Case Analysis

1.] LIFE INSURANCE CORPORATION OF INDIA V. CONSUMER EDUCATION

AND RESEARCH CENTER.

In this particular case The plaintiffs had sought certain details of insurance policies from the
respondents. After obtaining such details, plaintiffs made a framework outline of these
policies and submitted to the respondents. These proposals were subsequently rejected by the
respondents on the grounds that they did not meet the minimum statutory requisites. They
instead laid down their own guidelines for acceptance of these policies.

The plaintiffs filed a writ petition before the concerned High Court, alleging that the
administrative actions undertaken by such defendants were unconstitutional under the test of
reasonableness (as laid down under Article 14, 19 and 21 of the Constitution) in addition to
being totally arbitrary and opposed to public policy standards. In doing so, they filed a writ
petition under Article 226 of the Constitution before the State High Court seeking judicial
relief.

The High Court, after careful perusal of the conditions mentioned in the proposal, utilized the
principles of the doctrine of severability and declared only the portion that spoke of
acceptance of such policies qua Government/semi-Governmental agencies as being repugnant
in law.

The Defense ,The counsel for the defendant held that under principles of life insurance
business, it is only the holder of insurance policies that gets the benefits and not anyone else.
Hence, the petitioners were not entitled to receive the profits of the insurance policy.
However, the counsel for petitioners held that the life insurance policies issued by the parent
company must be of such a nature that they are in total conformity with principles of
equality, fairness and the test of reasonableness as has been laid down in the Constitution of
India. Prayers of the Defense On appeal before the Supreme Court under Article 32 of the
Constitution, the following reliefs were prayed by the petitioners: 1. A decree that would set
aside the High Court’s order as being repugnant-in-law 2. Absolute repugnancy of the
conditions set out in the insurance policy plan proposals which appeared to be absolutely
arbitrary and opposed to public policy
Final judgement in this cases - The Apex Court’s Verdict Therefore, in a contract of
insurance the rates of insurance must be totally reasonable, as should be the premium amount.
If both are arbitrary and opposed to public policy then the whole contract is liable to be set
aside. Thus, as the defendant’s policy terms were unconscionable and opposed to public
policy altogether, it was constitutionally void-in- law and thus liable to be set aside by the
High Court.

2.] B. SHAH V. PRESIDING OFFICER, LABOR COURT, AND COMBAITORE

The law relating to beneficial legislations, specifically the Maternity Benefits Act has been
overtly discussed by the judiciary in recenttimes, the prime example being the B. SHAH V.
PRESIDING OFFICER, LABOR COURT, AND COMBAITORE wherein for the first time,
a doctrine of “beneficial rule of construction was discussed in respect to social legislations
like Maternity Benefits Act. Even though the objective behind yielding social legislations is
to advance welfare of the masses, provide improved access to justice and give impetus to
reasonability, such primary constituents of the great legislative intent in majority of these
promulgations46 have failed to materialize as access of these to the vulnerable and
marginalized group of women still remains a hurdle .Coming to the forefront of the B. Shah
case wherein the question considered by the court revolved around one Subbammal who used
to work in the appellant’s plantation industry. Ona notice served by the respondent of her
expected delivery in due time (which actually tookplace in December 1967), she was allowed
to go on leave by the appellant industry in October of the same year. The respondent woman
was paid by the employer industry for the said amount of Maternity leave as mandated by the
Act, in this case for 72 Days. As the respondent was dissatisfied with the computation
concluded by the appellant industry which intentionally excluded the Sundays citing it as a
non-working holiday, she applied to the Labor Court, Coimbatore, under section 33C(2) of
the Industrial Disputes Act for redressal of her grievance. The Labour Court and High Court
both upheld the appeal due to which the appeal went to the Supreme Court for further course
of action.

Two of the major contentions before the court were the,

1. Legislative Intent behind the enactment of the statute and subsequent Interpretation of the
statute.

2. Computation of leave for the grant of Maternity Benefits.

The question before the Supreme Court was whether in calculating the maternity benefit for
the period covered by Section 5. Sundays being wage less holiday should be excluded. Issues
Raised before the Courts with Reference to Maternity Benefit Act, 1961 3
• The Apex Court in holding that Sundays must also be included, applied the beneficial rule
of construction in favor of the woman worker and observed that the benefit conferred by the
Act read in the light of the Article 42 of the Constitution was intended to enable the woman
worker not only to subsist but also to make up her dissipated energy, nurse her child, preserve
her efficiency as a worker and maintain the level of her previous efficiency and output.
• During this period she not only cannot work for her living but needs extra income for her
medical expenses. In order to enable the woman worker to subsist during this period and to
preserve her health, the law makes a provision for maternity benefit so that the woman can
play her productive and reproductive roles efficiently.
• Performance of the biological role of child bearing necessarily involves withdrawal of a
woman from the workforce for some period.

