacy. Feeling unsafe in Rome, the pope left for Orvieto,
called for a crusade against the clan, demoted the two Colonna cardinals,
confiscated their goods, and excommunicated them. After their escape
from prison, the Colonna cardinals traveled to France, where they re-
joined Pietro’s brother, Giacomo, alias the infamous Sciarra Colonna. The
French king was happy to support the Colonna in their quest as long as it
served his own purpose. Colonna troops joined the French in Anagni
when they attacked the pope. 12 According to Teofilo F. Ruiz, it would be
wrong to assume that Europeans constructed this assault as an attack on
the Church. Most medieval contemporaries viewed it purely in political
terms. 13 This episode demonstrates how Rome’s internal clan rivalries
affected international politics. Any pope had to maneuver between local
Roman allegiances that might easily take on an international character;
they themselves brought their divisions to the papal court, and to a large
extent, cardinals brought their tribal quarrels with them as well.
The conclave that opened at the death of Boniface elected Benedict XI
in October 1303. A Dominican, Benedict distanced himself as much as
possible from the quarrel between the Caetani and their French and Co-
lonna adversaries. He temporized with Philip the Fair, absolving most
participants of the Anagni coup with the exception of the main protago-
nists, Sciarra Colonna, Nogaret, and the Italian robbers of the treasury,
whom he excommunicated. But the cardinals Giacomo and Pietro Colon-
na were not pardoned, and Benedict did not bow to Philip’s demand for a
council that would judge Boniface. When Benedict died in Perugia under
suspicion of poisoning, the conclave opened in the city of his death, as
prescribed by the rules of the conclave. 14 As expected, the conclave was
racked by dissension caused by the Boniface/Colonna parties. Led by
Cardinal Matteo Rosso Orsini, the majority of the Italian cardinals were
still upset by the Outrage at Anagni and took a stance against French
32 Chapter 1

interests. Napoleone Orsini steered the “French party”: he lobbied for the
reinstatement of the Colonnas and a papal alliance with France. The de-
posed cardinals were actually in Perugia, ready to defend French inter-
ests in this election, buttressed by Nogaret himself, who darkly intimat-
ed, “If some Antichrist invade the Holy See, we must resist him.” 15 As
expected, tensions among the cardinals lengthened deliberations consid-
erably. The conclave lasted close to a year, opening in July 1304 and
finally reaching an agreement on the election of Bertrand de Got on June
5, 1305. Bertrand was in Lusignan, Poitou, when he learned of his election
as pontiff in June 1305 and traveled south via Bordeaux (where he took
the name of Clement V), Agen, Montpellier, Bezier, Nîmes, and Viviers,
before reaching Lyons for his coronation, an occasion attended by the
French king and his royal household.

CLEMENT V: FRENCH PUPPET OR ABLE DIPLOMAT?

The fifteen cardinals who elected the Gascon chose someone outside their
own ranks, a non-Italian perceived as immune or at least untouched by
the Italian cardinals’ divisions. But the famous Italian chronicler of that
time, Giovanni Villani, accused the pope of having bowed down to the
French king, promising papal submission to the crown if he were
elected. 16 Historians have been quick to point out the many inaccuracies
of the tale; but Villani’s propaganda soon took hold and continues to this
day to mar the Avignon papacy as a French “puppet.” 17
Bernard Guillemain, in his La cour pontificale, suggests that Clement
received the tiara in these difficult times because of his talent for keeping
everyone content. A great diplomat and an open and friendly man, Clem-
ent was called a “pleaser” by Guillemain to the point of indulgence. 18 For
Jean Favier, Clement was chosen because of his talents as a canonist and
administrator; he was at the time archbishop of Bordeaux. That both the
kings of France and England liked him was an added advantage working
in Clement’s favor. 19
Born in Guyenne, Bertrand de Got apprenticed diplomacy early as a
vassal of the king of England. Guyenne belonged to the cluster of French
territories possessed by the Crown, and subsequently, de Got understood
intimately the meaning of dual allegiance. He was at his core a man of
compromise. He studied civil and canon law and followed an ecclesiastic
career patronized by his namesake, his uncle Bertrand de Got (the elder),
 Early Popes 33

bishop of Agen, and most importantly by his brother Béraud, archbishop

of Lyons. Bertrand de Got was promoted to cardinal by Celestine V. Pope
Celestine also made him his chaplain; his successor, Boniface VIII, main-
tained Bertrand’s position until his nomination to the see of Comminges
in 1295 and the archiepiscopal see of Bordeaux in 1297.
The disruption of his pontifical coronation easily demonstrates the
popularity of such ceremonies but also their volatility and unforeseen
dangers. Of the five versions of Clement’s life recorded by Étienne Ba-
luze, two mention a dramatic accident that dampened the inaugural cele-
brations on November 14, 1305. According to Clement’s second recorded
life, authored by the Dominican Ptolemeus Lucensi, when the pope’s
cavalcade left the Cathedral of St. Just in Lyons for its parade, the sustain-
ing wall of a narrow street collapsed under the weight of onlookers,
tumbling onto members of the procession. Many nobles buried in the
rubble were injured, including Charles, brother of the king of France,
who eventually recovered from his wounds. Many died from their inju-
ries, however, including the Duke of Brittany. Even the pope was put in
danger when he fell from his horse and lost his crown, which tumbled to
the ground. He got up, unscathed, with minor scratches, but his tiara,
topped with precious gems, lost a ruby worth some six thousand florins.
While the stone was eventually recovered, the chronicler could not stop
himself from adding that such events were a warning, a bad omen, a
signum notabile (without really clarifying of what). 20 The next author who
discusses the event, Bernard Guidonis, bishop of Lodève, describes the
press of a crowd that rushed after the passing of the cavalcade as if they
were seeing “King Solomon with his diadem” and adds that twelve peo-
ple died of their injuries. 21 He also comments that many considered the
event a presage, negatively marking the beginning of this new papacy.
Still, it is interesting to note that several authors avoided discussing the
incident, choosing to either disregard popular “superstition” or to pass
over in silence a possible “curse” on the papacy.

THE PAST CATCHING UP: BONIFACE AND THE TEMPLARS

Clement inherited a papacy that rested on shaky ground after the Anagni
affair. It is worth remembering that his tenure and many of his decisions
cannot be separated from the constant demands pressed by France that a
posthumous trial condemn Boniface and that all involved in the attack be
34 Chapter 1

completely absolved. It is this convoluted past that directed many of

Clement’s policies. Clement first gave in to Philip the Fair, abrogating in
1306 Clericis laicos and Unam sanctam. In doing so, the pope backed down
from the high-ground theological stance previously taken by Boniface.
But more issues surfaced. Clement, as a Gascon, was also preoccupied by
the situation in his native Guyenne (Gascony belonged to Guyenne). The
king of England, unsatisfied by the marital policies that united both
crowns, could not be happy with the loss of Guyenne’s sovereignty. He
was but a vassal of the king of France for these lands. 22 Skirmishes be-
tween both armies spoiled this province’s daily life, and in his long-term
plans, the pope understood that the recapture of the Christian Holy Land
started with peace in Europe. He needed concord between Philip the Fair
and Edward I in order for them to shift their interest toward the Levant.
Taking in mind Helen Nicholson’s summary of Clement’s early years, it
is easy to understand why the pope faced a hard path ahead. She states:
“He inherited a papacy that had lost both prestige and power over the
past decades through its involvement in factional infighting, its involve-
ment in Sicily and its inability to assist the Latin Christendom in the East.
The political situation in Rome was so heated that Clement decided not to
set up his court there.” 23
In order to discuss so many pressing affairs, the pope decided to
remain in Lyons longer, forgoing a quick return to Italy. Clement under-
stood full well that the Italian situation was untenable for the pope and
was well aware of Rome’s peculiarly turbulent history. After long and
strenuous negotiations, he reached a deal with France in spring 1307 that
allowed him to avoid Boniface’s posthumous trials: Clement absolved
Nogaret and the assailants at Anagni and reintegrated the Colonna cardi-
nals into the college. Ever a shrewd politician, Clement staffed his
government with a new promotion to the rank of cardinal of the king of
England’s confessor, two French ecclesiastics, and seven Gascons—five
of whom were the pope’s relatives! With this promotion, Clement
pleased both rival kings and thwarted any accusation of favoritism by
doing so; at the same time, he also surrounded himself with people he
could trust and rely upon, his family. For modern readers, his actions
smack of nepotism, and quite a few historians have severely judged
Clement’s partiality for his own people.
Jean Favier does not shy away from describing the many advantages
that the de Gots received from this “stroke of good luck.” 24 Still, he does
 Early Popes 35

not mark out this nepotism as exceptional. It was commonly practiced in

all courts of the Middle Ages. Feudal princes were obligated to keep
relatives at court to maintain their rank; especially in cases of poorer
relatives, they needed to support those who bore their last names. Princes
relied on familial counselors, who had (or were supposed to have) the
prince’s best interests at heart. Brothers, nephews, cousins, and in-laws
were part of the political entourage of princes, whether lay or ecclesias-
tic. 25 In this way, Clement only continued a centuries-long practice well
entrenched in the European nobility. Accusing the pope of nepotism is an
anachronistic objection that no one would have understood during Clem-
ent’s lifetime.
Nevertheless, his transformation of the composition of the college of
cardinals shocked his contemporaries, especially the Italians. His second
and third promotions to the cardinalate (in 1310 and 1312) changed the
majority for years to come. The college of cardinals became largely
French, and it remained so for close to a century. The great Italian fami-
lies’ response to their loss of influence at the curia was one of bewilder-
ment, certainly because of their loss of power but also at the success of
the de Got lesser nobility. The Italian elites implicitly assumed it natural
to reward one’s “house” with multiple positions and offices; this fol-
lowed political mores. It shocked them, though, that a representative of
the lesser nobility and gentry like de Got was able to do the same.
If modern readers are not well versed in the internal politics of the
medieval Church and unfamiliar with Clement’s revolutionary alteration
of the college, they still may know Clement for his infamous participation
in the well-known “Affair of the Templars.” On October 13, 1307, Clem-
ent learned of the arrest of the French Templars. This important historical
event marked the quick downfall of the great military order and requires
scrutiny in and of itself. But it also precipitated Clement’s decision to
leave French territories for more neutral ground—up to then he had been
traveling between Bordeaux and Poitou, where he felt his presence
needed. His itinerant papacy was a handicap for the court, which had a
hard time finding decent quarters in the varied cities where they so-
journed. The long stay in France also suggested the influence of French
policies on ecclesiastical affairs. On August 8, 1308, the pope called a
council to deal with the matter of the Templars and other pressing issues.
Weighing his options, Clement preferred the city of Vienne on the Rhône
river (south of Lyons) over the Lateran Palace in Rome, feeling relatively
36 Chapter 1

more comfortable there under the pressure of the nearby French than
being at the mercy of the Italian clans. Vienne belonged to the county of
Provence, was controlled by the Angevin kings of Naples, and was thus
(in theory) liege of the Holy Roman Empire. Vienne was close to France
but outside its control, an easy destination for clergymen who needed to
reach the city for the council’s opening on October 1, 1310 (an event in
fact delayed until October 1, 1311, in order to finish various investiga-
tions). In the meantime, Clement chose Avignon for his own quarters; the
city was near Vienne and centrally located, easy to reach by land or sea.
In August 1308 the pope set out, arriving ill in Avignon on March 9,
1309. 26 Like Vienne, Avignon did not belong to France but to Provence,
and the city neighbored the Comtat Venaissin, papal territory since Philip
III of France granted it to the pope in 1274. France was also on the other
side of the Rhône, across the Pont Saint-Bénézet, on its western side.
Clement found lodging in the large Dominican convent at Avignon and
traveled back and forth from there to Carpentras, where he prepared for
the council. Cardinals and the curia struggled to find accommodations in
Avignon, however, causing half of the prelates to miss the council be-
cause they could not find appropriate lodging nearby.
Once the council and location were established, Clement was able to
focus on the Templars. The affair can be viewed as the cornerstone of
Clement’s reign. The Templars had been created shortly after the success
of the First Crusade in the early twelfth century. The order’s mission, as
indicated in their founding documents, was to protect pilgrims visiting
the Holy Land, “defending the land from the unbelieving pagans who
are the enemies of the son of the Virgin Mary.” 27 Eventually their knowl-
edge of the terrain made them the “special forces” of the Levant, superb
in warfare but also outstanding in their knowledge of Islamic society.
Because their existence rested on the defense of the Christian Levant,
their demise is linked to the end of the “crusading spirit” and the fall of
Acre in 1291. With the loss of Acre, the Templars were dealt a huge blow,
and they became an easy target for rulers in need of cash and scapegoats.
As Helen Nicholson explains, they lost a great number of men in their
last battles and all bases of operation in the East. Subsequently, they
retreated to the island of Cyprus. After his election as grand master in
1292, Jacques de Molay traveled to Europe to discuss his options with
Pope Boniface VIII, requesting funding for a new crusade. 28 Boniface
offered him some financial advantages and asked Europe’s kings to help
 Early Popes 37

supply Cyprus. But the kings of France and England were too distracted
by their own wars to go crusading, while Pope Boniface was busy in
Sicily supporting the Angevin attempts at regaining the island from the
Aragonese. 29
By the beginning of the fourteenth century, the papacy understood
that a Christian Levant required permanent forces on the ground. The
Templars and the Knights of St. John of Jerusalem were the best fitted for
the task. But they had a long tradition of squabbles and conflict. The
religious military orders bore the brunt of criticism for the failure of
Christian armies and politics in the East. A proposal to combine both
orders had been circulating for several decades, but it was systematically
refused. Clement had planned on bringing it up again when Philip ar-
rested the Templars. 30
In addition to losing Acre, the Templars’ wealth and perceived greedi-
ness disturbed many. According to Jean Favier, Philip the Fair’s strong
dislike of the order may have originated in their treatment of his grand-
father St. Louis (Louis IX), after whom he modeled his own reign. 31 Dur-
ing the Seventh Crusade in 1250, Mamluks had captured Louis at the
Battle of Fariskur and then ransomed him. According to Joinville (Louis’s
knight and bio-/hagiographer), the seneschal of the order refused to lend
funds to complete the ransom. Renaud de Vichiers, a marshal, solved the
issue. When Joinville asked for the loan (the money rested in a coffer on a
galley off the cost of Damietta), Vichiers indicated to Joinville that if he
took it by force, he would not interfere; Joinville did. 32 The story may be
apocryphal, but it indicates the general frame of mind that regarded the
Templars as greedy bankers.
As an international force, the Templars were in contact with European
leaders. At some point, Philip the Fair had used Templars in his adminis-
tration of the realm, which suggests that he had recently deemed them
trustworthy enough to support his rule. 33 But the changing circum-
stances of the dawning fourteenth century altered this relationship when
France’s pressing financial needs, born of the exigencies of the battlefield,
loomed large. The Templars’ most obvious miscalculation was to have
been, like Lombards and Jews, with the king’s creditors. In traditional
medieval fashion, when a king fell short of cash for reimbursement, he
could always exert his right of reprisal on his creditors, expel them, and
confiscate their goods. For the order, the loss of the Levant coalesced with
France’s pressing monetary issues. One solution tabled for a possible
38 Chapter 1

meeting between Clement V and de Molay was to join together both

crusading orders, Templars and Hospitallers, into a single community.
Yet the Templars were incarcerated before discussions could take place. 34
After their surprise arrest on October 13, 1307, the French Templars
were imprisoned and interrogated. The charges leveled against them had
more to do with their accusers than with their actual crimes. They were
charged with a bizarre assortment of incredible crimes: denying Christ,
defiling the cross, exchanging obscene kisses during induction ceremo-
nies, practicing sodomy, keeping secrets, adoring a cat, venerating a
bearded head as an idol, not believing in the sacraments, not being chari-
table and hospitable enough, receiving absolution from their lay superi-
or, lying for the order, and, finally, robbery. 35 If we turn to the charges
leveled during the same period against Boniface VIII by the same French
legal team led by Guillaume de Nogaret, many parallels arise. The late
pope was accused of illegitimacy, heresy, simony, sodomy, and general
malignancy. Boniface supposedly criticized the power of the sacraments,
including the Eucharist, penance, and marriage, and did not believe in
the immortality of the soul. He was said to have called believers idiots.
He was accused of statements insinuating that “he had everything he
wanted in this world and did what he wished”; and it was said that he
often quoted the proverb “No dead, no grass in the meadow”—a state-
ment that seemingly questioned his belief in an afterlife. He was also
charged with having sex with men and women. 36
The French court orchestrated propagandistic accusations against
both Boniface and the Templars that aimed to shape public opinion fa-
vorably toward France’s role in the events at Anagni. They played on late
medieval fears of heresy and pollution. Helen Nicholson shares the virtu-
ally unanimous verdict of historians that the Templars were attacked
because Philip the Fair needed funds for his wars and “to demonstrate
that he was the most Christian king of Europe.” 37 Pushing this argument
further, Julien Théry proposes that the Templars were instrumentalized
to achieve Philip’s desire to construct France as a mystical body. In this
scheme of things, Philip the Fair guaranteed a higher faith above the
pope, attacked the pope’s prerogatives, and provoked the pope by paro-
dying papal rhetoric. For Théry, the eschatological leaning of Philip and
Nogaret “pontificalized” the French monarchy. 38 They attacked Boniface
VIII and then his memory after his death, persecuted Jews, moneylend-
 Early Popes 39

ers, and holy women such as Marguerite Porete—in sum, anyone whose
fall would propel their own mysticism and benefit the king’s coffers.
Regardless of the veracity of the charges, French Templars were tor-
tured and as a result confessed. Tried in 1308, they largely recanted their
earlier assertions made under duress. According to a rather controversial
article by Barbara Frale, Philip tried to stop the pope from meeting with
the imprisoned Templars but eventually, using all his acumen, the pope
did hear and absolve scores of them at Poitiers in June 1308. 39 Frale,
insisting on the power play that took place between king and pope, sug-
gests that later (in August 1308) a special papal commission exonerated
the leaders, de Molay included. Clement thus played on Philip’s infatua-
tion with his grandfather, Louis IX. In his bull Ad preclaras sapientie, the
pope chastised the king for being less saintly than Louis, offering him a
chance to redeem himself by handing the Templars and their property
back to the pope. 40 When he met the prisoners, Clement’s astuteness
surfaced:
Clement V asked a number of questions that the French Inquisitor had
neglected to address in his own proceedings: did the Templars hear
mass, go to Holy Communion, go to confession and comply with their
liturgical duties? Naturally, the pope mostly wished to analyse the
faith and the religious habits of Templars; on the contrary, the royal
party had placed in evidence just those things which would be useful
to gain a condemnation. 41

In his bull Faciens misericordiam, dated August 12, 1308, Clement called
for the Council of Vienne. Scheduled to meet in 1310, it instead opened in
1311 because of lengthy preinquests. Clement’s diplomatic persuasion
had won the king over; a council, and not the king, was charged with
investigating both Boniface’s memory and the allegations against the
Templars. In 1311, the case against Boniface was quickly closed when
three cardinals defended him, buttressed by a knightly call for a trial by
combat against challengers. None stepped forward. The council, working
in committees, moved ahead with several items touching on ecclesiastical
reforms reminiscent of previous conciliar efforts. 42 These resolutions
were later labeled Clementinae, and eventually they were incorporated
into canon law as Liber Septimus, or the seventh book of the Decretals. In
1312, the pope announced to the council the dissolution of the Templars.
On March 22 of that year, the bull Vox in excelso suppressed the order
without condemning it. 43 Another bull, Ad providam, issued May 2, 1312,
40 Chapter 1

provided for the devolution of the Templars’ goods and property to the
Hospital of St. John of Jerusalem. 44 Note that Clement had obtained from
France the right to distinguish between trials of persons and a trial of the
order. If the order was suppressed without being charged, individual
French Templars given to the Inquisition were punished severely: some,
like de Molay, were burned at the stake in 1314. Satisfied by the turn of
events, the French king and his family took an empty vow of crusade.

WHY NOT RETURN TO ROME?

Clement’s preoccupations with rehabilitating the memory of his prede-

cessor and the affair of the Templars were encapsulated in his relation
with France. But he still had to address additional pressing concerns. He
knew that he could not return to Rome as long as aristocratic rivalries
made the city unsafe. This issue may not have been the most pressing,
however. A papacy away from Rome was not specifically new. Thir-
teenth-century popes had frequently resided in Anagni and Viterbo, and
few had died in Rome. In 1260, the great canonist Henry of Segusio
(Hostiensis) declared, “It is not the place that sanctifies the man, it is the
man who sanctifies the place.” 45 This justification for a papacy away
from Rome worked to the advantage of Avignon, a reminder that “Rome
is where the pope is” (ubi est papa, ibi est Roma). 46 The situation in the
Papal States compounded the difficulty of quickly resettling the papacy
in Rome (or Viterbo, or Anagni, for that matter) and also worked in favor
of an Avignon that could be Rome. Reaching the city was in itself a
difficult task.
The pontifical territories, or Papal States, existed long before the four-
teenth century; they were more or less founded when the Carolingians
gifted the papacy with lands conquered from the Lombards. These grants
allowed the papacy temporal sovereignty over territories that varied in
size with time but ranged from central to northern Italy. Hierarchical
rapport between popes and Holy Roman emperors was never regulated,
leaving open the question of dominance. The ebb and flow of their rela-
tionship is an abiding theme of the history of the Middle Ages. The Papal
States did not form territorial unity and counted several provinces that
were united under papal authority. During the late medieval period,
popes appointed rectors who embodied the pontifical administration lo-
cally. The local population historically viewed these officials negatively.
 Early Popes 41

Often they itched for autonomy, playing a game of shifting allegiances

between the papacy, the Holy Roman Empire, and the French Angevins,
who attempted to control southern Italy. These allegiances were addi-
tionally splintered within the large communes of the city-states, com-
munes riven by the turmoil of popular and aristocratic parties, the popolo
minuto and grasso, creating complex webs of Ghibellines and Guelphs.
At the time of Clement V’s rule, Guelphs were still fractured in their
allegiance to either the Colonna or the Caetani families, with open hostil-
ities between cities such as Florence and Bologna. It is evident that the
unity of the Guelph party was of primary interest to the Church. In 1306,
Clement sent Napoleone Orsini as legate to Italy to pacify its northern
states. Orsini had the experience of name and age. A scion of the great
Roman family, he had been a member of the college since 1288 and sat for
fifty-four years until his death in 1342; he was a leader of the curia, he
was extremely well connected as a nephew of popes and cardinals, and
(along with his family) he held large tracts of land in the Papal States.
Napoleone Orsini had participated in all the conclaves since 1292, and
Bernard Guillemain attributes the election of Clement to Orsini’s skills. 47
Orsini had held a previous legate position in Italy in 1301 in Spoleto and
Ancona and had been successful in seizing the town of Gubbio for Boni-
face VIII. What had seemed like a good choice unfortunately backfired,
however; Orsini was a staunch defender of the French party (he later
reneged on the Colonna) and failed at pacifying Arezzo, Florence, and
Bologna. He returned to meet Clement in Avignon in June 1309. As we
will see later, Orsini was to play an important role during the Franciscan
poverty debate.
Clement’s November 1308 confirmation of the election of the new
Holy Roman emperor, Henry VII of Luxembourg, exemplifies the com-
plex network of papal politics. In a move that showed some indepen-
dence, Clement sanctioned the election quickly, derailing Philip the Fair’s
hope of seeing his brother Charles de Valois receive the title. By tradition
the emperor received his title along with his crown in Rome and was thus
compelled to journey to the old capital. The pope proposed February
1312 as the date of Henry VII’s coronation, a date the emperor considered
tardy. The presence of the Ghibelline leader in Italy was an additional
source of instability for the Italian peninsula and the French, leading
Clement to temporize, even if he viewed the emperor as a safeguard
against French pretensions in southern Italy (the Angevin held Naples
42 Chapter 1

but had lost Sicily to the Aragonese). To complicate matters, in May 1309
the king of Naples, Charles II of the house of Anjou, died, succeeded
shortly thereafter by his son Robert. Clement quickly crowned Robert of
Anjou king of Naples in Avignon in August 1309 to assure Naples of his
support.
Henry’s so-called journey southward allowed the pope to parlay
France into favorable terms. France did not want to see the emperor’s
army marching down the Italian peninsula and thus destabilize its own
interests in the south. In addition, Henry was overlord of Provence and,
as such, of the king of Naples, who held both kingdoms, of Naples and
Provence (of whom the pope was a guest in Avignon until its purchase in
1348). Robert of Anjou still owed the emperor homage in person as a
vassal. Robert of Anjou complained to the pope, who proposed to medi-
ate the situation if Philip the Fair abandoned his vendetta against Boni-
face and promised to lead a crusade. Simply put, Clement yielded in
order to gain support for his own priorities. To further please Philip, he
agreed to excommunicate Flanders if the county were unable to pay its
indemnity at the end of the Franco-Flemish War and forced it to hand
over Lille, Douai, and Béthune to France. The bull Rex gloriae virtutum in
August 1311 exonerated Philip of any wrongdoing against Boniface and
sealed the case. The pope then invited the king to the Council of Vienne,
where, as we saw previously, he agreed to drop his revenge against
Boniface and discuss crusading plans. The pope had procrastinated to
reach his aim, but in 1311 he still contemplated the danger presented by
the Angevin alliance with the house of Hungary in southern Italy
(Charles II of Anjou had married Mary of Hungary, making Robert’s son
de facto king of Hungary).
As Clement negotiated with Philip, Henry of Luxembourg started his
march down to Rome. 48 Milan, Verona, Pisa, Lucca, and Sicily supported
the emperor and Ghibelline aspirations. In cities like Florence and Pistoia,
Guelphs were divided between Black and White parties based on their
willingness to see external influences (Black) or not (White) intervene in
their city. The political situation was so fluid that with the success of the
Black Guelphs in Florence, Pistoia, and Bologna, the White Guelphs ironi-
cally ended up pushed toward the emperor’s Ghibelline party, and the
papacy was criticized by both Black and White Guelphs (with the White
leaning toward Ghibelline affiliation!). During his march, Henry faced
insurrection from Guelph cities such as Cremona, Lodi, and Brescia. The
 Early Popes 43

pope intervened to calm the situation, negotiating the payment of indem-

nities to save the lives of the rebels. The emperor’s strategy was to be-
siege rebel cities (such as Genoa and Padua) in order to raise the funds
necessary for the continuation of his quest toward Rome. Still faced with
strong resistance from the Guelphs, who were supported by the Ange-
vins, Henry retreated to Pisa and negotiated his coronation with the
pope’s envoys from there. In Rome, John of Anjou (Robert’s brother) took
control of the city while the Colonna defended the emperor’s position;
the Eternal City was again in turmoil. Henry eventually made his way to
Rome but was unable to reach the Vatican for his coronation; he capitu-
lated for a ceremony at the Lateran. Papal legates crowned him on June
29, 1312. His ambition did not stop there. After spending three weeks in
Rome, the emperor began his exit and opted to besiege Guelph Florence
on the return trip. The Florentines agreed to receive Angevin help and
surrendered to Robert for five years. This complicated even more the
situation for the pope by giving control north of Rome to Robert of An-
jou. Anjou’s support of the Florentines infuriated the emperor, who de-
clared Robert a traitor (he was Henry’s vassal, after all) and confiscated
his lands. In response, the pope threatened to excommunicate the emper-
or (who was his vassal) if he decided to march toward Naples. The em-
peror died, perhaps conveniently for Clement, on his way to Rome on
August 24, 1314, while still planning an attack on Naples. The contest
between his possible successors, Frederick of Austria and Louis of Bavar-
ia, lasted close to ten years and became a major sore point for the next
pope, John XXII.
The importance of these Italian campaigns cannot be minimized. In
The Italian Crusades: The Papal-Angevin Alliance and the Crusades against
Christian Lay Powers, 1254–1343, Norman Housley argues from his read-
ing of contemporary texts that even though perceived as a political strug-
gle, the fight between insubordinate Italian states and the Holy Roman
Empire was a full-fledged crusade. Taxes were levied; fighters received
indulgences and stitched a cross on their garments; and Guelphs com-
muted their pilgrimage to the Levant in order to fight in Italy. Defense of
the Papal States equaled defense of papal authority, and no general oppo-
sition hindered the popes. It was understood that any attacks on the
sovereignty of the Papal States hindered the papacy in its spiritual mis-
sion. As we will see (in chapter 4, regarding papal administration), the
legacy of these Italian crusades resides in the development of banking.
44 Chapter 1

Short in their levy of subsidies to cover all their costs, the early Avignon
popes relied on merchant bankers for advances and the subsequent col-
lection of the funds necessary to their victory.
Criticized by many historians for his various weaknesses, one can
agree with Sophia Menache that Clement did his best to temporize and
save the Church from powerful enemies: France, the Holy Roman Em-
pire, and a dire situation in Italy. Following the great historians of Avi-
gnon Yves Renouard and Guillaume Mollat, Menache calls Clement
modern because he defended the interest of the Church against the rising
monarchies of western Europe. To the complex situation described in the
previous pages, one can add the beginning of the Hundred Years’ War
that kept Clement close to France and England and the theological threats
of Beghards and Beguines, who rebelled against traditional Church au-
thority. In his dealing with the Templars, Clement managed to prevent
Philip the Fair from seizing their property; in return, he received what he
wanted: a promise of a crusade and the abandonment of all charges
against Boniface. In her afterword, Sophia Menache locates Clement
within his time, adding:
The pope’s image, as designed by fourteenth-century authors and often
echoed in historical research, was isolated from the historical back-
ground and the many limitations imposed on the curia. This is not to
say that Clement V was an exemplary pope; it is to assert that he was a
true reflection of his age, with political and legal skills above the aver-
age. Neither an exemplary pope nor a weak subject of Philip the Fair,
Clement V, or more accurately his image, was often sacrificed on the
altar of unhistorical judgments, of longings for a more militant papacy
that could no longer exist. 49

Unaware of the historical legacy of the “Avignon papacy” and “Babylo-

nian Captivity” with which he would be burdened, Clement remained in
the city until he felt his end near. He died in Roquemaure on April 20,
1314, on his way to his beloved Gascony, where he was buried at Uzeste.

CENTRALIZATION: JOHN XXII

It took some two and a half years to elect a successor to Clement V,

evidence enough that the college was still not strongly unified, regardless
of the mounting significance of the French party. Ever a fine diplomat,
Clement V had anticipated the fissures that would emerge during the
 Early Popes 45

election of his successor. In his bull Ne romani (1311), he ordained the

opening of the conclave within ten days of the pope’s death in the diocese
where the curia resided (Carpentras in this case). The division of the
college between a Gascon group of ten, a fractured Italian group of seven,
and eight undecided voters hindered a swift resolution. No agreement
was reached after a three-month-long deliberation that ended in chaos
when Gascons and Italian courtiers started fighting. Things got even
worse when the pope’s nephew, Bertrand de Got, Viscount of Lomagne,
entered the city with mercenary troops in order to claim the pope’s body;
the troops chanted, “Death to the Italian cardinals, we want a pope!” De
Got’s army ransacked Carpentras and the conclave and plundered the
papal treasury. 50 These actions led to the dissolution of the conclave on
July 24, 1314. The cardinals escaped the city, and it took much convincing
from French authorities to rally the college into meeting again, this time
in the safety of the Dominican convent in the French city of Lyons.
Jacques Duèse, who took the name of John XXII, was then elected on
August 7, 1316, and was crowned in the same city.
The experienced Napoleone Orsini had nominated the aged Jacques
Duèse for several reasons. His advanced age made him a transitional
pope, and his origins (he was from Cahors in Quercy) pacified those who
refused another Gascon like his predecessor. But Orsini’s intentions rath-
er backfired. The seventy-two-year-old pope the college elected was not a
fragile, uninvolved administrator. To the contrary, he was engaged, a
brilliant and efficient organizer, a relentless workaholic, and what we
would label in modern parlance a micromanager. John XXII involved
himself in all the facets of his papal responsibilities, from architecture and
construction to taxation and theology. His conception of a supreme and
absolute papacy delineated to a certain extent the characteristics of the
Avignon papacy.
Jacques came from the bourgeoisie of Cahors. He was a southerner
who spoke and read Latin before langue d’oil, the French of the north. His
legal mind was framed while studying law at Montpellier and Orléans,
where he received his doctorate. Enrolled in theology in Paris, he never
finished his degree and probably taught law in Toulouse, supported by
the Neapolitan house of Anjou. He was in the entourage of both Charles
II of Provence and his son Louis. There is no doubt that his education and
experience made him an efficient administrator. Jacques collected several
benefices (archpriest and archdeacon) before being named archbishop of
46 Chapter 1

Toulouse in 1297. He was elected bishop of Fréjus in 1300, and in 1308

Charles II asked him to take the helm of the Kingdom of Sicily as its
chancellor. Clement V transferred him from Sicily to the diocese of Avi-
gnon when the pope moved there in 1310 (Jacques returned to his episco-
pal palace when elected pope). He played a large part in the discussions
related to Boniface’s trial and the Council of Vienne. Clement promoted
him to cardinal of San Vital in 1312, adding the bishopric of Porto in 1313.

SATANIC BEGINNINGS

Shortly after his election, rumors flew at the curia of a possible plot to
assassinate the pope. The first report of a Gascon conspiracy to eliminate
the pope and his Quercynois compatriots in the middle of a consistory
was rapidly quelled. Why kill an old man? But a real plot involving
several bizarre elements indeed unraveled soon afterward. 51 Hugues Gé-
raud, bishop of Cahors (thus head of a diocese close to the pope’s heart)
decided to poison the pope and his confidants when Géraud was threat-
ened with deposition for several offenses (involving mostly his simony).
Notably, in the wake of the accusations against Boniface and the Tem-
plars, times were propitious to accusations of enchantment and sorcery.
As treason became the benchmark accusation of the later fourteenth cen-
tury, sorcery was the accusation of choice in the earlier years. Still, in this
case the threat was real. Géraud resided in Avignon, and with his two
accomplices he quickly acquired the necessary accoutrements, arsenic
and wax dolls. The first doll needed to be baptized to become efficacious
so that the devil would recognize it and was named after Jacques de Via,
the cardinal-nephew of the pope. Since de Via died on June 13, 1317, his
death ensured Géraud of the effectiveness of his method. The bishop then
decided to kill the pope and two other cardinals. He found accomplices
working in the pope’s household to bring the dolls to court and another
bishop to baptize them. The dolls, which contained inscriptions stating
“May pope John die and no other,” “May Bertrand du Poujet die,” and
“May Gaucelme de Jean die,” traveled back to Géraud, after their bap-
tism, inside hollowed breads. On their way, the poisoners’ suspicious
behavior alarmed guards, who stopped them at the gate of the city. They
found overwhelming evidence fairly quickly. Géraud, who had not yet
been publicly denounced, nonetheless became alarmed and started talk-
ing. Arrested in March 1317, he was condemned and burned in Septem-
 Early Popes 47

ber. Afraid of opening a Pandora’s box of wrongdoing, John pardoned

most of the accomplices. As Jean Favier states, this affair plunged the
papacy back into its traditional Roman milieu. The Orsini and Colonna
may have been far away, but the French, Gascon, and Italian rivalries
easily replaced them. 52
It is highly possible that the Géraud affair impressed John enough to
leave him suspicious of the crimes of poisoning and black magic and of
antipapal conspiracies in general. He seemed to have genuinely feared a
Jewish-Christian “magical” scheme, which led him to expel Jews from
the Comtat Venaissin in 1321–1323. But the pope also accused the Viscon-
ti of Milan of practicing magic against him, and he was not afraid to fend
off poison with poison. In March 1317, the pope thanked a certain Mar-
guerite de Foiz for a poison antidote she had sent him; in February 1318,
the pope asked the bishop of Fréjus to search for necromancers. 53 But
most of all, John established the link as a kind of rationale that bound
demons and the devil to heresy. In short, John instigated the mode of
thinking that produced the witch crazes of the early modern period. In
his Satan the Heretic: The Birth of Demonology in the Medieval West, Alain
Boureau traces this evolution. Throughout the 1320s John created a com-
mission of theologians to investigate black magic and heresy; it con-
cluded the assimilation of the one into the other. 54 Enrico del Carretto, a
member of the commission, searched for causes behind the successful use
of images and hosts in sorcery, arguing that Satan was “the signified in
the sign.” 55 According to his logic, a baptized image became the site of
the pact with Satan and proof of devil worship, thus a heretical object.
Earlier views had minimized demonic power over humans as a mere
superstition. Authorities usually regarded magic as a practice for the
weak of mind. But the pope broke the tradition that regarded heresies as
intellectual (a matter of faith) and dissociated magic from doctrinal/dog-
matic issues. John upgraded magic to a powerful reality as dangerous
and unorthodox dogma. In 1326, John promulgated his bull Super illius
specula, handing black magic to the Inquisition as “perverse dogma” that
“infected” the Church. 56 It is highly possible that John’s broadening of
the concept of heresy to magic demonstrated his concern for protecting
the Church and its sovereignty at a time when the Spiritual Franciscans’
discussion of absolute poverty led the pope toward a redefinition of what
was acceptable debate and what was not.
48 Chapter 1

THE FRANCISCAN POVERTY DEBATE AND ITS

EUROPEAN IMPLICATION

The dispute over Franciscan poverty polarized much of John’s early rule,
and the debate was not new. Shortly after St. Francis’s death in 1226, his
followers split into two distinct groups: the Spirituals, who endorsed
strict adherence to the rule, and the Conventuals, willing to accept
change. Christianity has an ancient tradition of detachment from the
world and the embrace of radical voluntary poverty dating even to its
earliest origins, and St. Francis, by following in Jesus’s footsteps to the
permissible extent, marked himself as radically different from other con-
temporary religious leaders by the absoluteness of his commitment to
poverty. In 1279, Pope Nicholas III’s Exiit qui seminat had facilitated that
same commitment to poverty on the part of individual Franciscans and
the order as an institution when it stated that the papacy owned the
goods used by Franciscans. 57 The bull established that Christ and the
apostles had lived without individual or communal possession; they had
used property but rejected its possession. Most discussions over poverty
insisted on the separation between ownership/possession and use. In
short, Franciscans had usus facti of the goods they used, but they did not
possess them, the Church did. Hence individuals in the Franciscan order
could avoid the “burden” of ownership and claim total poverty since
they owned nothing and simply benefited from the pope’s assistance.
Franciscans could thus practice poverty without the inconvenience of
ownership.
The majority of Franciscans were satisfied with this arrangement, but
Angelo da Clareno and Ubertino da Casale headed a minority, the Spiri-
tuals, that championed a strict adherence to St. Francis’s lifestyle: utter
destitution. Tensions rose steadily between followers of the two obser-
vances and reached the breaking point under the rule of John XXII. But
this did not prevent the general Franciscan practice to put them at odds
with all the other orders that possessed and used goods. Clement V had
called Franciscans to discuss the issue at the Council of Vienne. He ad-
monished moderation without reaching a conclusion on the place of the
Spirituals.
Upon his nomination, John returned to the poverty issue, asking the
Inquisition to examine the friars. The leaders of the Spirituals were called
to Avignon in 1316, where Angelo da Clareno, Ubertino da Casale, and
 Early Popes 49

Bernard Délicieux (a strong opponent of the Inquisition) tried to compel

the pope to join their ranks. The pope did not appreciate their initiative.
Bernard was imprisoned and Angelo and Ubertino demoted. In 1317, a
papal bull condemned the Spirituals (labeling them Fraticelli for the first
time), and in his next bull the pope advanced obedience as the greatest of
all vows. He stated, “Poverty is great, but unity is greater, obedience is
the greatest good if it is preserved intact.” 58 The argument reached a new
level in 1321, when a heretic was burned by the Inquisition in Narbonne
for advocating a total poverty that was quite similar to the Spirituals’
model. A local Franciscan appealed to the pope against this injustice, and
John acted as any good manager would. He consulted experts, collected
their opinions, read all discussions, convened specialists, and listened to
arguments, finally making a decision in 1322. He abrogated Exiit qui semi-
nat. When Louis of Bavaria, the emperor-elect, appealed his decision,
John answered, “Scripture can contradict the poverty of Christ.” 59 He
added that he could in fact change an earlier pontifical act when it endan-
gered the present. His Ad conditorem canonum granted property owner-
ship back to the Franciscans. 60 The bull scandalized all Franciscans who
in a council in Perugia reasserted their strict adherence to the ideal of
apostolic poverty, following the lead of their general, Michael of Cesena.
The pope answered in 1323 with another bull, Cum inter nonnullos, that
condemned the Perugian defense and rendered moot any further discus-
sions of Christ’s poverty. 61 The Franciscans split, with a majority obeying
the pope and a minority sticking with Michael of Cesena to the strict ideal
of poverty. This alliance between Michael and the emperor-elect Louis of
Bavaria lent a further political dimension to the religious crisis that will
be addressed later.
In his book Pope John XXII and His Franciscan Cardinal: Bertrand de la
Tour and the Apostolic Poverty Controversy, Patrick Nold revisits the
historiography of the Franciscan poverty debate of the early fourteenth
century, noting how it usually reflects negatively on the pope, making
him the villain of the affair. He reevaluates the pope’s position (roughly
1322–1325) and studies how John managed the crisis, looking for the
counsel of specialists and relying on Franciscan supporters at the curia,
such as Cardinal Bertrand de la Tour, to counterbalance opinions. Nold
contends essentially that if John listened to a Franciscan, then the chasm
that separated him from Cesena was not as wide as traditionally thought.
In essence, Nold argues that John actually followed the recommendation
50 Chapter 1

of the Franciscan de la Tour and cannot thus be condemned alone for the
split. He portrays a pope more prone to compromise than previously
perceived, willing to review all the arguments of the controversy. Most of
all, he describes John XXII as a centralizer who brought important theo-
logical matters to the curia instead of leaving them in the hands of coun-
cils or universities. 62
The question remains, however: Why did John cast off absolute pover-
ty so adamantly? In her recent dissertation, Melanie Brunner focuses on
the reason behind John XXII’s rejection. She questions the pope’s dislike
of the Franciscans and his support of the Dominicans and probes the
pope’s vision of Franciscan ideology as a threat to ecclesiastical authority.
She restores John to the context of his earlier training in natural law and
offers a legal rationale for John’s objection. John hinted that absolute
poverty hinged on heresy and that Jesus was bound to have held proper-
ty. The papal dominion (dominium equaled lordship and property) over
Franciscan goods set the papacy sharply at odds with the secular clergy
(which controlled its own property). Further, the pope conceived domin-
ion as part of human nature, a divine institution that could not be refused
or rejected. For the pope, obedience was more important than poverty,
and a refusal to own property seemed like contempt for the material
world, a dangerous and familiar heretical position. As Brunner aptly
states,
Evangelical poverty was not characterised by lack of dominium. The
crucial point about Christ’s poverty from the papal point of view was
not that he did not have any dominium, but that he had dominium yet
chose not to use it. The fact that Christ refrained from using his rights
was the distinguishing factor of his poverty and humility. 63

The pope made the case in his bull Quia vir reprobus (1329) that reproved
the theories of the former Franciscan general Michael of Cesena and
ended further discussion. 64
Of course, this debate may sound abstract and quite remote to the
concerns of a modern reader. Its importance, however, may be suggested
by its relevance to the perennially important issue of legacies and inheri-
tance claims. The debate over apostolic poverty is a perfect example of
the ties that bound law to religion. Like many other religious orders, the
Franciscans’ charisma attracted the support of many individuals, most
notably in towns, where they spiritually counseled a population that felt
torn, like Francis of Assisi himself, between an ideal of absolute poverty
 Early Popes 51

and the birth pangs of early capitalism. A sense of pollution remained

attached to money and to the wealth amassed by the new merchant class.
One way to mitigate it was to transform this ungainly wealth into charity.
Bequests to the Franciscans alleviated the guilty conscience of the
wealthy and in turn supported the urban poor through Franciscan activ-
ities. The testamentary practice of the time shows that in Avignon Fran-
ciscans were tremendously popular with the merchant and laboring
classes, widely accepted as they were within European urban settings. In
Avignon, some 60 percent of cultivators, 44.5 percent of merchants, and
27 percent of artisans chose to be buried within Franciscan churches and
cemeteries. 65 The amount of property they received as bequests held in
trust also testified to their immense popularity. But, of course, the Fran-
ciscans’ extreme position muddled many inheritance cases, especially
when disinherited friends, kin, and relatives used the legal system to
their advantage and challenged how bequests could be made to the Fran-
ciscans because of their attachment to absolute poverty. A pragmatic man
like John XXII was bound to comprehend the deep ramifications of Fran-
ciscan “intransigence” over poverty. It put at risk the survival of the trust
holder, the Church.
John’s conflict with the Franciscans occasioned some of the most pro-
vocative Christian soul searching of the time. Authors such as Marsilius
of Padua, William of Ockham, Peter John Olivi, Ubertino of Casale, and
Bonagratia da Bergamo questioned papal authority in view of their read-
ing of the scriptures, addressing topics such as the apparent conflict of
papal and imperial authority and the theory of papal infallibility as they
attempted to reframe the dominant discourse. They discussed political
theory and ecclesiology, pushing boundaries like no one else had done
before them. The lengthy continuation of the Spirituals affair aptly dem-
onstrates how medieval political discourse was embedded in theology.
Since the publication of Ad conditionem canonum, the Franciscan general
Michael of Cesena had changed sides and joined the Spirituals; he could
not tolerate the papal defense of Christ’s and Apostolical possessions. In
a show of authority, John summoned Michael to Avignon, where he im-
prisoned him. In 1328, the latter escaped, accompanied by William of
Ockham; they both found refuge at the court of Louis of Bavaria, Holy
Roman emperor-elect, who supported their cause.
After the death of Emperor Henry VII in 1313, polarized German elec-
tors supported two rival emperors: Louis of Bavaria, crowned in Aachen,
52 Chapter 1

and Frederick of Austria, crowned in Bonn. The issue was resolved mili-
tarily when Louis defeated and captured Frederick in September 1322.
John chose this moment of imperial “weakness” to assert his sove-
reignty over Italian territory. He announced the Italian (imperial) vicari-
ate vacant and offered it to Robert of Anjou, King of Naples. Supporting
his Ghibelline cause, Louis backed the activities of the Milanese Visconti
against Anjou. In retaliation, the pope questioned Louis’s legitimacy,
which led the emperor to support the Spirituals.
The pope’s special envoys, known as papal legates, could not pacify
the land and were overextended trying to rule southern Italy and the
rebellious north. John trusted first Bertrand du Poujet to contain the Vis-
conti of Milan and the Ghibellines’ northern cities of Lombardy and Ro-
magna; but ultimately he failed. John then divided the Italian legacy in
two, keeping du Poujet to the north and granting southern Italy to Cardi-
nal Giovanni Orsini. The pope expected that Orsini’s Roman experience
with local politics would buttress papal support. He also failed, bringing
to his legation the fractured politics of Rome. Sebastian Zanke, working
with some 67,000 or so letters preserved in John XXII’s papal registers,
has been able to gauge the interest that the pope paid to foreign policy,
and unsurprisingly, the affairs of the Italian States monopolized most of
his attention. The pope sent up to twelve nuncios, who supplemented the
local administration, and his two legates. All other aspects of European
politics came second. Zanke cites the quite astonishing lack of interest on
the pope’s part at the deposition of King Edward II of England, for exam-
ple. He describes papal policies as “responsive” or “reactive” to specific
requests and not the results of an overarching planned and calculated
foreign policy. Only the petitioners and foreign representatives who were
able to reach the pope’s attention (through the curia) received attention. 66
By 1324, the pope had excommunicated the emperor, who had first
accused John of heresy. Louis’s stance was strengthened by one of the
most controversial pamphlets of its time, Marsilius of Padua’s Defensor
pacis. In his treatise, the Italian scholar weakened papal authority, pro-
moted imperial secular sovereignty (and councils of ecclesiastics and lay-
men) over the pope, denied ecclesiastical rights over temporal justice,
taxation, and property, and repudiated ecclesiastical prerogatives such as
excommunication. In short, according to Marsilius of Padua, the emperor
granted the pope his power. Marsilius’s formulations (a reversal of Boni-
face VIII’s utterances) were radical for the time, and he deserves a place
 Early Popes 53

among the greatest political thinkers of his time. Marsilius breached the
“modern” world of politics with the following declaration:
Now we declare according to the truth and on the authority of Aristotle
that the law-making power or the first and real effective source of law
is the people. . . . For temporal power and greed, and lust of authority
and rule is not the spouse of Christ, nor has He wedded such a spirit,
but has expressly repudiated it, as has been shown from the divine
Scriptures. . . . The recent Roman popes do not defend her who is the
spouse of Christ, that is, the Catholic faith and the multitude of the
believers, but offend her; they do not preserve her beauty, that is, the
unity of the faith, but defile it. Since by sowing tares and schisms they
are tearing her limb from limb, and since they do not receive the true
companions of Christ, poverty and humility, but shut them out entire-
ly, they show themselves not servants but enemies of the husband. 67

As Cary J. Nederman states, Marsilius “set the individual into a commu-

nal setting while maintaining a meaningful role for personal volition and
achieved this precisely by turning diversity of function—divergence in
‘ways of life’—into a virtue, indeed a necessity.” 68 Louis could not have
found a better intellectual support than Marsilius’s Defensor pacis. With
this defense of his authority in mind, the emperor marched into Italy in
1327, crowned himself king of Italy in Milan, and continued toward
Rome, where he was again elected and crowned emperor by the Romans
and a few rebellious bishops. The new regime, led by Sciarra Colonna,
benefited Roman aristocratic Ghibellines. In January 1328, John XXII pre-
dictably deposed the emperor, who retorted by deposing the pope and
supporting the election of a counterpope, the Franciscan Pietro of Corva-
ra, as Nicholas V. Louis’s iter italicum eventually became unsustainable,
however, and he returned north, leaving his pope (also excommunicated)
in Pisa. John eventually pardoned Nicholas, who abdicated in 1330 and
died in an Avignonese jail three years later. 69 Still, between 1330 and
1346, Louis attempted to have the pope annul the sentences levied
against him. But in order to do so, he had to swear absolute obedience to
the mandates of the Church, a step he was not willing to take, especially
when the pope refused to accept his stance on equal negotiation between
them.
54 Chapter 1

BEATIFIC VISION

A review of John XXII’s rich pontificate cannot end without discussing

his controversial “beatific vision” theory. His theological stance created
enough buzz to garner the criticism of all his enemies, Ghibellines and
Fraticelli included; some called him a heretic while others questioned the
pope’s infallibility. On All Saints’ Day 1331, John, while discussing verses
from the book of Revelation (especially the term “under the altar” found
in Rv 6:9), argued that the “blessed souls” could only contemplate
Christ’s humanity. Their visions of God’s essence and Christ’s divinity
had to wait for their bodily resurrection and Last Judgment. For John
(and to the contrary of what most medieval Christians believed), beatific
vision was achieved only after resurrection. John’s revisionist view fol-
lowed his logical mind. What was the point of a Last Judgment if all
received punishments and salvation before judgment? He continued his
defense in several sermons, up to his death, when he retracted his views
in articulo mortis. His successor, Benedict XII, ended the controversy, pro-
claiming in his conciliating Benedictus Deus (1336) that
By this Constitution which is to remain in force for ever, we, with
apostolic authority, define the following: According to the general dis-
position of God, the souls of all the saints who departed from this
world before the passion of our Lord Jesus Christ and also of the holy
apostles, martyrs, confessors, virgins and other faithful who died after
receiving the holy baptism of Christ—provided they were not in need
of any purification when they died . . . —and again the souls of children
who have been reborn by the same baptism of Christ . . . all these souls,
immediately after death and, in the case of those in need of purifica-
tion, after the purification mentioned above, since the ascension of our
Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ into heaven, already before they take up
their bodies again and before the general judgment, have been, are and
will be with Christ in heaven, in the heavenly kingdom and paradise,
joined to the company of the holy angels. Since the passion and death
of the Lord Jesus Christ, these souls have seen and see the divine es-
sence with an intuitive vision and even face to face, without the media-
tion of any creature by way of object of vision; rather the divine essence
immediately manifests itself to them, plainly, clearly and openly, and
in this vision they enjoy the divine essence. 70

It seems preposterous nowadays to consider that such a theological

statement could create an international crisis. But it did, entangling all of
 Early Popes 55

Europe’s secular and religious authorities into a defense or criticism of

the pope. While historians have argued that the debate remained a scho-
lastic squabble among savants, irrelevant to “simple Christians,” Jérémie
Rabiot demonstrates in a recent article that an educated merchant like
Giovanni Villani was interested enough to send missives asking ques-
tions to clarify the debate and became a cultural mediator, analyzing in
his chronicle the dogmatic, political, and ecclesiological stakes of the is-
sue. 71 For this merchant, the debate highlighted two distinct conceptions
of ecclesiastical authority: one, authoritarian and uncompromising, de-
fended by the position of John XXII, and one, collegial and more open,
defended by the college and universities. For Villani, the controversy
affected the cult of saints and their intercessory relevance, indulgences,
and the Church’s power in remitting sins—in summary, a large part of
the medieval Christian belief system. This example, limited in time and
topic, demonstrates that the boundary separating popular from scholastic
culture was not as marked as one might expect.
In any case, on December 3, 1334, a day before his death, the pope
(pressured by cardinals and family members) confessed “that souls sep-
arated from bodies and fully justified . . . see God and the divine essence
face to face and clearly, as much as the state and condition of the separat-
ed soul can bear.” 72 Understanding the damage his words had done,
John died with the assurance that his last confession eased the turmoil he
had created. It is worth noting that in his chronicle, Giovanni Villani
discussed the pope’s death and his last words, taking time to translate the
pope’s renunciation words that he had received from his brother who
resided at court, evidence enough of the impact of the pope’s utterance.
Villani adds further that the pope left his treasury in excellent shape with
some eighteen million gold florins in currency and liturgical objects
worth an additional seven million. 73 We can take the chronicler’s words
as evidence of the pope’s administrative and fiscal successes. John E.
Weakland, who has studied the pope’s administrative achievements, de-
scribes him as an efficient and talented administrator, energetic, elo-
quent, frugal, unwavering, confident, a tough opponent, a “burning gen-
ius” according to his contemporary, and a pope who was engaged with a
high conception of his office and a deep sense of preserving Church
unity. 74 We could go a step further: John XXII defined the Avignon papa-
cy. Its centralization, tight administration, and self-awareness marked the
institution for years to come. John symbolized the Avignon papacy.
56 Chapter 1

Travelers to Avignon can still see today what is left of John’s magnificent
Gothic mausoleum in the treasury of Notre-Dame des Doms.

MONASTICIZATION: BENEDICT XII

According to the well-informed Giovanni Villani, the conclave that

elected John’s successor was splintered into two parties. In spite of the
division, it ended up electing “a man of good life,” the Cistercian monk
Jacques Fournier. He chose the name of Benedict in honor of the founder
of his order. The humble new pope supposedly responded to his nomina-
tion by commenting wryly: “You have elected an ass.” 75 To English-
speaking readers, Jacques Fournier is better known as the inquisitor who
provided Emmanuel Leroy Ladurie with the material for his fabulous
ethnohistory, Montaillou: Occitan Village, than as a pope of Avignon. 76
Benedict XII’s short rule was certainly a respite after the frenetic pace
with which his predecessors had responded to relentless issues. Benedict
XII died early in his tenure, on April 25, 1342, making his reign the
shortest of the Avignon papacy. Because of its brevity, fewer internation-
al crises plagued his reign.
The conclave that elected John’s successor was also notable for the fact
that none of the cardinals but Cardinal Jacopo Stefaneschi had ever be-
fore participated in one, and thus the proceedings relied heavily on the
institutional knowledge of the old man. 77 This serves as a key reminder
that sometimes institutions, too, need to rely on “memory.” It seems
quite logical to assume, as Jean Favier did, that the election of the “ortho-
dox” Jacques Fournier by the twenty-four cardinals present in conclave
was a direct response to the dogmatic vagaries of his predecessor. 78 Ac-
cording to Giovanni Villani, the tiara was first proposed to the archbish-
op of Toulouse, Jean-Raymond of Comminges; he refused after French
cardinals set an electoral precondition that the new pope not return the
papacy to Rome. Out of spite, the French cardinals chose the “lesser”
candidate: the cardinal who was associated with the “small nation” of
Toulouse (a recently created province). But Villani does add that he was
“a man of good life.” 79 Regardless of the historical truth, the Italian
chronicler’s biases are quite apparent here!
Jacques Fournier’s rectitude and dogmatism certainly affected the car-
dinals’ vote. Fournier was a Cistercian monk of humble origins (his father
was rumored to have been a miller), who had followed his maternal
 Early Popes 57

uncle Arnaud Nouvel to the monastery of Boulbonne, today in the Midi-

Pyrenées. He studied theology at the Cistercian College of St. Bernard in
Paris and headed the Abbey of Fontfroide in 1311. Fournier was reputed-
ly a brilliant theologian. In 1317 he became bishop of Pamiers, where he
pursued heretics relentlessly. His “Fournier Register” recorded the inter-
rogations of some 578 Cathars; the register became a mine of information
for daily life in the medieval French Southwest. 80 His unique interroga-
tion skills allowed him to minimize physical torture, and his record keep-
ing was meticulous. There is no doubt that his zeal and organizational
skills pleased John XXII. In 1326, Fournier was transferred to the diocese
of Mirepoix, and in 1327 John XXII elevated him to cardinal with the title
of Santa Prisca, a post held previously by his uncle Arnaud Nouvel. Once
at court, he became one of John’s advisors, the court’s theologian, and
one of those who urged the pope to recant his “wayward” understanding
of beatific vision.
Benedict was an austere man. His interest focused largely on theology
and philosophy, and he showed little patience for politics or the law. As
cardinal and pope he kept his white Cistercian habit (hence his name,
“The White Cardinal”), and he embraced orthodox dogma and behavior.
Of him, Paul Amargier writes, “With more depth and constancy than his
two predecessors, Clement V and John XXII, he grasped the essentially
religious aspect of his position. He remained a monk.” 81 He announced
shortly after his election that his nearest kin should expect nothing from
him (it is worth remembering that his maternal uncle had been a cardinal,
so he indeed benefited from traditional nepotism). In 1336, his Benedictus
deus ended the beatific vision controversy. After his election, he rejected
all the requests from petitioners attracted to Avignon by the election of a
new pope, and he ordered those charged with benefices to reside where
they served a purpose; that is, they had to leave the court and reside
where they had been nominated. The new pope deplored the accumula-
tion of benefices and residence exemptions for ecclesiastics. 82
The pope’s interest in reducing abuses led to his personal involvement
in the nomination of thousands of benefices of all ranks—from bishops
and abbots to lower offices—in which he demonstrated his fairness by
granting positions even to the illegitimate sons of ecclesiastics, at the
same time centralizing the decision-making process in his own hands.
It was the reform of religious orders that first merited Benedict’s care
and attention, initiating these efforts with his bull Pastor bonus in June
58 Chapter 1

1335, which compelled abbots to search out and recall to religious life
wayward monks who had abandoned their calling. 83 With Fulgens sicut
stella, promulgated on July 12, 1335, Benedict focused on his own Cister-
cian order. Rigorous changes were initiated, including rules that stipulat-
ed: “In certain monasteries the monks have the right to a certain part of
the corn, the bread, the wine and the income. That must no longer hap-
pen; everything will be common to all. It will no longer be possible for
anyone to have any revenue or pension for his sustenance, his clothing or
for anything else”; and “Likewise to be abolished is the sharing of the
revenues among the Abbot, the officers and the community. The Abbots
opposing this decision are to be deposed, the monks to be imprisoned for
life.” 84 The pope was obviously attempting to restore fairness and equity
in practice and lifestyle. In June 1336, he turned to the Benedictines,
whose organization he attempted to centralize with the bull Summi magis-
tri. Again, in May 1339, he summoned the Augustinian Canons Regular
to reform with the bull Ad decorum ecclesie. Papal enthusiasm for reform
did not sit well with many orders, and his relations with the Franciscans
soured to the point of irreconciliation. J. B. Mahn, discussing the pope’s
Redemptor noster of 1336, states, “[This text] today still earns him the
stubborn hostility of all the sons of St. Francis, no matter which branch
they belong to.” 85 In some thirty articles the pope totally reformed the
order in ways that may have shocked purists. The most radical points
were the opening of conventual schools that would allow gifted students
to be educated and the elections by communal chapters of conventual
custodians and guardians. 86 Last, the pope attempted to reform the Do-
minicans, but they resisted so strongly that he first considered dissolving
the order before abandoning his plan.
A fervent opponent of heresies, Benedict was also active in expanding
the frontiers of Christendom. He sent an embassy of four missionaries to
Kublai Khan, grandson of Genghis, headed by the renowned Parisian
theologian Nicholas Bonet. Leaving Avignon in 1338, the embassy
reached Peking in 1342. They were well received and permitted to found
several missions throughout the Mongol Empire. The embassy returned
from the east in 1346, arriving back in Avignon in 1354; Bonet had died in
1343. The chronicle of Arnald de Sarrant recounts the event quite inaccu-
rately, emphasizing the great love Kublai showed for the Franciscans,
especially a certain Brother Francis of Alessandria, who had cured the
 Early Popes 59

emperor of cancer and a fistula and converted him! In any case, Kublai
Khan’s successor eradicated Christian influence in the Mongol Empire. 87

STAYING IN AVIGNON

Benedict was not solely interested in proselytizing faraway lands. He was

deeply uncomfortable with the location of the papacy and chose to return
to Rome as early as 1335; in his first consistory, he dedicated fifty thou-
sand florins for the reconstruction of the basilicas of St. Peter and the
Lateran. 88 He sent the archbishop of Embrun to revamp the ultramontane
papal administration, but the Italian barons still dominated the peninsu-
la. Benedict negotiated with local rulers in exchange for their support. He
recognized the vicariate of the della Scala in Verona and Vicenza, the
Gonzaga in Mantua, the Este in Modena, and the Visconti in Milan, thus
reinforcing their authority. Bologna, which had entered the Guelph party
in 1327, had rebelled against John XXII in 1334, and it took several years
to quell the uprising. In 1337, Benedict was forced to excommunicate the
revolt’s instigator, Taddeo Pepoli, and put the city under interdict. The
situation was remedied three years later in 1340, when Bologna surren-
dered and offered its allegiance to the pope, agreeing to the payment of a
feudal tax. Thenceforth, Taddeo became the ecclesiastical administrator
of Guelph-dominated Bologna.
Realizing that the political situation in Italy remained unresolved and
facing strong opposition at the court, Benedict decided to remain in Avi-
gnon. The city had been without a bishop since 1334. After a two-year-
long vacancy, in 1336 the pope finally named Jean de Cojordan to that
see. After purchasing the Petit Palais (a group of houses owned by the
late cardinal Arnaud de Via), Benedict personally kept what had been
episcopal property up to that point and offered the newly acquired Petit
Palais to the bishop of Avignon. He then charged architect Pierre Poisson
to rehabilitate and transform the episcopal residence into what became
the first austere papal fortress, the Palace (now labeled the Old Palace to
distinguish it from Clement VI’s upgrading). 89 The fate of the papacy in
Avignon was definitively sealed in 1339, when the pope recalled the
papal archives from Assisi to Avignon. 90 There is no doubt that foreign
policy also dictated the building of a new impregnable fortress as the
threat of invasion by Louis of Bavaria still loomed.
60 Chapter 1

Benedict’s alliance with the Visconti had deprived Louis of a tradi-

tional Ghibelline ally. The emperor also constantly feared the association
between the papacy and the French house of Anjou in Naples and the
Valois who ruled France. Louis sent embassies to the new pope and
readied himself to comply with Benedict’s imperatives for reconciliation.
The pope was eager; the houses of Anjou and Valois were not. Their
ambassadors criticized the German emperor for his notorious heresies
and the utter disregard with which he treated the Church. Discussions
went back and forth with no solution; the French pressured the pope to
refuse or defer negotiations. Long delays created new resolutions, and (in
traditional fashion) the enemies of France became the friends of Germa-
ny. Louis and Edward III of England allied and ceased negotiating with
Avignon. According to Henry Knighton, both Louis and Edward met in
the city of Coblenz among great ceremonies. “There in the presence of all
the assembled people the Emperor declared and made known to all the
unnaturalness, disobedience, and wickedness with which the King of
France had acted towards him; defied the King of France; and declared
him and all his adherents to be under forfeiture. Then the Emperor made
King Edward his Vicar, and gave him all the power he himself had, over
Cologne and from there to the sea.” 91 In response, the pope laid an inter-
dict on Germany. In 1338, German bishops begged the pope to resume
discussions. He refused. They then decided on a radical course of action.
In July 1338, Louis received from the six imperial electors (with the sup-
port of the German episcopate) the recognition that an emperor elected
by the majority had the right to rule, regardless of the pope’s confirma-
tion. With this Treaty of Rhens, imperial legitimacy officially circumvent-
ed papal approval. Three years later, a new agreement reconciled the
emperor to the pope and France with Germany. It was left to the next
pope, Clement VI, to end this convoluted imperial affair.
Modern historians of the period largely followed Guillaume Mollat’s
assessment of the relationship between France and the papacy. The rela-
tions were not “tainted with servility.” 92 The popes supported France
because it advanced their own interests, and the popes’ interests lay in a
crusade. It would be successful only if England and France solved their
difficulties and worked together on the (re)conquest of the Levant. 93
Once the Valois dynasty was recognized after the demise of the last Ca-
petian, it needed to affirm its authority over the six great fiefs of the
French monarchy: Flanders, Burgundy, Brittany, Armagnac, Foix, and
 Early Popes 61

Aquitaine. This authority legitimated its position. All were relatively

quiet except Aquitaine, English since 1152 and stuck between the hege-
monic tendencies of both France and England. Benedict stalled Philip
when he proposed to intervene in British-Scottish affairs, and he tried to
dissuade Philip from invading Guyenne. 94 Between 1337 and 1340 the
pope further restrained Philip from attacking Edward when the latter
was isolated. Pierre Roger, the future Clement VI, became the legate de-
ployed to maintain the peace necessary to the papacy’s long-term crusad-
ing plans. Ironically, Edward seized the moment to join with the emperor
and plan his conquest of France. Conversely, Benedict put much energy
in preventing Flanders from supporting British politics. In the end, the
pope’s efforts on both sides were all for naught. In 1337 Philip invaded
Gascony, initiating the Hundred Years’ War, and a year later Edward
landed in Flanders as Philip attacked Guyenne. In January 1340, Edward
declared himself king of France. In the midst of this turmoil, Benedict did
manage to negotiate the short-lived Truce of Esplechin in 1340. Karsten
Plöger’s examination of diplomacy at the papal court details the back-
and-forth discussions and travels that put the papacy at the center of
European negotiations. He qualifies the rapport between Avignon and
Edward III’s representatives thus:
The rarity of letters of procuration for English envoys dispatched to
Avignon in the mid-fourteenth century is a reflection of the nature of
Anglo-papal relations in this particular period. The use of plena potestas
had long since become a characteristic feature of negotiations both be-
tween equals and between rulers and their subjects in which the repre-
sentatives of either side would try to reach some form of mutually
binding agreement. Bilateral talks between English envoys and the
pope, however, did not normally involve the kind of give-and-take
typical of such discussions. Unlike their compatriots sent abroad to
negotiate with secular rulers, Edward III’s diplomats travelling to the
curia in those years did not go there with the aim of “striking deals”
and entering into contractual agreements (this also distinguished them
from the plenipotentiaries of Louis of Bavaria who came to Avignon
between 1335 and 1344 to negotiate the terms of the emperor’s absolu-
tion; their procurations were closely scrutinized in consistory and
played a central role in the subsequent discussion). Instead, as has been
suggested above, they would usually try to influence papal decisions
regarding such problems as provisions, peace and marriage dispensa-
tions by force of legal argument and persuasion. 95
62 Chapter 1

In summary, the papacy’s efforts on behalf of England may have been

half-hearted.
In 1340, Benedict became afflicted with several ulcers on his legs. Gan-
grene eventually killed him on April 25, 1342. His tomb can still be seen
in Notre-Dame des Doms. As Bernard Guillemain stated, while the
pope’s enemies described him as a vulgar fool, instead “he appears to us
simple, unpretentious, hardworking, devoted to the habits of monastic
life.” 96 He took counsel before making difficult decisions, and his bril-
liant theological mind granted him self-assurance and reliability. His dis-
tribution of benefices was fair, calculated, and impeccable. Benedict de-
fined his office first and foremost in religious terms and after becoming
pope remained a monk in practice and mind. He had pressed heretics to
confess; once they recognized their errors, they needed to be treated with
indulgence. 97 The castle that he ordered to be built protected the papal
administration and the pope as well. But it was devoid of grandeur and
elegance, neither ostentatious nor luxurious. The humblest of all the Avi-
gnon popes, Benedict remained the only one who did not succumb to the
temptation to shower his family and friends with favors. 98 The conclave
that elected his successor chose a man dramatically different.

