Discover Psychology2.0 - A BriefIntroductory Text PDF
Discover Psychology2.0 - A BriefIntroductory Text PDF
2.0 - A Brief
Introductory Text
NOBA
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R. Biswas-Diener & E. Diener (Eds), Noba Textbook Series: Psychology. Champaign, IL: DEF
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Contents
1 Why Science? 6
Edward Diener
Research in Psychology 17
2 Research Designs 18
Christie Napa Scollon
7 Gender 97
Christia Spears Brown, Jennifer A. Jewell & Michelle J. Tam
10 Aging 144
Tara Queen & Jacqui Smith
Consciousness 187
Learning 209
Memory 236
18 Intelligence 306
Robert Biswas-Diener
Personality 373
Therapies 511
30 Psychopharmacology 532
Susan Barron
The Diener Education Fund (DEF) is a non-profit organization founded with the mission of re-
inventing higher education to serve the changing needs of students and professors. The initial
focus of the DEF is on making information, especially of the type found in textbooks, widely
available to people of all backgrounds. This mission is embodied in the Noba project.
Noba is an open and free online platform that provides high-quality, flexibly structured
textbooks and educational materials. The goals of Noba are three-fold:
• To provide instructors with a platform to customize educational content to better suit their
curriculum
The Diener Education Fund is co-founded by Drs. Ed and Carol Diener. Ed is the Joseph Smiley
Distinguished Professor of Psychology (Emeritus) at the University of Illinois. Carol Diener is
the former director of the Mental Health Worker and the Juvenile Justice Programs at the
University of Illinois. Both Ed and Carol are award- winning university teachers.
Acknowledgements
The Diener Education Fund would like to acknowledge the following individuals and companies
for their contribution to the Noba Project: The staff of Positive Acorn, including Robert Biswas-
Diener as managing editor and Peter Lindberg as Project Manager; The Other Firm for user
experience design and web development; Sockeye Creative for their work on brand and
identity development; Arthur Mount for illustrations; Chad Hurst for photography; EEI
Communications for manuscript proofreading; Marissa Diener, Shigehiro Oishi, Daniel
Simons, Robert Levine, Lorin Lachs and Thomas Sander for their feedback and suggestions
in the early stages of the project.
Introduction to Psychology as a Science
1
Why Science?
Edward Diener
Scientific research has been one of the great drivers of progress in human history, and the
dramatic changes we have seen during the past century are due primarily to scientific findings
—modern medicine, electronics, automobiles and jets, birth control, and a host of other
helpful inventions. Psychologists believe that scientific methods can be used in the behavioral
domain to understand and improve the world. Although psychology trails the biological and
physical sciences in terms of progress, we are optimistic based on discoveries to date that
scientific psychology will make many important discoveries that can benefit humanity. This
module outlines the characteristics of the science, and the promises it holds for understanding
behavior. The ethics that guide psychological research are briefly described. It concludes with
the reasons you should learn about scientific psychology
Learning Objectives
• Discuss a few of the benefits, as well as problems that have been created by science.
• Describe several ways that psychological science has improved the world.
There are many people who have made positive contributions to humanity in modern times.
Why Science? 6
Take a careful look at the names on the following list. Which of these individuals do you think
has helped humanity the most?
1. Mother Teresa
2. Albert Schweitzer
3. Edward Jenner
4. Norman Borlaug
5. Fritz Haber
The usual response to this question is “Who on earth are Jenner, Borlaug, and Haber?” Many
people know that Mother Teresa helped thousands of people living in the slums of Kolkata
(Calcutta). Others recall that Albert Schweitzer opened his famous hospital in Africa and went
on to earn the Nobel Peace Prize. The other three historical figures, on the other hand, are
far less well known. Jenner, Borlaug, and Haber were scientists whose research discoveries
saved millions, and even billions, of lives. Dr. Edward Jenner is often considered the “father
of immunology” because he was among the first to conceive of and test vaccinations. His
pioneering work led directly to the eradication of smallpox. Many other diseases have been
greatly reduced because of vaccines
discovered using science—measles, pertussis,
diphtheria, tetanus, typhoid, cholera,
polio, hepatitis—and all are the legacy of
Jenner. Fritz Haber and Norman Borlaug
saved more than a billion human lives.
They created the “Green Revolution” by
producing hybrid agricultural crops and
synthetic fertilizer. Humanity can now
produce food for the seven billion people
on the planet, and the starvation that
does occur is related to political and
economic factors rather than our
collective ability to produce food.
today (Easterbrook, 2003). There were few cars and most people traveled by foot, horseback,
or carriage. There were no radios, televisions, birth control pills, artificial hearts or antibiotics.
Only a small portion of the world had telephones, refrigeration or electricity. These days we
find that 80% of all households have television and 84% have electricity. It is estimated that
three quarters of the world’s population has access to a mobile phone! Life expectancy was
47 years in 1900 and 79 years in 2010. The percentage of hungry and malnourished people
in the world has dropped substantially across the globe. Even average levels of I.Q. have risen
dramatically over the past century due to better nutrition and schooling.
All of these medical advances and technological innovations are the direct result of scientific
research and understanding. In the modern age it is easy to grow complacent about the
advances of science but make no mistake about it—science has made fantastic discoveries,
and continues to do so. These discoveries have completely changed our world.
What Is Science?
What is this process we call “science,” which has so dramatically changed the world? Ancient
people were more likely to believe in magical and supernatural explanations for natural
phenomena such as solar eclipses or thunderstorms. By contrast, scientifically minded people
try to figure out the natural world through testing and observation. Specifically, science is the
use of systematic observation in order to acquire knowledge. For example, children in a
science class might combine vinegar and baking soda to observe the bubbly chemical reaction.
These empirical methods are wonderful ways to learn about the physical and biological world.
Science is not magic—it will not solve all human problems, and might not answer all our
questions about behavior. Nevertheless, it appears to be the most powerful method we have
for acquiring knowledge about the observable world. The essential elements of science are
as follows:
1. Systematic observation is the core of science. Scientists observe the world, in a very organized
way. We often measure the phenomenon we are observing. We record our observations
so that memory biases are less likely to enter in to our conclusions. We are systematic in
that we try to observe under controlled conditions, and also systematically vary the
conditions of our observations so that we can see variations in the phenomena and
understand when they occur and do not occur.
4. Science is cumulative. We can learn the Systematic observation is the core of science. [Image: Cvl
important truths discovered by earlier Neuro, https://goo.gl/Avbju7, CC BY-SA 3.0, https://goo.gl/
Psychology as a Science
Even in modern times many people are skeptical that psychology is really a science. To some
degree this doubt stems from the fact that many psychological phenomena such as
depression, intelligence, and prejudice do not seem to be directly observable in the same way
that we can observe the changes in ocean tides or the speed of light. Because thoughts and
feelings are invisible many early psychological researchers chose to focus on behavior. You
might have noticed that some people act in a friendly and outgoing way while others appear
to be shy and withdrawn. If you have made these types of observations then you are acting
just like early psychologists who used behavior to draw inferences about various types of
personality. By using behavioral measures and rating scales it is possible to measure thoughts
and feelings. This is similar to how other researchers explore “invisible” phenomena such as
the way that educators measure academic performance or economists measure quality of life.
One important pioneering researcher was Francis Galton, a cousin of Charles Darwin who
lived in England during the late 1800s. Galton used patches of color to test people’s ability to
distinguish between them. He also invented the self-report questionnaire, in which people
Why Science? 9
offered their own expressed judgments or opinions on various matters. Galton was able to
use self-reports to examine—among other things—people’s differing ability to accurately
judge distances.
Despite our various methodological advances it is true that psychology is still a very young
science. While physics and chemistry are hundreds of years old psychology is barely a hundred
Why Science? 10
and fifty years old and most of our major findings have occurred only in the last 60 years.
There are legitimate limits to psychological science but it is a science nonetheless.
Psychological science is useful for creating interventions that help people live better lives. A
growing body of research is concerned with determining which therapies are the most and
least effective for the treatment of psychological disorders.
Forensic sciences have made courtroom decisions more valid. We all know of the famous
cases of imprisoned persons who have been exonerated because of DNA evidence. Equally
dramatic cases hinge on psychological findings. For instance, psychologist Elizabeth Loftus
has conducted research demonstrating the limits and unreliability of eyewitness testimony
and memory. Thus, psychological findings are having practical importance in the world outside
the laboratory. Psychological science has experienced enough success to demonstrate that
it works, but there remains a huge amount yet to be learned.
Why Science? 11
1. Informed consent. In general, people should know experiment be approved by a review board today?
[Image: Fred the Oyster, https://goo.gl/ZIbQz1, CC
when they are involved in research, and
BY-SA 4.0, https://goo.gl/X3i0tq]
understand what will happen to them during the
study. They should then be given a free choice as
to whether to participate.