3] K CHANDRIKA VS INDIAN RED CROSS SOCIETY

Services of the petitioner were terminated while she was on maternity leave. There was no
evidence to show that the petitioner had received the communication. The Industrial
adjudicator concluded that the workman had no intention of joining duty with the
management and the relief of reinstatement and consequential benefits was denied to her. The
court held that the petitioner’s services were terminated illegally and unjustifiably. The court
ordered that the Petitioner be reinstated in service with continuity of service for the purposes
of computation of service benefits. Back wages at the rate equivalent to 50 per cent of the
basic pay was also granted. In normal circumstances, full wages would have been granted as
back pay but as the organization was not for profit, this would have been onerous — Writ
petition allowed.

4.]PUNJAB NATIONAL BANK BY CHAIRMAN AND ANR. VS. ASTAMIJA DASH

AND ASTAMIJA DASH VS. PUNJAB NATIONAL BANK AND ANR.

The writ petitioner could not prepare well at the second test as she suffered miscarriage. As
per the provisions of the Maternity Benefit Act 1961 a woman is prohibited from working in
an establishment during the period of six weeks from immediately following the day of her
delivery, miscarriage or medical termination of pregnancy. S.9 states that In case of
miscarriage or medical termination of pregnancy, a woman shall be entitled to leave with
wages at the rate of maternity benefit, for a period of six weeks immediately following the
day of her miscarriage, or, as the case may be, her medical termination of pregnancy. It is
well established that a subordinate legislation must be made in conformity with the
Parliamentary Act. But the Regulations framed by the board of directors of the Bank failed to
provide for grant of Maternity Leave and other benefits to which a woman employee would
be entitled to in terms of the MB Act 1961. Even though the contention as regards the
applicability of the MB Act had not been raised before the court, and even if it was assumed
that the Act was not applicable, it was emphasized that the State while exercising its power of
discretion must conform to the doctrine of reasonableness. Therefore, a woman who had
undergone miscarriage was entitled to a different treatment in view of the nature of the
doctrine of equality as a positive concept as enshrined in Art.14 of the Constitution. Held,
“Article 14 does not apply in a vacuum. Whereas persons absolutely similarly situated,
should be treated equally, equal treatment to the persons dis-similarly situated would also
attract the wrath of Article 14. It is from that point of view that the writ petitioner’s case
ought to have been considered vis-a-vis Indubala.”

“The Executive Committee of the Bank had fixed the number of chances to be given to an
employee in the confirmation test. If it is enforced against the writ petitioner having regard to
her physical position, to appear in the second examination, the provisions thereof, keeping in
mind the principle underlying the statutory provisions of Maternity Benefit Act, may not be
held to be applicable. She was, thus, entitled to another opportunity to appear at the
examination. The Executive Committee or for that matter the appellate authority cannot
exercise the power of relaxation in a discriminatory manner.”

The court did not accept that it was for the employer to decide as to the number of chances to
be given to each employee and that the Bank could not be deprived of such discretionary
jurisdiction.

Ratio Decidendi: When conflict occurs between an executive order and a statutory
Regulation, thelatter will prevail - Whereas persons absolutely similarly situated, should be
treated equally, equal treatment to the persons dis-similarly situated would also attract the
wrath of Article 14
5.] MANAGEMENT OF KALLAYAR ESTATE, JAY SHREE TEA AND
INDUSTRIES LTD. VS. CHIEF INSPECTOR OF PLANTATIONS AND ANR.

• In the instant case the Court dealt with the question as to whether for being entitled to the
relief as provided in S.9 of the Act, i.e leave for miscarriage, whether a woman worker should
have put in 160 days of work prior to the miscarriage, as is the requirement U/S.5 of the Act.

• S.5 clearly lays down that in the case of delivery a woman worker is entitled to 12 weeks
leave i.e., six weeks for pre-natal period and six weeks for post-natal period and in the case of
miscarriage she is entitled only for the period of 6 weeks leave with wages following the day
of miscarriage on production of a certificate.

• Provisions contemplated U/S.9 and 5 are independent of each other and should not be
related or combined. Their relation, if at all, is limited in scope, i.e, so far as the rate of
benefit is concerned. Only in this context have the two been treated at par. If the condition
prescribed in S.5 were also applicable to S.9, the leave for miscarriage could have been
mentioned in S.5 itself. “Considering the intention of the Legislature and the condition
prescribed in Section 5 of the Act and in the absence of similar condition in Section 9, I am of
the view that in the case of miscarriage of a woman worker, she can claim the benefit under
Section 9 even if she has not worked for 160 days in the period of 12 months preceding date
of miscarriage.”

• Due to the unexpected nature of miscarriage, being beyond the control of any woman, there
cannot be a date of ‘expected delivery’. Most importantly, the Maternity Benefit Act, being a
piece of social welfare legislation has to interpreted and decided in favour of the workman
whenever a question of interpretation arises- it is a commitment of the welfare state.