NOTES

1. Alain Demurger, “Clement V,” in The Papacy: An Encyclopedia, ed. Philippe Le-
villain (New York: Routledge, 2002), 333–335, defends him to a certain extent, arguing
that he was not under the control of France. Still, he agrees that his nepotism was
flagrant, as was his financial centralization, two items that gave him bad press.
2. Jean Favier, Les papes d’Avignon (Paris: Fayard, 2006), 62.
3. Sophia Menache, Clement V (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); see
also Norman Housley, “Pope Clement V and the Crusades of 1309–10,” Journal of
Medieval History 8.1 (1982): 29–43.
4. Yves Renouard, The Avignon Papacy: The Popes in Exile 1305–1403, trans. Denis
Bethell (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1994), 14.
5. His direct predecessor was the short-lived Benedict XI, elected in March 1304,
who died of food poisoning in Perugia on July 7, 1304, after having eaten, according to
Giovanni Villani, a basket of fresh figs brought to him by a young man disguised as a
nun. See Key Figures in Medieval Europe: An Encyclopedia, ed. Richard Kenneth Emmer-
son and Sandra Clayton-Emmerson (London: Routledge, 2005), 143–144.
6. In a recent article, “Boniface VIII, Philip the Fair, and the Sanctity of Louis IX,”
Journal of Medieval History 29.1 (2003): 1–26, M. C. Gaposchkin argues that Boniface
canonized Louis to show his grandson what good leadership meant.
7. See Agostino Paravicini Bagliani, Boniface VIII: Un pape hérétique (Paris: Payot &
Rivages, 2003), 231–253, 279–299.
 Early Popes 63

8. Henry Scowcroft Bettenson and Chris Maunder, Documents of the Christian

Church (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 121–122.
9. For a copy of the letter, see Henry G. J. Beck, “William Hundleby’s Account of
the Anagni Outrage,” Catholic Historical Review 32.2 (1946): 190–220, also available at
http://www.fordham.edu/Halsall/source/1303anagni.asp.
10. Favier, Les papes d’Avignon, 18–22, clearly navigates the labyrinth of Roman
alliances.
11. Regarding the specifics of this robbery, see Joëlle Rollo-Koster, Raiding Saint
Peter: Empty Sees, Violence, and the Initiation of the Great Western Schism (1378) (Leiden:
Brill, 2008), 136–138.
12. Jean Coste, “Les deux missions de Guillaume de Nogaret en 1303,” Mélanges de
l’École française de Rome, moyen-âge-temps modernes 105.1 (1993): 299–326 discusses the
succession of events.
13. Teofilo F. Ruiz, “Reaction to Anagni,” Catholic Historical Review 65.3 (1979):
385–401, argues that medieval society viewed growing secularization essentially as a
political affair.
14. With his 1274 bull Ubi periculum, Pope Gregory X regulated the conclave. The
three-year-long vacancy that preceded his election made him well aware of all the
shortcomings associated with unregulated political transitions. Mandatory enclosure
(“conclave,” the technical term for papal elections, is from the Latin cum clave, a phrase
meaning “with a key”) isolated cardinals (who were the sole papal electors) from
external influences and gave them (at least in principle) freedom of choice—the idea
being that they were not supposed to choose under duress. The bull stated that the
conclave would open wherever the late pope died and asked the cardinals to wait ten
days before entering the conclave, allowing the absent cardinals to join them. It regu-
lated who enforced the integrity of the meeting and who guarded it, and it detailed
what cardinals did, said, ate, and slept. See Rollo-Koster, Raiding Saint Peter, 94–100,
for more details.
15. Guillaume Mollat, The Popes at Avignon: The “Babylonian Captivity” of the Medie-
val Church, trans. Janet Love (New York: Harper & Row, 1965), 3.
16. See Villani’s Chronicle Being Selections from the First Nine Books of the Croniche
Fiorentine of Giovanni Villani, trans. Rose E. Selfe and ed. Philip H. Wicksteed, M.A.
(London: Archibald Constable, 1906), book VIII, chap. 80, “How Pope Benedict Died;
and of the New Election of Pope Clement V,” at http://www.gutenberg.org/files/
33022/33022-h/33022-h.htm#VIII_80.
17. See, for example, Mollat, The Popes at Avignon, 4–5, who counters Villani’s state-
ment point by point.
18. Bernard Guillemain, La cour pontificale d’Avignon: Étude d’une société (Paris: De
Boccard, 1962), 129–130.
19. Favier, Les papes d’Avignon, 38.
20. Étienne Baluze, Vitae paparum avenionensium, hoc est, Historia pontificum romano-
rum qui in Gallia sederunt ab anno Christi MCCCV usque ad annum MCCCXCIV, ed.
Guillaume Mollat (Paris: Letouzey et Ané, 1914), vol. 1, 24–25.
21. Baluze, Vitae, vol. 1, 60–61.
22. See Favier, Les papes d’Avignon, 48–49.
23. Helen Nicholson, The Knights Templar: A New History (Thrupp, Stroud: Sutton,
2001), 225.
24. Favier, Les papes d’Avignon, 50–51.
25. Favier, Les papes d’Avignon, 166–167.
64 Chapter 1

26. The pope suffered from stomach or intestine cancer. His illness made him frail
and affected somewhat his character and behavior, making him reclusive for weeks at
a time during bouts of his illness. Aggravating his misery, one of the common reme-
dies his doctors prescribed consisted of mixing gold with his meals. See Agostini
Paravicini Bagliani, The Pope’s Body, trans. David S. Peterson (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 2000), 228; Menache, Clement V, 32.
27. From the text of the rule translated by Judith Upton-Ward, The Rule of the Tem-
plars (Woodbridge: Boydell, 1992), http://www.the-orb.net/encyclop/religion/
monastic/t_rule.html.
28. Nicholson finds no evidence that they were unpopular by the early fourteenth
century, even though their frequent fund-raising in Europe had negatively affected
public perception. In the West, people had little appreciation of the politics and diffi-
culties of waging and winning a war in the Levant and perceived them as money-
hungry. What made them a target was that they had a job to do and they were failing.
See Nicholson, The Knights Templar, 11–12.
29. Nicholson, The Knights Templar, 220–221.
30. Malcolm Barber, The New Knighthood: A History of the Order of the Temple (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 115.
31. Favier, Les papes d’Avignon, 54.
32. Jean de Joinville, The Memoirs of the Lord of Joinville: A New English Version, trans.
Ethel Wedgwood (London: J. Murray, 1906), 192.
33. Barber, The New Knighthood, 296.
34. Barber, The New Knighthood, 115.
35. Nicholson, The Knights Templar, 230.
36. Jean Coste, Boniface VIII en procès: Articles d’accusation et dépositions des témoins,
1303–1311 (Rome: L’Erma di Bretschneider, 1995), 413–415.
37. Nicholson, The Knights Templar, 13.
38. Julien Théry, “A Heresy of State: Philip the Fair, the Trial of the ‘Perfidious
Templars,’ and the Pontificalization of the French Monarchy,” Journal of Medieval Relig-
ious Cultures 39.2 (2013): 117–148.
39. Barbara Frale, “The Chinon Chart,” Journal of Medieval History 30.2 (2004):
109–134. The article is controversial because Frale accepts the charges against the
Templars, arguing that they represented a misunderstood rite of passage that exem-
plified what would happen to a Templar if caught by Muslims (denying and spitting
on the cross). Aware of the questionable initiation rites, Clement wanted to reform
them but was cut short by Philip’s imprisonment of the Templars.
40. Frale, “The Chinon Chart,” 122.
41. Frale, “The Chinon chart,” 126.
42. Council of Vienne, 1311–1312, http://www.ewtn.com/library/councils/vienne.htm,
has most of the council’s decrees.
43. The bull has erroneously been called Vox clamantis; see Anne Gilmour-Bryson,
“Vox in Excelso Deconstructed: Exactly What Did Clement V Say?” in On the Margins
of Crusading: The Military Orders, the Papacy and the Christian World, ed. Helen Nichol-
son (Farnham: Ashgate, 2011), 75–88.
44. Helen Nicholson insists that Clement did not declare them guilty, and charges
against them were “not proven”; see Nicholson, The Knights Templar, 11.
45. As cited by Favier, Les papes d’Avignon, 26.
46. See also Bagliani, The Pope’s Body, 60–63.
47. Guillemain, La cour pontificale, 241.
 Early Popes 65

48. See William M. Bowsky, Henry VII in Italy: The Conflict of Empire and City-State,
1310–1313 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1960), who considers Henry ill pre-
pared and foolish in his decision to make this “journey.”
49. Menache, Clement V, 307.
50. The papal treasury counted precious objects and rich vestments necessary to the
pontifical ritual (liturgical clothing, reliquaries, crosses, chalices, candlesticks, and or-
naments), all offerings in kind and currency, and, most important of all, the papal
archives in the form of registers and books. At a time when appropriate documenta-
tion was crucial to establishing legal claims, the loss of archives could be devastating.
51. See Favier, Les papes d’Avignon, 114–118.
52. Favier, Les papes d’Avignon, 118.
53. Robert André-Michel, Avignon, les fresques du Palais des Papes; le procès des Viscon-
ti (Paris: A. Colin, 1926), 168.
54. Alain Boureau, Satan the Heretic: The Birth of Demonology in the Medieval West,
trans. Teresa Lavender Fagan (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006).
55. Boureau, Satan the Heretic, 60.
56. Isabel Iribarren, “From Black Magic to Heresy: A Doctrinal Leap in the Pontifi-
cate of John XXII,” Church History: Studies in Christianity and Culture 76 (2007): 59.
57. The bull is available at the Franciscan Archive, http://www.franciscan-archive.
org/bullarium/exiit-e.html.
58. Gabrielle Gonzales, “The King of the Locusts Who Destroyed the Poverty of
Christ: Pope John XXII, Marsilius of Padua, and the Franciscan Question,” in The
World of Marsilius de Padua, ed. Gerson Moreno-Riaño (Turnhout: Brepols, 2006), 73.
59. Gonzales, “The King of the Locusts,” 84.
60. The bull is available from Macquarie University, http://www.mq.edu.au/about_
us/faculties_and_departments/faculty_of_arts/mhpir/politics_and_international_
relations/staff/john_kilcullen/john_xxii_ad_conditorem_canonum/.
61. The bull is available online at the Franciscan Archive, http://www.franciscan-
archive.org/bullarium/qinn-e.html. It is titled: The opinion, which asserts, that Christ and
His disciples had nothing, and in regard to those things, which they did have, they had no right,
is erroneous and heretical. This extravagant [opinion] is indeed striking, and has profound
implications, which have been drawn from the founts of sacred scripture. If one diligently
inspects the preceding extravagant [opinion] and the one [which] follows [it], he would say,
in my opinion, that it has been assigned this apt designation [i.e., heretical].
62. See Patrick Nold, Pope John XXII and His Franciscan Cardinal: Bertrand de la Tour
and the Apostolic Poverty Controversy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).
63. Melanie Brunner, “Pope John XXII and the Franciscan Ideal of Absolute Pover-
ty” (PhD diss., University of Leeds, 2006); available online at http://etheses.whiterose.
ac.uk/1095/, 237.
64. The bull is available from Macquarie University, http://www.mq.edu.au/about_
us/faculties_and_departments/faculty_of_arts/mhpir/politics_and_international_
relations/staff/john_kilcullen/john_xxii_quia_vir_reprobus/.
65. Jacques Chiffoleau, La comptabilité de l’au-delà: Les hommes, la mort et la religion
dans la région d’Avignon à la fin du Moyen-Âge (Paris: De Boccard, 1980), 261.
66. Sebastian Zanke, Johannes XXII, Avignon und Europa: Das politische Papsttum im
Spiegel der kurialen Register (1316–1334) (Leiden: Brill, 2013).
67. “Medieval Sourcebook: Marsilius of Padua, from Defensor Pacis, 1324,” available
at http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/source/marsiglio4.asp.
66 Chapter 1

68. Cary J. Nederman, Community and Consent: The Secular Political Theory of Marsi-
glio of Padua’s “Defensor pacis” (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1995), 145.
69. Losing their motivations, Romans then submitted petitions to the pope asking
his forgiveness.
70. The full translation is available at EWTN, http://www.ewtn.com/library/
papaldoc/b12bdeus.htm.
71. Jérémie Rabiot, “La culture théologique d’un grand marchand florentin: Échos
de la controverse sur la vision béatifique dans la Nuova cronica de Giovanni Villani
(XIVe siècle),” Mélanges de l’École française de Rome, moyen âge–temps modernes (2013):
125-1, available at http://mefrm.revues.org/1143.
72. Louis Duval-Arnould, “John XXII,” in The Papacy: An Encyclopedia, ed. Philippe
LeVillain (London: Routeldge, 2001), vol. 2, 850–851.
73. Giovanni Villani, Cronica di Giovanni Villani, ed. and trans. Ignazio Moutier and
Pietro Massai (Florence, 1823), vol. 6, 53–57.
74. John E. Weakland, “Administrative and Fiscal Centralization under Pope John
XXII, 1316–1334,” Catholic Historical Review 54.1 (1968): 39–43.
75. Villani, Cronica di Giovanni Villani, 59.
76. Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie, Montaillou: Village occitan (Paris: Gallimard, 1975),
trans. Barbara Bray as Montaillou: The Promised Land of Error (New York: George Bra-
ziller, 1978).
77. Marc Dykmans, Le cérémonial papal de la fin du moyen âge à la renaissance: Les textes
Avignonnais jusqu’à la fin du grand schisme d’occident (Brussels: Institut historique belge
de Rome, 1983), vol. 2, 168–169.
78. Favier, Les papes d’Avignon, 126.
79. Villani, Cronica di Giovanni Villani, book XI, chap. 21, 58–59.
80. Currently it is being translated into English by Nancy Stork at San José State
University; see “Inquisition Records of Jacques Fournier,” available at http://www.
sjsu.edu/people/nancy.stork/jacquesfournier/.
81. Paul Amargier, “Benedict XII,” in The Papacy: An Encyclopedia, ed. Philippe Le-
villain (New York: Routledge, 2002), 161.
82. Favier, Les papes d’Avignon, 127–128.
83. Philip Hughes, History of the Church: The Revolt against the Church, Aquinas to
Luther (Westminster: Sheed and Ward, 1947), vol. 3, 178.
84. A partial text of the bull is available on the website of the Order of Cistercians of
the Strict Observance at http://www.ocso.org/index.php?option=com_docman&
Itemid=120&lang=en.
85. Cited in Amargier, “Benedict XII,” 161.
86. See Bernard Guillemain, “Benedetto XII,” at Treccani, Enciclopedia dei Papi, http:/
/www.treccani.it/enciclopedia/benedetto-xii_(Enciclopedia_dei_Papi)/.
87. Arnald of Sarrant, Chronicle of the Twenty-Four Generals of the Order of Friars
Minor, trans. Noël Muscat, O.F.M. (Malta: TAU Franciscan Communications, 2010),
79–80, 530.
88. Favier, Les papes d’Avignon, 130.
89. A detailed account of the construction of the palace is addressed in a later
chapter.
90. Franz Ehrle, “Zur Geschichte des Schatzes, der Bibliothek und des Archivs der
Päpste im vierzehnten Jahrhundert,” Archiv für Literatur- und Kirchengeschichte des Mit-
telalters 1 (1885): 296–299.
 Early Popes 67

91. The Wars of Edward III: Sources and Interpretations, ed. Clifford J. Rogers (Wood-
bridge: Boydell, 1999), 70.
92. Mollat, The Popes at Avignon, 252.
93. Mollat, The Popes at Avignon, 252; Favier, Les papes d’Avignon, 402.
94. Edward III had a claim to the throne of France as grandson of Philip the Fair.
France was at the time trying to recover lands controlled by the British in France,
remnants of Eleanor of Aquitaine’s inheritance.
95. Karsten Plöger, England and the Avignon Popes: The Practice of Diplomacy in Late
Medieval Europe (London: Legenda, 2005), 181.
96. Guillemain, “Benedetto XII.”
97. Guillemain, La cour pontificale, 134–136.
98. Guillemain, La cour pontificale, 156.
 TWO
Papal Monarchy

There is no doubt that the seventeen cardinals who quickly decided on

the election of Pierre Roger as Benedict XII’s successor chose the “star” of
the college. Étienne Baluze’s Lives of the Avignon Popes accentuates the
rapidity with which Clement VI was elected in order to underscore the
unanimous decision of the college. “He was immediately [my emphasis]
elected pope in Avignon” on May 7, 1342, and was crowned in the large
Dominican convent on May 19; the apostolic see had remained vacant for
only thirteen days. 1 Clement’s close rapport with the French crown in
combination with the attendance of the Duke of Normandy (the future
king of France, John the Good) led detractors to insist on his French
partiality. On the other hand, expectations for Clement’s pontificate ran
so high that the second chronicler of his life reports that since he was
crowned on the day of Pentecost, a tongue of fire illuminated his crown’s
jewels, as if he himself received the blessing of the Holy Spirit. 2
In his history of the Avignon popes, Jean Favier clarifies, “He [Pierre
Roger] had acquired the reputation of a skillful and intelligent diplomat,
an impartial mediator, and an expert in political life.” 3 For Favier, the
cardinals unanimously elected an exceptional man. Pierre Roger chose
Clement as his papal name to emphasize what he considered the emble-
matic qualities of a pope: mercifulness and leniency. Like his predeces-
sors, Clement staunchly defended the sovereignty and infallibility of the
papacy and acted to protect the Church from secular infringement. Ironi-
cally, Clement’s accomplishments have disappeared behind the dark ve-
neer laid down by his detractors. He has become the emblematic repre-

69
70 Chapter 2

sentative of the Avignon popes, their ostentatiousness, venality, and pro-

clivity for worldly court life. While the latter description partially exag-
gerates the truth, Clement was indeed remembered to have said, “Prede-
cessores nostri nesciverunt esse papa” (Our predecessors did not know how
to be pope), stressing his own elevated conception of his office. 4
Still, it is important to remember that Clement dealt with many press-
ing issues during his papacy, including the traditional foreign policy
quagmire in Italy, the Hundred Years’ War between England and France,
and the condemnation of Louis of Bavaria in the empire. He is the pope
who defined the Christian jubilee and the theology of indulgences and,
above all, faced the greatest existential crisis of the Middle Ages with the
arrival of the Black Death in 1348. As his biographer Diana Wood states:
Clement VI was a fascinating and controversial figure. He has often
been regarded as the most typical of the Avignon popes, and has there-
fore tended to be the most vilified of them. He has been seen as the
symbol of the period of ‘Babylonish captivity’, a period said to be deca-
dent and devoid of ideas, and sullied with nepotism and vice, a period
when the popes were entirely in thrall to the French monarchy. This
apart, his pontificate, 1342–52, was an exceptionally eventful one. 5

HOW TO BE POPE: THE PAPAL MONARCHY OF CLEMENT VI

Pierre Roger was a native of southern France, from Limousin, born into
the minor nobility (his father was Lord of Rosières) at the Castle of Mau-
mont, in the diocese of Tulle. Pierre Roger’s career accelerated at light-
ning speed. After studying with the Black Monks at a local priory, in 1301
he joined the Benedictine abbey of La Chaise-Dieu; Pierre was ten years
old at the time. In 1307 he left for Paris in order to pursue his studies in
theology and canon law. There “the young monk’s reputation as a theolo-
gian, canonist, orator, and teacher began to increase by leaps and
bounds.” 6 In one famous discourse, he compared Aquinas to Augustine;
in another, he debated against the Defensor pacis. An anecdote attached to
his time at La Chaise-Dieu insists that Pierre continued to travel often
between Paris and his alma mater, even though he was once attacked by
robbers in the forest of Randan in Auvergne and suffered a head wound.
The prestigious abbey gained further fame through the accomplishments
of its brilliant monk.
 Papal Monarchy 71

Pierre was promoted to master in theology, laudabiliter, in 1323, and

after receiving a few smaller benefices was nominated abbot of Fécamp in
Normandy in 1326. This new office made him at once vassal to the kings
of both England and France, as he continued to “serve” the French king
as councillor and preacher. It is at the French court that he met the future
Holy Roman emperor Charles IV, who explains his friendship with the
future pope:
One of his [Philip’s] councilors was a very sagacious man, the abbot of
Fécamp originally from Limoges, a persuasive person of cultured and
upright character. He preached on Ash Wednesday, the first year of
Philip’s rule as king, and then he celebrated Mass so quickly that he
won everyone’s gratitude. After King Charles’ death, with whom I had
lived for five years, I lived with Philip whose sister became my wife.
The command of language and beauty of expression in that sermon of
the abbot, while I looked at him and listened to his words, pleased me
so much that I was suddenly moved to question why so much grace
flowed down upon me from him. I came to know him intimately, and
he lovingly helped me like a father even teaching me the Holy Scrip-
tures privately. 7

With the recommendation of Pope John XXII, Pierre was made bishop
of Arras in 1328, an appointment that received the strong support of the
new king of France, Philip VI of Valois. With this additional charge, the
young monk became versed in temporal and ecclesiastical affairs, gaining
experience and doing favors that worked to his advantage. He entered
the French parliament in 1329 and was elevated to archbishop, first of
Sens and then Rouen in 1330. Pierre quickly became the confidant of
Philip VI, entering the royal council, the Chambre des enquêtes of parlia-
ment, and finally heading the Chambre des comptes, that is, the treasury,
all in the same year. The culmination of Pierre’s rapid rise at the French
court came with his promotion to chancellor of France, which he also
achieved in 1330. It is of note that these promotions initiated by the king
occurred as he argued against French royal taxation of the clergy and
vehemently defended the Church’s jurisdiction against the crown. Clem-
ent showed his rectitude in that he did not yield to what could be per-
ceived as his employer’s pressure—he considered himself a man of the
Church before he was a servant of the king. His diplomatic skills were
put to the test during the beatific vision controversy, when John XXII
turned to Pierre and his skills to regain the confidence of the house of
France. 8
72 Chapter 2

It is during his tenure at Rouen that, according to John Wrigley, Pierre

Roger supported several of his kinsmen who had joined the ranks of the
clergy. Wrigley lists a long series of collaborators and friends who profit-
ed from Pierre’s new position to demonstrate that Pierre’s nepotism
mainly touched his ecclesiastical collaborators instead of his kin. This
favoritism continued when Benedict XII promoted him to cardinal of
Santi Nereo e Achilleo in 1338. 9 Still, Pierre Roger’s behavior was not
unusual for his time and station. Most medieval historians argue that
nepotism as practiced in Avignon offered the popes a trustworthy elite
on whom they could rely. As Pierre Jugie emphasizes, once Pierre be-
came pope,
Although he [Clement] allowed his lay relations to profit from his for-
tune, to which they owed, in large part, their riches, it is particularly to
ecclesiastics of his family that he ensured brilliant careers. Of the 25
cardinals he created, 19 came from the South of France among them 11
Limousins (the others were 2 French from the North, one Castilian, and
3 Italians). Among them were his own brother Hugues and five cou-
sins, including Pierre Roger de Beaufort, the future Gregory XI. He
peopled the Curia with Limousins, especially in key posts. 10

When the college chose Pierre Roger as the next pope in 1342, “Cardinals
did not choose to elect a paragon of piety. They knew that Pierre Roger
had nothing in him of a humble man. The conclave chose deliberately a
great lord and a statesman.” 11 Perhaps what distinguished Clement from
other Avignon popes was his willingness to bring the grandeur of
“Rome” to its new city. As his predecessors had only assuaged “exile,”
Clement constructed an Avignonese papal identity that paralleled that of
Rome. In Avignon he legitimated Italian leaders such as Cola di Rienzo
and Joanna of Naples, and he was the first pope to use the palace for
ritual functions that paralleled those that had been performed in Rome.
Clement’s new palace actually replicated Rome’s sacred space; thus, he
brought the sacred city within his palace’s walls.
It is difficult to assess whether the population at large lauded Clem-
ent’s election in the late spring of 1342. In Baluze’s Lives of the Avignon
Popes, the election is first discussed with reference to the floods that
plagued Germany, France, and the “entire world” the first summer of his
rule. It rained so much that in many cities, people desperately clung to
life on city walls as bridges and towers collapsed; in Avignon, people had
to navigate the streets in little boats. 12 One of Clement’s earliest acts was
 Papal Monarchy 73

to attend to the thousands of poor clerics who crowded the city in hopes
of receiving his “grace,” that is, a benefice. Peter of Herenthals put their
number at one hundred thousand, and (even though he certainly exag-
gerated) this provides a sense of the population surge that followed a
papal election. 13 Next, Clement met with Roman representatives begging
for his return to the banks of the Tiber. Although the Romans urged him
to reconsider his position, Clement insisted on remaining in Avignon, but
he offered them an important gift, both spiritually and materially re-
warding: he declared 1350 a jubilee year. It was Boniface VIII who had
first begun the practice of the “jubilee year,” first declaring 1300 a year of
special grace for pilgrims visiting Rome and its basilicas. An occasion of
great spiritual benefit to Christian believers, in the jubilee year pilgrims
received special indulgences and remission of the penalties for their sins
to be suffered in the afterlife. But of equally important benefit materially,
a jubilee was an economic boon for the city and became a distinctive
highlight in the reign of the pope who mandated it. Clement, of course,
did not know at the time that the arrival of the Black Death in 1348 would
give special meaning to his jubilee. Clement explained his decision to
halve the span of time separating holy years, from a century to only fifty
years, as a means of accommodating infinite spiritual graces to limited
human proportions. Few humans lived one hundred years, thus a shorter
span afforded greater numbers the opportunity to partake in the benefits
of the jubilee.
Although he could not have known it at the time of its publication,
Clement’s bull Unigentius Dei filius, dated January 27, 1343, came to de-
fine the Catholic Church’s theory on indulgences and ultimately helped
to lay the foundations for the revolt of Martin Luther and the Reforma-
tion. The bull recognized the existence of a “treasury of merits of the
Church in Heaven” that was solely available to the pope who, as Vicar of
Christ on earth, could dispense these merits at will (as he did with the
Church’s temporal goods). The pope thus began to define the theology of
indulgences; he could distribute the “treasury of merits” as he distributed
benefices in the temporal world. 14 An additional text specified which
churches pilgrims needed to visit and how long they had to remain in the
city (fifteen to thirty days) to receive their full indulgence. 15 The promul-
gation of the Jubilee Year of 1350 underscored the solicitous care that the
pope showed for Rome’s spiritual and economic survival. 16
74 Chapter 2

CLEMENT VI AND ROME: COLA DI RIENZO

Amid the group of Roman citizens who petitioned Clement for his return
to Rome stood a young notary, the humble son of an innkeeper with a
most unusual future, Cola di Rienzo. In Avignon Rienzo met and struck
up a friendship with the great Petrarch, and their correspondence details
their relationship. It was under Petrarch’s direction that Rienzo read av-
idly about the rich history of the Eternal City. According to Rienzo’s
anonymous biographer (the Anonimo romano), his travel to Avignon in
1342 marked the culmination of a series of events that had started with
the presumed unavenged murder of Rienzo’s younger brother. He
blamed this personal loss on Rome’s endemic violence, exacerbated by
poor municipal governance. Cola’s thirst for revenge drove his personal
ambition, political education, and rise, and finally secured his nomina-
tion to the Roman embassy to the papal court at Avignon. 17 According to
Ronald Musto’s recent biography, Rienzo “was regarded even then as the
best orator in Rome and would soon be known as the best of his age. Cola
knew well the art and technique of public speaking.” 18 It is quite easy to
understand how the brilliant orator at once intrigued and captivated a
pope who was fascinated with words and rhetoric. Clement made him a
papal notary. 19 In 1344, Rienzo returned to a Rome still in the clutches of
the inevitable bad governance of the Orsini and Colonna families and
their political networks. 20
In May 1347, Rienzo took action. Backed by the anti-Colonna barons
and their respective networks, he staged a coup to restore imperial Rome,
making himself a tribune. His “revolution” harked back to the city’s
mythical past and yearned for the return of the so-called good govern-
ance (buono stato) of the virtuous Romans. Petrarch, who could not partic-
ipate, supported the movement from afar and enjoined his friend to ex-
emplify the merits of those ancient worthies he had encountered in his
studies. Rienzo organized an army that defeated the baronial resistance
(November 20, 1347) but then quickly dismissed them, owing perhaps to
his unstable and volatile temperament or his own hubris. Unfortunately
for Rienzo, in December the Colonna took the city back and he was ex-
pelled. In the meantime, he had managed at once to threaten mutual
enemies (such as the Avignon pope and the Roman barons) and to alien-
ate the Roman commune, who soon grew tired of his taxes and tyranny.
 Papal Monarchy 75

As recent historiography has shown, Rienzo—who may be viewed

variously as a tyrant, patriot, or martyr—became enthralled with Rome’s
imperial history and was most skillful at manipulating myth, symbols,
and ritual. He knew how to exploit both the collective memory that Ro-
mans had of their own past and their common frustration with baronial
violence, intimidation, and exactions. After his expulsion, Rienzo contin-
ued his endeavors, prophesying the fall of the current pope and the rise
of a new saint, Francis of Assisi. He found refuge in the Abruzzi during
the Black Death and eventually made his way to Prague, where he pre-
sented his case to the Holy Roman emperor Charles IV. He was arrested
there in 1350, brought to Avignon, tried by the Inquisition, and eventual-
ly released by Clement’s successor, Innocent VI, in 1352. 21 Supported by
the new pope, Rienzo was sent to Cardinal Albornoz, papal legate in Italy
for the reconquest of the Papal States, who planned to use him as lever-
age against the Roman barons. Rienzo reentered Rome in 1354. By that
time, he had been appointed senator. But Rienzo quickly fell into some
form of madness or delusion that rendered him violent and somewhat
incoherent, costing him the support of the Roman people. The barons,
especially the Colonna, exacted long-sought revenge, motivating an an-
gry mob to hack Rienzo to death two months later.
The pope’s role in Rienzo’s story exemplifies how the Avignon papa-
cy never lost oversight of the old capital. Involvement with Rome, city
and myth, was the linchpin of papal authority and policy. Melding Avi-
gnon into Rome legitimated Avignon and allowed the papacy to project
its authority in temporal and spiritual matters. As Diana Wood states, “It
was vital that the identity between Rome and the universal Church
should be accepted by all Christians, and it needed to be spelt out espe-
cially to Eastern Christians, those who had no Roman conditioning on
which to draw.” 22 Clement remained intransigent with the Eastern Chris-
tians, making little effort to reunite Catholic and Orthodox churches but
instead sending mendicant missionaries to Armenia and the Caucasus,
for example, to convert them to Latin Christianity.

CLEMENT VI AND JOANNA OF NAPLES

Southern Italy also remained on Clement’s mind. The life and rule of
Queen Joanna of Naples (1326–1382) is closely associated with the Avi-
gnon papacy since she led the powerful Kingdom of Naples, a vassal and
76 Chapter 2

staunch supporter of the papacy. Her long and tumultuous rule involved
many popes, from Clement VI to Clement VII, and she played a signifi-
cant role in the diplomacy of many pontiffs. Joanna was the daughter of
Robert of Anjou’s eldest son, the Duke of Calabria. More to the point, she
was the great-granddaughter of the founder of the Angevin dynasty in
Italy, Charles I of Anjou, brother of Saint Louis. Charles I had received
Naples and Sicily from the papacy in the 1260s as a reward for his con-
quest of what was then Hohenstauffen territory. From that point on, the
King of Naples became a vassal of the pope. This Angevin southern
kingdom buffered the papal territories from southerly attacks; preserving
them from unfriendly Ghibelline hands was an absolute necessity. The
Angevins eventually lost Sicily to Aragon (during the Sicilian Vespers in
1282), but the dream of Italian conquests remained a cornerstone of
French foreign policy for many years. Joanna of Naples was also Count-
ess of Provence and Forcalquier, a role drawing her closely to the Avi-
gnon papacy as she was overlord of the territory on which it resided. This
is why she was easily convinced to sell Avignon to the pope in 1348. Last,
as titular queen of Jerusalem (a somewhat empty title since the Christian
Levant had vanished in the fourteenth century), Joanna’s rule represent-
ed hope for future crusades.
Born in 1326, Joanna was betrothed as a child to Andrew of Hungary;
they wed in 1342. Andrew was a somewhat distant relative, the son of
Carobert (himself a son of Robert of Anjou’s brother and, as such, her
cousin thrice removed). He represented the eastern branch of the Ange-
vins, who considered Naples their own. In any event, dynastic politics
backfired. Once married, Joanna insisted that her husband remain strictly
a prince consort. This caveat greatly peeved her Hungarian in-laws, espe-
cially her brother-in-law King Louis of Hungary, who resented the fact
that Andrew could not rule. 23 As a result, Naples divided into several
factions, variously defending or reviling Joanna for fully assuming her
role as queen. Her detractors, uncomfortable with Joanna’s enthusiastic
embrace of her royal duties, sent envoys to the pope in order to convince
him to allow Andrew to rule with and for her—and be crowned. Joanna’s
behavior was construed as a reversal of the natural order, one that must
be corrected. Petrarch was unsparing in his disparagement of the city and
its queen, accusing her of all sorts of things, but deploring especially her
tolerance for gladiator games within the city. He fumed, “But is it any
wonder that they act brazenly under the cover of darkness without wit-
 Papal Monarchy 77

nesses, when in this Italian city in broad daylight with royalty and the
populace as spectators infamous gladiatorial games are permitted of a
wildness that is greater than we associate with barbarians?” 24
But Joanna stood firm, defending her administration and refusing to
allow the coronation of her spouse. She argued that as his wife she was
the person most likely to advance his best interests. At first the pope
agreed with her and was not inclined to see Naples allied with Hungary,
but the kingdom grew so fractious that in 1345 he decided to send his
legate, Aimery de Châlus, to oversee her administration and coronation
(alongside her husband). The issue became moot, however, when, on
September 18, 1345, on the eve of his coronation, Andrew was brutally
murdered, strangled, stabbed, sexually mutilated, hanged, and defenes-
trated. 25
Joanna was immediately considered the instigator of the murder, la-
beled a she-wolf and unfit to rule. Andrew’s brother, King Louis of Hun-
gary, and his mother, Elizabeth, requested her deposition and her crown,
but Clement (as overlord of Naples) temporized. He sided with Joanna’s
cousins, Charles of Durazzo and Robert of Taranto, allowing a purge of
her court as a compromise. Infuriated, Louis of Hungary invaded Naples
in 1347–1348 while Joanna fled to Avignon with her new husband, her
cousin, Louis of Taranto (Louis and Robert were sons of Philip of Taran-
to, Robert of Anjou’s brother). It was while in Avignon that Joanna
“mortgaged” the city to the pope for the sum of eighty thousand florins.
At the same time, Emperor Charles IV, as suzerain of Provence, surren-
dered to the pope his feudal rights to the city (a testament to Clement’s
negotiating skills). 26 With her coffers refilled, Joanna was able to regain
Naples and her throne in July 1348. She was eventually crowned along-
side her husband in 1352. 27 As for Louis of Hungary, after a second failed
attempt to take Naples in 1350, he abandoned that effort in order to
pressure Venice and to further crusades in Lithuania and Bulgaria. The
inept rule of Louis of Taranto, who basically seized control of Naples
from Joanna, and the failed attempt at regaining Sicily kept Joanna at
least in the thoughts (if not in the favor) of the pope. In December 1352,
Clement died (Louis lived on until 1363), but there is no doubt that the
queen’s adventures weighed heavily on Clement’s mind. 28
78 Chapter 2

CLEMENT VI AND ITALY: MILAN AND LOUIS OF BAVARIA

Rome and Naples were not the pope’s only Italian preoccupations. Clem-
ent wavered for many years in his relations with traditionally Ghibelline
Milan. The archbishop of this powerful city in north-central Italy had
been an early supporter of Louis of Bavaria and his antipope, Nicholas V.
After Louis’s excommunication, Giovanni Visconti returned to Avi-
gnonese obedience and received his archbishopric. This did not stop him
from invading Bologna, an act that incurred papal excommunication.
Clement then recanted, choosing to appease rather than antagonize, and
he offered Visconti the vicariate of Bologna for twelve years. 29 His hesita-
tions may be indicative of Clement’s diplomatic savvy; offering a high
position to a Visconti may have been a way of ingratiating the Ghibel-
lines to the pope. Still, the Ghibelline party was buttressed by Louis of
Bavaria’s positions (even if erratic). Louis’s alliance with Edward III
against France lasted until 1341; the emperor then returned his support to
France. The emperor’s use of dynastic policies (rewarding his wife, son,
cousins, and nephews with lands) allowed him to concentrate more terri-
tory into his hands and alienate German princes. In July 1346 Clement
opted to support the election of his former student, Charles IV of Luxem-
bourg, as rival emperor. In doing so, the pope received assurances that
the new emperor would defend the Church and steer away from Italian
affairs, abandoning large chunks of land in Provence to the pope. Mean-
while, Louis maintained the allegiance of the Teutonic Knights, whom he
supported in their northern and Eastern “crusades,” and of the Hanseatic
and imperial cities. The struggle between both emperors could have fes-
tered a long time and divided German allegiances, but Louis died in
October 1347, putting an end to some twenty years of papal and imperial
contention. 30 It is quite remarkable that even before Louis’s death in 1347,
Cola di Rienzo, taking his office as tribune of Rome extremely seriously,
called on both rival emperors, the imperial electoral college, and repre-
sentatives of the free cities of Italy to conduct a new election! 31 But no one
listened. With the disappearance of Louis of Bavaria, the pope became
free to focus on his main preoccupation: negotiating a long-lasting peace
between England and France.
 Papal Monarchy 79

CLEMENT VI: ARBITER OF THE HUNDRED YEARS’ WAR

Clement’s rise to prominence paralleled the end of the French Capetian

dynasty and the advancement of the House of Valois. When Charles IV of
France died in 1328, the circumstances of his succession brought to light a
painful reality. As the last of Philip the Fair’s sons, Charles died without
any living male descendants. The lack of male heirs allowed Philip’s
daughter Isabelle and her male descendants a possible claim to the throne
of France. Capetian lawyers made sure that this would not happen, reen-
acting the early medieval Salic law that prohibited a woman (and her
children) from ascending the French throne. One is forced to wonder
whether the law would have been revived were Isabelle of France and
Edward II of England not married. British hopes were doused when the
throne passed to Philip VI of Valois, a cadet branch of the Capetian (he
was the son of Charles, a brother of Philip the Fair). This election left
Edward III of England, son of Isabelle and Edward II, bitter and crestfal-
len. Herein lies a central cause of the Hundred Years’ War.
Regardless of French dynastic policy, Philip VI favored Pierre Roger
(as had his cousin, the late French king Charles). There is no doubt that
the French crown favored an influential rising star of its own in the
Church. Philip named Pierre Roger bishop of Arras shortly after his coro-
nation. The king further advanced Pierre Roger with promotions to the
archbishopric of Sens and later Rouen, even though Roger opposed some
of Philip’s policies (especially his taxation of the French clergy). 32 Pierre
participated in the king’s assembly at Vincennes in December 1329,
which attempted to settle ecclesiastical and royal prerogatives; the arch-
bishop valiantly protected the French church. Philip also requested in
1328 that Pierre accompany the failed embassy requiring Edward of En-
gland to present his homage to the king of France for his territory in
Guyenne (Bordeaux and the Gascony coast). Edward at first refused, and
the territory was confiscated until he finally relented in June 1329. In
turn, Pierre met Edward for the confirmation and fealty that the English
king owed the king of France for the archbishopric of Rouen and, as such,
established the personal rapport that he used later as pope. On numerous
occasions, the archbishop attempted without success to mediate a peace
between Philip and Edward that would allow their eventual departure
together for a crusade. 33
80 Chapter 2

When the idea of a crusade failed, French and British antagonism

revived even further, and Pierre Roger’s role as mediator also increased.
Still, in 1338, the pope’s ally, France, condemned the alliance between
Edward and Louis of Bavaria (a staunch enemy of the papacy), justifying
posthumously France’s confiscation of Guyenne. Edward argued that he
went to Louis in retaliation for this seizure of English-claimed territory.
Named cardinal in 1339, Pierre assumed greater diplomatic responsibil-
ity for this issue, filling a position that John Wrigley defines as “special
secretary of state for English and French affairs.” 34 There is no doubt that
when Pierre ascended to the papal throne he was the best-informed per-
son on the situation. But his partiality and financial support of France
made successful negotiations close to impossible. Most authors of the
time accused Clement of favoring France; but William of Ockham sum-
marized their views most bluntly when he said, “The said lord Clement is
schismatic because he creates schism between the kings of England and
France, and favours one side, and provokes wars and strife between
them.” 35 Clement cannot be accused of not having tried a peaceful solu-
tion, however.
Soon after his election in 1342, the pope sent Cardinals Pierre des Prés
and Annibaldo Caetani of Ceccano to Brittany in order to negotiate the
ineffective Truce of Malestroit (January 19, 1343), which aimed to end the
civil war that had originated with the death of the duke of Brittany in
1341. Jean de Montfort, one of the claimants to the duchy of Brittany, was
moved by fears of his rival claimant, Jeanne of Penthièvre, wife of Philip
VI’s nephew, Charles of Blois, and thus had offered his allegiance to
England. Montfort’s alliance with Edward allowed the English control of
several of Brittany’s ports, giving them easy access to Normandy and the
rest of France. From 1343 to 1344 the pope attempted to organize a con-
ference among all parties to bring them to a peaceful settlement; Clement
again acted as mediator. 36 Yet the talks only deadlocked. France viewed
the conflict through the lens of its suzerainty over Guyenne, while the
English claimed the French crown for themselves, creating an obvious
barrier to compromise.
By 1346 the English controlled Brittany and had regained lost territo-
ries in Guyenne. 37 Edward prepared to land his forces in Normandy and
make his way to Paris to defeat its king, which he accomplished at the
Battle of Crécy (August 26, 1346). Before the battle, Edward received
cardinals who offered France’s terms. According to these terms, Edward
 Papal Monarchy 81

could have Guyenne if he were willing to offer his homage to the king of
France. He flatly refused and was encouraged in the legitimacy of his
claim with his resounding victory in the famous Battle of Crécy. The pope
was again embroiled in the talks that led to the Truce of Calais in Septem-
ber 1347, sending Cardinal Annibaldo a second time, accompanied, how-
ever, this time by Étienne Aubert, the future Innocent VI. While the Black
Death decimated Europe’s populace, the truce was extended until 1355. 38
This truce followed the long siege of Calais, where the frustrated Edward
III, eager to return to English soil, demanded the lives of the six most
prominent bourgeois of the city to spare the rest of the population. Ro-
din’s sculpture has immortalized the moment when the defeated captives
presented themselves to the king, nooses around their necks, ready to die
for their city. Their lives were spared only when Edward’s pregnant wife
Philippa interceded with the king on their behalf. Still, Calais’s popula-
tion was expelled and replaced by English inhabitants. The truce main-
tained something of a status quo between both exhausted camps; En-
gland kept its control over Calais, Brittany, Gascony, and Scotland, while
France kept its king. In his study of the diplomacy between England and
the popes, Karsten Plöger argues that Clement’s efforts were never more
than the exertions of a “mutual friend” rather than an “arbitrator.” 39 Both
sides attempted to revive the conflict, but scarce resources and the
scourge of the Black Death prevented any large-scale operations. 40
Clement may have also considered his own papal finances among the
many reasons that pushed him to mitigate a costly war. In English eyes,
the payment of ecclesiastical taxes to the pope benefited French war cof-
fers; Edward III issued writs preventing papal collectors from levying
taxes and calling for their arrest. 41 Edward’s earlier statements bloomed
into the Statutes of Provisors of 1351 that prevented the pope’s handling
of the collation (that is, the making of appointments) of English benefices.
Considering Clement’s considerable investment in making peace be-
tween England and France, a peace he pursued for the common good of
all parties, there must be no doubt that his failure in this endeavor
weighed heavily on his conscience. But the Truce of Calais provided only
short relief for the pope and Western Europe.
82 Chapter 2

THE ARRIVAL OF THE BLACK DEATH

The Black Death reached Avignon around Candlemas 1348. 42 The chroni-
cler of Clement’s first biography insists on the uniqueness of the event,
the appearance of plague on a scale unknown previously in human histo-
ry. This plague caused ulcers and bumps (buboes, or bossa) in the groin
area and armpits; its survivors were too few in number to bury the dead.
In its throes, parents abandoned children, children abandoned parents; it
was a disease that even killed cats, dogs, chickens, and other animals. 43
The impact of the disease will be discussed later, in chapter 5, dedicated
to papal Avignon, but here we must pause to examine Clement’s actions
at the start of the epidemic.
Louis Heyligen of Beeringen accurately described the two early forms
of the disease, both pneumonic and bubonic (also mentioning the buboes
in the groin and armpits areas); and he attests that on the pope’s orders,
anatomical examinations were carried out in Italian cities and in Avi-
gnon. 44 These efforts to establish the biology of the plague according to
the medical standards of his day suggest that Clement possessed a re-
markably scientific mind for the time. Heyligen reported that half the
population of Avignon died of the plague, requiring the pope to purchase
additional burial ground. Clement offered extraordinary spiritual com-
fort to the immense numbers of dying, granting a plenary indulgence to
all those who were both “confessed and contrite.” 45 John Aberth reports
from contemporary sources that the shortage of priests necessitated a
radical solution, and he finds evidence that bishops permitted, in an ex-
traordinary concession, that the dying might confess to anyone (even to a
woman) if they could not find a priest. 46 Clement reluctantly allowed
penitential processions of flagellants in Avignon on certain days of the
week. 47 The pope had condemned flagellants in his bull of October 29,
1349, Inter solicitudines. 48 But in time Clement came to withdraw his op-
position at the urging of the French crown and the University of Paris. 49
According to contemporary chroniclers, a popular flagellation movement
had started in Germany and descended on France, gathering all classes
“noble and ignoble” who publically professed for thirty-two days. In one
of the most volatile and radically apocalyptic of the popular religious
movements of the Middle Ages, the flagellants practiced their peculiar
form of penance night and day, half naked, threatening violence if the
pope forbade clergy to participate. Tearful and loudly lamenting their
 Papal Monarchy 83

sins, the flagellants sang a special song as they fell to the ground in
prostration. 50 A chronicler describes the flagellants as penitentes cruciferos
(penitent crusaders) who counted priests and mendicants among their
ranks and in some instances were even led by women. No wonder the
pope had anathematized them, for the unconventional organization and
radical spirit of the flagellants goes far in helping to explain their con-
demnation! 51
As often is the case in periods of radicalization, scapegoating oc-
curred. The flagellants’ behavior, their songs and religious devotion incit-
ed participants and onlookers to anti-Jewish violence in the towns
through which they passed. Although in his research John Aberth has
refuted any link between the movement and Jewish pogroms, it remains
a fact that attacks against Jews multiplied during the plague years. In
particular, Jews were accused of poisoning wells, a claim that ran counter
to the contemporary logic that surmised the disease was airborne. 52
Clement reacted courageously, protecting the Jewish population by the
best means he could. In July 1348 he reissued the 1120 bull Sicut Judeis,
which originally aimed to protect the Jewish population in the aftermath
of the First Crusade. Again in September 1348 Clement instructed his
clergy to protect the Jews; he spoke out against the pogroms one more
time in October when he pointed to the financial motivations behind the
attacks. 53 In this last bull, Clement stated:
We are nevertheless mindful that Our Saviour chose to be born of
Jewish stock when he put on mortal flesh for the salvation of the hu-
man race . . . following in the footsteps of our predecessors . . . we have
taken the Jews under the shield of our protection, ordering among the
rest that no Christian presume in any way to wound or kill Jews, or
take their money or expel them from his service before their term of
employment has expired . . . it has been brought to our attention by
public fame—or, more accurately, infamy—that numerous Christians
are blaming the plague with which God, provoked by their sins, has
afflicted the Christian people, on poisonings carried out by the Jews . . .
yet we should be prepared to accept the force of the argument that it
cannot be . . . because throughout many parts of the world the same
plague, by the hidden judgment of God, has afflicted and afflicts Jews
themselves and many other races who have never lived alongside
them. 54

Clement’s bull shows a certain moral courage and logical mind, but he
was still a man of his age. Clement spent the entire epidemic, according
84 Chapter 2

to Mathias of Neuenburg, “shut up in his chamber where he had large

fires continually burning.” 55 In addition, Clement composed the text of a
special votive Mass to be said in times of plague, a work that remained in
use in the Roman Catholic Church until the twentieth century and that
earned whoever heard or said it 260 days’ worth of indulgence. Popular
belief held that people who heard Clement’s Mass for five days while
carrying a burning candle would not die suddenly. 56

CLEMENT VI: THE HUMANIST

In her biography of the pope, Diana Wood sees the fledgling signs of
early humanism in Clement’s official and private behavior. On the one
hand, Clement was a man of his time, and his actions were consistent
with his era and his preeminent position: he preached, granted indul-
gences, wrote a Mass, reluctantly allowed the flagellant movement, and
credited the belief that the plague was retribution for the grievous sins of
his time, perhaps most notably Queen Joanna’s murder of her husband,
Andrew. Yet on the other hand, the pope perhaps anticipated the inter-
ests of later humanist princes: he demonstrated a keen scientific interest,
as we have seen, in the anatomical studies he permitted. A collector and
student of ancient texts, he patronized scholars and artists at his court,
described as Europe’s most brilliant. 57 Ronald Musto concludes that
Clement must be regarded as an important figure of transition:
Often called an early humanist pope, he was more a medieval poly-
math. His interests ranged from crusading history to astronomy; and in
the papal library he supplemented the liturgical, legal, and theological
collections of John XXII and Benedict XII with the classics, especially
Cicero, but also Pliny, Valerius Maximus, and Macrobius, and with
books in Hebrew and Arabic. Yet while his many sermons also quote
Seneca, Cicero, and Boethius, they reveal not a secular man but one
deeply familiar with Scripture, the early church fathers, and Bernard of
Clairvaux. Clement was also a great patron of learning and the arts,
and his generosity to both office seekers, such as Petrarch, and diplo-
matic guests was unmatched, his reputation for opulence unrivaled, his
ceremony, feasts, and festivals the envy of all other European
princes. 58

The special minted coat of arms that he had etched in the stones of his
“new” palace (d’argent à la bande d’azur accompagnée de six roses de gueules
boutonnées d’or, trois en chef et trois en pointe) tied the pope to that place
 Papal Monarchy 85

and the man to his office. The keys of St. Peter and the triple-crowned
papal tiara supported the azure band and stars of his family crest. Clem-
ent imprinted the stones of the palace with his name and redefined the
Avignon papacy. In a campaign to remake Avignon as an altera Roma, he
renamed many sites in the city so that they might mirror their Roman
originals. In 1344 he renamed the Chapel of St. Michael, located above the
Tower of the Wardrobe, Roma. 59 Clement also built his own great Chapel
of St. Peter, intended for papal coronations, in Avignon. Rome’s outdoor
coronation ritual, which spanned the city between the great axis of the
Via papalis from St. Peter to St. John Lateran, was now replicated inside
the newly revamped palace between the chapels of St. Peter and St.
John—the latter decorated by Matteo Giovanetti to honor (just as at the
Lateran) both the Baptist and the Evangelist. Bernhard Schimmelpfennig
was the first papal historian to identify how Avignon’s popes, and espe-
cially Clement, linked papal ritual to the palace, uniting the popes and
their residence. 60 An architectural history of Clement’s new palace shows
how his constructions (the Tower of the Wardrobe, the new Audience,
the Great Chapel, the gardens, the decorations and painting of the Cham-
bre du Cerf and of the chapels of Saints Martial, Michael, and John) all
reflected the brilliant, colorful character of the pope and bound the pope
to his French residence. 61 Further, Clement used the large chapel at-
tached to the palace’s kitchens to recount the life of the French Saint-
Martial, sent by Peter to evangelize his native Limousin. Clement com-
manded Giovanetti to paint the exquisite frescoes on the chapel’s arches
that still charm visitors today, a masterpiece of the fourteenth century
ordered by a pontiff who certainly proved true the judgment of his times
about him: he knew how to be pope. Most importantly, Clement was the
living incarnation of the saying, “Rome is where the pope is.”
Clement VI suffered from gout, gallstones, and purulent abscesses
that plagued him his entire life and as a consequence kept many doctors
at his court. Despite their efforts, Clement died from a severe hemorrhage
on December 6, 1352, after the rupture of a tumor found on his back. 62
His body lay in state in the Cathedral of Notre-Dame des Doms until
March 1353; it was then transported to La Chaise-Dieu in accordance
with his last wishes. His large and impressive tomb is still visible there
today. The cortège that accompanied Clement to La Chaise-Dieu left on
February 28, 1353; his successor, Innocent VI, offered the sum of five
thousand florins for the journey. The procession included Hugues Roger,
86 Chapter 2

the late pope’s brother, cardinal of San Lorenzo in Damaso; Guillaume de

la Jugie, cardinal deacon of Santa Maria in Cosmedin; Nicolas Besse,
cardinal of Santa Maria in Via Lata; Clement’s nephew Pierre Roger de
Beaufort, the future pope Gregory XI, cardinal deacon of Santa Maria
Nova; Clement’s cousin, Guillaume d’Aigrefeuille, cardinal of Santa Ma-
ria in Trastevere; and Count Guillaume Roger de Beaufort, Clement VI’s
older brother. Still, the cortège was not as numerous as the forty-four
figures who surrounded the pope’s tomb at La Chaise-Dieu, representing
the kin and friends whom Clement had supported during his reign. In
death, as in life, Clement showed himself magnanimous. 63

LAWYER AND CONQUEROR: INNOCENT VI

The college of twenty-five cardinals that elected Clement VI’s successor

again acted swiftly. They entered the papal palace in conclave on Sunday,
December 16, 1352, and chose Étienne Aubert, cardinal bishop of Ostia,
just two days later. But the speediness of the process did not belie the
importance of this conclave. The initial choice of the cardinals was a holy
man, the Limousin Jean Birel. His lack of experience, according to Cardi-
nal Talleyrand of Périgord, did not fit with the times or circumstances. 64
The college relented and opted instead for Étienne Aubert, who, while
not as flamboyant as his predecessor, nevertheless bore the same profile.
He was an experienced administrator extremely familiar with the French
court. Again the seat of the Holy See was filled by a pope who had served
both the courts of France and the Church.
Étienne Aubert was born into the minor nobility of Limousin some-
time in the late 1280s. He studied law in Toulouse and received his docto-
rate in 1330. His began his legal career as a judge in Toulouse in 1321,
continuing in this post in the employ of the French crown until 1334. At
that date, Philip VI made him his commissioner, counselor, and clerk of
the parliament. As such, the king sent Aubert to Avignon on several
occasions from 1337 to 1338. Pleasing both the king and pope, he received
the bishoprics of Noyon in 1338 and Clermont in 1340. Clement VI
named him cardinal of Santi Giovanni e Paolo in September 1342; and in
1348 Aubert became the pope’s Grand Penitentiary (dealing with cases of
high-ranking confessor-penitents). In February 1352 Clement also named
him cardinal-bishop of Ostia and Velletri. This title was prestigious: the
cardinal-bishop of Ostia occupied an important liturgical office. He acted
 Papal Monarchy 87

as the consecrator of the pope in the papal coronation liturgy. Thus the
choice of the cardinals would seem logical—if Aubert had not been old,
frail, and in poor health at the time of his election. His physical state
betrays the cardinals’ intention. They chose someone they could control.
As Yves Renouard suggests, he was a pope who “would be harmless” to
the cardinals. 65
The second event that marked this conclave was of great historical
significance. Before they named a pope, all the cardinals signed a “con-
clave capitulation”—the first of its kind in papal history. A papal con-
clave is a complicated business, not effected in a single stroke. It was, and
is, of course, a spiritual affair to determine the leader of the Catholic
Church. But leadership entails relations of power and politics, personal-
ity, and diplomacy. Christianity evolved significantly over the course of
the first millennium of its history, and so did the nomination of a pope
and the type of power he wielded. Similarly, the cardinals’ role grew
with time, from solely liturgical functions in Rome’s great basilicas to
papal advising and diplomacy. If their freedom of action was limited
during a pope’s rule, cardinals usually argued in favor of heightened
responsibilities during the vacant see. In the thirteenth century, canonists
such as Henry of Segusio (the Hostiensis) proposed that during a period
of sede vacante, in which there was no reigning pontiff, cardinals should
supervise the Church’s spiritual and temporal matters. The Hostiensis
voiced what the cardinals really yearned for, a form of oligarchy in which
a council of cardinals ruled alongside the pope. Their dreams were shat-
tered with Gregory X’s 1274 bull Ubi periculum, which created the con-
clave. The bull decreed without any ambiguity whatsoever that the sole
responsibility of the cardinals during the sede vacante was to elect a new
pope.
In the conclave of 1352 at Avignon, the cardinals, perhaps motivated
by the change of location and Clement’s monarchic rule, attempted to
regain some of their former power in a context they considered condu-
cive to negotiations: the conclave. They returned to the old dream, put-
ting pressure on all members of the college to accept the capitulation
which stipulated that anyone elected would limit his college to twenty
cardinals. This rule also stated that a pope would not demote, nominate,
or expel any member of the college without that member’s consent; that
he would ban papal nepotism; and that he would consult cardinals before
levying any new subsidies, which should in the event be borne by the
88 Chapter 2

treasuries of both the pope and the cardinals. Last, they requested total
freedom of expression. Some cardinals accepted the capitulation, solemn-
ly swearing to respect its conditions; others stalled. Étienne Aubert swore
“that if one of them were elected, he would observe it insofar as it did not
conflict with church law, and that, on election, he would investigate with
care the validity of the terms of the document, and, therefore, the validity
of their oaths.” 66 After researching the topic, on July 6, 1353, Innocent
decreed Sollicitudo pastoralis, which repudiated the capitulation on the
legal grounds that it breached Gregory X’s Ubi periculum. A conclave
could not reform; it only elected a new pope. Innocent also made it clear
that as supreme pontiff the pope could not be limited in his actions by
anyone. 67 The issue was solved temporarily. But it would reappear again
with the Great Western Schism (1378–1417), which brought the cardinals’
oligarchic agenda to its full conclusion. It will be discussed in depth in
chapter 6.
Once crowned amid great festivities, Innocent settled into the busi-
ness of ruling. He was not his predecessor; Bernard Guillemain describes
him as a pontiff of good intentions but indecisive and somewhat over-
whelmed by the task. 68 One of the main issues at hand was the state of
the papal treasury, depleted by the grand politics of his predecessor.
Even if he wished to, Innocent did not have the means to continue Clem-
ent’s policies. Thus he had to choose carefully where he would invest his
resources. Innocent picked Italy and the reconquest of the Papal States;
he was the first pope in many years who considered a return of the
papacy to Rome. One could not go without the other. But the task was
daunting and expensive; it necessitated almost the entire revenues of the
papacy. Numbers are telling. According to Herman Hoberg, the wars in
Italy cost the pope 1,549,000 florins at an annual average of 235,000 flo-
rins. The papacy income during the entire reign of Innocent reached only
some 1,811,622 florins. Hence the treasury could barely survive with this
scale of expenses. The pope used his system of tax collectors and raised
the funds from Italian taxes at an average of 135,000 florins a year. 69 For
the rest, he sold precious objects from the treasury and started borrowing
from Italian bankers.
 Papal Monarchy 89

THE LANDS OF ST. PETER

In June 1353 Innocent VI promoted Cardinal Albornoz (the Castilian Gil

Álvarez Carillo Albornoz) to vicar general for all the lands of St. Peter
and papal legates. Peter Partner has shown that the legates yielded “qua-
si monarchical powers,” going so far as to call them “satrap-legates” to
indicate the range of control they held. 70 A member of the Spanish aris-
tocracy (he was of the Luna and Carillo families) and a descendant of the
royal lines of Léon and Aragon, Albornoz studied law in Toulouse,
where he probably took classes from Étienne Aubert. He entered the
court of King Alfonso XI of Castile and occupied several positions there
before becoming the leader of the Spanish Church and a political force in
Castile. Albornoz was at once archdeacon of Calatrava, canon regular,
and chaplain. He became archbishop of Toledo in 1338 and chancellor of
Castile in 1339 as he served his king in crusades against the Moors. Jean
Favier describes him as energetic, generous, cultivated, a fine politician,
and a great warlord (he led the victories of Tarifa in 1340 and Gilbraltar
in 1349). 71 A man of the law, he also legislated and drafted the Ordena-
miento de Alcalá that harmonized Castilian laws and participated in sever-
al Spanish synods aimed at reforming the Church. In sum, Albornoz was
the most prominent Spaniard of his time. But at the death of Alfonso XI in
1350, he lost his influence at the Castilian court when he quarreled with
the king, Pedro the Cruel (Peter of Castile, who sided with Edward III in
the Hundred Years’ War). That same year Albornoz left for the court of
Clement VI in Avignon, where he was made cardinal of San Clemente.
Two years later, Clement VI, finding that the man had the qualities re-
quired for the task, named him legate and papal vicar of Italy. Innocent
similarly trusted in Albornoz’s qualities.
The last serious attempt to reconquer the Papal States had occurred
more than a generation earlier, in the reign of John XXII (r. 1316–1334),
when the failed attempt of Bertrand du Pouget had been distracted by
Louis of Bavaria. The Papal States had evolved into a concatenation of
petty tyrants who basically ruled for themselves, recognizing papal suze-
rainty only when it fit their needs, if ever. Albornoz learned the lessons of
the past and turned his focus initially on Rome, leaving Lombardy and
Milan, along with Archbishop Giovanni Visconti (who had also con-
trolled Bologna since 1350), aside for a while. The legate initiated a strate-
gy that used tactics marked by heavy casualties and collateral damage,
90 Chapter 2

mercenary tactics originally tested by the English and French during the
Hundred Years’ War. The fourteenth century witnessed the result of a
tactical move that had gradually replaced the feudal hosts and communal
militias of the earlier Middle Ages: paid troops that were largely orga-
nized in small independent units, well trained and disciplined and effi-
ciently commanded by their captains, known as condottieri (from the Ital-
ian word for “contractor” or “captain”). They remained the leitmotif of
the Italian campaign; at once used, disbanded, and paid off when neces-
sary.
Albornoz arrived in the Papal States in November 1353 and headquar-
tered in Montefiascone. The city was only one of three that had remained
out of Giovanni di Vico’s hands. Vico was Rome’s hereditary prefect, of
Ghibelline allegiance, who controlled most of the Papal States and ac-
cording to some was attempting to carve out for himself a kingdom on
the Italian peninsula. Clement VI had originally excommunicated Vico
when he seized the papal cities of Viterbo in 1338, Orvieto in 1352, and
later Corneto in 1353. Vico also controlled Umbria (including Perugia,
Spoleto, Assisi, and Nocera), a traditionally Guelph region. By late 1353,
Clement had freed Cola di Rienzo from his Avignonese jail; now exoner-
ated of heresy, the tribune of Rome joined the legate in his labors. But
Cola’s imprisonment in Avignon had not solved the Roman issue; the
city was still racked by strife, and Vico’s unrestrained claims were grow-
ing. Thus in September 1353 Innocent decided to send him to Albornoz to
“curb [the barons’] criminal appetite with the bit of justice and so that,
having stifled all hatred and rancor, he will, with the favor of God and
with our aid, cause you and your compatriots to enjoy the prayed for
quiet and peace.” 72 Following through with Clement’s excommunication,
Innocent declared Vico contumacious and decreed the legal seizure of his
territories. Helped by Rienzo and the Roman militias, Albornoz won
hard victories and retook Tuscania, Orvieto, and Viterbo in 1354. He
gained the support of his enemy, however, when in a tactical move he
returned the seized territories to Vico in the 1354 Treaty of Montefias-
cone, with the hope of placating Vico’s ambition with his recognition of
the pope’s lordship, of course. As for Cola di Rienzo, he made his fateful
reentry into Rome in August 1354 and was stabbed to death in October.
Albornoz, buttressed by the armies of the infamous and expensive
German “great companies” and supplemented by troops from Florence,
Siena, and Perugia, then aimed his forces against the tyrants of the Ro-
 Papal Monarchy 91

magna region. He confronted first the Malatesta of Rimini, Pesaro, Anco-

na, and Ascoli. The Malatesta were condottieri who had carved out a
patrimony in central Italy. Innocent excommunicated the Malatesta in
1354, and in 1355 the pontifical army first took Rimini and quickly seized
the rest of the March of Ancona. Albornoz showed a genius for under-
standing Italian politics when he gave the vicariate of Rimini first to
Galeotto Malatesta for ten years; he then changed his mind and replaced
him with Albornoz’s nephew Blasco Fernandez, judicially keeping Mala-
testa gonfaloniere (standard-bearer) of the papal army.
Albornoz continued his successful strategy of defeat and alliance,
sealed by an oath of allegiance to the pope from several tyrants. His
approach usually meant returning the conquered territory to the defeated
party as a vicariate held in the name of the pope. In return, the vicar
provided the papal army with troops and paid an indemnity to the apos-
tolic chamber (the pope’s finance ministry) that paid for the next con-
quests. If this policy worked in the short term, in the end, as Peter Partner
argues,
the apostolic vicariate gave a legitimate title to the formerly abusive
domination of certain families in the Papal State, and . . . partly as a
result of this it became impossible to eradicate the dominion of these
families for the rest of the Middle Ages. Albornoz is usually represent-
ed as the great innovator in the imposition of papal sovereignty in the
Papal State, but viewed in this light his actions seem very different; he
was in another way the man who began a policy of explicitly granting
away a lot of important papal government rights. 73

In 1357 Albornoz ended his first campaign in Italy with his Constitu-
tiones Sanctæ Matris Ecclesiæ (Constitutions of the Holy Mother Church, usu-
ally known as the Egidian Constitutions) that regulated the states of the
Church until 1816. In a meeting at Fano he redrew the states into five
provinces (Campagne and Maritima, the Duchy of Spoleto, the March of
Ancona, the Patrimony of St. Peter, and the Romagna), codified the inter-
nal mechanism of each Papal State, and centralized their administration.
He called for a papal-appointed rector at their head, who in turn named a
council of seven judges for his province. The rector also named the head
of his army, with the stipulation that this position could not be granted to
a member of his own family.
With his success in central Italy achieved, Albornoz was free to turn to
the tyrants of Lombardy, including one of the most powerful enemies of
92 Chapter 2

the Church in Italy: the Milanese Visconti family. The papacy used what
could be anachronistically labeled a Machiavellian policy with Milan’s
rulers. The pope temporized with Milan while Visconti, as vicar of Bolo-
gna, furnished Albornoz with revenues and troops while the papacy also
fought against the ruler of Milan! Sharon Dale estimates that Giovanni
Visconti “was the largest single contributor, besides the papal treasury, to
Albornoz’s military efforts.” 74 The Visconti maintained close contact with
the papal court, and well-placed lobbyists defended the family’s inter-
ests. As Peter Partner suggests, it is highly probable that cardinals (like
Talleyrand of Périgord) maintained pro-Visconti pressure and that some
cardinals were possibly “bought off.” 75 Still, keeping peaceful relations in
the north, by whatever means necessary, was preferable to war.
In 1354 Archbishop Visconti died, opening the field for internal rival-
ries between his nephews. Visconti’s captain in Bologna, Giovanni di
Oleggio, seized the city for himself in 1355. The choice was now in the
hands of the Church. It could either defend Matteo Visconti’s claim to
Bologna or make Oleggio an apostolic vicar, an occasion for the Church
to reclaim the city (an idea defended by Albornoz). In 1356 Matteo Vis-
conti asked for papal support against Oleggio, and (after some delay)
Innocent sent Androin de la Roche, the abbot of Cluny, to Italy; he even-
tually replaced Albornoz as legate in May 1357. Jean Favier considers the
move “a stab in the back” to Albornoz, arguing that the Milanese ambas-
sadors who came to Avignon spread rumor and intrigue to convince the
pope that Albornoz’s war was costing the Church a fortune. 76 They were
not wrong; yet their attempt first and foremost was to eliminate Albornoz
from Italian soil, not restore funds to the Church. The anti-Albornoz cabal
won a grand victory when the pope replaced him with Androin de la
Roche, a man with no experience in Italian politics, government, or lead-
ership. He presented himself to Albornoz and ordered the legate to deliv-
er Bologna to Visconti. An incensed Albornoz passed his command to de
la Roche and returned to Avignon, accompanied by Malatesta and a
group of Romagnan nobles now allied with the Church, a definite show
of Albornoz’s success in his role. It took less than a year for Innocent to
realize the gravity of his mistake and to reinstate Albornoz as legate in
September 1358. Albornoz then took Forlì in 1358, satisfying its defeated
signore Ordelaffi with the vicariate of Forlimpopoli. In October 1360 he
installed his nephew Blasco Fernandez as rector of Bologna. Visconti at-
tempted in vain to retake the city; Bernabò Visconti lost the Battle of
 Papal Monarchy 93

Rosillo in June 1361, leaving Albornoz’s anti-Visconti policies in place

until the death of Innocent.
Albornoz had been somewhat successful for Innocent. He had re-
gained at least nominal control of the Papal States but left important
territorial charges to vicars who could change their minds at whim. The
consequences of Albornoz’s legation may have been as psychological as
they were military. Partner characterizes the legate called the “Angel of
Peace” in these terms: “Albornoz brought a passionate temperament and
the highest political and military ability to the task of pacifying central
Italy—if ‘pacifying’ is the right word to use of a man who drenched the
Italian countryside with blood from the Po to the Garigliano.” 77 The suc-
cess of the legate was a combination of his strategic use of governance,
violence, and fear. These politics of reconquest also underscored new
players in the Italian equation: the great companies of mercenaries that
remained a thorn in the side of Italy, and France, for that matter, for the
rest of the fourteenth century.

THE HUNDRED YEARS’ WAR: POITIERS AND ITS AFTERMATH

The Avignon papacy, by virtue of its location and personal ties, followed
French politics closely, and all popes remained attached to the idea of
peace between France and England. Innocent VI repeatedly sent nuncios
to both parties, organized “peace conferences” at the court, but systemati-
cally managed little success. The most he could achieve from both parties
were prolongations of truces. Innocent chose the cardinal of Porto, Gui of
Boulogne, for the task, initially as a nuncio and mediator rather than a
legate. Gui of Boulogne was far from being an impartial judge since his
niece, Jeanne of Boulogne, had married the king of France, John II the
Good, in 1350. The cardinal was at once an uncle of the French king and a
cousin of Charles of Navarre, also known as Charles the Bad, who played
an important role in all French-English transactions. The English usually
viewed Boulogne with suspicion because of his French ties; still, he man-
aged to extend the truce of Calais. 78
In 1354, Boulogne also negotiated the short-lived Treaty of Mantes
between Charles the Bad and John II. Charles held extensive lands in
Normandy and set himself up as arbitrator of the war between Edward
III of England and John II of France, shifting his allegiance according to
his whims and interests. He was John’s son-in-law but dreamed of an
94 Chapter 2

impossible claim to the throne of France through his mother, the daugh-
ter of the late Louis X. Unfortunately for him, Salic law denied his cognat-
ic descent to the throne. In January 1354, Charles openly conspired in the
murder of John’s favorite, the constable Charles de la Cerda, toward
whom he felt marked jealousy. Inconsolable, John decided to arrest
Charles and confiscate his Norman property. Charles responded by
opening negotiations with the English, forcing John to sign the Treaty of
Mantes in February 1354. From that point forward, relations soured
quickly, leading John to retake his Norman territories as the pope orga-
nized a new peace conference in Avignon.
Edward III was willing to drop his claim to the French crown in ex-
change for enormous territorial gains in France (the old Aquitaine of
Eleanor, Touraine, Ponthieu, Guînes, and Calais) and full suzerainty. The
cardinal of Boulogne thus negotiated a meeting in Avignon, this time to
ratify the so-called Treaty of Guînes that virtually dismembered France,
with the prior approval of all parties. Ambassadors of both kings arrived
in the city in November 1354, and discussion began with Charles the Bad,
who had been invited for good measure. Unsurprisingly, negotiations
went nowhere fast, and both sides recanted their previous approval, leav-
ing the pope and Gui of Boulogne destitute of this long-sought-for peace.
The only person who viewed this failure in a good light was Charles the
Bad, who seized the occasion to negotiate the partition of France between
Edward and himself. Charles did not succeed, however; even the English
could not trust him, and their negotiations stalled. John eventually im-
prisoned Charles in 1356 after catching wind of his scheme.
At this stage, Innocent had few choices but to change course, especial-
ly when rumors surfaced blaming Boulogne of having facilitated meet-
ings between Charles the Bad and the Duke of Lancaster, the English
representative in Avignon. In general, the historical record has not treat-
ed Gui of Boulogne kindly. Still, Pierre Jugie argues that most conces-
sions the cardinal granted the English were directed toward achieving
peace at all costs. For Jugie, Boulogne was a grand lord, an aristocrat who
leaned toward the pro-Navarre policies of his “house” and aimed at rec-
onciling all parties, regardless of the means. Jugie exonerates the cardinal
of any scheme to dismantle France between Navarre and Edward but
accuses him of having been dragged into a diplomatic game where his
pride got the best of him. 79
 Papal Monarchy 95

Disappointed in his initial efforts to achieve peace between the French

and English, Innocent doggedly pursued his goal, next charging the car-
dinal of Périgord, Hélie de Talleyrand, often accompanied by Cardinal
Niccolo Capocci, to mediate another truce. Since 1355, Edward’s son, the
Black Prince of Wales, had been raiding Aquitaine from Bordeaux up to
the Loire Valley, as papal nuncios ran from one camp to the other at-
tempting to prevent the battle that all felt was inevitable. 80 The famous
chronicler Jean Froissart dramatically represented the cardinal of Peri-
gord’s speech to the king in these terms:
Most dear sire, you have here with you all the flower of knighthood of
your kingdom against a handful of people, such as the English are,
when compared to your army; you may have them upon other terms
than by a battle; and it will be more honourable and profitable to you to
gain them by this means than to risk such a fine army, and such noble
persons as you have now with you. I therefore beseech you, in all
humility, and by the love of God, that you will permit me to go to the
prince, and remonstrate with him on the dangerous situation he is in. 81

As the cardinal reminded Edward, “Fair son, if you have well considered
the great army of the king of France, you will permit me to make up
matters between you both, if I possibly can.” 82 All this was to no avail.
On September 19, 1356, the impressive forces of John the Good were
thoroughly defeated by a lesser army commanded by the Black Prince in
one of the most famous and consequential events of the Middle Ages, the
Battle of Poitiers. This stands as one of the greatest victories in England’s
long and distinguished military history. The Black Prince not only won a
resounding triumph but captured King John and his son Philip; scores of
nobles and elite troops of the French army were killed. All that remained
to the cardinals was the challenging task of trying to convince the prince
to temper his ire and show magnanimity toward the defeated.
In the wake of this battle, Pope Innocent wrote to the Black Prince
reminding him that the forthcoming crusade against the Turks would
depend on his grace; terms with France needed to be favorable in order to
allow reconciliation and foster a long-lasting peace. Meanwhile, Talley-
rand needed to convince the king of France that he should relent and
accept English terms. In Bordeaux, Talleyrand proposed to grant all of
Aquitaine, in full suzerainty, to the English. Later in London, the king
and cardinals discussed the liberation of John the Good, while his son the
dauphin (the future Charles V) ruled in the name of his father. Papal
96 Chapter 2

nuncios who repeatedly insisted on keeping the French crown on John’s

head did not convince the English of their goodwill. Even with the pope’s
replacement of Talleyrand, the English always considered the nuncios
little more than representatives of the Valois. According to Henry Knigh-
ton, a chronicler from Leicester, a limerick circulating at the time read,
“Thus the pope is now French, and Jesus English. Let us see who can do
more, the pope or Jesus?” 83
While negotiations remained active to conclude the English victory of
1356 with a treaty, France went to war with itself; the country suffered
the depredations of the free companies of mercenaries that terrorized the
countryside now that a truce had been concluded. Their violent, destruc-
tive ravaging required the dauphin to raise an army from his Dauphiné to
fight them. At the same time, the ransom payment needed to free the
king antagonized the French nobility. The bourgeoisie of Paris, led by
Étienne Marcel, revolted against the dauphin in 1358. The peasantry too,
oppressed by taxes, mercenaries, and the nobility’s failure to protect
them, followed suit that same year in their own rebellion, the infamous
Jacquerie. The dauphin managed to respond to every threat with the help
of his father, who negotiated the Treaty of London with Edward III in
1358. It was a treaty that granted a third of France to England and the
payment by France of a ransom of three million gold ecus, while Edward
renounced his claim to the French crown.
The Treaty of London precipitated events in Paris. Étienne Marcel,
outraged by the “treacherous” clauses of the treaty, attacked the dauphin
in Paris and killed his three marshal-generals with the hope of controlling
the young man himself. Assisted by the Estates General, Marcel insti-
tuted a constitutional regency, naming the dauphin regent. The dauphin
grudgingly accepted this guardianship but balked at the liberation of
Charles the Bad—who was greeted by many as the savior of France and
granted an army. After escaping Paris, the dauphin could only witness
the brutal repression of the Jacquerie by Charles the Bad and other barons
such as Gaston of Foix. By then, the peasants’ resentment against the
nobility, their anger at the numerous French defeats and the increased
burden of higher taxation, and the lack of protection against the roaming
free companies had reached Paris. Étienne Marcel seized the occasion to
join the movement. Marcel supported the peasants for a while only, until
they stopped serving his larger purpose: an alliance with Charles the Bad
to install in France a form of parliamentary monarchy.
 Papal Monarchy 97

After his victory against the peasantry, Charles the Bad entered Paris
as captain of the town, hoping that an “urban league” could change the
political dynamics, creating a situation in which he might be offered the
crown. But many French nobles, naturally suspicious of his behavior,
joined the dauphin in exile and left the Parisian defense of Charles the
Bad in the hands of his English mercenaries. In June 1358, the dauphin
began to besiege Paris, supplemented by troops of mercenaries anxiously
waiting to loot the city. Charles the Bad’s English mercenaries became his
Achilles’ heel. The Parisians (unsurprisingly) revolted against them after
they had killed many citizens in skirmishes clearly drawn along nation-
alistic lines. Fearing Charles the Bad would bring reinforcements with the
arrival of more English mercenaries, the Parisians returned their alle-
giance to the dauphin and killed Étienne Marcel. The dauphin reentered
his city on August 2, 1358, while Charles the Bad and his English troops
ransacked the Île-de-France until they retreated to Navarre. Still, compa-
nies of routiers—roaming mercenary troops—harassed the countryside
for the rest of the century, pillaging and ransoming people, whole vil-
lages, sometimes entire cities, even going so far as to attack the neighbor-
hoods of Avignon.
It was in this context that the Treaty of Brétigny, which freed John the
Good from English captivity, was negotiated. Innocent VI sent Androin
de la Roche to the kings, who agreed to the thirty-nine articles of the
treaty on May 25, 1360. They ratified the document in Calais that October,
both kings accompanied by their eldest sons. Edward III received Aqui-
taine more or less in free suzerainty but gave up Touraine, Anjou, and
Maine and suzerainty of Brittany and Flanders, and he rescinded his
claim to the throne of France. John had to pay a ransom of three million
gold ecus and was to be freed, along with ten other prisoners, after a
third of the ransom was paid. He left two of his sons, several nobles, and
some of the French bourgeoisie as surety. The rest of the ransom was to
be paid in sixths, every six months, with one fifth of the hostages freed in
each instance. Shortly after his liberation, John decided to travel to Avi-
gnon to discuss with the pope the proposed marriage of his son Philip to
Joanna of Naples and the possibility of leading a crusade, an act he hoped
would rehabilitate his kingly image. Most of all, his visit served to thank
the pope and the Apostolic Chamber, who had produced nine hundred
thousand ecus for his ransom. John learned of Innocent’s death in 1362 as
he was making his way toward Provence. 84 Thus, after close to sixty
98 Chapter 2

years of mediation, the papacy had still not succeeded in pacifying

France and England in order to resume its crusading effort. Brétigny
offered a temporary truce that ended up lasting nine years, but it was no
permanent solution.

THE FREE COMPANIES IN PROVENCE

The events in the aftermath of the Battle of Poitiers were, in an indirect

way, of dire consequence for the Avignon papacy. In the last clause of the
Treaty of Brétigny, Edward condemned all acts of war perpetrated by
English soldiers:
[A]nd as it may fall out or happen that some warriors from our king-
dom, or other of our subjects, may endeavour to do or undertake things
contrary to the said peace by taking or detaining forts, towns, cities and
castles, or in pillaging and arresting persons, and taking from them
their goods, merchandise or other things, acting against the said peace
(the which will highly displease us, and we cannot nor will not suffer
it, nor pass it over under any sort of dissembling); We, willing to reme-
dy these aforesaid things with all our powers, wish, desire, and ordain,
by the deliberation of our council, that none of our subjects or allies,
whatever their state or condition may be, do, or endeavour to do, any
thing contrary to the said peace, by pillaging, taking, or detaining forts,
persons or goods of any sort in the kingdom of France, or belonging to
our said brother, his subjects, allies or adherents whomsoever. 85

Yet this grave warning had little effect on the European continent.
The free companies of mercenaries, unemployed in the north since the
1356 truce, subsequently made their way down to more promising lands.
As early as May 1357 the company of the archpriest Arnaud de Cervole
invaded Provence. 86 Froissart is again our guide to the events. He states:
About this period, a knight, named sir Arnold de Cervole, but more
commonly called the Archpriest, collected a large body of men at arms,
who came from all parts, seeing that their pay would not be continued
in France, and that, since the capture of the king, there was not any
probability of their gaining more in that country. They marched first
into Provence, where they took many strong towns and castles, and
ruined the country by their robberies as far as Avignon. Pope Innocent
VI., who resided in Avignon, was much alarmed, as not knowing what
might be the intentions of the archpriest, the leader of these forces; and,
for fear of personal insult, he and the cardinals kept their households
 Papal Monarchy 99

armed day and night. When the archpriest and his troops had pillaged
all the country, the pope and clergy entered into treaty with him. Hav-
ing received proper security, he and the greater part of his people
entered Avignon, where he was received with as much respect as if he
had been son to the king of France. He dined many times with the pope
and cardinals, who gave him absolution from all his sins; and, at his
departure, they presented him with forty thousand crowns, to distrib-
ute among his companions. These men, therefore, marched away to
different places, following, however, the directions of the archpriest. 87

But Froissart, as a grand admirer of these men-at-arms, obviously

exaggerated. Papal sources demonstrate that indeed the curia feared Cer-
vole’s incursions, but there are no records of any dinners and entertain-
ment! The registers of the Apostolic Chamber are filled with expenses
incurred from the dispatching of couriers and troops that closely fol-
lowed the mercenaries’ movements and attacked them when needed. 88 In
July 1357 Innocent clearly designated Cervole (alias the Archpriest) as a
captain of a company. 89 The pope then dispatched one of his squires with
a letter requiring Cervole to make his intentions clear, brandishing the
spiritual punishments he would incur if he entered papal territory. Cer-
vole responded that he planned to attack only Louis, King of Sicily, and
not the pope. But a skeptical Innocent called for the help of the emperor
and of the captive king of France. With their aid, by the end of July
Innocent had committed hundreds of troops to the defense of the Comtat
Venaissin and Avignon. 90
Cervole was eventually bought off with one thousand florins and
joined the ranks of Charles the Bad’s troops. A couple of years later,
additional bands of mercenaries, the so-called Tard-venus (in French, liter-
ally “the late-comers”) and Grandes compagnies pillaged a path through
Burgundy and Beaujolais, finally arriving in the neighborhood of Avi-
gnon at Pont-Saint-Esprit by the end of 1360. After taking this city, they
controlled access to Avignon and Languedoc, disrupting vital supply
lines to the region. In response, the pope initiated the construction of
Avignon’s protective new ramparts still visible today. (Their construction
is discussed in chapter 5.) The pope proclaimed a crusade against Charles
the Bad and Cervole after their excommunications but continued to pay
them off when needed. In his letters, Innocent rationalized the crusade by
the fact that the bands menaced the papacy and thus constituted an at-
tack on Christendom itself, but in fact the crusade went nowhere. 91 In
1361 the routiers agreed to leave Pont-Saint-Esprit for campaigns in Lan-
100 Chapter 2

guedoc, Italy, or Aragon. Some eventually made their way back to the
north, and others joined the troops of Henry of Trastámara and his efforts
to claim the Castilian throne, while others pursued further mercenary
adventures elsewhere.
The complicated and precarious situation in France had not prevented
the pontiff from contemplating the affairs of Spain and pursuing the
policy of his predecessor. Clement VI had encouraged the marriage of
Pedro of Castile to a French princess, the fourteen-year-old Blanche of
Bourbon. Medieval diplomacy and international politics were often car-
ried through by means of marital alliances. Such an alliance, sealed by
proxy in July 1352, reinforced the diplomatic ties binding Castile to
France just as the Hundred Years’ War erupted. Unfortunately for
Blanche, the young Pedro only had eyes for his mistress Maria de Padilla,
and throughout his rule, Innocent VI sent numerous letters exhorting the
young man to consummate his marriage. Pedro never consented to rec-
ognize the union, however, and attempted to extricate himself from it by
an unusual strategy. He requested papal approval of a convent of Poor
Clares—one that happened to be his mistress’s foundation. Recognizing
Maria, a known royal mistress, as a founder of a religious house would
have legitimated her position (and contrition!) as it simultaneously rein-
forced Pedro’s so-called attempts at breaking free from her charm. Pedro
was thus showing his willingness to simultaneously protect the virtue of
his former mistress and embrace his royal obligations. But it did not
matter since Pedro abandoned both Maria (for another mistress) and
Blanche. Pedro eventually sided with England and demonstrated his
break with France by having Blanche imprisoned. She died of poison or
natural death in 1361. But Pedro’s ruthless actions eventually caught up
with him. A few years later his half-brother Henry of Trastámara chal-
lenged him for the throne during a civil war that had originally been
encouraged by Innocent VI, who was happy to see bands of French routi-
ers joining the fray.
Henry of Trastámara was one of the many illegitimate children of
King Alfonso XI of Castile, begotten from his noble mistress Eleanor of
Guzmán. Henry had been raised at the Castilian court and married into
the kingdom’s most prominent noble family, the Manuel. But with Alfon-
so’s passing in 1350, the situation of his illegitimate descendants became
precarious, as the legitimate ruling heir, King Alfonso XI’s son Pedro the
Cruel, viewed them with suspicion. Pedro ordered the execution of Hen-
 Papal Monarchy 101

ry’s mother, Eleanor, and Henry and Pedro fought on and off for several
years until Henry found shelter at the French court. In France Henry
became the equivalent of a “noble” captain of mercenaries, supporting
Aragon in its wars with Castile and eventually fighting in the Castilian
Wars that joined Henry’s Castilians, Aragonese, and French troops under
the leadership of the famous French condottiere Bertrand du Guesclin
against Pedro the Cruel.
In 1362, Henry and his brother Sancho marched into Languedoc and
from there penetrated into Provence, supposedly on their way to Castile.
They ransomed the region. A letter from Pope Innocent suggests that
they were bought off with a tax levied on local inhabitants and clergy. 92
But this was not enough; once paid off, the free companies became avail-
able to fight other companies. The systematic and commonplace misman-
agement of such mercenary companies explains why their presence did
not diminish in the latter half of the fourteenth century: they had no
compelling reasons to go away but plenty of compelling reasons to stay—
money being the principal one. The popes systematically bought them off
as they continued to hire their services. 93 As we will see later, Urban V
devised what must have seemed at the time a radical solution when he
promised mercenaries absolution if they entered the Christian army
against the Turks.
Meanwhile, Pedro the Cruel, who at first committed the misstep of
engaging his Castilian troops across the Pyrenees into English-held
southern French territory, ended up allying with the Black Prince. Queen
Joanna of Naples’s third husband, James of Majorca, defeated Henry and
Du Guesclin at the Battle of Nájera in 1367. Escaping to France once
again, Henry regrouped his men and re-formed his alliance with Du
Guesclin. When the brothers next met in the field, Henry delivered Pedro
a crushing defeat at the Battle of Montiel in March 1369 and killed him.
Thus, Henry became the next king of Castile. Because of his title and
martial activities throughout Europe, until his death in 1379 Henry more
or less remained a constant presence in the Avignon papal registers, es-
pecially for the reigns of Innocent VI and Urban V.
In any case, what remained in the wake of the mercenary companies
was a ravaged and destabilized Provence. The old argument made fifty
years earlier against returning to Rome’s “malaria-infected, crumbling,
mob-infested, and baron-torn wreck” began to weaken. 94 Thus the mer-
102 Chapter 2

cenaries’ depredations helped convince the popes eventually to return

the curia to Rome.

HOLY ROMAN EMPIRE

Compared with policies of his predecessors, Innocent’s foreign policy

was less concerned with the Holy Roman Empire. The usual grand de-
scent on Rome for the emperor’s coronation did not happen. The emper-
or spared the Italian peninsula and the papacy the Guelph-Ghibelline
instabilities that traditionally accompanied his formal coronation. In-
stead, the emperor came and left Rome quickly once his coronation was
granted in 1354. On January 13, 1356, Charles IV emancipated the empire
from the overarching authority of the papacy with the publication of the
Golden Bull. According to this document, seven prince-electors would,
by a majority ruling, name the King of the Romans, who would then be
crowned by the pope. This effectively removed the pope from the electo-
ral process by eliminating the papal confirmation of the elect. The
Church’s vicariate of Italy during imperial vacancies also disappeared
with the Golden Bull. 95 Guillaume Mollat argues that Innocent’s lack of
resistance to it demonstrates his relief to see that “the bull weakened
imperial authority, and so indirectly furthered papal claims in Italy.” 96
But most of all, the pope obliged the emperor because he needed the
support of Charles IV in his fight against the Visconti and the routiers.
While preoccupied with this complex international situation, Innocent
never abandoned his agenda to reform the Church. He thinned the num-
bers of petitioners idling at court, warning them either to return to their
benefices or be excommunicated, and he required candidates to benefices
to be literate and qualified. He also reduced the expenses of the court at
Avignon, an action taken more by necessity than conviction since the
Italian campaigns had emptied his treasury. 97 In his relations with relig-
ious orders, Innocent was as intransigent with the Spiritual Franciscans
as his predecessors had been. Evidence of this can be found in the words
of St. Bridget of Sweden, who compared the pope to Judas and Pilate and
condemned the Avignon cardinals to the fires of Sodom. 98 The saint,
living in Rome from 1349, constantly harangued the Avignon popes to
return the curia to Rome. The Avignon popes were no strangers to critics
from within the religious orders. Innocent kept the prophet, alchemist,
and Spiritual Franciscan Jean de Roquetaillade in prison until the end of
 Papal Monarchy 103

his life for his relentless criticism of the papal court, accusing him of
heresies, false prophecies, and magic. Imprisonment did not quiet the
Franciscan, however, as he continued writing and circulating his apoca-
lyptic visions with the help of his jailers. 99
Innocent’s reforming spirit also attempted to control Dominicans’
zeal. Mendicant orders and their role in medieval society, especially in
England, were frequently discussed at the curia, especially by the arch-
bishop of Armagh, Richard FitzRalph, who deeply resented mendicant
intrusion into the ministry of the secular clergy (clergymen not affiliated
with a religious order). An older bull, decreed by Boniface VIII (Super
cathedram) in 1300 and confirmed by the Council of Vienne (1311), had
already established that mendicants who preached and heard confessions
needed to be preapproved by the local ordinary. They also needed to
share with local clergy the income they received from bequests and lega-
cies. FitzRalph vigorously argued that the Church had survived for cen-
turies without the mendicants, and he questioned their methods and mo-
tivations. Innocent decreed a renewal of Super cathedram in England and
in 1357 charged a commission of cardinals to further evaluate the ques-
tion. Acrimonious debates went on between mendicants and the arch-
bishop until Innocent’s October 1358 decree, Gravem dilectorum, a bull
that supported mendicant ministry. FitzRalph’s death in 1360 abruptly
ended the proceedings.
By the end of his life, Innocent VI was a dispirited and broken man
who felt overwhelmed by the constant wars that surrounded him. Mat-
ters worsened when an outbreak of plague returned to Europe in 1361,
terrifying the population and killing in even higher numbers than during
the first onslaught. Chroniclers remarked that this plague killed more
“nobles and notables,” vindicating the widespread fear of the disease.
Werner, author of a biography of the pope, mentions the death of eight
cardinals and innumerable people during the 1361 outbreak. 100 The fa-
mous surgeon Guy de Chauliac wrote in his Chirurgia magna that this
plague affected the rich and nobility, many children but few women.
Perhaps overcome by grief and exhausted from his hard labor and re-
sponsibilities, Innocent died on September 12, 1362, asking to be buried
in Villeneuve-les-Avignon, across the Pont Saint-Bénézet in the Carthu-
sian monastery that he had founded.
The popes who had anchored the central years of the Avignon papacy
faced unprecedented challenges: plague, the Hundred Years’ War, and
104 Chapter 2

attacks of mercenary companies. They responded to the best of their

abilities. For many years to come, the surviving European population
learned to live with the epidemic. As they maintained a steady grip on
the reins of the Church, advanced Church reform, and pacified Rome and
the Papal States, Clement VI and Innocent VI broadened their diplomatic
activities on the European stage. Nuncios and papal legates crisscrossed
the fields of action of a war that would take years to bring to an end.
There is no reason to question the genuine interest the popes showed in
bringing to term both kings of France and England in an enduring peace
and in pacifying Italy. War brought violence, and the pressures on Avi-
gnon compelled the popes to rethink their position. As companies of
mercenaries threatened the new capital of Christendom, Innocent must
have pondered whether the city was indeed so much safer than Rome.
His successors decided it was not.