2. Confidentiality. Information that researchers learn about individual participants should not
be made public without the consent of the individual.
3. Privacy. Researchers should not make observations of people in private places such as
their bedrooms without their knowledge and consent. Researchers should not seek
confidential information from others, such as school authorities, without consent of the
participant or his or her guardian.
4. Benefits. Researchers should consider the benefits of their proposed research and weigh
these against potential risks to the participants. People who participate in psychological
studies should be exposed to risk only if they fully understand these risks and only if the
likely benefits clearly outweigh the risks.
5. Deception. Some researchers need to deceive participants in order to hide the true nature
of the study. This is typically done to prevent participants from modifying their behavior
Why Science? 12
in unnatural ways. Researchers are required to “debrief” their participants after they have
completed the study. Debriefing is an opportunity to educate participants about the true
nature of the study.
I once had a psychology professor who asked my class why we were taking a psychology
course. Our responses give the range of reasons that people want to learn about psychology:
1. To understand ourselves
4. To learn how to better help others and improve the world, for example, by doing effective
psychotherapy
5. To learn a skill that will lead to a profession such as being a social worker or a professor
6. To learn how to evaluate the research claims you hear or read about
7. Because it is interesting, challenging, and fun! People want to learn about psychology
because this is exciting in itself, regardless of other positive outcomes it might have. Why
do we see movies? Because they are fun and exciting, and we need no other reason. Thus,
one good reason to study psychology is that it can be rewarding in itself.
Conclusions
The science of psychology is an exciting adventure. Whether you will become a scientific
psychologist, an applied psychologist, or an educated person who knows about psychological
research, this field can influence your life and provide fun, rewards, and understanding. My
hope is that you learn a lot from the modules in this e-text, and also that you enjoy the
experience! I love learning about psychology and neuroscience, and hope you will too!
Why Science? 13
Outside Resources
Web: Science Heroes- A celebration of people who have made lifesaving discoveries.
http://www.scienceheroes.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=258&Itemid=27
Discussion Questions
1. Some claim that science has done more harm than good. What do you think?
2. Humanity is faced with many challenges and problems. Which of these are due to human
behavior, and which are external to human actions?
3. If you were a research psychologist, what phenomena or behaviors would most interest
you?
4. Will psychological scientists be able to help with the current challenges humanity faces,
such as global warming, war, inequality, and mental illness?
5. What can science study and what is outside the realm of science? What questions are
impossible for scientists to study?
6. Some claim that science will replace religion by providing sound knowledge instead of
myths to explain the world. They claim that science is a much more reliable source of
solutions to problems such as disease than is religion. What do you think? Will science
replace religion, and should it?
7. Are there human behaviors that should not be studied? Are some things so sacred or
dangerous that we should not study them?
Why Science? 14
Vocabulary
Empirical methods
Approaches to inquiry that are tied to actual measurement and observation.
Ethics
Professional guidelines that offer researchers a template for making decisions that protect
research participants from potential harm and that help steer scientists away from conflicts
of interest or other situations that might compromise the integrity of their research.
Hypotheses
A logical idea that can be tested.
Systematic observation
The careful observation of the natural world with the aim of better understanding it.
Observations provide the basic data that allow scientists to track, tally, or otherwise organize
information about the natural world.
Theories
Groups of closely related phenomena or observations.
Why Science? 15
References
Butler, A. C., Chapman, J. E., Forman, E. M., & Beck, A. T. (2006). The empirical status of cognitive-
behavioral therapy: A review of meta-analyses. Clinical Psychology Review, 26, 17–31.
Diener, E., & Crandall, R. (1978). Ethics in social and behavioral research. Chicago, IL: University
of Chicago Press.
Easterbrook, G. (2003). The progress paradox. New York, NY: Random House.
Guzzo, R. A., Jette, R. D., & Katzell, R. A. (1985). The effects of psychologically based intervention
programs on worker productivity: A meta-analysis. Personnel Psychology, 38, 275.291.
Hoffman, S. G., & Smits, J. A. J. (2008). Cognitive-behavioral therapy for adult anxiety disorders.
Journal of Clinical Psychiatry, 69, 621–32.
Moore, D. (2003). Public lukewarm on animal rights. Gallup News Service, May 21.
http://www.gallup.com/poll/8461/public-lukewarm-animal-rights.aspx
Sales, B. D., & Folkman, S. (Eds.). (2000). Ethics in research with human participants. Washington,
DC: American Psychological Association.
Research in Psychology
2
Research Designs
Christie Napa Scollon
Psychologists test research questions using a variety of methods. Most research relies on
either correlations or experiments. With correlations, researchers measure variables as they
naturally occur in people and compute the degree to which two variables go together. With
experiments, researchers actively make changes in one variable and watch for changes in
another variable. Experiments allow researchers to make causal inferences. Other types of
methods include longitudinal and quasi-experimental designs. Many factors, including
practical constraints, determine the type of methods researchers use. Often researchers
survey people even though it would be better, but more expensive and time consuming, to
track them longitudinally.
Learning Objectives
Research Designs
Research Designs 18
In the early 1970’s, a man named Uri Geller tricked the world: he convinced hundreds of
thousands of people that he could bend spoons and slow watches using only the power of
his mind. In fact, if you were in the audience, you would have likely believed he had psychic
powers. Everything looked authentic—this man had to have paranormal abilities! So, why
have you probably never heard of him before? Because when Uri was asked to perform his
miracles in line with scientific experimentation, he was no longer able to do them. That is,
even though it seemed like he was doing the impossible, when he was tested by science, he
proved to be nothing more than a clever magician.
When we look at dinosaur bones to make educated guesses about extinct life, or systematically
chart the heavens to learn about the relationships between stars and planets, or study
magicians to figure out how they perform their tricks, we are forming observations—the
foundation of science. Although we are all familiar with the saying “seeing is believing,”
conducting science is more than just what your eyes perceive. Science is the result of
systematic and intentional study of the natural world. And psychology is no different. In the
movie Jerry Maguire, Cuba Gooding, Jr. became famous for using the phrase, “Show me the
money!” In psychology, as in all sciences, we might say, “Show me the data!”
One of the important steps in scientific inquiry is to test our research questions, otherwise
known as hypotheses. However, there are many ways to test hypotheses in psychological
research. Which method you choose will depend on the type of questions you are asking, as
well as what resources are available to you. All methods have limitations, which is why the
best research uses a variety of methods.
Most psychological research can be divided into two types: experimental and correlational
research.
Experimental Research
If somebody gave you $20 that absolutely had to be spent today, how would you choose to
spend it? Would you spend it on an item you’ve been eyeing for weeks, or would you donate
the money to charity? Which option do you think would bring you the most happiness? If
you’re like most people, you’d choose to spend the money on yourself (duh, right?). Our
intuition is that we’d be happier if we spent the money on ourselves.
Knowing that our intuition can sometimes be wrong, Professor Elizabeth Dunn (2008) at the
University of British Columbia set out to conduct an experiment on spending and happiness.
She gave each of the participants in her experiment $20 and then told them they had to spend
Research Designs 19
But wait! Doesn’t happiness depend on a lot of different factors—for instance, a person’s
upbringing or life circumstances? What if some people had happy childhoods and that’s why
they’re happier? Or what if some people dropped their toast that morning and it fell jam-side
down and ruined their whole day? It is correct to recognize that these factors and many more
Research Designs 20
can easily affect a person’s level of happiness. So how can we accurately conclude that
spending money on others causes happiness, as in the case of Dunn’s experiment?
The most important thing about experiments is random assignment. Participants don’t get
to pick which condition they are in (e.g., participants didn’t choose whether they were
supposed to spend the money on themselves versus others). The experimenter assigns them
to a particular condition based on the flip of a coin or the roll of a die or any other random
method. Why do researchers do this? With Dunn’s study, there is the obvious reason: you can
imagine which condition most people would choose to be in, if given the choice. But another
equally important reason is that random assignment makes it so the groups, on average, are
similar on all characteristics except what the experimenter manipulates.
Here’s another example of the importance of random assignment: Let’s say your class is going
to form two basketball teams, and you get to be the captain of one team. The class is to be
divided evenly between the two teams. If you get to pick the players for your team first, whom
will you pick? You’ll probably pick the tallest members of the class or the most athletic. You
probably won’t pick the short, uncoordinated people, unless there are no other options. As a
result, your team will be taller and more athletic than the other team. But what if we want the
teams to be fair? How can we do this when we have people of varying height and ability? All
we have to do is randomly assign players to the two teams. Most likely, some tall and some
short people will end up on your team, and some tall and some short people will end up on
the other team. The average height of the teams will be approximately the same. That is the
power of random assignment!