NOTES

1. Étienne Baluze, Vitae paparum avenionensium, hoc est, Historia pontificum romano-
rum qui in Gallia sederunt ab anno Christi MCCCV usque ad annum MCCCXCIV, ed.
Guillaume Mollat (Paris: Letouzey et Ané, 1914), vol. 1, 241.
2. Baluze, Vitae, vol. 1, 263.
3. Jean Favier, Les papes d’Avignon (Paris: Fayard, 2006), 134. My translation.
4. Baluze, Vitae, vol. 1, 299.
5. Diana Wood, Clement VI: The Pontificate and Ideas of an Avignon Pope (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1989), xi.
6. John E. Wrigley, “Clement VI before His Pontificate: The Early Life of Pierre
Roger, 1290/91–1342,” Catholic Historical Review 56.3 (1970): 441.
7. As quoted by Wrigley, “Clement VI before His Pontificate,” 444. Of course, this
relationship favored the pope’s rapport with the empire.
8. Wrigley, “Clement VI before His Pontificate,” 454–456.
9. Wrigley, “Clement VI before His Pontificate,” 451–452, 467–469.
10. Pierre Jugie, “Clement VI,” in The Papacy: An Encyclopedia, ed. Philippe Levillain
(New York: Routledge, 2002), 336.
11. Favier, Les papes d’Avignon, 134. My translation.
12. Baluze, Vitae, vol. 1, 305.
13. Baluze, Vitae, vol. 1, 299.
14. See Christopher Kleinhenz, Medieval Italy: An Encyclopedia (New York: Rout-
ledge, 2004), 1209–1210. A Latin transcription of the text (based on Heinrich Joseph
Dominicus Denzinger’s Enchiridion Symbolorum et Definitionum) is available online at
http://catho.org/9.php?d=bxy#bt). On purgatory, see Jacques LeGoff, The Birth of Pur-
gatory (London: Scolar, 1990).
15. Baluze, Vitae, vol. 1, 299–303.
16. It should be noted, however, that robbers and pirates plagued pilgrims. Many
documents attest to the high incidence of robbery and attacks committed by “thieves,
 Papal Monarchy 105

robbers and pirates,” which forced pilgrims en route to Rome to conceal their identity
as much as possible (see Baluze, Vitae, vol. 1, 253).
17. “Cola di Rienzo and Fourteenth-Century Rome,” in Medieval Italy: Texts in
Translation, ed. Katherine L. Jansen, Joanna Drell, and Frances Andrew (Philadephia:
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009), 295–300.
18. Ronald G. Musto, Apocalypse in Rome: Cola di Rienzo and the Politics of the New Age
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003), 70.
19. On Cola in Avignon, see Musto, Apocalypse in Rome, 58–82.
20. See Wood, Clement VI, 74–95, for the situation of Rome at the time of Clement
VI.
21. Wood, Clement VI, 79, explains: “Clement’s accusation against Cola was that he
had not scrupled to blaspheme against the ‘holy, catholic, and universal Church’ by
asserting that the universal Church and the city of Rome were the same (prefatam
Ecclesiam civitatemque Romanam idem esse asseruit). What really incensed the Pope was
Cola’s identification of the city of Rome with the universal Church, rather than with
the localised church of Rome. He had confused Clement’s two brides: he had made
possession of the city of Rome a sine qua non for possession of universal authority,
rather than vice versa. He had turned the city of Rome into the head of the Church and
thus usurped the position of the papacy.”
22. Wood, Clement VI, 77.
23. Louis of Hungary was a grandnephew of Joanna’s father, so again an Angevin
relative of the queen.
24. Ronald G. Musto, Medieval Naples: A Documentary History, 400–1400 (New York:
Italica, 2012), 267–268.
25. See Musto, Medieval Naples, 274–275.
26. Wood, Clement VI, 48–50.
27. See Musto, Medieval Naples, 278–298.
28. After Louis’s death, Joanna married the unreliable Jaime IV, titular king of Ma-
jorca, on September 26, 1363. He died in 1375. During the Schism, she rallied the
Clementist side and saw herself attacked by the Urbanists. She was deposed by Urban
VI and attacked by Charles III (son of Charles) of Durazzo. Childless, Joanna adopted
Louis of Anjou as her heir. Her new husband, Otto of Brunswick, helped her fight
Durazzo’s invasion, but to no avail. Durazzo took Naples in 1381, but realizing the
imminent advance of Louis of Anjou toward Naples, he removed Joanna from the city
and had her strangled in 1382.
29. Wood, Clement VI, 38.
30. See Wood, Clement VI, 142–176, for the pope’s relations with the empire.
31. Wood, Clement VI, 79.
32. Wrigley, “Clement VI before His Pontificate,” 447–448.
33. Wrigley, “Clement VI before His Pontificate,” 460–463. See Wood, Clement VI,
123–141 for a detailed history of Clement’s involvement in the diplomacy between
France and England.
34. Wrigley, “Clement VI before His Pontificate,” 472.
35. Wood, Clement VI, 123.
36. Karsten Plöger, England and the Avignon Popes: The Practice of Diplomacy in Late
Medieval Europe (London: Legenda, 2005), 30–36.
37. Robin Neillands, The Hundred Years War (London: Routledge, 1990), 88–91.
38. Plöger, England and the Avignon Popes, 36–40.
39. Plöger, England and the Avignon Popes, 38–41, esp. 33–34.
106 Chapter 2

40. John A. Wagner, Encyclopedia of the Hundred Years War (Westport, CT: Green-
wood, 2006), 73–75.
41. Wood, Clement VI, 133–134.
42. Baluze, Vitae, vol. 1, 305.
43. Baluze, Vitae, vol. 1, 251.
44. Rosemary Horrox, The Black Death (Manchester: Manchester University Press,
1994), 42.
45. Horrox, The Black Death, 44.
46. John Aberth, From the Brink of the Apocalypse: Confronting Famine, War, Plague,
and Death in the Later Middle Ages (New York: Routledge, 2000), 121.
47. Horrox, The Black Death, 44–46.
48. Baluze, Vitae, vol. 1, 303; Aberth, From the Brink of the Apocalypse, 133–156.
49. Aberth, From the Brink of the Apocalypse, 145.
50. Baluze, Vitae, vol. 1, 550.
51. Baluze, Vitae, vol. 1, 307.
52. Aberth, From the Brink of the Apocalypse, 153–163.
53. Horrox, The Black Death, 221.
54. Horrox, The Black Death, 221–222.
55. Aberth, From the Brink of the Apocalypse, 120.
56. J. Viard, “La messe pour la peste,” Bibliothèque de l’École des chartes 61 (1900):
344–48.
57. Wood, Clement VI, 66–71.
58. Musto, Apocalypse in Rome, 62.
59. Musto, Apocalypse in Rome, 66.
60. Bernhard Schimmelpfennig, “Eleven Papal Coronations in Avignon,” in Corona-
tions: Medieval and Early Modern Monarchic Ritual, ed. János M. Bak (Berkeley: Univer-
sity of California Press, 1990), 179–193.
61. Dominique Vingtain, Avignon: Le palais des papes (Saint-Léger-Vauban: Zodi-
aque, 1998), 181–394.
62. Baluze, Vitae, vol. 1, 303.
63. Eugène Déprez, “Les funérailles de Clément VI et d’Innocent VI d’après les
comptes de la cour pontificale,” Mélanges d’archéologie et d’histoire 20 (1900): 238–239.
64. Guillaume Mollat, The Popes at Avignon: The “Babylonian Captivity” of the Medie-
val Church, trans. Janet Love (New York: Harper & Row, 1965), 44. Norman P. Zacour,
“A Note on the Papal Election of 1352: The Candidacy of Jean Birel,” Traditio 13 (1957):
456–462, questions this assertion.
65. Yves Renouard, The Avignon Papacy: The Popes in Exile 1305–1403, trans. Denis
Bethell (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1970), 49.
66. Zacour, “A Note on the Papal Election of 1352,” 460.
67. Pierre Gasnault and Marie-Hyacinte Laurent, eds., Innocent VI (1352–1362), Let-
tres secrètes et curiales (Paris: Bibliothèque des Écoles françaises d’Athènes et de Rome,
1959–2006), vol. 5, no. 435.
68. Bernard Guillemain, La cour pontificale d’Avignon: Étude d’une société (Paris: de
Boccard, 1962), 141.
69. Hermann Hoberg, ed., Die Einnahmen der Apostolischen Kammer unter Innozenz
VI. Zweiter Teil: Die Servitienquittungen des päpstlichen Kamerars (Paderborn: Ferdinand
Schöningh Verlag, 1972).
70. Peter Partner, The Lands of Saint Peter: The Papal State in the Middle Ages and Early
Renaissance (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972), 332.
 Papal Monarchy 107

71. Favier, Les papes d’Avignon, 474.

72. Musto, Apocalypse in Rome, 312.
73. Partner, The Lands of Saint Peter, 344.
74. Sharon Dale, “Contra damnationis filios: The Visconti in Fourteenth-Century Pa-
pal Diplomacy,” Journal of Medieval History 33.1 (2007), 11.
75. Partner, The Lands of St. Peter, 346.
76. Favier, Les papes d’Avignon, 478.
77. Partner, The Lands of St. Peter, 340.
78. Plöger, England and the Avignon Popes, 38–41.
79. Pierre Jugie, “L’activité diplomatique du cardinal Gui de Boulogne en France au
milieu du XIVe siècle,” Bibliothèque de l’École des chartes 145.1 (1987): 99–127.
80. Baluze, Vitae, vol. 1, 317.
81. John Froissart, Chronicles of England, France and Spain and the Surrounding Coun-
tries, trans. Thomas Johnes, Esq. (London: William Smith, 1848), chapter 160, 215.
82. Froissart, Chronicles of England, France and Spain, chapter 160, 216.
83. Favier, Les papes d’Avignon, 410. My translation.
84. Favier, Les papes d’Avignon, 410.
85. Froissart, Chronicles of England, France and Spain, chapter 212, 289.
86. Kenneth Fowler, Medieval Mercenaries: The Great Companies (Oxford: Blackwell,
2001), 61–64.
87. Froissart, Chronicles of England, France and Spain, chapter 176, 238.
88. Karl Heinrich Schäfer, Die ausgaben der Apostolischen kammer unter Benedikt XII.,
Klemens VI. und Innocenz VI. (1335–1362.) (Paderborn: F. Schöningh, 1914), 647, 681,
726, 751, and 821.
89. Cervole’s nickname came from his possession of an ecclesiastical benefice in
Dordogne.
90. Heinrich Denifle, La désolation des églises, monastères, hôpitaux en France, pendant la
guerre de cent ans (Paris: A. Picard et fils, 1897–1899), vol. 2, 196–198.
91. ASV, Reg. Vat. 25, fol. 378v. (March 8, 1361).
92. ASV, Reg. Aven. 28, fol. 505 (May 2, 1362).
93. See especially for that period Denifle, La désolation des églises, vol. 2, 406–410.
94. Musto, Apocalypse in Rome, 66.
95. The bull can be found on the website of Yale Law School at http://avalon.law.
yale.edu/medieval/golden.asp.
96. Mollat, The Popes at Avignon, 228.
97. Baluze, Vitae, vol. 1, 343, 347.
98. Denis Michael Searby and Bridget Morris, The Revelations of St. Birgitta of Sweden
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), vol. 2, 245–246; and Mollat, The Popes at
Avignon, 46.
99. See the recent Leah DeVun, Prophecy, Alchemy, and the End of Time: John of Rupes-
cissa in the Late Middle Ages (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009) for an over-
view of this extraordinary character.
100. Baluze, Vitae, vol. 1, 327, 340; vol. 2, 490.
 THREE
Returning to Rome

Jean Froissart, the famed chronicler of the Hundred Years’ War and in-
sider to the politics of the high nobility, used the following words to
recall the nomination of pope Urban V:
About Christmas pope Innocent VI departed this life: and the cardinals
were in great discord about the election of another, for each was desir-
ous of that honour; more particularly the cardinals of Boulogne and
Périgord, who were the greatest in the college. Their dissensions kept
the conclave a long time shut up. The conclave had ordered and ar-
ranged everything according to the desires of the two before-
mentioned cardinals, but in such a manner that neither of them could
succeed to the papacy: upon which they both agreed, that none of their
brethren should wear the papal crown, and elected the abbot de St.
Victor of Marseilles, who was a holy and learned man, of good morals,
and who had laboured hard for the church in Lombardy and other
places. The two cardinals sent to inform him of this elevation, and to
desire he would come to Avignon: which he did as soon as possible,
and received this gift with joy. He was called Urban V, and reigned
with great prosperity: he augmented much the power of the church,
and did great good to Rome and other parts. 1

Froissart, like his patrons, was well aware of the fractures that had
divided the college. When Innocent died on September 12, 1362, eighteen
of the twenty-one cardinals composing the college were French. The
Spaniard Albornoz was at the time in Italy, and Androin de la Roche,
who had been named cardinal in September 1361, still had his cardinal’s
voice “closed.” He had yet to be introduced into the consistory and

109
110 Chapter 3

needed a special derogation in order to participate in the conclave. A

certain few of his colleagues refused him the privilege. The college even-
tually mandated a commission, however, which decided that he could
vote. 2 When the time came to choose the next pope, the conclave divided
along geographical lines between a Limousin party of six cardinals, who
lobbied for the election of a compatriot, opposed by the anti-Limousins,
who refused this course of action on the grounds that Limousins had
been in control of the papacy for too long. In addition, the Limousin
region was at the time in English hands, a state of affairs that did not sit
well with nascent French nationalism.
The cardinals’ vote went first to Hugues Roger, brother of Clement VI,
cardinal-priest of San Lorenzo in Damaso. He refused because of his age.
The second round brought only eleven votes to Cardinal Raymond of
Canillac, thus under the required majority of two-thirds. The latter was
also related to Clement VI and cardinal-bishop of Palestrina. As Froissart
remarks, the cardinals of Périgord and Boulogne also unsuccessfully
manifested their desire to wear the papal tiara. Since neither wanted to
yield to the other, however, the college decided on someone outside its
own membership; this sometimes happened when negotiations dead-
locked. They named as papal-elect the current nuncio in Naples, Guil-
laume de Grimoard. The cardinals kept the election secret until Grimoard
acquiesced, afraid that resentful Italians would keep him in Naples and
return him to Rome to bring back the papacy to Italy. Grimoard accepted
his nomination in Marseille as he was making his way back to Avignon in
October 1362. He then entered the city on October 31. Following protocol,
Étienne Aubert, the cardinal of Ostia, consecrated Grimoard bishop of
Rome and crowned him inside the palace on November 6.

URBAN V

Guillaume de Grimoard (who took the name of Urban, perhaps in refer-

ence to the biblical “city on the hill”) was a Benedictine monk like Bene-
dict XII and Clement VI, foreign to the politics of the curia and college
and devoid of diplomatic experience with France. 3 In some ways, he
represented new blood. Guillaume de Grimoard was born in 1310, the
oldest son and namesake of his father, Guillaume de Grimoard, a knight
who held the Castle of Grizac near Mende. The Grimoards were related
to the Sabrans, a family who received medieval fame when Elzéar and
 Returning to Rome 111

Delphine de Sabran, though married, lived chastely together for the rest
of their lives. Elzéar epitomized a masculine virtuous sanctity that en-
compassed men who could control their bodies as well as armies. 4
According to legend, Guillaume was born deformed, but during his
baptism the prayers of his godfather Elzéar worked a miracle that cured
him.
Guillaume de Grimoard had six siblings. Thus, as Pope Urban V he
could have followed his predecessors’ example and elevated kin and
friends to high positions. To some extent he did, but in decided modera-
tion. As soon as he became pope, Urban named his younger brother
Anglic de Grimoard to the vicariate of Avignon; he was later made cardi-
nal in 1366 and vicar of Bologna. Anglic was a talented administrator
whose sound management of the Avignon diocese produced a detailed
listing of the episcopal revenues of the city (a terrier) that remains a valu-
able source for historians of the city. Urban could rely on his brother. He
also brought to the court his elderly, widowed father, who appears to
have been a medieval anomaly since he was nearly a centenarian at the
time of his death in 1366, four weeks after having celebrated Anglic’s
promotion to cardinal. Since old Grimoard’s sons all died with no descen-
dants, Urban bequeathed his patrimony to his sister’s son, Raymond de
Montaut, whom he also made sergeant and squire at the court. The pope
also shared limited friendship with every cardinal except for his close
relationship with Guillaume d’Aigrefeuille, who had tabled his name
during the election.
Guillaume de Grimoard the son followed the traditional career of a
bright, literate young man. At twelve years old he left his homestead for
schooling in Montpellier, where his rapid progress landed him at Tou-
louse University. He studied civil law and opted for a career in the regu-
lar orders. It is notable that he chose to enter monastic life outside of
typical parental pressure. Grimoard joined the priory of Chirac in 1327 to
become a Benedictine monk; he later moved to the ancient and famous
Abbey of Saint-Victor in Marseille. He continued his education after join-
ing the order, studying in Toulouse, Montpellier, Paris, and Avignon to
become a doctor in canon law in 1342. Indeed, Grimoard was a renowned
canonist of his time. He taught law at Montpellier, where he survived the
first onslaught of the plague in 1348. He was promoted vicar and prior of
several benefices before Clement VI made him legate to Lombardy in
February 1352. There, Grimoard discovered the court of Bishop Giovanni
112 Chapter 3

Visconti in Milan and honed his diplomatic skills. He negotiated with

Visconti for the return of Orvieto to the pope in exchange for the vicariate
of Bologna (that Visconti had previously seized) for twelve years and
12,000 yearly florins. Grimoard was then named abbot of Auxerre as a
reward for his activities. Starting in 1354, Innocent VI selected him for
diverse missions in Italy. He seconded Albornoz in Rome and Milan,
where he convinced Bernabò Visconti (Bishop Visconti’s nephew) to let
Bologna go and gathered funds for the reconquest of the Papal States. But
Albornoz’s troops crushed the Milanese, and Grimoard’s travels ended
there. Innocent VI named him abbot of Saint-Victor in Marseille in Au-
gust 1361 and shortly after, in May 1362, appointed him Italian nuncio at
the court of Naples following the death of Joanna of Naples’s second
husband, Louis of Taranto. It is in Naples that Grimoard learned the
news of his election to the papal throne.
Urban appears to have been a man of contradictions. He was before
all else a monk, frugal and ascetic, who could do without the luxury of
the court; he supposedly slept in the palace on a wooden pallet. He was
interested in reforming the Church and especially in reversing the ram-
pant secularization of the court; a patron of education, he supported
hundreds of scholars. As pope, he used his position to found colleges and
ameliorate schools and universities. Urban’s love of intellectual pursuits
was unrestricted, and on the subject of education, he stated: “I know that
all the ones [students] I support will not enter ecclesiastic life. . . . Some
will become either regular or secular clergymen; some will remain in the
world and become fathers. Regardless of their choice, even if they turn
out laborers their education will always serve them well.” 5 He also loved
nature, which is very evident in the construction of the palace gardens
(viridarium) in Avignon, parts of which are still visible today. When he
returned to Rome, Urban also rehabilitated the Vatican gardens, adding
fruit trees and a large vineyard. Similarly, when Urban summered in
Montefiascone in 1368, he ordered the creation of new gardens and or-
chards around the Rocca (fortress).

A FASTIDIOUS MAN

Urban was a man of integrity, piety, and moral worth. His sole fault,
according to Jean Favier, was a detailed, fastidious, and exacting mind
that prevented him from delegating tasks and bogged his thoughts down
 Returning to Rome 113

in trivial minutiae. The pope’s hand is found on scores of documents that

he read and adjudicated himself, where he noted information he had
gathered and the decisions he took. Urban oversaw everything, even
fashion, going so far as to declare: “It is my intention, and I want, that the
indulgence in mortis articulo (at the moment of death) be granted only if
they [laymen] wear their robe at least to the knee.” 6 If the devil is in the
details, the pope’s personal demon may well have been in his exacting
care for matters that could seem trivial for a man of state. In sum, Urban
ran the large administrative machine that had developed in Avignon as
his personal household, where he involved himself and gave advice on
all matters, large and small.
The Avignon registers underscore the energy Urban spent on peti-
tions, a task that other popes often delegated to secretaries. In a single
week of November 1363, the pope annotated in his own hand the peti-
tions of an English prince, a Silesian duchess, a poor clerk of Le Puy, an
English priest, a Tuscan abbot, Sicilian monks, a York noblewoman, a
burgher from Bayeux, and the widow of a Londoner. He confirmed the
election of a prior, allowed a deacon to cumulate benefices, and author-
ized the burial of a priest in consecrated ground. We get a glimpse of his
common sense when he authorized Sicilian Benedictines to celebrate holi-
day masses—exceptionally—regardless of the interdict weighing on the
island—because they resided in an isolated location where no one would
see and hear them. He simply added that they remain inconspicuous,
with their doors locked and bells silenced so as not to raise attention.
Last, he authorized a Parisian Franciscan established at Oxford to return
to his alma mater if its chancellor and regents authorized him. 7
Urban was actually so involved in the daily running of the papal court
that he is the only pope who left behind clear traces of his own adminis-
tration and personality. Anne-Marie Hayez has studied the 20,481 peti-
tions scrutinized by the pope and itemized some 5,000 notations from the
first year of his rule until November 26, 1366. 8 It is important to note that
refused petitions were destroyed, so the exact numbers of these requests
that Urban read far outweighed the numbers that he approved or anno-
tated. From these extant documents, Hayez has drawn a picture of Ur-
ban’s personality. He did not like favors or nepotism. He attempted re-
forming the mores of the clergy, limited and stigmatized their ambition
and greed, and reminded them that their spiritual charges prevailed over
their personal interests. To the clergy who cumulated benefices, he
114 Chapter 3

granted new posts only if they let go of others. He enforced an education-

al minimum for clerks, refusing benefices to those who could not demon-
strate a university education. The pope also assumed that a priest served
better where he had been born and where he spoke the same language as
his parishioners. Thus, Urban usually granted benefices within the lin-
guistic and geographical limits of petitioners. Urban emphasized that
clerics be of sound mind and good moral standing and (most importantly
in the fashion-conscious Middle Ages!) that they be attired decently for
their vocation. This latter injunction appears many times in his notes, and
it seems that the pope strongly resented the fashions of the day, especial-
ly shorter robes for men. Conversely, Urban usually approved the special
dispensations required of illegitimate children to enter regular orders,
and as a rule he mandated that all candidates for benefices first pass
competency examinations and be subject to scrutiny concerning their mo-
rals. The abbot of Montmajour was the usual examiner.
The pope obviously cared about the quality of his clergy. He strove to
maintain a high standard of education and limited the entrance of imma-
ture young people into holy orders. Familial tradition or pressures often
sent young men into the church regardless of their fitness or personal
inclination to that calling; Urban tried to make the selection more rigor-
ous. He reduced the numbers of demands for delayed entrance, allowing,
for example, a clerk to finish his education or take care of other matters,
and he fought arduously against the nonresident clergy. He expelled
from Avignon clergymen who had never resided in their own benefices.
As a monk himself, the pope abhorred idle, rootless, and wandering
monks (gyrovagues) subject to little ecclesiastical discipline and unstable
in the religious life, and he seldom approved petitions requesting a move
from one monastery to another or from one religious order to another.
Urban never granted requests to found new orders. He was not an inno-
vator. He rarely granted dispensations to eat meat during a fast and in
one case authorized it only for one meal! He rarely granted a remission of
tithes without full knowledge of the particular conditions and often left
the decisions to local representatives more versed on the matter.
The pope was as strict in secular affairs concerning the laity as he was
in ecclesiastic ones. He granted indulgences only to laypersons who were
not frivolous or secular minded (for example, men who were not slaves
to fashion), and he required women to practice higher forms of penance
than men. Women usually had to fast every Friday for the granting of
 Returning to Rome 115

absolution in mortis articulo, while men were not required to do so. To

preserve the holy seclusion of convents, Urban rarely allowed men to
visit nunneries, allowing only mature women of ages forty to sixty to
visit. There is no doubt that this pope took his temporal and spiritual
charges extremely seriously.

HOW TO ELIMINATE THE FREE COMPANIES

In October 1350, ten days after his coronation, King John II of France
arrived in Avignon. He had meant to face Innocent but instead found his
successor. Froissart again explains,
The king took with him the lord John of Artois, his cousin, whom he
much loved; the earl of Tancarville, the earl of Dampmartin, Boucicault
marshal of France, sir Arnold d’Andreghen, the grand prior of France,
and several others. He travelled slowly and with much expense, mak-
ing some stay in all the cities and towns of Burgundy, so that he did not
arrive at Villeneuve, until about Michaelmas. It was there that his hôtel
was prepared, as well for himself as for his attendants. He was most
magnificently received and feasted by the pope and the college at Avi-
gnon: the king, pope, and cardinals, visited each other often. The king
remained at Villeneuve during the whole time. 9

The King came to discuss his ransom, raising a crusade, and the possible
marriage of Joanna of Naples to his son Philip the Bold. The pope prom-
ised to relay the message to Joanna, who had already been promised to
her third husband, James of Majorca. The king sojourned close to a year
in Villeneuve-lès-Avignon, where he ordered the construction of the for-
tress of Saint-André. It is still visible today from the balconies of the
palace, towering across the right bank of the Rhône.
It is possible that during his sojourn John and Urban discussed the
project of a crusade now that the king was somewhat in limbo while
awaiting the full payment of his ransom. France would lead a new cru-
sade against the Ottomans, who had just conquered Adrianopolis. By
March 1363, Peter of Lusignan, king of Cyprus, and Valdemar of Den-
mark were present in Avignon; Urban preached the crusade to the three
of them. King John was named captain general and the cardinal of Péri-
gord the pope’s legate for the venture. Lusignan went on to northern
France to garner support and returned to Avignon in July. By then he had
convinced King John to abandon the retaking of Adrianopolis for the
116 Chapter 3

conquest of Alexandria in Egypt. But John’s enthusiasm was cut short

when his son Louis of Anjou, a hostage in England since the signing of
the Treaty of Brétigny, escaped his captors. John was forced to return to
England, where he died in 1364. The Alexandrian crusade nevertheless
took place. Peter of Lusignan used the years between 1362 and 1365 to
prepare the expedition that led him in October 1365 to take and sack the
city. Unable to gather support for an attack on Cairo, he left Alexandria
and returned to Cyprus, dreaming until his death of further efforts to
take Egypt.
Like his predecessors, Urban kept the crusading ideal a top priority.
The crusade also became a motivation to rid France of its companies of
roaming mercenaries. For the pope, there was no better way for men-at-
arms to atone for their violence than fighting for the cross. Urban at-
tempted to convince them of the rightness of this task. He cajoled the
mercenaries for their martial qualities, telling them they were the best-
qualified troops for a victorious crusade. He also reminded them that a
crusade was the best penance for all their ill deeds. Their departure
would free France from their depredations and allow the king to join
them instead of fighting them. The companies refused, however, using
the great distance as a pretext. Urban’s bull Cogit nos, published on Feb-
ruary 27, 1364, ratified his failure with the mercenaries. He retraced the
excesses committed by these arrogant “ferocious animals” who pillaged,
robbed, committed arson, murdered, spoiled, and raped and who dared
threaten the pontifical court. Offering two years of plenary indulgence to
any willing to fight them, he excommunicated the companies and ex-
horted princes and the Christian faithful to crusade against them. 10
Urban repeated the bull with slight adaptation in May and July 1364;
in January 1365 he also condemned those who joined and supported the
mercenary troops. In Clamat ad nos, published on April 5, 1365, Urban
again excommunicated all guilty of violence and put their lands under
interdict, declaring them “ill-famed” for the generations to come. 11 The
same injunction appears in a letter dated May 9, 1367, suggesting that the
companies stayed on and people supported them, perhaps under dur-
ess. 12
The years 1363–1364 were especially difficult for the pope and Pro-
vence. The plague became endemic after 1363, and, beginning in Decem-
ber of that year, our sources insist on a series of climatic events that led to
further widespread catastrophes. Initially, the winter between January
 Returning to Rome 117

and March 1364 turned brutally cold, freezing the Rhône to the point that
people could cross it on horses and carts; the cold destroyed vineyards
and orchards, impeding a successful summer harvest. The free compa-
nies simultaneously caused havoc throughout the region, pushing the
pope, as we have seen above, to declare a crusade against them. Then the
king of France died in April 1364, leading to a war over the succession
between his son, Charles V, and Charles the Bad of Navarre, who claimed
the French throne with the support of the English. The Battle of Cocherel
(May 16, 1364), with Bertrand du Guesclin and Arnaud de Cervole (who
eventually deserted) commanding the French troops and the Captal of
Buch, Jean de Grailli, leading the Navarrese, ended in a resounding de-
feat for Navarre. This outcome halted Navarrese pretentions and sent
Charles the Bad to Avignon, pleading with the pope to negotiate a truce
with Charles V on his behalf. In July, locusts darkened the skies over
Provence, feeding on crops until the crops disappeared. This is the first
historically documented locust invasion in Provençal history. After two
years of such calamitous events, the pope took to heart the words of
Roman ambassadors who begged him to return the court to Rome. 13

THE EMPEROR’S VISIT

Since the twelfth century, the Kingdom of Arles was traditionally at-
tached to the Holy Roman emperor, a vestige of late-Carolingian enter-
prises and a title reminiscent of Germanic pretensions in Provence. In
May 1365, the Holy Roman emperor, Charles IV, made his way to Pro-
vence to receive his crown for the kingdom. In Italy, the papacy had
simply crowned the emperor, but as a neighbor, the Avignon pope had to
do better. The emperor’s sojourn in Provence became a spectacular affair.
An impressive retinue of Germans, who no doubt relished the charms of
the Provençal countryside, accompanied the emperor. According to the
bishop of Avignon’s secretary, the visit created a shortage of wine for the
rest of the year. 14 As protocol required, Anglic Grimoard and the pope’s
treasurer greeted the emperor and the bishops of Worms and Trier in
Valence; from there, they made their way to Pont-de-Sorgues. The pontif-
ical palace of Pont-de-Sorgues was privileged for the residence of emi-
nent guests. The apostolic registers saved scores of entries itemizing the
expenses involved with these visits, which usually tallied hundreds of
gold florins and pounds for upkeep and provisioning.
118 Chapter 3

The financial burden of such receptions is comparable to today’s state

budget, and expenses must have taken a toll on the papal treasury. It is
important to note that in many cases Jews provided and leased neces-
sities for such occasions, such as the beds that were delivered for the
emperor’s household. 15 The court also rented dinnerware. The fact that
many plates, trenchers, goblets, and cups disappeared in significant num-
bers suggests that perhaps guests filled their pockets with souvenirs.
Among the items used for the emperor’s party that disappeared were
1,930 out of 4,200 wooden bowls and 1,030 out of 1,900 plates. Yet these
expenses seem minor compared with those of provisioning. For the sole
week of May 22–29, 1365, the master cook spent 837 livres to feed his
guests when he had spent only some 73 the previous weeks. 16 Parting
gifts for such honored guests were also expected. For example, in June
1365, the pope offered one hundred florins to the emperor’s jugglers for
the marriage of their children. 17
Charles IV entered the city of Avignon and participated in the ceremo-
nies of Pentecost in full regalia. He returned to Prague shortly after, in
June 1365. Urban found the presence of Charles IV in Avignon a great
respite because the emperor brought with him hope of a crusade, and to
Urban a crusade represented the means to rid Provence of the great com-
panies. King and pope agreed on the subsidies they would provide their
“crusaders,” and Charles granted passage through his northeastern terri-
tories to the “crossed” free companies making their way eastward. It was
with relief that the pope heard that the archpriest Arnaud de Cervole, a
chief of the mercenaries, seemed willing to enlist his outstanding talent
for violence and mayhem in the higher cause of the crusade. This cru-
sade, of course, never happened. But Cervole still filled his pockets in
Champagne and Lorraine, as he supposedly made his way to Hungary
and then turned back toward Alsace, ransoming Metz for some 18,000
florins along the way. Cervole’s company controlled the area until
Charles and his army intimidated him enough to return to France. 18
Popes and princes opted then to send the mercenaries on another grand
crusade, this time toward Spain. The pretext was to attack the Moors; the
reality was to dethrone Pedro the Cruel of Castile.
 Returning to Rome 119

THE CASTILIAN SITUATION

Since 1362, Urban had inherited the Castilian “situation,” which Froissart
summarizes in these terms in his entry for that year:
Don Pedro, proud and presumptuous as he was, not only refused to
obey the mandate, but even received with insults the ambassadors
from the holy father, for which he felt grievously under his indigna-
tion. This wicked king still persevered in his sin. It was then considered
how or by what means he could be corrected; and it was determined
that he was no longer worthy to bear the title of king, or to possess a
kingdom. He was therefore publicly excommunicated, in full consisto-
ry, held in the apartments of the pope, at Avignon, and declared to be a
heretic and infidel. They thought they should be able to punish him by
means of the free companies who were in France. They requested the
king of Aragon, who hated very much this don Pedro, and Henry the
bastard of Spain, to come immediately to Avignon. The Holy Father
then legitimated the birth of Henry the bastard, so that he might be in a
condition to obtain the kingdom from don Pedro, who had been cursed
and condemned by the sentence of the pope. 19

After the death of Blanche de Bourbon while imprisoned by her hus-

band, Pedro, France supported his half-brother Henry of Trastámara’s
claim to the throne, while the pope sent Cardinal Guillaume
d’Aigrefeuille, the cardinal of Saragossa, to Pedro’s court to negotiate the
king’s abdication. Rumors circulated that the king had ordered his wife’s
murder. The verdict of historians is still open on this question. Pedro
refused to moderate his behavior. Urban then conceived of a plan that
would clear Provence, the Comtat Venaissin, and France of the ever-
present marauding companies and replace Pedro with his half-brother
Henry of Trastámara. Bertrand du Guesclin, famous for his Breton mer-
cenaries, took the lead of the expedition in August 1365; Arnaud de Cer-
vole promised to join him! On their way to Spain, du Guesclin,
Trastámara, and their troops managed to ransom Provence for some thir-
ty thousand florins and the Comtat Venaissin for five thousand florins,
also claiming a tithe for their “crusade.” Following the road to Spain,
they ransomed Montpellier for ten thousand francs. By the mid-1360s, the
French south had been bled white, and the pope dispatched several mis-
sives to princes and kings asking them to lighten the financial burden
levied on these territories. While in 1365 du Guesclin and Trastámara
passed the Pyrenees and eventually succeeded a few years later in elimi-
120 Chapter 3

nating Pedro the Cruel, some of their troops stopped at the border in
Perpignan and made their way back, a final time, to Avignon. The attrac-
tion of the capital of Christendom was not easy to let go. In January 1366,
Urban decreed another bull of excommunication against these maraud-
ing troops. Arnaud de Cervole, who had not yet joined du Guesclin’s
troops, stayed behind in Burgundy fighting English mercenaries; from
there he proposed to join the army of the Count of Savoy, ready to sup-
port the Byzantine emperor against the Turks. Urban’s joy at the news
only increased when one of Cervole’s companions subsequently killed
him. 20
The fourteenth century has often been regarded as a calamitous centu-
ry, marked by famine, plague, war, and schism. Free companies of mer-
cenaries, like a metaphorical pestilence matching the very literal one,
burdened the population to extremes. Hired soldiers were numberless
and limitless in their depredations. Closer to Avignon, as Trastámara was
sacking the French southeast, a war between the Count of Foix (Gaston III
of Foix-Béarn, alias Gaston Phoebus) and John of Armagnac erupted, and
their mercenary troops ravaged Languedoc. The pope sent Pierre of Cler-
mont, bishop of Cambrai, to mediate in December 1362, but both contin-
ued fighting in the vicinity of Toulouse until Gaston Phoebus won. He
became one of the greatest barons of France and was tremendously well
positioned to bargain with both France and England for the remainder of
the Hundred Years’ War.
Documents show the frustration that the pope felt toward soldiers,
both the rank-and-file and the nobility, who showed only contempt and
callousness for civilians. There is no better example than a letter sent to
Burgundy by Urban in January 1366, where Urban described a tourna-
ment that pitted Burgundian nobles against mercenaries. In summary,
when troops did not actually fight, they pretended to yet still marauded
the local area, entertaining themselves with bloody “spectacles.” The
pope excommunicated all involved and asked the bull to be posted on all
churches and public offices. 21 Much to Urban’s dismay, as if the violence
of wars were not sufficient, nobles and mercenaries also needed to fight
for sport.
 Returning to Rome 121

RETURNING TO ROME

Since his encounter with Roman ambassadors in 1363, Urban looked pos-
itively on the prospects of a return to Rome. As the episode of Cola di
Rienzo demonstrated, the court in Avignon and the pope kept close
watch on events happening in Rome. The enduring image of an Avignon
papacy utterly detached from Roman politics is inaccurate. On the
contrary, the correspondence that the popes maintained with specific in-
dividuals in Rome shows that they were well aware of minute political
shifts. In his study of the papal letters addressed to the Roman nobility,
Jean Coste demonstrates that the papacy was familiar with barons’
“death, renewal of best placed familial representatives, or collateral
members, and shift in actual center of power.” 22 It was this intimate
knowledge that allowed Urban to make his decision regarding the con-
tinuing location of the papacy. As early as September 1364 the pope
asked Cardinal Jean de Blauzac to rule on the status of the Avignonese
population, if and when the curia returned to Rome. Inhabitants of the
city were divided between citizens (native or naturalized) and courtiers,
followers of the Roman court. The pope’s departure would have depleted
the ranks of the tax-paying citizenry and bankrupted the city unless poli-
cies were initiated to soften the change this transition implied. It was
needed economically and militarily to support the city after a departure
of the court. But at a more theoretical level, the pope who questioned the
absenteeism of his clergy could not rationalize a long stay in Avignon,
away from the historical location of the papacy. Yves Renouard argues
that by the 1360s Rome was actually better suited for Urban’s goal of a
reunification with the Eastern Church. 23
The pope could leave Avignon with a certain peace of mind. The truce
that followed the Treaty of Brétigny seemed to hold between France and
England, and the political situation in Italy had dramatically improved.
Albornoz had managed to regain control of the Papal States and of Rome.
Albornoz had codified the Roman Statutes in 1363, which excluded the
Roman nobility from public offices and, in their absence, radically pac-
ified the city. The death of Giovanni di Vico, the perpetual agitator of the
Romagna, facilitated appeasement as Rome itself was under the control
of a popular militia, which ruled the commune and managed to frighten
away nobles and roving bands of mercenaries. Milan, long the object of
many popes’ preoccupation, had been subdued with the help of Charles
122 Chapter 3

IV. In 1360, when Bernabò Visconti had sent an army to retake Bologna,
Charles had levied a Hungarian army to stop him. Bernabò was again
defeated in June 1361 at the Battle of Ponte Rosillo. By then, Albornoz
had negotiated an alliance with the Este in Ferrara and the Della Scala in
Verona to infringe Visconti’s movements, sealed with his excommunica-
tion by the pope for his disregard of Emperor Charles IV, his feudal
overlord. Following this general offensive, the emperor upped the ante
by confiscating the Visconti’s lands in Italy.
At that moment, the Visconti’s stronghold on Lombardy and Roma-
gna could have been destroyed. The pope hesitated, however, turning
face in the name of peace and an eventual crusade. He recalled the effi-
cient Albornoz as papal legate—who opposed any type of settlement
with Visconti—in exchange for his promise to return his conquest only to
a new legate. Bernabò viewed Albornoz as the impediment to peace. In
1364 a Visconti was again named vicar of Bologna by the new legate,
Androin de la Roche, while Albornoz was sent to Naples. Urban realized
that he could not trust both de la Roche and Visconti and recalled Albor-
noz to the north. De la Roche opposed his replacement for a while but
eventually moved to Viterbo, where he died in October 1369. Meanwhile,
Albornoz continued to pacify the Papal States in order to prepare for the
pope’s return to Italy. One of his biggest accomplishments was the hiring
of John Hawkwood’s Company of St. George for the papal army. In the
spring of 1367, as Urban was preparing to leave Avignon, Hawkwood
defeated the Perugian army, a victory that cleared the way for Albornoz
to consolidate his hold on the Romagna.
Urban first communicated his desire to return to Italy in September
1366, much to the dismay of the French court and a French embassy sent
to convince the pope of the futility of his plans. But by October, plans
were well under way; the pope authorized a tithe to be levied in Germa-
ny that would cover the emperor’s expenses for accompanying him back
to Italy. 24 Urban also ordered the repair and refurbishing of several lo-
cales in preparation for his return; orders were sent to make ready the
papal city of Viterbo, the Lateran palace, and St. Paul Outside the Walls.
Petrarch, who had spent his life penning letters and invectives against the
vices of the papal curia in Avignon, reinforced his attacks in order to spur
the pope to action. He praised the charms of Italy vis-à-vis Provence,
especially its food and wine; but most of all, he reminded the pontiff that
one day he would have to answer for his failure to act. Petrarch did not
 Returning to Rome 123

need to prod the pope; Urban stood firm on his decision. His court did
not share his enthusiasm, however.
Few members of the curia really knew Italy from direct experience or
were deeply acquainted with its politics, and they disagreed in general
with the pope’s design. The dangers of political strife in Italy and fear of
the Visconti added to the French cultural block. French cardinals were
also deeply worried about displeasing the king of France. It is striking
that the pope, who had the courage to return the curia to Rome, had in
actuality better administrative and diplomatic experience with Italy than
he had with France. In any case, the pope’s plans for a return to Rome
failed, no doubt to the pleasure of the French cardinals, but not by their
design. Urban V left Avignon on April 30, 1367, and arrived in Rome on
October 16. But in 1370, after three short years, Urban decided to return
to the safety of Avignon. He entered the city on September 22, 1370, only
to die three months later, on December 19, 1370.
Urban organized his departure thoroughly. He first named Philippe
de Cabassole as vicar general for Avignon. Cabassole, the former bishop
of Cavaillon, had extensive administrative knowledge of the area. He had
been nominated rector of the Comtat Venaissin in 1362, and with his
nomination to the rectorship Urban efficiently centralized the govern-
ment of this ultramontane papal territory. This freed Cabassole to deal
singlehandedly with emergencies in the area. For example, in 1368 Ca-
bassole bought off Bertrand du Guesclin and thus avoided the renewed
incursions of his free companies. In 1368 Urban elevated Cabassole to the
title of cardinal of St. Marcelline and in 1369 required his presence in
Rome. By then, the rector had inventoried the pope’s treasury and inves-
tigated two penitentiaries accused of simony and gambling. Urban, al-
ready frazzled by the situation in Italy, may have known in 1369 that he
would soon return to Avignon. He did not name a new rector; he simply
charged the five cardinals who remained behind in Avignon to deal with
pressing judicial and administrative matters.
Urban, always a skilled administrator, understood that moving the
entire administration from one place to another was close to impossible,
if not dangerous. In addition, the administration could not remain vacant
during the move. So the pope opted for the safest solution: he divided the
administration in half. He left part of the curia’s organization in place in
Avignon as well as the entire papal treasury. The papal court had been
halved, and Avignon retained its centralizing financial role. The treasur-
124 Chapter 3

er, along with a good number of the Apostolic Chamber and chancery
employees, stayed behind in the city. As Yves Renouard explains, the
central position of Avignon and decades of financial centralization were
habits difficult to break. Thus, it was Avignon that subsidized Rome. 25
One of Étienne Baluze’s sources offers us specific details on Urban’s
exact itinerary. 26 The pope left Avignon for Pont-de-Sorgues, then Noves,
Aix-en-Provence, and Marseille, where he stayed two weeks in his former
home, the ancient monastery of Saint-Victor, a site that had been renovat-
ed and beautified at his own expense. From Marseille, the pope boarded
a galley that brought him to Genoa; he then sailed to Corneto, where
Cardinal Albornoz awaited him. There a Roman embassy offered the
keys of Castel Sant’Angelo as a sign of the city’s submission to its return-
ing ruler. Urban rode to Viterbo, which he entered amid great ceremony
on June 9. But while the curia was still in Viterbo, Urban lost a trusted
agent of his policy when Cardinal Albornoz died on August 22, 1367.
The events that unfolded after the death of the powerful legate dem-
onstrate how tenuous was the pope’s hold on his Italian cities and how
volatile the political situation remained on the peninsula. Within a few
days of Albornoz’s death, on September 5, 1367, the Viterbese rebelled
against the curia. They attacked foreigners for some three days and then
surrendered to the pope; he severely punished the leaders of the insurrec-
tion. The French cardinals, fearing for their lives, had disguised them-
selves and fled to find refuge in the Rocca, the fortress previously
strengthened on the order of Albornoz. According to contemporary
chronicles, the rebellion started when certain courtiers belonging to the
household of the pope’s marshal washed a dog in the town’s fountain.
From there, a maid who rebuked the courtiers for their action may have
been killed. The town rose against the pope for the offense committed by
his staff.
What is certain is that the insurrectionists’ cries, “Long live the pope
and death to the foreigners,” or “Long live the people and death to the
Church,” did not bode well for the pope’s return to Italy and showed that
nationalistic sentiment could mar Italian enthusiasm for the pope. 27 In
any case, the pontiff returned to the business of ruling the Church once
Viterbo was pacified. He received the Count of Savoy and a delegation,
assembling representatives of the patriarch of Constantinople and am-
bassadors of the Eastern emperor to discuss a return of the Eastern
Church to the West. Then, on October 16, the pope left Viterbo and en-
 Returning to Rome 125

tered Rome in the midst of renewed celebrations. This did not prevent
chroniclers from underscoring the decrepit state of the new capital. 28
As he restored the splendor of the Eternal City physically, Urban also
gave it back its liturgical centrality. He commissioned the reconstruction
of two of the major basilicas that had been destroyed by earthquake and
fire, respectively: St. Paul Outside the Walls and the Lateran. He also
ordered two new reliquaries for the heads of St. Paul and St. Peter. Urban
celebrated offices at the twin liturgical centers of the city, the basilicas of
St. Peter and the Lateran. He revived the civic pride of Rome with public
ceremonies, receiving important dignitaries such as St. Bridget of Swe-
den, who asked permission to found two convents in Rome; Queen Joan-
na of Naples, to whom he offered the papal Golden Rose as a mark of
affection and esteem; and King Peter of Cyprus, who, as he celebrated his
victory in Alexandria with the pope, may have recoiled at Urban’s pres-
entation of the Golden Rose to a woman. But perhaps by this gesture
Urban showed his support for the queen, whose kingdom was then
under attack by Louis of Anjou (brother of Charles V) and Bertrand du
Guesclin’s troops.
In France, alarmed by the threat of so many free companies, the bar-
ons had decided to keep these violent mercenaries busy by invading
Provence and the Comtat during the pope’s absence. The pope railed
against the mercenaries with another bull of excommunication, and in
Avignon Cabassole negotiated their retreat at the price of some 37,000
florins. This war in Provence affected the region’s main cities, dividing
constituencies into Angevin and Neapolitan factions as the duke of Anjou
and du Guesclin continued their efforts, regardless of the pope’s com-
plaints to the king and bulls of excommunication against anyone who
helped them. The companies continued to ravage Provence, and their
depredations added to the mandatory papal tithes, further exacerbating
the population’s frustration with their rulers. As in 1358, the peasantry
rebelled. If Provençal barons had been ineffective against the well-trained
men of Anjou and du Guesclin, they showcased their talent with the
repression of the peasantry and laborers. This suppression was violent; in
response, Urban excommunicated du Guesclin one more time in Septem-
ber 1368, but to little effect. The king’s family was simply untouchable.
Among his more distinguished visitors, Urban again received Emper-
or Charles IV in September 1368; the imperial “descent” was this time
rationalized by the coronation of the emperor’s fourth wife. In reality, the
126 Chapter 3

journey was a show of force against Bernabò Visconti, who had invaded
Tuscany and been excommunicated by the pope. Urban additionally
called a crusade against Visconti. Charles’s presence held the added ad-
vantage of impressing the companies of mercenaries that were now ran-
sacking Italy. Charles met the pope in Viterbo and entered Rome with
him, leading the pope’s horse through the gate Collina, near Castel
Sant’Angelo, to St. Peter. The pope crowned the empress, Elizabeth of
Pomerania, in November.
Although protected by Charles, Urban nevertheless second-guessed
his decision to return the curia to Rome. He certainly did not ingratiate
Romans and Italians to his rule when, in the cardinal promotion of Sep-
tember 1368, he named only one Italian (the Roman Francesco Tebaldes-
chi) among the eight new cardinals. This promotion signaled to Italians
the pope’s reliance on France. But Urban was shocked by the situation in
Italy and the attacks on Provence and more so by the renewal of hostility
between France and England with Charles V’s seizure of Aquitaine in
1369. The Perugians’ rebellion against Church rule finally enticed Urban
to leave Rome in April 1369 for his summer residence at Montefiascone.
But the Perugian army commanded by Hawkwood, who had again
changed allegiances, threatened the pope’s retreat. After excommunicat-
ing them in August, the pope moved the court to Viterbo, still sur-
rounded by Hawkwood’s troops. Unfortunately, the plague struck Viter-
bo, and the court was too fearful to exit its walls because of the mercenar-
ies in the surrounding area. Five cardinals died between September and
October, including the abbot of Cluny and the intrepid legate Androin de
la Roche. Another died as soon as the court returned to Rome. It was at
this moment, at the end of October, that the Byzantine emperor, John V
Paleologus, arrived in the city to make peace with the West. He submit-
ted his empire to the Western Church in return for aid against the Turks.
In seeming disregard of this spectacular success (the pope had, after
all, theoretically reunited Eastern and Western Christianity), Urban de-
cided to return to Provence. The threats of the Hundred Years’ War
seemed negligible in comparison with Italian instability. He left for Mon-
tefiascone and Viterbo in the summer of 1370 and announced to the Ro-
mans on June 26, 1370, after having already departed the city, that he
would not come back to Rome. He explained that the pacification of Italy
allowed him to return to Avignon, where renewed hostilities between
France and England required his presence. Urban sailed again from Cor-
 Returning to Rome 127

neto to Marseille and entered Avignon on September 4, 1370. Fragile,

sick, and surely depressed by his failure to stabilize the Church’s pres-
ence in Rome, he died on December 19, 1370. The body of Urban V rested
in Avignon Cathedral for eighteen months before it was transferred to
the Abbey of Saint-Victor of Marseille, where he had once been a monk.
His body was exhumed on June 1, 1372, placed on a ceremonial bed, and
transported to the abbey. During the cortège’s first stop at the abbey of St.
Ruf, however, Avignonese citizens attacked the bed and shredded its red
silk cover to “share it like relics.” 29
Urban had died a good and holy death in the estimation of his con-
temporaries. His agony was public; he asked to be displayed at his broth-
er Anglic’s house with all the gates of the episcopal palace opened “to
show that the papacy is immortal even if the pope dies” and to demon-
strate to the people “how popes know to die.” 30 This good death, taken in
combination with his return of the papal court to both Rome and later
Avignon, propelled him to quasi-sainthood in these areas. The first in-
quest for his canonization made him popular in France and Italy. The
numerous images and pictures that remain of Urban V in Italian and
Roman churches attest to his popularity in Italy. But it is around Mar-
seille and Saint-Victor that his cult became the most active. In 1870 Pius
IX declared him “blessed” but not canonized; he could be venerated by
local churches but not considered part of the Christian calendar of saints.
In his influential biography, Ludwig Vones retraces the disappoint-
ments Urban suffered for Christianity. The pope in some ways failed as a
reformer and scuttled the papal return to Italy; even with excellent per-
sonal qualities, he remained an uninspiring leader. Still, Urban was a
pope in line with the traditions of his Avignonese predecessors. His ef-
forts to raise a crusading army, reform the Church, centralize ecclesiasti-
cal governance, and reinforce clerical education were all part of the Avi-
gnon papacy’s agenda. What distinguished him from other popes was his
relationship with his curia and especially with the college of cardinals,
from which he was somewhat alienated as an outsider. The personal
rivalries of the cardinals, for example, the clash between the Limousins of
the Aubert and Roger clans and Albornoz or the factions of Talleyrand of
Périgord and Gui of Boulogne, mystified him. 31 But the pope learned and
earned their respect. The abbot of Moissac put these words in Talleyrand
of Périgord’s mouth: “At least we have a pope. We honored the previous
ones by duty; this one we must fear and honor because he is powerful in
128 Chapter 3

action and words.” 32 Urban actually managed to control the college via
his close involvement in the collation of benefices, cardinals’ nomina-
tions, and his reliance on his own family. The pope created his own
networks to temper the growing impatience of cardinals looking to in-
crease their power. The next pope elected outside the college, Urban VI,
succeeded Gregory XI (Urban V’s successor) and followed in the reform-
ing footsteps of his namesake. He failed, opening the doors to cardinals’
greater empowerment and the Great Western Schism. Still it remained to
reestablish the papacy in Rome. Where Urban failed in that respect, his
direct successor, Gregory XI, succeeded, though at a dear price.

THE LAST OF THE AVIGNON POPES: GREGORY XI

Little division was evident within the conclave that elected Gregory XI.
The cardinals entered the conclave at the end of the novena (the nine
days of devotions and prayers for the soul of the dead pope) and unani-
mously elected the forty-two-year-old Cardinal Pierre Roger of Beaufort
on December 30, 1370. He took the papal name Gregory XI. It is of note
that his namesake, Gregory X, had initially created the conclave in 1274
with his bull Ubi periculum, a telltale sign that Pierre Roger admired ad-
ministrators who took charge. Baluze’s sources add that Pierre Roger was
the son of the Count of Beaufort, that he had been a notary of the Apos-
tolic Chamber in his teens (adolescentia), and that he had been named
cardinal-deacon of Santa Maria Nuova. They do not highlight that the
new pope was only nineteen in 1348 when his uncle Clement VI elevated
him to the cardinalate. Pierre studied at Perugia under the tutelage of one
of the greatest medieval jurists of the time, Baldo degli Ubaldi, the so-
called king of Roman and canon laws. He excelled to such a degree that,
according to Ptolemaeus Lucensis, the master often quoted his pupil. 33
Pierre Roger was calm, humble, pious, and modest. Even his detrac-
tors, like the famous Florentine humanist Coluccio Salutati (1331–1406),
praised “his prudence and discretion, his modest demeanour, his piety,
goodness and affability, the uprightness of his character and his stead-
fastness of purpose in word and deeds.” 34 These qualities should not
diminish the fact that Roger was not a pushover and could be obstinate in
his anger. Cristoforo da Piacenza, a Mantuan ambassador at the papal
court, reported the rage the pope often showed to the Visconti, whom he
wanted to see utterly destroyed. 35 Apparently choleric by temperament,
 Returning to Rome 129

he once banished an ambassador of the Visconti, accusing the man of

being at the court only to spy. 36
Gregory represented the traditional and powerful Limousin clan at
the curia. He was closely related to some six cardinals and a previous
pope. Thanks to his illustrious lineage, Pierre Roger had a splendid ca-
reer; he rose from deacon to archdeacon and archpriest before being
made a very young cardinal in 1348. A prime example of where such a
career led, he rose through the Church without ever having been or-
dained a priest. Roger was only ordained priest and bishop for his papal
consecration. He participated in two conclaves before the one that elected
him and thus had experience in curial politics. As cardinal he arbitrated
several cases of an international nature, and he was also ambassador and
negotiator for several affairs in Italy and the Neapolitan court, posts that
made him an able diplomat. 37
Like his uncle Clement VI, Pope Gregory XI was a talented diplomat,
but his experience lay more with Italian rather than French affairs. He
was at once prudent and daring. Before consulting his consistory on sign-
ing a peace treaty with the Visconti, Gregory intercepted all the corre-
spondence sent to the court by the Milanese and the Count of Savoy so
that he could decipher the true intentions of his former enemies and
investigate whom they were attempting to pay off. 38 The new pope was
also a deeply cultured man and an early humanist. He searched for man-
uscripts of ancient authors but also loved traditional scholastic enter-
prise. Perhaps his retiring and bookish nature was linked to his fragile
health.
As Coluccio Salutati notes, the new pope was modest. But if he dis-
liked luxury for his person, he nevertheless maintained a high conception
of his office, keeping up proper appearances and protocol for a person of
his lofty rank. He restored the papal coronation cavalcade that Urban V
had avoided. The cortège that rode throughout the city was organized
around the pope; the closer the person to him, the higher his rank. This
procession started with deacons, followed by a large group of clerics
carrying the cross, then twelve messengers of the pope with ten red ban-
ners and two starred; auditors of the palace and advocates wearing their
sacred vestments followed. Then came abbots riding white-blanketed
horses, themselves wearing white pluvials (copes) and mitres. Fifty bish-
ops rode along with archbishops and patriarchs, followed by seventeen
cardinals in beautiful copes, also riding white-blanketed horses and again
130 Chapter 3

wearing white mitres; lastly appeared the pope with the fourth-century
crown that Constantine had given Saint Sylvester. The duke of Anjou,
brother of the king of France, held the papal horse’s bit, with two hun-
dred lances (some six hundred men) and a large group of diverse people
finishing the line. 39
Gregory XI may be the best remembered of the Avignon popes for
several reasons. Significantly, he returned the curia to Rome. As we will
see in a later chapter, Gregory’s death in Rome triggered the events that
led to the Great Western Schism. Even more importantly, he fought a war
against the Church’s most outspoken ally, Florence. The relation between
that city and the pope is best epitomized by the words of the Florentine
historian and statesman Francesco Guicciardini (1483–1540). Summariz-
ing his views on the Church, he stated, “I don’t know anyone who dis-
likes the ambition, the avarice, and the sensuality of priests more than I
do. Nevertheless, the position I have enjoyed with several popes has
forced me to love their greatness for my own self-interest. Were it not for
this consideration, I would have loved Martin Luther as much as I love
myself.” 40 Politics was not simple when a city’s neighbor was the Roman
Catholic Church, the most powerful entity of its time, and when its eco-
nomic life rested on this neighbor’s support.

FLORENCE AND THE POPE: TOWARD THE BREAK

The deterioration of rapport between the papacy and Florence is best

placed within the context of the reconquest of the Papal States. Gene A.
Brucker, the great historian of Florentine politics, describes the initiation
of the break in this way:
What intensified Florentine fears of the church’s temporal power? This
question is equally as significant, historically, as that of papal motives
and designs. The problem was not simply one of jealousy inspired by
the emergence of a strong rival state. One difficulty was the unique
character of the papacy’s political role in central Italy. In the name of
peace and order, church officials could and did intervene in the domes-
tic affairs of the Tuscan communes, seeking to mediate between rival
factions, and conceivably giving a decisive advantage to the party
which favored the church. Gregory XI contended that the promotion of
peace was the objective of Gérard du Puy’s intervention in southern
Tuscany. The same argument might well have been advanced to justify
Pierre d’Estaing’s intrusion into the quarrel between Florence and the
 Returning to Rome 131

Ubaldini. Papal mediation was not a novelty in Tuscany; the innova-

tion was its foundation upon a strong temporal position. The line be-
tween arbitration and dictation is particularly narrow when the arbitra-
tor is a powerful neighbor. 41

The Church’s growth in territory alarmed its neighbors and countered

the interests of cities like Florence. A papacy in Avignon fitted the de-
signs of Florentines who felt that they could, ironically, better control
Guelph support with the pope away from Italy. Similarly, Ghibellines
often felt their interests were better preserved as long as the emperor
remained on the other side of the Alps. In summary, two allied states
striving for expansion, such as Florence and the Church, were bound to
clash. It is noteworthy that both states suffered severe internal upheaval
from their expansionist policies. The climax of the Otto Santi war led to a
schism in the Church and the Ciompi revolt in Florence; both erupting in
1378.
Since the late thirteenth century the Florentine republic was based on
a signoria government composed of an executive with several elected
officials, the priors, headed by a “standard-bearer of Justice” (the gonfalo-
niere). Tenure in this position was changed frequently to account for so-
cial mobility and prevent single-family rule. Of course, these measures
were in reality only nominal, since magnates did, in fact, control Floren-
tine politics. Many families competed for positions in its government. On
the one hand, the ancient patrician families represented old money and
the traditional Guelph alliance with the papacy; in contrast, the new rich
were associated with il popolo (a misnomer since they often did not repre-
sent the lower classes but simply other factions of the wealthy, mostly
new blood) and Ghibelline leanings.
Politically aligned with the papacy, the ruling Florentine Guelph par-
ty often clashed with the powerful merchant guilds that produced the
city’s wealth, especially when they allowed popes to interfere in internal
politics. These Guelph magnates had a long history of banking relations
with the popes. Since the end of the thirteenth century they were heavily
involved in the collection of papal taxes and finances. This mutual sup-
port profited both; patricians received ecclesiastical positions, while
popes had their finances in the reliable hands of the Bardi, Peruzzi, Ac-
ciaiuoli, Soderini, and Alberti antichi and nuovi banking families, who
collected and transferred papal funds. They kept branches in Avignon,
and the names of their representatives fill the registers of the Apostolic
132 Chapter 3

Chamber. The Florentine community was heavily represented in Avi-

gnon and formed the most important expatriate community of the four-
teenth-century Christian capital.
In the late 1330s, however, a series of bankruptcies, most notably of
the important Bardi, Peruzzi, and Acciaiuoli houses, destabilized the fi-
nancial health of the commune, affecting hundreds of subsidiaries. By the
early 1340s, Florence found itself seriously indebted after losing a war
with Lucca and begged Benedict XII to temporarily give the commune
revenues from papal taxation. In spite of their financial relationship, the
pope refused, transferring his reliance away from Florentine banks into
Sienese firms. By doing so, he further ruined Florentine bankers. To solve
this crisis, Florence’s magnates endowed full power to one of their com-
manders in the war against Lucca, Walter of Brienne, Duke of Athens. In
1342, Florence’s magnates chose this signore (a despot) to rule the com-
mune in this time of emergency, to steer the city toward a sounder fiscal
course, and possibly to intervene in their favor with the pope. But
Brienne’s taxing economic measures failed, and his despotic rule disen-
chanted both the poor and the rich. He was expelled after only ten
months in power.
The Florentines then tried to consolidate the communal public debt
with the creation of the Monte in 1345. This was a public saving institu-
tion that paid interest regardless of usury regulations. It paid some 5
percent and led speculators to trade Monte’s shares as today’s stocks.
This fresh influx of funds allowed new investors, the gente nuova, to ac-
quire financial and political clout in Florence. At this point, more than
anything, the members of the rising upper class wanted a relaxation of
the Church’s moral grip on their commercial activities.
Shortly after the expulsion of Brienne in 1342, the commune found
itself at odds with the pope over a debt that the Acciaiuoli owed to one
cardinal. Yet the curial agents’ aggressive harassment of Florence’s bank-
rupted financiers strained relations between the city and the pope quite
severely. To demonstrate its frustration, the signoria decided in April 1345
to remove legal cases from ecclesiastical courts; the new law also prevent-
ed clerics from escaping local justice by claiming ecclesiastical immunity.
The pope’s response was swift. He put the city under interdict for disre-
garding the Church’s privileges. In response, the Florentines argued that
their city’s peace was better served when jurisdiction remained local.
 Returning to Rome 133

Florence ordered its citizens to ignore the interdict, but the city frac-
tured. Gente nuova (the new rich) associated the old aristocracy with the
defense of the Church, the institution which in their mind had bank-
rupted the state. But since the old patrician houses still controlled the
bishopric and clergy, Florentine internal struggle reached a stalemate. In
any case, both Clement VI and Florence ended up temporizing, and the
pope lifted his interdict on the city in February 1347. We can note that
afterward, some Florentine banking firms still found their place in papal
finances, but they never regained the level of involvement they had at-
tained before the 1340s.

FLORENCE AND THE POPE AT WAR

Relations between the popes and Florence teetered on the brink until a
new crisis, the outbreak of the “War of the Eight Saints” (in Italian, Otto
Santi, 1375–1378). Gene Brucker blames the “disintegration of the Guelf
entente” on many factors: quarrels and misunderstanding, Florence’s de-
sire to free itself from the Church’s tutelage, and its active sabotage of the
Church’s diplomacy. When Florence grew strong and controlled Tuscany
during the second half of the fourteenth century, it did not require the
same level of papal protection that it did earlier in its history. This disen-
gagement was consequential for Florentine life. With its newfound hege-
mony, the commune complained of curial infringement: in 1364, it pro-
tested that Albornoz occupied Florentine territory near Bologna; in 1367,
that he was taxing the Apennines district and that Urban V supported a
takeover of Tuscany by Emperor Charles IV. Urban V was aware of these
protests, and in June 1369 he replied:
Recently it has come to our attention that the Florentines believed that
church troops wished to occupy imperial lands and disturb the status
of Tuscan cities. . . . This suspicion is completely false and has no basis
in reality. . . . Our intention has never been, nor is it now, to disturb the
pacific and tranquil state of Tuscany by means of church forces, nor to
occupy imperial territory. We are quite content with the lands, which
belong to the church. 42

Florence riposted by setting itself up as the defender of Tuscan liber-

ties. According to a chronicler, “The Florentines acquired greater honor
than they had ever possessed, since they had been confronted by the
whole of Italy and the great lords of the world. . . . They sent ambassa-
134 Chapter 3

dors to every part of Tuscany, arranging peace agreements. They assisted

the Tuscan cities with troops and money, so that they would remain in
peace.” 43 Pisa, Lucca, and Siena became Florentine satellites. In Florence,
the Albizzi and Corsini best represented the Guelph party, while the
Ricci supported their opponents. When the Guelphs succeeded in con-
vincing Florence to support the pope’s anti-Milanese efforts, Piero Corsi-
ni was elevated to cardinal, a reward for Guelph support. Of course, the
Ricci and their Ghibelline lobbyists lost influence in policy making each
time they lost patronage.
For his part, Gregory XI (like his predecessors) was intent on recover-
ing Papal States that had fallen into hostile hands, especially territories
claimed by the Visconti lords of Milan. Albornoz’s campaigns left little
doubt as to papal motivations in regaining a foothold on the Italian pe-
ninsula; these efforts were, after all, tied to a papal return to Rome. Yet
the recovery of those territories encroached upon by the Visconti brought
papal diplomacy uncomfortably close to Florentine interests in Tuscany.
Perugia, an “independent” Papal State, fell to the papal army in 1371.
When Florence wrote to the pope inquiring of his intentions, Gregory
again answered that they should not fear. “The Florentines were in error,
Gregory insisted, when they criticized the conquest of Perugia. That city
was papal territory; it was only natural that the church should seek to
recover its own property. The pontiff then broached a subject which ap-
peared with increasing frequency in papal letters to Tuscan communes:
‘The clergy are falsely accused of not being satisfied with their posses-
sions, and of seeking to aggrandize themselves at the expense of Tuscany.
The popes have always defended the peace and liberty of Italy.’” 44
From 1372 to 1375, the pope renewed his attacks against the Visconti,
buttressed this time by the famous “Green Count,” Amadeus VI of Savoy
(named after his green livery on tournament fields), and Enguerrand VII,
Lord of Coucy, two formidable military leaders. They were supported by
papal troops led by the pope’s brother Nicolas Roger of Beaufort and his
nephew Raymond de Turenne (who became the scourge of Provence
during the Schism), all under management of the legate in Italy, Cardinal
Pierre d’Estaing. Gregory made his best efforts to present the league as a
pact of mutual protection between the pope, the emperor, and the queen
of Naples, with the cities of Genoa, Florence, Pisa, Lucca, Siena, and
Arezzo. Florence refused to join, however. Three years of military expedi-
tions did not bring any decisive victories. Even though papal troops re-
 Returning to Rome 135

mained in Milanese territory, they conquered nothing, perhaps because

they were paid too irregularly and the papal allies remained half-hearted
at best. By 1374, the Green Count had left for Savoy and signed a treaty
with the Visconti. These campaigns cost the pope an immense portion of
his budget; for example, 218,712 florins were spent for this purpose in
1372. That is half of the Apostolic Chamber’s expenses. Another 307,062
florins went to the anti-Visconti campaigns in 1373. 45
Florence remained neutral when the pope attacked Bernabò Visconti;
it refused to help the pope, arguing that wars were expensive and bad for
commerce. The gente nuova had won, even if by then the Ricci had turned
coat and were now supporting papal policies in return for ecclesiastic
positions. Florentines eyed the papal troops’ progress with suspicion.
When papal troops attacked Visconti near Florence’s borders and when
Siena accused the Church of wanting to overthrow its government, the
fears of the Florentines could not be quelled. As tension mounted outside
the city, so did internal politics. By 1373, the Florentine regime, attempt-
ing to subdue factionalism, enforced a moratorium on the participation of
the Albizzi and Ricci families in its governance for the next ten years.
Authorities distrusted the magnates’ rapprochement with the Church,
finding conspiracies everywhere. By 1374, the everlasting wars between
the Visconti and the Church had exhausted both parties, and both were
ready to enter peace negotiations. Milan requested diplomatic support
from the warring parties’ neighbors in Siena and Florence; Gregory re-
ceived the embassies as a courtesy, but lofty in his demeanor, he rejected
any assistance, saying dismissively, “In my affairs, I need neither aid nor
favor.” 46 A treaty was eventually drafted on June 4, 1375. The peace, of
course, brought new fears to the surface, including that of the disbanded
free companies that would feed on Tuscany while awaiting new
contracts.
The early months of 1375 were dire for Florence. The plague of 1374
had weakened the population, and stocks of grain were meager. The
Florentines felt disparaged when they were forced to wait for papal per-
mission to import wheat from the Marche and Umbria, as the pope ac-
cused the Florentines of secretly negotiating with Milan. In June, a con-
ference gathered papal envoys with the representatives of several Tuscan
states, including Florence, Siena, Lucca, and the papacy. The Church re-
quired financial help against the Visconti. The Tuscan shareholders
promised some 75,000 florins in order to underwrite almost entirely John
136 Chapter 3

Hawkwood’s mercenary defense of the Papal States against Milanese

incursions. But the events at this conference seemed rather duplicitous to
the Tuscans, who feared that Hawkwood’s incursion into Tuscany while
at the pay of the pope was simply a pretext to attack their cities. In short,
many considered the funds either payment supporting an invasion of
their own territories or a ransom for protection against this invasion. To
Tuscan eyes, both prospects revealed the pope’s guile.
By the summer of 1375, all elements were in place for a radical altera-
tion of the Italian political balance. The presence of papal mercenary
troops in central Italy, widespread famine, and rumors of anti-Florentine
conspiracies as close as nearby Prato combined to push Florence into the
arms of Milan. On July 24, 1375, Florence and Bernabò Visconti signed a
treaty, joined by the Sienese in November. The recently named priors and
gonfaloniere made good on their antipapal rhetoric; they named a special
commission to deal with the war effort. It was this Otto di Balìa—the
governing committee of eight later known as “the Eight Saints” (Otto
Santi)—that gave the war its unusual name.
In a letter addressed to the Visconti, the Otto left no doubt as to their
intentions: “Since in the pacts of the league no specific mention was made
of the pope or the emperor, we declare that this league . . . is to be
extended to the pope and the emperor, and against them.” 47 The Floren-
tine chancellor Coluccio Salutati, when justifying this revolutionary Flo-
rentine defection from the Guelph party to the other European powers,
cited the discriminating papal attacks on the Visconti, the pope’s refusal
to allow grain transport to the city, the plot in Prato, and Hawkwood’s
incursions into Tuscany. These events demonstrate with little doubt that
Urban V and Gregory XI had failed in their administration of the newly
conquered Papal States. They had left these territories in the control of
French cardinals and bishops. These “foreigners” alienated the Italian
people and clergy, who viewed the encroaching French as warmongers.
This sentiment echoed in St. Catherine of Siena’s words, “Pace, pace, pace,
babbo mio dolce, e non piú guerra” (“peace, peace, peace, my sweet father,
and no more war”). 48
Florentine resentment (and to some extent its anticlerical propaganda)
against the purported avarice of the Church quickly spread throughout
the Papal States, including hard-won Bologna, as the pope raged against
Florentine cries of “popular liberty.” Most of Albornoz’s fortresses, the
essential basis of papal military defense in Italy, were totally destroyed.
 Returning to Rome 137

Gregory had difficulties fighting this insurrection. Financially limited, he

could not pay his mercenaries, who responded by ransacking the Italian
peninsula. Breton troops were finally hired under the general command
of Robert of Geneva (the future Clement VII) to augment the forces of
Hawkwood, but the atrocities they committed antagonized the Italians
even more and worked against the Church. The slaughter of the popula-
tion of Cesena, which took place on February 3, 1377, cemented the gen-
eral mistrust between the Italians and the “French” popes for many years
to come.
Although some papal cities eventually rejoined the fold of the Church,
including Bologna in 1377, these victories were hard won and only with
the skill of violent mercenaries. All negotiations needed to take into con-
sideration the military might of mercenary captains, such as Hawkwood,
Landau, and Budes. Their somewhat shifting allegiances directed their
strategy and negotiations. The pope’s failure at retaining condottieri ex-
plains in part the failure of his military campaigns, and no action better
illustrates this than the changed source of Hawkwood’s financial back-
ing, the shift from papal coffers to Florentine and Milanese purses.
But Florence continued to take radical steps. The city refused to nego-
tiate with the pope, thinking that it could bring him to his knees with the
strength of its rebellion—especially in 1376, when more than forty cities
joined the rebellion. The Florentine signoria required the city’s clergy to
choose sides; then it opted to support its war by selling the Church’s
property in the city. The pope accepted the challenge; rather than aban-
don them, Gregory renewed his efforts at reconquering papal lands and
decided that the return to Rome would galvanize support behind him.
He then put Florence under interdict on March 31, 1376. “Within Floren-
tine territory, all religious services and functions were suspended. Thirty-
six citizens who had held important offices since the war’s outbreak were
excommunicated. The Florentines were declared outlaws of Christen-
dom; no one was permitted to have any dealings or contacts with them.
They were to be expelled forthwith from every state; their property could
be confiscated, and they could be imprisoned or enslaved.” 49 As we will
see in chapter 5, the consequences of the interdict were felt in Avignon
and all throughout Europe.
138 Chapter 3

THE INTERDICT

Florence’s fortune was based on banking and the wool trade; its mer-
chants feared reprisal and confiscation, common “diplomatic” tools used
in the Middle Ages. Many European leaders, such as Charles V of France,
ignored the pope’s interdict, understanding that bringing down Florence
would in turn destroy their own economies. This furnishes no better
proof of medieval globalization. Throughout Europe, Florence’s misfor-
tune was perceived as an opening for profit: local entrepreneurs pres-
sured their authorities to respect the interdict in order to replace Floren-
tine influence in markets where they might now have a chance to com-
pete. Locally raised merchants displaced Florence in the wool trade and
in banking. The decline of Florentine commerce eclipsed its fortunes. In
the city, economic decline was real; the resulting discontent and unem-
ployment led to the revolt of the Ciompi in 1378. When the Florentines
ran short on much-needed cash (to pay mercenaries, for example), they
forced loans from the clergy and confiscated ecclesiastical property for
resale. In response, the pope did the same, with limited success, on Flo-
rentine property in Avignon. In his research, Richard C. Trexler has
shown that, while only a few unfortunate residents lost their livelihood,
scores of Florentines bought insurance protection to avoid such a fate;
they used their networks and relations to buy themselves out of trou-
bles. 50
Despite this strife between Church and city, on the surface at least, the
interdict did not seem to affect the Florentines’ spiritual lives very much.
Churches remained full and processions multiplied as Florence demon-
strated its piety, publicly extolling civic religiosity even as it simultane-
ously disobeyed the pope. But the psychological damage to Florence’s
citizens from this conflict was real, in Trexler’s estimation. The interdict
denied the faithful access to the host, the focal point of medieval piety;
and even if they answered, “But we will see it [the host] with our hearts,”
they keenly felt its absence. 51 In response, the people channeled their
religious devotion into other activities. They joined confraternities, prac-
ticed flagellation, and listened to apocalyptic sermons preached by Frati-
celli (Spiritual Franciscans). This turn to lay forms of spirituality was a
harbinger, to a certain extent, of civic cults and public rituals that venerat-
ed the state in its various forms. By October 1377, the Florentines decided
officially to ignore the interdict; the signoria ordered masses and offices to
 Returning to Rome 139

be offered as normal. Still, the interdict produced heated discussion in

popular circles and in the end weakened Florentine authorities. Herein
lies another cause of the Ciompi revolt.
In 1378, Florence’s Otto were branded heretics, and Milan entered
negotiations with Gregory, who had by that time returned to Rome. The
Roman people had already revolted against the pope when he requested
them to disband their militia, forcing him to delay his decisions on the
Milanese and Florentine affairs, taking care of pressing matters first.
Eventually, both the pope and Florence sued for peace. Negotiations
were initiated. Florence had begun to notice the ramifications of three
years of war, and in the midst of this confusing situation the reemerging
Guelph party strictly opposed the war. Florentine Guelphs managed to
stop the nomination of certain members of the signoria by nominating
some of their own party in the pool of electives. The Guelphs were even-
tually defeated with the nomination of Salvestro de Medici as gonfalo-
niere. After several skirmishes, grandstanding, and gross manipulation,
the Medici won a decree that branded the old patrician magnates and led
the lower classes to the revolt of the Ciompi in 1378. The clog-wearing
laborers of the wool industry requested and received, for a few years,
participation in the government with the formation of their own guilds.
What emerged from the affair is that Gregory was deeply wounded
by the Florentines’ betrayal; this made him unforgiving. His proceedings
against them show an eagerness for Florentine obliteration. The pope
forbade the rest of the world to speak, eat, and drink with them or to buy,
sell, or in any other way give counsel to, help, or favor the Florentines,
directly or indirectly. Gregory XI considered Florence’s call for a revolt of
Guelph cities atrocious, and he labeled the Florentines schismatic or un-
faithful. He expedited their trial, excommunicated them as contuma-
cious, confiscated their movable and immovable goods, imposed a com-
mercial embargo against Florence, and cancelled Florentine credits. He
refused Florentines justice, ordered the destruction of their houses, ex-
cluded them from receiving ecclesiastical positions, ordered their en-
slavement for disobedience, placed the city under an interdict, and sup-
pressed all their privileges. 52 The pope’s ire was certainly to be feared.
140 Chapter 3

RETURNING TO ROME

As the war with Florence unraveled, Gregory maintained his stance on a

papal return to Rome, regardless of the fierce opposition that he encoun-
tered from the French court and all of the cardinals. 53 Gregory simply
delayed his plans but never cancelled them. King Charles V of France’s
brother, the duke of Anjou (who eventually played a crucial role during
the Schism), warned the pontiff in brutally direct terms: “It will be your
fault if the church falls in great tribulations. If you die over there, which is
highly probable according to your physicians, the Romans who are bi-
zarre and treacherous will become master of the college and will force a
pope of their liking.” 54 But the pope was determined. Bernard Guille-
main affirms that his resolve was supported by his faith and a certain
mystical penchant. 55 The pope fought France, his kin, his court, and the
people of Avignon, finally deciding that he would return regardless of
what was left of the papal territories in Italy. He silenced criticism with
his inner conviction that he had to return the papacy to the place where it
belonged; the throne of St. Peter must be in Rome. The Mantuan ambas-
sador at the court reports that the pope even said that he would die if he
did not return the court to Rome. 56 Catherine of Siena did not have to
encourage him; his decision came from within.
But as Urban V’s failure had demonstrated, the papacy’s return to
Rome was no simple affair. First of all, the pope needed to raise signifi-
cant funds. A special tax was levied from the clergy. Certain kingdoms,
such as England, fought this tax emphatically. Funds were borrowed
from willing lenders, and the papal treasury was pawned, not for the first
time. While the situation in Italy required the pope’s presence, the rest of
Europe seemed relatively pacified. Great lords like Emperor Charles IV
and Louis of Hungary and the dukes of Bavaria and Savoy were recon-
ciled, and France and England had agreed to the Truce of Bruges on July
1, 1375; it lasted until June 24, 1377.
Since the late 1360s and the end of the Truce of Brétigny, things had
not gone well for England, a kingdom more familiar with offensive than
defensive wars. Several chevauchées were mounted on its French territo-
ries, but the English could not dislodge their French reconquerors. En-
gland lost most of the territories it had gained during the rule of a young-
er Edward III with the exception of Calais, Bordeaux, Brest, and Cher-
bourg. At this juncture, a truce was advantageous to the French, who had
 Returning to Rome 141

been regaining territories (all of Poitou up to Bordeaux) but at great cost.

Over the years, Bertrand du Guesclin may have at times been the scourge
of the popes when he harassed Provence and the Comtat Venaissin, but
his battle tactics regained Brittany for France. He could not clear the
Massif Central nor the Limousin of English brigands, however. The cam-
paigns emptied both French and English treasuries, and the papal leg-
ates, especially Jean de la Grange, utilized the situation to parlay for
peace. They obtained a truce, an act the legates had tried to accomplish
since 1369. Discussions took place between the dukes of Lancaster, An-
jou, and Berry to secure a lasting agreement; it was unreachable as long
as the French sovereignty of the Valois was not accepted by England. Yet
the truce satisfied all parties for a while, including the duke of Anjou,
who spent a fortune on banquets and tournaments of celebrations.
The pope, reassured that the continental situation was stabilized, fol-
lowed his heart and left Avignon on September 13, 1376. He labored to
avoid the mistakes his predecessor had made by first reestablishing the
pope in the Eternal City and then bringing his administration. Gregory
did not halve the government of the Church as Urban V had done; he left
it in place in Avignon, waiting to transfer the curia whole once he was
safely settled in Rome. Gregory’s decision demonstrates that he under-
stood his place in the symbolic web of the papacy and the expectations
attached to his person. Italians wanted to see the father of the Catholic
Church, not the French curial bureaucratic machine behind him. 57 Sever-
al cardinals stayed in Avignon, including Jean de Blauzac, who was
named vicar general of the Comtat Venaissin, Anglic Grimoard, Gilles
Aycelin de Montagut, Pierre de Monteruc, Guillaume de Chanac, and
Hugh of Saint-Martial. Gregory did, however, take Pierre de Cros, his
camerlengo, with him, leaving his treasurer, Pierre de Vernols, along
with most of the treasury and archives secured in Avignon’s papal pal-
ace.
The papal fleet of some thirty-two ships was commanded by Juan
Fernández of Heredia, Grand Master of the Hospitallers. Heredia was a
military commander first and foremost, as was Raymond de Turenne,
who entered Rome with the pope accompanied by some two thousand
troops. Gregory understood well the perils of his voyage. He organized
his departure meticulously, producing some twenty-five bulls for Avi-
gnon alone. He named Aymar d’Aigrefeuille captain general of Avignon
(the man in charge of the city’s defense) and maintained his vicar as the
142 Chapter 3

city’s judge. As will be seen, the pope enacted a series of measures aimed
at protecting the status of Avignon’s inhabitants and the wealth of the
city. To maintain traffic in the area, he offered indulgences to pilgrims
visiting the local hospitals of St. James and Roquemaure, the Cathedral of
Notre-Dame des Doms, and the Chapel of Notre-Dame la Belle near the
Augustinian monastery. He also supported his two favorite almshouses,
one for poor orphans and the other for repentant prostitutes, to prevent
their decline in his absence.
Baluze’s sources retell the pope’s return voyage in vivid detail. They
all agree that it was a journey plagued by bad weather, delays, food
shortages, and disease. Numerous curialists became ill, and the pope’s
cousin, Cardinal Pierre de la Jugie, died in Pisa. Jean Favier judicially
remarks that thanks to his strong morale, although he was the most frag-
ile person among them, the pope fared best. 58 Gregory finally arrived on
the banks of the Tiber and entered the city via St. Paul Outside the Walls
in January 1377. In the next chapter, we will resume our narrative with
the pontiff’s entrance into Rome and the initiation of the Western Schism,
which would last until 1417. For now, our focus remains on the pope’s
return and the last months of his life.
Gregory arrived in a city that was ambivalent about his return. On the
one hand, the prospect of economic recovery warmed every Roman’s
heart; yet on the other, they were not keen to surrender their political
autonomy to the pope. In her study of the English at the papal court in
Rome, Margaret Harvey characterizes the Romans’ conflicted feelings in
this way: “The city to which the pope returned was turbulent, and al-
though the citizens wanted the papal court, that did not imply cordiality.
In theory, Rome was self-governed with its own elected representatives
and depended no longer on a rule by either territorial nobility or papal
imposed officials. Thus, the popolo (the people of Rome) were likely to be
uneasy about the return of the pope if that meant replacement of local
authority.” 59 Issues of nationalism erupted quickly. The French cardinals
and court disdained Romans for their general lack of respect for high-
ranking officials and for their propensity to walk around armed, while
the Romans labeled the cardinals “Limousin robbers.” 60
The Rome to which Gregory returned was caught in a vicious circle of
contrary inclinations. The rebellion of the Papal States incited Romans to
favor the kind of communal liberty that Florentine banners proclaimed.
But the city hesitated in biting the hand that fed it. Florence did its best to
 Returning to Rome 143

pressure the Romans into expelling papal officials. A Roman revolt

would effectively shut the pope out of Rome and advance the interests of
the league in revolt in the Papal States. Rome was thus a hotbed of spies
and double agents. Florentine merchants long established in the city cir-
culated news and planted rumors to agitate the crowd as they paid off
whomever was willing to support their cause. Already in 1377 news cir-
culated that the Romans wanted to elect an antipope of Roman extrac-
tion. Florence urged the Romans not to disband their militia (the bandere-
si); such an act would leave them powerless once the court arrived in the
city. Coluccio Salutati, Florence’s chancellor, added:
While it is possible, while there is still time, while the oppressor of your
domestic liberty is not yet served within your walls, we pray you,
Roman citizenry, who have your salvation in your hands, to consult
your liberty. Even if we are forced to follow, we are ready to lend all
our power for your liberty as if it were for our own liberty and health.
We are aware that once your citizenry comes under the yoke, although
it would seem soft at first, it would be difficult to escape. 61

Even if overly dramatic and of purely classicist inspiration, these words

in themselves were biting. To the Florentines, papal rule equaled the
yoke that constricted libertà. In the meantime, Florence did its best to
disrupt the papal return. It confiscated ecclesiastical property in its terri-
tories and spread revolts throughout the Papal States.
Rome's internal fragmentation was aggravated by the assumed alli-
ance between the old Roman nobility and the French curia. Thus, the
arrival of the court was assimilated with the assumed Colonna, de Vico,
Gaetani, and Orsini’s resurgence on the civic stage. This distrust became
evident in 1377 when Romans balked at the pope’s intention of summer-
ing in Anagni, away from prying Roman eyes. The pope needed the
permission of city authorities to leave and had to promise to come back!
As Gregory negotiated an eventual cease-fire within the Papal States, the
disbanded Breton mercenaries ransacked Romagna and territory within
Rome’s vicinity. Their devastation (which continued even though the
pope enlisted them in his own service) exasperated the local population.
Rumors flew freely that vengeance might be exacted from the populace,
and these were met with calls to violence against the pope himself and
his court as the only means of effective self-defense. By January 1378, an
extremely sick Gregory was confined to his bed, and new rumors took
hold: the cardinals were organizing a coup to ensure the nomination of a
144 Chapter 3

French pope. To ensure the election of a Roman pope, the Romans met,
and plans to kill the cardinals were broached.
It was at this juncture that a plot to crush the city’s government sur-
faced, giving credence to these rumors. The pope, in conjunction with
several Roman nobles, would have disbanded the militia to seize govern-
ance from citizens’ hands. The plot issued from certain nobles, and papal
responsibility has never been proved. What is certain is that Francisco di
Vico, urban prefect and usurper of papal Viterbo, had returned to the
pope’s fold as early as September 1377, and the populace was more than
willing to believe the French court’s guilt. The people revolted, forcing
the pope and his court to seek refuge at Castel Sant’Angelo. The commu-
nal authorities gained the upper hand, executed several plotters, and let
the court return to the Vatican. Amid these events, Gregory, feeling his
end near, decided to promulgate two new bulls.
Drafted on March 19, 1378, a week before his death, the first bull
handed over the guard of Castel Sant’Angelo to a Provençal knight and
ordered him to prevent Roman intrusion. The second bull altered the
traditional rules of the conclave, allowing cardinals to speed up the elec-
tion and suspend the traditional nine-day hiatus after the pope’s death.
This bull also waived nomination by a two-thirds majority. Because of
the exceptional circumstances, the pope was in essence empowering car-
dinals to choose a candidate outside the structure of the conclave. But the
second bull was never proclaimed. The eminent papal historian Marc
Dykmans discovered and edited its content, suggesting that the papal
camerlengo Pierre de Cros hid its contents to facilitate his control over
future events. 62 After Urban VI’s election, Pierre de Cros went to Castel
Sant’Angelo and seized the papal tiara, jewels, and archives—the impor-
tant symbolic objects of papal sovereignty. He later headed the commit-
tee that deposed the elected pope. Eventually, he even handed the pope’s
regalia to Urban’s rival, Clement VII. In any case, Gregory could not
know the future, even if he sensed that it was uncertain. The pope died in
Rome during the night of March 26–27, 1378, at the relatively young age
of forty-nine. He was buried in the Roman Church of Santa Maria Nuova,
now known as Santa Francesca Romana.
Anne-Marie Hayez opens her biography of Pope Gregory XI with a
short quotation. In his eulogy of the late Urban V, Gui of Boulogne asked
that the next pope be one “to put those things that have been changed for
no reason back into their original state, one who might make innovations
 Returning to Rome 145

disappear . . . who might not make too many presumptions about himself
and who would willingly listen to good advice.” 63 For Hayez, these
words encapsulate Gregory’s papacy well. He satisfied his cardinals with
presents and twenty-one promotions, ensuring again the domination of
the Limousins. He would have been perfect for French members of the
curia but for his steadfast motivation to return the papal court to Rome.
Paul Thibault, Gregory XI’s most recent biographer, highlights his
failures as pope. 64 Too influenced by his predecessors (especially his un-
cle, Clement VI), Gregory attempted to replicate their policies and failed.
Thibault argues that Gregory’s devotion to the crusading ideal was a
mistake since carrying such a plan to fruition was simply not viable in the
late fourteenth century. His call to put an end to the Turkish threat fell on
deaf ears. Most of Europe was too busy fighting its own wars, and Grego-
ry’s subsequent reliance on Hungary and Venice for aid in raising a cru-
sade army was a serious misstep. The Venetians promised involvement,
but peace in the Levant and a weak Byzantine Empire actually worked to
the maritime capital’s best interests. As long as the Turks kept trade
routes to the East open, Venetians were in no rush to join the melee.
Angevin Hungary was little more interested than Venice in crusading.
The Hungarians preferred to control the Byzantine Empire, not free it
from the threat of Turkish militancy.
Gregory XI also failed to establish control over the Papal States. In that
arena he did come close to annihilating the Church’s main enemy, the
Visconti. But the great expense of these efforts bankrupted his treasury
and created Italian resentment toward the pope’s relentless fiscal pres-
sures. The pope needed to compromise. By leaving the governance of the
conquered states to French curial agents, a more traditional means than
Albornoz’s bribing and empowerment of local despots, Gregory failed to
see the consequences: a general movement of revolt against papal op-
pression.
If Paul Thibault considers that Gregory XI exhausted the papacy and
led it to the Great Schism, Guillaume Mollat is more restrained in his
judgment. The historian emphasizes Gregory’s moral qualities and his
will to reform the Church. He supported Dominican missions in the East
and West, fought heresies with the Inquisition, and tried to bring peace to
Europe. 65 Despite the disagreement of historians, Gregory is unanimous-
ly praised for the energy he spent in returning the papacy to its historic
location in the Eternal City. He cannot be wholly blamed for the events
146 Chapter 3

following his death, even if his otherwise blameless actions had set the
stage.

NOTES

1. John Froissart, Chronicles of England, France and Spain and the Surrounding Coun-
tries, trans. Thomas Johnes, Esq. (London: William Smith, 1848), chapter 216, 301.
2. Étienne Baluze, Vitae paparum avenionensium, hoc est, Historia pontificum romano-
rum qui in Gallia sederunt ab anno Christi MCCCV usque ad annum MCCCXCIV, ed.
Guillaume Mollat (Paris: Letouzey et Ané, 1914), vol. 1, 349–350.
3. Urban (from the Latin urbanus) may refer to Matthew 5:14: “You are the light of
the world. A town built on a hill cannot be hidden.”
4. Elzéar actually led the mission that expelled Emperor Henry VII from Rome.
After two canonization attempts led by John XXII and Clement VI failed, Urban can-
onized his uncle in Rome on April 15, 1369.
5. Bernard Guillemain, La cour pontificale d’Avignon: Étude d’une société (Paris: De
Boccard, 1962), 142. My translation.
6. Jean Favier, Les papes d’Avignon (Paris: Fayard, 2006), 147–148.
7. Favier, Les papes d’Avignon, 148.
8. Anne-Marie Hayez, “La personnalité d’Urbain V d’après ses réponses aux sup-
pliques,” in Aux origines de l’État moderne, le fonctionnement administratif de la papauté
d’Avignon, actes de la table ronde organisée par l’École française de Rome, Avignon, 23–24
janvier 1988 (Rome: École française de Rome, 1990), 7–31.
9. Froissart, Chronicles of England, chapter 216, 301.
10. Heinrich Denifle, La désolation des églises, monastères et hopitaux en France pendant
la guerre de cent ans (Brussels: Culture et civilisation, 1965), vol. 2, 444–445.
11. Denifle, La désolation, vol. 2, 446–452.
12. Urbain V, Ut per litteras, no. 020323.
13. Baluze, Vitae, vol. 1, 355, 385.
14. Anne-Marie Hayez, “À la cour pontificale d’Urbain V: Réceptions et déplace-
ments,” Annuaire de la Société des amis du Palais des papes (1986–1987): 16.
15. Hayez, “À la cour pontificale d’Urbain V,” 18, 19.
16. Hayez, “À la cour pontificale d’Urbain V,” 19.
17. Hayez, “À la cour pontificale d’Urbain V,” 20.
18. Denifle, La désolation, vol. 2, 478–485.
19. Froissart, Chronicles of England, chapter 230, 340.
20. Denifle, La désolation, vol. 2, 485–491.
21. Denifle, La désolation, vol. 2, 491.
22. Jean Coste, “Les lettres collectives des papes d’Avignon à la noblesse romaine,”
in Le Fonctionnement administratif de la papauté d’Avignon: Aux origines de l’État moderne:
Actes de la table ronde (Rome: École Française de Rome, 1990), 165.
23. Yves Renouard, The Avignon Papacy:The Popes in Exile 1305–1403, trans. Denis
Bethell (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1970), 37.
24. Baluze, Vitae, vol. 1, 387.
25. Renouard, The Avignon Papacy, 59–61.
26. Baluze, Vitae, vol. 1, 361–362.
27. Chronache e statuti della città di Viterbo, ed. Ignazio Ciampi (Florence, 1872), 35.
 Returning to Rome 147

28. Baluze, Vitae, vol. 1, 363–365.

29. Jean Baptiste Magnan, Histoire du bienheureux Urbain V et de son siécle d’aprés les
manuscrits du Vatican (Paris: Retaux-Bray, 1870), 472–473.
30. Baluze, Vitae, vol. 1, 393.
31. Ludwig Vones, Urban V (1362–1370): Kirchenreform zwischen Kardinalkollegium,
Kurie, und Klientel (Stuttgart: Anton Hiersemann, 1998).
32. Baluze, Vitae, vol. 1, 413.
33. Baluze, Vitae, vol. 1, 415 and 460.
34. As quoted in Guillaume Mollat, The Popes at Avignon: The “Babylonian Captivity”
of the Medieval Church, trans. Janet Love (New York: Harper & Row, 1965), 59.
35. Arturo Segre, “I dispacci di Cristoforo da Piacenza, procuratore mantuano alla
corte pontificia,” Archivio Storico Italiano 43 (1909): 42.
36. Segre, “I dispacci,” 41.
37. Paul R. Thibault, Pope Gregory XI: The Failure of Tradition (Lanham, MD: Univer-
sity Press of America, 1986), 24–26.
38. Guillemain, La cour pontificale, 145; Segre, “I dispacci,” 64–66.
39. Guillaume Mollat, “Relations politiques de Grégoire XI avec les Siennois et les
Florentins,” Mélanges d’archéologie et d’histoire 68 (1956): 359.
40. David S. Peterson, “The War of the Eight Saints in Florentine Memory and
Oblivion,” in Society and Individual in Renaissance Florence, ed. William Connell (Berke-
ley: University of California Press, 2002), 176.
41. Gene A. Brucker, Florentine Politics and Society, 1343–1378 (Princeton, NJ: Prince-
ton University Press, 1962), 280.
42. As quoted in Brucker, Florentine Politics and Society, 267.
43. As quoted in Brucker, Florentine Politics and Society, 268.
44. Brucker, Florentine Politics and Society, 271.
45. Galland Bruno, “Le rôle du comte de Savoie dans la ligue de Grégoire XI contre
les Visconti (1372–1375),” Mélanges de l’École française de Rome, moyen-âge-temps mod-
ernes 105.2 (1993): 792.
46. Alison Williams Lewin, Negotiating Survival: Florence and the Great Schism,
1378–1417 (Madison, NJ: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 2003), 42.
47. Brucker, Florentine Politics and Society, 294.
48. As quoted in Peter Partner, The Lands of St. Peter: The Papal State in the Middle
Ages and Early Renaissance (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972), 361.
49. Brucker, Florentine Politics and Society, 294.
50. Richard C. Trexler, The Spiritual Power: Republican Florence under Interdict (Lei-
den: Brill, 1974), 44–54.
51. Trexler, The Spiritual Power, 117.
52. Baluze, Vitae, vol. 1, 424.
53. With the exception of the Italian Jacopo Orsini.
54. As quoted in Favier, Les papes d’Avignon, 540. My translation.
55. Guillemain, La cour pontificale, 147–148.
56. Segre, “I dispacci,” 70.
57. This situation worked to the advantage of Clement VII in 1379.
58. Favier, Les papes d’Avignon, 543.
59. Margaret Harvey, The English in Rome, 1362–1420: Portrait of an Expatriate Com-
munity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 31.
60. Richard C. Trexler, “Rome on the Eve of the Great Schism,” Speculum 42 (1967):
494.
148 Chapter 3

61. As quoted in Trexler, “Rome on the Eve of the Great Schism,” 492.
62. Pierre de Cros despised Urban VI. Upon his election, the camerlengo had de-
clared, “This pretentious bloke is no pope and will never be,” and labored for his
demotion; Marc Dykmans makes him instrumental in the initiation of the Schism. See
Marc Dykmans, “La bulle de Grégoire XI à la veille du grand schisme,” Mélanges de
l’École française de Rome, moyen-âge–temps modernes 89 (1977): 494.
63. Anne-Marie Hayez, “Gregory XI,” in The Papacy: An Encyclopedia, ed. Philippe
Levillain (New York: Routledge, 2002), 658.
64. Thibault, Pope Gregory XI.
65. Mollat, The Popes at Avignon, 59–63.
 FOUR
Constructing the Administration
Governance and Personnel

The Avignon popes were administrative innovators, but there is no

doubt that their actions were largely directed by the specific conditions in
which they found themselves. Their varied adaptations to life in Avignon
were part of a concerted effort to carry into France the same mystique
that the papacy had enjoyed in the traditional seat of the Church at Rome.
Hence they needed to construct—both literally and symbolically—a capi-
tal city with a defined architecture, culture, and administration that
would leave no ambiguity as to its significance in the mind of their con-
temporaries. The Avignon popes’ institutional legitimacy rested on
Christendom’s total acceptance of a non-Roman papacy. In their efforts at
legitimation, they created what is expected of today’s modern states: eve-
ry pontiff bureaucratized the Church and centralized its government and
finances. They occupied a distinct space they had clearly circumscribed.
Thus, the papal administration cannot be studied without discussing the
imprint it left on Avignon, still visible today in its monumental papal and
cardinals’ palaces. An intricate hierarchy of papal officials ran what be-
came a well-developed and complicated administrative system, in real-
ity, a government whose administration emphasized efficient productiv-
ity rather than the practice of austere spirituality.
One cannot fully gauge the adaptability and creativity of the Avignon
popes without glancing backward momentarily to their predecessors.
The history of the governance of the Church during the twelfth and thir-

149
150 Chapter 4

teenth centuries is framed by the papacy’s anti-imperial stance and its

correlative will to disentangle the Church from secular influence. This in
itself was a continuation of the policies of the great eleventh-century
reforming popes of the Gregorian era. In general, popes strengthened
their power base by surrounding themselves with politically savvy relig-
ious counselors, and over time the administrative role of the cardinals
was carved out of their purely Roman liturgical function. The summit of
this evolution was in 1274 with the Council of Lyons’s elaboration of the
conclave, in which the college of cardinals would now hold total respon-
sibility for electing the pope. With this action, the papacy had managed to
free itself from secular influence at its most defining moment: the naming
of a new pope.
Thirteenth-century popes had initiated a movement of ecclesiastical
centralization by expanding the papal court and the administrative layers
required to access services from that court. They increased the duties of
the Chancery and Apostolic Chamber and added new offices such as the
Penitentiary. The papal court became, in the words of Bernhard Schim-
melpfennig, the place where a petitioner “received the answers and fa-
vors he was looking for.” 1 The familiar realities of bureaucracies every-
where—the various offices with their separate procedures, the red tape,
and the “greasing of the palms” that went with them—first appeared in
the offices of the curia and was devised by thirteenth-century popes. As
Schimmelpfennig demonstrates, the tedious process of ecclesiastical peti-
tioning started in the thirteenth century. 2 Similarly, the number of depen-
dent feudatories who owed allegiance to the Church also augmented
during the thirteenth century, forcing the organism that operated it, the
Apostolic Chamber, to grow with it. Thus, elements were in place for
later popes to build on.
The popes understood that the Church’s independence rested on its
financial autonomy. This financial self-rule was built from and rested on
the Church’s administrative structure. Since the thirteenth century, taxes
had arrived in Rome from the levies imposed on those particular bene-
fices granted by the pope. An ecclesiastical benefice was the equivalent of
a salary—one that took the form of a right to receive revenues from
property in usufruct. This income supported clergy who did not engage
in the pastoral work of “the care of souls” (for this reason, benefices were
sometimes called sinecures, from the Latin, “without care”). Clerical office
and benefice were closely knit by tradition, but over time they separated,
 Constructing the Administration 151

leading to a situation where clergy received the income from benefices

that they did not occupy. Benefices evolved from salaried posts (with an
expectation that the clergy worked in nonpastoral responsibilities) into a
system of gifts and rewards (without any expectation of any specific
duties in a given post). More taxes were imposed to support both the
Church’s central administration and clergy who enjoyed the lucrative
gains of the benefice system. The genius of the Avignon popes was to
reserve for themselves the right to award benefices, thus ensuring that
the Church could tax the benefice. For example, by the fourteenth centu-
ry, the common services (servitia communia) were the equivalent of a third
of a bishop’s or abbot’s yearly revenue that an incumbent paid back to
the papal treasury after either the pope collated (granted) that benefice to
him, approved his nomination or translation, or confirmed his election.
The system of collation, which seems quite obscure to modern read-
ers, revolved around the distribution of benefices and the rewards that
the grantor could expect from the beneficiary. Simply stated, until the
fourteenth century, popes collated few benefices directly, since secular
authorities nominated higher-ranked clergymen and some other offices
were elective (abbots, for example). The pope usually approved a choice
but did not name him directly. This collation system did not advantage
the Church and, ironically, tended to diminish the temporal power that it
could exact on what was theoretically its own property. It meant parcel-
ing away one’s own goods for the sake of governance.
In one of the most notable administrative innovations of the Avignon
papacy, the pontiff systematically replaced traditional collators (kings
and emperors, bishops, or a monastic community) and assumed to him-
self this prerogative. This centralization initially led to manifest resent-
ment on the part of former grantors who lost their rights of taxation on
these benefices. At the same time, this period saw a tremendous increase
in the numbers of petitions and requests arriving at the court from candi-
dates in search of benefices. Significantly, the new and larger role of the
Avignon popes in granting these collations sparked an exponential in-
crease in the papal bureaucracy. This very system made the ecclesiastical
administration controversial and resented, fostering antipathy for the
Avignon papacy! An early-fourteenth-century sermon from the Domini-
can preacher Guillaume de Sauqueville describes the tedious process put
in place by John XXII, the complex protocol a petitioner had to follow
punctiliously if he did not want to return home empty-handed. Petition-
152 Chapter 4

ers or Romipeta (pilgrims to Rome or individuals who appealed to the

curia in Rome) had first to access the court, difficult in itself because of
physical distance; then to write a proper petition and have it edited,
corrected, and inspected to be sure that it contained nothing offensive to
the pope; and finally hand the petition, duly written and amended, to a
referendarius (referee), who presented it to the pope. 3 The process was
expensive, with fees collected by the Chamber and Chancery at each level
of the process—not to mention traveling, lodging, and miscellaneous ex-
penses.
Bureaucracy also expanded in the collection of taxes. Traditionally,
papal revenues came often from afar, with income raised from its tempo-
ral (or seignorial) lands, the Papal States, and taxes paid by ecclesiastics.
In general, papal income from taxation was irregular with the exception
of the common services. In extraordinary circumstances like the crusades,
the papacy also levied tithes. The income levied from ecclesiastical sei-
gnorial (feudal) rents and the revenues of the Papal States of central Italy
were more predictable. But collecting such income brought its own chal-
lenges. These states were organized into provinces headed by an eccle-
siastical rector and a treasurer, who often faced difficulties meeting their
levy. In response to a frequently chaotic political situation, thirteenth-
century popes replaced these treasurers with local, powerful lords who
earned respect by force and imposed on their people a census (a form of
lease involving fees that tenants paid in recognition of partial land own-
ership directly to the papal treasury). Unfortunately for the Church, con-
trol of the Papal States quickly became entangled within the networks of
allegiance of the secular lords who ruled over them, however poorly, as
papal vicars. Popular revolts abounded throughout this region and made
papal oversight (and taxation) difficult. This state of affairs weakened
centralization and put the Church in a double bind. Wishing to exercise
de facto rule in its states, the papacy had to offer a certain level of immu-
nity (if not free rein) to its so-called representatives in exchange for their
allegiance to the Church. Yet by the thirteenth century, local powers had
come to represent the rule of the popes in their Italian territories, tying
the Church’s hands and disrupting its politics.
In the early thirteenth century, Innocent III had intended a reorganiza-
tion of the papal provinces. One means of regaining control over local
political forces was to nominate to military command the members of the
powerful families of the Roman cardinals, counting on their networks of
 Constructing the Administration 153

clientele to support Church policy. The pope hoped that the Orsini, Co-
lonna, Savelli, Caetani, Frangipani, and Conti families could ease the
burdensome administration of the States and offer a dedicated elite on
whom he could rely. Unfortunately, this plan backfired and eventually
familial rivalries came into play, marked most flagrantly by the disas-
trous alliance of the Colonna with France at the end of the thirteenth
century against the Caetani pope, Boniface VIII. Resorting to more drastic
measures, the popes decided to allow foreign involvement in order to
rein in Italian territorial feuding. At the end of the thirteenth century, the
papacy supported Angevin intrusion into southern Italy in exchange for
military power—a development that once again left the pope dependent
on a temporal power. In sum, the events of the thirteenth century showed
that early papal centralization had in turn created new perils. Avignon’s
popes tried to remedy this situation by developing a system of taxation
that could finance wars of reconquest in the Papal States.
Thirteenth-century popes, because of their severely reduced treas-
uries, also tended to rule by what may loosely be described as “consen-
sus.” They employed great councils, gathering a large number of clergy-
men and lay associates to define guidelines and procedures, deal with
specific issues, and reform the Church. Numerous councils worked to
define Church policies during the hundred years that preceded the papa-
cy’s move to Avignon. The Fourth Lateran Council, called in 1215 by
Innocent III, countered heresies, launched European crusades, advanced
liturgical life, and promoted ecclesiastical reform. The First Council of
Lyons, called by Innocent IV in 1245, dealt with the Holy Roman Empire
and Frederick II; the Second Council of Lyons, called by Gregory X in
1274, reformed papal elections and created the conclave. The Council of
Vienne, called in 1311 by Clement V (a pope often remembered as the
first of the Avignonese line) addressed the Church’s rapport with France,
the dissolution of the Templars, the reinstatement of Philip the Fair after
his excommunication (caused by his attacks against Boniface VIII), and
clerical reform. The Council of Vienne remained the one and only Church
council of the fourteenth century. The next council, held in Constance,
was called a hundred years later, in 1414, as a forum to discuss ending
the Schism. This dearth of officially sanctioned councils during the four-
teenth century easily demonstrates that the Avignon popes approached
their administrative challenges differently: they did not call a single
154 Chapter 4

council and relied instead on ecclesiastical support and their own net-
works of followers.

GOVERNANCE AND FINANCE: AVIGNON

Three generations of Avignon popes learned from papal history and

strove to establish a veritable monarchy that could act independently of
secular interference. The early Avignon popes understood the power of
symbolism and used it to manifest their monarchial pretenses. Between
Boniface VIII and John XXII, the papal mitre evolved into a tiara: the red
ribbon of the mitre became a gold band, surmounted by a second crown
and, finally, a third. John XXII rationalized the transformation of the
mitre into a triple crown, explaining that the three crowns represented
the three churches: suffering, militant, and triumphant. Symbolism com-
plemented action.
After the Council of Vienne closed in 1312, Clement V centralized his
grip on ecclesiastical administration; he used his family and his clients to
serve his rule and left lesser autonomy to dioceses and councils. The
popes who followed Clement V understood that councils limited central-
ization and efficient decision making. Ecumenical councils fostered plu-
rality in dealing with Church policy. Councils had been necessary during
the century-long centralizing process that had required multilateral nego-
tiations with political powers, but they eventually failed when the papacy
was at its most critical moment. Vienne was necessary for Clement V
because he needed to address several issues that could not remain ambig-
uous, especially the relationship between popes and kings, centered on
the treatment of Boniface VIII’s memory, the Knights Templar, and
Church reform. The Avignon popes’ approach was markedly different;
they acted like temporal princes who designated officials to run their
government and staffed their administration according to their wills.
Clement V’s successor, John XXII, was an administrative genius who
opted for new tools of centralization: he focused on the sound manage-
ment of revenues collected from taxation. This meant, first, the creation of
a dedicated and educated group of efficient fiscal bureaucrats; second,
the organization and development of taxable items; and third, the effec-
tive collections, recording, and management of these revenues. He can be
labeled as the architect of papal centralization. John E. Weakland, dis-
cussing John’s administrative and fiscal centralization, qualifies it in this
 Constructing the Administration 155

way: “Power, centralization, fiscal independence, conformity, political

stability, and discipline, were all means to an end—strengthening the
Church, maintaining papal primacy, and preserving ‘the seamless robe of
Christ.’” 4 He continues,
Everywhere the hand of John XXII was visible: in the complex system
of accounts which had to be rendered by the Camera; in the oaths of
fidelity to the pontiff required of Curia personnel; in the extensive
regulations covering the most minute details of Chancery operations;
in the systematization of fees for the expediting of papal correspon-
dence with severe punishment of violators; in the centralization and
control of the judicial procedures of the Rota which handled many
more benefice cases from all over Christendom than under previous
pontificates; and above all in the extensive fiscal activities which be-
came much more intensified. 5

The evidence for this feverish administrative activity can be found in the
usual places; the Apostolic Chancery used some 71,566 pounds of lead to
seal its thousands of missives. 6
The great success of the Avignon popes was to centralize the finances
of the Church into their hands, regardless of lingering networks of influ-
ence and nepotism. They succeeded where Boniface VIII had failed. Papal
political growth was linked to its fiscal growth and to the amount of
revenue the pope could collect. Numbers speak volumes: the income of
the papacy increased exponentially throughout the Avignonese sojourn.
John XXII collected some 228,000 gold florins a year; Benedict XII,
166,000; Clement VI, 188,500; Innocent VI, 253,600; Urban V, 260,000; and
Gregory XI, 481,000. At their highest point, under Clement VI, papal
expenses covering the administration of the palace and states, the con-
struction of the palace, and the wars in Italy reached some 96,000 gold
florins a year. 7 The papal treasury enjoyed a surplus that freed the pon-
tiffs from borrowing and, thus, from external influence.

APOSTOLIC CHAMBER

The cornerstone of the pontifical administration was the Apostolic Cham-

ber (or Camera), in charge of the court’s finances. When the papacy set-
tled in Avignon, some four to five hundred officers (papal servants, in
comparison to public servants) served the court, which was understood
more in terms of the pope’s familia (household) than as a government of
156 Chapter 4

the Church. In Avignon, the finances of popes and cardinals were separ-
ated, and under the popes there, the Chamber oversaw pontifical reve-
nues, the court’s sustenance, the large group of agents and officers who
circulated throughout Christendom, the mint, financial and religious tri-
bunals, papal correspondence, messenger services, and the papal treas-
ury. The chief operator of the Chamber was the camerlengo (chamber-
lain), who usually was not a cardinal but a bishop or archbishop. Minis-
ters of finance and confidants of the popes, only seven camerlengos as-
sisted the Avignon popes until 1378, with Gasbert de Laval supporting
three successive popes between 1319 and 1347. Laval originated, like
John XXII, from the Quercy and belonged to the household of the pope
before his nomination. He received from the pope several benefices, a
parochial church, a canonry, and an archdeaconry. He was named in turn
vicar general of the church of Avignon in replacement of its bishop, bish-
op of Marseille, archbishop of Arles, and eventually treasurer and camer-
lengo. His well-deserved ascent epitomizes the successful career of a
superb administrator. It is worth noting that most of the camerlengos,
because of their responsibilities and closeness to the pope, were rarely
elevated to the cardinalate. If they did, they had to abandon their post in
the Chamber.
Gasbert de Laval and John XXII became instrumental in Avignon’s
financial centralization. Since Innocent III, popes had actively searched,
with little success, to control what was called “the reserve of benefices,”
until John XXII and his faithful Laval initiated the centralizing momen-
tum that carried the fortunes of the Avignon papacy. They devised
means that were rational and efficient, centralizing the various taxes paid
directly to the court by increasing the pope’s right of reservation, that is,
his right to collate benefices directly. John XXII claimed control of the
ecclesiastical nominations of major benefices such as bishops and abbots;
later popes extended the reserve of collations to minor benefices (priests,
canons, deacons, etc.), and all nominations that involved the “care of
souls” (that is, not sinecures). Until the fourteenth century, the nomina-
tion to benefices was loosely defined by ancient traditions that permitted
the nomination of a bishop to the canons of a diocese, that of an abbot to
the monks of a monastery, and that of a priest to the lay patrons of a
church. The pope only became involved as an arbiter of last resort in
cases where the nomination by established custom was inconclusive or
challenged. Beginning in the late 1260s, Clement IV had already per-
 Constructing the Administration 157

ceived that this state of affairs should be improved, but it was left to John
XXII and Gasbert de Laval to bring these changes to fruition. The pope
initially created papal oversight for the nominations of the successors of
those clerics who died while at court. From that point forward, each
Avignon pope expanded the cases available to his own collation until
Urban V finally claimed the right for himself and his successors to collate
all benefices as he wished. With each collation, the Chamber received a
tax from each new incumbent (called common services), levied on the
value of the benefice received. All benefices were assessed for tax pur-
poses, and the tax was valued at one-third to a full year’s gross income.
Bishops and abbots usually paid their common service over several years
to reduce their annual expenses.
John XXII was the first pope to collate successfully an important num-
ber of benefices left vacant by death or other reasons: during his reign he
collated 455 bishops and abbots. 8 With this development, the pope con-
trolled a large network of ecclesiastical “clients” who waited anxiously
for their nominations or advancements. It was a means of rewarding the
pope’s clients or the clients of monarchs, thus further developing and
reinforcing papal networks of power. The ties that bound grantor to
grantees ensured their faithfulness as well as the broadening of papal
policies supported by officials acting on the Church’s behalf. Once ap-
pointed, a grantee’s interests lay in promoting the politics of the man
who had raised him to his position and could still promote him. This
movement was quite similar to traditional feudalism, a system in which
lords ensured the faithfulness of their vassals through the granting of
fiefs.
John also multiplied “expectative” collations; that is, he offered for a
future date benefices not yet vacant. Certain benefices might have four or
five expectant candidates (who paid their Chancery fees) eagerly await-
ing their turn, and in many cases they must have known that their cause
was lost. The sheer number of petitioners made the process a lengthy and
onerous affair. Vatican registers illustrate a lag of some five years be-
tween requests and responses. In addition to Chancery fees, petitioners
had to travel to Avignon or send a procurator, who received a fee for his
task. The petitioners also needed to befriend the powerful allies who
would champion their request, usually through gifts and favors. All of
this explains why the Avignon papacy counted a large population of
poor “expecting” clerics who were often fed by the papal almshouse, the
158 Chapter 4

Pignotte, and who offered the general population a cheap clerical labor
force to attend its liturgical functions.
Petty services were added to the common services described above,
tied again directly to the collation of benefices. These burdened the newly
collated bishops and abbots with several small fees allocated to members
of the court and cardinals’ households. Common and petty services were
shared between the Apostolic Chamber and the college of cardinals. Sev-
eral other dues (the sacra, the subdiaconum, and quittance fees) marked
specific moments of a bishop’s, abbot’s, or subdeacon’s career to be
shared with other members of the court, like the clerks of the Chamber
and its sergeants.
Bishops were not spared from such expenses. Because of persistent
dangers, especially with the widespread presence of mercenaries and
great chance of highway robberies, they often requested exemption from
the visitations they were required to make within their sees. When bish-
ops did visit their sees, they were owed a right of “procuration” that
replaced the old droit de gîte (right of boarding and lodging). To obtain an
exemption from their duties, bishops paid a fee equivalent to one-half or
two-thirds of the value of the procuration fee that went to the papal
treasury. Similarly, bishops who received their pallium and/or visited the
curia also paid a fee. In any case, the treasury also received the fees that
anyone doing business with the Chancery was required to pay for send-
ing, sealing, and registering letters. These were standardized in the Chan-
cery’s Books of Taxes established by John XXII in 1316 and 1331. A final
kind of tax paid directly to the court was the seignorial dues received
from the Church’s vassal kingdoms: the Kingdom of Naples, Sicily, Ara-
gon (for Corsica and Sicily), England, Ireland, Avignon, and the Comtat
Venaissin. The Church also received donations and gifts, goods from
clerics who died at court without a will in place, and the various fines
imposed by religious tribunals.
If some of the taxes paid directly to the papal court existed before the
curia moved to Avignon, they were never collected as effectively as
under the rule of the Avignon popes, who centralized taxation with their
rights of reserve on collations. More impressively, what distinguished the
Avignon popes from their predecessors was their genius in developing
additional means of levying and collecting subsidies and taxes through-
out Europe. This resourcefulness culminated in the Church’s system of
 Constructing the Administration 159

collectors, some of the most powerful but least historically recognized

officials of the papacy.
The collection of taxes from all over Europe by agents named collec-
tors, the geographical definition of fiscal regions (“collectorates,” from
the Latin collectories), the creation of adequate administrative personnel to
run and collect from these provinces, the transfer of funds to Avignon,
the means of currency exchange, the accounting procedure for collecting
and spending, the recording and archival procedures—in sum, the crea-
tion of an entirely new financial administration for the Church—rested
again on the centralizing policies of John XXII and Gasbert de Laval.
These policies were refined over time and were finalized by Clement VI
in the 1340s.
The principle of sending a special fiscal commissary to collect extraor-
dinary taxes in a defined area at a specific time was certainly not new; nor
was the ancient system of asking bishops to collect tithes for the pope.
The Avignon popes simply combined the tasks of both special fiscal en-
voys and bishops into one, made the office permanent rather than period-
ic, and delineated the boundaries of several collectorates, arriving at thir-
ty-one collectorates for all of Europe, fifteen of which were located in
France (a reminder that France was one of the wealthiest European king-
doms at the time). Papal tax collectors were essentially clerics steeped in
fiscal matters and legal culture, knowledge that helped them face the
myriad legal issues they might encounter. Collectors were charged with
collecting taxes and negotiating the amount of their levy with their con-
stituency if disputes arose. They were powerful (perhaps even more so
than bishops) since collectors could excommunicate bishops for nonpay-
ment of taxes. The camerlengos chose collectors, and their bulls of ap-
pointment officially named them Apostolic nuncios and collectors. They
were not paid but all held benefices that provided them with an income.
They resided in their collectorate capitals and were seconded by subcol-
lectors, who allowed them to complete the many travels required by their
office to receive and transfer funds. There is no doubt that their task was
difficult and dangerous; evidence shows that many collectors survived
violent robberies, beatings, and torture. They were, however, granted the
widest range of action in their duty. Perusing the countless complaints
lodged against them in the papal archives, it becomes clear that many
collectors abused the trust that had been placed in them.
160 Chapter 4

It seems that their many abuses easily made collectors the most hated
pontifical officials of medieval Europe. Of course, complaints against tax
collectors are never unusual, and it is highly possible that their numbers
are exaggerated in the archives, but the sources do immortalize in a kind
of infamy some particularly unsavory types. Jean Bernier, collector for
Lyons, Vienne, and Besançon, was poor when first nominated to his
charge. Within a few years, he exacted some ten thousand livres from his
province in such ways that local officials initiated prosecution, and the
camerlengo followed suit. His trial shows that Bernier had robbed the
Chamber, cheated on taxation rates, excommunicated both the living and
dead, threatened and ransomed, forged fake documents, and practiced
usury. Subsequently excommunicated himself, Bernier continued to offi-
ciate in his church for four years. Another fellow collector, Jean de Pal-
mis, was charged with thirty-five accusations ranging from raping vir-
gins to collecting from the poor, pimping, notorious adultery (he had a
son called Collectoret, “the little collector”), drinking from chalices, for-
gery, robbery, hoarding, embezzling, usury, and bragging. When his suc-
cessor, Geraud Mercadier, traveled to Avignon to render account and
announce de Palmis’s death, he was robbed on the way and stripped of
his clothing and two horses. 9
Collectors stayed busy levying taxes within their collectorates. These
included the tithes (decimae) levied on benefices, initially for exceptional
circumstances, that became a regular source of revenue for the Avignon
popes and their reconquest of the Papal States. The value of each benefice
was assessed (taxatus) in order to identify the share of the levy. Benefices
were also renegotiated and reassessed during the vicissitudes of the four-
teenth century. The annates (annatae), or “first fruits,” created by Clement
V, were collected from new beneficiaries on their first year of incumben-
cy. The tax originally affected only the limited numbers of collations done
by the pope, but the pope’s reserve over most collations made this tax
apply to most ecclesiastics.
As we have seen, bishops needed to pay their exemption from procu-
ration if they did not visit their see, but the right of spoil (jus spolii)—the
papal confiscation of goods left by clerics intestate—evolved as a more
lucrative affair for the papacy. 10 This right had originally allowed incum-
bent bishops and abbots to seize the goods (movable property) of their
predecessors, the idea being that because they were successors, it right-
fully belonged to them. The pope’s stranglehold over the collation of
 Constructing the Administration 161

benefices changed this state of affairs. Since the pope collated all bene-
fices anyway, the property reverted to him before any of it could be
granted to a new occupant. The right of spoil acquired such momentum
that in 1362, Urban V made himself heir to the movable property of any
dead ecclesiastics. Daniel Williman calculated that between 1316 and
1415, the papacy received the movable property of some 1,200 ecclesias-
tics. 11 The books of dead prelates were integrated into the popes’ librar-
ies, their movable goods sold off, and their jewelry and liturgical orna-
ments used to enrich the papal treasury. Collectors also levied various
“caritative subsidies” charged on exceptional occasions to help the Holy
See; cense, that is, rentals fees paid for papal lands; vacancies (the income
of benefices left vacant or uncollated); Peter’s pence (levied on northern
Europe); and the papal seignorial revenues from the Papal States, Avi-
gnon, and the Comtat Venaissin.
As they gathered their funds, collectors were also charged with
spending them properly. Here again, evidence for the administrative
genius of the Avignon papacy is noted. Instead of having these funds
transported to Avignon, a highly risky and dangerous task, the camerlen-
go assigned amounts to be paid locally in order to cover various curial
expenses. This avoided the logistical nightmare of transportation and
redistribution. The Avignonese system lessened risk and promoted effi-
ciency. Such so-called assignations were contracts that named where,
why, and to whom the collected funds were to be delivered. The majority
of papal expenses during the fourteenth century went directly to Italy for
the reconquest of the Papal States.
By the death of Gasbert de Laval in 1347, the financial administration
was firmly in place and the camerlengos advised the pope in political,
military, financial, and administrative affairs. The organized collection of
funds led to systematic expenses ordered around four areas: (1) the court
in Avignon with the construction of the palace, the payment of its bu-
reaucrats, and all the expenses tied to curial maintenance, (2) the wars in
Italy and elsewhere, (3) the repairs and construction outside Avignon, in
Rome and elsewhere, and (4) charity. The role of treasurer evolved from a
mere guard of the papal treasury (a store of currencies, prized liturgical
objects, and archives) to an officer controlling the revenues and expenses
of the Chamber, an aide of the camerlengo in the daily administration of
finances. Most treasurers originated from the same geographic area as the
pope whom they served and were selected from his group of chaplains;
162 Chapter 4

they had to be his trusted confidants. Clerks of the Chamber acted as the
financial bureaucrats who prepared letters and contracts, checked collec-
tors’ accounts, and wrote memos at the will of the camerlengo. All were
apostolic notaries, and as such, their scripts held public legal value.
Clerks of the Chamber were all issued from the financial administration
and had previously held the positions of treasurers, collectors, or finan-
cial commissaries. This administrative elite was well trained, mainly in
the study of canon law, and widely traveled, and they often received
prized episcopal sees as rewards for good service.
The camerlengo, treasurers, and clerks of the Chamber regularly met
in council to discuss the financial interests of the Church at large, and
other counselors could join them, according to need. A staff of lower
clerks, including notaries of the Chamber, scribes, scriveners, and ser-
vants of the Chamber supported the entire group. This centralization of
papal finances was so successful that by the end of the fourteenth centu-
ry, additional financial servants, cashiers, and money changers lent their
services to the Chamber’s administration. The success of this financial
organization also rested on the many agents sent throughout Europe, the
Church’s various provincial administrators, and collectors.
Financial centralization could not be sustained without minting a pa-
pal coinage, however. And again, the Avignon papacy innovated. Since
the early twelfth century, Roman popes had been impeded in the minting
of their own coins by the Roman senate, which considered itself the tem-
poral ruler of the city. The coins produced by the senate usually carried
inscriptions such as Roma caput mundi or the old imperial SPQR (Senatus
Populusque Romanus) without a single reference to the pontiffs. This situa-
tion changed outside Rome. John XXII relied on an existing mint in Pont-
de-Sorgues, a few miles from Avignon, to mint the first papal coinages in
several centuries. Silver and gold currencies were minted on demand by
a master of the money, who was hired for the minting of specific curren-
cy. A guard of the money, often Florentine or Tuscan, assisted by a pro-
vost, clerks, verifiers, and local laborers constituted this small administra-
tion. Of course, John XXII and Gasbert de Laval had rightfully expected
that their effective financial governance would create litigation. Hence
the Chamber had its own jurisdiction headed by a judge, the auditor of
the Chamber, supported by his vice auditor. Fiscal procurators brought
cases to the auditor, assisted by fiscal advocates, notaries, a keeper of the
seals, and prison guards.
 Constructing the Administration 163

This burgeoning centralization initiated a remarkable growth in the

production of official documentation. The early popes of Avignon
showed their organizational shrewdness by increasing record-keeping
and archival procedures. Thousands of documents were not only mailed
but also copied and archived on a yearly basis. Many of those documents
are still available for viewing today at the Vatican Archives. The range of
information they offer is indeed daunting. Financial records itemize ex-
penses in minute detail. They range from recording the purchase of Bur-
gundy wine to the hiring of mercenary captains; from laundry lists to
spices and medicine; from the purchase of fine knives to the making of
the pope’s red slippers or the embroidery of his chasubles; and the wax,
parchment, and ink used by the scribes themselves to write. Letters detail
diplomatic and political relations with medieval European “states,” the
benefices offered to ecclesiastics, both high and low, authorizations to
enter convents and monasteries, and individual favors such as the au-
thorization to own a portable altar, to say mass before dawn, to choose a
confessor, to deal with “infidels,” to travel with safe-passage, and to be
promoted. Some focus on spiritual gifts such as indulgences and absolu-
tions, others allow ecclesiastics to draw a last will, and some record com-
plex litigations.
Many of the letters composed by the popes literally passed through
the hands of the Chamber’s scribes. Documents actually describe them as
litterae que per cameram domini pape transiverunt (“letters that passed
through the Lord Pope’s Chamber”). These letters were of two kinds:
communal and open, or curial and secret. But the delimitation and boun-
daries of these two kinds of letters were somewhat fluid. Secret and curi-
al letters covered what could be called the papacy’s foreign policy: diplo-
macy and the administration of the Papal States; the activities of the
Chamber, financial and otherwise; the nomination of officers; and any
special favor of the pope. Communal letters covered more or less the
same subjects but remained tied to internal policy; they responded to
individual petitioners and also included the correspondence of the leg-
ates. Secretaries sent letters that had been abbreviated (briefs), drafted,
and finalized (engrossed) by scores of scribes, both apostolic and papal.
There was no state postal service in the modern sense, but the work of the
Chamber spanned most of Europe and subsequently needed a compre-
hensive system of communication. Information was exchanged via a dou-
ble system of messengers. The official messengers of the pope, under the
164 Chapter 4

control of the Chamber, carried missives, dealt with various purchases

and their delivery, escorted prisoners and goods, or guarded and
arrested whoever faced papal justice, from heretics to poisoners and em-
bezzlers. This multitasking group of some fifty men, employed on a year-
ly basis, was supplemented by the private messenger services of the Ital-
ian merchant companies and a private mail company. We associate couri-
er service with the modern world, but it already was a well-established
practice in the Middle Ages. In the mid-1350s the papacy began using the
private mail service of the Florentine merchants, the Scarsella, headed
first by Piero di Gieri da Scarperia and later by Tomaso Cardini.
Papal secretaries crowned the hierarchy of clerical bureaucrats. They
were trusted confidants who took an oath of fealty to the pope. They
possessed a deep legal culture that enabled them to mesh with the bu-
reaucracy of the court, and they could often translate and relay on parch-
ment the thoughts and intentions of their superiors. Francesco Bruni (c.
1315–1385), secretary to three popes, is the most notable of the pontiffs’
secretaries. The renowned humanist was an official of the Florentine
government in the 1350s before he joined the papal court in Avignon in
the early 1360s. He assisted Urban V and Gregory XI with their secret
correspondence, and the popes used his Florentine experience to send
him to Tuscany as an envoy. Bruni defended the interests of the papacy
in Italy and the interests of his homeland at the court. He left the papal
court of Urban VI, accusing the pope of having cut his salary to such an
extent that he was starving. He returned to the government of the signoria
in the 1380s and was named Florence’s gonfaloniere of Justice (gonfaloniere
di Giustizia) in 1383. Bruni’s private letters describe a world of stiff com-
petition for these bureaucratic positions at the papal court, where net-
works of influence each tried to advance candidates who competed in-
tensely for promotions. The selection process was complex, and the
Church, aware of the issue of pluralism (individuals who collected multi-
ple benefices and offices as sinecures), tried to limit the selection to candi-
dates who were actually qualified for the job. 12
In total, the Chamber was the largest employer of the Avignonese
papal court, constituting between five hundred and six hundred bureau-
crats. But it was not solely the papal administration that was centralized
and enlarged in the fourteenth century. When the papacy reserved the
collation of most benefices into the hands of the pope, it required a well-
 Constructing the Administration 165

organized administration to record who went where and when, in re-

placement of whom, and so forth. This administration was the Chancery.

CHANCERY

The Chancery dealt with the hundreds of petitions to higher and lower
benefices that the pope received daily, as well as any other business that
required the pope’s written response, like special privileges, dispensa-
tions, excommunications, absolutions, and indulgences. Once again,
numbers best demonstrate its productivity. The Apostolic Chancery pro-
duced some 300,000 documents from 1305 to 1378 and some 500,000 by
the end of the fourteenth century. 13 It had produced some 50,000 docu-
ments in the thirteenth century. 14 The Chancery also kept records of all
present and past documents, which could be reproduced for a fee when
need arose. The Vatican registers list some 550 curialists who were em-
ployed in the Chancery from 1305 to 1378, evidence enough that this was
an important service. More importantly, the staff of the Chancery im-
proved socially throughout the fourteenth century, as in many cases of-
fice assistants advanced to become the personal assistants of high-rank-
ing dignitaries. This promotion in status is a sign of the growing impor-
tance of the administration and of a related trend that saw the Chancery’s
personnel hiring assistants to do their jobs. In sum, many of these posi-
tions became sinecures.
The Chancery, charged with the publication of papal records, already
existed in the thirteenth century, but its procedure was reorganized and
extended by John XXII in 1331. The Chancery also dealt with the two
forms of letters: the secret letters, regarding political and administrative
business, also called curial letters; and the communal letters, sent to indi-
vidual petitioners who requested waivers for movable altars, masses be-
fore dawn, absolutions, marriages within prohibited degrees of consan-
guinity, or benefices. Most documents, if not every single step in a docu-
ment’s production and delivery, required a fee that went to papal coffers.
Hence, the rise of the Chancery is also linked to the growing monetiza-
tion of the Avignon papacy. 15 In the large majority of cases, documents
responded to petitions. First, the requests were referred to the pope by
the referendarius (referee), who suggested an answer (his fiat of approval).
The petition was then registered, and the answer briefed and sketched
out in the form of minutes (abstracts) prepared by abbreviators. Once
166 Chapter 4

corrected, the abstracts were passed to scribes who “engrossed,” or de-

veloped, them in longer form; they were then checked by correctors, who
reviewed their form and content, making sure that the response matched
the petition. They were then sealed by bullatores (the bulla was the pope’s
metal seal), registered by registrars, and indexed (with a synopsis of the
letter’s content) for the rubrics that headed the registers where they were
recorded. 16 It should be noted that the bullatores were all illiterate Cister-
cians from the Abbey of Fontfroide in the diocese of Narbonne. Their
illiteracy safeguarded and prevented the dissemination of private materi-
al. In order to maintain their privacy, the monks actually resided in some
undisclosed area of Avignon outside the papal palace with their own
cooks, sergeants, valets, and scribes.
The Avignon papacy also transformed the administration of the
Church by developing archives and recording procedures. This once
more demonstrates the efficiency of its leadership. Registrars copied all
letters in ledgers. Those made out of paper remained in Avignon until
1784, when they were shipped to Rome; they are commonly named the
Avignon registers. Others were recopied on parchment. They were la-
beled “Vatican registers” and sent to Rome in the 1430s. But efficiency
had its limitations. It has been calculated that the court produced some
70,000 bulls (sealed letters) per year, but the Avignon and Vatican regis-
ters only account for some 2,000 of them, indicating that a choice was
made to either save and archive or not. It is possible that some petitioners
actually paid an extra fee to see their scripts recorded, as an added safe-
guard that ensured a paper trace in case of litigation. In any case, the
bureaucracy was tedious and heavy. A single bull traversed seven offices
and went through the hands of twelve officers, with a system of fees or
taxes paid to segments of the administration at every step of the way.
There is no doubt that the fees imposed by this administrative machine
gave a bad name to the Avignon papacy.
The Chancery employed scores of scribes and secretaries all working
within a defined and complex hierarchy. In many cases, high-ranking
positions were truly sinecures, administered by teams of assistants. The
titles “apostolic secretary” and “engrosser” were in some cases rewards
granted for previous service, given to individuals clearly not directly
involved in the secretarial functions of the administration, such as physi-
cians or the director of the palace’s construction. These officers belonged
to the entourage of high secular or religious dignitaries who collected
 Constructing the Administration 167

offices and were often exempted from residency in the place of their
titles. Abbreviators had been originally Italians, but in Avignon, more
often than not, they originated from the same area as the pope. Scribes of
apostolic letters were also Italian and French. Notaries of the pope issued
from the great French and Italian aristocratic families. Achieving the po-
sition of notary was seen as a great step up the ladder of church prefer-
ment since many cardinals had held that title before their elevation.
A vice-chancellor, either a friend of the pope or a relative, headed the
Chancery. Most secretaries were trained in civil and ecclesiastical law
and eventually moved up to the cardinalate. In difficult cases brought
before the vice-chancellor, a corrector or the auditor of the Chancery
determined which procedure to follow; issues were solved preemptively
to minimize aggravation. A referendarius (referee) decided which peti-
tions would be brought to the attention of the pope. It should be noted
that by the sixteenth century, many offices of the Chancery became vacab-
ili, meaning that they were sold to the highest bidder, evidence enough
that the revenues this administration produced were extremely attractive
to the many candidates who bid on positions.

PENITENTIARY AND ROTA

Two more offices had belonged to the Roman court: the Penitentiary, and
the Apostolic Court of Audience, renamed in Avignon the Rota (or
“wheel” in Latin, perhaps from the circular arrangement of its benches in
the meeting room). The Grand Penitentiary headed the Penitentiary and
heard the confession of ecclesiastics who required the pope’s absolution.
He was thus the cardinal confessor of the court. The office dealt with
spiritual jurisdiction. Sixteen to eighteen minor penitentiaries chosen by
the pope (usually multilingual mendicant brothers) also dispensed spiri-
tual justice and heard confessions. Some forty scribes answered petitions
for waivers (dispenses), excommunications, and interdicts. As in the
Chancery, the office of Scribes of the Penitentiary became a sinecure,
handled by an assisting staff. Again, fees and fines were attached to this
jurisdiction, which also included a staff of correctors and an auditor for
difficult cases.
The Rota was the Audience of Apostolic Causes, the permanent judici-
ary unit of the papal court. It grouped together various auditors or judges
who sat on a round, padded bench, hence the name of rota (wheel). The
168 Chapter 4

Rota was, again, a foundation of John XXII (in 1331). The auditors acted
as the pope’s chaplains and confidants. Ten to twelve auditors were as-
sisted by four notaries. They served some five years and could be sent on
diplomatic missions during their tenure. Medieval law required knowl-
edge but little creativity, and subsequently, auditors tended to regroup
commentaries and compile, classify, and index them, but rarely did they
innovate. Each auditor held his own caseload, heard witnesses, examined
evidence, and wrote conclusions to each case. These he shared with his
colleagues, who, within twelve days, had to sign onto or refute the sen-
tence. Case results were then passed on to notaries, who recorded and
notified the concerned parties. Litigations were numerous and proce-
dures lengthy.
In addition to meting out justice for the Latin Church as a whole, the
Rota also identified and directed cases to local tribunals. In Avignon, this
was no simple affair. Before the arrival of the Roman court in the city, the
legal process had carefully distinguished between layfolk and clergy. The
Temporal Court, headed by a vicar and two judges, administered justice
to lay citizens, both Christian and Jewish, while secular clergy (priests)
were subject to episcopal justice. The orders of monks, friars, and nuns
obeyed their abbots, generals, or abbesses, and—as the last resort—were
referred to the pope.
Created long before the papal move to Avignon, the Court of the
Marshal of Justice existed to remove the followers of the Roman court,
the so-called curialists (the staff of religious and lay papal officers and
servants) from the jurisdiction of the many cities the pope visited, in
order to judge them without the intervention of local authorities. Once in
Avignon, the organization of the Court of the Marshal of Justice was
finalized between 1335 and 1337. The Avignon papacy extended its au-
thority not only to the lay curialists of the court but also to all immigrants
who came to reside in the city. Considering the tremendous growth of the
city during the fourteenth century, the Court of the Marshal dealt with an
important share of Avignon’s population. The leader of the court, the
marshal, was charged with law and order and the general security of the
city, organizing the pope’s defense and supplementing the pope’s house-
hold guard. Because the pontiff relied on the marshal for his personal
safety, he personally filled appointments to this position from his own
homeland, if not from the members of his own family. To assist him in
the administration of justice, the marshal also appointed two judges, who
 Constructing the Administration 169

conducted civil and criminal cases. A fiscal procurator represented the

pontifical administration, assisted by a treasurer who received fees and
fines. A captain headed a company of forty sergeants, which policed the
city along with the sergeants of the Temporal Court. The Avignon popes
excelled in administrative efficiency. The sheer detail with which these
popes addressed both internal affairs and public administration proves
the wide extent of their oversight and regulation.

THE POPE’S HOUSEHOLD

The “household of the pope” is the last papal administrative unit to be

defined in this short survey of the pontifical bureaucracy. The English
word “household” best translates in Latin as familia (and a member of the
household, familiaris). These included the kitchen and stable staff, notar-
ies, domestic servants, almoners, chaplains, sergeants, and officers of the
Chamber and Bull’s Office who received food, lodging, clothing, and
gifts from the pope. 17 Members of the pope’s household took care of his
person; they were his private staff, separate from the small army of ad-
ministrators and civil servants whose purpose was the administration of
the Church. Note, however, that medieval people did not clearly separate
personal and administrative services performed for a sovereign, and one
finds in ecclesiastical careers some fluidity of movement between both
services individual and personal due to the pope himself and otherwise
general administrative responsibilities.
The papal institution, and monarchies in general, strove to create po-
litical stability and continuity throughout the Middle Ages. Quite often,
the transitional periods that followed the death of a secular or religious
leader were rife with intrigue and challenges to the status quo. Institu-
tions responded by creating mechanisms of continuity—a king naming
his successor during his lifetime, the creation of an electoral college, or
the conclave, for example. This concern for the continuity of sovereignty,
for the stable and uninterrupted exercise of personal power even after a
monarch’s death, led Ernst Kantorowicz to theorize the dual nature of the
king. For the king was at once a physical body (that needed care and
honor) yet was also the embodiment of the enduring monarchical institu-
tion itself. The king’s physical body eventually perished, but his institu-
tional body endured through the life of his kingdom. 18 Building on Kan-
torowicz, Agostino Paravicini Bagliani demonstrates in his seminal work,
170 Chapter 4

The Pope’s Body, how the Church also represented its own institutional
continuity in the dual nature of the pope, who simultaneously embodied
a transient, mortal man yet also personified the Church’s institutional
continuity. 19 Hence, the protection and prolongation of the pope’s body
became a pressing focus. Starting in the thirteenth century, the papal
court maintained physicians whose sole task was to preserve the physical
body of the pope and in sum, the institution.
More specifically, the entire personal staff of the pope, consisting of
chamberlains, physicians, cooks, and sommeliers was devoted to his
physical welfare. Originally assigned to the pontiff’s domestic service,
the chamberlains (who knew the pope intimately because of their re-
quired tasks) grew in importance and became confidants to whom the
popes could turn for various missions. Between the pontificates of Clem-
ent V and Gregory XI, some forty-four medical doctors surrounded the
popes, with each pope keeping one to four physicians on call at his court
at all times. 20 Most popes were older, frail men who necessitated constant
care (with the exception of the highly energetic John XXII), so they sur-
rounded themselves with physicians who were either renowned for their
successful practice or academic knowledge. Their names are among the
most famous of their time, including Arnaud de Villanova (who died
before getting to Avignon in 1313), Guy of Chauliac, and Jean de Torna-
mira. 21 A few barbers (who also treated fractures), and apothecaries (who
dispensed medicines) aided and complemented these specialists. Spice
merchants, who sold the spices needed to flavor food (or to make it
digestible), also provisioned the court with the various waxes and ink
products needed for lighting and writing.
Feeding the pope and his household was the task of the “pope’s kitch-
en,” staffed by cooks but also by the food-purchasing and storing admin-
istration, a group that included buyers, scribes, and pantry guards. A
“small” kitchen prepared the pope’s meals while the “big” kitchen oper-
ated for staff and guests. Kitchen extras were hired locally when required
by necessity. A maître d’hôtel, called master of the room (magister aulae),
usually a sergeant, oversaw the observance of dining etiquette and or-
dered space and people during the pope’s meals. The pope’s bakery de-
livered bread to the court without making it in the palace; it was bought
from Avignon’s bakers. The bottle office bought and distributed pitchers,
cups, and drinks, usually wines bought locally but also some imported
 Constructing the Administration 171

from Bordeaux or Burgundy. Water was carried, sometimes from afar, to

the pope’s kitchen by the officer in charge of water provisioning.
The pope received many guests, and his domestic administration
must have been constantly busy. Papal dinners were gigantic affairs. For
example, the dinner offered by John XXII for the marriage of his niece
required 4,012 loaves of bread, 8 steers, 55 sheep, 8 pigs, 4 boars, innu-
merable fishes, 200 roosters, 690 chickens, 580 partridges, 270 rabbits, 77
ducks, 50 doves, 4 cranes, 2 pheasants, 2 peacocks, 292 birds, 33 quintals
of cheese, 250 dozen eggs, and 11 carts of wine. Clement VI’s coronation
meal counted 118 steers, 1,023 sheep, 101 calves, 914 kids, 60 pigs, 6,900
kilograms of lard, 15 sturgeons, 300 pikes, 1,500 roosters, 3,043 chickens,
1,446 geese, 12 mortars for aioli, 3,250 dozen eggs, 50,000 tarts or little
cakes, 36,100 apples, 400 pears, fresh almonds, 5,875 pitchers, 200 flasks,
5,000 glasses, 26,000 platters, and wines from Provence, La Rochelle,
Beaume, and the Rhine. 22 Granted, not all meals at the papal court were
of such magnitude, but given these examples we can still envision the
energy expended to coordinate such events. Stefan Weiss’s publication of
the dinner guest lists of John XXII, Benedict XII, Clement VI, and Inno-
cent VI and his subsequent tabulations of large purchases for the Avi-
gnon popes and the Apostolic Chamber demonstrates the array, variety,
geographic range, and expenses involved in feeding the papal court and
its guests. 23
All services ancillary to the pope and curia’s living conditions were
also established within the pope’s household. These comprised the vari-
ous officers in charge of lodging, decoration, and maintenance according
to the changing seasons; the tailors who manufactured the pope and
court officers’ garments and liveries; and the laundresses, sweepers, bell
ringers, gardeners, architects, and masons who were constantly em-
ployed for the upkeep or new construction of the buildings that sheltered
this important court.
The staff of the Pope’s Chapel, consisting of his confessors, almoners,
and theologians, handled the pope’s spiritual welfare. It has been accu-
rately suggested that the growth of the papal court mirrored contempo-
rary princely courts, and as most medieval dignitaries and magnates did,
the popes maintained their own “chapels,” naming almoners (to assist in
the distribution of charity) and personal confessors. The Pope’s Chapel
was the administrative unit charged with the performance of the liturgy,
of which singing and chanting were an essential part. Benedict XII orga-
172 Chapter 4

nized a new schola cantorum, a choir especially dedicated to the singing of

the canonical hours, often in the new polyphonic fashion from the north
that eventually replaced plainchant. Other chaplains were necessary to
the performance of the offices, which Benedict XII also reformed by as-
signing the purely liturgical tasks to chaplains of the chapel (capellani
capelle). These chaplains were headed by a master of the chapel, while
commensal chaplains (capellani commensales) became honorific titles with
vaguely identified liturgical functions.
Public religious worship also entailed pious works of charity. The
papal almshouse focused on three tasks: the daily distribution of food,
clothes, and shoes to the indigent poor in Avignon at the Almshouse of
the Pignotte; the occasional tossing of coins and food during the pope’s
coronation ceremony, or on holy days, or when the pope entered or exit-
ed cities; and the distribution of specifically targeted alms. The pope also
supported Avignon’s many hospices and hospitals. While perhaps negli-
gible as a specific contribution to a poor person, in the aggregate, the
sums spent on relief of the poor could be significant. For example, in 1375
a scribe of the Apostolic Chamber recorded that on Easter, almoners
distributed some 880 florins, giving 680 florins to the religious and chari-
table establishments of the city and 200 florins to Avignon’s poor and its
hospitals. 24 It is estimated that the “charitable” budget ranged between
12,000 and 25,000 florins per year, and in times of crisis, like the years
1346–1348, it reached 46,500 and 52,000 florins. These sums fluctuated
between 2.34 percent and 19.4 percent of the papal yearly budget. 25
Within the realm of papal charity, the “secret almonry” was yet an-
other innovation of the Avignon popes, more specifically of Clement VI,
who consolidated the various alms distributed to numerous institutions
and individuals into the hands of a “secret almoner.” Still, trustworthy
persons continued to be charged with distributing various alms to a wide
array of beneficiaries. Convents and monasteries were often the recip-
ients of alms, in turn allowing them to donate directly to their own crowd
of indigent persons. While these sums were important, they were not as
large as those reserved for the Almshouse of the Poor. For example, in
1364, Guidonus de Podiovallis, a squire of the pope, donated to eight
girls (“named in the ‘big book’ for special alms”) the sum of 253 florins
for their dowry funds. Who were these women, and what decided their
selection? Certainly someone at the court had personal knowledge of
their cases, as with Johannetta, a poor orphan, daughter of the late Theo-
 Constructing the Administration 173

baldus Alegre, who was promised to a certain youth; she received twenty
florins for her dowry and ten florins for her wedding gown (vestibus
nuptialibus). Another recipient, Jacometa de Aquis, was promised to Guil-
lemus Guillemi, a servant of the cardinal of Saint-Martial, and received
twenty florins for her dowry and ten florins for her wedding gown. An-
other, Marguerite, daughter of the late Burdolfi, silversmith of Avignon,
promised to Johanneto, notary of the Papal Court of the Marshal, was
given thirty florins. It is not difficult to imagine some cardinals or courti-
ers petitioning the pope for the grant of alms for these specific cases. 26
The papal Almshouse of the Poor, also known as the Pignotte, took its
name from the Italian word pagnotta, meaning “little bread.” Its budget
was twice that of the secret almonry, meaning that it needed to receive a
regular source of income budgeted from the Chamber’s expenses, in this
case taken out of assignations from collectorates. Its name indicates clear-
ly the nutritional staple of the Middle Ages and the Pignotte’s main func-
tion: the distribution of bread. In the fourteenth century, the name desig-
nated not only the almshouse staff with its administrator, chaplains,
cooks, and sergeants but also the building where the alms were distrib-
uted. Records show that papal almoners distributed hundreds of bread
loaves and sometimes other food items, clothes, and shoes to the poor of
Avignon daily, dedicating enormous sums (up to 3,000 to 4,000 florins
per single order of wheat) to the task. The Pignotte’s administrators
bought the grain used daily by local bakers to bake six thousand to ten
thousand or so “little loaves,” composed of two-thirds wheat and one-
third barley or rye. 27 Bernard Guillemain estimates that some 1,200 indi-
viduals each received seven small loaves weighing some sixty grams,
accompanied by a ration of wine each day. 28 We can note that roughly a
pound of bread was considered sufficient nutrition for basic human sur-
vival. Usually, one-third of the daily bread recipients (some 350 individu-
als) were allowed a full meal, consisting of wine, porridge of peas and
beans, cheese, mutton, or fish. 29 Because of the gargantuan task of feed-
ing Avignon’s poor, the Pignotte required a competent administration,
and its administrators, suppliers, cooks, sergeants, and ushers (to contain
the crowd) may have been some of the most efficient and capable mem-
bers of the entire curia. In any case, this quick survey of the papal almon-
ry testifies to the care with which the pope took his charitable obligations.
Another Avignonese innovation in the spiritual realm was Clement
VI’s creation of the post of papal confessor in 1342. Again, the pope’s
174 Chapter 4

confessors and “secret” almoners emulated positions already well estab-

lished at the court of the king of France. Like other high-ranking curial
posts, papal confessors usually originated from the same provinces as the
popes. They ordered liturgical life for the pope, deciding the themes of
the sermons that were to be preached in his presence and assisting ves-
pers, solemn masses, and other special services. Papal confessors also
prepared liturgical ornaments for ceremonies, safeguarded sacred jewel-
ry and the papal tiara, presented the pope with ritual objects in the course
of divine services, and served at the pope’s altar. A sacristan relieved the
confessor of most mundane tasks. When the pope traveled, his confessor
followed him on a mule carrying the Blessed Sacrament with him. The
confessor’s role was precise and clearly enunciated in ceremonial books,
where he is described assisting the pope during the mass ritual of ablu-
tion. But his most important task was to attend the pontiff through the
last hours before his death, hearing his final confession and offering the
sacrament of the last rites.
The papal court attracted and necessitated an educated elite that could
effectively manage its growing administration. To facilitate recruitment,
the pope kept a school that also belonged to his household. In Avignon,
the curriculum focused on theology, since civil and canon law were
taught at the recently founded university. Some of the school’s masters
had careers that led to the highest ecclesiastical positions like auditors,
cardinals, and even pope, as in the case of Urban V. These masters
formed students for their special teaching degree, the licencia ubique do-
cendi. The masters produced sermons and preached before the pope and
his entourage; they also advised him on difficult spiritual and doctrinal
questions. Most of the professors, however, were Dominicans who seem
to have followed closely the teaching of Saint Thomas Aquinas without
much originality. Because this institution seldom challenged its students
to step beyond the conventional, its general lack of brilliance has led the
great historian of papal Avignon, Bernard Guillemain, to comment that
“speculative and doctrinal issues did not garner much attention” in a
court where jurists and administrators made their careers. 30 It seems that
the school indeed epitomized the character of this Avignon papacy; there
was first and foremost a down-to-earth pragmatism at the curia, and
administrators had little patience for hypothetical and theoretical abstrac-
tions.
 Constructing the Administration 175

In the papacy’s continued efforts to protect the pontiff’s soul and

body, an honor guard supervised his personal and palace security and
also belonged to his household. But this guard cannot be considered
solely protective; among the 125 ushers, sergeants, and squires main-
tained yearly by the popes, some held their office purely on honorific
terms while others actually worked for them. The facts that their names
can be traced on the Apostolic Chamber registers and that they received
liveries and payments does not substantiate their actions. Registers show
that movement was fluid between one rank and the next. Positions were
often rewarded to deserving servants of the pope, and many accumulat-
ed posts in this manner. Giovanni Bruni, for example, appears as sweeper
of the palace from 1343 until 1347, when he was promoted to messenger.
He was named usher in 1351. 31 Roberto di Sangallo was a barber and
sergeant of the pope from the 1360s until the 1380s. 32 He belonged to the
large group of messengers, sweepers, cooks, goldsmiths, apothecaries,
furriers, wax purveyors, and other workers who rendered enough service
to the pope and his court to be promoted as members of the papal guard.
It is difficult to ascertain whether or not these men actually held two
positions at one time. Still, the pope needed real protection and received
it, at least from the marshal and from a portion of his guard. Ushers,
sergeants, and squires multitasked at the court. They could escort and
defend people and convoys but also relay messages and act as purchas-
ers. Ushers (hostiarii and porterii), as their name indicates, guarded the
doors of all palace rooms. Sergeants (servientes armorum and masserii) es-
corted and guarded the pope, his staff, and papal convoys. They also
arrested clerics or guarded jails and could be dispatched as special en-
voys, or nuncios. The squires of the pope (scutiferi and domicelli) repre-
sented an underemployed elite or parade corps. The pope rewarded his
family and friends or high-ranking petitioners with these sinecures. They
were all nominal titles, and sergeants usually replaced them in their actu-
al functions.
All in all, the papal curia of the late Middle Ages owed much to the
administrative genius of John XXII. He multiplied the personnel in each
of the curial offices (Apostolic Chamber, Chancery, Penitentiary, and
Rota) and as such extended his control over the administration. This
increase in the papal workforce also meant an increase in the amount of
money that had to be reserved for salaries, but fees attached to the ad-
ministration compensated and paid for the enlarged expenses. The multi-
176 Chapter 4

plication of sinecures in most of the offices indicates that these were

valuable positions worth competing for. They were cozy posts that, for
their owners, raised enough income to hire a parallel staff to actually
complete expected duties. As they centralized the administration of the
court, the Avignon popes raised revenues and extended their control
over the Church and its administration.

THE ADMINISTRATION’S MARK ON AVIGNON

It is evident that the papal administration left its imprint on Avignon,

first, in physically reshaping it by adding new buildings and neighbor-
hoods but also in the way the massive influx of curialists transformed
how the Avignonese occupied their own territory. It is possible to locate
in Avignon the site of the various apostolic services. Before the construc-
tion of the papal palace, the Chamber and the treasury were divided
between an almshouse next to the Gate Notre-Dame and a building south
of the episcopal palace that the registers call the “old treasury.” Starting
in 1316, John XXII enlarged his papal residence, the episcopal palace. He
bought or annexed most of the houses that surrounded the palace in
order to increase his space. He then rearranged the episcopal palace to fit
its new function as a papal residence, dedicating for this task the enor-
mous sum of 48,413 florins between 1316 and 1334. 33 The parochial
church of Saint-Étienne was transformed into the pope’s chapel, and old-
er and newer buildings were linked with eastern, western, and southern
wings, thus enclosing a courtyard and a cloister and sheltering the vari-
ous offices of the court. John XXII resided in a tower with his treasury.
After his death, his successor, Benedict XII, continued to reshape the old
episcopal residence.
Benedict decided on residing in his predecessor’s residence and liter-
ally remaking it as his own. On June 5, 1336, he bought a group of houses
(now called the Petit-Palais) that formally belonged to Cardinal Arnaud
de Via and reassigned them to the current bishop, Jean de Cojordan,
while Benedict assumed full ownership of the episcopal palace for him-
self. The transfer of ownership was ritually sealed on June 27, when each
new owner opened and locked each door of his new residence as a sign of
full possession. Benedict was then free to improve his lodging and trans-
form his palace into an administrative and liturgical center, a fortress that
 Constructing the Administration 177

would at once serve as shelter to the popes and as the symbolic locus of
Christianity.
Benedict first ordered the construction of a great chapel truly worthy
of a pope (this Grande Chapelle is now a depository for the archives of
Avignon), and he moved into a new forty-six meter (six-floor) tower
known at the time as the Big Tower (magna turris), the Tower of the
Treasury, or the Tower of the Pope. This tower formed the pope’s treas-
ury (above and below his apartments), the pope’s residence, and the
apartments of his camerlengo (located below his). Over time, additional
wings and towers grew around several cloisters and formed what is
called today the Old Palace. It included a tower for study, with chambers
for secret meetings, a kitchen and a latrine tower, papal dressing rooms,
big and small dining rooms (the pope usually ate in the Petit Tinel with
his officers and special guests; the Grand Tinel was reserved for special
occasions), conclave and consistory wings, a great cellar, and apartments
for visiting dignitaries that were refurbished for each new guest. The
palace’s construction offered some interesting moments. The Tower of
Trouillas was built by Saracen prisoners offered to the pope by the king
of Spain; it became the papal prison. During the construction of the Tow-
er of the Bell (Campane) a laborer fell to his death; in compensation,
Benedict provided his sisters with dowries. 34
When Benedict died in 1342, the next conclave elected Clement VI, a
brilliant man and a true Renaissance cardinal skillful in diplomacy and a
patron of the arts. His ties to Avignon were unambiguous; he bought the
city from the Countess of Provence in 1348 and built what is now called
the New Palace (palais neuf). Influenced by northern Gothic architecture,
the creation of the new palace initiated with the construction of the Tow-
er of the Wardrobe, south of the Tower of the Pope, an edifice that dis-
placed Benedict’s kitchens and required the construction of a new Tower
of the Kitchen. The latter, rather unfortunately, shared walls with the
Tower of the Latrines and Benedict’s former Tower of the Kitchen. (Inci-
dentally, kitchen waste and palace sewers emptied into the Rhône River.)
The further creation of the Tower of the Wardrobe added space to the
pope’s apartments, with a floor dedicated to bathing (with some sort of
wood-boiler to warm up the water), several wardrobes for the pope’s
linen, the Chambre du Cerf (a study cabinet exquisitely decorated with
hunting scenes), and the Chapel of Saint Michael. The unidentified
French and Italian painters who decorated these rooms brought with
178 Chapter 4

them a new artistic movement to Avignon, naturalism. Clement chose to

adorn the rooms of his new palace with secular and aristocratic motifs
that depicted forests, vegetation, men, and animals in their natural envi-
ronment. His choice matched the sensibility of the time when authors like
Jean de Jandun and Petrarch sang the praises of nature. 35
Clement’s next project was to enlarge the Audience, a building dedi-
cated to hearing judicial cases. He ordered the construction of the Grande
Audience, the first floor of which was reserved for officials’ apartments
and which contained a basement that served as a theological study room.
The cour d’honneur (Courtyard of Honor) allowed access to the Audience.
Attached to the Audience, the Grande Chapelle became Clement’s pri-
vate chapel, comparable in size to some of Rome’s basilicas.
Once finished, the palace physically centralized the administration,
containing the staff of the Chamber, treasury, and Chancery, the camer-
lengo, and the Rota. Their offices were located to the southeast of today’s
palace and in the Tower of the Pope with the pope’s and camerlengo’s
apartments and the treasury. A record of 1343 estimates the treasury’s
content at forty coffers and six bags containing some 600,000 gold florins.
The treasury’s rooms also contained armoires for books and important
ledgers, several hideouts, and a secret meeting room. They were staffed
with the Chamber’s scribes, notaries, accountants, and some of the Chan-
cery personnel. We learn from the expense registers that all of these
rooms were swept daily. Certain staff members actually slept on site,
maybe as a means of protection. But their proximity to the papal riches
may have also been irresistibly tempting. On October 23, 1343, Clement
VI asked his treasurer to investigate the robbery of certain sums from his
treasury. 36 In that same vein, we read that on March 30, 1360, a requisi-
tion was made to fix the locks of the treasury’s door that had been broken
by robbers. 37
The modernization of the palace ordered by Clement VI widened pal-
ace rooms and eased the working conditions of the camerlengo, treasur-
er, auditors, and their staffs. Their apartments were expanded and made
airier and sunnier, and their access to the pope improved. The Rota’s
benches took on their circular shape, with seats and desks behind them
for the auditors’ scribes and notaries. A guardroom was attached to the
audience hall, where guards, judges, and notaries shared common la-
trines. Little is known on the location of the bulla’s office and Chancery.
 Constructing the Administration 179

Most historians suggest that given their diligent work ethic, the exem-
plary bureaucrats of papal Avignon brought their work home.