Other considerations
In addition to using random assignment, you should avoid introducing confounds into your
experiments. Confounds are things that could undermine your ability to draw causal
Research Designs 21
inferences. For example, if you wanted to test if a new happy pill will make people happier,
you could randomly assign participants to take the happy pill or not (the independent variable)
and compare these two groups on their self-reported happiness (the dependent variable).
However, if some participants know they are getting the happy pill, they might develop
expectations that influence their self-reported happiness. This is sometimes known as a
placebo effect. Sometimes a person just knowing that he or she is receiving special treatment
or something new is enough to actually cause changes in behavior or perception: In other
words, even if the participants in the happy pill condition were to report being happier, we
wouldn’t know if the pill was actually making them happier or if it was the placebo effect—an
example of a confound. A related idea is participant demand. This occurs when participants
try to behave in a way they think the experimenter wants them to behave. Placebo effects
and participant demand often occur unintentionally. Even experimenter expectations can
influence the outcome of a study. For example, if the experimenter knows who took the happy
pill and who did not, and the dependent variable is the experimenter’s observations of people’s
happiness, then the experimenter might perceive improvements in the happy pill group that
are not really there.
One way to prevent these confounds from affecting the results of a study is to use a double-
blind procedure. In a double-blind procedure, neither the participant nor the experimenter
knows which condition the participant is in. For example, when participants are given the
happy pill or the fake pill, they don’t know which one they are receiving. This way the
participants shouldn’t experience the placebo effect, and will be unable to behave as the
researcher expects (participant demand). Likewise, the researcher doesn’t know which pill
each participant is taking (at least in the beginning—later, the researcher will get the results
for data-analysis purposes), which means the researcher’s expectations can’t influence his or
her observations. Therefore, because both parties are “blind” to the condition, neither will be
able to behave in a way that introduces a confound. At the end of the day, the only difference
between groups will be which pills the participants received, allowing the researcher to
determine if the happy pill actually caused people to be happier.
Correlational Designs
When scientists passively observe and measure phenomena it is called correlational research.
Here, we do not intervene and change behavior, as we do in experiments. In correlational
research, we identify patterns of relationships, but we usually cannot infer what causes what.
Importantly, with correlational research, you can examine only two variables at a time, no
more and no less.
Research Designs 22
So, what if you wanted to test whether spending on others is related to happiness, but you
don’t have $20 to give to each participant? You could use a correlational design—which is
exactly what Professor Dunn did, too. She asked people how much of their income they spent
on others or donated to charity, and later she asked them how happy they were. Do you think
these two variables were related? Yes, they were! The more money people reported spending
on others, the happier they were.
To find out how well two variables correspond, we can plot the relation between the two
scores on what is known as a scatterplot (Figure 1). In the scatterplot, each dot represents a
data point. (In this case it’s individuals, but it could be some other unit.) Importantly, each dot
provides us with two pieces of information—in this case, information about how good the
person rated the past month (x-axis) and how happy the person felt in the past month (y-
axis). Which variable is plotted on which axis does not matter.
A negative correlation is one in which the two variables move in opposite directions. That is,
as one variable goes up, the other goes down. Figure 2 shows the association between the
average height of males in a country (y-axis) and the pathogen prevalence (or commonness
of disease; x-axis) of that country. In this scatterplot, each dot represents a country. Notice
how the dots extend from the top left to the bottom right. What does this mean in real-world
terms? It means that people are shorter in parts of the world where there is more disease.
The r value for a negative correlation is indicated by a negative number—that is, it has a minus
(–) sign in front of it. Here, it is –.83.
The r value of a strong correlation will have a high absolute value. In other words, you disregard
whether there is a negative sign in front of the r value, and just consider the size of the
numerical value itself. If the absolute value is large, it is a strong correlation. A weak correlation
is one in which the two variables correspond some of the time, but not most of the time.
Figure 3 shows the relation between valuing happiness and grade point average (GPA). People
who valued happiness more tended to earn slightly lower grades, but there were lots of
exceptions to this. The r value for a weak correlation will have a low absolute value. If two
variables are so weakly related as to be unrelated, we say they are uncorrelated, and the r
Research Designs 24
value will be zero or very close to zero. In the previous example, is the correlation between
height and pathogen prevalence strong? Compared to Figure 3, the dots in Figure 2 are tighter
and less dispersed. The absolute value of –.83 is large. Therefore, it is a strong negative
correlation.
Qualitative Designs
Just as correlational research allows us to study topics we can’t experimentally manipulate (e.
g., whether you have a large or small income), there are other types of research designs that
allow us to investigate these harder-to-study topics. Qualitative designs, including participant
observation, case studies, and narrative analysis are examples of such methodologies.
Although something as simple as “observation” may seem like it would be a part of all research
Research Designs 25
Another qualitative method for research is the case study, which involves an intensive
examination of specific individuals or specific contexts. Sigmund Freud, the father of
psychoanalysis, was famous for using this type of methodology; however, more current
examples of case studies usually involve brain injuries. For instance, imagine that researchers
want to know how a very specific brain injury affects people’s experience of happiness.
Obviously, the researchers can’t conduct experimental research that involves inflicting this
type of injury on people. At the same time, there are too few people who have this type of
injury to conduct correlational research. In such an instance, the researcher may examine
only one person with this brain injury, but in doing so, the researcher will put the participant
through a very extensive round of tests. Hopefully what is learned from this one person can
be applied to others; however, even with thorough tests, there is the chance that something
unique about this individual (other than the brain injury) will affect his or her happiness. But
with such a limited number of possible participants, a case study is really the only type of
methodology suitable for researching this brain injury.
The final qualitative method to be discussed in this section is narrative analysis. Narrative
analysis centers around the study of stories and personal accounts of people, groups, or
cultures. In this methodology, rather than engaging with participants directly, or quantifying
their responses or behaviors, researchers will analyze the themes, structure, and dialogue of
each person’s narrative. That is, a researcher will examine people’s personal testimonies in
order to learn more about the psychology of those individuals or groups. These stories may
be written, audio-recorded, or video-recorded, and allow the researcher not only to study
what the participant says but how he or she says it. Every person has a unique perspective on
the world, and studying the way he or she conveys a story can provide insight into that
perspective.
Quasi-Experimental Designs
What if you want to study the effects of marriage on a variable? For example, does marriage
Research Designs 26
make people happier? Can you randomly assign some people to get married and others to
remain single? Of course not. So how can you study these important variables? You can use
a quasi-experimental design.
been happier than the people who have gl/IcmLqg, CC BY-NC-SA, https://goo.gl/HSisdg]
remained single.
Because experimental and quasi-experimental designs can seem pretty similar, let’s take
another example to distinguish them. Imagine you want to know who is a better professor:
Dr. Smith or Dr. Khan. To judge their ability, you’re going to look at their students’ final grades.
Here, the independent variable is the professor (Dr. Smith vs. Dr. Khan) and the dependent
variable is the students’ grades. In an experimental design, you would randomly assign
students to one of the two professors and then compare the students’ final grades. However,
in real life, researchers can’t randomly force students to take one professor over the other;
instead, the researchers would just have to use the preexisting classes and study them as-is
(quasi-experimental design). Again, the key difference is random assignment to the conditions
of the independent variable. Although the quasi-experimental design (where the students
choose which professor they want) may seem random, it’s most likely not. For example, maybe
students heard Dr. Smith sets low expectations, so slackers prefer this class, whereas Dr. Khan
sets higher expectations, so smarter students prefer that one. This now introduces a
confounding variable (student intelligence) that will almost certainly have an effect on
students’ final grades, regardless of how skilled the professor is. So, even though a quasi-
Research Designs 27
Longitudinal Studies
Another powerful research design is the longitudinal study. Longitudinal studies track the
same people over time. Some longitudinal studies last a few weeks, some a few months, some
a year or more. Some studies that have contributed a lot to psychology followed the same
people over decades. For example, one study followed more than 20,000 Germans for two
decades. From these longitudinal data, psychologist Rich Lucas (2003) was able to determine
that people who end up getting married indeed start off a bit happier than their peers who
never marry. Longitudinal studies like this provide valuable evidence for testing many theories
in psychology, but they can be quite costly to conduct, especially if they follow many people
for many years.
Surveys
variables in this study? Can you guess what researchers and the time commitments of participants
judged as more likely to go to heaven (the dependent variable) compared to unhappy people!
Likewise, correlational research can be conducted without the use of surveys. For instance,
psychologists LeeAnn Harker and Dacher Keltner (2001) examined the smile intensity of
women’s college yearbook photos. Smiling in the photos was correlated with being married
10 years later!
Tradeoffs in Research
Even though there are serious limitations to correlational and quasi-experimental research,
they are not poor cousins to experiments and longitudinal designs. In addition to selecting a
method that is appropriate to the question, many practical concerns may influence the
decision to use one method over another. One of these factors is simply resource availability
—how much time and money do you have to invest in the research? (Tip: If you’re doing a
senior honor’s thesis, do not embark on a lengthy longitudinal study unless you are prepared
to delay graduation!) Often, we survey people even though it would be more precise—but
much more difficult—to track them longitudinally. Especially in the case of exploratory
research, it may make sense to opt for a cheaper and faster method first. Then, if results from
the initial study are promising, the researcher can follow up with a more intensive method.
Beyond these practical concerns, another consideration in selecting a research design is the
ethics of the study. For example, in cases of brain injury or other neurological abnormalities,
it would be unethical for researchers to inflict these impairments on healthy participants.
Nonetheless, studying people with these injuries can provide great insight into human
psychology (e.g., if we learn that damage to a particular region of the brain interferes with
emotions, we may be able to develop treatments for emotional irregularities). In addition to
brain injuries, there are numerous other areas of research that could be useful in
understanding the human mind but which pose challenges to a true experimental design—
such as the experiences of war, long-term isolation, abusive parenting, or prolonged drug
use. However, none of these are conditions we could ethically experimentally manipulate and
randomly assign people to. Therefore, ethical considerations are another crucial factor in
determining an appropriate research design.
Just look at any major news outlet and you’ll find research routinely being reported. Sometimes
the journalist understands the research methodology, sometimes not (e.g., correlational
evidence is often incorrectly represented as causal evidence). Often, the media are quick to
Research Designs 29
draw a conclusion for you. After reading this module, you should recognize that the strength
of a scientific finding lies in the strength of its methodology. Therefore, in order to be a savvy
consumer of research, you need to understand the pros and cons of different methods and
the distinctions among them. Plus, understanding how psychologists systematically go about
answering research questions will help you to solve problems in other domains, both personal
and professional, not just in psychology.
Research Designs 30
Outside Resources
Discussion Questions
1. What are some key differences between experimental and correlational research?
Vocabulary
Confounds
Factors that undermine the ability to draw causal inferences from an experiment.
Correlation
Measures the association between two variables, or how they go together.
Dependent variable
The variable the researcher measures but does not manipulate in an experiment.
Experimenter expectations
When the experimenter’s expectations influence the outcome of a study.
Independent variable
The variable the researcher manipulates and controls in an experiment.
Longitudinal study
A study that follows the same group of individuals over time.
Operational definitions
How researchers specifically measure a concept.
Participant demand
When participants behave in a way that they think the experimenter wants them to behave.
Placebo effect
When receiving special treatment or something new affects human behavior.
Quasi-experimental design
An experiment that does not require random assignment to conditions.
Random assignment
Assigning participants to receive different conditions of an experiment by chance.
Research Designs 32
References
Dunn, E. W., Aknin, L. B., & Norton, M. I. (2008). Spending money on others promotes happiness.
Science, 319(5870), 1687–1688. doi:10.1126/science.1150952
Festinger, L., Riecken, H.W., & Schachter, S. (1956). When prophecy fails. Minneapolis, MN:
University of Minnesota Press.
Harker, L. A., & Keltner, D. (2001). Expressions of positive emotion in women\'s college
yearbook pictures and their relationship to personality and life outcomes across adulthood.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 80, 112–124.
King, L. A., & Napa, C. K. (1998). What makes a life good? Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 75, 156–165.
Lucas, R. E., Clark, A. E., Georgellis, Y., & Diener, E. (2003). Re-examining adaptation and the
setpoint model of happiness: Reactions to changes in marital status. Journal of Personality
and Social Psychology, 84, 527–539.
3
Conducting Psychology Research in the
Real World
Matthias R. Mehl
Learning Objectives
• Explain ways in which daily life research can further psychological science.
• Know what methods exist for conducting psychological research in the real world.
Introduction
accumulates a lot of knowledge on what can happen—under carefully isolated and controlled
circumstances—but it has little to say about what actually does happen under the
circumstances that people actually encounter in their daily lives.
One important challenge researchers face when designing a study is to find the right balance
Conducting Psychology Research in the Real World 35
between ensuring internal validity, or the degree to which a study allows unambiguous causal
inferences, and external validity, or the degree to which a study ensures that potential findings
apply to settings and samples other than the ones being studied (Brewer, 2000). Unfortunately,
these two kinds of validity tend to be difficult to achieve at the same time, in one study. This
is because creating a controlled setting, in which all potentially influential factors (other than
the experimentally-manipulated variable) are controlled, is bound to create an environment
that is quite different from what people naturally encounter (e.g., using a happy movie clip to
promote helpful behavior). However, it is the degree to which an experimental situation is
comparable to the corresponding real-world situation of interest that determines how
generalizable potential findings will be. In other words, if an experiment is very far-off from
what a person might normally experience in everyday life, you might reasonably question just
how useful its findings are.
Because of the incompatibility of the two types of validity, one is often—by design—prioritized
over the other. Due to the importance of identifying true causal relationships, psychology has
traditionally emphasized internal over external validity. However, in order to make claims
about human behavior that apply across populations and environments, researchers
complement traditional laboratory research, where participants are brought into the lab, with
field research where, in essence, the psychological laboratory is brought to participants. Field
studies allow for the important test of how psychological variables and processes of interest
“behave” under real-world circumstances (i.e., what actually does happen rather than what can
happen). They can also facilitate “downstream” operationalizations of constructs that measure
life outcomes of interest directly rather than indirectly.
Take, for example, the fascinating field of psychoneuroimmunology, where the goal is to
understand the interplay of psychological factors - such as personality traits or one’s stress
level - and the immune system. Highly sophisticated and carefully controlled experiments
offer ways to isolate the variety of neural, hormonal, and cellular mechanisms that link
psychological variables such as chronic stress to biological outcomes such as
immunosuppression (a state of impaired immune functioning; Sapolsky, 2004). Although
these studies demonstrate impressively how psychological factors can affect health-relevant
biological processes, they—because of their research design—remain mute about the degree
to which these factors actually do undermine people’s everyday health in real life. It is certainly
important to show that laboratory stress can alter the number of natural killer cells in the
blood. But it is equally important to test to what extent the levels of stress that people
experience on a day-to-day basis result in them catching a cold more often or taking longer
to recover from one. The goal for researchers, therefore, must be to complement traditional
laboratory experiments with less controlled studies under real-world circumstances. The term
ecological validity is used to refer the degree to which an effect has been obtained under
Conducting Psychology Research in the Real World 36
conditions that are typical for what happens in everyday life (Brewer, 2000). In this example,
then, people might keep a careful daily log of how much stress they are under as well as noting
physical symptoms such as headaches or nausea. Although many factors beyond stress level
may be responsible for these symptoms, this more correlational approach can shed light on
how the relationship between stress and health plays out outside of the laboratory.
Capturing “life as it is lived” has been a strong goal for some researchers for a long time.
Wilhelm and his colleagues recently published a comprehensive review of early attempts to
systematically document daily life (Wilhelm, Perrez, & Pawlik, 2012). Building onto these
original methods, researchers have, over the past decades, developed a broad toolbox for
measuring experiences, behavior, and physiology directly in participants’ daily lives (Mehl &
Conner, 2012). Figure 1 provides a schematic overview of the methodologies described below.
diary method (Bolger & Rafaeli, 2003). Although variations within this set of methods exist,
the basic idea behind all of them is to collect in-the-moment (or, close-to-the-moment) self-
report data directly from people as they go about their daily lives. This is typically accomplished
by asking participants’ repeatedly (e.g., five times per day) over a period of time (e.g., a week)
to report on their current thoughts and feelings. The momentary questionnaires often ask
about their location (e.g., “Where are you now?”), social environment (e.g., “With whom are
you now?”), activity (e.g., “What are you currently doing?”), and experiences (e.g., “How are you
feeling?”). That way, researchers get a snapshot of what was going on in participants’ lives at
the time at which they were asked to report.
Technology has made this sort of research possible, and recent technological advances have
altered the different tools researchers are able to easily use. Initially, participants wore
electronic wristwatches that beeped at preprogrammed but seemingly random times, at which
they completed one of a stack of provided paper questionnaires. With the mobile computing
revolution, both the prompting and the questionnaire completion were gradually replaced by
handheld devices such as smartphones. Being able to collect the momentary questionnaires
digitally and time-stamped (i.e., having a record of exactly when participants responded) had
major methodological and practical advantages and contributed to experience sampling going
mainstream (Conner, Tennen, Fleeson, & Barrett, 2009).
is more externally valid, or more generalizable to real life, than the traditional laboratory
experiment.