CARDINALS

The pope and his administration were not alone in needing shelter in the
new papal city. Cardinals expected homes appropriate to their rank. Yet
unlike the pope, in most cases they did not build new residences but
instead rehabilitated preexisting buildings. In general, the higher one’s
social rank, the closer one’s lodging stood to the pope’s. Cardinals set up
housing clusters (called librata in Latin, from liberate, or “freed” [that is,
“freed for the pope’s needs”], livrées in French) where they resided with
their staffs. The English “liveries” brings to mind notions of uniforms
worn by officials and servants and does not fit the profile of these hous-
ing clusters. These were not new constructions but simply the appropria-
tion of a number of residences (sometimes up to fifty) that were nominal-
ly united to form a single residence while materially circumscribed with
barricades and chains. The latter feature often hampered commuting, and
the city quickly ordered their removal when the pope left Avignon in
1376. 38
Tradition dictated that livrées carry the name of their last, and some-
times penultimate, owner. But in the Middle Ages, naming a cardinal
was not a straightforward affair. Cardinals were designated either by
their last name, such as Saluces, or their title as cardinal, such as “the
cardinal of Sant-Angelo.” Finally and most often, they were named after
the episcopal see they occupied before their elevation to the cardinalate,
such as the cardinal of Florence.
Livrées spread throughout Avignon’s territory during the fourteenth
century, and their presence is still palpable in the modern city. The Parish
of Saint-Étienne, close to the palace of the pope, held the Small Palace, or
Petit Palais, as a livrée. Today a museum, it was initially occupied by an
uncle and nephew both named Bérenger Frédol, who both died in 1323.
The parish also regrouped the livrées Sant-Angelo (not identifiable today),
Mirault, whose tower is still visible today between the Palace’s place and
the Rue de la monnaie, and Auch, between today’s streets Petite-Fusterie,
Saint-Étienne, and Racine and the Saint-Agricol Church.
The Parish of Saint-Agricol included the Albano livrée, which stood
roughly on the location of today’s town hall, the bell tower of which is a
180 Chapter 4

fourteenth-century vestige; the livrée Amiens, between today’s Impasse

de l’Oratoire, Rue Joseph-Vernet, and Rue Plaisance; the livrée Poitiers,
quite large, extending to today’s streets Saint-Agricol, Bouquerie, Plan de
Lunel, Petite Calade, and Felix Gras; the livrée Cambrai, on the location of
today’s Calvet Museum; the livrée of Naples (now gone, but extending
from today’s Rue Théodore-Aubanel to Rue Bouquerie); and the livrée
Dax, close to today’s Place de l’Horloge.
The Parish of Saint-Didier encompassed the livrée Vergne or Ceccano,
which today serves as Avignon’s magnificent municipal library; the livrée
Venice, near Ceccano, on today’s Rue Laboureur; and the livrée Giffon, on
the southern limits of today’s Rue des Lices. The Parish of Notre-Dame la
Principale held the livrée Pétramale, on the location of today’s namesake
street; the livrée Viviers, near Pétramale (it was located between the
streets Bonneterie, Collège de la Croix, de la Masse, and Grivolas); the
livrée du Puy, located on today’s Rue du Collège de la Croix; the livrée
Principale or Pampelune, on today’s Rue des Fourbisseurs; and the livrée
Garlanderie, on today’s Rue Galante.
The Parish of Saint-Geniès tallied the short-lived livrée “at or near the
Dominicans,” which was made up of a building owned by the Francis-
cans; and the livrée Saint-Geniès (where the old parochial church, Rue
Bonneterie, stood). The Parish of Saint-Pierre counted the livrée Thury,
the vestiges of which can be found in the cellar of a hotel located on the
Rue de Mons; the livrée of Florence, on today’s Place Pie; and the livrée
Neuchâtel, which housed the auditor of the Apostolic Chamber and his
jail, the tower of which can be seen today in Rue du Chapeau Rouge. The
Parish of Saint-Symphorien held the livrée Saunerie, with its surviving
tower in today’s Rue Carnot; the livrée Saluces, north of the previous one,
running from the Rue de la Croix to Rue Sainte-Catherine; the livrée
“Old” Viviers, north of the Rue Banasterie; and south of the same street,
the livrée Auxerre. Last, the livrée Saint-Martial stood on today’s Rue
Peyrolerie and Rue Taulignan.
The construction of the palace and the delimitation of livrées altered
the fabric of Avignon’s urban landscape. Houses were bought or rented
by the court to be assigned to curialists and administrative departments,
while others were destroyed in order to make way for new construction
projects. When space eventually ran out within Avignon’s city center, the
cardinals moved across the bridge to Villeneuve. From 1316 on, faced
with a housing shortage, civil and religious authorities set up a system of
 Constructing the Administration 181

assignation. Assignatores (assignation officers), after having inventoried

all available lodgings, allotted houses at fixed rents to newly arrived
curialists. In this way, the papacy devised some form of rent-control prac-
tice. Once a house was selected, the owners were mandated to leave it
after receiving fair compensation. The system was not perfect, though. In
1346, for example, the cardinal of Autun evicted from his house the rep-
resentative in court of the city of Hamburg, claiming that the residence
belonged to his livrée. Tenacious, the German representative complained
to the pope and received gain de cause. 39 In 1364, Bishop Anglic Grimoard
of Avignon, Urban V’s brother, could not take possession of his episcopal
palace because a cardinal, Talleyrand of Périgord, considered it his in-
stead. 40
Still, all parties tried to take advantage of the situation. The Avi-
gnonese, who carried the burden of this housing crisis, demanded exorbi-
tant rents and selling prices. They rationalized their claims by stating that
homes requisitioned by assignatores could not be sold or bequeathed at
will, since they had to be rented or sold to curialists. Because they were
hampered in their rights of ownership, the Avignonese instead tried to
charge whatever they wanted in this buyers’ market. The situation be-
came so dire that John XXII devised a new system of home taxation
wherein each homeowner contented himself with the minimum rooms
necessary to his rank and allowed available space to be offered to curial-
ists. Assignatores and taxatores domorum (home-tax officers) formed a com-
mission that inventoried all available space, assigned a tax rate to rentals,
and distributed available lodging according to necessity and rank. To
forestall eventual discontent, Clement VI declared the area outside the
city walls free from the “livrée burden”; there, all new construction could
be permitted without restriction. 41 This regulation created a large flux
toward the city suburbs.
Cardinals were not shy in claiming their territory. Often at the ex-
pense of others, they (or, rather, their staff) preemptively branded their
coat of arms on houses belonging to others, forcing the unlucky owners
to drag cardinals to court for their removal. We know, for example, that
in 1357, Cardinal Nicolas Rosell branded the house of the sergeant at
arms Giraud de Beaupuits. Papal officers subsequently ordered the re-
moval of the coat of arms, much to the cardinal’s annoyance.
Another housing problem surfaces frequently in Avignonese records:
rental evasion. This was so pervasive that the popes intervened on sever-
182 Chapter 4

al occasions, issuing numerous bulls in response to the problem. In July

1311 the camerlengo requested that the followers of the Roman court pay
their rents within nine days of arrival. 42 On April 10, 1367, at the request
of the Avignonese citizenry, Urban V, on leaving Avignon for Rome,
commanded under the threat of excommunication that all followers of
the Roman curia—regardless of rank, ecclesiastic or monk, religious or
layman—pay their rents. Urban did clarify that expenses incurred from
repairs done to the rentals could be deducted from the total sum, as long
as lessors and lessees agreed on the terms. 43 After his return to Avignon,
Gregory XI reiterated the same injunction on December 1, 1373, in his
own words to satisfy the Avignonese people, and he did so again in 1376
on leaving for Rome. 44
The recurrence of these issues points to a specific mind-set. Cardinals
and other curialists showed a remarkable detachment toward Avignon
and its people, an attitude perhaps revealing their sense of the unnatural
and transitory character of the Avignon papacy. They refused to pay rent
because they were not engaged with their community; Avignon was just
a means to an end. The court’s presence in itself economically benefited
the city, and to much of the curia this alone sufficed; with that, their
involvement with Avignon ended. Even when they died, most cardinals
chose to be buried in their homelands, sometimes electing to leave a
portion of their remains entombed in a monument in the papal city, if
only to keep with the papal tradition of double burial.
After the pontiff, cardinals were the most important members of the
Church. Like the pope, they were named for life. Most of them had long
careers at the court, which perhaps led them to create partisan factions, to
lead networks of clients, and to practice nepotism. The “princes of the
Church” were the pope’s electors when meeting in conclave and his ad-
visors when meeting in consistory. Cardinals led the pope’s executive
branch of government. They often headed the Chancery, Penitentiary,
and special tribunals set up to resolve difficult ecclesiastical cases. They
drafted reports and appeals; they were sent on legations abroad, specifi-
cally to pacify the Italian Papal States while serving as vicar-general; they
might broker peace between France and England or travel generally
throughout Europe to defend the interests of the Church. Some twenty of
them supported each Avignon pope, and their numbers varied slightly,
according to papal promotions. Clement V and John XXII each named
twenty-eight cardinals; Benedict XII, seven; Clement VI, twenty-five; In-
 Constructing the Administration 183

nocent VI, fifteen; Urban V, fourteen; and Gregory XI, twenty-one. 45 The
numbers of Italian cardinals decreased exponentially with the election of
southern French popes (all together, ninety-five cardinals were southern-
French between 1316 and 1375), and of the fourteen Italians who re-
mained, three were of the Orsini family, two were Colonnas, and two
were Caetanis, evidence that the turbulent Roman aristocracy was still
welcomed at the court. 46 As will be discussed later, this French majority
became pivotal in the initiation of the Great Western Schism. Of the 134
Avignon cardinals, 91 were members of the secular clergy, and 43 be-
longed to the regular orders. In general, the majority of them were pro-
moted because they were either relatives or compatriots of the pope,
high-ranking curial servants, or officers of kings or great magnates. 47
The “princes of the Church” were funded in part by the Apostolic
Chamber, in part by the income of the many benefices they held, and by
generous gifts from popes and kings. They usually supplemented their
ecclesiastical income with their own private fortunes, which were usually
quite large since most cardinals issued from the aristocracy. They kept
households that mimicked the pope’s in composition, with a staff of
around fifty; this explains their demanding need for space. 48 Their house-
holds included a chapel with chaplains and cantors, an almoner, physi-
cians, apothecaries, barbers, sergeants, squires, a kitchen, officers, scribes,
secretaries, and a judicial team led by an auditor; the whole lot was
headed by the cardinals’ chamberlains.
Cardinals were arrogant, ostentatious, and vain. As such, they fol-
lowed the lifestyle of magnates and aristocrats, men who considered
magnificence their duty. The most obvious example is Cardinals Annibal
Ceccano and Pedro Gomez and the infamous banquet they offered in
honor of Clement VI in April–May 1343. Cardinal Ceccano was widely
known for such an extravagant and refined lifestyle, it led Saint Bridget
of Sweden to promise him eternal life in hell (this could explain why he
chose to be buried in Franciscan garb). 49 He and Cardinal Gomez fed the
pope, his entire retinue (with a large contingent of the pope’s family), and
some additional cardinals nine courses comprising three dishes each.
These included a castle constructed from “hairy” game with a huge stag,
boar, roe deer, and hares, which, even when roasted, were arranged to
look alive! Trees covered with silver held apples, pears, figs, peaches,
raisins, and candied fruits. Wines came from the best regions: Greece, La
Rochelle, Beaune, and Saint Pourçaint. The rooms of the cardinal’s palace
184 Chapter 4

were decorated with exquisite cloths, furs, covers, and tapestries. The
entertainment consisted of a choir of young boys, tableaux vivants, joust-
ing and hand-to-hand combats, music, and dancing. In addition to this
feast, the attendants received sumptuous gifts: the cardinals offered the
pope two rings of sapphire and topaz and a racehorse, while the pope’s
knights and squires received new coats and silver belts holding florin-
filled purses; all in attendance received gifts of money and jewelry. 50
In spite of their efforts to flatter the popes, John XXII in 1316 and
Innocent VI in 1357 rebuffed cardinals by promulgating sumptuary regu-
lations aimed at limiting their extravagant behavior. The popes at-
tempted to limit the size of the cardinals’ entourages, the quality and
quantity of the food they ate, and the lavishness of their entertainment.
The cardinals responded mostly by ignoring papal regulations until the
pope died. After all, as papal designators they had the upper hand in
choosing a pope whom they felt would give them wider berth. If a pope
became insistent on these measures, some cardinals rebelled openly
against what they considered papal infringement on their lives. As we
saw earlier, before the cardinals agreed to confirm Innocent VI’s election
in December 1352, they coerced him into a “capitulation” that freed them
from papal interference. Innocent VI agreed to the amendments for his
election, but he repudiated them quietly in June 1354. 51 Of course, the
most flagrant act of rebellion against the pope arose in 1378, when the
cardinals’ rebellion against their pope initiated the Great Western
Schism. 52
When summarizing the general and specific traits of the Avignon pa-
pacy, Jean Favier insists on differentiating between royal and ecclesial
administrations. 53 In the case of monarchies, by the fourteenth century,
royal domains and realms tended to coincide, while for the papacy, the
Papal States did not actually coincide with the Church. The pope’s spiri-
tual kingdom was much larger than his temporal one. This major differ-
ence led to unique attributes in the development of the papacy’s judicial
and financial administrations. For example, the pope did not feel the
need to judge a large group of subjects and, as such, did not develop an
administration centered on imposing justice on people, as kings did.
Rather, the pope’s justice went to litigation centered on curial benefices
and collations. In practice, this meant that papal justice could not borrow
administrative procedures from secular states, as European states did,
and was bound to innovate. The papacy had to stand alone and negotiate
 Constructing the Administration 185

its rights with secular states. This position led to a strengthening of papal
diplomacy that gave the Church an advantage in European politics. Pa-
pal diplomacy cost the pope very little. Legates and nuncios did not
receive salaries from the Chamber but incomes from their benefices; the
only caveat was for the pope to ensure that his staff was well trained and
competent. Because of its unique status in Europe, the Church created a
specific legal system with its own personnel tied to its distinct needs; this
is why popes created a university in Avignon that specialized in the
study of law. But ironically, secular and clerical states recruited for their
bureaucracies in similar fashion: once established, personnel invited fam-
ily and friends to join them, and nepotism was widely encountered in
both.
All in all, the greatest originality of the Avignon papacy was its
archiving and financial capability. Jean Favier states, “The Avignon Pa-
pacy constantly made an effort comparable to that of England at the time
of Domesday Book.” 54 It may have been the sole Western state to ever
preserve its documents with such a level of detail and meticulousness.
The abundance of material found in the Vatican Secret Archives is a
testament to the Avignon papacy’s foresight. In addition to their pen-
chant for thorough record keeping, the popes understood that the
Church needed a well-qualified administration. As it centralized docu-
mentation, the papacy’s financial centralization also quickly made Avi-
gnon a business capital of Europe, concentrating funds, business elite,
and spending in one location. This elite altered the fabric of the city. Some
of the beautiful cardinal livrées still stand today, like Avignon’s
Bibliothèque Ceccano, former home of Cardinal Annibaldo Ceccano be-
tween 1329 and 1350, serving as reminders of the city’s glorious medieval
past.

NOTES

1. Bernhard Schimmelpfennig, The Papacy, trans. James Sievert (New York: Colum-
bia University Press, 1992), 188.
2. See Schimmelpfennig, The Papacy, 188–197, where he itemizes the function of the
court.
3. Guillaume de Sauqueville, Paris, BnF, lat. 16495 f. sermon 24 (f. 66rb–66vb), in
Christine Chevalier Boyer, Les sermons de Guillaume de Sauqueville: L’activité d’un prédic-
ateur dominicain à la fin du règne de Philippe le Bel (Thèse de doctorat d’Histoire, Lyon 2:
Lumières, 2007), http://theses.univ-lyon2.fr/documents/lyon2/2007/chevalier_c#p=0&
a=top.
186 Chapter 4

4. John E. Weakland, “Administrative and Fiscal Centralization under Pope John

XXII, 1316–1334,” Catholic Historical Review 54.1 (1968): 43.
5. Weakland, “Administrative and Fiscal Centralization,” 54.
6. Weakland, “Administrative and Fiscal Centralization,” 51; Sebastian Zanke
itemized some 67,000 letters for John XXII’s pontificate; see “Imagined Spaces? The
Papal Registers in the Pontificate of John XXII (1316–1334),” in Images and Words in
Exile: Avignon and Italy in the First Half of the Fourteenth Century (ca. 1310–1352), ed.
Elisa Brilli, Laura Fenelli, and Gerhard Wolf (Florence, Italy: SISMEL-Edizioni del
Galluzzo, forthcoming).
7. These numbers come from Jean Favier, Les papes d’Avignon (Paris: Fayard, 2006),
251–252. Favier was the great specialist on the finances of the Avignon papacy.
8. Favier, Les papes d’Avignon, 229.
9. See Charles Samaran and Guillaume Mollat, La fiscalité pontificale en France au
XIVe siècle: Période d’Avignon et Grand Schisme d’Occident (Paris: Fontemoing, 1905),
116–119, 211–220.
10. It was, in fact, so lucrative that it was condemned by the Council of Constance in
1417.
11. Daniel Williman, The Right of Spoil of the Popes of Avignon, 1316–1415 (Philadel-
phia: American Philosophical Society, 1988), 1; and Joëlle Rollo-Koster, Raiding Saint
Peter: Empty Sees, Violence, and the Initiation of the Great Western Schism (1378) (Leiden
and Boston: Brill, 2008), 107–166.
12. See Gene Brucker, “ An Unpublished Source on the Avignon Papacy: The Let-
ters of Francesco Bruni,” Traditio 19 (1963): 351–370.
13. Irena Sulkowska-Kuras and Slanislaw Kuras, “Suppliques, brouillons, lettres et
registres de la Chancellerie apostoloque relatifs à la Pologne à l’époque d’Avignon
(1305–1378),” Mélanges de l’École française de Rome, moyen-âge-temps modernes 96.2
(1984): 721.
14. Walter Ullman, A Short History of the Papacy in the Middle Ages (London: Me-
thuen, 1972), 248.
15. Michael Tangl, Die päpstlichen Kanzleiordnungen von 1200–1500 (Innsbruck: Wag-
ner, 1894), published the medieval popes’ regulations for the Chancery, updated at the
beginning of their taking office. They itemized the fees charged for each imaginable
letter the Chancery possibly sent and the remuneration that the various scribes, notar-
ies, correctors, abbreviators, and others received for their tasks.
16. The seal held Peter and Paul on one side, Peter recognizable by his curly beard
and Paul by his pointy one, and the name and number of the pope on the other. It was
tied to the parchment with a yellow or red ribbon or hemp.
17. Bernard Guillemain, La cour pontificale d’Avignon: Étude d’une société (Paris: De
Boccard, 1962), 42.
18. Ernst Kantorowicz, Laudes Regiae: A Study in Liturgical Acclamations and Mediae-
val Ruler Worship (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1946); and The King’s Two
Bodies (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1957).
19. Agostino Paravicini Bagliani, The Pope’s Body, trans. D. S. Peterson (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 2000).
20. Guillemain, La cour pontificale, 376–382.
21. See Thomas F. Glick, Steven J. Livesey, and Faith Wallis, eds., Medieval Science,
Technology and Medicine: An Encyclopedia (London: Routledge, 2005), 51–53, 213–214,
and 85 for, respectively, Villanova, Chauliac, and Tornamira.
22. Robert Brun, Avignon au temps des papes (Brionné: Gérard Monfort, 1983), 220.
 Constructing the Administration 187

23. Stefan Weiss, Die Versorgung des päpstlichen Hofes in Avignon mit Lebensmitteln
(1316–1378): Studien zur Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte eines mittelalterlichen Hofes
(Berlin: Akademie, 2002), is a monumental study of the food supply and provisioning
at the court of Avignon; see, specifically, 449–515 for the papal guest list and 516–652
for the tables of purchase organized by pontificate.
24. Karl Heinrich Schäfer, Die Ausgaben der apostolischen Kammer unter den Päpsten
Urban V und Gregor XI (1316–1378) (Paderborn: Ferdinand Shöningen Verlag, 1937),
582.
25. Guillemain, La cour pontificale, 409.
26. Schäfer, Die Ausgaben der apostolischen Kammer unter den Päpsten Urban V und
Gregor XI, 326.
27. Guillemain, La cour pontificale, 412.
28. Guillemain, La cour pontificale, 413.
29. Schäfer, Die Ausgaben der apostolischen Kammer unter den Päpsten Urban V und
Gregor XI, 584.
30. Guillemain, La cour pontificale, 391.
31. Guillemain, La cour pontificale, 426. I describe some of the careers in The People of
Curial Avignon: A Critical Edition of the Liber Divisionis and the Matriculae of Notre Dame
la Majour (Lampeter, GB, and Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press, 2009), 146–147.
32. On Roberto di Sangallo, see Guillemain, La cour pontificale, 382; Anne-Marie
Hayez and Michel Hayez, “Les saints honorés à Avignon au XIVe siècle,” Mémoires de
l’académie de Vaucluse, series 7, 6 (1985): 200; Pierre Pansier, “Les médecins des papes
d’Avignon (1308–1403),” Janus (1909): 405, 432; Schäfer, Die ausgaben der Apostolischen
kammer unter Benedikt XII, Klemens VI und Innocenz VI (1335–1362), 809; and Schäfer, Die
Ausgaben der apostolischen Kammer unter den Päpsten Urban V und Gregor XI, 72, 207, 221,
254, 517, 542, and 602.
33. Dominique Vingtain, Avignon: Le palais des papes (Saint-Léger-Vauban: Zodi-
aque, 1998), 72.
34. Vingtain, Avignon: Le palais des papes, 168–171.
35. Vingtain, Avignon: Le palais des papes, 254–84.
36. Clément VI, Ut per literas apostolicas, no. 000480.
37. Roberte Lentsch, “La localisation et l’organisation matérielle des services ad-
ministratifs au palais des Papes,” in Aux origines de l’État moderne: Le fonctionnement
administratif de la papauté d’Avignon: Actes de la table ronde d’Avignon (23–24 janvier 1988)
(Rome: École française de Rome, 1990), 299.
38. August 25, 1376, Archives départementales de Vaucluse (henceforth ADV),
Archives communales d’Avignon, boîte 77, no. 2251.
39. Joseph Girard, Évocation du vieil Avignon (Paris: Les éditions de minuit, 1958), 50.
40. Anne-Marie Hayez, “L’entourage d’Urbain V: Parents, amis et familiers,” Annu-
aire de la Société des amis du Palais des papes (1988–1989): 38.
41. ADV, Archives communales d’Avignon, boîte 18, no. 574.
42. ADV, Archives communales d’Avignon, boîte 18, no. 581.
43. Urbain V, Ut per litteras apostolicas, no. 019752.
44. Grégoire XI, Ut per litteras apostolicas, no. 027351; and ADV, Archives communales
d’Avignon, boîte 77, no. 2551.
45. Guillemain, La cour pontificale, 184.
46. At their origins, cardinals were the administrators of Rome: cardinal-deacons
administered Rome’s oldest churches; cardinal-priests were the priests of Rome’s
greatest parishes; and cardinal-bishops were bishops of the Latium sees.
188 Chapter 4

47. Guillemain, La cour pontificale, 183–276 remains the best thorough study of the
Avignon cardinals.
48. Guillemain, La cour pontificale, 252, emphasizes this “mimicking” characteristic.
49. See Marc Dykmans, “Le cardinal Annibal de Ceccano (vers 1282–1350): Étude
biographique et testament du 17 juin 1348,” Bulletin de l’institut historique belge de Rome
43 (1973): 145–344.
50. George de Loye, “Réceptions du pape Clément VI par les cardinaux Annibal
Ceccano et Pedro Gomez à Gentilly et Montfavet (30 avril–1ier mai 1343),” in Avignon
au moyen âge: Textes et documents, ed. I.R.E.B.M.A. et alii (Avignon: Aubanel, 1988),
81–92.
51. The text is published in Pierre Gasnault and M. H. Laurent, Innocent VI (1352–
1362): Lettres secrètes et curiales (Paris, 1960), vol. 1, fasc. 2, 137, no. 435.
52. Stefan Weiss, “Luxury and Extravagance at the Papal Court in Avignon and the
Outbreak of the Great Western Schism,” in A Companion to the Great Western Schism
(1378–1417), ed. Joëlle Rollo-Koster and Thomas Izbicki (Leiden: Brill, 2009), 67–87.
53. Jean Favier, “Traits généraux et traits spécifiques de l’administration pontifi-
cale,” in Aux origines de l’État moderne: Le fonctionnement administratif de la papauté
d’Avignon: Actes de la table ronde d’Avignon (23–24 janvier 1988) (Rome: École Française
de Rome, 1990), 1–4.
54. Jean Favier, “Traits généraux et traits spécifiques de l’administration pontifi-
cale,” 3.
 FIVE
Avignon
The Capital and Its Population

It is a matter of course that the settling of the papacy at Avignon trans-

formed what was then little more than a Provençal village into a vibrant
cosmopolitan city, a true Christian capital. This transformation was the
result of various related events. The papacy did not control the flow of
immigrants who constantly populated the city in its footsteps, but its
presence, its administration, and its ordinances encouraged this move-
ment. The fourteenth-century population boom redefined habitable space
in the city. In addition to this marked increase in Avignon’s residents, the
popes installed themselves in a new palace at the center of the old town,
expanding service buildings nearby, and all crowded within the old
twelfth-century walls. Following the construction of the palace, the city
arranged itself concentrically, placing, with great symbolic importance,
the head of Christianity at its ancient center and his administration
around the Rocher des Doms (Rock of the Domes), sanctified by the city’s
cathedral and the papal palace. When space became scarce, papal ser-
vices spread outward and around the city, toward the boundaries of its
urban limits.
A new Avignon, segmented topographically and socially, grew from
the inside out, with the papal administration and wealthy citizens at the
center and the poorer population on the margins of its territory, in the
new bourgs (suburbs) that sprang up outside the old walls. Despite this
separation, the new fourteenth-century walls, built in the late 1350s, en-

189
190 Chapter 5

circled Avignon’s old and new quarters, integrating to some extent the
wealthy and poor. All in all, the city acclimated to these changes well. In
truth, the commune did not have much choice after the pope bought
Avignon from Joanna of Naples in 1348, legally binding the fate of the
city to that of the papacy. Given this unique arrangement, what surprises
historians of the city the most is fourteenth-century Avignon’s relative
cultural modernity. Avignon was far quieter than Rome with its turbu-
lent politics, and its aristocracy never reached the level of violence and
aggression found among the Roman clans. Papal civic legislation man-
aged and satisfied Avignon’s population, which was diverse and rela-
tively tolerant for the time. The city accepted all newcomers without
stigmatizing the poor or foreigners. Contrary to popular assumption,
medieval urban life did not differ dramatically from its modern counter-
part. Cities have always attracted people in search of opportunities to
better their lives, and medieval Avignon serves as a paradigm for the
study of the social-cultural effect of immigration on urban growth. Avi-
gnon’s residents endured a rapid population increase, overcrowded
streets, noise, poor sanitation, and scarce shelter, mainly as a result of the
mass of urban poor who arrived in the footsteps of the popes.
At Avignon, the municipal and papal authorities responded quite
wisely to demographic expansion. They regarded immigrants as legal
agents having specific rights and duties, who eventually formed a new
population combining natives of the city and immigrants—a rather
multicultural society, redefining and pioneering a new urban space.
Meanwhile, the native-born moved out of the urban center to make room
for the papacy’s new demand for real estate, and Avignon’s ancient core
became the administrative center of Christianity. Still, in fourteenth-cen-
tury Avignon, as in many settings throughout history, people living in
very close quarters tended to get anxious and aggressive; fierce demand
for housing created sharp price increases, and the government in turn
attempted to regulate the resulting social chaos.
Set within the wider context of our general understanding of medieval
urban society, this chapter attempts to recover something of the texture
and flavor specific to medieval Avignon. Several mitigating factors are
analyzed in order to reconstruct the city’s life. First, we discuss the city’s
governance and regulations, leading to an examination of the various
categories of urban dwellers among the citizens and courtiers. Even
though the focus of the chapter lies with Avignon’s people, certain insti-
 Avignon: The Capital and Its Population 191

tutional practices also need explanation, especially when they affected

those people. A tour and history of the urban landscape and architecture
then introduces a presentation of Avignon’s social topography based on
its seven parishes. The chapter ends with vignettes touching on everyday
life in the capital of Christianity.

AVIGNON’S GOVERNANCE AND ADMINISTRATION

The struggle for power among religious and secular authorities shaped
life and politics in western Europe in the Early Middle Ages. Popes, kings
and nobles, magistrates and burghers: all negotiated, schemed, manipu-
lated, and openly fought for control over medieval cities and the wealth
they generated. In the 1120s, the free male citizens of Avignon agreed to
make Avignon a commune—a sworn association of free men for their
own protection and self-governance. The city’s multiple overlords, the
bishop of the city and the counts of Forcalquier, Provence, and Toulouse,
allowed the commune to form because they understood the financial
advantages they gained from such a venture. The commune assumed its
own defense, and its self-regulation increased prosperity. What the lords
lost in prestige they gained in taxes.
The commune chose to form a consular government with eight con-
suls, four members of the nobility and four burghers, elected by a small
group of men who had been drawn by lot and approved by the bishop.
Some hundred years later, during the Albigensian crusade in the 1220s,
Avignon sided with the Count of Toulouse and lost against the papacy
and its French crusaders. The Venaissin (the western part of Provence)
was punished for its unfortunate alliance, and in 1229 the region passed
from the rule of Toulouse to that of the papacy.
At the beginning of the fourteenth century, Pope Clement V
(1305–1314) promoted the Venaissin to the status of county or comtat,
establishing what is still known today as Comtat Venaissin. Until 1791,
the popes retained control over the area and directly named its rector
(recteur), an official who held jurisdiction over the land and ran its gener-
al administration. He appointed all magistrates, presided over the
county’s council, confirmed the statutes of the Venaissin’s towns, re-
ceived homage from feudal lords, and led the army.
Avignon itself escaped the 1229 papal annexation of the Comtat, how-
ever, and the city remained the property of Raymond VII of Toulouse
192 Chapter 5

until his death in 1249. By then, the Capetians’ territorial ambitions to

exert control over the south led them to pursue a clear strategy: a matri-
monial policy that gained them a large portion of the Midi when their
sons married the daughters of southern nobles. At his death, Raymond’s
land passed to his daughter Jeanne of Toulouse, wife of Alphonse of
Poitiers (Louis IX’s brother). When the couple died childless, the French
crown co-opted their patrimony, with the exception of the Comtat Ve-
naissin, which Jeanne had bequeathed to the papacy. Avignon was al-
lowed to continue its self-governance under the lordship of the Capetian
Count of Provence.
In 1251, Charles of Anjou, husband of Beatrice of Provence (younger
daughter of Raymond Berenger V, Count of Provence and Forcalquier),
and Alphonse of Poitiers, each of them respectively the counts of Pro-
vence and Toulouse, reorganized Avignon’s institutions. On May 11,
they decreed that from that day forward a vicar (viguier) would govern
the city on their behalf and would annually appoint two judges to head
the seignorial Temporal Court of Justice. The Avignonese, though now
limited in their right of assembly, were still allowed to try criminal and
civil cases in situ, claim damages against foreigners, and refuse to pay
new taxes (e.g., taillage, forced taxes, new tolls).
Starting in 1290, a seneschal (an agent of the Count of Provence) began
annually appointing Avignon’s vicar and both its judges. The vicar and
judges controlled all political and judicial institutions within the city. A
subvicar supervised the municipal police, with ten soldiers serving as his
personal guard and thirty-two sergeants headed by a captain maintain-
ing public order. The vicar in turn chose the city council, which elected a
few officials as his permanent representatives in municipal affairs. The
role of the bishop of Avignon was maintained in that he never lost his
right of supervision; he oversaw the vicar, examined him to ensure that
he conformed to Christian doctrine, and received his oath in the presence
of the city council.
French dominion did not affect Avignonese citizenship and the rights
it entailed. In the 1240s, the city’s consuls had negotiated special commer-
cial treaties with other cities that favored the native inhabitants of Avi-
gnon and, more specifically, those who claimed an Avignonese father or
grandfather (it is obvious that this limitation curtailed female kinship and
reinforced agnatic ties). Citizens descending from Avignonese males
were exempt from paying certain tolls and taxes. But the Avignonese
 Avignon: The Capital and Its Population 193

never granted any special privileges or exemptions for the resident aliens
who lived in their city. Throughout the thirteenth century, the Temporal
Court administered lay citizens and the Jewish population. Except for the
poor (the ill-defined vilissimi), who were not recognized as citizens but
still placed under the authority of the vicar of the Temporal Court, the
counts’ legislation of 1251 had not considered any noncitizen residents.
We must assume that at the time they were few in number and quickly
assimilated with the citizenry.
Resident aliens were able to apply for citizenship when they lived
within the walls of the city (intra muros) and when they held at least one-
third of all their real estate within the city. 1 The naturalization ceremony
required candidates to take a special oath and pay a small fee of one obol
to formalize entry into the civic rank. Again, their low numbers signify
that it was not a pressing issue for anyone before the fourteenth century.
In 1316, when Pope John XXII established his residence in Avignon, he
became a guest of the Count of Provence, sole lord of the city since 1290.
The status between Avignon and its pope changed from guest to lord in
1348, when Pope Clement VI bought Avignon for 80,000 florins from
Joanna of Naples, the Countess of Provence. The Avignonese citizens,
obviously forewarned of the acquisition in 1347, petitioned the queen not
to sell their city. Their reasoning remains uncertain and opaque. It seems
that the Avignonese feared an alteration of their status and privileges,
and their petition reflects fear of a change in leadership. Their meeting
with the queen resulted in a public instrument (publicum instrumentum),
authenticated by Pierre Guiramand of Aix, notary of Avignon. 2 The doc-
ument explains that on February 13, 1347, the knight Jean d’Aurons, syn-
dic of Avignon, and the burgess Dalmas Brotinel, ambassador of the
council of the city, met with Queen Joanna in the royal chamber of her
palace in Aix-en-Provence. After kissing the ground at her feet in a sign
of peace, they formally petitioned the queen not to sell, exchange, mort-
gage, or transfer the city to any person, entity, college, or community. The
queen promised that she would not, but in case she changed her mind,
she guaranteed the Avignonese that they would not be coerced into pay-
ing homage or swearing fealty to another political entity. The syndics and
the queen solemnly swore on the Gospels to maintain the liberties, immu-
nities, franchises, privileges, and conventions previously ratified in 1251.
This meeting was to no avail, since the queen sold Avignon to the
pope just over a year later. Respectful of local sensibilities, however, the
194 Chapter 5

papacy waited ten years before it required the Avignonese to formalize

the transfer of property with an oath of fealty to the pope, by then Inno-
cent VI. The ceremony started on April 10, 1358, and continued over
several days, with some 780 citizens and 200 Jews promising their fealty
to the pope and the Church. 3 A 1363 document shows that the commu-
nity of Avignon (universitas civitatis Avinionensis) renewed its allegiance
with the next pope when it petitioned the newly elected Urban V to
confirm the 1251 conventions. 4
The purchase of the city put the Comtat Venaissin and Avignon solely
in the hands of the papacy. Rather than joining both administrations into
one, the papacy chose to keep them separate. They ran parallel to each
other until the papacy’s second attempt at returning to Rome. On leaving
in 1367, Urban had required that resident aliens who stayed in Avignon
be de facto naturalized. 5 In 1370, when the pope came back to Avignon
after a three-year absence, he did not challenge the administration of
Avignon. The vicar had maintained continuity, and the papal presence or
absence was largely incidental. In 1376, when Gregory XI returned to
Rome, he joined the two positions of vicar and rector into a single post, to
which he appointed Jean de Blauzac. The office of vicar survived
throughout the Great Schism, but in 1434, after the Council of Basel took
over the papal possessions in southern France, a papal legate replaced the
vicar in governing the city; he did so until the French Revolution. In 1790,
Avignon and the Comtat proclaimed their union with France, finally end-
ing papal control over the region.

CITIZENS AND COURTIERS

The arrival of the Roman court in Avignon and the mass of people at-
tending it (the so-called curiam romanam sequentes, or “followers of the
Roman court”) challenged local institutions not only by their sheer num-
bers but also by their uncertain legal status. It is estimated that thirteenth-
century Avignon counted some five thousand inhabitants, and most his-
torians agree that the fixed population climbed to approximately thirty
thousand by the 1370s, a number swelled by thousands of uncounted
visitors (lay and religious petitioners at court, students, beggars, and offi-
cials) who escape our statistics. This demographic boom created a press-
ing need in Avignon for social organization and control but most of all
 Avignon: The Capital and Its Population 195

for justice. Which law and authority were these people supposed to fol-
low? The papacy settled that question.
Avignon was not the first city besides Rome where a pope had re-
sided. Between the pontificates of Innocent III (1198–1216) and Benedict
XI (1303–1304), the popes sojourned in Viterbo for a total of 3,319 days;
another 3,216 days were spent in Anagni; 2,806 days in Orvieto; and 1,770
days in Perugia. By the time John XXII arrived in Avignon, a system
adapted to the pope’s itinerant ways was already in place with the Court
of the Marshal of Justice. Any newcomer to the city obtained the qualifier
of courtier (cortisianus/a) when he or she presented the Marshal with the
documents or witnesses justifying his or her motivations to be in court.
Fourteenth-century documents immediately tried to differentiate the
large crowd of immigrants who came to Avignon from the actual follow-
ers of the court who traded directly with the curia, but before long the
terms “curialist,” “courtier,” “resident,” and “follower” were used inter-
changeably.
Fourteenth-century records aggregated curialists (curiales), followers
of the Roman court (curiam romanam sequentes), and inhabitants of Avi-
gnon (habitatores Avinionensis) into a larger group generically labeled
courtiers (cortisiani, cortesiani, cortesani) and sometimes citizens of the Ro-
man Court (cives romane curie). For example, a papal bull dated August
1373 that reviews the status of natives and nonnatives of the city refers to
the latter as omnes curiales in its third paragraph and then switches to
dilectos filios cortesanos in the following paragraph. 6 In summary, the va-
riety of descriptions attached to Avignon’s nonnatives, whether curiales,
cortisiani, curiam romanam sequentes, or habitatores Avinionensis indicates
that no clear distinction separated curialists from immigrants; they all
served the popes and their courts one way or the other. By enlarging its
definition of resident status and lumping into one large category all the
nonnatives, the papacy effectively legitimized the presence of any transi-
ents within the city: they were all the pope’s followers. At a time when
most governments restricted and condemned “vagrancy,” “transiency,”
or the presence of anyone who had no specific ties to a location, the
papacy proved most generous (and relatively modern) in its views. In
fact, this open mind-set remained with Avignon for some time after the
papacy returned to Rome; scholars must look at the mid-fifteenth century
(1458, precisely) to see the first Avignonese regulation targeting foreign-
ers and vagabonds who did not exercise an “art” or profession in the city.
196 Chapter 5

Even then, offenders were simply asked to leave and were condemned to
a fine if they returned without a working permit. 7
This somewhat dry discussion of jurisdictional language should not
obscure a social reality. Avignon was crowded with people from all over
western Europe, and justice needed to be served within the narrow con-
fines of its walls; perhaps the papacy attempted to level the field by
treating all residents equally. No evidence indicates social or professional
favoritism for either citizens or courtiers. No restrictions limited either
group from participating in professional activities, possessing real estate,
or paying taxes. As we will see later, there were no clearly demarcated
national or professional neighborhoods within the city. National discrim-
ination only surfaced in a few cases: when Gregory XI levied extra funds
to ransom back a number of castles held by mercenaries in his native
province of Limoges, for example, he asked the Limousins in Avignon for
contributions. In 1376, to take revenge on Florence during the War of the
Otto Santi, he expelled the Florentine courtiers from the city.
Avignon attracted large numbers of people who followed opportunity
to the city, and if some like Francesco di Marco Datini were resounding
successes, the livelihood of most resident aliens was fragile at best. 8 The
main threat to resident aliens was the right of reprisal that punished
foreign nationals for the actions committed by their homeland. In times
of political hostilities, medieval governments imprisoned any foreign na-
tionals they found on their territories and froze and confiscated foreign
assets (the latter action is still practiced today). The papacy wielded this
diplomatic tool expertly, as a Florentine merchant, Buonaccorso Pitti, ex-
plained in 1375:
Being young, inexperienced, and eager to see something of the world, I
joined forces with Matteo dello Scelto Tinghi, a merchant and a great
gambler. We went to Genoa, Pavia, back to Genoa and on to Nice and
then Avignon, which we reached at Christmas time and where we
were seized and thrown into the prison of the Pope’s marshall. When
we had been a week in prison, they had us up for questioning and
accused us of being spies for the commune of Florence. They produced
a letter to Matteo from a brother of his in Florence telling him that
Florence had instigated Bologna’s rebellion against the pope. After ex-
amining us closely, the court recognized our innocence but insisted
nonetheless on our furnishing a bail of 3,000 fl. lest we leave the city
without the marshal’s permission. Matteo found someone to put up the
bail, and once we were out of prison, sagely decided that it would be
 Avignon: The Capital and Its Population 197

dangerous to stay on here while our Commune was waging war in the
territories of the papacy. . . . [After returning to Florence, he heard that]
the Pope had caused all Florentine citizens to be arrested and their
records and possessions seized. 9

As we have seen, the war between the papacy and Florence had dra-
matic consequences for the Florentines established in Avignon. In March
1376 the pope expelled them and seized their goods. But in a bitterly
ironic twist, the people who lost the most were those who had the least
connections with the court: the common folk. Among those spared were
the great number of international traders who had dealt with the curia for
decades and who had literally bought their security from officials, as
were those who, in anticipation of the papal interdict, had been wealthy
enough to part with their Avignonese goods in quick sales or consign-
ments with their compatriots. Their losses, if and when they materialized,
were largely incidental. For example, the pope actually allowed his cor-
sairs to seize Florentine goods that left from the southern French ports of
Aigues-Mortes and Montpellier.
A witness to the events of 1376 states that some Florentines were
expelled “like dogs.” 10 A banker who eventually left Avignon of his own
free will describes the events in these words: “Upon the delivery of the
said sentence [the March 31, 1376, expulsion], all Florentines and other
people of Florence were expelled of the city of Avignon, and they were
robbed, and all what they had in the city of Avignon was taken by the
pope’s officials and the rectors of the said city.” 11 After a stalemate of a
few months, in October 1376 the curia proceeded to auction off all Floren-
tine property in Avignon. The Chamber received some 30,000 florins
from sales, a substantial but not enormous amount, proof enough that the
very wealthy had escaped with their capital (in cloth, spices, and weap-
ons, for example). The items that sold were the household goods and the
belongings of the common folk who made a good living in the city but
not a fortune. They had no wealth to protect them. In one instance, the
curia seized the wine stock of Cardinale di ser Neri from Carmignano, an
innkeeper who had resided in the city since the 1330s. The auction
brought some 500 florins to the Apostolic Chamber, plus some 2,000
florins for his real estate. 12
The legal distinction between citizen and courtier could also become
of utmost importance when facing trial; it could mean the difference
between life and death. Any medieval person knew that religious justice
198 Chapter 5

was more lenient than a noble lord’s secular justice (as long as one con-
siders excommunication milder than beheading or hanging). And luckily
for its residents, religious justice abounded in Avignon. The Court of the
Marshal took care of lay courtiers at large because of their connection to
the papal court. Cardinals and their respective auditors prosecuted cases
regarding their own household staffs. The auditor of the Apostolic
Chamber took charge of cases regarding religious courtiers and religious
petitioners. Finally, the bishop’s justice controlled the Avignonese secular
clergy. The Temporal Court administered justice only to lay citizens and
the Jews. Jacques Chiffoleau, in his study of papal justices, Les justices du
pape, found evidence that religious justice effectively prevailed in Avi-
gnon, where he counts only fifteen to thirty public executions per year—a
number which he considers very low in comparison with other medieval
cities. 13
Often a tonsure (a special haircut that identified clerical status in the
minor or major holy orders) proved one’s membership in the clerical
ranks and, as such, suggested the legal status of a courtier since the
demarcation between lay courtier and religious curialist was very fluid.
Since wearing a tonsure moved a defendant from the realm of lay to
religious justice, it is easy to understand why many laypersons adopted
the tonsure in phony imitation of their religious neighbors in order to
escape the rigors of the temporal judicial system. False clerics flourished
in papal Avignon. In 1356, the mother of a young delinquent led the
defense of her son to prove that he indeed had attended school and,
because of that, his tonsure was real. Her argument won; he was trans-
ferred from the Temporal Court to the Court of the Marshal. Others did
not hesitate to get tonsured in jail in order to avoid secular justice. Obvi-
ously, a tonsure could bring complexity to a legal case. For example, in
May 1336 the marshal’s sergeants arrested the Florentine Lorenzo Burba-
ci for the presumed robbery and murder of several merchants. In August
of the same year, the court of the bishop demanded to try Lorenzo be-
cause he claimed to be tonsured. His legal odyssey did not end there. His
complicated status of courtier-tonsured-cleric led the pope to withdraw
the case from the bishop’s tribunal and assign him to a special commis-
sion led by the inquisitor! After a two-year trial, Lorenzo was proved
innocent and freed.
In general, Avignon’s civil and criminal courts handed out fines and
avoided the death penalty. Because medieval justice was a means of rais-
 Avignon: The Capital and Its Population 199

ing revenue, Avignon followed the letter of medieval law and typically
allowed the permutation in kind of most offenses (even when accompa-
nied by serious harm). Torture or incarceration were used only in the case
of unpaid fines, so we can assume that the poorest paid dearly with their
bodies. The death sentence was pronounced only in cases of homicide
sine justa causa and treason.

AVIGNON’S URBAN LANDSCAPE

Since the early Middle Ages, Avignon counted seven parishes: Saint-
Étienne, Saint-Symphorien, Saint-Pierre, Saint-Geniès, Notre-Dame-la-
Principale, Saint-Didier, and Saint-Agricol. Since the twelfth century, the
city was wealthy enough to enclose those parishes within formidable
walls. In 1226, in the course of the Albigensian Crusade, these ramparts
offered strong resistance to the invading French army of Louis VIII but
not strong enough to prevent Avignon’s eventual capitulation. When
Avignon fell to these northern invaders, Occitania, or the Midi, lost its
independence and was absorbed into the royal kingdom of France.
After 1316, the perimeter area around the outer walls evolved into
new neighborhoods grouped into fifty or so bourgs, districts generally
named after the owner of the land on which they developed. These may
perhaps be defined as medieval suburban neighborhoods. Most often, the
impoverished nobility led the development of these bourgs as a means of
raising revenue and profit from the land. Proprietors leased parcels long
term and allowed the construction of houses, sometimes a few, some-
times a hundred, within each area. Since rents were generally lower out-
side the walls of the city, the inhabitants of Avignon’s bourgs were mostly
a working-class hodgepodge of citizens and immigrants alike, while the
wealthy lived within the protection of the city’s walls. Bourgs developed
in higher numbers where space permitted, that is, to the east, west, and
south of the city; the Rhône River and the surrounding rocky terrain to
the north precluded new construction. These bourgs allowed the civic
territory to expand and relieved the demographic pressure inside the old
walls. Eventually in the mid-1350s, however, the bourgs were incorporat-
ed into the city with the construction of new surrounding walls.
Religious houses were likewise positioned throughout the city. The
orders of men (principally the mendicants) occupied the exterior periph-
ery of the old walls. The mendicants’ location was not accidental.
200 Chapter 5

Throughout the thirteenth century, when these orders started to prolife-

rate, their arrival posed a threat to the city’s existing religious orders.
Rectors of parochial churches saw mendicants as direct competition for
souls and gifts and asked them to move away from the parochial boun-
daries, toward the city’s outskirts close to the old walls. In Avignon, the
mendicants divided three large zones of influence. Thus the religious
orders were symmetrically opposed in the east, south, and west of the
city: Dominicans in Saint-Agricol, Franciscans in Saint-Geniès, Carmelites
in Saint-Symphorien, and Augustinians in Saint-Pierre. The male Bene-
dictines were of little importance in Avignon; their small community
resided in the college of Saint-Martial, in the parish of Saint-Didier, to the
south. Alone among the new orders of warrior-monks, within the old
walls was the Order of Saint John of Jerusalem, with its temple to the
west and Commanderie to the east.
Within the ambit of the old walls of Avignon were closely enclosed
female institutions as well, with the Benedictines of Saint-Laurent to the
northwest, Benedictines of Notre-Dame-des-Fours to the southwest, Cis-
tercians of Sainte-Claire to the northeast, and Franciscan Clarisses to the
southeast. The symmetrical disposition of these four intramuros convents
is remarkable. There can be no doubt that these religious communities
traced some form of symbolic boundaries for the city and that the nuns’
prayers rose from the center inscribed by the sacred space of this circle.
The Repenties, a convent for repentant prostitutes, was unsurprisingly
located outside this symbolic area on the city’s southern margin.
The original episcopal residence, a small fortress with several towers,
stood on the Rocher des Doms, a rocky promontory that sits on the west-
ern bank of the Rhône facing Villeneuve-lez-Avignon. Avignon’s cathe-
dral of Notre-Dame des Doms was the parochial church of Saint-Étienne,
with a campanile, baptistery, and cemetery as its neighbors. The first of
the so-called Avignon popes, Clement V, was in reality an itinerant who
resided in the city only sporadically between 1309 and 1314. When
present there, he was installed in the largest space that could accommo-
date him and his staff, the Dominican convent. His successor, John XXII,
elected in 1316, had been bishop of Avignon between 1310 and 1312 and
opted to return to his former city and palace. The arrival of the pope and
his court of some five hundred curialists in Avignon immediately meant
that space for work and lodging was at a premium. John’s solution was to
share the episcopal palace with the bishop and acquire various properties
 Avignon: The Capital and Its Population 201

in Avignon’s surroundings and the Comtat Venaissin to accommodate

his large staff. He initiated a beautification and construction campaign,
adding chapels to the cathedral but also installing parochial and conven-
tual churches; in addition, he founded the Chapel of Notre-Dame des
Miracles in the southwestern section of the city.
By 1350 the construction of the new palace had ended. It was a mas-
sive and imposing fortress that ensured defense from any threats outside,
yet it was also an exquisitely decorated, functional palace on the inside.
Built on high terrain, the palace was a place designed to see and be seen.
Following in the footsteps of his predecessor John XXII, Clement VI had
more or less bankrupted his court for the construction of the papal pal-
ace. By the time of Clement VI’s death, the palace had more or less taken
its present-day shape. His successors in turn satisfied themselves with
smaller projects, including the planting of a large garden during Urban
V’s papacy.
From their palace, the popes could gaze on one of Avignon’s greatest
landmarks: its bridge, the Pont d’Avignon or the Pont Saint-Bénézet (a
nickname for Benedict). Local tradition held that God commanded Béné-
zet, a young shepherd of the Vivarais area, to build in Avignon a bridge
by which to cross the turbulent Rhône River. The 915-meter-long bridge,
graced by twenty-four arches, was built in the 1160s and refurbished in
the 1230s. The small Chapel Saint Nicolas, still visible today, adorned its
eastern bank. The bridge became the natural border between France, on
the western bank of the Rhône in Villeneuve-lez-Avignon, and the city of
Avignon on the eastern side. One of the very few spots that crossed the
Rhône, it was a continual point of contention between the papacy and
France.
We learn from the many legal records that this rivalry produced that,
for several decades, the Avignonese controlled the entire length of the
bridge to the doors of Villeneuve and that they actually set their gallows
on the Villeneuve side, at a place named Les fourches de Montault. 14 In
1365, several witnesses came forward to declare that for the previous
sixty or so years they had seen executions there, sometimes with thirty
men hanged at once. 15 Regardless, in 1368 King Charles V declared that
the pope controlled only the portion of the bridge that ran from the walls
of Avignon to the Chapel Saint Nicolas; France controlled the rest. 16 But
Avignon did not rest on this claim. When in 1379 a prisoner of Avignon,
condemned to death, was thrown into the Rhône from a section of the
202 Chapter 5

bridge that belonged to France, Pope Clement VII was forced to acknowl-
edge the deed and renounce any future executions from that spot. 17 In a
gruesome effort at collaboration between the pope and France, one Marie
de Roussiac was condemned by a judge of Villeneuve to be flogged at the
hand of Avignon’s executioner from the gates of Villeneuve across the
bridge, past the chapel, and into Avignon. 18 We unfortunately do not
know what the poor woman did to deserve such a treatment; the only
information given is that she was a widow.
Of course, the discussion over control of the bridge was not simply an
issue of justice; it was first and foremost a question of money. Who was
supposed to receive the tolls and taxes charged on merchandise passing
across the bridge, and who was to pay for the bridge’s maintenance? Its
upkeep was such a pressing concern that many individuals made be-
quests in their wills for the bridge’s “works” or repairs, testimony to the
constant care it required. Among many such examples was Barthelemie
Tortose, who in 1317 left ten sous for the repair of the Pont Saint Bénézet,
and another two sous for the construction of a new bridge whenever it
should need to be built. 19 This preoccupation remained in the minds of
the Avignonese, since in 1386, Jacoba Heymerice left six deniers for the
“works of the bridge.” 20
Before turning to an overview of the city and its parishes and inhabi-
tants, a few words should be said about its protective ramparts. In the
1350s and 1360s, Avignon and the Comtat Venaissin suffered from vari-
ous incursions of mercenary bands, the so-called companies made up of
soldiers of fortune who descended on the south, attracted by the presence
of the pope and his wealth. These were the men who had fought the
battles of the Hundred Years’ War and the Italian Wars of Cardinal Al-
bornoz. In times of peace, when their income disappeared, they made a
living harassing the population at large wherever they suspected an op-
portunity for gain. Some of these mercenaries are well known, such as
John Hawkwood, Arnaud de Cervoles, and Bertrand du Guesclin. Spe-
cialists in plunder and rapine, they devised ingenious ways to ransom
entire cities from their eventual attacks.
The presence of these gangs in Provence alarmed the pope, and Inno-
cent VI with the city council decided that Avignon needed reinforced
protection and the construction of new ramparts. The old thirteenth-
century walls, even if repaired, were deemed insufficient. The city had
simply grown too much throughout the century, and it largely exceeded
 Avignon: The Capital and Its Population 203

the limits of the old walls. The new ramparts, still visible today, counted
some twenty towers and ten gates with their respective drawbridges
when completed.
Pope Innocent VI first suggested constructing the new ramparts, but
he funded the enterprise only partially, and begrudgingly at that. Quick-
ly, communal authorities were pressed to devise a new scheme to pay for
the project and decided to implement a new form of taxation, the gabelles,
levied on wine, merchandise, and salt. These taxes, auctioned (that is,
“farmed”) to the highest bidder for the first time in January 1358, were
collected at the gates of the city from citizens and courtiers (one-third
from citizens and two-thirds from courtiers) as foodstuffs came in. The
gabelles ended up paying not only for the new walls but also for the entire
defense and guard of the city.
The Vatican Archives still preserve some of the registers that detailed
the deposits and expenses incurred for the ramparts’ construction be-
tween roughly 1356 and 1372. 21 According to these registers, on average
between 1366 and 1372 (at the height of construction), some 23,500 florins
were levied per year on the wine gabelle, 7,600 on merchandise, and 3,400
on salt. Only the very wealthy did not pay. Twelve teams of masons and
laborers built the walls within approximately ten years, using large quan-
tities of stone and lime from Villeneuve or Châteauneuf, on the other side
of the Rhône, and wood from Savoy.
According to the registers, work started with trenches dug around a
newly designed periphery that was ample enough to cover large gardens
and edifices such as all the mendicant convents, the Hospital Bernard
Rascas, the Chapel of Notre-Dame des Miracles, and the Convent for
Repentant Prostitutes. Next, they set the gates, and finally, they raised the
walls. The new construction led to a few expropriations; most notably,
the livrée of Cardinal Gui of Boulogne was shorn of a few houses, and a
few inside traders profited from their resale.
If they were never overly concerned, the popes were certainly solici-
tous of Avignon’s future welfare in some of their decisions, especially
when they decided to leave the city. Urban V’s failed return to Rome
lasted from April 30, 1367, to September 27, 1370, while Gregory XI left
on September 13, 1376, with well-known and far-reaching consequences.
The pope of true Avignonese obedience, Clement VII, entered the city on
June 20, 1379. In the case of both Urban and Gregory, their respective
camerlengos followed them back to Rome, but the treasurers, along with
204 Chapter 5

the papal treasury and archives, stayed behind in Avignon. For the Avi-
gnonese these repeated divided administrations afforded a slight hope
that the papacy might someday return, especially with the papal treasury
still housed within their walls. The idea was reinforced by the lingering
presence of certain cardinals. Five of Urban’s cardinals stayed in Avi-
gnon, while six of Gregory’s also remained. They assured a minimum of
continuity in the administration of the Church during the pope’s dis-
placement.
In general, the popes chose talented officers to rule the city in their
absence. Urban V named the capable Philippe de Cabassole, former bish-
op of Cavaillon, as rector of the city and of the Comtat Venaissin. He
eventually left in February 1369 to help the pope in Rome. His position
was not refilled, but Urban asked Jean de Blauzac to deal with all press-
ing matters, like the status of the city’s inhabitants once the papacy left.
When Gregory left, the previous experience of Jean de Blauzac marked
him as an ideal candidate to oversee the city in the pope’s absence. De
Blauzac had experience with both the logistics of curial moves and the
administration of Avignon.
The popes took further care to promote several bulls for Avignon’s
economic survival after their departure. In 1368 Urban allowed the city’s
council to devise the best ways to establish a wool industry in the city,
granting it the right to negotiate financial privileges and stimuli. Gregory
extended these privileges in 1376. Specialists were required to define the
dimensions, quality, and finish of the cloth produced. 22 Likewise, the
popes waived tolls and taxes and allowed the settlement of capable spe-
cialists in the city, the construction of windmills on the Sorgue and Du-
rance Rivers, and the alteration of their riverbeds if need be, as long as it
did not prejudice others.
The pope continued to support the defense of the city in a period
marred by the ravaging by free companies of mercenaries. Both vicars
and captains handled municipal defense by calling on the city’s council
some fifteen to twenty-five times a year to deal with these issues. In
addition, the papacy made sure that the city’s administration functioned
continuously. The mint kept operating, multiple justices still functioned,
and a special commission headed by Jean de Blauzac resolved the issues
created by the papal departure, usually concerning housing assessments
and taxations, as well as the legal status of the population. Urban V
mandated all followers of the Roman court to pay their rents and debts
 Avignon: The Capital and Its Population 205

before they left the city, under the threat of excommunication. 23 Gregory
repeated the injunction. A month or so before his departure, Urban de-
creed that all secular courtiers (omnes curiales) remaining in Avignon after
his departure would be automatically considered citizens. That bull of
March 26, 1367, is well known among historians of Avignon and was
repeated by his successor when he, too, later left. 24 This question of citi-
zenship was so essential to the demographic and economic survival of
the city that it reemerged with the return of Clement VII. In April 1383
and again in May 1388, the pope repeated that even though the court had
returned to Rome, followers of the court in Avignon would be considered
inhabitants and citizens of Avignon. 25
All in all, the popes showed more care for the economic survival of
Avignon when they left than they ever did during their tenure in the city.
In addition to the previous legislation, they facilitated recruitment for
Avignon University by allowing masters and students to receive the rev-
enue of their benefices even when not in residence. This allowed the
maintenance of the university in the city with all the benefits that it
brought. The Avignonese also received the special privilege to trade with
Alexandria in Egypt, to receive wheat from Italy, and to fund the mainte-
nance and construction of more defensive walls and towers. The pope
also financially supported several religious houses and foundations like
the orphan hospitals and the House for Repentant Prostitutes, institu-
tions that indirectly benefited the city’s population.
One of the defining events of the fourteenth century, the Black Death
of 1348, is, rather ironically, poorly documented for Avignon. The attack
of the plague cut short the vibrant era of Clement VI’s papacy. Bernard
Guillemain measured the town’s demographic and economic growth
during roughly 1342–1346 by surveying interventions of the town’s as-
sessors aimed at preventing real estate speculation. 26 These interventions
by papal authorities bear witness to their efforts to tame unruly urban
development based on fraudulent real estate transactions, a trend
brought on by quick economic expansion. But suddenly, a “huge mortal-
ity and pestilence started in September 1347” that halted this growth. 27
Still, the constant flow of human traffic reaching Avignon mitigated the
disease’s effects on the social and economic life of the city. Immigration
spurred by the presence of the court hid some of the consequences of the
first epidemic, as new residents quickly arrived to replace those who had
died in the first wave of the disease.
206 Chapter 5

According to contemporary author Louis Heyligen, several portents

akin to the apocalyptic plagues of the scriptures announced the arrival of
the Black Death: on the first day, it rained frogs, snakes, lizards, and
scorpions; on the second, it thundered and hailed; on the third, fire de-
scended from the sky and burned all. Then, according to the author, the
“calamity” spread quickly via the “stinking breath of the wind” taking
various forms. Sometimes it infected the lungs and breathing, leading to
a rapid death within two days—this form was highly contagious. Alter-
natively, it sometimes killed via the sudden appearance of boils or “bu-
boes” under the armpits or in the groin areas. In each instance, death
followed quickly, leaving people too traumatized or too afraid to care for
the dying and dead. Heyligen offers staggering numbers: seven thousand
houses were emptied of their inhabitants, and no survivors were left in
the suburbs; some eleven thousand were buried in the city’s new ceme-
tery, without counting those interred elsewhere. 28 Heyligen estimates
that between January and March 1348 some 62,000 dead were buried in
Avignon. 29 Bernard Guillemain suggests losses reaching half of the gen-
eral population—about one-fifth of all curial personnel—many of whom,
by escaping the city, minimized their losses.
It is certain that after the first epidemic, even though reduced in popu-
lation size, Avignon still attracted newcomers. The flow of immigrants
and visitors did not dry up, and the economic profile of the city did not
change. Avignon presented the same pattern of occupation, the same
geographical origins of its residents that it did before the epidemic. Taxa-
tion and assignation registers demonstrate the continuing need for shel-
ter and space, in fact, with an increase in the size of the city’s occupied
space after the first epidemic. 30
However, the plague did not stop in 1349; it continued and became
endemic. The renowned physician Guy de Chauliac remarks in his Chi-
rurgia Magna that the plague of 1361 varied from the first outbreak, for
while more commoners and large numbers of women died in 1348, the
wealthy, the nobility, and children were more affected by the latter. 31 By
the 1380s, the plague had become almost continuous, and it was a fright-
ening part of daily life. The remedies proposed by spiritual and medical
healers seem bizarre quackery to us today; they included the usual pre-
scriptions of masses, prayers, penitential processions, fasts, and indul-
gences, together with the more medically effective strategies of sequestra-
tion or flight. Still, some Avignonese had recourse to physicians who
 Avignon: The Capital and Its Population 207

prescribed special diets, fumigations, and cauterizations, which some-

times healed them. 32
In the midst of these decades of plague, the departure of the curia may
also have felt like a catastrophe for some inhabitants. Not all Avignonese
dreaded seeing the papacy leave, however, since its absence freed the
city’s real estate from all the lodging obligations attached to the court’s
presence. Houses were released from the right of livrées, and the chains
and barriers that demarcated the cardinals’ quarters were removed. 33
Some of the freed space was used to enlarge the university quarters.

AVIGNON’S PARISHES AND THEIR SOCIAL TOPOGRAPHY

All in all, regardless of their differences in social composition, Avignon’s

parishes were organized on a similar twin pattern. The wealthy classes
belonged to the “old city” close to its center, within the old ramparts,
while the poorer classes were located in bourgs within the old and newly
constructed walls. The parish of Saint-Étienne could be considered Avi-
gnon’s crown jewel since it held the Rocher des Doms (Rock of the
Domes), with its original episcopal-turned-papal palace, the cathedral
Notre-Dame des Doms, and the bridge. Limited to the north and west by
the rock and the Rhône River, Saint-Étienne never grew like Avignon’s
other parishes. Defended by the rock’s height, it was easily accessible
from the Rhône, and geography dictated its evolution. As the cradle of
Avignon, it quickly became the court’s parish, housing prelates and curi-
al servants while its western boundaries hosted goods and newcomers
arriving down the river or across the bridge. Originally, the parochial
church was adjacent to the cathedral, but in 1316, John XXII took owner-
ship of the church for his private service and transferred the parochial
title to a chapel named after Saint Mary Magdalene. Hence, throughout
the fourteenth century, references to the parish usually named both
saints, as in parrochia Sancti Stephani alias Magdalene. Benedict XII demol-
ished the old church in Saint-Étienne to rebuild a new grand chapel on its
grounds, a sanctuary subsequently incorporated into his palace. Today it
is a repository for the departmental archives of the Vaucluse department.
Avignon’s cathedral grew during the papal sojourn. It was endowed
by several dignitaries who added chapels around its apse. The cathedral
served as the ceremonial hub for the funerals of popes and cardinals and
other high dignitaries. Benedict XII chose to be buried in one of its chap-
208 Chapter 5

els, and his tomb is a beautiful example of the fourteenth-century Gothic

style. The large place (town square) that stands today below the cathedral,
accessible by a flight of stairs, was covered with dwellings in the Middle
Ages. As early as 1316, mercers were allowed to trade there in front of the
bishop’s palace, certainly in recognition of the importance of their trade.
Saint-Étienne was obviously a prime location for the city’s inhabitants,
and its real estate was expensive. The original inhabitants were often
domicelli (sons of nobles), or patricians, who quickly sold or rented their
“mansions” to eminent courtiers. Papal registers show well-known Avi-
gnonese names like Faraud, Flamenc, Matheron, Morières, Hugues, Vay-
ran, and de Sade leasing to cardinals, camerlengos, apostolic nuncios,
auditors of the Chamber, chaplains, scribes, and other curial servants.
Avignon’s traditional elite engaged in brisk commerce, and we find domi-
celli, for example, involved in the rental of mixed-gender bathhouses,
establishments quite often used as brothels. One of the parish streets, the
Grande Fusterie or Fusterie Vieille (named after the wood, fusta, that was
shipped down the Rhône), was the seat of the episcopal tribunal. The
Fusterie was the city sector devoted to temporary lodging. Visitors arriv-
ing by land via the bridge or by river could find a variety of inns and
hostels here, with names like the Inns of the White Horse, the Iron
Crown, the Wood Crown, the hostels Saint-James, the Red Hat, the Pea-
cock, the Lilly, the Saint-George, the Saracen, the Golden Lion, the Black
Peacock, the Griffon, the Star, the Golden Bowl, and Saint-Martin. In our
age of bland uniformity, of the predictable chain names of Marriott and
Holiday Inn, it is quite interesting to read the diverse selection of popular
names for inns preferred by medieval people! Even if highly lucrative,
this location was at high risk because of its proximity to the Rhône and its
violent floods. Finally, close to the Gate Eyguière we find the pope’s
barns (for the court’s cereal, wine, and fodder) and the hospital Bénézet
for poor pilgrims, founded in the twelfth century.
The parish of Saint-Symphorien is the best documented of all Avi-
gnonese parishes, simply because several religious houses within its
bounds left records pertaining to parochial life. 34 Saint-Symphorien’s
Church was already decrepit in the fourteenth century, and a 1374 papal
bull explains that, in a kind of negative competition, neither citizens nor
courtiers would spend anything on its repair, thus leaving the church to
collapse. 35 The bull makes clear that in general, the obligation to maintain
churches fell on parishioners, and their refusal to fulfill their Christian
 Avignon: The Capital and Its Population 209

duty enlightens us on the limits of medieval urban piety. In Avignon,

many parishioners were immigrants who may have felt no particular ties
to their new residence and church. Indeed, their wills frequently show
foreigners leaving bequests to their home parish, evidence how much
more their homelands counted in their hearts than Avignon. Our sources
also note the important economic role that Saint-Symphorien cemetery
played because of its Saturday market. Initially on the cemetery’s out-
skirts, the fresh produce market kept expanding into neighboring streets.
The bustling market testifies how the urgent, basic needs of a living pop-
ulation jostled against the resting place of the dead.
As was quite common in the Middle Ages, the prior of the church of
Saint-Symphorien did not attend to the duties of his benefice directly;
rather, he “leased” the charge to secular priests, who “farmed” the reve-
nue of the church. This meant that priests paid a lump sum to the prior to
minister at the church; over time, they expected to recover their initial
investment directly from the donations of their parishioners. Sometimes
priests were not above suspicion, and we read in the ledgers of the dio-
cese that a certain Hugh, priest of Saint-Symphorien, committed adul-
tery, violence, and robbed a breviary. 36
From the early years of the papacy’s tenure in Avignon, Saint-Sym-
phorien attracted an inexhaustible stream of new parishioners who en-
joyed proximity to the pope’s residence. Curial servants, ambassadors,
high prelates, and jurists displaced native inhabitants, who took advan-
tage of the real estate boom. Not long after the papacy moved to the city,
the curial “nobility” replaced Avignon’s traditional knightly class. By the
time of Urban V and Gregory XI, the parish was still the residence of
many curial servants, bull officers, papal guards, and messengers, but
many had by then spread to the other parishes. In return, artisans and
merchants moved in, and the parish became something of a hub for the
housing industry, with plasterers, carpenters, stonecutters, masons, and
roofers lodging within its limits. Only the jurists seem to have remained
grounded in this parish, maybe because of the closeness of several legal
“schools.”
Because the parochial area circumscribed by the city walls was so
large, it allowed several suburbs to develop within the boundary of Saint-
Symphorien. A well-known Avignonese family, the Cabassole, founded a
few of these suburban areas. In spite of this growth, the size of the parish
allowed for open spaces and gardens, with enough room left in between
210 Chapter 5

to house the pope’s stables and most of the city’s smiths and farriers. The
presence of the fresh produce market on the perimeters of Saint-
Symphorien’s cemetery was a reminder of the parish’s agricultural char-
acter. Aside from its wealth of green space, however, the parish was also
defined by the presence of the important Cistercian Convent of Saint
Catherine.
The convent moved inside the old walls for protection sometime dur-
ing the 1250s and became a haven for the daughters of patricians and
nobles, who in turn endowed the convent with substantial property. It is
remarkable that a single abbess, Aygline de Blauzac, led the house as its
head for some forty years, between 1356 and 1399. Saint Catherine’s nuns
were women of high standing, and one wonders whether their social
station gave them self-confidence to fight abusive neighbors. For several
decades the nuns complained of their lack of privacy and initiated several
procedures. They sued most of their neighbors, who between 1327 and
1405 kept building extremely tall houses that enabled their inhabitants to
look down on the sisters inside their convent. 37 We also find them fight-
ing a procurator who claimed access to their well. A squabble between
neighbors has become a treasure for historians; all in all, Saint-Symphori-
en offers testimony concerning such a representative cross-section of resi-
dents that a prominent historian of papal Avignon has called it “a win-
dow into the pontifical court.” 38
Located to the southeast of Saint-Symphorien, the parish of Saint-
Pierre was a thriving commercial and institutional center, sheltering the
papal justices, the Jewish quarter, the Augustinian convent, the Hospital
Sainte-Marthe (founded by Bernard Rascas and today’s Avignon Univer-
sity), and scores of shops and artisan stalls. It was an important parish,
and its real estate was in high demand.
The collegiate church of Saint-Pierre remains one of Avignon’s most
beautiful monuments to this day, but without a doubt its cemetery at-
tracts the largest share of our notice. Saint-Pierre’s cemetery was not
walled in, and it seems that in a medieval city tight for space, opportu-
nities to make use of the burial grounds were not missed. Already in 1306
a cattle market used the space, and although it was eventually displaced
toward the old ramparts, various commercial activities continued in ad-
vance of Clement V’s entry in 1309. Trading in the cemetery went on for
decades; in fact, a complaint from 1359 states that there were still mer-
chants, public meetings, fights, and all sorts of crimes committed on its
 Avignon: The Capital and Its Population 211

hallowed ground, including fornication, debauchery, adultery, homicide,

and other “abominable” things. 39 Supporting these charges, in 1347
Saint-Michel, another of Avignon’s cemeteries, was described as a bor-
dello. 40
Cemeteries in medieval Avignon were well integrated into the fabric
of urban life. Avignon counted some twenty parochial, conventual, and
hospital cemeteries, a Jewish cemetery, and Champfleury (flower field)
south of the old walls, created to bury the dead of the 1348 plague. Tradi-
tionally, urban cemeteries were open spaces, and as the population grew,
so did the demand for their space. Medieval cemeteries hosted many
economic and social activities, an uncomfortable thought for our modern
Western society, so sheltered from the sight of death. Court records make
mention of the many crimes that took place within their boundaries, but
also of communal meetings like those of the Masters of the Streets, who
met in Saint-Pierre. 41
Saint-Pierre also counted several religious establishments, including
the house of the Hospitallers of Saint-John, the Trinitarian order, and the
mendicant brothers of Saint-Augustine. These three orders were in con-
stant litigation with the parochial canons and priors over their share of
the offerings. The parish expected a share from all donations made to the
various orders established within its boundaries.
It was no coincidence that the Augustinians had settled at the limits of
the city by the old walls, as far away as possible from the parochial
church. The front of their conventual church sheltered an image of the
Virgin (Notre-Dame la Belle) that was quite popular with the Avi-
gnonese, but the building was difficult to access because of the rubbish
that seeped from the neighboring inns, bathhouses, and houses. The
stench was intolerable, and it inconvenienced visitors. To solve the issue,
the Augustinians developed the area commercially. They installed a sub-
floor and merchant stalls that eased access to the church and sanitized the
area. 42 The Augustinians also allowed the meetings of the confraternity
of Notre-Dame la Majour within their walls. Notre-Dame was a kind of
community center and support association for the Italians resident at
Avignon. They met regularly to organize social and religious events. The
association also supported poor pilgrims in their nearby hospital.
The Trinitarian brothers had spiritual charge of the patients of the
Hospital of Sainte-Marthe, founded in 1353 by Bernard Rascas and his
wife. An eminent Avignonese, Rascas issued from the old knightly class
212 Chapter 5

but studied law to become a professor. He was at the time Avignon’s

ambassador to the court of Queen Joanna of Naples and marshal of the
Roman court from 1353 to 1354. Needless to say, as often happened in
large cities, competition was stiff among the many religious orders, and
Sainte-Marthe and the Trinitarians were sued by the parish for a portion
of the offerings they received from pious almsgivers.
The western limits of the parish abutted the Rock and the twelfth-
century communal palace. With the papacy’s arrival, the area became the
residence of vicars, judges, and sergeants of both the Temporal and Mar-
shal Courts, accompanied by their prisons, tribunals, and archives. The
courts explain the location of the pillory and the presence of many notar-
ies in their vicinity. The same neighborhood also sheltered the clothes-
resellers and (hemp) rope-making streets. Hemp dressing was a lucrative
profession, and Avignon’s archives have kept some 184 documents be-
longing to its most famous representative, Jean Teisseire. 43 Married and
widowed three times, two of his wives were daughters of hemp dressers,
evidence of intermarriage within the profession. The children born of his
unions all predeceased him, and in 1384 Teisseire bequeathed all of his
patrimony to the city council. A good portion of Teisseire’s real estate
was located within the parish, counting four houses in front of the church
and cemetery, a house with the inn “of the drink,” three shops (combined
with apartments) near the inn, and seven merchant stalls for vegetables,
bread, and meat. Even if he owned real estate in the other parishes, Teis-
seire invested heavily in Saint-Pierre because of its rich commercial char-
acter.
The parish also accommodated the Payrolerie, named after the caul-
dron/stove makers that also housed the furriers, pitcher makers, clog
makers, and salt workers/merchants. A small square in the latter street
served daily as an open labor fair. One of its main avenues was the Street
of the Spice Merchants (at once spice merchants, wax sellers, and apothe-
caries). The profession actually defined the street quite well, as most of its
residents were Tuscans or Avignonese spicers. Intermarriage homoge-
nized this class, and we often find daughters of spicers marrying other
spice traders or merchants. Exacting in the quality of the service they
provided, in 1376 spicers who met in the fraternity of the spice traders
paid three laborers to sweep the street daily and wash it twice a week.
The Jewish quarter moved to Saint-Pierre in the 1230s. Jews lived in an
enclosed area of some two and a half acres, secured (or rather contained)
 Avignon: The Capital and Its Population 213

by three gates. Avignonese Jews were at the mercy of the popes in resi-
dence there, and their protection fluctuated with the personality of each
pope. Early in his rule, John XXII projected his twin fears of magic and
antipapal conspiracies onto the Jews. He persecuted the Jewish commu-
nities of the Comtat, expelling them in 1322; they were readmitted in the
1340s. Several authors have even linked the pope’s anti-Judaism to
French monarchical policies during the same time. 44 Conversely, Clem-
ent VI showed relative tolerance toward Avignonese Jews during the
horrors of the Black Death and defended their community. Within this
flimsy bubble of papal protection, the Jewish community elected its own
representatives, who dealt with civic and papal authorities and negotiat-
ed the many small taxes imposed on the community.
If Jews were traditionally allowed to engage in lending with interest,
this activity was limited to short-term consumer loans; Italian merchants
controlled the larger international financial market. Jewish pawnbroking
led to reselling and retailing, and Jews specialized in the general resale of
various objects ranging from furniture to cloth. As was the custom gener-
ally in western Europe at that time, Jews were forced to wear a yellow
badge of recognition and forbidden to circulate after sunset and during
Easter week, while Christians were allowed free access to the Jewish
quarter. Christians could possess real estate in the quarter, and so many
did that in 1379 Clement VII granted Avignon’s Jews the freedom to
control their own streets, prohibiting Christians from living in the Jewish
quarter and renting or owning houses. 45 The Jewish community of the
fourteenth century also counted several medical doctors renowned for
their scientific knowledge, two surgeons, and some artisans, including
several weavers, binders, and parchment sellers. 46 In 1358, 215 Jewish
heads of household gave their oath to Pope Innocent VI, suggesting the
presence of a community that must have ranged in the thousands. Their
meeting place, Avignon’s synagogue, was called “the Jews’ School,” and
it supported an almshouse for the poorest members of their community.
The Jewish cemetery was located near the old walls and the Pignotte, the
papal almshouse.
Records of the Temporal Court allow a glimpse into the daily lives of
Avignon’s Jewry. By a large majority, the registers mention civil cases
punishable by fines. For example, Vicia de Chambayrino and Nathan
Roussel attacked and beat the porter Aymon Teissier for no apparent
reason and then paid a sergeant to keep the affair quiet. Abraham Bona-
214 Chapter 5

qui of Saint-Rémy carried a knife into the city, the length of which ex-
ceeded the allowed dimensions; and Donette, wife of Astruguet Sartre,
abused Jeannette la Bugadière with insults (she was accused of saying,
“Tu mentes per la gola,” which translates into “You lie through your face”).
In each case, a fine resolved the issue. Likewise, when the Christian Ray-
mond Chaput fought with the Jew Ferrier Escale, both were fined. But
religious tolerance was limited; Samuel Cohen, a Jew from Aix, was ar-
rested and fined for not wearing his rota (“the wheel badge”) the moment
he arrived in Avignon. Bellicadra, Bonafes of Agde, and Abraham Achier
were also fined for leaving the Jewish quarter after curfew. One of the
biggest court cases on record pitted Aginet, son of Jacob Bendich, against
his brother-in-law Salon Fournier and his brother David, accused of hav-
ing led the wealthy and elderly Jacob to Barcelona to eventually seize his
fortune after his natural death. The case highlights the precarious nature
of medieval Jewish life. Three years after the 1348 arrival of the Black
Death, servants of Cardinal Nicholas de Besse instigated “reprisals”
against Avignon’s Jews, accusing them of causing the epidemic. 47 Several
members of Avignon’s Jewish community escaped to Cataluña; they
eventually returned to Avignon after facing more epidemics, famine, and
reprisals in Iberia. Yet the Jews were but one group in the large parish of
Saint-Pierre in Avignon. From its religious pluralism to its economic and
multiethnic diversity, it is obvious that fourteenth-century Saint-Pierre
was a thriving community that mixed agriculture, commerce, and admin-
istration within the wide ambit of its boundaries.
The parish of Saint-Geniès was by far the most humble of Avignon’s
districts. Little is known about the state of its church during the papal
sojourn except for the familiar squabbles between citizens and courtiers
regarding the funding of its repairs. A 1374 letter of Gregory XI reiterates
that it was the duty of citizens and courtiers to maintain the parochial
church, which the pope labeled as “in ruin.” 48 The parish was largely
dedicated to the leather, skin, and fur industry, and it is highly probable
that the stench produced by the treatment of animal skins made it unde-
sirable as a place of residence. Every Tuesday the parish hosted a leather
market, first in the street Pelleterie, then on the square of the Curaterie
(both names indicate skin or leatherwork). Leatherworkers joined an al-
monry (the fraternity of the leatherworkers) that distributed alms but
also regulated leatherworks, since we find this group suing a worker for
disregarding the city’s weights and measures regulations. 49
 Avignon: The Capital and Its Population 215

The parish counted a large livrée (traditionally labeled de Viviers)

formed by scores of houses. For some thirty years it was assigned to
Cardinal Pierre de Monteruc. His position of vice-chancellor may explain
why several jurists (judges, notaries, or professors of law), protonotaries
of the popes, scribes, and correctors of apostolic letters resided in the
vicinity. Historians have had difficulty identifying a single location for
the papal chancellery, and it is highly probable that papal scribes and
copiers worked from their homes within the parish. 50 A few more curial
servants, such as ushers and sergeants of the pope, seem to have resided
in the parish, but their persistence in declaring their wives as proprietors
suggests that they were scamming the court. Ushers, sergeants, and cur-
riers received a lodging indemnity, and a common real estate scam con-
sisted of entering their wives’ names so that they could claim their in-
demnity while residing someplace else and subletting the tenements.
Saint-Geniès also boasted some well-known residents such as Gandul-
phus de Cremona, master surgeon of the Court of the Marshal. Gandul-
phus was also some sort of coroner or expert witness, since in 1366 he
was paid to examine murder victims for the court. Adding to the diver-
sity of its residents, the parish counted several individuals in the music
trade, including Brocardo di Campanino, a maker of musical instru-
ments, a trumpet maker, and several minstrels.
The horse market was located outside the old walls, and after the
1340s, scores of bourgs grew farther east toward the new walls, amid large
tracts of land occupied by orchards and gardens. All kinds of small arti-
sans moved in, often renting from the more well-to-do who lived in the
city’s center, making Saint-Geniès a true working-class neighborhood.
In contrast to Saint-Geniès, Notre-Dame la Principale was small but
nevertheless rich, the economic hub of the city. Much of its territory
rested within the old walls, and most of its inhabitants were wealthy
enough to afford its high rents. According to tradition, Notre-Dame la
Principale’s church was named after the “church of the prince” (princi-
pale), but we do not know who this prince was. One of the church’s
chapels, Notre-Dame d’Espérance, was dedicated to a miraculous image
located outside the church, facing the street (the image had started bleed-
ing after a drunk threw a rock at it). This wonder-working image became
so popular and received so many rich donations that it sparked a rivalry
between the diocese and the church’s dean, a veritable tug-of-war over its
custody. Eventually, both were required to share the collected revenues it
216 Chapter 5

generated that, incidentally, were so high that they needed to be man-

aged by an Italian broker.
Just as in other parishes, Notre-Dame la Principale’s cemetery again
attracted the attention of the authorities, and in a letter of 1373 the pope
ordered its enclosure, along with the cemetery of Saint-Didier. The pope
lambasted the profane actions, like dicing and fighting to the point of
bloodshed, that took place on public hallowed grounds, and he required
the parishioners to pay for the labor required to properly secure it. 51
The Franciscan Clarisses, or Poor Clares, possessed the sole convent
founded in the parish. Even though small in number, they received prefe-
rential treatment among the city’s religious orders. Ill-acquired goods
that had been confiscated by the Marshal Court reverted to their order,
and the papacy waived their tax payments to the parish. In general, the
Avignon popes showered them with gifts, paying for the construction of
their kitchen and dormitory, granting them indulgences, and bestowing
many presents in the form of clothing and liturgical objects. Lovers of
Petrarch will know that he said he had first met his Laura in this church
of the Franciscan Sisters on Good Friday in 1327, which was (according to
him) exactly twenty-one years to the day before her death.
Notre-Dame was a commercial hub, tightly knit and overcrowded. Its
heart was the Place des Changes, a town square dedicated to banking and
money changing. Of course, Avignon had no stock exchange, but this
square was the closest thing to one. Money changing and banking in
papal Avignon is well documented because, as seen earlier, the papal
administration developed a thriving financial market. Avignon bankers
operated from shops and stalls facing onto the streets and kept a nummu-
larius (a strong room) in their basements. The Italians, who traditionally
dominated the medieval banking industry, lived in this expensive neigh-
borhood. Notre-Dame la Principale was best defined by its population of
Florentines. Well aware of the frequency of rights of reprisal, a form of
economic warfare where authorities imprisoned or confiscated alien per-
sons and merchandise, these wealthy merchants, bankers, and silver and
goldsmiths never assimilated or settled permanently in the area. Special-
ized butcher shops and luxury boutiques were intermixed with the bank-
ing stalls. The parish also sheltered herb and oil markets. Every Tuesday
the leather market operated in this sector until it moved to Saint-Geniès,
where circulation was easier.
 Avignon: The Capital and Its Population 217

The parish of Saint-Didier was heavily remodeled during the papal

sojourn, starting with the 1355 reconstruction of its modest church, ele-
vated to the rank of collegial church by Cardinal Bertrand de Déaulx. It is
still one of Avignon’s prettiest churches. Once inside, one can still visit
the tomb of the Cardini brothers, Florentine master messengers of the
pope and developers of the private courier service of the scarsella.
The parochial cemetery of Saint-Didier has already been mentioned,
along with Notre-Dame la Principale’s, for its many infractions. Still an-
other cemetery is worth noting because it shows an unusual side of char-
ity. In 1341, a naturalized Florentine bought a piece of land in front of the
cemetery of the Hospital Pont-Frac in order to bury the dead of Avi-
gnon’s hospitals, all the deceased, both rich and poor. This was a gener-
ous action, as offering proper burial is one of the Christian works of
mercy. Originally named Saint-Antoine, the cemetery was simultaneous-
ly labeled Saint-Michel after a small chapel of the same name and Pont-
Frac after the hospital. This cemetery gained fame when two recluses (the
recluse of Saint-Michel from 1330 to 1348, and Marie Robine in the 1390s)
lived there, enclosed in an oratory, and when the miracle-working Cardi-
nal Peter of Luxembourg also chose to be buried there as a sign of humil-
ity. Eventually, in the 1380s Pope Clement VII charged the new convents
of the Celestine and Saint-Martial Benedictines to manage the collection
of funds and the various chapels founded on its grounds.
The parish also contained several hospitals extremely active during
the fourteenth century, Pont-Frac and Saint-Antoine, dedicated to the
care of poor courtiers. The Hospital of Pont-Frac had been founded in the
thirteenth century and was made famous by a miracle-producing image
painted on one of its exterior walls. The offerings it produced allowed the
construction of a new building dedicated to the care of orphans and the
poor. Created during the thirteenth century, the hospital of Saint-Antoine
moved with the popes and took care of poor pilgrims and curialists who
followed the popes, including during their Avignon exile. Finally, a
smaller hospital, founded by the Italian confraternity of Notre-Dame la
Majour, also supported poor pilgrims. All in all, these charitable institu-
tions testify to the power the papacy exerted on believers and also their
willingness to accommodate and support the growing number of new-
comers arriving in Avignon. It is truly remarkable that private individu-
als and institutions were so compassionate in the care of these unfortu-
nate or needy persons.
218 Chapter 5

To a certain extent, these hospitals were born from the unique social
mix and mutual solidarity of the parish. Inhabitants of Saint-Didier cov-
ered a wide range of occupations, from nobles to jurists, merchants, bank-
ers, farmers, and skilled artisans (including parchment makers, who took
advantage of the brook running alongside the old walls to clean their
skins). The parish also included large gardens tended by those who lived
in the parish’s bourgs and probably served the needs of the wealthy popu-
lation within the city walls. The parish also comprised many inhabitants
involved in the garment industry, such as tailors, underskirt makers, and
silk workers.
A 1380 tax document offers a quick snapshot of the social composition
of Saint-Didier. According to that source, the wealthiest members, who
were required to pay a defense tax, included a Florentine noble who had
escaped the 1376 expulsion and was worth some 10,000 florins, a black-
smith from Turin worth 6,000 florins, several Italian money changers and
a few Avignonese nobles worth between 1,000 and 2,500 florins, as well
as a few hemp merchants, spicers, and market gardeners, all worth more
than 1,000 florins. 52 This data demonstrates how much and in what ways
papal Avignon allowed commoners the opportunity for relative financial
success and social mobility.
The parish of Saint-Agricol, named after one of the earliest bishops of
the city, boasted Avignon’s oldest church. John XXII cared specifically for
this church, endowing it with revenues, chapels, and bells. 53 By Gregory
XI’s era, however, it was so run down that the pope granted an indul-
gence to those who contributed toward its repair. 54 Within the church
and among the many chapels founded by both popes and parishioners,
the Almshouse of the Petite Fusterie stood out. It was founded by the
carpenters and wood merchants of the city in order to succor the poor
and indigent; it remained throughout the fourteenth century one of Avi-
gnon’s most active confraternities. As with many of the city’s churches,
the bourgeoisie of Avignon often requested to be buried within its walls,
while common folk were buried outside in its cemetery’s tombs or in
mass graves.
The cemetery attached to the church retained portions of its enclosing
walls, but an interesting tradition allowed burials outside the walls as
well, a sign that being “near” consecrated ground was often good enough
for parishioners. An inquest on the matter interviewed scores of inhabi-
tants to establish whether the practice was sound, and as a result, the
 Avignon: The Capital and Its Population 219

body of a suicide victim was disinterred from consecrated ground to be

reburied next to the Durance River. 55 Christian practice did not allow
suicide victims to be buried in consecrated ground.
The Dominican convent, the largest of the religious buildings in Avi-
gnon prior to the completion of the papal palace, also stood in the parish
of Saint-Agricol. Its size made the convent an ideal location for various
grand occasions. In the early fourteenth century, it lodged Pope Clement
V and his court, as well as high-ranking visitors like Queen Dowager
Clemencia of Hungary, widow of Louis X. The convent also served as the
site for grand liturgical ceremonies like the canonization of St. Thomas
Aquinas and the coronations of Benedict XII and Clement VII. The con-
vent was also the site of large processions and sermons that attracted
widespread attendance from the Avignonese populace.
Notre-Dame des Miracles, founded by John XXII, sat directly south of
the convent on a location that was usually attributed to the gallows. The
chapel was built in the 1320s to commemorate a miracle of the Virgin that
freed from the stake a young man accused of lewdness toward his moth-
er. For the medieval Avignonese, such a place of redemptive deliverance
was a worthy and fitting site on which to establish a convent for repen-
tant prostitutes (Repenties). It should be noted that if traditionally the
gallows were located outside the boundaries of cities, pillories were usu-
ally located at their centers. Thus in Avignon, after the foundation of
Notre-Dame des Miracles, the gallows moved from the south to the
north—on the bridge—while the pillory remained in the center, next to
the church of Saint-Pierre. The “theater” of medieval justice moralized
offenses; it is clear that hanging, often reserved for lower classes and
outsiders, polluted the symbolic territory of the city while the pillory,
reserved for citizens and residents, was there to edify its audience and
thus deserved a place within the city.
Saint-Agricol included a few more religious institutions. The Tem-
plars built a church here in the 1280s, the possession of which passed to
the Hospitallers of Saint John after their dissolution by Clement V in
1312. Both orders have unfortunately left few traces of their presence in
Avignon. Female religious orders also found safety in the parish. The
aristocratic Benedictines of Saint Laurent may have been the parish’s
oldest foundation (from about 1100), but the nuns’ observance of their
holy rule was lax enough for Pope Innocent VI to reinforce their enclo-
sure “because of the many disorders and troublesome lives they led
220 Chapter 5

there.” 56 In contrast, the poor and unwelcome Benedictine ladies of No-

tre-Dame des Fours moved inside the city walls only when bands of
mercenaries threatened their safety. Once reinstalled in the parish, a new
menace threatened them in the form of the local rector who claimed all of
their revenues, leaving them destitute. The nuns reached a settlement in
1376 when they agreed to pay a percentage of their income to the parish.
Saint-Agricol was one of Avignon’s largest parishes, divided between
an older section within the old walls that had been long occupied (it was
close to the episcopal/papal palace) and an intermuros section that was
populated largely during the sojourn of the papacy in the city. In the old
section, streets leading to the palace specialized in commerce and luxury
crafts. The meat, tripe, and fish markets were located between the palace
and the church, where sellers rented stalls from wealthy bourgeois. The
northwest section housed a socially diverse group of carpenters and
woodworkers, merchants, nobles, and court officers. The newly devel-
oped intermuros section was also divided between an urbanized northern
area and gardens to the south, where the popes kept their fish ponds. It
should be noted that the fourteenth-century capital of Christianity was a
great consumer of fish, the quintessential fasting food associated with
Lent. Saltwater fishes arrived in plenty from the Mediterranean coast,
while freshwater fishes were transported down the Rhône from Bur-
gundy to fill the pope’s ponds. Finally, Saint-Agricol counted some fif-
teen bourgs, mostly inhabited by the papal court’s civil servants.
The large-scale approach that I have undertaken up to this point does
not preclude a more intimate knowledge of the city’s population. The
Liber Divisionis, a document that lists some 3,800 heads of household who
resided in the city in 1371, offers one of the best social portraits of the city.
In addition to names and legal status (either citizen or courtier), the docu-
ment notes the parish of residence and sometimes an occupation and
town or region of origin—most of the individuals listed are not Avi-
gnonese natives. The document allows the historian to gain a quite accu-
rate picture of the Avignonese population at its second-highest point—
that is, after the initial losses of the 1348 epidemic and after the second
return of the papacy to the city.
In general, immigrants outnumbered citizens in all parishes, with a
few clusters of citizens in the parishes of Saint-Didier, Saint-Symphorien,
and Saint-Pierre. Citizens had lost control of the traditional heart of the
city as delineated by the old walls in the parishes of Saint-Pierre and
 Avignon: The Capital and Its Population 221

Notre-Dame-La-Principale. They faced stiff professional and social com-

petition from newcomers who were employed in the skilled occupations
necessary to the papal court. Rental prices and real estate values in-
creased closer to the palace and decreased toward the bourgs, making it
more expensive for citizens to reside in the more bustling, profitable
areas of Avignon.
According to the Liber Divisionis’s data, the service industries em-
ployed a large percentile of the Avignonese population. Metrics on the
forty or so most common occupations offer the following results: the
garment and shoe industry represented 21 percent of the working popu-
lation expressed in the Liber; occupations related to agriculture employed
19 percent; merchants, 16 percent; preparation and sale of food, 14 per-
cent; hostelry, tavern, and innkeeping, 10 percent; construction and home
equipment, 8 percent; stevedores, 3 percent; barbers, 2 percent; occupa-
tions related to horses, 2 percent; notaries, 2 percent; procurators, 2 per-
cent; and weavers, 1 percent. Interestingly enough, these numbers come
close to statistics related to modern Western economies that employ a
large segment of their working force in the tertiary sector.
In general, occupations correlated with geographical origins. Usually
lower-skilled workers came from a fifty-kilometer radius around Avi-
gnon, while high-skilled occupations, like international commerce and
finance, attracted immigrants from regions as far away as Italy. Geogra-
phy dictated residence in something close to socionational neighbor-
hoods. For example, the southern French lived in Saint-Didier, Saint-
Symphorien, and Saint-Agricol parishes, while Tuscans and northern
Italians resided principally in Notre-Dame-La-Principale, Saint-Pierre,
and Saint-Agricol parishes.
Papal Avignon attracted a large number of immigrants, and while
many came from Italy, a significant portion also hailed from what is
today France’s northeastern region: Toul, Metz, Besançon, the Alps (most
specifically, Gap and Grenoble), the Limousin, and Paris. The document
shows that the immigration radius correlated with occupations. Thus,
workers in the garment and food industries came mainly from the north-
east, and farmers and stevedores from Avignon and its hinterlands. Italy
sent merchants, innkeepers, notaries, and procurators to Avignon, while
construction workers and barbers descended from the mountains. The
weavers, saddlers, and blacksmiths came from the north of France. The
large pool of immigrants stemming from the north and northeast also
222 Chapter 5

explains why it was the place of origin of 49 percent of the bakers, 57

percent of the butchers, 37.5 percent of the carters, 35 percent of the
stonecutters, 40 percent of saddlers, 36 percent of blacksmiths, and 43
percent of pie makers. But this argument fails to explain why the little-
represented southwest was the home of 45 percent of candle makers.
In spite of the influx of northern French immigrants, the Italian com-
munity had the most significant presence in the city, the majority of them
being Florentines and lower numbers coming from Turin, Milan, Lucca,
Asti, Piacenza, Siena, Carmignano, Bologna, Prato, Rome, Pistoia, and
Bergamo. It was a skilled community with merchants, bankers and mon-
ey changers, innkeepers, and haberdashers but also artisans such as car-
penters, waistcoat makers, barbers, armorers, tailors, silversmiths, and
goldsmiths. Most often, men arrived alone, grouped themselves within
certain streets and neighborhoods, and joined religious associations or
confraternities that met to honor a particular saint or a chapel. These
associations also facilitated social networking.
The Italian merchant class rarely intermarried with the Avignonese.
Their social alliances remained Italian. We know, for example, that an
Avignonese Italian, Piero di Lorenzo, found his wife and most important-
ly, her dowry, in Florence. Unfortunately, he was robbed of the latter
when making his way back to Avignon alone. He states, “I went to Flor-
ence to fetch a wife, got a few penny for her [he never names her]; lost
half of it and spent the rest. Between one thing and the other, this has
brought me nothing good.” 57 On the other hand, another Florentine, Tieri
di Benci, married a Florentine and brought her back to Avignon, 58 while
Andrea Rapondi married the daughter of Helena de Plaisance (another
Italian) and received a dowry of 3,000 florins. A merchant’s letter com-
menting on the latter marriage adds, “And this is without counting what
he can expect from the mother,” proof enough that good deals could still
be made in the city. 59
In the Central Middle Ages, confraternities—religious societies de-
voted to prayer, the practice of spiritual discipline, charitable works, and
artistic patronage—were a common feature of urban life, seen every-
where in the large trading centers of Europe and offering adherents mate-
rial and spiritual protection, support, social networks, and communica-
tion. In papal Avignon, their membership largely consisted of foreigners.
For example, the large confraternity of Notre-Dame la Majour integrated
Italian immigrants into the city by facilitating networking horizontally
 Avignon: The Capital and Its Population 223

with their native and foreign peers and vertically with their socially
superior brothers who remained at the court, such as curial servants and
cardinals. Later in the century the records mention a confraternity of
Saint John the Baptist strictly for Florentines, which acted as a lobby to
the papacy and king of France.
Notre-Dame la Majour was a confraternity for the merchants, follow-
ers of the Roman curia (the curiam romanam sequentes) who were purvey-
ors of the many services needed by the papal court. Proof of its social
utility, most Italians who arrived in the city joined its ranks immediately.
When, for example, Matteo Benini arrived in Avignon in 1360, he joined
the association. He left soon afterward for Arles, where he became a
trading partner of the Avignonese Florentines. Still, even though in Arles,
he remained a member of the organization and retained his membership
as long as he remained active in his trade. Maybe Notre-Dame la Majour
served as a reference for good social and commercial practices. Ronald
Weissman explains that “in a society where patronage, recommendation,
and personal ties were of primary importance, the confraternity was a
vehicle for expanding personal networks and gaining access to patronage
chains throughout the city and, thus, for exercising patronage and orga-
nizing factions on a citywide . . . basis.” 60
Members of Notre-Dame met periodically and practiced what can be
loosely defined as the seven corporal and spiritual works of mercy. They
attended Mass twice per month, recited the Our Father and Hail Mary
daily, distributed alms regularly, buried their dead, and offered prayer
for the souls in Purgatory. According to the association’s statutes, mem-
bers had to lead respectable lives, avoid blasphemy, murder, and concu-
bines, and keep the peace. In Avignon, the association funded two hospi-
tals for poor pilgrims (the Lombards’ Hospital and the Hospital of Notre-
Dame), evidence again that pilgrims massed to the city.
Immigration inevitably affects the position of women in any particular
society, and in papal Avignon, a woman’s status was to some extent
dictated by the demographic evolution of the city. The traditional weight
of that society’s expectations that a woman would either marry or retire
to a cloister (and in either event largely disappear) was lighter in the face
of immigration and the unusually high rates of death and disease in that
era. The large extended family was scarce in this unusual urban setting;
most families were small and often went extinct after a couple of genera-
tions. The number of testamentary bequests that ended up in the posses-
224 Chapter 5

sion of charitable institutions is the best evidence for the testators’ lack of
successors. Legally, small families favored women’s patrimonial accumu-
lation, and with these legal rights they became more socially visible.
Women inherited houses, lands, shops, and cash, and they could official-
ly assume the title of head of household—since often no men were left to
claim it. The traditional exclusion of dowered daughters from any rights
of succession often vanished, and women were designated inheritors in
more than 24 percent of the wills of the period.
During the fourteenth century, widows and older daughters often
bypassed their alieni juris status (this was, under Roman law, their inca-
pacity to act legally without male guardianship) and acted in legal mat-
ters with or without the authorization of a guardian. Records also men-
tion married women acting with or without their husband’s permission.
Our sources also indicate that some women worked, mainly in the
lodging industry as innkeepers or hoteliers; they sold foodstuffs and un-
specified articles; they manufactured and sold textiles, shoes, and cloth-
ing. And a few Avignonese women were unskilled laborers or skilled
artisans. Of course, the presence of the court and masses of immigrants,
including large numbers of unmarried men, also led to the presence of a
substantial number of prostitutes in the city. Brothels spread throughout
Avignon, often near entrance gates and public “baths,” with an area spe-
cialized in the sex trade in the “New Bourg,” next to the Franciscans.
Prostitutes were tolerated as an evil necessary in order to avoid the great-
er evils that would ensue without them. Males without access to sex were
assumed to be by nature sexually aggressive, inclined to rape, incest, and
sodomy. But we must take care in considering the many hidden assump-
tions behind these conclusions.
When discussing women, Avignonese records usually identify them
as mothers, wives, or daughters. A lack of affiliation identifiers or of titles
specifying the men to whom they were related often indicates a single
person. By this standard, papal Avignon held a large percentage of single
women in its population. A generation of historians assumed that when
medieval women were identified as single, their lack of affiliation indi-
cated vagrancy and prostitution. Granted, the large number of unmarried
men living in Avignon offered a ready clientele; nevertheless, these wom-
en may still have been employed in some form of ancillary services. They
could have been maids or servants rather than career prostitutes, strictly
speaking. The frequent mention of “maids” (ancillae) in single men’s tes-
 Avignon: The Capital and Its Population 225

taments points to this, even if at times these maids could also have been
their concubines.
Yet the large number of single women in Avignon’s records does not
necessarily mean that prostitution was rampant and endemic throughout
the city; on the contrary, other sources lead us to think it was controlled
and regulated. Prostitutes were not overwhelmingly stigmatized, since a
few of them owned property. A 1366–1368 tabulation of leases held by
the bishop of Avignon names “public women” who owned properties
under the episcopal lordship: Mingette of Narbonne, Jeanette of Mers,
alias of Lorraine, and Marguerite La Porcelude owned tenements in the
bourg of Guimet Abbert. Mingette of Narbonne, a “common woman,”
paid nine sous every Easter for a house neighboring the two houses of the
said Jean Tesseire, the public street, and the house of Simonette, wife of
William the Taylor. Her neighbor was Jeanette of Mers, another “com-
mon and public woman” who held a house that also neighbored with the
public street and the houses of Peter Barneri of Montpellier and Nicholas
Raymond. She paid ten sous at Easter. In the same neighborhood, Mar-
guerite La Porcelude (alias De La Casserra) paid six sous and nine de-
niers for her house. 61
Statistical data on medieval Avignon’s labor force shows that single
women were far more active in their communities than married women,
and often they practiced a wider range of activities which both required
better skills and offered better compensation. In the absence of wide net-
works of kinship, women had to work to survive, and spinsterhood and
widowhood sometimes favored women’s social and occupational gains.
Like any capital bustling with people, medieval Avignon posed as
many dangers as it did opportunities. Jacques Chiffoleau, in his study of
criminality, considers certain districts of the city more prone to violence
than others. 62 His data shows that most criminals condemned by the
Temporal Court were not transients but actually integrated in the city’s
labor force and resided on the margins of the city. They lived in the new,
affordable bourgs that developed outside the twelfth-century town, espe-
cially close to the Gates of Saint-Michel, Imbert, and Lazare. In 1387, for a
total of 174 criminals, only 33 lived within the walls; the rest were in the
bourgs. Chiffoleau argues for a spatial and social segregation that pinned
the social classes perceived to be dangerous to the good order of the city
into the new neighborhoods near the inns, bordellos, and taverns that
skirted the old gates close to the mendicant orders.
226 Chapter 5

As often is the case, close quarters incited violence. Noise, such as the
music of minstrels going late into the night, led to verbal jousting, aggres-
sion, and physical violence. Study of court records shows that in Avignon
violent incidents were, in the majority of cases, spontaneous acts linked
to domestic disputes, gambling, and drinking. Homes, brothels, taverns,
and the streets themselves were the main sites of this violence. People
cursed each other for what seem to the modern reader trivial matters and
then punched and kicked if they did not also unsheathe their knives.
Violence was random and impulsive, and most crimes were not premedi-
tated; death usually happened by accident when a sword or knife was
drawn too quickly. The Italians also brought their crimes of vengeance or
“honor” with them, and we find in Datini’s letters many examples of
Florentines arriving in Avignon to avenge the death of a relative, some-
times targeting people who may have been related by blood to the guilty
party but not at all related to the affair in question. As in any case of
vendetta, vengeance took years to be appeased. On October 30, 1399,
Tieri di Benci wrote to Francesco Datini that three days earlier, the streets
of Avignon witnessed a vendetta. Figlono, son of Nicolo Alamani, ar-
rived in Avignon from Florence to avenge the death of his brother, killed
four years earlier by the son of Jacopo Vivoli. Vivoli’s son was caught on
his doorstep and was struck twelve times; his sister was also wounded.
His deed accomplished, Figlono had dinner and found refuge at the pal-
ace of the cardinal of Florence, Piero Corsini. 63
As a deterrent to these kinds of crimes, justice was served in the form
of fines, maimings, and executions, always carried out publicly. Records
at the municipal archives show that the executioner (carnifex, or “butch-
er”) threw prisoners from the bridge down into the Rhône. 64 Between
June 1328 and February 1329, records of the Temporal Court show that
the carnifex performed sentences that called for the cutting of hands, feet,
tongues, and ears. 65 In addition, decrees were enacted in order to contain
what society thought were instigating conditions for crime: open spaces.
Medieval authorities linked openness to gambling, drinking, prostitu-
tion, and circulation at night. Hence, these “deviations” were institution-
alized within the closed walls of inns and bordellos as curfews limited
circulation and all open spaces were walled in. Most of these regulations
failed. According to papal letters, even enclosed monks gambled. 66 Gam-
bling prohibitions were readily ignored, even when linked directly to the
 Avignon: The Capital and Its Population 227

sins of blasphemy and lust, 67 and no better proof can be offered of their
failure than the continual repetition of such crimes across the centuries. 68
Xenophobia was another marker of the city’s violence. It was closely
linked to immigration and the perception of vagrancy. Avignon received
immigrants and visitors from a large portion of Europe. People came for
specific callings or simply with the hope of finding a job. In spite of this
diversity, parochialism was prevalent. Marseillais despised Normans,
Avignonnais hated Florentines, and so on. Language barriers and a gen-
eral lack of communication may have been at the root of the situation, but
even in an urban setting, transients were perceived as threats to local
peace. The fear of robbery, the most prevalent crime of the era, also
added to general feelings of insecurity.
The papal city also offered a form of class warfare mixed with the
presence of what may be described as “clerical gangs.” Ecclesiastics of
high rank, such as abbots, bishops, and cardinals, were patrons of a wide
network of clients who often lived within their quarters (livrées) and
caused trouble with other grandees’ clients or the natives. For example, in
1331 a fight erupted between the “people” of the abbot of Saint-Victor
and those of the bishop of Castres, and Catalan knights caused the death
of one of them. The reason for the altercation epitomizes Avignon’s situa-
tion in the fourteenth century. The Catalans had found rooms in an inn
close to the abbot’s and bishop’s quarters. The smoke emanating from the
inn’s kitchen inconvenienced the southern French who, through a hole in
the wall, “tainted” the roasting meat. The Catalans retaliated with a fight.
The offense that started the whole affair is not described. Was it the smell
or smoke emanating from the roasting meat, fear of fire, a dislike of
foreigners, or lack of communication? 69 As this example demonstrates,
the presence of armed guards, those knights attached to ecclesiastics’
households, may have added an element of instability in the city. They
were men of war, quick to start a fight or draw their weapons, but evi-
dence shows that there was little correlation between, for example, the
cardinals’ livrées and criminality. Data provided by Chiffoleau for crimi-
nals’ residences in 1387, when correlated to maps of bourgs and livrées,
suggests no specific results that would indicate such a connection. 70 The
only trait that emerges is that certain bourgs’ residents received the most
sentences, with Saint-Pierre ranking first with forty, Saint-Didier second
with thirty-one, and Saint-Agricol third with twenty-six convicts.
228 Chapter 5

TO LIVE IN A MEDIEVAL CAPITAL CITY

Regardless of the information available to us, it remains difficult to per-

ceive what life was like for the common people of Avignon. Historians
can only imagine and infer from whatever documentation is left. In addi-
tion to the multitude of services that an urban setting offered, there is no
doubt that Avignon must have been a noisy, vibrant city with many
things to see and experience. A capital city offered entertainment that
country folks and the residents of other cities rarely saw, like jousting,
minstrel shows, ceremonial entries, grand funerals, and coronations. Two
papal letters, respectively dated from 1328 and 1348, prohibit tourna-
ments and jousting in the city and its suburbs, evidence enough that they
took place. 71
Many guests visited the papal court during its Avignonese sojourn,
and their entries offered a grand spectacle for the populace. For example,
Pope Urban V received the king of France John the Good in November
1362, followed a few days later by the Count of Savoy and the king of
Cyprus. In 1363 Waldemar, king of Denmark, arrived, as did the Holy
Roman emperor Charles IV. The Duke of Anjou, second son of John the
Good, visited Avignon in December 1364 and July 1366, the Duke of
Berry in May–June 1365, and the Duchess of Anjou in January 1366. For
each grandee, the ceremony of entry began a few miles outside the city so
that the entire region, attracted by the pomp and circumstance, profited
from the occasion. 72
Various civic religious organizations celebrated feast days throughout
each year, and Avignon must have witnessed many grand liturgical pa-
rades and processions. For example, the confraternity of Notre-Dame la
Majour participated in the procession of the Assumption every August.
On August 15 at six o’clock, the brothers paraded throughout the city
accompanied by civic authorities. They always stopped at the great court-
yard of the palace, where they received the pontiff’s benediction.
The pope’s movements were also a motive for ceremonies and mone-
tary gain. Popes traveled in cortege and usually rode under a canopy
with their banner displayed. An almoner throwing coins to spectators
always accompanied them, as tradition dictated. Of course, the funerals
and elections of new popes were also cause for revelry, looting, and
violence. On the death of popes, mobs sacked the property of the de-
ceased and of any potential candidates to the papacy. The coronation
 Avignon: The Capital and Its Population 229

ceremonies of a pope (and of other claimants) offered pomp, pageantry,

and more alms. During the coronation of Clement VI on the Sunday of
Pentecost 1342, the most ostentatious of the Avignon popes proceeded
through the town with pennons, banners, a menagerie, and attendants
who sprinkled pennies on the crowd like holy water. At his death, the
papal almshouse distributed 400 livres to the poor of the city; an addi-
tional 40 livres were distributed to onlookers during the funeral cortege.
The pope also bequeathed 400 florins to the mendicants of Avignon, 300
florins to female religious orders, and 425 florins to local hospitals. 73
We can also assume that, like most large medieval cities, Avignon was
unhygienic and polluted. When Petrarch complained about the stench of
the city, he was not only using a rhetorical artifice, he was telling the
truth. Raymond Chalmel, a doctor who wrote a treatise on the plague,
argues that poor hygiene in Avignon and in Paris influenced the propa-
gation of the epidemic. 74 Louis Heyligen, a Flemish cleric who resided in
Avignon in 1348, describes the infection that spread “by means of the
stinking breath of the wind,” adding that “sea fish are now not generally
eaten, men holding that they have been infected by the infected air.” 75
Masters of the Streets were engaged to try to organize and improve hy-
giene, traffic, and circulation, but the growing number of inhabitants
made their tasks nearly impossible. Circulation throughout the city was
difficult, forcing the Temporal Court in 1377 to stop carters from remain-
ing on their mounts while traversing the city. This precaution was in-
tended to slow down their movements within the city and the dangers
they presented to pedestrians. This legislation was unfair, however, since
courtiers escaped the jurisdiction of the temporal court and could indeed
ride at their convenience.
Papal Avignon did not invent urban public administration—what is
called in French l’hygiène des rues (street hygiene). As early as 1233 an
officer existed in Rome to inspect and maintain its streets, fountains,
aqueducts, and sewers. 76 Similarly, in thirteenth-century Avignon, three
officers were in charge of the streets’ cleanliness: they prohibited littering
and throwing any kind of used water into the street and disposing of
dead animals and other carcasses in any locations other than the Rhône
and Durance rivers. They forbade diverting the course of public water
ditches, mandated that outhouses be carefully enclosed, and asked the
public not to use public roads as latrines. 77 Statute forty, entitled “of not
purging one’s belly in the street,” reminded residents that no men or
230 Chapter 5

women older than twelve and fourteen could “purge” themselves into
the street, gardens, or vineyards that carried fruits. 78 Emptying oneself
was allowed only in the ditches of the city. Human manure (fimoratium)
could not be stored in homes nor piled in narrow public streets nor any
confined space made out of walls or hedges, and no one was allowed to
use an already existing pile for “purging their bellies” or to add anything
to an existing pile that already stank. 79
One of the basic principles of medieval hygiene linked noxious smells
with corruption and disease. 80 Hence, many regulations tried to entice
citizens to keep the streets clean, and often Avignonese authorities led
the way. The mandats de gabelles, or receipts of expenses paid by the
treasurers on the gabelles taxes on wine and merchandise, show that in
October 1376 the gabelle treasurers paid for the cleaning (purgacione) of the
street located between the back of the palace and the court of the Marshal
of Justice. It required the work of two carts, two horses, and three men for
three days. 81
As seen previously, the frequent grand ceremonies that took place in
the city offered a hidden advantage to life in Avignon: the cleaning and
rehabilitation of certain streets and quarters that were on the routes of
festivities. The more visitors came, the cleaner Avignon got. For example,
a 1380 payment warrant indicates that the drawbridge of the Gate of
Saint James was repaired, this time for the exit of the Duke of Anjou. The
warrant insists that the bridge was in such poor condition that no animal
could cross it. 82 Extant receipts saved from the 1389 visit of the king of
France display the works initiated for the visit of a magnate. The bridge
was repaired and covered with mulch; torches lit the town, streets were
paved and dressed with colorful banners and cloths, and town magis-
trates, sergeants, and councilmen received new clothes. 83 In December,
repairs and cleaning were done on the Rue Carreterie in front of the
Augustinian church and the Chapel of Notre-Dame la Belle and then
again on the street in the back of the Augustinian church. The mandats
also paid for paving the front of the Augustinian church and chapel of
Notre-Dame la Belle. 84 This area had been a sore spot for a long time. It
existed as of 1328, when a certain Petrus de Mascone was whipped for
having stolen a large quantity of candles burning in front of the image in
the Chapel of Notre-Dame la Belle. 85 In March 1390 the port of the Rhône
and other places near it were dredged. The city paid seventy men to clean
the Rue Palafrenerie. Trash was in such quantity that merchants could
 Avignon: The Capital and Its Population 231

not unload their wood. 86 Cleaning projects like this one could be of large
scale. In June 1406 the waters of the Sorgue were diverted so that the
riverbed could be dredged, forcing an anonymous chronicler to state that
the Sorgue had never been so beautiful. The work lasted two months. 87
It seems that in many cases, paving streets was often considered a
better option than systematically draining them. We must assume that
paving also allowed cart traffic and circulation in general to flow more
smoothly. The Mandats de Gabelles offer several examples. In March 1376
the treasurer paid the laborers who had covered the bridge of the Rhône
with some sort of ballast. 88 A year later, in September 1377, the treasurer
released funds for paving the bridge (the arches of the bridge were also
repaired and marked with the pope’s coat of arms). 89 In 1388 the Rue
Carreterie was paved. 90 In June 1390 the treasurers paid for paving the
lissiis (lices, the walkway that followed the ramparts) toward the Moulin
de Pertus, the gate of Aquerie, the Place Saint-Didier, and the Place des
Corps-Saint.
If draining was not done systematically, controlling the flow of Avi-
gnon’s three rivers (the Rhône, Durance, and Sorgue) was considered. In
March 1376, the city council ordered the construction of a protecting
ditch to divert the flow of the Durance as a means of impeding floodwa-
ters. Floods plagued Avignon throughout the latter part of the fourteenth
century. We find records of flooding in 1353, 1358, 1362, and then eight
more times in the next twenty years, counting 1384, 1396, 1408, and
1433. 91 In October 1376, the treasurer paid to repair the fishpond of the
pope in order to prevent water from draining into the new ditches that
ran along the ramparts. 92
The gabelles registers also demonstrate that not only the palace but
also the city of Avignon contained sewers (aygueria seu conductus), ves-
tiges of ancient Roman construction. They were roughly one meter by
one meter and emptied into the Rhône. In 1382, the treasurer paid work-
ers to purge sewers next to the Tower of Saint-Jacques, next to the resi-
dence of the cardinal of Urgell, and next to the Tower of Mal-Conseil. In
1386, a grid was placed on a sewer next to the pope’s attic and the Sewers
of the Stew. The chronicle of Martin de Alpartil, a secretary of Pope
Benedict XIII who recounted the siege of the palace during the 1398 sub-
traction of obedience during the Great Western Schism, records the failed
attempt by mercenaries to enter the palace via its kitchen sewers. The
description of the events indicates that besiegers cleaned the sewer that
232 Chapter 5

served the common kitchen and certain other parts of the palace that ran
through a stone column into the garden. 93 The system had the advantage
of both irrigating and fertilizing the garden. In any case, their attempt at
penetrating the palace failed when guards sounded the alarm as they
reached the kitchen and captured the mercenaries.
It is evident that the medieval Rhône and Durance Rivers were as
polluted as, maybe even more than, they are today. Indirect evidence for
their foul state appears in the canonization procedure of Saint Peter of
Luxembourg. Many depositions describe rescue and reanimation after
individuals (adults and children) had drowned in either the Durance or
Rhône. In one case, Bertrand Calneti, a salt merchant, spent up to an hour
under the Rhône’s waters. Knowing how to swim, in his own words, “as
well as a stone,” he ingurgitated much water but managed to survive, by
miracle, without getting sick. Still, for eight days he felt “the stench of the
Rhône on and in him.” 94 I would argue that modern-day Avignon, dur-
ing its summer festival, brings us closest to the crowds, smells, and
sounds of the medieval city.
Finally, another pressing issue remained for medieval Avignon: the
pervasiveness of urban fires. Fires were even more devastating in an age
that lacked any efficient means of extinguishing them, so strict regula-
tions attempted to prevent them. Citizens were asked to keep their chim-
neys clean, to cover their hearths, and to keep plenty of water on hand.
Storing straw and hay within the walls of the city was also forbidden. 95
Once fires started, the local parish bell rang to alert certain corporations
that held a monopoly on firefighting: the porters, carpenters, plasterers,
well clearers, and delegates of the mendicant orders. 96 No one else was
supposed to help with dousing the fire, with the exception of the twenty-
four nearest relatives and neighbors of the fire victims. Vicars, sergeants,
and the city’s militia secured order and safety. 97 A miracle from Peter of
Luxembourg describes a huge fire in Avignon at the hostellaria ad signum
leonis (Inn at the sign of the lion) in the Grande Fusterie. The fire started
during the night by accident and, fueled by a strong mistral wind, con-
sumed everything, including the house and five horses. It became un-
stoppable. The owner of the house, Richardona de Carmiliano, a female
spice merchant and innkeeper, prayed to the cardinal of Luxembourg
asking for his help in stopping the wind and fire; and he did, in her own
words, “as if all the water of Rhône had been thrown on it.” 98 One of the
most terrible Avignonese fires, however, was one that destroyed a good
 Avignon: The Capital and Its Population 233

section of the papal palace on May 7, 1413. According to a chronicler, the

fire burned the consistory, great kitchen, and wine cellar. 99
At another canonization, more evidence was offered of the compelling
need for an adequate alarm system. Pons Joannis was a fishmonger
whose lips were so swollen that he had not been able to eat for eight
days. He was miserable and promised Peter of Luxembourg that he
would visit his tomb naked and as a penitent if the cardinal fulfilled his
wish. Joannis fell asleep and had a compelling dream in which the cardi-
nal asked him to tell the Avignonnese to build a bell tower over his tomb,
in which tower they would put a big bell, nice and clear, that would ring
for the elevation (offertory) but also sound the alarm for storms, thunder,
and lightning (another cause of fires) to save the “fruits of the land.” 100
We will never know how happy Avignon’s residents were compared
with other people of the late Middle Ages, but historians can ascertain
that they lived and died no worse than most medieval urban dwellers.
Unlike many other Europeans of the age, however, the Avignonese had
access to more goods, charitable help, and services. After the papacy
returned to Rome, Avignon remained for a few decades a vibrant cultural
center and a relatively comfortable place to live, within the parameters
set by the Middle Ages, of course. As Ronald Musto states so eloquently,
But nothing compared to its [Avignon] court spectacles, its lavish
feasts, or the annual awarding of the Golden Rose. This prize—worth
over 100 florins and created by Tuscan craftsmen from sapphire, pearl,
garnet, and gold—was bestowed by the pope on the fourth Sunday of
Lent to the prince of the pope’s choosing and would often climax the
arrival of a great, and politically important, visitor. It was, in 1368, even
granted to a woman, Queen Giovanna I of Naples. Yet cultural life in
this papal city naturally went deeper than spectacle and ceremony. The
home of some of the brightest and most influential men in Europe, the
Curia was a center of intellectual creativity and exchange: in law and
theology for the most part, but from an early date the new international
humanism pioneered by Petrarch. Poetry, letter writing, history, and
classical literature found avid supporters. While there is no record of
grammar schools in Avignon, the substantial number of educated
heads of households—lawyers, notaries, advocates, diplomats, and
others of every type—made the presence of several schools indispens-
able. A university had existed since 1303, and this soon specialized in
what best served the needs of the Avignon papacy: law. 101
234 Chapter 5

NOTES

1. The walls enclosed the ancient episcopal city and were composed of a double
stockade complemented by ditches and a canal that ran along its route.
2. The petition is transcribed by Anne-Marie Hayez in “Le conseil de la ville sup-
plie la reine Jeanne de ne pas vendre Avignon,” in Avignon au moyen âge: Textes et
documents (Avignon: Aubanel, 1988), 97–102.
3. The document is discussed by Bernard Guillemain, La cour pontificale d’Avignon:
Étude d’une société (Paris: de Boccard, 1962), 628–642, and Anne-Marie Hayez, “Citoy-
ens et notables Avignonnais au milieu du XIVe siècle,” Bulletin philologique et historique
du comité des travaux historiques (1982–1984): 199–219.
4. Urbain V, Ut per litteras apostolicas, no. 005447 (May 5, 1363). This letter states
that Urban followed in the footsteps of Innocent VI, who had renewed the 1251 con-
ventions on March 28, 1358, a few days before the oath of allegiance of the city to its
pope.
5. Urbain V, Ut per litteras apostolicas, no. 019710 (March 26, 1367). Urban specified
that he was approving this request from the community of Avignon to allow for its
defense. The court’s departure depleted its population, and the city needed men for its
defense. Urban also proceeded to remove Avignonese citizens from external jurisdic-
tion; see Urbain V, Ut per litteras apostolicas, nos. 019711 and 019712.
6. This bull is transcribed by Anne-Marie Hayez, Jeanine Mathieu, and Marie-
France Yvan in Grégoire XI, Ut per litteras apostolicas, no. 026855; and Marc Dykmans,
“La fin du séjour des papes en Avignon d’après quelques documents inèdits sur les
habitations,” Mémoires de l’academie de Vaucluse 4 (1983): 45–46.
7. Joseph Girard and Pierre Pansier, La cour temporelle d’Avignon au XIVme et XVme
siècles (Paris: Champion, 1909), 150.
8. Born into a humble background in Prato, Italy, fifteen-year-old Francesco di
Marco Datini left his hometown for Avignon sometime around 1335. He made a for-
tune in trading (mainly weapons) and returned to Tuscany in December 1382, a very
rich and influential man. He died on August 16, 1410.
9. Gene Brucker, Two Memoirs of Renaissance Florence: The Diaries of Buonaccorso Pitti
and Gregorio Dati (New York: Harper & Row, 1967), 25.
10. Arturo Segre, “I dispacci di Christoforo da Piacenza, procuratore mantuano alla
corte pontificia,” Archivio Storico Italiano 43 (1909): 86.
11. Richard C. Trexler, The Spiritual Power: Republican Florence under Interdict (Lei-
den: Brill, 1974), 46 (my translation).
12. Trexler, The Spiritual Power, 51–52.
13. Jacques Chiffoleau, Les justices du pape (Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne, 1984),
235.
14. See, for example, ADV, Archives communales d’Avignon, FF4, 5, 21, and 25–26.
15. ADV, Archives communales d’Avignon, boîte 64, no. 2205.
16. ADV, Archives communales d’Avignon, boîte 68, no. 2230.
17. ADV, Archives communales d’Avignon, boîte 68, no. 2231.
18. ADV, Archives communales d’Avignon, boîte 68, no. 2233.
19. September 16, 1317, ADV, H Sainte Praxède 52, no. 39.
20. December 3, 1386, ADV, H Cordeliers 14, no. 15.
21. Archivio Segreto Vaticano (henceforth ASV), Collectoriae, ff. 47–49.
 Avignon: The Capital and Its Population 235

22. See Michel Hayez, “Éviter la recession économique, souci des papes Urbain V et
Grégoire XI, au départ d’Avignon,” in Avignon au moyen âge: Textes et documents (Avi-
gnon: Aubanel, 1988), 149–152, for a French translation of these bulls.
23. Urbain V, Ut per litteras apostolicas, no. 19711 (March 26, 1367); no. 019752 (April
10, 1367).
24. It is partially quoted in Guillemain, La cour pontificale, 653 n. 140. Guillemain
states that the pope ordered this radical solution because there were not enough citi-
zens for the defense of the city. This seems to be an exaggeration since mercenaries
were in charge of the defense of the town. See Anne-Marie Hayez, “Travaux à
l’enceinte d’Avignon sous les pontificats d’Urbain V et de Gregoire XI,” Actes du
101ème congrès national des sociétés savantes (Paris, 1978), 195; and Guillemain, La cour
pontificale, 619–625. On the delicate issue of citizens and followers of the Roman court,
see Joëlle Rollo-Koster, The People of Curial Avignon: A Critical Edition of the Liber Divi-
sionis and the Matriculae of Notre-Dame la Majour (Lampeter, GB, and Lewiston, NY:
Edwin Mellen, 2009).
25. ADV, Archives communales d’Avignon, Boîte Pintat 18, nos. 575, 582.
26. Guillemain, La cour pontificale, 555.
27. Rosemary Horrox, The Black Death (Manchester: Manchester University Press,
1994), 41.
28. Horrox, The Black Death, 42–43. The disease attacked humans and also animals.
A writer of the life of Clement VI mentions that dogs, cats, roosters, chickens, and all
kinds of animals also died during the plague; see Jacques Chiffoleau, La comptabilité de
l’au-delà: Les hommes, la mort et la religion dans la région d’Avignon à la fin du Moyen Age
(vers 1320–vers 1480) (Rome: École française de Rome, 1980), 95–101.
29. Horrox, The Black Death, 44.
30. Guillemain, La cour pontificale, 558–559.
31. Guy de Chauliac, La grande chirurgie, ed. E. Nicaise (Paris: Alcan, 1890), 173.
32. Chiffoleau, La comptabilité de l’au-delà, 95–101.
33. ADV, Archives communales d’Avignon, Boîte Pintat 77, no. 2251, and Pierre Pan-
sier, “Annales Avignonnaises de 1370–1382 d’après le livre des mandats de la ga-
belle,” Annales d’Avignon et du Comtat Venaissin 3 (1914–1915): 36–37.
34. They were the Chapels of Saint Perpetua, Notre-Dame de Fenouillet, and Sainte-
Croix, the highly endowed Cistercian convent of Saint-Catherine, and the convent of
the Carmelites.
35. ASV, Registra Avenionensia (henceforth Reg. Aven.), 193, f. 304.
36. ADV, Archives communales d’Avignon, G9, F 129.
37. ADV, H Sainte Catherine, 30, 52, 54.
38. The original reads “Une vitrine de la cour pontificale,” in Anne-Marie Hayez,
“La paroisse Saint-Symphorien au temps des papes d’Avignon,” Annuaire de la Société
des amis du Palais des papes et des monuments d’Avignon 74 (1997): 50.
39. See ADV, Archives communales d’Avignon, 9G7, 22, 23, 24, 28, and 34.
40. See ADV, H Célestins 5.
41. ADV, H Augustins d’Avignon, 22 mi 693 bis (1395).
42. ADV, H Augustins d’Avignon, 22 mi 693 bis (1395).
43. ADV, Archives municipales d’Avignon, Boîte 96.
44. Kenneth R. Stow, Popes, Church, and Jews in the Middle Ages: Confrontation and
Response (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007), 296. In his chapter on the Avignon papacy, Stow
details the inconsistencies of Jewish papal policies.
45. ASV, Reg. Aven. 215, f. 158v.
236 Chapter 5

46. See Irven M. Resnick, Marks of Distinctions: Christian Perceptions of Jews in the
High Middle Ages (Washington, DC: Catholic Press of America, 2012), 138; and Danielle
Iancu-Agou, “Avignon,” in Medieval Jewish Civilization: An Encyclopedia, ed. Norman
Roth (New York City: Routledge, 2003), 63–66.
47. The cases are found in Michel and Anne-Marie Hayez, “Juifs d’Avignon au
tribunal de la cour temporelle sous Urbain V,” Provence historique 23 (1973): 165–173.
48. Grégoire XI, Ut per literas apostolicas, no. 033602.
49. ADV, Archives municipales d’Avignon, HH 141.
50. Brigide Schwarz, Die Organisation kurialer Schreiberkollegien (Tübingen: Niemey-
er, 1972), 67–71.
51. Grégoire XI, Ut per literas apostolicas, no. 028339.
52. ADV, Archives communales d’Avignon, CC 21.
53. Jean XXII, Ut per litteras apostolicas, no. 14634.
54. Grégoire XI, Ut per litteras apostolicas, no. 20352.
55. ADV, Archives communales d’Avignon, 8G4.
56. Hermann Hoberg, Die Einnahmen der apostolischen Kammer unter Innozenz VI (Pa-
derborn: F. Schöningh, 1955), 63.
57. Robert Brun, “Annales Avignonnaises de 1382 à 1410: Extraites des archives
Datini,” Mémoires de l’institut historique de Provence 13 (1936): 73.
58. Brun, “Annales,” 12 (1935): 26.
59. Brun, “Annales,” 12 (1935): 4.
60. Ronald Weissman, Ritual Brotherhood in Renaissance Florence (New York: Aca-
demic, 1982), 80.
61. Anne-Marie Hayez, Le terrier Avignonnais de l’évêque Anglic Grimoard: 1366–1368
(Paris: CTHS, 1993), 314–315.
62. Chiffoleau, Les justices du pape, 254–255.
63. Brun, “Annales,” 14 (1937): 14. He was eventually expelled from the palace and
caught by the Avignonese authorities.
64. ADV, Archives communales d’Avignon, boîte 68, no. 2231.
65. Girard and Pansier, La cour temporelle, 57–60.
66. See, for example, Nicolas IV, Ut per litteras, no. 003297 (April 9, 1290); Innocent
VI, Ut per litteras, no. 000459 (July 29, 1353); and Urbain V, Ut per litteras, no. 000349
(August 19, 1363) and 001461 (July 29, 1365).
67. Innocent VI, Lettres secrètes et curiales, no. 000459 (July 29, 1353), where officials
of the provinces and cities of the Roman Church prohibit their immediate subjects
from cheating at dice games and procuring or pandering prostitutes.
68. The 1243 statutes established a curfew, prevented citizens of all status from
circulating without a light or from drinking, gambling, and patronizing inns, taverns,
and prostitutes after the toll of the night bell; see statutes 76 and 77 in René Maulde-
La-Clavière, Coutumes et règlements de la république d’Avignon au treizième siècle (Paris: L.
Larose, 1879), 166.
69. Anne-Marie Hayez, “Familiers de prélats contre catalans: Un ‘tumulte’ à Avi-
gnon au temps de Jean XXII,” Annuaire de la Société des amis du Palais des papes et des
monuments d’Avignon 75 (1998): 149–155.
70. Chiffoleau, Les justices du pape, 255.
71. Tournaments were prohibited under sentence of excommunication because they
were considered dangerous for body and soul; see Jean XXII, Ut per litteras apostolicas,
no. 003543; and Clément VI, Ut per litteras apostolicas, no. 004197.
 Avignon: The Capital and Its Population 237

72. The 1379 entrance of Clement VII had the pope enter the city via the eastern
route from the direction of Carpentras, initiating some five kilometers from the city,
near the monasteries of Montfavet and St. Praxède; see Pansier, “Annales Avi-
gnonnaises,” 51.
73. Eugène Déprez, “Les funérailles de Clément VI et d’Innocent VI d’après les
comptes de la cour pontificale,” Mélanges d’archéologie et d’histoire 20 (1900): 237.
74. Joseph Girard, Évocation du vieil Avignon (Paris: Les éditions de minuit, 1958), 54.
75. See Horrox, The Black Death, 42, 45.
76. Jacques Heers, “Les villes d’Italie centrale et l’urbanisme: Origines et affirma-
tion d’une politique (environ 1200–1350),” Mélanges de l’École française de Rome, moyen-
âge-temps modernes 101.1 (1989): 69.
77. Maulde-La-Clavière, Coutumes et règlements de la république d’Avignon, 168.
78. Maulde-La-Clavière, Coutumes et règlements de la république d’Avignon, 146.
79. Maulde-La-Clavière, Coutumes et règlements de la république d’Avignon, 201.
80. I find no better evidence than the letter of Louis Heyligen.
81. Pansier, “Annales Avignonnaises,” 28.
82. Pansier, “Annales Avignonnaises,” 55.
83. Pansier, “Annales Avignonnaises,” 64–67.
84. Pansier, “Annales Avignonnaises,” 69.
85. Girard and Pansier, La cour temporelle d’Avignon, 57.
86. Pansier, “Annales Avignonnaises,” 69.
87. François Charles Carreri, “Chronicon parvum Avinionense de schismate et bello
(1397–1416),” Annales d’Avignon et du Comtat Venaissin (1916): 166.
88. Pansier, “Annales Avignonnaises,” 12–13.
89. Pansier, “Annales Avignonnaises,” 14.
90. Pansier, “Annales Avignonnaises,” 63.
91. See Jacques Rossiaud, Le Rhône au moyen âge (Paris: Aubier, 2007), 131, 134–135.
There is evidence that during floods, the water unearthed buried corpses that could
then be seen floating downstream. See Rossiaud, Le Rhône, 348.
92. Pansier, “Annales Avignonnaises,” 29.
93. Martin de Alpartil, Chronica actitarum temporibus domini Benedicti XIII, ed. J. An-
gel Sesma Muñoz and M. Mar Agudo Romeo (Saragossa: Centro de Documentación
Bibliográfica Aragonesa, 1994), 46.
94. See Acta Sanctorum: Secunda dies julii, de B. Petro de Luxemburgo S. R. E. Cardinali,
Ep. Metensi. Avenione in Gallia: [230] [Depositiones de mercatore in Rhodanum lapso,] Testis
XLIII, Col. 0566F.
95. Girard and Pansier, La cour temporelle d’Avignon, 167; regulations about the stor-
age of hay are found on pages 174–175 under the rubric Igne (fire).
96. Girard and Pansier, La cour temporelle d’Avignon, 175.
97. Girard and Pansier, La cour temporelle d’Avignon, 28–29.
98. Acta Sanctorum, CCLV, 584.
99. Carreri, “Chronicon parvum avinionense,” 171.
100. See also Acta Sanctorum, CCLV, 585.
101. Ronald Musto, Apocalypse in Rome: Cola Di Rienzo and the Politics of the New Age
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003), 64.
 SIX
The Great Western Schism
and Avignon

The preceding chapters have argued that the Avignon papacy strove to
establish institutional and administrative legitimacy as it developed an
acceptable capital away from Rome, one with a vibrant international soci-
ety and culture. This chapter, which focuses on the Schism, returns to the
issue of legitimacy at the core of the double papal election that initiated
the crisis in 1378. One of the lessons the Schism offers institutional histo-
rians is that two papal capitals could compete in advancing the legitima-
cy of their respective claimants and both be successful. Two papal courts
could not only survive but flourish. If Rome and Avignon had not been
thriving Christian cities, they would not have rivaled each other for papal
supremacy for close to two generations without instigating major social
upheavals. The Church’s administration had been so well defined by the
Avignon popes and was so innovative and efficient that it could be cut in
half and still function quite effectively.
The Great Western Schism (1378–1417), approximately forty years that
witnessed a double and sometimes triple papacy, belongs with the Black
Death and the Hundred Years’ War as one of the threefold calamities that
plagued the fourteenth century. The Schism shattered Western Christian
unity, the ideological touchstone of the Middle Ages, literally dividing
western Europe into two camps that each obeyed their respective popes.
It diminished the aura of the Catholic Church, raised doubts about papal
authority and the advance of conciliarism, and saw the emergence of
national churches. While many historians have discussed the Schism’s
239
240 Chapter 6

religious, political, and economic consequences, few have focused on its

social effects on both capital cities of Christianity. With that in mind, this
chapter reviews the main events of the Schism, removing the emphasis
from institutional issues to reset it within a sociocultural historical con-
text. Presently, we will examine the Avignonese’s understanding and
perception of the crisis and, in more general terms, its repercussions on
the population.

WHY A SCHISM?

Upon his election in Avignon, Pope Gregory XI (like his predecessor,

Urban V) made a point to voice his wish to return the papacy to Rome.
Politics prevented Gregory from acting quickly on his desire, but he
eventually put a plan into action and embarked for Rome on September
13, 1376, arriving four months later on January 17, 1377. Later naysayers,
with the advantage of hindsight, of course, emphasized the many bad
omens attached to Gregory’s departure: in Avignon, his horse refused to
be mounted; en route, weather played havoc with the pope’s flotilla,
scattering ships with strong winds or stopping its progress when the
gales died. 1 Human intervention also slowed down the pope’s progress.
Gregory had to wait some five weeks in Corneto, on the Italian Mediter-
ranean coast, for his Avignonese and Roman representatives to reach an
agreement on his ceremonial entry into the city. In the Middle Ages, the
official entry (or adventus) of an important personage into a city was a
significant event among the rituals of social communication. The pageant
displayed social and political harmony for both audience and partici-
pants and needed to be carefully articulated and negotiated by all parties
before its enactment.
For the Romans, the adventus symbolized the balance between inde-
pendence and obedience. The Romans’ joy at the papal return reflected
the heightened status and economic advantages that the city would re-
gain. Still, the Romans balked at their loss of independence, which they
had enjoyed during some seventy years of papal absence. The pope was
the lord of Rome, and the city needed to renew its acknowledgment of his
lordship, both symbolically and persuasively, as it simultaneously strove
to maintain a semblance of autonomy. The entrance of the pontiff cere-
monially displayed his political dominance over Rome and provided a
suitable spectacle for his receiving the keys of Castel Sant’Angelo, the
 The Great Western Schism and Avignon 241

fortress that protected the Borgo—the Vatican’s Leonine city, where the
ancient basilica of Saint Peter stood—together with Rome’s cathedral, the
basilica of St. John Lateran, and the complex of its buildings and palace.
To reassert his presence, a magnificent procession paraded down the Via
Papalis that meandered through the ancient city, by the Capitol Hill and
the Colosseum.
The adventus held for Gregory in January 1377 was remarkable in the
sense that it ratified an implicit victory for the Romans. The Romans
altered tradition by leading the pope from the basilicas of Saint Paul to
Saint Peter, in the opposite direction of the traditional Vatican-Lateran
route. During their negotiations over the pope’s homecoming celebration,
the Romans signaled a subtle and symbolic rebuke, arranging for the
pontiff to enter the city via the traditional route of the Roman carnival! A
population attuned to communication through ceremony must not have
missed the message signaled by this change in protocol. In any case,
Gregory settled in Rome only to die a few months later, on March 27,
1378, tired but certainly satisfied with his return of the papacy to its
traditional home.
Following canon law, on the night of April 7, 1378, the sixteen cardi-
nals present in Rome entered into conclave (by nationality, they were
eleven French, four Italian, and a single Spanish cardinal). The following
day, despite internal divisions between Limousins and northern French
and a boisterous Roman crowd chanting at their windows, the college
elevated Bartolomeo Prignano, archbishop of Bari, as Pope Urban VI. He
was crowned on April 10 and, after a reign of eleven years, died on
October 15, 1389. Significantly, Urban VI was not a cardinal, and he has
the distinction of being the last pontiff elected from outside the college of
cardinals. He was, however, a well-qualified curial servant, praised for
his rigor and moral integrity; but he was also temperamental and intense.
It did not take long for dissatisfaction about the new pontiff to surface. By
June, unhappy French cardinals began abandoning Rome for Anagni,
and on August 9, 1378, they posted their Declaratio on the gates of Anag-
ni’s cathedral, denouncing Urban’s election as fraudulent because it had
taken place under duress and violence. The cardinals justified their aban-
donment of Urban by asserting the illegality of an election in which the
Roman mob had subjected them to a “fear of the kind that can conquer
even a steadfast man” (metus qui potest cadere in constantem virum). The
dissenting cardinals cited the Romans’ threats: “We want a Roman
242 Chapter 6

pope—or at least an Italian. If not, we’ll cut you to pieces!” They argued
that their decision to elect Urban was invalid because it had been a des-
perate act of self-defense, exacted from them under extreme pressure.
During the months of July and August 1378, both parties initiated talks in
an attempt to avoid a break between the pope and his cardinals, but
positions soon hardened. Twelve French cardinals required Urban’s un-
conditional abdication; others advised the pope to rule with the aid of a
council. The idea of a general council also circulated, but with one impor-
tant caveat: only a legitimate pope could call one. The French cardinals
agreed early on to the via facti, meaning the “way of force,” or removal of
the pope by military means. On July 20, 1378, emboldened by their
troops’ recent defeat of Roman soldiers at Ponte Salario, they declared
their election of Urban null and void. Positions on all sides remained
firm, however, and on August 2, 1378, the cardinals again invalidated
their election and urged Urban to step down.
A week later their declaration became an encyclical letter denouncing
Urban as intrusus (intruder) and anathematizing him. They followed
their declaration by physically distancing themselves from the pope’s
reach, settling at the court of Onorato Caetani in Fondi, in the Kingdom
of Naples. On September 21, a conclave of all thirteen rebellious cardinals
elected Robert of Geneva as Pope Clement VII. The three Italian cardinals
present abstained from voting. Clement was crowned in Fondi a month
later on October 31, with the papal tiara brought from Castel Sant’Angelo
by Gregory XI’s former camerlengo, Pierre de Cros, who had joined the
French party. At Rome in September 1378, Urban VI learned of the elec-
tion of his rival. In response, he expanded his power base by completely
renewing the college of cardinals, elevating twenty-five new candidates.
With this action, he officially confirmed the Schism. None of his cardinals
had participated in his election to the papal throne. All the electors in his
own election in April had abandoned him. From the outbreak of the
Schism in late 1378, tradition assigned the partisan supporters of each of
these two pope into two rival factions; even after the deaths of Clement
VII and Urban VI, their followers were still labeled Clementists or Urban-
ists.
Previous schisms had usually been political in origin and caused by
the intense rivalry between popes and Roman emperors. In contrast, this
new Schism divided Christianity between two popes, two courts, two
loyalties, each one directing all of his energy at proving his own legitima-
 The Great Western Schism and Avignon 243

cy and robbing his opponent of supporters. The crisis was essentially an

electoral dispute, and the equal strength of both sides ensured that this
division would take a long time to heal.
After the initial events of 1378, politics played a large part in the
allegiances garnered by either pope. Clement VII gained the support of
the king of France, Charles V, his brother Louis of Anjou, and to a lesser
degree the kings of Castile, Aragon, and Navarre. Most of Gregory XI’s
former administration also stood by Clement, while Urban had more or
less to staff his entire government. To re-create an efficient papal admin-
istration on the fly was a daunting task that Urban tackled pragmatically.
He did have the support of Portugal, the Holy Roman Empire, Rome, the
Italian city-states, and England and its territories in France. Internal Euro-
pean politics also dictated allegiances. Because England opted to support
Urban, Scotland chose Clement. The Holy Roman emperor, Charles IV,
and the king of Hungary chose Urban, leading the Dukes of Luxem-
bourg, Lorraine, and Austria to support Clement in turn.
The financial assets of the Clementist obedience rested on its well-run
collector system. Again, Urban VI had to start anew, as only a single
collector chose his camp after 1378. As these officials continued to collect
and pay assignations for Clement VII, Urban had to keep improvising,
often changing his staff and the size of his collectorates. The system large-
ly failed Urban, for the collections from the Papal States and the pontifical
vicars from this region could often be unreliable. The rival popes were
intent on financially sapping their opponents, going so far as allowing
theft if it increased their own incomes. Put in the same predicament, both
popes minimized the always perilous movement of funds and relied on
local assignations, as often as possible spending funds exactly where they
received them. In Avignon, Clement’s camerlengos controlled assigna-
tions; after deducting their personal expenses, collectors sent their sur-
plus on to the treasury. Urban and his Chamber, on the contrary, held
little control over their revenues and expenses. They replaced the tradi-
tional system of assignation with rectors and temporal vicars who were
given direct financial control over their posted locations. Often abusive,
their monetary exactions in the Papal States led to numerous popular
revolts. On a day-to-day basis, Urbanists borrowed from bankers to sur-
vive.
Banking grew equally in importance for both parties. Even if by differ-
ent means, merchant-bankers coordinated the transport of funds and
244 Chapter 6

supported both popes financially. The Avignon popes employed several

small firms that received letters of change in their various European
agencies and in the capital city. In general, the Avignon papacy used its
resources well, free from bankers’ pressure. In contrast, the Roman papa-
cy handed its financial control over to bankers who responded by grant-
ing generous credit that supported the pontiffs. This reliance on external
funds led the Roman popes to choose expedient and unsavory means to
replenish their treasury. Under the guise of promoting Christian spiritu-
ality, they really advanced their own material interests—like the calling
of two Jubilee Years within ten years, in 1390 and 1400, to fill their coffers.
As years went by, popes died, and with each new election, any hope
for the reunion of the Latin Church vanished. First, the popes tried to
defeat each other through the use of force. When this failed, each camp
suggested its rival’s abdication (willingly or coerced) or perhaps the
withdrawal of secular support from papal obedience (self-serving argu-
ments with dangerous future implications). After years of stalemate, the
much-debated proposal to call a council to reconcile the Urbanist and
Clementist parties eventually became the accepted solution. The first
general council, held in Pisa in 1409, succeeded in befuddling the situa-
tion even more. Called to Pisa to participate, both popes refused to at-
tend; in response, the council tried them, declared them disobedient and
contumacious, and deposed them both. The council then elected a third
pope, Alexander V, who added a third line of claimants to the papacy
since the two other popes rejected the authority of the council to depose
them. In 1413, both the Holy Roman emperor, Sigismund, and Alexan-
der’s successor, John XXIII, broke ground by calling the next council.
They used their collaboration to unite all papal factions around a single
goal: reunion. The Avignonese and Roman obedience could not refuse
this summons, since the call came from the emperor and not from an
illegitimate pope. The Council of Constance, held between 1414 and 1417,
effectively ended the crisis by accepting the resignation of the Pisan clai-
mant, John XXIII, and the Roman claimant, Gregory XII, deposing the
Avignonese claimant, Benedict XIII, and electing Martin V as singular
pope of Western Christendom.
Historians who have tried to understand the causes of the Schism
have largely benefited from hindsight. The council simultaneously
solved the Schism and sapped at least two centuries of papal efforts at
gaining political and religious supremacy. In their words, the fathers of
 The Great Western Schism and Avignon 245

the council put the common good (bonum commune) of the Church before
the claims of either pope. 2 The Council of Constance’s decree, Haec sancta
synodus, asserted the legitimacy of the council as representative of the
Church and posited the authority of a Church council above that of the
popes, thus defining “conciliarism.” A subsequent decree, Frequens, orga-
nized a regular pattern of council meetings as “an especial means for
cultivating the field of the Lord and effecting the destruction of briars,
thorns, and thistles, to wit, heresies, errors, and schism, and of bringing
forth a most abundant harvest.” 3 The negative implications of these de-
crees for the monarchical papacy sent shockwaves through the camp of
those defending papal primacy. But perhaps they also revealed the hid-
den motives of those who had always opposed papal supremacy and
who had helped their cause by generating the Schism in the first place.
The Schism was narrowly about a legal issue attached to the validity of
an election; disputed papal elections were not infrequent in the Middle
Ages for the simple reason that they involved multiple, competing inter-
ests. But the implications of that one contested election in 1378 were far
reaching for the general theory of the papal fullness of power (plenitudo
potestatis).
Papal nominations or elections were a variance of the episcopal nomi-
nation, since the pontiff was essentially the bishop of Rome. The momen-
tous election of a pope inevitably evolved through the ages, but its most
significant development was perhaps the notion of a conclave—an inde-
pendent, secret election held by a group of special electors (the cardinals)
in a reserved, private space (in Latin, cum clave means “with a key,” hence
“locked”)—which lessened some of the concerns repeatedly raised across
the centuries. The main issue was ridding the vote of secular interference
and conflicts, whether from crowds of Roman clerics, aristocratic fami-
lies, Holy Roman emperors, or, more simply, from human ambition. Un-
til the time of Gratian’s Decretum in the twelfth century, Rome’s clergy
had elected the pope, upon some general approbation of the people. At a
Lateran synod in April 1059, Pope Nicholas II created the first indepen-
dent ecclesiastic electoral college, giving cardinal-bishops first choice in
naming a pope, seconded by cardinal-deacons, the rest of the clergy, and
the Roman people. To prevent certain abuses, the Third Lateran Council
of 1179 gave a single vote to each cardinal and required an electoral
majority of two-thirds. This legislation proved to be contentious and
troublesome; in many instances, the majority was not attained, and the
246 Chapter 6

vacant see or interregnum lasted up to several years. Tebaldo Visconti,

taking the name of Pope Gregory X, was elected in 1271 after a three-year
papal vacancy and, to prevent another such impasse, he decreed the rev-
olutionary innovation of the conclave in 1274 with his bull Ubi periculum.
In his own words,
Where there is greater danger, there must certainly be greater foresight.
We learn from the past how heavy are the losses sustained by the
Roman church in a long vacancy, how perilous it is; we see this all too
clearly when we wisely consider the crises undergone. . . . We judge
therefore that everything wisely instituted by our predecessors and
especially by Pope Alexander III of happy memory, for avoiding dis-
cord in the election of the Roman pontiff, should remain altogether
intact. We intend in no way to detract from this legislation, but to
supply by the present constitution what experience has shown to be
missing. 4

From then on, the conclave’s regulations strictly enclosed the College
of Cardinals to prevent electoral interference. If cardinals took too long to
reach a decision, they were subjected to fasting after their third day of
enclosure.
According to the cardinals, in 1378 violence and external interference
marred the election, making it noncanonical. The cardinal of Mende em-
phasized the threat he felt when he heard Romans chanting: “We want a
Roman, or at least an Italian or by the keys of S. Peter we will kill and cut
to pieces these French and foreigners, starting first with the cardinals!” 5
According to their depositions, bands of armed men roamed the city as
the crowd occupied and invaded the Vatican on the conclave’s opening
and closing days.
On the other hand, violence was expected during and after the elec-
tion. Dietrich of Niem, a papal notary residing at court, states, “After the
cardinals had elected him [Prignano] pope unanimously, they sent for
him and other prelates on Friday, at the third hour. He immediately
moved his books and other valuables into a safe place, so that they would
not be stolen, as is the Roman tradition [author’s emphasis] if the rumor
were spread abroad that he had been elected.” 6
As they later asserted, the cardinals deemed the violence so insidious
that it nullified their decision. Still, they refrained from mentioning that
such violence was traditional and that they had witnessed it on previous
occasions and (more importantly) in Avignon. How could they not have
 The Great Western Schism and Avignon 247

seen this, when Bartolomeo de Zabrici, Bishop of Recanati and Macerata,

testified, “As it was customary [author’s emphasis] and as I witnessed in
Avignon when the Lord of Beaufort had been made pope, back then, they
[the crowd] had pillaged the house [of the elected] as was customary with
all of his predecessors.” 7
The simple fact that no one doubted the validity of the election in the
days immediately following it offers further evidence that the cardinals
might very well have expected this violence. In their depositions against
the pope, cardinals simply refrained from mentioning that they were
familiar with “electoral violence.” The carnivalesque behavior surround-
ing the election and the plunder of ecclesiastical property, accompanied
by the pillaging of cardinals’ residences and the cells of the conclave, are
well documented from the third to the eighteenth centuries. Such mob-
like disorder was commonplace by the fourteenth century. 8 Yet only in
1378 was such a claim of duress used to invalidate an election.
In the main, modern students of papal history decline to blame the
Schism on a single party; rather, it seems wiser to enumerate the several
circumstances whose convergence produced the crisis. All agree that the
French cardinals were largely instrumental at its inception. It was they,
after all, who repudiated their own initial judgment that the election was
canonical. It is obvious that the cardinals regretted their choice of Urban
soon after electing him, especially when he turned imperious, reproving,
and erratic. By electing a bureaucrat, they attempted to supplant him,
proposing instead an innovative scheme in which they shared in a limit-
ed fashion in the pope’s rule; but Urban resisted, determined to maintain
the absolute supremacy of the papacy.
Throughout the Middle Ages, the pope’s growing assertion of his
plenitude of power went hand in hand with a metaphorical construction
that conflated the pope’s body with the Church’s (in medieval parlance,
the pope was head and body of the Church). This vision barred cardinals
from participating fully (literally and metaphorically) in the life of the
Church. By their own vision, the cardinals saw the pope at the head of the
Church and themselves as its trunk and limbs, directly challenging the
papal understanding of the intimate relationship between man and insti-
tution. Even if today this debate seems lofty and idealistic, it had real
implications for medieval papal governance and finance. Cardinals
wanted participation in decision making and their own share of the
Church’s revenue because they saw themselves as fully integrated within
248 Chapter 6

the Church’s body. They resented that the pontiff reserved to himself
various taxes (like the annates) and did not share this bounty with them. If
it can be claimed that the pope aimed for an absolute monarchy, it must
also be acknowledged that at the same time, the cardinals were pulling
toward a constitutional one. That the pope and his cardinals clashed over
what may be regarded as “lifestyle questions”—for example, the person-
al observance of standards of apostolic life (vita apostolica) appropriate to
their positions as church leaders—perhaps also fueled the break. The
pope was intent on fighting simony and other abuses, and some cardinals
no doubt resented Urban’s reform agenda and his pressing summons to
religious discipline and austerity.
Another factor contributing to the crisis was the conflict between Ur-
ban’s personality and the motivations of Charles V of France. The French
king obviously regretted Gregory’s departure to Rome and favored re-
turning the papacy to Avignon, where the pontiff would once more re-
side in his territorial and political sphere of interest. Predictably, the
French cardinals supported the king; they, too, expected a return to Avi-
gnon and begrudged Urban for his refusal to do so. The personality of
Urban was also at fault. The pope acted independently in his nomina-
tions to major and minor offices, bypassing the counsel of his court and
thus further curbing the cardinals’ influence. He may have simply been
too rigid and unbending for a position that required the ability to com-
promise. The cardinals had elected a man they knew to be prudent and
modest; he had been an effective administrator of the Chancery with little
political clout. Once pope, however, the man’s personal strengths became
for the cardinals a serious political obstacle. The administrator felt no
esprit de corps with the princes of the Church. In fact, Urban’s attitude
toward his cardinals was downright demeaning. He was inflexible, arro-
gant, unrestrained in his reproach, and abusive. The office had changed
the man. Cardinal Robert of Geneva ominously warned Urban, “Holy
Father, you have not treated the cardinals with the honour due to us and
that your predecessors used to show us, but you are diminishing our
honour. I tell you in all earnest that the cardinals will work to diminish
your honour too,” but his advice went unheeded. 9
As historians have scoured archives to pin down a single or multiple
factors responsible for the origin and continuation of the crisis, they have
also laid much of the blame on the papal institution itself. For Howard
Kaminsky, the institutional culture that grew from the Avignon papacy
 The Great Western Schism and Avignon 249

was directly responsible for the break. Essentially, the Schism was a con-
sequence of the Avignon papacy. His judgment is harsh; while labeling
the Avignon papacy a “triumphant construction of papal monarchy,” he
accuses it of “reifying the ecclesiastical institution into a system of bene-
fices apprehended as property rights, acquisition and preservation of
which were the primary objects of clerical interest.” 10 The consequence of
such an attitude was a general disinterest in things “papal.” In the minds
of the silent majority of Christians in the Latin West, the survival of the
institution became largely detached from the issue of salvation. That dis-
connect explains why no widespread and general movement to end the
Schism emerged. As Robert Norman Swanson states, “The schism was
not, therefore, a matter of belief, but of administration; this explains why
the response on the ground was ‘cavalier.’” 11 The Schism was primarily a
dispute of succession irrelevant to the quality of the religious lives of the
individuals involved or of the laity at large. Thus, it did not create a
confessional crisis in the larger Church, nor did it provoke religious wars
more widely in Europe.