To illustrate these techniques, consider a classic study, Stone, Reed, and Neale (1987), who
tracked positive and negative experiences surrounding a respiratory infection using daily
experience sampling. They found that undesirable experiences peaked and desirable ones
dipped about four to five days prior to participants coming down with the cold. More recently,
Killingsworth and Gilbert (2010) collected momentary self-reports from more than 2,000
participants via a smartphone app. They found that participants were less happy when their
mind was in an idling, mind-wandering state, such as surfing the Internet or multitasking at
work, than when it was in an engaged, task-focused one, such as working diligently on a paper.
These are just two examples that illustrate how experience-sampling studies have yielded
findings that could not be obtained with traditional laboratory methods.
Recently, the day reconstruction method (DRM) (Kahneman, Krueger, Schkade, Schwarz, &
Stone, 2004) has been developed to obtain information about a person’s daily experiences
without going through the burden of collecting momentary experience-sampling data. In the
DRM, participants report their experiences of a given day retrospectively after engaging in a
systematic, experiential reconstruction of the day on the following day. As a participant in this
type of study, you might look back on yesterday, divide it up into a series of episodes such as
“made breakfast,” “drove to work,” “had a meeting,” etc. You might then report who you were
with in each episode and how you felt in each. This approach has shed light on what situations
lead to moments of positive and negative mood throughout the course of a normal day.
Experience sampling is often used to study everyday behavior (i.e., daily social interactions
and activities). In the laboratory, behavior is best studied using direct behavioral observation
(e.g., video recordings). In the real world, this is, of course, much more difficult. As Funder put
it, it seems it would require a “detective’s report [that] would specify in exact detail everything
the participant said and did, and with whom, in all of the contexts of the participant’s life”
(Funder, 2007, p. 41).
As difficult as this may seem, Mehl and colleagues have developed a naturalistic observation
methodology that is similar in spirit. Rather than following participants—like a detective—
with a video camera (see Craik, 2000), they equip participants with a portable audio recorder
that is programmed to periodically record brief snippets of ambient sounds (e.g., 30 seconds
every 12 minutes). Participants carry the recorder (originally a microcassette recorder, now a
Conducting Psychology Research in the Real World 39
smartphone app) on them as they go about their days and return it at the end of the study.
The recorder provides researchers with a series of sound bites that, together, amount to an
acoustic diary of participants’ days as they naturally unfold—and that constitute a
representative sample of their daily activities and social encounters. Because it is somewhat
similar to having the researcher’s ear at the participant’s lapel, they called their method the
electronically activated recorder, or EAR (Mehl, Pennebaker, Crow, Dabbs, & Price, 2001).
The ambient sound recordings can be coded for many things, including participants’ locations
(e.g., at school, in a coffee shop), activities (e.g., watching TV, eating), interactions (e.g., in a
group, on the phone), and emotional expressions (e.g., laughing, sighing). As unnatural or
intrusive as it might seem, participants report that they quickly grow accustomed to the EAR
and say they soon find themselves behaving as they normally would.
In a cross-cultural study, Ramírez-Esparza and her colleagues used the EAR method to study
sociability in the United States and Mexico. Interestingly, they found that although American
participants rated themselves significantly higher than Mexicans on the question, “I see myself
as a person who is talkative,” they actually spent almost 10 percent less time talking than
Mexicans did (Ramírez-Esparza, Mehl, Álvarez Bermúdez, & Pennebaker, 2009). In a similar
way, Mehl and his colleagues used the EAR method to debunk the long-standing myth that
women are considerably more talkative than men. Using data from six different studies, they
showed that both sexes use on average about 16,000 words per day. The estimated sex
difference of 546 words was trivial compared to the immense range of more than 46,000
words between the least and most talkative individual (695 versus 47,016 words; Mehl, Vazire,
Ramírez-Esparza, Slatcher, & Pennebaker, 2007). Together, these studies demonstrate how
naturalistic observation can be used to study objective aspects of daily behavior and how it
can yield findings quite different from what other methods yield (Mehl, Robbins, & Deters,
2012).
A series of other methods and creative ways for assessing behavior directly and unobtrusively
in the real world are described in a seminal book on real-world, subtle measures (Webb,
Campbell, Schwartz, Sechrest, & Grove, 1981). For example, researchers have used time-lapse
photography to study the flow of people and the use of space in urban public places (Whyte,
1980). More recently, they have observed people’s personal (e.g., dorm rooms) and
professional (e.g., offices) spaces to understand how personality is expressed and detected
in everyday environments (Gosling, Ko, Mannarelli, & Morris, 2002). They have even
systematically collected and analyzed people’s garbage to measure what people actually
consume (e.g., empty alcohol bottles or cigarette boxes) rather than what they say they
consume (Rathje & Murphy, 2001). Because people often cannot and sometimes may not
want to accurately report what they do, the direct—and ideally nonreactive—assessment of
real-world behavior is of high importance for psychological research (Baumeister, Vohs, &
Conducting Psychology Research in the Real World 40
Funder, 2007).
In addition to studying how people think, feel, and behave in the real world, researchers are
also interested in how our bodies respond to the fluctuating demands of our lives. What are
the daily experiences that make our “blood boil”? How do our neurotransmitters and
hormones respond to the stressors we encounter in our lives? What physiological reactions
do we show to being loved—or getting ostracized? You can see how studying these powerful
experiences in real life, as they actually happen, may provide more rich and informative data
than one might obtain in an artificial laboratory setting that merely mimics these experiences.
measured in daily life with portable signal recording devices are the electrocardiogram (ECG),
blood pressure, electrodermal activity (or “sweat response”), body temperature, and even the
electroencephalogram (EEG) (Wilhelm & Grossman, 2010). Most recently, researchers have
added ambulatory assessment of hormones (e.g., cortisol) and other biomarkers (e.g.,
immune markers) to the list (Schlotz, 2012). The development of ever more sophisticated ways
to track what goes on underneath our skins as we go about our lives is a fascinating and
rapidly advancing field.
In a recent study, Lane, Zareba, Reis, Peterson, and Moss (2011) used experience sampling
combined with ambulatory electrocardiography (a so-called Holter monitor) to study how
emotional experiences can alter cardiac function in patients with a congenital heart
abnormality (e.g., long QT syndrome). Consistent with the idea that emotions may, in some
cases, be able to trigger a cardiac event, they found that typical—in most cases even relatively
low intensity— daily emotions had a measurable effect on ventricular repolarization, an
important cardiac indicator that, in these patients, is linked to risk of a cardiac event. In another
study, Smyth and colleagues (1998) combined experience sampling with momentary
assessment of cortisol, a stress hormone. They found that momentary reports of current or
even anticipated stress predicted increased cortisol secretion 20 minutes later. Further, and
independent of that, the experience of other kinds of negative affect (e.g., anger, frustration)
also predicted higher levels of cortisol and the experience of positive affect (e.g., happy, joyful)
predicted lower levels of this important stress hormone. Taken together, these studies
illustrate how researchers can use ambulatory physiological monitoring to study how the little
—and seemingly trivial or inconsequential—experiences in our lives leave objective,
measurable traces in our bodily systems.
Another domain of daily life that has only recently emerged is virtual daily behavior or how
people act and interact with others on the Internet. Irrespective of whether social media will
turn out to be humanity’s blessing or curse (both scientists and laypeople are currently divided
over this question), the fact is that people are spending an ever increasing amount of time
online. In light of that, researchers are beginning to think of virtual behavior as being as serious
as “actual” behavior and seek to make it a legitimate target of their investigations (Gosling &
Johnson, 2010).
One way to study virtual behavior is to make use of the fact that most of what people do on
the Web—emailing, chatting, tweeting, blogging, posting— leaves direct (and permanent)
verbal traces. For example, differences in the ways in which people use words (e.g., subtle
Conducting Psychology Research in the Real World 42
Reflecting their rapidly growing real-world importance, researchers are now beginning to
investigate behavior on social networking sites such as Facebook (Wilson, Gosling, & Graham,
2012). Most research looks at psychological correlates of online behavior such as personality
traits and the quality of one’s social life but, importantly, there are also first attempts to export
traditional experimental research designs into an online setting. In a pioneering study of online
social influence, Bond and colleagues (2012) experimentally tested the effects that peer
feedback has on voting behavior. Remarkably, their sample consisted of 16 million (!) Facebook
users. They found that online political-mobilization messages (e.g., “I voted” accompanied by
Conducting Psychology Research in the Real World 43
selected pictures of their Facebook friends) influenced real-world voting behavior. This was
true not just for users who saw the messages but also for their friends and friends of their
friends. Although the intervention effect on a single user was very small, through the enormous
number of users and indirect social contagion effects, it resulted cumulatively in an estimated
340,000 additional votes—enough to tilt a close election. In short, although still in its infancy,
research on virtual daily behavior is bound to change social science, and it has already helped
us better understand both virtual and “actual” behavior.
“Smartphone Psychology”?
A review of research methods for studying daily life would not be complete without a vision
of “what’s next.” Given how common they have become, it is safe to predict that smartphones
will not just remain devices for everyday online communication but will also become devices
for scientific data collection and intervention (Kaplan & Stone, 2013; Yarkoni, 2012). These
devices automatically store vast amounts of real-world user interaction data, and, in addition,
they are equipped with sensors to track the physical (e. g., location, position) and social (e.g.,
wireless connections around the phone) context of these interactions. Miller (2012, p. 234)
states, “The question is not whether smartphones will revolutionize psychology but how, when,
and where the revolution will happen.” Obviously, their immense potential for data collection
also brings with it big new challenges for researchers (e.g., privacy protection, data analysis,
and synthesis). Yet it is clear that many of the methods described in this module—and many
still to be developed ways of collecting real-world data—will, in the future, become integrated
into the devices that people naturally and happily carry with them from the moment they get
up in the morning to the moment they go to bed.
Conclusion
This module sought to make a case for psychology research conducted outside the lab. If the
ultimate goal of the social and behavioral sciences is to explain human behavior, then
researchers must also—in addition to conducting carefully controlled lab studies—deal with
the “messy” real world and find ways to capture life as it naturally happens.
Mortensen and Cialdini (2010) refer to the dynamic give-and-take between laboratory and
field research as “full-cycle psychology”. Going full cycle, they suggest, means that
“researchers use naturalistic observation to determine an effect’s presence in the real world,
theory to determine what processes underlie the effect, experimentation to verify the effect
and its underlying processes, and a return to the natural environment to corroborate the
experimental findings” (Mortensen & Cialdini, 2010, p. 53). To accomplish this, researchers
Conducting Psychology Research in the Real World 44
have access to a toolbox of research methods for studying daily life that is now more diverse
and more versatile than it has ever been before. So, all it takes is to go ahead and—literally
—bring science to life.
Conducting Psychology Research in the Real World 45
Outside Resources
Discussion Questions
1. What do you think about the tradeoff between unambiguously establishing cause and
effect (internal validity) and ensuring that research findings apply to people’s everyday lives
(external validity)? Which one of these would you prioritize as a researcher? Why?
2. What challenges do you see that daily-life researchers may face in their studies? How can
they be overcome?
3. What ethical issues can come up in daily-life studies? How can (or should) they be
addressed?
4. How do you think smartphones and other mobile electronic devices will change
psychological research? What are their promises for the field? And what are their pitfalls?
Conducting Psychology Research in the Real World 46
Vocabulary
Ambulatory assessment
An overarching term to describe methodologies that assess the behavior, physiology,
experience, and environments of humans in naturalistic settings.
Ecological validity
The degree to which a study finding has been obtained under conditions that are typical for
what happens in everyday life.
Experience-sampling method
A methodology where participants report on their momentary thoughts, feelings, and
behaviors at different points in time over the course of a day.
External validity
The degree to which a finding generalizes from the specific sample and context of a study to
some larger population and broader settings.
Full-cycle psychology
A scientific approach whereby researchers start with an observational field study to identify
an effect in the real world, follow up with laboratory experimentation to verify the effect and
isolate the causal mechanisms, and return to field research to corroborate their experimental
Conducting Psychology Research in the Real World 47
findings.
Generalize
Generalizing, in science, refers to the ability to arrive at broad conclusions based on a smaller
sample of observations. For these conclusions to be true the sample should accurately
represent the larger population from which it is drawn.
Internal validity
The degree to which a cause-effect relationship between two variables has been
unambiguously established.
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Bolger, N., Davis, A., & Rafaeli, E. (2003). Diary methods: Capturing life as it is lived. Annual
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Bond, R. M., Jones, J. J., Kramer, A. D., Marlow, C., Settle, J. E., & Fowler, J. H. (2012). A 61 million-
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Cohn, M. A., Mehl, M. R., & Pennebaker, J. W. (2004). Linguistic indicators of psychological
change after September 11, 2001. Psychological Science, 15, 687–693.
Conner, T. S., Tennen, H., Fleeson, W., & Barrett, L. F. (2009). Experience sampling methods: A
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Funder, D. C. (2007). The personality puzzle. New York, NY: W. W. Norton & Co.
Gosling, S. D., & Johnson, J. A. (2010). Advanced methods for conducting online behavioral research.
Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.
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379–398.
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Kahneman, D., Krueger, A., Schkade, D., Schwarz, N., and Stone, A. (2004). A survey method
for characterizing daily life experience: The Day Reconstruction Method. Science, 306, 1776–
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Biology as the Basis of Behavior
4
The Brain and Nervous System
Robert Biswas-Diener
The brain is the most complex part of the human body. It is the center of consciousness and
also controls all voluntary and involuntary movement and bodily functions. It communicates
with each part of the body through the nervous system, a network of channels that carry
electrochemical signals.
Learning Objectives
• Name the various parts of the nervous system and their respective functions
• Articulate how the primary motor cortex is an example of brain region specialization
• Name at least three neuroimaging techniques and describe how they work
In the 1800s a German scientist by the name of Ernst Weber conducted several experiments
meant to investigate how people perceive the world via their own bodies (Hernstein & Boring,
1966). It is obvious that we use our sensory organs—our eyes, and ears, and nose—to take
in and understand the world around us. Weber was particularly interested in the sense of
touch. Using a drafting compass he placed the two points far apart and set them on the skin
of a volunteer. When the points were far apart the research participants could easily
distinguish between them. As Weber repeated the process with ever closer points, however,
most people lost the ability to tell the difference between them. Weber discovered that the
ability to recognize these “just noticeable differences” depended on where on the body the
The Brain and Nervous System 53
compass was positioned. Your back, for example, is far less sensitive to touch than is the skin
on your face. Similarly, the tip of your tongue is extremely sensitive! In this way, Weber began
to shed light on the way that nerves, the nervous system, and the brain form the biological
foundation of psychological processes.
It is worth mentioning here, at the start, that an introduction to the biological aspects of
psychology can be both the most interesting and most frustrating of all topics for new students
of psychology. This is, in large part, due to the fact that there is so much new information to
learn and new vocabulary associated with all the various parts of the brain and nervous system.
In fact, there are 30 key vocabulary words presented in this module! We encourage you not
to get bogged down in difficult words. Instead, pay attention to the broader concepts, perhaps
even skipping over the vocabulary on your first reading. It is helpful to pass back through with
a second reading, once you are already familiar with the topic, with attention to learning the
vocabulary.
As a species, humans have evolved a complex nervous system and brain over millions of years.
Comparisons of our nervous systems with those of other animals, such as chimpanzees, show
some similarities (Darwin, 1859). Researchers can also use fossils to study the relationship
between brain volume and human behavior over the course of evolutionary history. Homo
The Brain and Nervous System 54
habilis, for instance, a human ancestor living about 2 million years ago shows a larger brain
volume than its own ancestors but far less than modern homo sapiens. The main difference
between humans and other animals-- in terms of brain development-- is that humans have
a much more developed frontal cortex (the front part of the brain associated with planning).
Interestingly, a person’s unique nervous system develops over the course of their lifespan in
a way that resembles the evolution of nervous systems in animals across vast stretches of
time. For example, the human nervous system begins developing even before a person is
born. It begins as a simple bundle of tissue that forms into a tube and extends along the head-
to-tail plane becoming the spinal cord and brain. 25 days into its development, the embryo
has a distinct spinal cord, as well as hindbrain, midbrain and forebrain (Stiles & Jernigan,
2010). What, exactly, is this nervous system that is developing and what does it do?
The nervous system can be thought of as the body’s communication network that consists
of all nerve cells. There are many ways in which we can divide the nervous system to
understand it more clearly. One common way to do so is by parsing it into the central nervous
system and the peripheral nervous system. Each of these can be sub-divided, in turn. Let’s
take a closer, more in-depth look at each. And, don’t worry, the nervous system is complicated
with many parts and many new vocabulary words. It might seem overwhelming at first but
through the figures and a little study you can get it.
neurons in the human brain and each has many contacts with other neurons, called synapses
(Brodal, 1992).