THE EARLY YEARS

Initially, both Clement and Urban resorted to force to defeat his rival.
Clement’s hopes to seize Rome and its pope vanished when Urban’s
Company of Saint George, led by the famous condottiere Alberico da Bar-
biano, defeated Clement’s mercenaries at Marino on April 29, 1379. The
best of the condottieri of his time, Jean de Malestroit, Sylvestre de Budes,
Louis de Montjoie, and Bernardon de la Salle, led Clement’s Breton and
Gascon mercenary troops. In spite of their fame and skill, these mercenar-
ies could not prevent Castel Sant’Angelo from capitulating to Urban’s
forces. With this defeat, Clement lost his foothold in Rome. As for Urban,
he had achieved one of his two goals: he had prevented his opponent
from seizing Rome. His next move was to force Clement out of Italy
entirely.
Urban’s second goal in fact mirrored Clement’s strategy. Both popes’
foreign policies relied on control of the Kingdom of Naples. At that time,
Queen Joanna, granddaughter of Robert, late king of Naples, and daugh-
ter of Marie of Valois, sister of the late King Philip VI of France, ruled
Naples. She was countess of Provence and Forcalquier and titular queen
of Jerusalem and Sicily. After some brief hesitation, Joanna nominally
250 Chapter 6

opted for Clement, and the pope relied heavily on the foothold she pro-
vided in Italy. Unfortunately for Clement, the Neapolitans did not sup-
port their queen’s choice, and any hope he may have had of initiating a
conquest of the papal territories via Naples vanished quickly. He had to
retreat from southern Italy. Clement eventually left his unsustainable po-
sition in Italy and retreated to the former papal city; he entered Avignon
on June 20, 1379, relying on the experienced administration that had
supported the Avignon papacy.
Back in Avignon, Clement resettled his court with some five hundred
papal servants. Although fifty of them were from his native Geneva, he is
not generally accused of having widely practiced nepotism. As shown by
his policy in the distribution of benefices, Clement was not a pawn of
France. Rather, he distributed (or collated) ecclesiastical, spiritual, and
temporal benefices across a geographically wide diversity of clergy, inde-
pendent of French influence. Still, he faced French pressure throughout
his rule. The king, the bishops, and the University of Paris attempted to
sway him from the traditional right of reserve, a right that the Avignon
popes had long fought for and gained. This right of reserve allowed the
pope (and no one else) to collate benefices. Such control over who re-
ceived benefices allowed Clement to widen his influence by choosing his
own nominees to church posts and to receive income from the annates,
the tax on the first year’s revenue of a benefice. Clement needed these
funds to fight his “way of force,” but like most aristocrats, Clement also
proved to be generous. By generously funding scholarships for French
clerics to attend universities, he tamped down discontent. His magna-
nimity also extended to the city of Avignon, where he agreed to support
the Pignotte almshouse.
Clement’s return to the city also occasioned municipal improvements.
Two weeks before his arrival in Avignon, officials inspected the roads the
papal cortege was to follow and decreed the traditional route via the
Gate Saint-Michel unusable. They rerouted the pope via the Gate Saint-
Lazarus, next to the Perron, site of public executions. Once again, the
adventus’s change of route may have been totally necessary, but it is prob-
able that residents were communicating a message to their returned lead-
er. Such a route change may have been a subtle way of demonstrating to
the pope the city’s mitigated satisfaction at seeing him back. The Italian
conquest, with its diplomatic ramifications and endless financial levies,
became the central preoccupation of the pope, and in turn, of Avignon.
 The Great Western Schism and Avignon 251

Of course, Avignon rejoiced at the prospect of regaining its status as the

capital of Christianity; but it also paid a high price in supporting the
pope. By the time Clement entered the city under his golden-embroi-
dered canopy, he had already taxed the city council a subsidy of 3,000
florins, levied to help the war effort while in Italy. Clement’s financial
reliance on his city continued after his return; he required of them some
10,000 florins in January 1379 and 5,000 florins in 1380. 12
After arriving in Avignon, Clement’s rapport with his capital re-
mained distant and driven by financial self-interest. In November 1379,
the pope ratified the old and unpopular convention of 1251, which had
ended the city’s political autonomy. For Avignon, it was easier to revert
to a familiar status quo than languish without a formal agreement with
its suzerain. Extending slight grace and favor to a few prominent citizens
(permitting the enclosure of their daughters in convents), Clement other-
wise showed little concern for the city where he set his throne. The local
gabelle taxes, levied on salt, wine, and merchandise, and which had been
initially created to fund the defense of the city, became the pope’s indirect
taxes instead.
After his failure to gain Neapolitan allies, Clement’s hopes turned to
Duke Louis of Anjou, brother of Charles V of France, to whom he pro-
posed the conquest of the fictive Kingdom of Adria, which would re-
group all the Papal States, minus the Latium. Regretting and later refut-
ing this decision, Clement found a comfortable alternative in asking the
childless Queen Joanna to adopt the same Louis. The French duke thus
became de facto heir to the Neapolitan throne. Since the County of Pro-
vence and Forcalquier were attached to the Kingdom of Naples, the lead-
ers of both were involved in the recovery of the kingdom. Provence and
the Comtat Venaissin were either physically or financially implicated
along with big players such as Milan and its ruling family, the Visconti,
and the house of Savoy. The journal of Jean Le Fèvre, bishop of Chartres
and chancellor to Louis I and II of Anjou between 1380 and 1388, offers a
glimpse into these intense diplomatic relations. Le Fèvre recorded in his
journal the correspondence he received and dispatched between Febru-
ary and July 1382 as well as the flow of eminent visitors who followed the
Duke of Anjou to Avignon, including the Count of Savoy, the Duke of
Berry, the Marquis of Montferrat, the Viscount of Rhodes, and many
more ambassadors whom the cardinals and the pope hosted. 13
252 Chapter 6

Avignon became a diplomatic hub that hosted foreign officials as the

pope dispatched legates and ambassadors all over Europe. The financial
support of the Clementist curia fell on French clergy and the capital city.
Le Fèvre itemizes countless meetings, always around meals, reminding
us how important the act of eating together was to medieval society.
These various assemblies promoted the local economy, if only by the
amount of resources needed to feed and equip the various parties. It may
have been with mixed feelings that on May 30, 1382, the Avignonese sent
the Duke of Anjou on his way. In a grand public display, the duke re-
ceived the banners of the Kingdom of Sicily and Jerusalem from the
hands of the pope, performed his feudal obeisance by kissing the pope’s
slipper, and in a sign of peace kissed all the cardinals present on the
mouth. 14 The income the duke generated while in Avignon was lost, but
the cost of his wars remained Avignon’s burden. 15
Meanwhile, Urban VI responded to the situation by supporting
Charles of Durazzo’s claim to the Neapolitan title. 16 This cousin of the
queen conquered the kingdom of Naples over the summer of 1381. Du-
razzo captured Joanna, imprisoned her, and eventually ordered her
death by suffocation in May 1382 when Louis initiated a rescue mission
to liberate his “mother.” After her demise, Louis moved to reclaim Na-
ples. His campaign was a difficult one, with Durazzo proving a brilliant
strategist who starved and harassed the French army. Louis’s death in
1384 ended all hope for the French until Urban’s actions turned the situa-
tion around.
Shortly before Louis of Anjou’s death, Urban VI had severed his ties
with Charles of Durazzo when the latter refused to hand over conquests
(and some hard cash) to Urban’s nephew, an adventurer named Butillo
Prignano. Their argument escalated when Durazzo also refused to give
up his hard-won crown. Urban was left with no choice but to look for the
protection of Butillo in Nocera. Life in Nocera was dismal, and many at
the court used any opportunity to escape it. During the summer of 1384,
the plague stalled the triple contest of Louis of Anjou versus Durazzo,
Durazzo versus Urban, and Urban versus Louis of Anjou. Louis died,
and the crown passed to his oldest son, Louis II (then quite young and
under the regency of his mother, Marie of Blois). His troops started their
journey home, freeing a convalescent Durazzo to deal with the pope. The
argument between Urban and Durazzo reached its climax when they
declared war against each other. Some of Urban’s cardinals sided with
 The Great Western Schism and Avignon 253

Durazzo, however, suggesting that a council should assist the pope in

ruling. Livid by reports of this treachery, Urban called the offending
cardinals into consistory, imprisoned and tortured them, and ultimately
ordered their death; he simultaneously excommunicated Durazzo and
his entire court. In reply, Durazzo sent Alberico da Barbiano, now in his
pay, to take Nocera and besiege the castle where the pope had found
refuge. The death of Charles of Durazzo in February 1386 allowed the
Angevins to reclaim the Neapolitan throne, relying this time on the lead-
ership of Otto of Brunswick, the late Queen Joanna’s fourth husband.
Otto entered Naples in 1387; the young Louis II of Anjou, proclaimed
king of Naples in 1389, took possession of his kingdom a year later.
In an ironic turn of events, mercenaries in the pay of Anjou delivered
Urban from Nocera’s siege, freeing him only after he agreed to pay a
hefty ransom. Urban then fled to Benevento and Genoa, this time reward-
ing his Genoese rescuers with the papal town of Corneto. After a year in
Genoa, Urban journeyed through Lucca and Perugia, and eventually re-
gained Rome, where he died on October 15, 1389, though not before
proclaiming 1390 a Jubilee Year.
Meanwhile, in these early years of the Schism, Avignon faced tremen-
dous threats, beginning with the constant incursions of the so-called Un-
ion of Aix (1382–1387) and, throughout the Schism, the constant attacks
of Roger Raymond de Turenne (1352–1413). Louis of Anjou created the
Union in the early 1380s, when he journeyed south to Provence to receive
the crown of the Kingdom of Naples that he had inherited from Queen
Joanna. In 1382, the duke-turned-king accepted the lordship of many
Provençal towns, except Aix-en-Provence, which refused to bow to the
northern lord. Aix assumed the leadership of the union against the Ange-
vin house and chose instead to support its dynastic enemy, the house of
Durazzo. Politics mingled with religion when the duchy of Anjou sided
with Clement VII, and Durazzo with the union of Aix and Urban VI. This
rivalry brought war to the gates of Avignon. Roads were unsafe, and
travelers were often attacked by unpaid troops. This basic insecurity re-
mained a scourge during most of the Schism since funds were often
lacking on all sides and soldiers felt entitled to exact some form of pay-
ment, even if nothing more than highway robbery. As a merchant stated
so callously, “If they [meaning Clementists] had money, it would be a
good war for our pockets.” 17 But “they” did not, and insecurity pre-
vailed, hampering the travel of goods and men. 18 Unpaid soldiers pil-
254 Chapter 6

laged the Avignonese countryside, leaving the city’s inhabitants confined

within the safety of its walls, fearful they would be robbed the moment
they ventured outside. 19 The arms dealers who equipped the citizen-
conscripts for the siege of Aix (who did receive a small wage for their
pains) were among the few Avignonese who profited from the war in
Provence. 20
During this period, Viscount Raymond de Turenne (the so-called
scourge of Provence), a brilliant military commander and negotiator,
chose to exact a heavy toll from the pope and Avignon. Heir to the late
Pope Gregory XI as his nephew, of the lineage of Roger de Beaufort, and
former captain of the Comtat Venaissin, Raymond eventually turned
against his employers. He is frequently mentioned in the contemporary
writings of his time, which describe his unceasing attacks on Avignon’s
environs in search of cattle to carry off and wealthy victims to kidnap. 21
Raymond initially became an archenemy of the count of Anjou when the
latter seized several territories attached to his patrimony, including the
town of Pertuis, capital of Raymond’s viscounty. Seeing the Clementist-
Angevin alliance gaining ground, Raymond then accused Pope Clement
VII of defaulting on the loans his late father had granted his brother, the
late Pope Gregory XI. Finally, Raymond grew impatient and, aggravated
by the pope’s slow payment of his wages, recovered his losses during
several campaigns for the papacy and the king of France. (Stalling pay-
ments was actually a familiar strategy for the cash-strapped papacy, well
known from several campaigns.) Raymond hesitated in deciding which
camp to join in the war of the union of Aix, but he finally offered homage
to Marie of Blois, mother and regent of Louis II of Anjou. Despite his
support of the Angevins, the viscount spent his life fighting Clement VII,
Benedict XIII, and the Angevins, going so far as refusing to allow the
marriage of his only daughter, Antoinette, into the Angevin dynasty.
Instead, Antoinette married the renowned man-at-arms, Marshal Bouci-
caut. Raymond preferred to defend his choice by stating that the House
of Anjou was far too high for his own, and he certainly did not want to
bow to his in-laws.
The significance of these events for the population of Avignon is more
difficult to assess. Reviewing the contemporary sources, Philip Daileader
concludes that people adjusted as best they could and learned to live
with the Schism. 22 The case study of the Italian bankers, however, shows
a somewhat different result. The letters exchanged between one of the
 The Great Western Schism and Avignon 255

most successful Italian merchants in Avignon, Francesco di Marco Datini,

and his agent and associate Boninsegna di Matteo offer a glimpse into the
life of Avignon in the era of the Schism. 23 As direct witnesses of these
events, the sources offer historians invaluable information. Sadness and
frustration emerge from their exchanges. They clearly gauged the failure
of institutional Catholicism in quite remarkable terms for a period that is
often characterized by pious submission to authority.
In his letters, Boninsegna di Matteo shows no real attachment to the
Roman pope of his native Tuscany; he never calls him “Holy Father,” for
example. When Urban VI died in Rome on October 15, 1389, Boninsegna
remains laconic on the topic, mentioning that nothing will change in
Avignon and that the Italians in the city have nothing to fear. 24 Ironically,
in his letters Boninsegna usually speaks of Clement VII as “Our Pope.” 25
When the latter’s brother died, Boninsegna commiserates with the now
“orphaned” Clement. Boninsegna treats Clement as a man, showing a
human compassion rarely found in descriptions of Christ’s Vicar. 26
The 1376 expulsion of the Florentines from Avignon as well as the
absence of courtiers who had sided with Urban created an opportunity
that tempted economic risk takers. During the Schism, Italian residents
were scattered throughout the seven parishes of the city, with the bulk
still residing in the three parishes of Notre-Dame la Principale, Saint-
Pierre, and Saint-Agricol. These districts comprised the southern,
wealthier section of the city, where residents specialized in skilled crafts,
trade, and commerce. The Italians still met in two confraternities, Notre
Dame la Majour and Saint John the Baptist (Boninsegna was elected mas-
ter of Saint John in 1394). The latter association played a “legal” role in
various deals. The masters of Saint John lobbied the curia for the Floren-
tine Office of the Merchants (mercanzia) and Priors. 27 When the Lieuten-
ant of Beaucaire (representing the king of France) charged the Avi-
gnonese Florentines with reprisal and condemned Florentines on French
soil for the supposed embezzlement of French funds, he also settled
scores with the masters of the confraternity “of the community of Floren-
tines in Avignon.” 28
The confraternity of Notre Dame la Majour played an essential role in
the socialization of the Italians with the Avignonese merchant class and
the papal bureaucracy, all joining under its banner to celebrate the living
and the dead. 29 An analysis of the matriculation lists of the association
allows historians to follow the ebb and flow of this Italian population.
256 Chapter 6

Although the tables below highlight those who left rather than those who
remained in the city, they still provide an accurate portrayal of the Italian
population at an instant in time. Italians represent 80 percent of the lists’
membership, and Florentines represent 71 percent of the Italians. The
inflation of numbers for 1373 and 1374 found in table 6.1 represents the
endemic ravages of the plague. But interestingly enough, the Florentine
expulsion from the city in 1376 does not appear to be reflected in the
numbers. As we have seen, most wealthy Florentines were exempt from
harsh papal legislation because they were able to buy protection. In addi-
tion, the bull released from its condemnation those who were younger
than nine years old or were seventy and older, those who were without
relatives or property, and those who owed no taxes and had not visited
Florence in at least ten years. 30 In addition, some could claim they were
from the Florentine suburb of Prato; the curia seems to have accepted this
subterfuge. Table 6.1 reveals a surge in numbers for the years attached to
the return of the papacy to Rome (between 1367–1370 and 1376–1379),
certainly linked to the departure of “followers of the Roman court.” Table
6.1 also underscores a minor Italian exodus at the onset of the Schism, but
it halted in 1381 when Clement VII reauthorized Florentine residency in
Avignon.
On October 8, 1381, Clement permitted Urbanist Florentines—who
were largely merchants and bankers—to travel and reside on Clementist
lands for five years. He also suspended the effects of the 1376 condemna-
tion. In 1385, Florentine merchants began to contemplate their options. In
October of that year, Boninsegna wrote to Datini: “As you know the
Florentine received grace from the pope through the intervention of the
Cardinal of Florence; for five years they were allowed to remain and
circulate freely, as usual, and it was such until the fourth year passed in
August, and next August will bring a term to the deal. The cardinal has
already been contacted but he has not yet done a thing. They wrote to
Florence, but supposedly the commune does not want to hear a thing
from Avignon.” 31 Thus, in 1386 Florentine merchants still felt nervous
about their future in the city and were proactive in buying their protec-
tion from a court that was always willing to sell. They used traditional
networking means: influence and cash. Merchants’ letters are blunt, “re-
garding what you are telling me, concerning your intentions to deal with
messires d’Aigrefeuille and Naples [both cardinals] in order to be spared
by the pope. . . . It seems to me that 300 or 400 florins or more would be
 The Great Western Schism and Avignon 257

Table 6.1. Notre Dame: Table of Payments

Year ND1 Only in ND1 ND2 Only in ND2

1367 17 9 10 2
1368 14 6 5
1369 10 6
1370 49 24
1371 36 22
1372 51 37 2
1373 102 71 1
1374 90 73
1375 56 50
1376 29 18
1377 19 14 5
1378 36 31
1379 41 34
1380 82 60
1381 63 50
1382 7 5
1383 5 4
1384 5 4

The two lists of matriculations (ND1 and ND2) range from 1364 to 1384, well into
the Schism years. They record thousands of names along with dates of payments.
Dues were paid in advance, and the number attached to each name indicates the
year up to which a member had paid. After the stated year passed, and if no
arrears were collected for three to five years, the association added a cross to the
entry and removed the name from the next list (see table 6.2). Based on the
assumption that as long as they resided in the city members continued to join the
association, the crosses and Roman numbers allow historians to infer when indi-
viduals left Avignon or died.

good.” 32 Boninsegna leaves no doubt that the merchants purchased their

protection at a high price. The same idea is echoed further when he says,
“I do not believe that the people of the pope will cause you harm because
you have lent money to the pope and you are not badly seen here.” 33
The papacy’s pressing and endless need for funds made it the ideal
client for a banker but also an unreliable patron. While the prospect of
immense gain was attractive to merchants, the papacy’s habit of default-
258 Chapter 6

Table 6.2. Individuals with Crosses

1358: 1 1363: 1 1369: 0 1375: 5 1381: 3

1359: 0 1365: 6 1370: 5 1376: 3
1360: 0 1366: 0 1372: 0 1377: 0
1361: 3 1367: 0 1373:12 1379: 0
1362: 0 1368: 0 1374:10 1380: 1

ing on loans was far less appreciated. Boninsegna regularly complains of

this state of affairs in his letters: “We cannot get anything from Monseig-
neur d’Amiens [Cardinal Jean de la Grange]; Amiens’s chamberlain
keeps promising us some funds coming from a clerical benefice, but that
is all he can do.” Boninsegna mentions further:
We cannot get back the money you loaned Monseigneur de Macôn
[Jean de Boissy, bishop of Macôn]. He says that he will repay us at
Saint-Michael when he gets income from his benefices. We will pester
him and see if we can get it sooner. We cannot get anything from
Andrea Tici [a renowned merchant of the city] because lately, he has
lots of issues with the Apostolic Chamber; they found him guilty and
jailed him for fifteen days at the request of the Auditor. We still cannot
get anything from messire Guy de Saint-Marcel [Knight and Lord of
Lercio], and not for lack of trying! He only pays us with his words. We
will hassle him. We cannot get anything from the marshal’s lieutenant,
and Andrea da Siena goes there often. It seems to me that you should
write to all these lords, and when they are willing to pay, we will visit
them and get the funds. This will help us greatly. 34

If moneylending did not fill merchants’ purses, still the popes’ expen-
ditures on war invigorated the sale of weapons, a brisk business that
pleased them. Boninsegna reports: “For this expedition [the 1384 war
against Aix and the taking of the Castle of Lançon] we sold bassinets,
harnesses and other weapons for some 1000 fl. of the Queen”; 35 and
“Even though we take pretty high risks here . . . this place is a good place
especially for our trade.” 36 Still, wars entailed great risk, and merchants
were often captured and ransomed as a means of impeding the circula-
tion of merchandise, thus increasing the odds for losses. 37 On April 6,
1384, Boninsegna writes, “The land is filled with mercenaries, many com-
ing from France. We expect the arrival of the Duke of Berry any day now.
During this month we estimate that some ten to twelve galleys at the pay
of the pope will arrive from France and Marseilles, and four from Finale
 The Great Western Schism and Avignon 259

to cross to Naples. Thus, be more cautious than ever when you ship your
merchandise. Send small quantity and insure your stock until the galleys
are far at sea because they will hunt anybody since they need money.” 38
Disruptions like these could at times seem catastrophic and insur-
mountable. The sad tale of Filippo, a young Florentine broker in the pay
of Datini, is a telling example. 39 A September 24, 1389, letter explains
how in the city of Pertuis, Raymond de Turenne had confiscated for toll
evasion some merchandise that Filippo transported for Datini. Young
Filippo was so disconcerted that he locked himself in a room he was
renting from a Jewish broker and killed himself. Medieval society consid-
ered suicide a grave sin, and Raymond further threatened to hang Filip-
po’s body in disgrace and confiscate his goods and funds if tolls and fines
were not paid. Luckily for Datini and for Filippo’s body, the unnamed
Jewish broker took charge, a touching example of Jewish-Christian rap-
port in medieval Europe. Having discovered Filippo’s body, he called a
barber to clean and treat it and a priest to administer confession and last
rites. He then told two Italian pilgrims (Chiario and Puccio) who were
passing through Pertuis to warn Boninsegna in Avignon of Filippo’s
death and the confiscation of his goods. Boninsegna, once aware of the
situation, bought a safe-conduct to retrieve the merchandise. Meanwhile
in Pertuis, Chiario and Puccio paid for Filippo’s honorable funeral. The
tale is a marvelous example of the Schism’s toughest years but also one of
human kindness and resourcefulness. Raymond de Turenne received six-
ty florins, but most importantly for Boninsegna and those who knew the
young merchant, Filippo’s soul was saved.
Urban VI’s Avignonese supporters sometimes also lost their posses-
sions in Avignon with rights of reprisal, but there was no systematic
persecution. The registers for “reprisal” name only twenty-four individu-
als who lost property because of their allegiance to Urban. 40 In some
cases, however, the pope’s expedient decisions did fall on unfortunate
Italians. A July 1387 letter describes the misery of Lorenzo di Buto, a
Florentine resident of Avignon who lost his life savings. According to
Boninsegna, Datini financially supported the ailing Lorenzo with two
florins per month. Boninsegna adds,
As I believe you already know, the pope has given his [Lorenzo’s]
house, the one where he has been living for the past 36 years, to one of
his squires, a German named Tibutto; the house is considered property
of Matteo, the dead brother of Lorenzo and it has been confiscated as
260 Chapter 6

Florentine goods. [We have to assume that the squire had eyes on that
house to argue that Lorenzo’s house was in fact not his, but his dead
Florentine brother’s.] And, because this squire has great influence over
the pope, he is suing Lorenzo and has done so well that he has three
injunctions against him; Lorenzo has not found a procurator, lawyer,
cardinal or a bishop who will speak for him, and on July 13, Lorenzo,
his wife and family were evicted. To add harm to injury, they have
confiscated all his rags that are not even ten gold florins. Here is mercy
and justice! 41

Through these experiences merchants developed, if not a moral con-

science, then at least a political consciousness, self-aware of their own
interests and prompting their tendency to express political criticism
when things were not going their way. They wrote, “The people of the
pope afflict merchants and commoners, and they are advised by people
who only think of themselves, and who do not pay attention to the ills
they’re causing us, merchants and little people.” 42 As Boninsegna liked to
repeat, “Provence is a brigand’s den,” and the “people of the pope want
all the fat for themselves.” 43 These words resonate in the writing of the
Anonimo fiorentino (1382–1401), a man of roughly the same social back-
ground who vehemently argues that peace is essential for business. For
the Anonimo fiorentino, peace is a vital element of economic success, and
he lambasts the antipapa da Vignone and his antipapisti supporters, arguing
that violence and political confusion have worsened the economic situa-
tion of the “city dwellers, merchants, good men.” 44

CONTINUATION

When Urban VI died in October 1389, all hope for a solution to the crisis
vanished, as fourteen of his cardinals quickly elected his successor, Boni-
face IX, on November 2. This hasty election demonstrates that an end to
the Schism was not yet attainable. Clement’s response to Boniface’s elec-
tion was to put his rival on trial and forbid his followers from attending
the Jubilee that he initiated in December 1389—an event that was quite
successful regardless. Clement continued to defend what he considered
his rightful claim to the papacy, increasingly supported by his own per-
sonal wealth. In 1392 his brother died, and Clement became sole heir of
the wealthy county of Geneva. Clement was still actively championing
his “way of force” when he died on September 16, 1394.
 The Great Western Schism and Avignon 261

When the news of Clement’s death reached Paris on September 22, the
king took the advice of his conseil, made up of the Dukes of Bourbon,
Orléans, Berry, and Burgundy, and drafted a letter to the cardinals in
Avignon, asking them to wait for the arrival of his embassy before open-
ing the conclave. 45 But the missive arrived as the gates of the conclave
were closing, and it remained unread. On September 28, 1394, the twen-
ty-one cardinals present in Avignon elected Clement VII’s successor, the
Aragonese Pedro de Luna. He took the name of Benedict XIII. Clement
VII had named Pedro legate to Castile, Aragon, Navarre, and Portugal
and had sent him in 1393 to France, Brabant, Flanders, Scotland, England,
and Ireland. Pedro resided in Paris when not traveling. In general, his
wide European experience and connections made him well suited to
forge a solution to the crisis.
By 1394, the “way of force” was failing, and other alternative solutions
began to emerge, such as the “way of cession” or the “way of council.”
Influential authors like Philippe de Mézières recommended that councils
and kings spearhead ecclesiastical reform and unite the Church. Jean
Gerson, speaker for the University of Paris, put forward his theologians’
and jurists’ suggestions: the Church’s unity was possible if either pope
abdicated willingly (cessio); if a commission selected by both popes
reached a conclusion (compromissio); or if a general council was convened
(concilium pacis). Numerous renowned intellectuals of the time, such as
Jean Petit, Pierre d’Ailly, Simon de Cramaud, Nicholas de Clamanges,
Gilles Deschamps, and Honoré Bonnet, participated in something akin to
a propaganda campaign aimed at ending the Schism. They all wrote
pamphlets calling for its end. Benedict XIII agreed in theory to the idea of
abdicating, but refusing to submit to secular pressure, he presented “dis-
cussion” between the two popes (via discussionis) as his solution to bolster
negotiations.
Benedict’s proposal led to several French embassies. In May 1395,
Charles VI sent his uncles, the Dukes of Berry and Burgundy, and his
brother, the Duke of Orléans, to Avignon to persuade the pope to abdi-
cate. This was to no avail. Gontier Col, a secretary of the king of France,
kept a journal that informs his readers on the day-to-day conduct of the
negotiations. Gontier explains that the pope habitually offered dinner to
the emissaries, after which he systematically refused any of their propo-
sals. On July 7, the French ambassadors told Benedict that they had eaten
enough! Frustrated, they left Avignon. 46 The embassy nevertheless bene-
262 Chapter 6

fited the city’s merchants. Boninsegna relished the spending of the four
thousand men who arrived with the Dukes of Berry, Burgundy, and Or-
léans. 47 Discussions continued for three years after their departure, until
July 1398, when the French king and clergy voted for the “way of ces-
sion,” also called the “subtraction of obedience.”
The royal ordinance forbade anyone to obey Benedict’s commands or
send any tax revenues to his court. The king deprived the pope of his
right of collation and decreed the loss of benefices for any of his follow-
ers. This legislation favored a French (or Gallican) church financially and
administratively independent from the papacy. The resolution reached
Avignon in early September 1398, and most of Benedict’s cardinals left
for Villeneuve, directly across the bridge on French soil. They supported
an Avignon pope whom (ideally) they could influence, as opposed to the
Roman intruder, but not their current, inflexible pope. Benedict found
refuge in his palatial fortress with some Spanish troops and five cardi-
nals. The subtraction quickly led to war.
Martin de Alpartil, Benedict’s chamberlain, wrote a chronicle that
elaborates on this momentous event. 48 He explains how king and cardi-
nals decided that the capture of the pope would be the best means of
softening his resolve and how they hired the condottiere Boucicaut to take
the palace and its pope. Once in Avignon, Boucicaut bragged to anyone
listening that he would drag the pope back to Paris in chains. But, con-
founding his plans, the pope did not give in. The siege lasted almost a
year, until May 1399, and actually worked to Benedict’s advantage. Louis
of Orléans (Charles VI’s brother) admired the pontiff’s stubbornness and
resilience and became his protector. Louis negotiated an end to the siege,
by whose terms the pope was required to remain isolated in his palace.
Benedict submitted to this mandate, but only until he escaped the palace
on March 12, 1403. The pope’s evasion precipitated the end of the sub-
traction, and France quickly restored its obedience to Benedict XIII in
May 1403.
The French subtraction put Avignon in a difficult situation. The city
became the focal point of a complex mesh of factions that forced its citi-
zens to join a camp. Rumors of the expulsion of Benedict’s Spanish troops
circulated, and letters were posted on the palace gates urging the pope to
abdicate and the town to disavow him. In September 1398, after meeting
with the cardinals, the city council decided just that and gave Boucicaut’s
men their support. Lobbies were divided territorially: Benedict’s support-
 The Great Western Schism and Avignon 263

ers favored the old town within the twelfth-century walls, the palace, and
its surroundings, while his enemies distanced themselves both politically
and physically from the palace. Some cardinals settled in Villeneuve,
French lands on the other side of the Rhône, and antipapal meetings took
place on the city’s outskirts, away from the palace: at the Franciscan
convent in the southeast, and at the Church of Saint-Didier to the south.
The 1398–1399 siege inflicted much damage on the city, especially in its
expensive northern neighborhoods. Boucicaut bombarded and mined the
palace, and Benedict retaliated by aiming his own bombards and cross-
bows at the city, greatly damaging the area directly around the palace.
The siege of the palace led to a stalemate, and time favored the pope,
even if the besieged had to resort to eating cats, rats, and sparrows
(which Benedict supposedly relished). The papal fortress was impreg-
nable; military failure led to Boucicaut’s dismissal and his replacement by
the Sénéchal of Provence, an agent of the king of France. Propaganda
permeated this urban space. In December 1399, a sermon preached at the
city’s Carmelite convent renounced a return of obedience to Pope Bene-
dict. In February 1400, Benedict’s supporters then preached sermons at
the Church of Saint-Geniès. In response, the cardinals forbade calling the
pope by anything else but his secular name, Pedro de Luna.
The sense of loss of control felt by the Avignonese appeared incongru-
ously in spectacles that symbolized their position. In April 1400, crafts-
men supporting the pope appropriately chose to reenact the Trojan War
in the city’s streets. We can imagine Benedict as the heroic Hector, fight-
ing to defend the homeland of his Trojans, while the French were pre-
sented as the invading and besieging Greeks. A few months later, in June
1400, craftsmen organized a passion play at the Dominican convent dur-
ing Pentecost. It is hard to tell whom the crucified Jesus symbolized: the
pope, the city, or the state of the Church. When, in October 1400, the king
ordered his brother Louis to protect the pope, two factions took over: one
pro-cardinal group supporting papal abdication, and the other pro-
Orléans group supporting the reinstatement of France’s obedience to
Benedict. Both factions posted letters throughout the city to advance their
cause.
Eventually Benedict capitulated to these demands, assured of the
Duke of Orléans’s protection. The pope was assigned to mandatory con-
finement in his palace for the next three years while his enemies debated
whether or not to restore their obedience to him as leader of the Church.
264 Chapter 6

In May 1401, Provence returned its obedience to Benedict, and events

took a dramatic turn for the worse. The French cardinals, feeling their
control of the situation loosening, heightened the antipapal rhetoric.
Mobs searched the town to expel any Catalans and Spaniards, whom, as
the pope’s compatriots, the mobs considered to be traitors by association,
and such murky politics led to spectacularly gruesome executions. Com-
pelled by the cardinals, Avignon’s authorities accused a few men of trea-
son because they had publicly shown their support for Benedict. Con-
demned as traitors, they were beheaded, eviscerated, and quartered. As a
deterrent to others in the city who might sympathize with Benedict, their
limbs were hung on the gates of the city and remained there for several
months. 49
The cardinals chose this moment—surely to distance themselves from
the extreme violence and to legitimate their own position in the cause of
the Avignon papacy—to honor the late Clement VII and Peter of Luxem-
bourg, a local saint. On September 18, 1401, the body of Clement VII was
transferred with great pomp from the Cathedral of Notre-Dame des
Doms to his final resting place at the newly built Convent of Celestines,
founded to honor Cardinal Peter of Luxembourg. The cardinals used this
ceremony to communicate with the population in the familiar medieval
language of ritual; they were making clear to their audience that they
supported the schismatic Avignon papacy but not Benedict himself. By
the end of November, the limbs of the pseudotraitors still hung at the
Gates Saint-Lazare, Imbert Neuve, Saint-Michel, and des Miracles to re-
mind the Avignonese that the cardinals would not relinquish their hold
on the city. The crisis had reached a climax.
The political situation stabilized in Avignon only when powerful ac-
tors outside the immediate theater of the conflict compromised in their
politics and came to an agreement. In Paris, Isabeau, King Charles’s wife,
negotiated a truce between the Dukes of Orléans, Berry, and Burgundy.
She charged the Duke of Orléans with special responsibility for the pon-
tiff’s personal protection as well as safeguarding the cardinals, while she
assigned the protection of Avignon itself to the Duke of Berry. But the
key to the restoration of peace was Benedict XIII’s escape from the palace
during the night of March 12, 1403, in the disguise of a Carthusian monk.
According to a receipt found at the Vatican Archives, Benedict left the
palace at three in the morning and reached the Inn of Saint-Antoine,
where several knights belonging to Louis of Orléans’s household and the
 The Great Western Schism and Avignon 265

constable of Aragon were waiting for him. 50 The group embarked, sailing
down the Rhône and up the Durance toward Châteaurenard, in Proven-
çal territory.
Although Benedict’s departure left Avignon without its pope, the city
still remained a papal seat. Benedict appointed his nephew, Rodrigo de
Luna, as rector of Avignon and the Venaissin, but never again did a pope
rule the Latin Church from the city’s magnificent palace. On March 29,
1403, Avignon offered the pope the keys of the city in a sign of submis-
sion. Celebrations marked the end of the crisis, including feasts and a
procession led by children. But Avignon’s return to papal obedience,
soon followed by France and Castile, still did not solve the Schism.
The result of the subtraction was total failure. Both popes continued to
control their individual camps, but no more than that. Boniface IX in Italy
had also refused to abdicate and still ruled as rival to Benedict XIII. In-
deed, the subtraction had created in France an administrative mess when
royal collectors replaced papal officers, leaving ecclesiastical benefices
mere pawns in secular hands. The French clergy who had so vehemently
supported the subtraction soon realized that the king’s authority was no
better than the pope’s. By 1403, two of the three proposed solutions, the
ways of force and cession, had utterly failed, and the University of Paris
worked feverishly to formulate new options.
In 1381, Pierre d’Ailly, a young docteur of the University of Paris, had
proposed to the Duke of Anjou the calling of a general council. But be-
cause only a legitimate pope could summon a council, the proposal was
not considered feasible. Ironically, the very act of summoning a church
council presupposed the legitimacy as pope of the one who convened it;
in an era when two popes simultaneously asserted their legitimacy, the
calling of a council to determine legitimacy was itself problematic. In
addition, in order to mediate this conflict effectively, both parties needed
to participate in the council, and neither side was willing to defer and
allow a common meeting. However, there were signs of hope; after all,
after years of failure, the initial options pursued at the beginning of the
Schism—physical aggression, double resignation, and cession—were fi-
nally dropped by 1403. The return to Christian unity was an imperative,
and kings and courts spent the five years that followed the restoration of
obedience negotiating the feasibility of a council at which both popes met
and mediated their differences.
266 Chapter 6

Ironically, the difficulties the Schism created for both popes did not
alter their resolve. In Rome, Boniface constantly faced threats from his
enemies, mostly led by the Colonna family. Boniface exerted little control
over the Italian Papal States, which gained politically by constantly repo-
sitioning themselves vis-à-vis both popes. On the Clementist side, the
subtraction and restitution had only managed to buttress Benedict’s re-
solve to remain in power. His main enemy, Philip the Bold, Duke of
Burgundy, died in April 1404. The duke’s rivalry with his nephew, Louis
of Orléans, had fueled most of the events of the subtraction. The death of
his enemy, however, did not bring much relief to Benedict.
After the 1403 restitution of French obedience, Benedict proclaimed
his willingness to meet his papal competitor face to face. He promised to
step down if the Roman pope did also or if he died; and he promised to
attend a council if he could be convinced that it truly aimed to reunite the
Church. Many thinkers of that time, like Jean Gerson, assumed that Bene-
dict’s strategy to cast his actions as a goodwill effort to reestablish the
Church’s unity was a delaying tactic devised to maintain the status quo.
For Gerson, a council was the sole viable solution to the Schism. At Mar-
seille in November 1403, Gerson met Benedict. As the French ambassador
delegated to negotiate with the pontiff, he preached a sermon insisting
that a good shepherd sacrifices his life for his lambs. 51 The half-hidden
allusion hit its mark and shamed Benedict into action, as he then agreed
to negotiate directly with Boniface. He deployed ambassadors to Rome,
who reached the city at the end of September 1404. The chronicler of
Saint-Denis recounts the contentious meeting that took place between the
envoys of Benedict and Boniface, followed by the Roman pope’s death a
mere three days later on October 1, 1404. Alarmed by the coincidental
timing of Boniface’s death, the Roman population imprisoned Benedict’s
envoys until the end of the conclave that elected his successor, Innocent
VII. 52
As at earlier times, the death of a pope initiated a flow of declarations
from all sides intended to delay the opening the conclave; they were
largely ignored. The Roman cardinals elected Boniface’s successor and
swore that they and the new pope would work toward unity. Their
choice of Cosimo de’ Migliorati, who took the name of Innocent VII, was
based on his reputed honesty. The new pope continued negotiating with
the now-freed Avignonese envoys, who remained in the city to continue
their task. Discussions eventually stalled, and in February 1405 the am-
 The Great Western Schism and Avignon 267

bassadors returned home when Benedict excommunicated his new rival.

Benedict chose this moment to march toward Rome, intent on forcing
unity. It seemed no secret to anyone that, supported by Louis of Orléans,
the pope was reverting to the “way of force.” He traveled from Marseille
to Nice and entered Genoa in May 1405. He remained in the city for a
year, waiting for support from the king of France that never materialized.
This incursion on Italian soil naturally alarmed Pope Innocent, even
more so because it emboldened his archenemy, the Colonna clan. In
Rome, the Colonna continued instigating the city’s population to revolt.
Innocent charged his nephew Ludovico Migliorati, a condottiere whom he
had named cardinal, to defend his position. But Migliorati’s heavy-
handed response fueled the uprising even further, forcing the pope and
his court to escape to Viterbo and to dismiss his nephew (whom he later
made a marquis and count). But again, behind all Roman political in-
trigues of the early fifteenth century stood a familiar antagonist: Ladis-
laus Durazzo, son of Charles of Durazzo, the sometime king of Naples,
archenemy of Louis II of Anjou, and supporter of the Colonnas. Papal
policies were again enmeshed with the disputed Kingdom of Naples and
the claims of its rulers to papal territories. Like his father Charles, Ladis-
laus had inherited the contested Angevin Kingdom of Naples and de-
fended it against the son of Louis I of Anjou. The Roman papacy backed
Durazzo, but their relations were tense, as illustrated by Durazzo’s ac-
tions against Innocent. The pope realized that Durazzo’s ambition did
not stop at the defense of his southern kingdom of Naples; he knew that
Durazzo also plotted to conquer Rome and other Papal States. Innocent’s
response was to keep troops of mercenaries readily available in Rome.
Innocent’s rival, Pope Benedict, was also wary of his own situation.
Even though he had left his capital city of Avignon, he made sure to
repair his palace-fortress from the damage it had sustained during the
subtraction, and he kept a garrison of Catalan mercenaries stationed
there. In December 1403 he ordered the razing of several houses that
faced the palace, partially opening the square that still exists today, the
Place du Palais. He then initiated work on the ramparts that protected the
palace, the cathedral, the episcopal palace, and the Rock. He filled the
palace’s towers with provisions and weapons, obviously preparing for a
possible attack. His actions were not lost on the French court. The chroni-
cler of Saint-Denis reports, not without exaggeration, that “Our Lordship
Benedict kept busy restoring his palace of Avignon, and he fortified its
268 Chapter 6

ramparts by razing to the ground the Church of Notre-Dame, tomb of his

predecessors, and several other solid edifices.” 53 But it was clear that
while Paris paid attention, Benedict, unabashed in his resolve, was far
from ready to give up the papal throne.
Financial support for rival candidates from interested parties pro-
longed the Schism, making it last as long as it did. Resourceful measures,
more or less successful, met the financial crises of the two campaigns for
Naples in 1382–1384 and 1389–1399 and the French subtraction. The Avi-
gnon popes increased their taxation of the French clergy, who returned
the favor by subjecting the pope to similar financial pressure when they
withdrew their payments during the subtraction of obedience. Resolved
to maintain his power, Benedict ordered the French clergy to pay back its
arrears after the 1403 restitution of obedience, and in this fashion he
managed to fund his travels by dividing his court. The camerlengo and
treasurers remained with the pope, while the fiscal administration stayed
in Avignon to collect the necessary funds. These administrators then sup-
plied the pope with letters of exchange to be paid in Perpignan, Genoa, or
Savona. This sophisticated system allowed the pope and his court to
survive via the cashing of “checks,” the letters of exchange. The system
had the advantage of minimizing risks by eliminating the physical move-
ment of funds.
Financial matters also precipitated the second break with France and
what is called the second subtraction. Benedict required the French clergy
to pay all ecclesiastical arrears that had lagged since 1398. The French
clergy and the University of Paris, spurred on by the Dukes of Burgundy
and Berry, opposed the idea and decided to meet in council. Discussions
started in November 1406, continued through 1407, and evolved into a
division between an old-school partisan of an absolutist papacy that
could not envision limits to its power (represented by Pierre d’Ailly) and
the reformers who pleaded for limiting papal powers (represented by
Simon de Cramaud, Jean Petit, and Pierre Leroy). On January 3, 1407,
France declared its independence from the papacy. Gallicanism thus
emerged from the Schism; it was born at this specific historical moment
when local French authorities decided on certain temporal matters inde-
pendently from the papacy. The assembly of 1407 took the bold step of
declaring the Church ill governed and in need of major reform.
 The Great Western Schism and Avignon 269

TOWARD A SOLUTION

By early 1407, the crisis had partially abated for both parties. Innocent
had died in November 1406, and his successor Gregory XII was open to
negotiations. Most of the cardinals in both colleges were too young to
have participated in the original break of 1378, and both colleges were
also willing to open serious discussions. They convinced both popes to
meet in Savona, near Genoa, at the end of October 1407. Benedict arrived
early in September, but Gregory, limited financially, advanced only with
great difficulty. In the end, both popes remained some thirty miles away
from each other, one in Portovenere and one in Lucca, never to meet face
to face. Events external to this meeting sealed its fate. In November 1407,
men of John the Fearless, Duke of Burgundy, assassinated the Duke of
Orléans, John’s nephew and Benedict’s strongest supporter. The Duke of
Burgundy now equally controlled Parisian and papal politics. Benedict,
realizing that he had lost his most influential advocate, excommunicated
King Charles VI and put France under interdict. This news precipitated
the second French subtraction of obedience declared on May 25, 1408.
The French crown reestablished the French church’s liberty to act inde-
pendently from the pope and declared its neutrality.
After losing French support, in August 1408 Benedict found refuge in
Aragon, settling in Perpignan, on what is modern France’s southwestern
coast. It was from there that he decided to call his own council, attended
mainly by Castilians and Aragonese, now his sole base of support. In
Italy, Gregory’s response was to call his own council in June 1409, an
event joined by even fewer participants.
By the summer of 1409, both colleges had reached the limit of their
patience with their respective popes, and groups of dissidents from both
sides met in Livorno, deciding to call a Church council in Pisa. Their call
rallied most of the European kingdoms, which approved of “rebellion”
when facing “tyranny.” Both colleges agreed on advancing the theory of
the Church’s universality to solve the council’s deadlock. Even without
the presence of a pope, a council summoned by an entity outside the
papacy was legitimate because in some instances an assembly represent-
ing the universal Church was legitimate and surpassed the pope’s au-
thority.
In April 1409, some five hundred representatives attended the Council
of Pisa, proof of the cardinals’ power of persuasion. The council opened
270 Chapter 6

with the trial of both popes, both accused of heresy and witchcraft, evi-
dent from the fact that they had not tried to find a solution to the divi-
sion. On June 5, Simon de Cramaud read the unanimous sentence. The
council, in the name of the universal Church, pronounced both popes
notoriously schismatic and deposed them from office. De Cramaud de-
clared the papal see vacant. The council allowed the cardinals present to
choose a new pope, an interesting situation since they had all been ap-
pointed by popes now declared schismatic; their decision could be con-
sidered illegitimate. On June 26 they elected Peter Philarges, Pope Alex-
ander V. The council ended in August after announcing the news of
“union” to most of Europe while Alexander settled his court in Bologna.
But Pope Alexander, a Franciscan monk, managed to quickly arouse
widespread clerical discontent when he allowed the mendicant orders to
preach and confess wherever they wished, setting them in direct compe-
tition with secular clergymen. This radical novelty was strongly criti-
cized, especially by the University of Paris, which labeled it “intolerable.”
The crisis was far from over. Benedict and Gregory rejected the deci-
sions of the Council of Pisa, and Alexander died within a year of his
nomination. The cardinals of the new Pisan obedience then elected a
third pope, Baldassare Cossa, John XXIII. All three popes continued to
receive various levels of support as internal and external politics fueled
disunity, now between three papal courts. Each court offered financial
advantages to its followers that led to a chaotic race for ecclesiastical
benefices. Pisa’s union was unraveling at a fast pace. The solution rested
in the call of another council.
Avignon followed this news closely. A chronicler of the time had
remained silent on the second subtraction. 54 But the situation changed in
1409 after the Council of Pisa condemned both popes and elected a third
one: the chronicler then writes that “the said pope [Alexander V] was
crowned on 7 July. It is to note that there is a Schism, that is to say we
have three popes. Benedict XIII done in Avignon, Boniface done in Rome,
and the said Alexander, who is Greek.” He was not aware (or at least
pretended not to be) that Benedict had been deposed. He follows with a
description of Notre-Dame des Doms’s evacuation of its monks and dea-
cons by the garrison of Catalans. 55 In January 1409, Benedict took the
bold step of excommunicating all the cardinals, patriarchs, and the Uni-
versity of Paris as “schismatic” heretics. The bull was posted on all the
churches of Avignon. A propaganda war thus raged again. In March, the
 The Great Western Schism and Avignon 271

French lobby ordered the execution of a prisoner and left him hanging on
the Rocher des Doms to impress the population. In early April, a king’s
representative paraded on the Bridge Saint-Bénézet to remind Avignon
that the city needed to heed his orders and those of France. 56 In spite of
these threats, the “War of Catalans” officially erupted on April 29, 1410,
when the captain of the palace, the pope’s nephew Rodrigo de Luna,
captured twelve eminent citizens and held them as prisoners. Some one
thousand French-paid knights and troops arrived to free them, besieging
the palace while supported by a massive bombarde (an early cannon) that
required thirty-six horses to draw it. The palace was well defended by
Benedict’s Catalan troops; it suffered damage but did not fall. 57 The war
dragged on, causing more harm when both sides aimed their trebuchets
and bombardes at each other. The artifice of a crusade, called by John XXIII
to boost morale and hasten a dénouement to the conflict, did little to
lessen the captain’s resolve. Rodrigo de Luna’s heroic defense of the be-
sieged palace lasted close to eighteen months; he finally surrendered in
November 1411. Casualties were high on both sides. The anonymous
chronicler lists the death of most captives and the public displays of
several executed prisoners; he lists some four thousand losses for a single
assault in February 1411. 58
John XXIII ordered repairs for some of the damage at the end of 1412,
when he anticipated moving into the papal fortress. Lacking funds, John
followed the well-established custom that required the Avignonese to
finance the pope’s expenses in their city. In the name of the Church he
took over incomes produced by the unclaimed succession of Avignonese
citizens, taxed Jewish moneylenders, and pocketed bequests made to
“pious institutions.” This significant repair and construction campaign
certainly brought some work back to the city, as well as a few pilgrims.
Holy Roman Emperor Sigismund, on hearing praises of the refurbished
palace’s majesty, spent some twenty-three days between December 1415
and January 1416 visiting the area. He was so impressed that he bought
two paintings of the palace.
Pisa and the second subtraction demonstrated a dire need for eccle-
siastical reform, and John XXIII, eventually expelled from Rome, turned
to the Holy Roman emperor for a solution. As a new Constantine, Sigis-
mund, King of the Romans and, as such, defender of the Church since
1411, called a meeting by general edict in Constance for November 1,
1414. Ecclesiastical delegates (abbots, bishops, cardinals) and representa-
272 Chapter 6

tives of all states arrived at a slow pace, beginning with the French in
March 1415. For voting purposes, organizers divided the attendance into
linguistic communities, or nations, based on the model found in Euro-
pean universities, with French, German, English, and Italian nations and
the cardinals. Nations voted in a block with a single vote each. It is
important to note that Benedict XIII’s Spanish nation was absent early on
as Spain’s national organization remained fragmentary and insular,
working against the desired universality of the council.
The council’s first order of business was clearly to reconcile the
Church. Moved by the spirit of reform, delegates launched violent di-
atribes attacking the avaricious, luxurious, and simoniac practices of the
curia, pressuring John XXIII to abdicate. Worried for his safety, the pope
escaped to Schaffhausen with the help of the Duke of Austria, still pro-
tected by Emperor Sigismund. After a month-long negotiation, John
XXIII resigned without conditions, and the council deposed him. The
pope who had taken the first vital step toward union was the first one the
council dealt with; two other popes were left. On April 5, 1415, the decree
Haec sancta paved the way toward a radical solution by legitimizing all
decisions taken by the council. The council claimed its power directly
from Christ and ordered all men, regardless of office, to abide by its
decisions as a matter of faith, for the extirpation of the Schism. This
radical declaration nullified the powers of the Catholic Church’s hierar-
chy and of the pope, replacing hierarchical authority with the congrega-
tion of the faithful. The many replaced the one.
Events accelerated quickly after the council made this groundbreak-
ing decision. Gregory XII abdicated, and in July 1415, as a reward for his
gesture, the council ratified all the decisions he had made. Matters were
not so simple with Benedict XIII, however, who rejected any type of
compromise. The pope argued that as the sole survivor of all the cardi-
nals nominated before the Schism, he held the right to choose a new
pope. He was the unique legitimate elector. Stubborn in this belief until
the end, Benedict’s Spanish supporters abandoned him for his inflexibil-
ity, and he eventually left Perpignan for his fortress of Peñiscola, which
he nicknamed his Noah’s ark.
Benedict’s retreat allowed the Spanish nation to join the council at the
point when his trial opened. Benedict’s obstinacy earned him the epithets
“disturber of the peace and Church’s union, schismatic, heretic”; and as
such the council deposed him on July 27, 1417. With this action, all con-
 The Great Western Schism and Avignon 273

tenders for papal supremacy had been eliminated. The slate was wiped
clean to elect a new pope once the assembly agreed on the modalities.
The council articulated voting procedures that all members agreed on,
leaving the election to fifty-three electors (six representatives for each
nation) and twenty-three cardinals, with a majority of two-thirds re-
quired for each nation and the college of cardinals. After a three-day-long
conclave, on November 11, 1417, the nations and cardinals picked Od-
done Colonna as the sole pontiff ruling the Church. He took the name of
Martin V. With Martin’s ascension, the Schism was officially over. In
Avignon, the anonymous chronicler who remains the main source for the
period relates how the news of the election reached the city on November
20 among general celebrations. Avignon, relieved to be left with no more
than one pope, hosted festivities that lasted a week.

EFFECTS AND RESULTS

It is clear that this lengthy division within the Church lasted as long as it
did because it benefited the private interests of many parties. Both sides
perpetuated the Schism, even if through different means. The simple fact
that the financial records of the Avignon papacy survived the Schism and
the Roman records did not has led many historians to suggest Roman
incompetence. Unable to support the accounting procedures so dear to its
predecessors, the Roman administration simply faltered. On the contrary,
the Avignon popes benefited from a real advantage when Gregory XI’s
camerlengo chose to serve Clement VII, thereby bringing to him the sup-
port of most of the Chamber’s staff. The treasurer’s decision to follow
Clement with most of the papal treasury consolidated Avignon’s finances
and organization. Avignon kept the Chamber’s personnel along with its
experience.
Avignon’s central location relative to those subject to its obedience—
in and around the city and more generally in France—made the collection
of taxes steady and regular. Ecclesiastical and seignorial revenues (a few
thousand florins per year) levied from the Comtat Venaissin and Avi-
gnon were not as widespread as Urban’s and easily reached Clement’s
treasury. They were also far less important than the one million or so
florins Urban received from the Roman Papal States. But Urban’s obedi-
ence was large and dispersed throughout Europe, making it more diffi-
cult to control. Ireland, Scandinavia, and Hungary were far away from
274 Chapter 6

Rome, while the closer kingdoms of Germany and Italy could be at time
uncooperative. If not because of distance, politics made the collection of
taxes laborious for the Roman popes. Papal rectors and vicars collected
ecclesiastical and seignorial revenues and spent funds according to papal
needs. The Roman popes were at the mercy of their administrators, who
could sometimes be members of rival political entities. In addition, Ur-
ban’s newly formed Chamber and Treasury lacked experience, and this
complicated the administration of his court. But regardless of their differ-
ences, by the late 1380s both administrations collected roughly the same
amount of revenues from direct taxation—some 250,000 florins yearly,
enabling the Schism to last because each side could literally afford it.
As Avignon’s residents suffered the prolonged effects of local war-
fare, the depredations of the marauding companies, and Raymond de
Turenne’s troops, as their economy inevitably faltered and they bore the
brunt of so many exactions committed in the name of Church unity, it is
difficult to assess how the people really perceived the events of the
Schism, but we may hazard a guess, perhaps. The lack of widespread
literacy prevents historians from properly gauging how people felt, at
least based on what may have been preserved in written sources, and
whether they cared about these lofty political and religious issues or not.
Jean Favier, in the introduction to his book Genèse et débuts du Grand
Schisme d’Occident, maintains that continuity in the parochial infrastruc-
ture of both papal parties made the Schism an elite, academic debate that
did not concern average people. The common folk were not overly wor-
ried since their priests still maintained the familiar sacramental and litur-
gical continuities that lay at the heart of their religious lives. 59 Most peo-
ple followed their political and religious leaders, and as long as priests
delivered the sacraments in their local communities, they did not worry.
Thus for Favier, the Schism was not a spiritual crisis for Europe’s popula-
tion. Following Favier, in his own recent discussion of this question, Phil-
ip Daileader calls the response to the Schism “muted.” The crisis created
changes and complicated lives, but people learned to adjust: “As long as
masses were said, confessions heard, baptisms administered, and burials
conducted as they had always been—as long as the means of salvation
remained unchallenged—then the Schism’s local consequences could
only be minimal.” 60
On the other hand, in her study of the diocese of Cambrai during the
Great Western Schism, Monique Maillard-Luypaert has argued to the
 The Great Western Schism and Avignon 275

contrary, suggesting that since the crisis touched important matters of

faith, it was a daily preoccupation for all levels of society. 61 But her infor-
mation comes from the written sources of a literate class that may have
been more engaged in the crisis and understood its implications than
common laborers and peasants. Renate Blumenfeld-Kosinski, in Poets,
Saints, and Visionaries of the Great Schism, similarly tries to assess the level
of anxiety produced by the crisis in a group study comprising saints,
visionaries, poets, and prophets. She suggests that their literary and icon-
ographic responses, laden with apocalyptic themes, indicate deep mal-
aise. 62 As with the study of Maillard-Luypaert, her data is not truly rep-
resentative of the attitudes of the common folk.
Sources available for late medieval Avignon offer a modicum of infor-
mation that may afford us a glance into popular reactions to the crisis.
They range from legal documents like final wills to chronicles and canon-
ization dossiers. Because of the papal court’s presence and the early de-
ployment of Roman law in the French south, Avignon boasted a high
number of lawyers and notaries who spread their legal culture to all
levels of society. Most all classes recorded deeds, marriage contracts,
donations, and wills. The last wills, or testaments, of hundreds of people
offer an indirect way by which to gauge the impact of the crisis on the
population. Testators dictated their final wishes to notaries, who first
hand-drafted “minutes” in their notebooks and later recast them as a
formal document, usually a thick piece of parchment that they eventually
delivered to the testator for safekeeping. Wills are formulaic, but they are
sometimes a historian’s sole entry into the minds of people dead centu-
ries ago. They offer snapshots into emotional lives, familial connections,
and relations with institutions.
All medieval wills started with the same formula: “In nomine domini.
Amen” (“In the name of the Lord. Amen”), followed by the date and a
preamble on the certainty of death and the necessity to draft a will. Testa-
tors then revoked past wills and dedicated their souls to God, the Virgin,
and the celestial Court. The choice of the place of burial followed, with
the list of pious bequests, usually monetary gifts to religious institutions
in exchange for masses and prayers. Then came bequests and legacies to
a wide array of named individuals, relatives, kin, friends, acquaintances,
neighbors, and servants, and to specific religious institutions that testa-
tors wished to endow (such as churches, convents, confraternities, and
276 Chapter 6

hospitals). Gifts most often came in the form of money, products, uten-
sils, and often, clothing.
In his study of Avignonese testaments, Jacques Chiffoleau draws few
conclusions about the impact of the Schism on individuals’ inner lives.
First of all, he finds in the extant wills no echoes of the eschatological
crisis that marked the literary treatises of the time. He notes an increase in
alms and donations from 1380 to 1420, indicating that the population was
looking for intercessory prayers. But he also observes that testators were
keenly aware of the financial burden the Schism imposed on churches
and monasteries and chose to lighten it by compensating some of those
losses with their private donations. The personal engagement of testators
compensates them for the lack of institutional support. In a similar vein,
it is worth noticing that Avignon’s mass of unemployed poor clerics,
losers in the quest for benefices between the two competing papacies,
created a “liturgical proletariat,” as it were, readily available to support
the heavenly aspirations of commoners by praying on their behalf. Testa-
tors asked and paid for these clerics’ attendance in funeral corteges, pro-
cessions, and masses. In short, testamentary bequests prove that the
circumstances of the Schism actually empowered the lower classes to
copy the liturgical practices of their wealthy contemporaries. Commoners
expected, much like their wealthy neighbors, rather flamboyant and
spectacular funerals that featured supernumerary torch-bearing clergy,
who would (for a fee) be engaged to offer countless masses ensuring their
benefit in the afterlife. In this manner, to a certain extent the Schism
democratized access to a complex array of socially important liturgical
practices.
Finally, Jacques Chiffoleau suggests that the high incidence of re-
quests for burials within mendicant cemeteries (Franciscans, Dominicans,
Augustinian, and Carmelites) could suggest a certain mistrust of tradi-
tional parochial institutions. Still, he recognizes that this trend could sim-
ply be a response to a local situation. During the Schism, money short-
ages led to the quick degradation of many parochial churches, forcing
testators to choose burial elsewhere, most of all in convents. 63
Because of its sweeping chronological scope, Chiffoleau’s study
underscores large movements and not subtler shifts in popular mental-
ities. My own analysis of some eighty testaments of middle-class Avi-
gnonese women offers a different approach. These sources permit the
possibility of weighing data from a discrete sample, divided chronologi-
 The Great Western Schism and Avignon 277

cally between a pre- and post-Schism sample (see table 6.3). They are
divided almost equally between thirty-three testaments for the forty
years that preceded 1378 and thirty-two for the following years until
1446. Using these sources to test hypothetical attitudes toward the
Church as these are revealed in bequests, I chose to consider only in-
stances of legacies to institutions, not those to individuals. Contrary to
Chiffoleau’s conclusions, these women did not differentiate between bu-
rials in parochial or conventual churches, and they donated equally to
their parochial churches and to their favorite convents and monasteries.
In sum, this discrete sample suggests that at the local level, the Schism
did not alter how women viewed, related to, and supported their local
institutions.
Table 6.3. Testamentary Donations by Instances

Before 1378 After 1378

Church burial 17 20
Convent burial 16 12
Total 33 32
Buried with father 2 7
Buried with mother 1 2
Buried with husband 9 6
Buried with children 3 5
Buried with other 1 2
To Franciscans 9 9
To Dominicans 15 7
To Augustinians 11 6
To Carmelites 6 7
To Benedictines 3 0
To parish 25 26
To nuns 11 6
To confraternities 20 8
To bridge 8 5
To hospitals for poor 20 4
Marriage poor girls 5 1
Inscription in obituary/necrology 0 6

Indeed, a close reading of the data actually shows a very slight de-
crease in bequests to conventual and monastic institutions, confrater-
278 Chapter 6

nities, and hospitals after the Schism. This decline may simply represent
the lower wealth of testatrices rather than an overall shift in mentality.
The bequests aimed at repairing the St. Bénézet Bridge remained stable
over time, as did the alms for the marriages of poor girls.
Only one notable testamentary change stands out in the wake of the
Schism. It is the injunction by testatrices to see their names written down
in conventual and parochial necrologies or obituaries. These liturgical
“books of the dead,” created in the early Middle Ages for memorializing
the death of monks, quickly grew into lists of benefactors that recorded
names and dates of a benefactor’s passing. By the end of the Middle
Ages, most parochial, confraternal, and monastic institutions kept necrol-
ogies where they recorded the names of their members and the dates of
their deaths. These books of remembrance prompted the liturgical staff to
pray and celebrate the anniversary days of the dead. This Avignonese
practice of citing the names of the dead suggests a desire to remember the
deceased as still living by annually invoking their names; although they
are dead, yet still they live in remembrance—an important and consoling
act during the unstable and dangerous years of the Schism. The act of
writing a name down secured a place in Heaven by reminding interces-
sors to do their job in prayer. This also represents another instance of
liturgical democratization. Obituaries and necrologies started with
monks and nuns, spread to the aristocracy and patrician families, and
finally reached all social classes by the end of the Middle Ages.
Extraordinary circumstances led to exceptional events, and their oc-
currence provides a window into the mentality of the era. The few “spon-
taneous” pilgrimages encountered during the Schism also reflect how
contemporaries internalized the crisis. Nicolas di Bonaccorso, a mer-
chant-banker located in Avignon, corresponded frequently with his Flo-
rentine employer Francesco di Marco Datini. Starting in September 1393,
Nicolas began to write about groups of youths taking off from France and
Avignon for the Mont Saint-Michel. A letter dated September 16, 1393,
mentions that starting in July of that year, some young boys from France
led by the banners of Saint Michael, the fleur-de-lys, and Brittany abrupt-
ly left their families with no provisions (the letter notes that they had no
bread or wine). Several groups made their way to Mont Saint-Michel,
prayed, and returned home. The movement spread to Avignon, and Ni-
colas states that in the past three days from the date of his letter, at least
two hundred children of diverse ages left with their banners. He states:
 The Great Western Schism and Avignon 279

If only you could see them run! Happy is the one who can escape and
follow them! They say that big miracles have occurred; that fathers and
mothers who did not let their children go saw them dying on the spot.
They say that they will find enough provision to eat and drink on their
way, and that people give them enough alms. In Brittany and on the
lands of the duke of Berry, lords have decreed that they should be fed.
By God, these are great lords! We heard that thousands of children
have gone there from several countries. 64

Records of the Apostolic Chamber support the merchant’s account.

On September 18, the almoner of the pope sailed to Mont Saint-Michel
“by way of the dangerous sea” to bring aid to the poor children and
pilgrims of Avignon and its surroundings, who had just reached their
destination. 65 This spontaneous movement lasted into October, when Ni-
colas remarked that by October 4, some one thousand Avignonese had
left the city. Their departure stunned its residents. Nicolas insists again
on how young the children were, most between the ages of eight and
fifteen, and that they broke natural bonds by escaping their mothers and
fathers. This pilgrimage was for him truly miraculous, especially when
innocent children disobeyed their parents for the love of God. In his eyes,
the pilgrims were truly carried by supernatural fervor. Their youth and,
as such, purity added an intercessory quality to their task. Nicolas adds,
“This is for our sins since it started with the little children.” 66 For him, the
Schism was the affair of corrupted, selfish adults whose sinful intransi-
gence could be washed away only by the purity of children. The mer-
chant thus reflects a familiar topos in medieval reasoning: the sacrifices of
children to remit the sins of their elders.
This pilgrimage to Mont Saint-Michel had all the elements of an expia-
tory voyage. The distance covered to reach Brittany was significant
enough to give real intercessory value to the trip; and Saint Michael’s
stewardship and leadership was traditionally believed to protect pilgrims
from evil. He was the leader of God’s army, the protector of believers
who felt lost and powerless. This pilgrimage shows that the faithful
understood their lack of control and remedied it by showing their un-
adulterated devotion. Indeed, such pilgrims may have been somewhat
comforted by the continuity of ritual observance, but the Schism still
affected them. Frustrated by the church hierarchy’s indifference to their
spiritual welfare, they seized control of the situation by either leaving or
supporting and admiring those pilgrims who did travel to faraway Brit-
tany. Many Christians were waiting for Saint Michael to end the crisis.
280 Chapter 6

But the archangel was not the only saint asked to intervene. The cult
of a new saint appears to have been directly linked to the Schism. As
Robert Norman Swanson states, “When the church was split, the official
stance on canonization could raise serious issues. During the Great
Schism of 1378–1417, for instance, the separate lines of pontiffs created
their own saints. Both successions sought support by offering the carrot
of canonizations to their adherents.” 67 Saints legitimated popes. Pope
Urban counted on Catherine of Siena, while Clement advanced the sup-
port of Peter of Luxembourg and Vincent Ferrer. In general, each camp
was not afraid to use verbal and visual propaganda that included ser-
mons, processions, pamphlets, executions, and religious architecture as a
way to argue its pope’s legitimacy. The case of Peter of Luxembourg
illustrates this development.
A cousin of the king of France, Peter of Luxembourg received the
bishopric of Metz at age fifteen, in 1384; he died a cardinal three years
later, on July 2, 1387, just shy of his eighteenth birthday. Peter quickly
became a popular intercessor, his high rank and youth making his tomb
the center of a cult that attracted hundreds of pilgrims. Mystics like Marie
Robine also moved close to his remains. She set up residence in a small
oratory in the cemetery of Saint-Michel. 68 The combined presence of Lux-
embourg’s tomb and Robine’s residence made Avignon an attractive des-
tination for traveling pilgrims.
Realizing how popular he was with the people, the executors of Lux-
embourg’s will denied his original wishes to be buried in the humble
cemetery for poor immigrants. Luxembourg’s canonization procedure
(preserved in volume 27 of the Acta Sanctorum) records the cardinal’s
notoriety and his miracles. Interestingly enough, the procedure that led
to his beatification started shortly after his death; proof alone of his im-
mense popularity. Secretaries recorded a first set of testimonies between
July and December 1387. The formal process of canonization that began
three years later shows signs of extensive manipulation, emphasizing a
politicization of his miracles that supported the Clementist obedience. 69
The earlier set of testimonies makes it obvious that Peter’s remains
caused a prodigious enthusiasm in the city. His following was local and
urban, and maybe because of his age Peter was soon perceived as a
protector of sick children and youth. Testimonies mentioning Peter of
Luxembourg offer a window into the religious practices of late medieval
Avignon. For example, during the vigil that preceded his burial, a mass
 The Great Western Schism and Avignon 281

of people came to kiss his hands and feet, so many, in fact, that the doors
of the Church of Saint-Antoine could not be shut. Women brought jewel-
ry and rosaries that they rubbed on his head, hands, and feet, presumably
to save as personal relics. 70 Devotees assailed his coffin, ripping the
shroud that covered it and cutting it to pieces, along with the pillows and
cushions that supported his head. Then they broke through the bier and
hacked it to pieces in order to distribute as many shards as possible.
After witnessing such violent enthusiasm, the authorities decided to
fence off the site of his burial behind a wooden barricade. This did not
stop numbers of devotees from bringing pounds of wax and images (ex-
votos) to his tomb. Boninsegna di Matteo, a Florentine residing in Avi-
gnon whom we encountered earlier in the chapter, marveled at the devo-
tion surrounding Peter of Luxembourg and used him as a catalyst to
discuss what was wrong with the Church of his time. He may not have
realized how much promoting the veneration of local saints legitimated
popes and secured for themselves the grateful loyalty of large numbers of
devotees.
Discussing the fervor surrounding the saint and his tomb, Boninsegna
writes to his interlocutor,
the learned, the ignorant, the idiot, and the poor go there as they would
for a Great Pardon (a form of pilgrimage), and this, morning, afternoon
and night. Think that every single night 300 people remain there in
vigil. Many of the sick people who come for their novena end up
cured. . . . People arrive from everywhere, lame, crippled, one-armed,
and paralytic, and they are cured by the grace of God and of this saintly
cardinal. . . . This seems to be a great lesson, about real faith in the Holy
Church, and about those who want to live honestly in the world. When
you see the miracles that a young man of 24 [sic] operates, all the
faithful should thank God and behave well. 71

Like Nicolas before him, Boninsegna sharply takes the church to task
for its institutional defects. The faithful throng of pilgrims are for him the
honest ones, the true believers, and as such, these pilgrims are rewarded
by miracles. God recognizes his own. If the Schism is allowed to last, it is
because God chooses not to heal the wound. It is the Church’s just pun-
ishment for its sins.
Proof that there was a great need for healing and that the Schism
affected Christian believers, the saint’s fame quickly spread far and wide.
He became a favorite intercessor for thousands of pilgrims from all over
282 Chapter 6

France, who brought wax images to his tomb in thanks for fulfilling their
wishes. According to canonization procedures, Peter resurrected chil-
dren, saved the young and old from drowning in the Rhône and Durance
Rivers, healed the sick, cured the lame, doused fires, and found and
returned lost or stolen goods (even a mule). Pilgrims who visited his
tomb usually kissed the fence that protected the site and took some of the
soil from around the tomb to use in miraculous unguents. 72
Still, people did not systematically link the saint with the legitimacy of
the Avignon papacy, a trope that, as we will see below, ecclesiastics fa-
vored. Boninsegna’s previous comments are the extent of his criticism
when discussing the crisis. The merchant’s correspondence does not
dwell on the Schism and usually avoids discussing it directly. It was, to
him and many people of his day, a jinx. In July 1394, Boninsegna states:
“They say that sometimes, the ones who discuss the schism become mute
by virtue of Saint John Golden Mouthed. If a bigger principle does not
intervene in this business [the Schism] things will remain the same, be-
cause the world goes toward evil, everyone works against their own
interest, simony rules, and they want more money without thinking of
their souls.” 73
The statement seems a clear attack on the church hierarchy, which
seemed unwilling to solve the crisis. St. John Chrysostom was the patri-
arch of Constantinople in the late fourth century. At the imperial capital,
he earned for himself the surname “golden-mouthed” (chrysostomos) on
account of his eloquence, but he also made himself an exile from the
Byzantine court by his impolitic denunciation of all kinds of abuses, both
civil and religious. How appropriate, then, that the golden-mouthed
saint’s reputation for eloquence and truth rendered mute those who dis-
cussed the Schism. Simply naming the schismatic popes carried negative
associations. For example, the Anonimo fiorentino utilized the generic anti-
papa for Clement, never naming him directly, as if this simple act would
legitimize his existence. 74
The Schism’s prolonged continuation diminished the credibility and
international status of the papacy, promoting the emergence of national
churches that centuries of deliberate papal policy had smothered but
never totally eliminated. The old idea, fatal to papal pretensions of over-
lordship, that a king or emperor was in fact more fit than the pope to
defend the Christian faith, once more resurfaced. The Schism also pro-
moted conciliarism, a far more dangerous movement and one that Ren-
 The Great Western Schism and Avignon 283

aissance popes eliminated quickly. As for Avignon and its people, the
end of the Schism in Constance and the election of a “Roman” pope must
have stung, particularly when they saw their last hopes of retaining the
papacy vanish. The Schismatic papacy had been an ambiguous blessing
for the city, which had remained a truncated capital of Christianity, but a
capital nonetheless.