If we were able to magnify a view of individual neurons we would see that they are cells made
from distinct parts (see Figure 2). The three main components of a neuron are the dendrites,
the soma, and the axon. Neurons communicate with one another by receiving information
through the dendrites, which act as an antenna. When the dendrites channel this information
to the soma, or cell body, it builds up as an electro-chemical signal. This electrical part of the
signal, called an action potential shoots down the axon, a long tail that leads away from the
soma and toward the next neuron. When people talk about “nerves” in the nervous system,
it typically refers to bundles of axons that form long neural wires along which electrical signals
can travel. Cell-to-cell communication is helped by the fact that the axon is covered by a myelin
sheath—a layer of fatty cells that allow the signal to travel very rapidly from neuron to neuron
(Kandel, Schwartz & Jessell, 2000)
If we were to zoom in still further we could take a closer look at the synapse, the space between
neurons (see Figure 3). Here, we would see that there is a space between neurons, called the
synaptic gap. To give you a sense of scale we can compare the synaptic gap to the thickness
of a dime, the thinnest of all American coins (about 1.35 mm). You could stack approximately
70,000 synaptic gaps in the thickness of a single coin!
As the action potential, the electrical signal reaches the end of the axon, tiny packets of
chemicals, called neurotransmitters, are released. This is the chemical part of the electro-
chemical signal. These neurotransmitters are the chemical signals that travel from one neuron
The Brain and Nervous System 56
to another, enabling them to communicate with one another. There are many different types
of neurotransmitters and each has a specialized function. For example, serotonin affects sleep,
hunger and mood. Dopamine is associated with attention, learning and pleasure (Kandel &
Schwartz, 1982)
If we were to zoom back out and look at the central nervous system again we would see that
the brain is the largest single part of the central nervous system. The brain is the headquarters
of the entire nervous system and it is here that most of your sensing, perception, thinking,
awareness, emotions, and planning take place. For many people the brain is so important
that there is a sense that it is there—inside the brain—that a person’s sense of self is located
(as opposed to being primarily in your toes, by contrast). The brain is so important, in fact,
that it consumes 20% of the total oxygen and calories we consume even though it is only, on
average, about 2% of our overall weight.
It is helpful to examine the various parts of the brain and to understand their unique functions
to get a better sense of the role the brain plays. We will start by looking at very general areas
of the brain and then we will zoom in and look at more specific parts. Anatomists and
neuroscientists often divide the brain into portions based on the location and function of
various brain parts. Among the simplest ways to organize the brain is to describe it as having
three basic portions: the hindbrain, midbrain and forebrain. Another way to look at the brain
is to consider the brain stem, the Cerebellum, and the Cerebrum. There is another part, called
the Limbic System that is less well defined. It is made up of a number of structures that are
“sub-cortical” (existing in the hindbrain) as well as cortical regions of the brain (see Figure 4).
The brain stem is the most basic structure of the brain and is located at the top of the spine
and bottom of the brain. It is sometimes considered the “oldest” part of the brain because we
can see similar structures in other, less evolved animals such as crocodiles. It is in charge of
The Brain and Nervous System 57
a wide range of very basic “life support” functions for the human body including breathing,
digestion, and the beating of the heart. Amazingly, the brain stem sends the signals to keep
these processes running smoothly without any conscious effort on our behalf.
The limbic system is a collection of highly specialized neural structures that sit at the top of
the brain stem, which are involved in regulating our emotions. Collectively, the limbic system
is a term that doesn’t have clearly defined areas as it includes forebrain regions as well as
hindbrain regions. These include the amygdala, the thalamus, the hippocampus, the insula
cortex, the anterior cingulate cortex, and the prefrontal cortex. These structures influence
hunger, the sleep-wake cycle, sexual desire, fear and aggression, and even memory.
The cerebellum is a structure at the very back of the brain. Aristotle referred to it as the “small
brain” based on its appearance and it is principally involved with movement and posture
although it is also associated with a variety of other thinking processes. The cerebellum, like
the brain stem, coordinates actions without the need for any conscious awareness.
Consider this striking example: A split brain patient is seated at a table and an object such as
a car key can be placed where a split-brain patient can only see it through the right visual field.
Right visual field images will be processed on the left side of the brain and left visual field
images will be processed on the right side of the brain. Because language is largely associated
with the left side of the brain the patient who sees car key in the right visual field when asked
“What do you see?” would answer, “I see a car key.” In contrast, a split-brain patient who only
saw the car key in the left visual field, thus the information went to the non-language right
side of the brain, might have a difficult time speaking the word “car key.” In fact in this case,
the patient is likely to respond “I didn’t see anything at all.” However, if asked to draw the item
with their left hand—a process associated with the right side of the brain—the patient will be
able to do so! See the outside resources below for a video demonstration of this striking
phenomenon.
Besides looking at the brain as an organ that is made up of two halves we can also examine
it by looking at its four various lobes of the cerebral cortex, the outer part of the brain (see
Figure 5). Each of these is associated with a specific function. The occipital lobe, located at
the back of the cerebral cortex, is the house of the visual area of the brain. You can see the
road in front of you when you are driving, track the motion of a ball in the air thanks to the
occipital lobe. The temporal lobe, located on the underside of the cerebral cortex, is where
sounds and smells are processed. The parietal lobe, at the upper back of the cerebral cortex,
is where touch and taste are processed. Finally, the frontal lobe, located at the forward part
of the cerebral cortex is where behavioral motor plans are processed as well as a number of
highly complicated processes occur including speech and language use, creative problem
solving, and planning and organization.
as much dedicated brain processing as all of your fingers and your hand combined!
Figure 6: Specific body parts like the tongue or fingers are mapped onto certain areas of the brain including
Because the cerebral cortex in general, and the frontal lobe in particular, are associated with
such sophisticated functions as planning and being self-aware they are often thought of as a
higher, less primal portion of the brain. Indeed, other animals such as rats and kangaroos
while they do have frontal regions of their brain do not have the same level of development
in the cerebral cortices. The closer an animal is to humans on the evolutionary tree—think
chimpanzees and gorillas, the more developed is this portion of their brain.
In addition to the central nervous system (the brain and spinal cord) there is also a complex
network of nerves that travel to every part of the body. This is called the peripheral nervous
system (PNS) and it carries the signals necessary for the body to survive (see Figure 7). Some
of the signals carried by the PNS are related to voluntary actions. If you want to type a message
to a friend, for instance, you make conscious choices about which letters go in what order
and your brain sends the appropriate signals to your fingers to do the work. Other processes,
by contrast, are not voluntary. Without your awareness your brain is also sending signals to
your organs, your digestive system, and the muscles that are holding you up right now with
instructions about what they should be doing. All of this occurs through the pathways of your
peripheral nervous system.
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The brain is difficult to study because it is housed inside the thick bone of the skull. What’s
more, it is difficult to access the brain without hurting or killing the owner of the brain. As a
result, many of the earliest studies of the brain (and indeed this is still true today) focused on
unfortunate people who happened to have damage to some particular area of their brain.
For instance, in the 1880s a surgeon named Paul Broca conducted an autopsy on a former
patient who had lost his powers of speech. Examining his patient’s brain, Broca identified a
damaged area—now called the “Broca’s Area”—on the left side of the brain (see Figure 8)
(AAAS, 1880). Over the years a number of researchers have been able to gain insights into the
function of specific regions of the brain from these types of patients.
with brain lesions. Advances in technology have led to ever more sophisticated imaging
techniques. Just as X-ray technology allows us to peer inside the body, neuroimaging
techniques allow us glimpses of the working brain (Raichle,1994). Each type of imaging uses
a different technique and each has its own advantages and disadvantages.
Another technique, known as Diffuse Optical Imaging (DOI) can offer high temporal and
spatial resolution. DOI works by shining infrared light into the brain. It might seem strange
that light can pass through the head and brain. Light properties change as they pass through
oxygenated blood and through active neurons. As a result, researchers can make inferences
regarding where and when brain activity is happening.
The Brain and Nervous System 62
Conclusion
It has often been said that the brain studies itself. This means that humans are uniquely
capable of using our most sophisticated organ to understand our most sophisticated organ.
Breakthroughs in the study of the brain and nervous system are among the most exciting
discoveries in all of psychology. In the future, research linking neural activity to complex, real
world attitudes and behavior will help us to understand human psychology and better
intervene in it to help people.
The Brain and Nervous System 63
Outside Resources
Web: Teaching resources and videos for teaching about the brain, from Colorado State
University:
http://www.learner.org/resources/series142.html
Discussion Questions
1. In your opinion is learning about the functions of various parts of the brain by studying
the abilities of brain damaged patients ethical. What, in your opinion, are the potential
benefits and considerations?