NOTES

1. Étienne Baluze, Vitae paparum avenionensium, hoc est, Historia pontificum romano-
rum qui in Gallia sederunt ab anno Christi MCCCV usque ad annum MCCCXCIV, ed.
Guillaume Mollat (Paris: Letouzey et Ané, 1914), vol. 1, 427, 440–441.
2. See Phillip H. Stump, The Reforms of the Council of Constance, 1414–1418 (Leiden:
Brill, 1994), for a thorough discussion of the council and common good.
3. Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils, ed. N. P. Tanner, S.J. (London: Shed and Ward,
1990), vol. 1, 438–442. The text is also available online at http://www.fordham.edu/
halsall/source/constance2.asp or http://www.papalencyclicals.net/Councils/ecum16.
htm (session 39).
4. Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils, ed. N. P. Tanner, S.J. (London: Shed and Ward,
1990), vol. 1, 314.
5. Noël Valois, La France et le grand schisme d’occident (Paris: A. Picard et fils,
1896–1902), vol. 1, 12.
6. Annales ecclesiastici, ed. Cesare Baronio, Odorico Rinaldi, Giacomo Laderchi,
Augustin Theiner, Antoine Pagi, and Giovan Domenico Mansi (Barri-Ducis: L. Guerin,
1864–1883), vol. 26, 288–289.
7. Louis Gayet, Le grand schisme d’occident d’après les documents contemporains dépo-
sés aux archives secrètes du Vatican (Florence: Loescher et Seeber, 1889), Pièces justifica-
tives, 100.
8. This violence is the subject of my Raiding Saint Peter: Empty Sees, Violence, and the
Initiation of the Great Western Schism (1378) (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2008).
9. Howard Kaminsky, “The Great Schism,” in The New Cambridge Medieval History,
ed. Michael Jones (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), vol. 6, 676.
10. Kaminsky, “The Great Schism,” 679.
11. Robert Norman Swanson, “Obedient and Disobedient in the Great Schism,”
Archivum historiae pontificiae 22 (1984): 377–378.
12. Anne-Marie Hayez, “Clément VII et Avignon,” in Genèse et début du grand
schisme d’occident, ed. Jean Favier (Paris: Éditions du CNRS, 1980), 126, 136.
13. See Henri Moranvillé, ed., Journal de Jean Le Fèvre, évêque de Chartres, chancelier
des rois de Sicile Louis I et Louis II d’Anjou (Paris: Picard, 1887).
14. The events are also recounted in Thalamus parvus: Le petit thalamus de Montpellier
publié pour la première fois d’après les manuscrits originaux, ed. Ferdinand Pégat and
Eugène Thomas (Montpellier: J. Martel ainé, 1836–1840), 405.
15. According to the Florentine merchants, in periods of pressing financial needs,
the Chamber increased minting and devalued money to inflate its revenues and be
solvent; see Robert Brun, “Annales Avignonnaises de 1382 à 1410 extraites des
284 Chapter 6

archives Datini,” Mémoires de l’institut historique de Provence 12 (1935): 54, 72, 78, 85,
108.
16. Charles of Durazzo was one of the sons of Robert of Anjou’s youngest brother,
John of Gravina, Duke of Durazzo.
17. Brun, “Annales” 12 (1935): 36.
18. Capturing and ransoming merchants were also lucrative activities; see Brun,
“Annales” 12 (1935): 81.
19. Brun, “Annales” 12 (1935): 78.
20. Brun, “Annales” 12 (1935): 39.
21. Brun, “Annales” 12 (1935): 92, 111.
22. Philip Daileader, “Local Experiences of the Great Western Schism,” in A Com-
panion to the Great Western Schism (1378–1417), ed. Joëlle Rollo-Koster and Thomas
Izbicki (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2009), 89–121.
23. See Robert Brun, “A Fourteenth-Century Merchant of Italy: Francesco Datini of
Prato,” Journal of Economic and Business History 2 (1930): 451–466; Brun, “Annales” 12
(1935): 17–142; 13 (1936): 58–105; 14 (1937): 5–57; 15 (1938): 21–52, 154–192. The transla-
tion is mine in all instances. See also Iris Origo, The Merchant of Prato: Francesco di
Marco Datini (New York: Knopf, 1957).
24. Brun, “Annales” 12 (1935): 119.
25. Brun, “Annales” 13 (1936): 96.
26. Brun, “Annales” 12 (1935): 135.
27. Brun, “Annales” 12 (1935): 94–95.
28. See two different cases in Brun, “Annales” 13 (1936): 7–9, 37–38.
29. Bernard Guillemain, La cour pontificale d’Avignon: Étude d’une société (Paris: De
Boccard, 1962), 596–605, summarily analyzes this document. I edited and analyzed its
content in detail in The People of Curial Avignon: A Critical Edition of the Liber Divisionis
and the Matriculae of Notre Dame la Majour (Lampeter, GB, and Lewiston, NY: Edwin
Mellen, 2009).
30. Richard C. Trexler, The Spiritual Power: Republican Florence under Interdict (Lei-
den: Brill, 1974), 46.
31. Brun, “Annales” 12 (1935): 88.
32. Brun, “Annales” 12 (1935): 87.
33. Brun, “Annales” 12 (1935): 89.
34. Letter dated July 1383; Brun, “Annales” 12 (1935): 42.
35. Brun, “Annales” 12 (1935): 55.
36. Brun, “Annales” 12 (1935): 56.
37. For example, in April 1385, see Brun, “Annales” 12 (1935): 81.
38. Brun, “Annales” 12 (1935): 56.
39. Brun, “Annales” 12 (1935): 114–117.
40. Hayez, “Clément VII et Avignon,” 130.
41. Brun, “Annales” 12 (1935): 113.
42. Brun, “Annales” 12 (1935): 75.
43. Brun, “Annales” 12 (1935): 111.
44. Alle bocche della piazza: Diario di Anonimo fiorentino: BNF, Panciatichiano 158, ed.
Anthony Molho (Florence: L. S. Olschki, 1986), il. My translation.
45. It should be noted that since 1392, Charles VI had suffered fits of madness that
left him unable to rule. From then on, French politics became intertwined with the
influence wielded by Charles’s entourage, starting with his uncles, the Dukes of Berry
 The Great Western Schism and Avignon 285

and Burgundy, his brother, the Duke of Orléans, his wife, Isabeau, and his many
counselors.
46. Edmond Martène and Ursin Durand, Veterum scriptorum et monumentorum histo-
ricorum, dogmaticorum, moralium, amplissima collectio (1724), vol. 7, 479–525.
47. Brun, “Annales” 14 (1937): 17.
48. Martin de Alpartil, Cronica actitatorum temporibus Benedicti XIII Pape, ed. and
trans. José Angel Sesma Muñoz and María del Mar Agudo Romeo (Zaragoza: Centro
de Documentación Bibliográfica Aragonesa, 1994).
49. See Joëlle Rollo-Koster, “The Politics of Body Parts: Contested Topographies in
Late Medieval Avignon,” Speculum: A Journal of Medieval Studies 78 (January 2003):
66–98, where I detail the episode.
50. ASV, Reg. Aven., 348, f. 671.
51. Guillaume Henri Marie Posthumus Meyjes, Jean Gerson, Apostle of Unity: His
Church Politics and Ecclesiology (Leiden: Brill, 1999), 99–101.
52. Louis Bellaguet, Chronique du religieux de Saint-Denys contenant le règne de Charles
VI, de 1380 à 1422, publiée en latin pour la première fois et traduite (Paris: L’imprimerie de
Crapelet, 1839), vol. 3, 217–218.
53. Bellaguet, Chronique du religieux de Saint-Denys, vol. 3, 219.
54. François Charles Carreri, “Chronicon parvum Avinionense de Schimate et bel-
lo,” Annales d’Avignon et du Comtat Venaissin (1916): 166. All translations are mine.
55. Carreri, “Chronicon parvum Avinionense,” 166.
56. Carreri, “Chronicon parvum Avinionense,” 167.
57. Carreri, “Chronicon parvum Avinionense,” 167–174.
58. Carreri, “Chronicon parvum Avinionense,” 169.
59. Jean Favier, “Le Grand Schisme dans l’histoire de France,” in Genèse et débuts du
Grand Schisme d’Occident: Avignon, 25–28 septembre 1978 (Paris: Editions du Centre
National de la Recherche Scientifique, 1980), 7–16.
60. Philip Daileader, “Local Experience of the Great Western Schism,” in A Compan-
ion to the Great Western Schism, ed. Joëlle Rollo-Koster and Thomas Izbicki (Leiden:
Brill, 2009), 121.
61. Monique Maillard-Luypaert, Papauté, clercs, et laics: Le diocese de Cambrai à
l’épreuve du Grand Schisme d’Occident (1378–1417) (Brussels: Publications des Facultés
universitaires Saint-Louis, 2001).
62. Renate Blumenfeld-Kosinski, Poets, Saints, and Visionaries of the Great Schism,
1378–1417 (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2006).
63. Jacques Chiffoleau, La comptabilité de l’au-delà: Les hommes, la mort et la religion
dans la région d’Avignon à la fin du moyen-âge (Rome: École française de Rome, 1980),
110, 237, 243, 251, 260.
64. Brun, “Annales” 13 (1936): 78–79.
65. ASV, Intr. et exit., 370, fol. 152.
66. Brun, “Annales” 13 (1936): 80.
67. Robert Norman Swanson, Religion and Devotion in Europe: C. 1215–1515 (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 149.
68. See Matthew Tobin, “Le ‘livre des révélations’ de Marie Robine (+1399): Étude et
édition,” Mélanges de l’École française de Rome: Moyen-âge, temps modernes 98 (1986):
229–264; and Blumenfeld-Kosinski, Poets, Saints, and Visionaries of the Great Schism, 29,
35, 81–85, 93.
286 Chapter 6

69. See the study of Yveline Prouvost, “Les miracles de Pierre de Luxembourg
(1387–1390),” in Hagiographie et culte des saints en France méridionale (Xiiie–Xve siècle)
(Toulouse: Privat, 2002), 481–506.
70. Acta Sanctorum, vol. 27, 562.
71. Brun, “Annales” 12 (1935): 100.
72. See Acta Sanctorum, vol. 27, 486–628.
73. Brun, “Annales Avignonaises,” 13 (1936): 93.
74. Alle bocche della piazza, 208.
 Conclusion

This book has endeavored to tell the story of the popes and their people
in Avignon. I have not lingered very long on passing visitors who, like
Petrarch, are commonly associated with the city. Readers especially inter-
ested in him will find information in the Petrarchian literature below. 1
Petrarch is considered the father of humanism; and even if he railed
against Avignon, his name and eloquence are part of the city’s story,
regardless. Poetry and rhetoric shone in Avignon, and Petrarch was not
the sole humanist or protohumanist who found fame in the city. After
him, authors like Giovanni Moccia and Jean Muret also left their mark on
the rebirth of the study of the classics. 2 Even though mere sojourners
there, these men found themselves woven into the historical fabric of
Avignon.
I have also left to specialists of the field a detailed discussion of the
many artists who, like Matteo Giovanetti or Simone Martini, embellished
the Avignonese monuments built by the popes and their courts. Cathleen
Fleck has recently surveyed art in the capital (despite her work’s title) in
the pre- and post-Schism periods. 3 A recent publication of the Société des
amis du Palais des papes et des monuments d’Avignon highlights the cultural
contribution of the Avignon popes. In the year 2000, Avignon was named
the European capital of culture to acknowledge not only the city’s present
but also its past. The vibrant theater and opera festival that brings legions
of visitors every summer is well known all over the world, as are Avi-
gnon’s imposing medieval papal palace and bridge.
The Avignon popes were cultivated, educated, capable administrators
and politicians who enriched their court and environment. They studied
civil and canon law and theology, and a few of them taught these sub-
jects. As in today’s governments, heads of services and popes were doc-
tors of law, showing again how modern was the papal administration in
this era, staffed as it was with an educated elite. The popes kept up with
education and ordered the copying of manuscripts and the building of an
important library, in large part through their use of the right of spoils. 4
Some 2,045 volumes were collected between 1342 and 1352. 5 Books were
287
288 Conclusion

essentially academic, organized around the liberal arts, medicine, law,

and theology. 6 The popes are known to have specifically decentralized
the study of theology (taught mainly in Paris), bringing faculty in theolo-
gy to the universities they supported. This academic culture was but-
tressed by the need to form an administrative elite to serve the court; the
foundation of universities assuaged this need. 7
Between 1305 and 1378, several universities appeared throughout Eu-
rope, in Orléans, Angers, Valladolid, Prague, and Perugia, all with pon-
tifical confirmation. The Avignon popes also founded colleges within
existing universities. In 1359, Innocent VI created the College of Saint-
Martial in Toulouse; in 1368–1369, Urban V founded in Montpellier the
Colleges of St. Germain, St. Benedict, and the Twelve Doctors. Gregory XI
chose Bologna in 1371 for his foundation of a college named after him. 8
Cardinals followed suit, founding colleges in Paris, Toulouse, Montpelli-
er, Bologna, and Perugia. But, as Jacques Verger duly notes, the greatest
success of the Avignon papacy in regard to universities was its uncondi-
tional support of students. The Avignon popes distributed thousands of
benefices to support students, waiving for them the requirement of resi-
dence to allow them full dedication to their studies. Last, it is possible to
speak of an intentional policy to promote education when popes founded
provincial boarding schools in the south of France to recruit and train
talented young students who would pursue their studies in universities.
Music also interested the papal court, though not all popes were en-
thusiastic about musical innovations. John XXII, who, as we have seen,
micromanaged his court, legislated on musical developments in one of
his Extravagantes decretals. He condemned motets as profane, menacing
with spiritual punishment anyone who would use them in liturgy. But
specialists of the fourteenth-century musical culture consider John’s anal-
ysis revolutionary. In condemning some forms and allowing others, the
pope advanced polyphony and defined the stylistic traits specific to relig-
ious music and separated them from profane music. He made plainchant
the musical expression of liturgy, allowing several voices to improvise at
once, leading thus to polyphony. 9 The papal chapel adopted the new
polyphonic chant (the ars nova or new art) and hired northern cantors to
embellish worship. Benedict XII was the first to organize a capella intrinse-
ca (“chapel of the interior”) that focused essentially on the celebration of
the divine offices, music included. Clement VI transformed it into a col-
lege of singers, engaging qualified cantors from all over Europe. 10
 Conclusion 289

Taste for music spread from the papacy to southern towns. Gretchen
Peters has recently documented the activities of minstrels in the south of
France. Many were freelance musicians who made a living cobbling to-
gether part-time contracts with cities, confraternities, and individuals. In
Avignon, the pope was one of their employers. He patronized a watch-
man who sounded his trumpet from the top of the Bell Tower of Notre-
Dame des Doms, and he financially supported musicians who served his
guests. Music went out from behind the walls of the papal palace to fill
the streets of the city during various papal and communal celebrations. 11
It has been the intent of this book to rehabilitate for the English-speak-
ing reader the Avignon papacy from its “black legend.” As the previous
pages have shown, the Avignon popes were certainly no more venal nor
less worthy to claim the papal office than their predecessors and succes-
sors. As southwestern Frenchmen, their mental apparatus and reflexes
were not that different from their contemporaries; venality and nepotism
were rampant among all members of the high society. The popes simply
acted like men of their times. We find in the Avignon popes a common,
relentless insistence on crusading, reforming the Church, centralizing the
Church’s administration and finance, and more generally, on asserting
their authority over their court and lands. The well-established practice
of excommunicating insolvent creditors and the financial harassment of
the Church tax collectors did not ingratiate the papal court to the secular
rulers and ecclesiastics who participated in the construction of the Avi-
gnon papacy’s enduring negative legend. 12 Most of these popes were
lawyers, and their legal thinking may have at times clouded their spiritu-
ality; but men like Urban V and Gregory XI show that they could priori-
tize spirituality before convenience. There is little doubt that all of Avi-
gnon’s popes understood their city to be a temporary residence. We have
seen that their attachment to the city was limited. To a large extent, Avi-
gnon provided the popes with a base, with funds and bodies. When they
created something at Avignon, as with the construction of the palace, for
example, the popes attempted to remake Rome rather than work from
something new.
One way to prove their successful centralization is to return to the
resentment they created with the members of the court who saw their
chances at governing the papacy diminish with each new pope. As curial
life grew and centralized, so did the pretensions of the cardinals, who
claimed a more central role in the governance of the Church. Their hopes
290 Conclusion

were high with the election of Innocent VI, who, even as he paid them
dutiful lip service, quickly deflated the cardinals’ pretensions. The Great
Western Schism marked the culmination of their demands. It sealed, at
least for a few years, the cardinals’ hopes to govern with the pope as an
elite spiritual oligarchy. They had attained the ultimate responsibility: the
making and unmaking of popes. Conciliar rule lasted but a few years,
and the first assertion of the Renaissance papacy was to repeal Con-
stance’s regulations.
The little city of Avignon gained recognition during the papal sojourn.
The large burg grew into a capital, supporting within its ramparts an
ever-renewing population. Its walls encompassed wide social and ethnic
variety. We can note that the Provençal shores of the Rhône did not
witness social movements and rebellions to the extent that they arose
throughout the rest of Europe during the fourteenth century. Avignon
witnessed panic during the plague and the assaults of the free companies,
but nothing like the French Peasants’ Revolt of 1358, for example. Socially
the capital allowed for individual promotion, and although conditions
were far from idyllic, social improvements were definitely permitted, if
only in the scores of occupations and professions that the papacy and its
court supported. The popes also left their physical mark on the city’s
streets and neighborhoods as Avignon shared their successes and fail-
ures. The wide ramparts that protected the population are the best exam-
ple of the popes’ care for their new residence; the scars left by both
subtractions of obedience showed the price to pay. To travelers visiting
the area today, the Avignon popes’ presence can still be felt acutely in the
many monuments they have left us and in the vineyards they planted,
like the renowned Châteauneuf-du-Pape. As for us Provençaux, they also
left us legends like the good mule of the pope. 13 After being dragged up
the bell tower of the palace by a mischievous Tistet Védène, the mule of
the pope waited seven years for his return from Queen Joanna’s court to
exact her revenge. She kicked him to death the day of his induction into
the ranks of spicers of the pope. Alphonse Daudet’s tale of vengeance is
framed by the popular vision of Avignon at the time of the popes: a city
of sycophants searching favors from a good pope who loved his wine
and his mule.
 Conclusion 291

NOTES

1. Victoria Kirkham and Armando Maggi, Petrarch: A Critical Guide to the Complete
Works (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009); and, among many other valuable
works, Harold Bloom, Petrarch (New York: Chelsea House, 1989); David Thompson,
Petrarch: A Humanist among Princes: An Anthology of Petrarch’s Letters and of Selections
from His Other Works (New York: Harper & Row, 1971).
2. Ezio Ornato, “L’humanisme à la cour pontificale Avignonnaise,” Annuaire de la
Société des amis du Palais des papes et des monuments d’Avignon 77 (2000): 51–67.
3. Cathleen Fleck, “Seeking Legitimacy: Art and Manuscripts for the Popes in
Avignon from 1378 to 1417,” in A Companion to the Great Western Schism (1378–1417),
ed. Joëlle Rollo-Koster and Thomas Izbicki (Leiden: Brill, 2009), 239–302.
4. See Daniel Williman, Marie-Henriette Jullien de Pommerol, and Jacques Mon-
frin, Bibliothèques ecclésiastiques au temps de la papauté d’Avignon (Paris: Editions du
CNRS, 1980); Daniel Williman, The Right of Spoil of the Popes of Avignon, 1316–1415
(Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 1988).
5. Bernard Guillemain, “La formation, la culture et les gouts des papes d’Avi-
gnon,” Annuaire de la Société des amis du Palais des papes et des monuments d’Avignon 77
(2000): 14.
6. Jacques Verger, “La politique universitaire des papes d’Avignon,” Annuaire de la
Société des amis du Palais des papes et des monuments d’Avignon 77 (2000): 18.
7. Hilde de Ridder-Symoens, ed., Universities in the Middle Ages (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 1992) offers the most recent treatment on medieval univer-
sities.
8. Verger, “La politique universitaire des papes d’Avignon,” 23.
9. Gunther Morche, “L’ars nova et la musique liturgique au temps des papes
d’Avignon,” Annuaire de la Société des amis du Palais des papes et des monuments d’Avi-
gnon 77 (2000): 132.
10. Morche, “L’ars nova et la musique liturgique au temps des papes d’Avignon,”
137.
11. See Gretchen Peters, “Urban Musical Culture in Late Medieval Southern France:
Evidence from Private Notarial,” Early Music 25 (1997): 403–410; “Urban Minstrels in
Late Medieval Southern France: Opportunities, Status and Professional Relation-
ships,” Early Music History 19 (2000): 201–235; The Musical Sounds of Medieval French
Cities: Players, Patrons, and Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012).
12. As illustrated, for example, in Daniel Williman, Calendar of the Letters of Arnaud
Aubert, Camerarius Apostolicus 1361–1371 (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval
Studies, 1992).
13. Alphonse Daudet, Letters from My Windmill, ed. Mireille Harmelin and Keith
Adams (Auckland: Floating Press, 2013).
 Additional Bibliography

1: EARLY POPES

In addition to Guillaume Mollat, The Popes at Avignon: The “Babylonian

Captivity” of the Medieval Church, trans. Janet Love (New York: Harper &
Row, 1965); Bernard Guillemain, La cour pontificale d’Avignon: Étude d’une
société (Paris, 1962); Yves Renouard, The Avignon Papacy: The Popes in Exile
1305–1403, trans. Denis Bethell (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1970); and
Jean Favier, Les papes d’Avignon (Paris: Fayard, 2006), used extensively
throughout the book, this chapter has relied on the following studies. On
Boniface VIII, see T. S. R. Boase, Boniface VIII (London: Constable, 1933);
Charles T. Wood, Philip the Fair and Boniface VIII: State vs. Papacy (New
York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1967); and, more recently, Agostino
Paravicini Bagliani, Boniface VIII: Un pape hérétique? (Paris: Payot & Riv-
ages, 2003). For his trial, see Jean Coste, Boniface VIII en procès: Articles
d’accusation et dépositions des témoins, 1303–1311 (Rome: L’Erma di
Bretschneider, 1995). Regarding the first jubilee, see Herbert L. Kessler
and Johanna Zacharias, Rome 1300: On the Path of the Pilgrim (New Haven,
CT: Yale University Press, 2000). On Clement V’s early career, see J. H.
Denton, “Pope Clement V’s Early Career as a Royal Clerk,” English His-
torical Review 83.327 (1968): 303–314. The Templars have become victims
of their historical success. Publications abound, but many are fantasies far
removed from reality. I am listing here some of the best and most recent
historians who have worked on the topic: Helen Nicholson, The Knights
Templar: A New History (Thrupp, Stroud: Sutton, 2001); Malcolm Barber,
The Trial of the Templars (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978,
reprint 2006); Malcolm Barber, The New Knighthood: A History of the Order
of the Temple (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994); Malcolm
Barber, The Crusader States (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2012);
Malcolm Barber and A. K. Bate, The Templars: Selected Sources (Manches-
ter: Manchester University Press, 2002); Norman Housley and Malcolm
Barber, Knighthoods of Christ: Essays on the History of the Crusades and the
Knights Templar Presented to Malcolm Barber (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007);
293
294 Additional Bibliography

Alan Forey, Military Orders and Crusades (Aldershot: Variorum, 1994);

Alan Forey, The Military Orders from the Twelfth to the Early Fourteenth
Centuries (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1992); Alain Demurger,
The Last Templar: The Tragedy of Jacques de Molay, Last Grand Master of the
Temple (London: Profile, 2004); Jochen Burgtorf, Paul Crawford, and Hel-
en Nicholson, eds., The Debate on the Trial of the Templars: 1307–1314 (Fran-
ham: Ashgate, 2010). On Vienne and other medieval Church councils, see
Norman P. Tanner, ed., Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils (Washington,
DC: Georgetown University Press, 1990), vol. 1. For a thorough discus-
sion of the Papal States, see Peter Partner, The Lands of St. Peter: The Papal
State in the Middle Ages and Early Renaissance (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1972). Regarding Napoleone Orsini, see the only biogra-
phy available, by Carl A. Willemsen, Kardinal Napoleon Orsini, 1263–1342
(Berlin: E. Ebering, 1928); Guillemain, La cour pontificale, 241–244; and
Emily E. Graham, “Reconsidering Reputation through Patronage: Cardi-
nal Napoleone Orsini and Angelo Clareno at the Avignonese Papal
Court,” Journal of Medieval History 39:3 (2013): 357–375. On Robert of An-
jou, King of Naples, see Samantha Kelly, The New Solomon: Robert of Na-
ples (1309–1343) and Fourteenth-Century Kingship (Leiden: Brill, 2003); and
Ronald G. Musto, ed., Medieval Naples, a Documentary History: Historical
Texts, 400–1400 (New York: Italica, 2012), 192–223. On the conclave that
followed Clement V’s death, see my Raiding Saint Peter: Empty Sees, Vio-
lence, and the Initiation of the Great Western Schism (1378) (Leiden: Brill,
2008), 138–145. The ceremony that marked the coronation of John XXII is
detailed in Marc Dykmans, Le cérémonial papal de la fin du moyen âge à la
renaissance: De Rome en Avignon ou le cérémonial de Jacques Stefaneschi
(Brussels: Institut historique belge de Rome, 1981). A biography of John
XXII is found in Louis Duval-Arnould, “John XXII,” in The Papacy: An
Encyclopedia, ed. Philippe Levillain and John W. O’Malley (New York:
Routledge, 2001), 847–851. John’s poisoning is discussed in Franck Col-
lard, “Horrendum Scelus: Recherches sur le statut juridique du crime
d’empoisonnement au Moyen Age” Revue historique 300.4 (1998): 737–764;
and Edmond Albe, Autour de Jean XXII: Hugues Géraud, évêque de Cahors:
L’affaire des poisons et des envoûtements en 1317 (Cahors: Girma, 1904). Val-
érie Theis, “Jean XXII et l’expulsion des juifs du Comtat Venaissin,” An-
nales, histoire, sciences sociales 67 (2012): 41–77 discusses John’s expulsion
of Jews. See Robert André-Michel, Avignon, les fresques du Palais des Papes,
le procès des Visconti (Paris: Colin, 1926), 146–206 for the accusations
 Additional Bibliography 295

against the Visconti. For a transcript of the commission John set up

against witchcraft, see Alain Boureau, Le Pape et les sorciers: Une consulta-
tion de Jean XXII sur la magie en 1320 (manuscrit B.A.V. Borghese 348)
(Rome: École française de Rome, 2004). For a discussion of all the ramifi-
cations of this commission, see Isabel Iribarren, “From Black Magic to
Heresy: A Doctrinal Leap in the Pontificate of John XXII,” Church History,
76.1 (2007): 32–60. For a gendered analysis of the phenomenon, see Nancy
Caciola, Discerning Spirits: Divine and Demonic Possession in the Middle
Ages (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003); and Dyan Elliott, Prov-
ing Woman: Female Spirituality and Inquisitional Culture in the Later Middle
Ages (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004). The Franciscan
poverty discussion is the background of Umberto Eco’s popular Name of
the Rose (Il nome della rosa, 1980). For a full discussion of the topic, see
Decima L. Douie, The Nature and the Effect of the Heresy of the Fraticelli
(New York: AMS, 1978); Malcolm Lambert, “The Franciscan Crisis under
John XXII,” Franciscan Studies 32 (1972): 123–43; Malcolm Lambert, Fran-
ciscan Poverty: The Doctrine of the Absolute Poverty of Christ and the Apostles
in the Franciscan Order 1210–1323 (St. Bonaventure, NY: Franciscan Insti-
tute, 1998); John Oakley, “John XXII and Franciscan Innocence,” Francis-
can Studies 46 (1986): 217–226; Thomas Turley, “John XXII and the Fran-
ciscans: A Reappraisal,” in Popes, Teachers, and Canon Law in the Middle
Ages, ed. James Ross Sweeney and Stanley Chodorow (Ithaca, NY: Cor-
nell University Press, 1989), 74–88; David Burr, The Spiritual Franciscans:
From Protest to Persecution in the Century after Saint Francis (University
Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2001); Takashi Shōgimen, Ock-
ham and Political Discourse in the Late Middle Ages (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2007); John V. Fleming, Michael F. Cusato, and Guy
Geltner, Defenders and Critics of Franciscan Life: Essays in Honor of John V.
Fleming (Leiden: Brill, 2009); and Michael J. P. Robson, The Cambridge
Companion to Francis of Assisi (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2012). For an in-depth discussion of property, see Virpi Mäkinen, Property
Rights in the Late Medieval Discussion on Franciscan Poverty (Leuven, Bel-
gium: Peeters, 2001). Bernard Délicieux was a tremendously charismatic
preacher; he has recently received the attention of historians and journal-
ists; see Alan Friedlander, The Hammer of the Inquisitors: Brother Bernard
Délicieux and the Struggle against the Inquisition in Fourteenth-Century
France (Leiden: Brill, 2000); Stephen O’Shea, The Friar of Carcassonne: Re-
volt against the Inquisition in the Last Days of the Cathars (Toronto: Douglas
296 Additional Bibliography

& McIntyre, 2011). For testamentary bequests to Franciscans, see Anne-

Marie Hayez, “Clauses pieuses de testaments Avignonnais du XIVe
siècle,” in Actes du 99ième congrés national des sociétés savants (Paris:
Bibliothèque nationale, 1977), 129–159. Thomas Frank, “Exploring the
Boundaries of Law in the Middle Ages: Franciscan Debates on Poverty,
Property, and Inheritance,” Law and Literature 20. 2 (2008): 243–260, high-
lights and discusses the legal quandary between donations and poverty.
On Franciscan theology, see, for example, Kenan B. Osborne, The History
of Franciscan Theology (St. Bonaventure, NY: Franciscan Institute, St. Bona-
venture University, 1994); Marsilius de Padua and Annabel S. Brett, The
Defender of the Peace (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Ger-
son Moreno-Riaño, ed., The World of Marsilius of Padua (Turnhout: Brep-
ols, 2006); George Garnett, Marsilius of Padua and ‘the Truth of History’
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006); Hwa-Yong Lee, Political Repre-
sentation in the Later Middle Ages: Marsilius in Context (New York: P. Lang,
2008); Joseph Canning, Ideas of Power in the Late Middle Ages, 1296–1417
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011); Arthur Stephen
McGrade, The Political Thought of William of Ockham: Personal and Institu-
tional Principles (London: Cambridge University Press, 1974); Paul Vin-
cent Spade, The Cambridge Companion to Ockham (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1999); Eva Luise Wittneben, Bonagratia von Bergamo:
Franziskanerjurist und Wortführer seines Ordens im Streit mit Papst Johannes
XXII (Leiden: Brill, 2003). See Blake R. Beattie, Angelus Pacis: The Legation
of Cardinal Giovanni Gaetano Orsini, 1326–1334 (Boston: Brill, 2007) on the
imperial-papal rivalry. Additional information on the northern Italian
situation can be found in H. S. Offler, “Empire and Papacy: The Last
Struggle,” Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, Fifth Series, 6 (1956):
21–47; Sharon Dale, “The Avignon Papacy and the Creation of the Vis-
conti Myth,” in La vie culturelle, intellectuelle et scientifique à la cour des papes
d’Avignon, ed. Jacqueline Hamesse (Turnhout: Brepols, 2005), 333–366;
“Contra Damnationis Filios: The Visconti in Fourteenth-Century Papal
Diplomacy,” Journal of Medieval History 33 (2007): 1–32; and “Fourteenth
Century Lombard Chroniclers,” in Chroniclers and Historians in Medieval
and Renaissance Italy, ed. Sharon Dale, Alison Williams Lewin, and Duane
J. Osheim (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2007),
171–195. On William of Ockham’s Defensor pacis, see William of Ockham,
On the Powers of Emperors and Popes, trans. and ed. Annabel S. Brett (Bris-
tol: Thoemmes, 1998). See Blake Beattie, “The Antipope Who Wasn’t
 Additional Bibliography 297

There: Three Formal Submissions to Pope John XXII,” in La vie culturelle,

intellectuelle et scientifique à la cour des papes d’Avignon, ed. Jacqueline Ha-
messe (Turnhout: Brepols, 2006), 197–236, on Louis’s antipope. For the
beatific vision controversy, see Decima Langworthy Douie, “John XXII
and the Beatific Vision,” Dominican Studies 3 (1950): 154–174; Marc Dyk-
mans, Les sermons de Jean XXII sur la vision béatifique: Texte précédé d’une
introduction et suivi d’une chronologie de la controverse avec la liste des écrits
pour et contre le pape (Rome: Presse de l’Université Grégorienne, 1973);
Christian Trottmann, La vision béatifique des disputes scolastiques à sa défini-
tion par Bénoît XII (Rome: École française de Rome, 1995); and Isabel
Iribarren, “Theological Authority at the Papal Court in Avignon: The
Beatific Vision Controversy,” in La vie culturelle, intellectuelle et scientifique
à la cour des papes d’Avignon, ed. Jacqueline Hamesse (Turnhout: Brepols,
2006), 277–301. Jacques Fournier’s Latin registers have been edited and
translated into French; see Jacques Fournier, Le registre d’inquisition de
Jacques Fournier, evêque de Pamiers (1318–1325), ed. Jean Duvernoy (Tou-
louse: Privat, 1965), 3 vols.; and Jacques Fournier, Le registre d’inquisition
de Jacques Fournier (Evêque de Pamiers) 1318–1325, trans. and ed. Jean Du-
vernoy (Paris: Mouton, 1978), 3 vols. See also René Weis, The Yellow Cross
(New York: Penguin, 2001). On Benedict XII’s reforming zeal, see Peter
McDonald, “The Papacy and Monastic Observance in the Later Middle
Ages: The Benedictines in England,” Journal of Religious History 14.2
(1986): 117–132.

2: PAPAL MONARCHY

Avignon coronations are discussed in detail by Bernhard Schimmelpfen-

nig, “Eleven Papal Coronations in Avignon,” in Coronations: Medieval and
Early Modern Monarchic Ritual, ed. János M. Bak (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1990), 179–193. On the relationship between Petrarch
and Cola di Rienzo, see Francesco Petrarca, Mario Emilio Cosenza, and
Ronald G. Musto, The Revolution of Cola Di Rienzo (New York: Italica,
1996). A contemporary chronicler composed the Vita di Cola di Rienzo
around 1358, later translated by John Wright as The Life of Cola di Rienzo
(Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1975). Regarding
Cola, see Amanda Collins, Greater Than Emperor: Cola Di Rienzo (Ca.
1313–54) and the World of Fourteenth-Century Rome (Ann Arbor: University
of Michigan Press, 2002); Ronald G. Musto, Apocalypse in Rome: Cola Di
298 Additional Bibliography

Rienzo and the Politics of the New Age (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 2003); Andreas Rehberg and Anna Modigliani, Cola di Rienzo e il
commune di Roma (Rome: RR Inedita, 2004), 2 vols.; on his death, see Joëlle
Rollo-Koster and Alizah Holstein, “Anger and Spectacle in Late Medieval
Rome: Gauging Emotion in Urban Topography?” in Cities, Texts and So-
cial Networks, 400–1500: Experiences and Perceptions of Medieval Urban
Space, ed. Anne Lester, Caroline Goodson, and Carol Symes (Farnham,
UK: Ashgate, 2010), 149–174. Nancy Goldstone, Joanna: The Notorious
Queen of Naples, Jerusalem and Sicily (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson,
2010), offers a compelling read of the queen’s dramatic life. Elizabeth
Casteen, “Sex and Politics in Naples: The Regnant Queenship of Johanna
I,” Journal of the Historical Society 11.2 (2011): 183–210, frames her analysis
of Joanna’s rule within the medieval construction of queenship, insisting
on contemporary propaganda that either supported or reviled the queen.
On the Hundred Years’ War, see C. T. Allmand, The Hundred Years War:
England and France at War, c. 1300–c. 1450 (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 1988); Jonathan Sumption, The Hundred Years War: Trial by
Battle (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1991); Anne Cur-
ry, The Hundred Years’ War, 1337–1453 (New York: St. Martin’s, 1993); L. J.
Andrew Villalon and Donald J. Kagay, The Hundred Years War: A Wider
Focus (Leiden: Brill, 2005); and L. J. Andrew Villalon and Donald J. Ka-
gay, The Hundred Years War (Part II): Different Vistas (Leiden: Brill, 2008).
On the Battle of Crécy, see Andrew Ayton, Philip Preston, Françoise Au-
trand, Michael Prestwich, and Bertrand Schnerb, The Battle of Crécy, 1346
(Woodbridge: Boydell, 2005). On the Statutes of Provisors, see Cecily
Davies, “The Statute of Provisors of 1351,” History 38.133 (1953): 116–133;
and Fredric Cheyette, “Kings, Courts, Cures, and Sinecures: The Statute
of Provisors and the Common Law,” Traditio 19 (1963): 295–349. Étienne
Anheim has recently reconstituted Clement VI’s library; see his “La
bibliothèque personnelle de Pierre Roger/Clement VI,” in La vie culturelle,
intellectuelle et scientifique à la cour des papes d’Avignon, ed. Jacqueline Ha-
messe (Turhnout: Brepols, 2006), 1–48. On Clement VI’s tomb, see Anne
McGee Morganstern, “Art and Ceremony in Papal Avignon: A Prescrip-
tion for the Tomb of Clement VI,” Gesta 40.1 (2001): 61–77. On Talleyrand
of Périgord, see Norman P. Zacour, “The Cardinal of Périgord
(1301–1364),” Transactions of the American Philosophical Society 50.7 (1960):
1–83. Pierre Jugie, “Innocent VI,” in The Papacy: An Encyclopedia, ed. Phi-
lippe Levillain (New York: Routledge, 2002), vol. 2, 794–797, offers gener-
 Additional Bibliography 299

al information on Pope Innocent VI. Regarding Albornoz’s Italian cam-

paigns, see Peter Partner, The Lands of Saint Peter, 262, 339–360, 378, and
446. The most complete survey of Albornoz is found in the recent edition
of Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda, Jenaro Costas Rodríguez, and Maria Teresa
Ferrer i Mallol, Historia de los hechos del Cardenal Gil de Albornoz (Pozoblan-
co, Spain: Ayuntamiento de Pozoblanco, 2002); and Paolo Colliva, Il cardi-
nale Alborno. Lo Stato della Chiesa, le “Constitutiones Aegidianae”
(1353–1357) (Bolonia: Real Colegio de España, 1977). To establish a last-
ing presence in Bologna, in his will of 1364 Albornoz created a college
“for the benefit of poor scholars . . . of Spanish origin,” to enable them
“the more freely and readily to be intent upon the acquisition of knowl-
edge.” The college was named “Real Colegio Mayor Albornociano de San
Clemente de los Españioles en Bolonia”; see Berthe M. Marti, ed., The
Spanish College at Bologna in the Fourteenth Century (Philadelphia: Univer-
sity of Pennsylvania Press, 1966). On Pedro the Cruel of Castile, see Clara
Estow, Pedro the Cruel of Castile, 1350–1369 (Leiden: Brill, 1995). On the
use of mercenaries by the papacy, see William L. Urban, Medieval Mercen-
aries: The Business of War (London: Greenhill Books, 2006); Philippe Con-
tamine, War in the Middle Ages (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1984); Maurice
Hugh Keen, Medieval Warfare: A History (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1999); William Caferro, John Hawkwood: An English Mercenary in
Fourteenth-Century Italy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press,
2006); and Norman Housley, “The Mercenary Companies, the Papacy,
and the Crusades, 1356–1378,” Traditio 38 (1982): 253–280. Regarding the
Battle of Poitiers and the Black Prince, see Richard Barber, Edward, Prince
of Wales and Aquitaine: A Biography of the Black Prince (London: Allen Lane,
1978); and Richard Barber, ed., The Life and Campaigns of the Black Prince:
From Contemporary Letters, Diaries and Chronicles, Including Chandos
Herald’s Life of the Black Prince (Woodbridge: Boydell, 1986); Jonathan
Sumption, The Hundred Years War: Trial by Fire (Philadelphia: University
of Pennsylvania Press, 1999); David Green, Edward, the Black Prince: Power
in Medieval Europe (Harlow: Longman, 2007); and Peter Hoskins, In the
Steps of the Black Prince: The Road to Poitiers, 1355–1356 (Woodbridge: Boy-
dell, 2011). Françoise Autrand, Charles V: Le sage (Paris: Fayard, 1994)
offers a biography of the French king Charles V. On Jean de Roquetail-
lade, see Leah DeVun, Prophecy, Alchemy, and the End of Time: John of
Rupescissa in the Late Middle Ages (New York: Columbia University Press,
2009). On the archbishop of Armagh, Richard FitzRalph, and his vituper-
300 Additional Bibliography

ations against the mendicants, see Katherine Walsh, “Archbishop Fitz-

Ralph and the Friars at the Papal Court in Avignon, 1357–60,” Traditio 31
(1975): 223–245.

3: RETURNING TO ROME

Regarding Urban, see Anne-Marie Hayez, “Urban V,” in The Papacy: An

Encyclopedia, ed. Philippe Levillain (New York: Routledge, 2002),
1556–1557; Yves Chiron, Urbain V: Le bienheureux (Versailles: Via Romana
2010); Paul Amargier, Urbain V: Un homme, une vie (1310–1370) (Marseille:
Société des médiévistes provençaux, 1987); and Anne-Marie Hayez,
“L’entourage d’Urbain V: Parents, amis et familiers,” Annuaire de la société
des amis du Palais des papes (1988–1989): 31–45. For Urban’s love of gar-
dens, see Élydia Barret, “Les ‘vergers’ de la papauté d’Avignon: Avignon,
Pont-de-Sorgues et Villeneuve (1316–1378)” (PhD diss., École des chartes,
2004). Regarding Urban’s camerarius, Arnaud Aubert, and the return of
the papacy to Rome, see Daniel Williman, Calendar of the Letters of Arnaud
Aubert, Camerarius Apostolicus 1361–1371 (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of
Mediaeval Studies, 1992). For general politics, see Maurice Prou, Études
sur les relations politiques du pape Urbain V avec les rois de France Jean II et
Charles V (1362–1370) (Paris: F. Vieweg, 1888). The dates and details of the
returns to Rome of Urban V and Gregory XI are found in Mollat, The
Popes at Avignon, 111–128; Favier, Les papes d’Avignon, 530–538; and Mich-
el Hayez, “Avignon sans les Papes (1367–1370, 1376–1379),” in Genèse et
début du Grand Schisme d’Occident, ed. Jean Favier (Paris: De Boccard,
1980), 143–157. See also Johann Peter Kirsch, Die Rückkehr der Päpste Ur-
ban V. und Gregor XI. von Avignon nach Rom: Auszüge aus den Kameralregist-
ern des vatikanischen Archivs (Paderborn: F. Schöningh, 1898). On Urban’s
reforms, see Ludwig Vones, “La réforme de l’église au XIV siècle: Tenta-
tives pontificales dans l’esprit bénédictin et courants spirituels dans
l’entourage d’Urbain V,” in Crises et réformes dans l’Église, de la réforme
grégorienne à la pré-réforme, 115e congrès national des sociétés historiques et
scientifiques Avignon, 1990 (Paris: Comité des travaux historiques et scien-
tifiques, 1991), 189–206. Regarding the Sabran and their spiritual mar-
riage, see Dyan Elliott, Spiritual Marriage: Sexual Abstinence in Medieval
Wedlock (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993); and P. H. Cul-
lum and Katherine J. Lewis, Religious Men and Masculine Identity in the
Middle Ages (Woodbridge: Boydell & Brewer, 2013). The terrier of Anglic
 Additional Bibliography 301

Grimoard, describing Avignon episcopal parcels and rents, has been edit-
ed by Anne-Marie Hayez, Le terrier Avignonnais de l’évêque Anglic Grim-
oard: 1366–1368 (Paris: CTHS, 1993). On Peter of Lusignan’s crusades, see
Peter W. Edbury, The Kingdom of Cyprus and the Crusades, 1191–1374
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991). Regarding the Avignon
papacy and crusades, see Norman Housley, The Avignon Papacy and the
Crusades, 1305–1378 (Oxford: Clarendon, 1986). On the Hundred Years’
War, see Jonathan Sumption, The Hundred Years War: Volume II, Trial by
Fire (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1999). On the Viter-
bo rebellion, see Joëlle Rollo-Koster, Raiding Saint Peter: Empty Sees, Vio-
lence, and the Initiation of the Great Western Schism (1378) (Leiden and Bos-
ton: Brill, 2008), 148–157. Regarding the cult of Urban V, see Claudia
Bolgia, “Cassiano’s Popes Rediscovered: Urban V in Rome,” Zeitschrift für
Kunstgeschichte 65.4 (2002): 562–574; John Osborne, “Lost Roman Images
of Pope Urban V (1362–1370) for Julian Gardner,” Zeitschrift für Kunstge-
schichte 54.1 (1991): 20–32; Gérard Veyssiere, “Le rayonnement géogra-
phique du culte d’ Urbain V,” Mémoires de l’académie de Vaucluse, 7th
series, 6 (1985): 137–152; Joseph-Hyacinthe Albanès and Ulysse Cheva-
lier, Actes anciens et documents concernant le bienheureux Urbain V Pape: Sa
famille, sa personne, son pontificat, ses miracles et son culte (Paris: Picard,
1897); and Gérard Veyssière, “Miracles du bienheureux pape Urbain V,”
in Avignon au Moyen Âge: Textes et documents, ed. IREBMA (Avignon,
1988), 161–166. Regarding Gregory XI, see additionally Guillaume Mollat,
“Grégoire XI et sa légende,” Revue d’ histoire ecclésiastique 44 (1954):
873–877. On the pope’s return to Rome, see Michel Hayez, “Avignon sans
les papes (1367–1370, 1376–1379),” in Genèse et début du grand schisme
d’occident, ed. Jean Favier (Paris: Éditions du Centre national de la re-
cherche scientifique, 1980), 143–57; and Richard C. Trexler, “Rome on the
Eve of the Great Schism,” Speculum 42 (1967): 489–509. On the pope’s
relation with the East, see James Muldoon, “The Avignon Papacy and the
Frontiers of Christendom: The Evidence of Vatican Register 62,” Archi-
vum historiae pontificiae 17 (1979): 125–195; and Popes, Lawyers, and Infidels:
The Church and the Non-Christian World, 1250–1550 (Philadelphia: Univer-
sity of Pennsylvania Press, 1979). On the Treaty of Bruges, see Maurice
Keen, England in the Later Middle Ages: A Political History (London: Rout-
ledge, 2003). On relations with Savoy, see Eugene L. Cox, The Green Count
of Savoy, Amadeus VI and Transalpine Savoy in the Fourteenth Century
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1967); and the more recent
302 Additional Bibliography

Bruno Galland, Les papes d’Avignon et la Maison de Savoie, 1309–1409

(Rome: École française de Rome, 1998). Regarding the war with Florence,
see Samuel Kline Cohn, Lust for Liberty: The Politics of Social Revolt in
Medieval Europe, 1200–1425: Italy, France, and Flanders (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 2006); Popular Protest in Late-Medieval Europe:
Italy, France and Flanders (Manchester: Manchester University Press,
2004); and John M. Najemy, A History of Florence 1200–1575 (Malden, MA:
Blackwell, 2006). On Baldo degli Ubaldi, see “Civil Violence and the Initi-
ation of the Schism,” in A Companion to the Great Western Schism
(1378–1417), ed. Joëlle Rollo-Koster and Thomas Izbicki (Leiden: Brill,
2009), 9–66. On Pierre of Cros, the pope’s camerlengo, see Daniel Willi-
man, The Letters of Pierre De Cros, Chamberlain to Pope Gregory XI,
1371–1378 (Tempe: Arizona Center for Medieval and Renaissance Stud-
ies, 2009).

4: CONSTRUCTING THE ADMINISTRATION

The École française de Rome, Le Fonctionnement administratif de la papauté

d’Avignon: Aux origines de l’état moderne (Rome: École française de Rome,
1990) and Armand Jamme and Olivier Poncet, Offices et papauté,
XIVe–XVIIe siècle: Charges, hommes, destins (Rome: École française de
Rome, 2005) are the most recent surveys of the papal administration.
Bernard Guillemain, La cour pontificale d’Avignon: Étude d’une société (Par-
is: De Boccard, 1966) remains an invaluable source on the topic. On the
papal mint, see Marc Bompaire, “La monnaie de Pont-de-Sorgues dans la
première moitié du XIVe siècle,” Revue numismatique 25 (1983): 139–176.
The system of communication of the popes has been well studied. See
Anne-Marie Hayez, “Les couriers des papes d’Avignon sous Innocent VI
et Urbain V (1352–1370),” in La Circulation des nouvelles au Moyen Âge:
XXIVe Congrès de la S.H.M.E.S. Avignon, juin 1993 (Rome: École française
de Rome, 1994), 49–62; and Yves Renouard, “Comment les papes d’Avi-
gnon expédiaient leur courier,” Revue historique 180 (1937): 1–29. Regard-
ing the political transitions, see Ralph A. Giesey, The Royal Funeral Cere-
mony in Renaissance France (Geneva: Droz, 1960); Alain Boureau, The Myth
of Pope Joan, trans. L. G. Cochrane (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
2001); Sergio Bertelli, The King’s Body: Sacred Rituals of Power in Medieval
and Early Modern Europe, trans. R. Burr Litchfield (University Park: Penn-
sylvania State University Press, 2001); and my Raiding Saint Peter: Empty
 Additional Bibliography 303

Sees, Violence, and the Initiation of the Great Western Schism (1378) (Leiden
and Boston: Brill, 2008). Guy de Chauliac was without a doubt the most
famous surgeon of his time. His Chirurgia remained the standard of sur-
gery until the seventeenth century. See Guigonis De Caulhiaco (Guy de
Chauliac), Inventarium Sive Chirurgia Magna, ed. Michael R. McVaugh and
Margrete S. Ogden (Leiden: Brill, 1997), 2 vols. On confessors, see Xavier
de La Selle, Le service des âmes à la cour: Confesseurs et aumôniers des rois de
France du XIIIe au XVe siècle (Geneva: Droz, 1995); and regarding music at
the papal court, see Andrew Tomasello, Music and Ritual at Papal Avignon,
1309–1403 (Ann Arbor, MI: UMI Research Press, 1983). The Pignotte, the
papal almshouse, has recently been studied by Daniel Le Blevec in his
monumental La Part du pauvre: L’assistance dans les pays du Bas-Rhône du
xiie siècle au milieu du xve siècle (Rome: École française de Rome, 2000), 2
vols. Marc Dykmans has edited and published most medieval ceremonial
books, also called ordines; see Le cérémonial papal de la fin du Moyen Âge à la
Renaissance (Brussels: Institut historique belge de Rome, 1977), 4 vols.;
L’oeuvre de Patrizi Piccolomini, ou le cérémonial papal de la première Renais-
sance (Città del Vaticano: Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, 1980), 2 vols.;
and Le pontifical romain révisé au XVe siècle (Città del Vaticano: Biblioteca
Apostolica Vaticana, 1985). Regarding double burials and the Avignon
cardinals’ endowments to the city, see Julian Gardner, The Tomb and the
Tiara: Curial Tomb Sculpture in Rome and Avignon in the Later Middle Ages
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), especially 133–171; and Cathleen
A. Fleck, “Seeking Legitimacy: Art and Manuscripts for the Popes in
Avignon from 1378–1417,” in A Companion to the Great Western Schism, ed.
Joëlle Rollo-Koster and Thomas Izbicki (Leiden: Brill, 2009), 239–302. For
a case study of cardinals, see Blake R. Beattie, Angelus Pacis: The Legation
of Cardinal Giovanni Gaetano Orsini, 1326–1334 (Leiden: Brill, 2007); Mar-
garet Harvey, “The Household of Cardinal Langham,” Journal of Ecclesias-
tical History 47.1 (1996): 18–44; and Norman P. Zacour, Talleyrand, the
Cardinal of Périgord, 1301–1364 (Philadelphia: American Philosophical So-
ciety, 1960). See Pierre Jugie, “Les familiae cardinalices et leur organisa-
tion interne au temps de la papauté d’Avignon: Esquisse d’un bilan,” in
Aux origines de l’état moderne: Le fonctionnement administratif de la papauté
d’Avignon (Rome: École française de Rome, 1990), 41–59, for the most
recent survey of cardinals’ households. Norman P. Zacour, “Papal Regu-
lation of Cardinals’ Households in the Fourteenth Century,” Speculum
50.3 (1975): 434–455 studies papal attempts at reining in their expenses.
304 Additional Bibliography

On the diplomacy of Avignon’s popes, see Karsten Plöger, England and

the Avignon Popes: The Practice of Diplomacy in Late Medieval Europe (Lon-
don: Legenda, 2005). On universities in western Europe and Avignon in
particular, see Walter Rüegg and Hilde De Ridder-Symoens, A History of
the University in Europe: Universities in the Middle Ages (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 1992).

5: AVIGNON: THE CAPITAL AND ITS POPULATION

See Iris Origo, The Merchant of Prato: Francesco di Marco Datini (New York:
Knopf, 1957) for Datini’s biography. Regarding Avignon’s seven par-
ishes, see Anne-Marie Hayez, “La paroisse Saint-Agricol au temps des
papes à Avignon,” Annuaire de la société des amis du Palais des papes et des
monuments d’Avignon 71–72 (1994–1995): 67–97; “La paroisse Saint-Geniès
d’Avignon à l’époque pontificale,” Annuaire de la société des amis du Palais
des papes et des monuments d’Avignon 73 (1996): 83–98; “La paroisse Saint-
Symphorien au temps des papes d’Avignon,” Annuaire de la société des
amis du Palais des papes et des monuments d’Avignon 74 (1997): 25–50; “La
paroisse Saint-Étienne au temps des papes d’ Avignon,” Annuaire de la
société des amis du Palais des papes et des monuments d’Avignon 75 (1998):
83–98; “La paroisse Saint-Pierre au temps des papes d’Avignon,” Annu-
aire de la société des amis du Palais des papes et des monuments d’Avignon 76
(1999): 11–38; “La paroisse Saint-Didier au temps des papes d’Avignon,”
Annuaire de la société des amis du Palais des papes et des monuments d’ Avi-
gnon 78–79 (2001–2002): 19–40; “La paroisse Notre-Dame-La-Principale
au temps des papes d’Avignon,” Annuaire de la société des amis du Palais
des papes et des monuments d’Avignon 80 (2003): 85–108. Regarding the
condition of Avignon’s Jewish population, see Léon Bardinet, “Condition
civile des juifs du Comtat Venaissin pendant le séjour des papes à Avi-
gnon, 1309–1376,” Revue historique 12 (1880): 1–47; and “Les juifs du Com-
tat Venaissin au moyen âge: Leur rôle économique et intellectuel,” Revue
historique 14 (1880): 29–35; Elizabeth A. R. Brown, “Philip V, Charles IV
and the Jews of France: The Alleged Expulsion of 1322,” Speculum 66
(1991): 294–322; William C. Jordan, “The Jews and the Transition to Papal
Rule in the Comtat Venaissin,” Michael 12 (1991): 213–232; and Valérie
Theis, “John XXII et l’expulsion des juifs du Comtat Venaissin,” Annales,
histoire, sciences sociales 67 (2012): 41–77. On the convent for repentant
prostitutes, see Joëlle Rollo-Koster, “From Prostitutes to Virgin Brides of
 Additional Bibliography 305

Christ: The Avignonese Repenties in the Late Middle Ages,” Journal of

Medieval and Early Modern Studies 32 (2002): 109–144. For details on Avi-
gnon’s population and the Liber Divisionis, see Joëlle Rollo-Koster, “Mer-
cator Florentinensis and Others: Immigration in Papal Avignon,” in Ur-
ban and Rural Communities in Medieval France, ed. Kathryn L. Reyerson
and John Drendel (Leiden: Brill, 1998), 73–100; and The People of Curial
Avignon: A Critical Edition of the Liber Divisionis and the Matriculae of Notre-
Dame la Majour (Lampeter, GB, and Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen, 2009).
On the Italian membership of Avignon’s confraternities, see Joëlle Rollo-
Koster, “Forever After: The Dead in the Avignonese Confraternity of
Notre-Dame la Majour (1329–1381),” Journal of Medieval History 25 (1999):
115–140; and “Amongst Brothers: Italians’ Networks in Papal Avignon
(1360s–1380s),” Medieval Prosopography 21 (2000): 153–189. Regarding
Avignon’s women, see Joëlle Rollo-Koster, “The Women of Papal Avi-
gnon, A New Source: The Liber Divisionis of 1371,” Journal of Women’s
History 8 (Spring 1996): 36–59. Regarding prostitution and the reintegra-
tion of prostitutes in medieval Avignon, see Joëlle Rollo-Koster, “Prosti-
tutes,” in Women and Gender in Medieval Europe: An Encyclopedia, ed. Mar-
garet Schaus (New York and London: Routledge, 2006), 675–678. For
plundering papal goods at a pope’s death and election, see Joëlle Rollo-
Koster, Raiding Saint Peter: Empty Sees, Violence, and the Initiation of the
Great Western Schism (1378) (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2008).

6: THE GREAT WESTERN SCHISM AND AVIGNON

On Gregory’s return to Rome, see Joëlle Rollo-Koster and Alizah Hol-

stein, “Anger and Spectacle in Late Medieval Rome: Gauging Emotion in
Urban Topography?” in Cities, Texts and Social Networks, 400–1500: Experi-
ences and Perceptions of Medieval Urban Space, ed. Anne Lester, Caroline
Goodson, and Carol Symes (Farnham, UK: Ashgate, 2010), 149–174. On
the Great Western Schism, see the collection of essays edited by Joëlle
Rollo-Koster and Thomas Izbicki, A Companion to the Great Western Schism
(1378–1417) (Leiden: Brill, 2009); E. Delaruelle, E. R. Labande, and Paul
Ourliac, L’église au temps du Grand Schisme et de la crise conciliaire
(1378–1449) (Paris: Bloud & Gay, 1962); Paul Ourliac, “Le schisme et les
conciles (1378–1449),” in Histoire du christianisme des origines à nos jours,
ed. Jean Marie Mayeur (Paris: Desclée, 1990), 89–139; and Howard Ka-
minsky, “The Great Schism,” in The New Cambridge Medieval History, ed.
306 Additional Bibliography

Michael Jones (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), vol. 6,

685–696, offers an excellent introduction to the topic. I have written at
length on sacking and pillaging at the deaths of popes; see Joëlle Rollo-
Koster, Raiding Saint Peter: Empty Sees, Violence, and the Initiation of the
Great Western Schism (1378) (Leiden: Brill, 2008). On the responsibility of
cardinals, see Stefan Weiss, “Luxury and Extravagance at the Papal Court
in Avignon and the Outbreak of Great Western Schism,” in A Companion
to the Great Western Schism, ed. Joëlle Rollo-Koster and Thomas Izbicki
(Leiden: Brill, 2009), 67–97. On Raymond de Turenne, see Noël Valois,
Raymond Roger, vicomte de Turenne, et les papes d’Avignon (1386–1408)
d’après un document découvert par M. Camille Rivain (Paris: Picard, 1890). I
have discussed Avignonese confraternities in Joëlle Rollo-Koster, The Peo-
ple of Curial Avignon: A Critical Edition of the Liber Divisionis and the Matric-
ulae of Notre Dame la Majour (Lampeter, UK, and Lewiston, NY: Edwin
Mellen, 2009), especially 77–160; “Forever After: The Dead in the Avi-
gnonese Confraternity of Notre Dame la Majour (1329–1381),” Journal of
Medieval History 25 (1999): 115–140; and “Amongst Brothers: Italians’ Net-
works in Papal Avignon (1360s–1380s),” Medieval Prosopography 21 (2000):
153–189. I discussed the subtraction of obedience in detail in Joëlle Rollo-
Koster, “The Politics of Body Parts: Contested Topographies in Late Med-
ieval Avignon,” Speculum: A Journal of Medieval Studies 78 (2003): 66–98.
On the repairs done to the palace after the Catalan War, see Claude
Faure, “Les réparations du palais pontifical d’Avignon au temps de Jean
XXIII (1413–1415),” Mélanges d’archéologie et d’histoire 28 (1908): 185–206;
and Germain Butaud, “Les deux sièges du palais apostolique d’Avignon
(1398–1411),” in Villes en Guerre: XIVe–XVe siècles, ed. Christiane Raynaud
(Aix-en-Provence: Publications de l'université de Provence, 2008),
103–126. Regarding saints of the Schism, see Renate Blumenfeld-Kosin-
ski, Poets, Saints, and Visionaries of the Great Schism, 1378–1417 (University
Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2006); and Laura Ackerman
Smoller, The Saint and the Chopped-Up Baby: The Cult of Vincent Ferrer in
Medieval and Early Modern Europe (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press,
2014). On John Chrysostom, see J. N. D. Kelly, Golden Mouth: The Story of
John Chrysostom, Ascetic, Preacher, Bishop (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University
Press, 1995); and Jaclyn L. Maxwell, Christianization and Communication in
Late Antiquity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).
 Index

abbreviators, 165, 167 Austria, Frederick of, 43, 52

absolution in mortis articulo, 113, 115 Avignon, Parish of: Notre-Dame la
Acre, 36, 37 Principale, 180, 199, 215–216, 217,
Aigrefeuille, Guillaume de, cardinal, 220, 221, 255; Saint-Agricol,
86, 111, 119, 256 179–180, 199, 218–220, 221; Saint-
Ailly, Pierre de, 261, 265, 268 Didier, 180, 199, 216, 217–218, 220,
Aix, Union of, 253–254, 258 221, 231, 263; Saint-Étienne, 176,
Albornoz, Gil Álvarez Carillo, cardinal 179, 200, 207, 208; Saint-Geniès, 180,
and Papal Legate, 75, 89–93, 109, 199, 214–215, 217; Saint-Pierre, 180,
112, 121–122, 124, 127, 133, 134, 136, 199, 210–213, 219, 220, 221; Saint-
145, 202 Symphorien, 180, 199, 208–210
Alexander V, pope, 244, 270
Alfonso XI, king of Castile, 89, 100 Babylon, 2
alms, 5, 172–173, 215, 223, 228, 276, 277, Babylonian Captivity, 23, 70
279 Baluze, Étienne, 3–4, 8, 33, 69, 72, 124,
Alpartil, Martin de, 232, 262 128, 142
Amadeus VI of Savoy, 134 banderesi, 143
Anagni, 25, 27, 27–28, 30–31, 33–34, 38, bankruptcies, 132
40, 143, 195, 241 Battle of: Cocherel, 117; Crécy, 80–81;
Ancona, 41, 91 Poitiers, 93–96, 98
Anjou, John of, 42 Bavaria, Louis of, Holy Roman
Anjou, Louis II of, 251, 252, 253, 254, emperor, 43, 49, 51, 59, 61, 70, 78, 80,
267 89
Anjou, Louis of, 125, 130, 140, 141, 228, beatific vision controversy, 54–56
230, 243, 251–252, 253, 253–254, 265 Benedict XI, pope, 31, 195
Anjou, Robert of, king of Naples, 42, Benedict XII, pope, 6, 54, 56–62, 69, 72,
52, 76, 77 84, 110, 132, 155, 171, 176–177, 182,
annates, 160, 248, 250 207, 219, 288
Annibaldi, Roman family, 29–30 Benedict XIII, pope, 232, 244, 254,
Apostolic Chamber, 4, 10, 14, 91, 97, 99, 261–272
124, 128, 135, 150, 155–164, 171, 172, Benedictines, 57, 70, 110, 111, 113,
175, 180, 183, 197, 258, 279 199–200, 217, 220
apostolic poverty, 48–53 benefices, 25, 45, 57, 62, 71, 73, 81, 102,
Aquitaine, 61, 94, 95, 97, 126 111, 113–114, 128, 150–151, 155,
Aragon, 23, 36, 41, 76, 89, 100, 101, 119, 156–158, 159, 160–161, 163, 164,
158, 243, 261, 265, 269 164–165, 183, 184, 185, 205, 209, 249,
Arezzo, 41, 134 250, 258, 262, 265, 270, 276, 288
assignation, 10, 161, 173, 181, 206, 243 Bernier, Jean, collector, 160
assignation officers (assignatores), 181 Berry, duke of, 141, 228, 251, 258, 261,
Aubert, Étienne. See Innocent VI, pope 262, 264, 268, 279

307
308 Index

Black Death, 70, 73, 75, 81, 82–83, college, 15, 30, 35, 36, 39, 41, 45, 55,
205–206, 212, 213, 239 69, 72, 86, 87, 88, 92, 98, 99, 102, 103,
Black Prince, prince of Wales, 95, 101 109–110, 115, 123, 124, 126, 127, 128,
Blauzac, Jean de, cardinal, 121, 141, 129, 136, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 149,
194, 204, 205 150, 152, 155, 158, 167, 173, 174,
Blois, Charles of, 80 179–184, 197, 222, 288, 289; role in
Bologna, 41, 42, 59, 78, 89, 92, 111, 112, the Great Western Schism, 241–242,
122, 133, 136–137, 144, 196, 222, 270, 245–248, 251, 252, 253, 260–261,
288 262–264, 266, 269, 269–272, 273
Bonet, Nicholas, 58 caritative subsidies, 161
Boniface VIII, pope, 24, 26–28, 29, 30, Carpentras, 12, 36, 45
33, 33–34, 36, 37, 38, 39, 41, 42, 44, Castel Sant’Angelo, 30, 124, 126, 144,
46, 52, 73, 103, 153, 154, 155 240, 242, 249
Boniface IX, pope, 260, 265, 266, 270 Castile, 89, 100–101, 118, 243, 261, 265
Boninsegna di Matteo, 255–260, 262, cavalcade, 33, 129
281, 282 Ceccano, Annibaldo Caetani di,
Bordeaux, 32, 33, 35, 79, 95, 140, 141, cardinal, 80, 180, 183, 185
171 Celestine III, pope, 29
Borgo, 241 Celestine V, pope, 26, 27, 33
Boulogne, Gui of, cardinal, 93–94, 109, cemeteries, 51, 200, 206, 209, 210, 211,
110, 127, 203 212, 213, 216, 217, 218, 276, 280
Bourbon, Blanche de, 100, 119 centralization, 11, 55, 124, 150, 151–152,
bourgs, 189, 199, 207, 215, 218, 220, 224, 154–155, 156, 162–163, 185, 289
225, 226, 228 Cerda, Charles de la, Constable of
bridges, 72, 180, 201–202, 202, 207, 208, France, 94
219, 226, 230–231, 262, 271, 277, 278, ceremonies, 25, 33, 38, 60, 125, 174, 219,
287 228, 230
Bridget of Sweden, 14, 102, 125, 183 Cervole, Arnaud de, 98–99, 117, 118,
Brienne, Walter of, Duke of Athens, 119, 120, 202
132 Chaise-Dieu, Abbey, 70, 85, 86
Bruni, Francesco, 164 Châlus, Aimery de, Papal Legate, 77
bullatores, 166 chamberlains, 14, 15, 156, 170, 183, 258,
Burgundy, Duke of, 60, 261, 262, 264, 262
266, 268, 269 Chambre des comptes, 71
Chambre des enquêtes, 71
Cabassole, Philippe de, cardinal, 123, Chambre du Cerf, 85, 177
125, 204 Chancery, 5, 124, 150, 152, 155, 157,
Caetani, Benedetto. See Boniface VIII, 158, 165–167, 167, 175, 178, 182, 248
pope Chapel of St. Michael, 85
Caetani family, 30–31, 41, 153, 183 Chapel of St. Peter, 85
Calais, 81, 94, 97, 140 Charles IV, Holy Roman Emperor, 71,
Camera. See Apostolic Chamber 75, 77, 78, 102, 117, 118, 122,
camerlengo, 156, 159, 161–162, 177, 178, 125–126, 133, 140, 228, 243
182, 204, 208, 243, 268, 273 Charles IV, king of France, 79
Capitol (Rome), 28–29, 241 Charles V, king of France, 95, 117, 125,
Capocci, Niccolo, cardinal, 95 126, 138, 140, 202, 243, 248, 251
cardinals: in Avignon, 149, 156, 158, Charles VI, king of France, 261, 262,
179–184, 185, 197, 204, 207, 207–208, 264, 269
222, 227; capitulation, 87–88; as a Chauliac, Guy de, 103, 170, 206
 Index 309

Cistercians, 56, 57, 166, 200, 209 confraternities, 138, 211, 217, 218, 222,
citizens, 12, 28, 74, 97, 121, 127, 133, 223, 228, 255, 276, 277, 278, 289
138, 142, 143, 144, 168, 182, 189, 190, consistory, 46, 59, 61, 109, 119, 129, 177,
191, 192, 193, 194–198, 199, 203, 205, 182, 233, 253
209, 214, 219, 220, 230, 232, 251, 254, Constantinople, 25, 124, 282
262, 271 consuls, 191, 192
citizenship, 192, 193, 194–198, 205 Conti, Roman family, 29–30
Clareno, Angelo, 48 Conventuals. See Franciscan poverty
Clement V, pope, 14, 23, 24, 32–44, 44, coronation, 25, 29, 32, 33, 41, 43, 77, 79,
46, 48, 57, 153, 154, 160, 182, 191, 85, 87, 102, 115, 125, 129, 171, 172,
200, 210, 219, 220 219, 228
Clement VI, pope, 8, 14, 59–60, 61, Corsini, Piero, cardinal, 134, 226
69–86, 86, 87–88, 89, 90, 104, 110, Corvara, Pietro of, 53
128, 129, 133, 145, 155, 159, 171, 172, Council of: Constance, 153, 244–245,
173, 177–178, 181, 182, 183, 193, 201, 271, 272, 273, 282, 289; Pisa, 244,
205, 212–213, 228, 288 269–270, 271; Vienne, 35, 36, 39, 42,
Clement VII, pope, 137, 144, 202, 204, 46, 48, 103, 153, 154
205, 217, 219, 242, 243, 249–252, Court of the Marshal of Justice, 168,
253–254, 255, 256, 260–261, 264, 273, 173, 195, 197–198, 212, 215, 216, 230
280, 282 courtiers, 45, 121, 124, 173, 190,
Clementist, 242, 243, 244, 252, 253–254, 194–198, 203, 205, 208, 209, 214, 217,
256, 266, 280 229, 255
clerks of the Chamber, 158, 162 Cramaud, Simon de, 261, 268, 270
Cojordan, Jean de, bishop of Avignon, Cremona, 42
59, 176 Cros, Pierre de, Camerlengo, 141, 144,
Col, Gontier, 261 242
Cola di Rienzo, 72, 74–75, 78, 90, 121 curial letters, 5, 163, 165
collations, 81, 128, 151, 157–160, 164,
262 Datini, Francesco di Marco, 6, 196, 226,
collectorates, 159, 160, 173 255, 256, 259, 278
collectors, 11, 81, 88, 159–162, 243, 265, Delicieux, Bernard, 49
289 diplomacy, 5, 32, 61, 76, 81, 87, 100, 133,
Colonna, Roman family, 27, 28, 29–31, 134, 163, 177, 185
34, 41, 43, 47, 74–75, 143, 153, 183, Dominicans, 24, 31, 36, 45, 50, 57, 69,
266, 267, 273 103, 145, 174, 180, 199, 200, 219, 263,
Colonna, Sciarra, 30, 31, 53 276, 278
common services, 151, 152, 157, 158 Duèse, Jacques. See John XXII, pope
communal letters, 5, 163, 165 Durance, 204, 218, 230, 231, 232, 265,
Comtat Venaissin, 36, 47, 99, 119, 123, 281
141, 158, 161, 191–192, 194, 201, 202, Durazzo, Charles of, 77, 252, 253
204, 251, 254, 273 Durazzo, Ladislaus, 267
conciliarism, 1, 239, 245, 283
conclave, 31, 32, 41, 45, 56, 62, 72, 86, Edward I, king of England, 34
87–88, 109–110, 128, 129, 144, 150, Edward II, king of England, 52, 79
153, 169, 177, 182, 241–242, 245, 246, Edward III, king of England, 60, 61, 78,
247, 261, 266, 273 79–81, 89, 93–94, 94–95, 95, 96, 97,
conclave capitulation, 87 98, 140
confessor, 34, 86, 163, 167, 171, 173, 174 Egidian constitutions (Constitutiones
Sanctæ Matris Ecclesiæ), 91
310 Index

entry (adventus), 211, 228, 240, 241, 250 Ghibelline, 29, 30, 41, 42, 52, 53, 54, 60,
episcopal palace, 46, 127, 176, 181, 201, 76, 78, 90, 102, 131, 134
267 Giovanni di Oleggio, 92
Estaing, Pierre de, cardinal, 130, 134 Giovanni di Vico, 90, 121
excommunication, 26, 52, 78, 90, 99, gonfaloniere, 91, 131, 136, 139, 164
120, 122, 125, 153, 165, 167, 182, 197, Got, Bertrand de. See Clement V, pope
205 Got, Bertrand de, Viscount of
expectative collations, 157 Lomagne, 45
Grange, Jean de la, cardinal, 141, 258
familiae (households), 155, 156, 158, 168, Great Western Schism, 1, 2, 10–11, 14,
169–176, 183, 197, 213, 220, 223, 227, 88, 128, 130, 142, 145, 153, 183, 184,
234, 264 194, 232, 239–282
fires, 69, 84, 102, 232, 233, 281 Gregory X, pope, 87, 88, 153, 246
FitzRalph, Richard, archbishop of Gregory XI, pope, 1, 8, 12, 14, 72, 86,
Armagh, 103 128–145, 155, 164, 170, 182, 183, 194,
Florence, 11, 14, 41, 43, 90, 130–139, 196, 204, 209, 214, 218, 240, 241, 242,
140, 142, 143, 164, 180, 196, 197, 222, 243, 248, 254, 273, 288, 289
226, 256 Gregory XII, pope, 244, 269, 270, 272
followers of the Roman court. See Grimoard, Anglic de, cardinal, 12, 13,
courtiers 111, 117, 127, 141, 181
Fournier, Jacques. See Benedict XII, Grimoard, Guillaume de. See Urban V,
pope pope
Fournier Register, 57 guards, 46, 144, 161, 162, 168, 170, 175,
Franciscan poverty, 41, 48–53, 102 178, 192, 203, 209, 227, 232
Franciscans, 24, 57, 58, 113, 180, 183, Gubbio, 41
199, 200, 216, 224, 263, 270, 276, 278 Guelph, 29, 41, 42–43, 59, 90, 102, 131,
Frangipani, Roman family, 29, 30, 153 134, 136, 139
Fraticelli, 49, 54, 138 Guesclin, Bertrand du, 101, 117, 119,
free companies (mercenaries), 96, 120, 123, 125, 141, 202
98–101, 115–117, 118, 119, 120, 123, Guyenne, 32, 34, 61, 79–81
125, 135, 204, 290 Guzman, Eleanor of, 100
Frejus, 46, 47
Froissart, John, 95, 98, 99, 109–110, 115, Hawkwood, John, 122, 126, 135, 136,
119 136–137, 202
Henry VII of Luxemburg, Holy Roman
gabelle, 12, 203, 230, 231, 251 emperor, 41, 51
Gallicanism, 268 Herenthals, Peter of, 73
Gascony, 34, 44, 61, 79, 81 heresy, 27, 31, 38, 47, 50, 52, 90, 270
Gelasius II, pope, 30 Holy Land, 24, 34, 36
Geneva, 250, 260 Hundleby, William of, 27–28
Geneva, Robert of. See Clement VII, Hundred Years’ War, 44, 61, 70, 79–81,
pope 89, 90, 93–97, 100, 103, 109, 120, 126,
Genoa, 43, 124, 134, 196, 253, 267, 268, 202, 239
269 Hungary, Andrew of, 76
gente nuova (new families), 132, 133, Hungary, Louis of, 76, 77, 140
135 hygiene, 15, 229–230
Géraud, Hugues, bishop of Cahors, 46,
47 illegitimacy, 27, 31, 38
Gerson, Jean, 261, 266
 Index 311

immigrants, 11, 14, 168, 189, 190, 195, Lusignan, Peter of, king of Cyprus,
199, 206, 209, 220, 221–222, 222, 224, 115, 116
227, 280 Luxembourg, Peter of, 217, 232–233,
indulgences, 43, 55, 70, 73, 82, 84, 113, 264, 280–281
114, 116, 142, 163, 165, 207, 216, 218 Lyons, 32, 33, 34, 45, 150, 153, 160
Innocent III, pope, 24, 26, 152–153, 156,
195 magic, 47, 103, 212
Innocent VI, pope, 5, 75, 81, 85, 86–103 Majorca, James of, 101, 115
Innocent VII, pope, 266 Malatesta family, 91, 92
inquisition, 40, 47, 49, 75, 145 Marcel, Étienne, 96–97
interdict, 14, 59, 60, 113, 116, 132–133, Martin V, pope, 244, 273
137–139, 167, 197, 269 Matteo Giovanetti, 85, 287
Italians, 8, 9, 10, 15, 29, 31, 32, 35, 36, 45, mercenaries, 6, 10, 45, 90, 93, 96, 97,
52, 56, 59, 72, 88, 110, 126, 136, 141, 98–101, 104, 116, 118, 119–120, 121,
164, 167, 177, 183, 211, 213, 216, 218, 125–126, 135, 136, 137, 138, 143, 158,
221, 222, 223, 226, 241, 242, 246, 254, 196, 202, 204, 220, 232, 249, 253, 258,
255–256, 259 267
messengers, 5, 15, 129, 156, 164, 175,
Jacquerie, 96 209, 217
Jews, 37, 38, 47, 83, 118, 168, 193, 197, Milan, 42, 47, 52, 53, 59, 78, 89, 92, 112,
210, 211, 212–213, 259, 271 121, 129, 134–136, 137, 139, 222, 251
John II the Good, king of France, 69, mint, 156, 162, 205
93–94, 95, 97, 115, 228 mitre, 129, 130, 154
John V Paleologus, 126 Molay, Jacques de, 36, 38, 39, 40
John XXII, pope, 8, 43, 44–55, 57, 59, 71, Mont Saint-Michel, 278–279
84, 89, 151, 154, 154–155, 155, Montefiascone, 90, 112, 126
156–157, 158, 159, 162, 165, 168, 170, Montfort, Jean de, 80
171, 175, 176, 181, 182, 184, 193, 195, Montpellier, 32, 45, 111, 119, 197, 225,
200–201, 207, 212, 218, 219, 288 288
John XXIII, pope, 244, 271–272
jubilee, 26, 70, 73, 244, 253, 260 Naples, 30, 36, 42, 43, 52, 60, 75–77, 78,
judges, 86, 91, 141, 162, 167–168, 178, 110, 112, 122, 158, 180, 242, 249, 250,
192, 202, 212, 215 251, 252–253, 253, 256, 258, 267, 268
Naples, Joanna of, 72, 75–77, 97, 101,
Knighton, Henry, 60, 96 112, 115, 125, 134, 190, 193, 211, 233,
249, 251, 252, 253
Lateran Palace, 35, 122 Narbonne, 49, 166, 225
Latium, 29, 251 nepotism, 34, 57, 70, 72, 87, 113, 155,
Laval, Gasbert de, camerlengo, 156, 182, 185, 250, 289
157, 159, 161, 162 new palace, 72, 84, 85, 177, 178, 189, 201
Levant, 24, 34, 36–37, 37, 43, 60, 76, 145 Nicholas II, pope, 245
Limousin, 3, 70, 72, 85, 86, 110, 127, 129, Nicholas III, pope, 48
141, 142, 144, 196, 221, 241 Nicholas V, antipope, 53, 78
livrées (cardinals’ palaces), 179–181, Niem, Dietrich of, 246
185, 207, 228 Nocera, 90, 252, 253
Lodi, 42 Nogaret, Guillaume de, 27, 31, 32, 34,
Lucca, 42, 132, 134, 135, 222, 253, 269 38
Luna, Rodrigo de, 265, 271 Notre-Dame la Majour, confraternity
of, 211, 218, 222–223, 228, 255
312 Index

Notre-Dame la Principale, 180, 199, papal secretaries, 113, 117, 163–164,

215–216, 217, 220, 221, 255 166–167, 183, 232
Notre-Dame des Doms, 56, 62, 85, 127, Papal States, 9, 40–41, 43, 75, 88, 89–90,
142, 189, 200, 201, 207, 264, 267, 270, 91, 93, 104, 112, 121–122, 130, 134,
289 135, 136, 143, 145, 152, 153, 160, 161,
163, 182, 184, 243, 251, 266, 267, 273
Ockham, William of, 51, 80 papal treasury, 27, 27–28, 31, 45, 55, 88,
omen, 33, 240 92, 102, 118, 123, 140, 141, 145, 151,
Orleans, 45, 288 152, 155, 156, 158, 161, 176, 177, 178,
Orleans, Louis of, 261, 262, 263, 264, 204, 243, 244, 273–274
266, 267, 269 Paris, 45, 57, 58, 70, 80, 82, 96–97, 111,
Orsini, Giovanni, cardinal, 52 113, 221, 229, 250, 261, 262, 264, 265,
Orsini, Matteo Rosso, cardinal, 31 268, 269, 270, 288
Orsini, Napoleone, cardinal, 32, 41, 45 parishes in Avignon. See Avignon,
Orsini, Roman family, 29–30, 47, 74, Parish of
143, 153, 183 Pedro the Cruel, king of Castile, 89,
Orvieto, 25, 31, 90, 112, 195 100–101, 118, 119, 120
Otto Santi, War of the Eight Saints, 131, Peking, 58
133–139, 196, 197 penitentiary, 86, 150, 167, 175, 182
Penthièvre, Jeanne of, 80
Padilla, Maria de, 100 Pepoli, Taddeo, 59
Padua, 43 Perpignan, 120, 268, 269, 272
Padua, Marsilius of, 51, 52 Perugia, 31, 32, 49, 90, 122, 126, 128,
palace gardens, 85, 112, 201, 232 134, 195, 253
Palmis, Jean de, Collector, 160 Petit Palais, 59, 176, 179
papal bulls: Ad conditorem canonum, 49; petitioners, 52, 57, 102, 114, 150, 151,
Ad decorum ecclesie, 57; Ad preclaras 157, 163, 165–166, 175, 194, 197
sapientie, 39; Ad providam, 39; Petrarch, 2, 3, 14, 74, 76, 84, 122, 178,
Ausculta fili, 27; Benedictus Deus, 54; 216, 229, 234, 287
Clamat ad nos, 116; Clericis laicos, 26, petty services, 158
34; Cogit nos, 116; Cum inter Philip III, king of France, 36
nonnullos, 49; Exiit qui seminat, 48, Philip IV the Fair, king of France, 23,
49; Faciens misericordiam, 39; Fulgens 24–28, 31, 34, 35, 37–39, 41–43, 44,
sicut stella, 57; Gravem dilectorum, 79, 153
103; Haec sancta, 245, 272; Inter Philip VI, of Valois, king of France, 60,
solicitudines, 82; Ne romani, 45; Pastor 71, 79, 80, 86, 249
bonus, 57; Quia vir reprobus, 50; Rex physicians, 5, 7, 140, 166, 170, 183, 206,
gloriae virtutum, 42; Sicut Judeis, 83; 207
Sollicitudo pastoralis, 88; Summi Pierleoni, Roman family, 29, 30
Magistri, 57; Super cathedram, 103; Pignotte, papal almshouse, 158, 172,
Super illius specula, 47; Unam 173, 213, 250
sanctam, 27, 34; Unigentius Dei filius, pilgrimages, 43, 278–279, 281
73; Vox in excelso, 39 Pisa, 30, 42, 43, 53, 134, 142, 244,
papal household, 46, 98, 113, 124, 156, 269–270, 271
168–176 poison, 31, 46–47, 83, 100, 164
papal legate, 41, 43, 52, 61, 75, 77, Poisson, Pierre, architect, 59
89–90, 92–93, 93, 104, 111, 115, 122, Poitiers, 39, 98
124, 126, 134, 141, 163, 185, 194, 252, Poitiers, Alphonse of, 192
261 Poitou, 32, 35, 141
 Index 313

Pont-Saint-Esprit, 99 Saint-Symphorien, 180, 199, 208–210

pope’s chapel, 171, 176 Saint-Victor of Marseille, 109, 111, 112,
pope’s kitchen, 171 124, 127, 227
popolo minuto (commoners), 29, 41, 131, Saisset, Bernard, bishop of Pamier, 27
142 Salutati, Coluccio, 128, 129, 136, 143
Poujet, Bertrand du, cardinal, 46, 52 Sarrant, Arnald de, 58
Prague, 75, 118, 288 Savelli, Roman family, 29, 30, 153
Prés, Pierre des, cardinal, 80 scribes, 4, 5, 10, 15, 162, 163, 166, 167,
processions, 33, 82, 85, 129, 138, 207, 170, 172, 178, 183, 208, 215
219, 228, 241, 265, 276, 280 second subtraction, 268, 269, 270, 271,
propaganda, 2, 30, 32, 136, 261, 263, 290
270, 280 secret almonry, 172, 173
prostitutes, 2, 8, 142, 200, 203, 205, 219, sede vacante (empty see), 87
224 Senate, Rome, 28, 29, 162
prostitution, 6, 13, 15, 225, 227 seneschal, 192
sergeants, 111, 158, 166, 169, 170, 173,
ramparts, 99, 199, 202, 203, 207, 211, 175, 181, 183, 192, 198, 212, 213, 215,
231, 268, 290 230, 232
record-keeping, 163 sewers, 177, 230, 231, 232
rector, 40, 91, 92, 123, 152, 191, 194, 197, Sicily, 34, 37, 42, 46, 76, 77, 99, 158, 249,
199, 204, 220, 243, 265, 274 252
referee, 152, 165, 167 Siena, 14, 90, 134, 135, 136, 140, 222,
resident aliens, 193, 194, 196 258, 280
Rhône River, 1, 2, 13, 35, 36, 115, 117, Sigismund, Holy Roman Emperor, 244,
177, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 207, 208, 271, 272
220, 226, 230, 231, 232, 233, 263, 265, signoria, 131, 132, 137, 138, 139, 164
281, 290 simony, 27, 31, 38, 46, 123, 248, 282
right of spoil, 160, 161, 287 Spiritual Franciscans. See Franciscan
rioni (quarters of Rome), 28 poverty
Roche, Androin de la, cardinal and Spoleto, 41, 90, 91
papal legate, 92, 97, 109, 122, 126 squires, 99, 111, 172, 175, 183, 184, 260
Roger, Pierre. See Clement VI, pope St. John of Jerusalem, knights of, 37, 40,
Roger de Beaufort, Pierre. See Gregory 199
XI, pope St. Peter basilica, 25, 59, 85, 125, 126
Roman jubilee, 26, 253, 260 Statutes of Provisors, 81
Roquetaillade, Jean de, 102 Stefaneschi, Jacopo, cardinal, 56
Rota, 155, 167, 168, 175, 178 streets, 1, 8, 12, 33, 72, 179, 180, 190,
208, 209, 211, 212, 213, 215, 216, 220,
Sabran family, 110, 111 222, 225, 226, 229, 230, 231, 263, 289,
Saint-Agricol, 179–180, 199, 218–220, 290
221 subtraction of obedience, 232, 262, 265,
Saint-Didier, 180, 199, 216, 217–218, 266, 267, 268, 269, 290
220, 221, 231, 263
Saint-Étienne, 176, 179, 200, 207, 208 Talleyrand, Hélie de, cardinal of
Saint-Geniès, 180, 199, 214–215, 217 Périgord, 86, 92, 95, 96, 127, 181
Saint Louis, Louis IX, king of France, Taranto, Louis of, 77, 112
26, 37, 39, 76, 192 Taranto, Philip of, 77
Saint-Pierre, 180, 199, 210–213, 219, Taranto, Robert of, 77
220, 221
314 Index

taxation, 10, 24, 26, 27, 45, 52, 71, 79, 96, Urban VI, pope, 1, 127, 144, 164,
132, 151, 152, 153, 154, 158, 160, 181, 241–243, 247, 248, 249, 252–253, 255,
203, 205, 206, 268, 273 259, 260, 273, 274, 280
Templar, Knights, 24, 33–40, 40, 44, 46, Urbanist, 242, 243, 244, 256
153, 154, 219 ushers, 173, 175, 215
Temporal Court, 8, 168, 169, 192, 193,
197, 198, 213, 226, 229 Vatican, 3, 4, 5, 10, 13, 43, 112, 144, 157,
testaments (wills), 13, 51, 223, 225, 163, 165, 166, 185, 203, 241, 246, 264
275–278 Via, Jacques de, cardinal, 46
tithes, 24, 114, 119, 122, 125, 152, 159, vicar, 24, 27, 52, 59, 60, 73, 78, 89, 91, 92,
160 93, 102, 111, 112, 122, 123, 141, 152,
tonsure, 198 156, 168, 182, 192, 193, 194, 204, 212,
Toulouse, 45, 46, 56, 86, 89, 111, 120, 232, 243, 255, 274
191, 192, 288 vice-chancellor, 167, 215
Toulouse, Jeanne of, 192 Villani, Giovanni, 3, 32, 55, 56
Tour, Bertrand de la, cardinal, 49, 50 violence, 28, 74, 75, 82, 83, 93, 104, 116,
tournaments, 120, 134, 141, 183, 228 118, 120, 143, 190, 209, 225, 226, 227,
Tower of the Wardrobe, 85, 177 228, 241, 246–247, 260, 264
towers, 72, 85, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, Visconti, Bernabò, 92, 112, 122–123,
200, 202, 205, 232, 233, 267, 289, 290 126, 135, 136
Trastámara, Henry of, king of Castile, Visconti, Giovanni, 78, 89, 92, 112
100, 119–120 Visconti, Matteo, 92
Treaty : of Bretigny, 97, 98, 116, 121, Visconti family, 47, 52, 59, 60, 92, 93,
140; of London, 96; of 102, 129, 134, 134–135, 145, 251
Montefiascone, 90 Viterbo, 25, 40, 90, 122, 124, 126, 144,
triple tiara, papal crown, 26, 33, 85, 144, 195, 267
154, 174, 242
truce : of Calais, 81, 93; of Esplechin, 61 war of Catalans, 270–271
Turenne, Raymond de, 134, 141, way of cession, 261, 262
253–254, 259, 274 way of council, 261
way of force, 242, 250, 260, 261, 267
Ubertino da Casale, 48, 51 women, 6, 38, 39, 83, 103, 114, 115, 172,
Urban II, pope, 24 206, 210, 223, 224, 225, 230, 276, 277,
Urban V, pope, 8, 12, 13, 101, 109–127, 281
129, 133, 136, 140, 141, 144, 155, 157,
161, 164, 174, 181, 182, 183, 193–194, xenophobia, 227
201, 203–205, 209, 228, 240, 288, 289