2. Are research results on the brain more compelling to you than are research results from
survey studies on attitudes? Why or why not? How does biological research such as studies
of the brain influence public opinion regarding the science of psychology?
3. If humans continue to evolve what changes might you predict in our brains and cognitive
abilities?
Vocabulary
Action Potential
A transient all-or-nothing electrical current that is conducted down the axon when the
membrane potential reaches the threshold of excitation.
Axon
Part of the neuron that extends off the soma, splitting several times to connect with other
neurons; main output of the neuron.
Brain Stem
The “trunk” of the brain comprised of the medulla, pons, midbrain, and diencephalon.
Broca’s Area
An area in the frontal lobe of the left hemisphere. Implicated in language production.
Cerebellum
The distinctive structure at the back of the brain, Latin for “small brain.”
Cerebrum
Usually refers to the cerebral cortex and associated white matter, but in some texts includes
the subcortical structures.
Contralateral
Literally “opposite side”; used to refer to the fact that the two hemispheres of the brain process
sensory information and motor commands for the opposite side of the body (e.g., the left
hemisphere controls the right side of the body).
Corpus Callosum
The thick bundle of nerve cells that connect the two hemispheres of the brain and allow them
to communicate.
Dendrites
Part of a neuron that extends away from the cell body and is the main input to the neuron.
The Brain and Nervous System 65
Electroencephalography (EEG)
A neuroimaging technique that measures electrical brain activity via multiple electrodes on
the scalp.
Frontal Lobe
The front most (anterior) part of the cerebrum; anterior to the central sulcus and responsible
for motor output and planning, language, judgment, and decision-making.
Limbic System
Includes the subcortical structures of the amygdala and hippocampal formation as well as
some cortical structures; responsible for aversion and gratification.
Myelin Sheath
Fatty tissue, that insulates the axons of the neurons; myelin is necessary for normal conduction
of electrical impulses among neurons.
Nervous System
The body’s network for electrochemical communication. This system includes all the nerves
cells in the body.
Neurons
Individual brain cells
Neurotransmitters
Chemical substance released by the presynaptic terminal button that acts on the postsynaptic
cell.
Occipital Lobe
The back most (posterior) part of the cerebrum; involved in vision.
Parietal Lobe
The Brain and Nervous System 66
The part of the cerebrum between the frontal and occipital lobes; involved in bodily sensations,
visual attention, and integrating the senses.
Soma
Cell body of a neuron that contains the nucleus and genetic information, and directs protein
synthesis.
Spatial Resolution
A term that refers to how small the elements of an image are; high spatial resolution means
the device or technique can resolve very small elements; in neuroscience it describes how
small of a structure in the brain can be imaged.
Split-brain Patient
A patient who has had most or all of his or her corpus callosum severed.
Synapses
Junction between the presynaptic terminal button of one neuron and the dendrite, axon, or
soma of another postsynaptic neuron.
Synaptic Gap
Also known as the synaptic cleft; the small space between the presynaptic terminal button
and the postsynaptic dendritic spine, axon, or soma.
Temporal Lobe
The part of the cerebrum in front of (anterior to) the occipital lobe and below the lateral fissure;
involved in vision, auditory processing, memory, and integrating vision and audition.
Temporal Resolution
A term that refers to how small a unit of time can be measured; high temporal resolution
means capable of resolving very small units of time; in neuroscience it describes how precisely
in time a process can be measured in the brain.
The Brain and Nervous System 67
References
American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS). (1880). Dr. Paul Broca. Science,
1, 93.
Brodal, P. (1992). The central nervous system: Structure and function. New York: Oxford University
Press.
Darwin, C. (1859). On the origins of species by means of natural selection, or, The preservation
of favoured races in the struggle for life. London, UK: J. Murray.
Hernstein, R. & Boring, E. (1966). A source book in the history of psychology. Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press.
Kandel, E. R., & Schwartz, J. H. (1982). Molecular biology of learning: Modulation of transmitter
release. Science, 218(4571), 433–443.
Kandel, E. R., Schwartz, J. H., & Jessell, T. M. (Eds.) (2000). Principles of neural science (4th ed.).
New York, NY: McGraw-Hill.
Raichle, M. E. (1994). Images of the mind: Studies with modern imaging techniques. Annual
Review of Psychology, 45(1), 333-356.
Stiles, J., & Jernigan, T. L. (2010). The basics of brain development. Neuropsychology Review, 20
(4), 327-348.
5
Evolutionary Theories in Psychology
David M. Buss
Evolution or change over time occurs through the processes of natural and sexual selection.
In response to problems in our environment, we adapt both physically and psychologically to
ensure our survival and reproduction. Sexual selection theory describes how evolution has
shaped us to provide a mating advantage rather than just a survival advantage and occurs
through two distinct pathways: intrasexual competition and intersexual selection. Gene
selection theory, the modern explanation behind evolutionary biology, occurs through the
desire for gene replication. Evolutionary psychology connects evolutionary principles with
modern psychology and focuses primarily on psychological adaptations: changes in the way
we think in order to improve our survival. Two major evolutionary psychological theories are
described: Sexual strategies theory describes the psychology of human mating strategies and
the ways in which women and men differ in those strategies. Error management theory
describes the evolution of biases in the way we think about everything.
Learning Objectives
• Identify the core premises of error management theory, and provide two empirical
examples of adaptive cognitive biases.
Evolutionary Theories in Psychology 69
Introduction
However, we all know that our ancestors hundreds of thousands of years ago weren’t driving
sports cars or wearing designer clothes to attract mates. So how could someone ever say that
such behaviors are “biologically programmed” into us? Well, even though our ancestors might
not have been doing these specific actions, these behaviors are the result of the same driving
force: the powerful influence of evolution. Yes, evolution—certain traits and behaviors
developing over time because they are advantageous to our survival. In the case of dating,
doing something like offering a gift might represent more than a nice gesture. Just as
chimpanzees will give food to mates to show they can provide for them, when you offer gifts
to your dates, you are communicating that you have the money or “resources” to help take
care of them. And even though the person receiving the gift may not realize it, the same
evolutionary forces are influencing his or her behavior as well. The receiver of the gift evaluates
not only the gift but also the gift-giver's clothes, physical appearance, and many other qualities,
to determine whether the individual is a suitable mate. But because these evolutionary
Evolutionary Theories in Psychology 70
To broaden your understanding of evolutionary processes, this module will present some of
the most important elements of evolution as they impact psychology. Evolutionary theory
helps us piece together the story of how we humans have prospered. It also helps to explain
why we behave as we do on a daily basis in our modern world: why we bring gifts on dates,
why we get jealous, why we crave our favorite foods, why we protect our children, and so on.
Evolution may seem like a historical concept that applies only to our ancient ancestors but,
in truth, it is still very much a part of our modern daily lives.
Evolution simply means change over time. Many think of evolution as the development of
traits and behaviors that allow us to survive this “dog-eat-dog” world, like strong leg muscles
to run fast, or fists to punch and defend ourselves. However, physical survival is only important
if it eventually contributes to successful reproduction. That is, even if you live to be a 100-
year-old, if you fail to mate and produce children, your genes will die with your body. Thus,
reproductive success, not survival success, is the engine of evolution by natural selection. Every
mating success by one person means the loss of a mating opportunity for another. Yet every
living human being is an evolutionary success story. Each of us is descended from a long and
unbroken line of ancestors who triumphed over others in the struggle to survive (at least long
enough to mate) and reproduce. However, in order for our genes to endure over time—to
survive harsh climates, to defeat predators—we have inherited adaptive, psychological
processes designed to ensure success.
At the broadest level, we can think of organisms, including humans, as having two large classes
of adaptations—or traits and behaviors that evolved over time to increase our reproductive
success. The first class of adaptations are called survival adaptations: mechanisms that helped
our ancestors handle the “hostile forces of nature.” For example, in order to survive very hot
temperatures, we developed sweat glands to cool ourselves. In order to survive very cold
temperatures, we developed shivering mechanisms (the speedy contraction and expansion
of muscles to produce warmth). Other examples of survival adaptations include developing
a craving for fats and sugars, encouraging us to seek out particular foods rich in fats and
sugars that keep us going longer during food shortages. Some threats, such as snakes, spiders,
darkness, heights, and strangers, often produce fear in us, which encourages us to avoid them
and thereby stay safe. These are also examples of survival adaptations. However, all of these
adaptations are for physical survival, whereas the second class of adaptations are for
reproduction, and help us compete for mates. These adaptations are described in an
Evolutionary Theories in Psychology 71
Darwin noticed that there were many traits and behaviors of organisms that could not be
explained by “survival selection.” For example, the brilliant plumage of peacocks should
actually lower their rates of survival. That is, the peacocks’ feathers act like a neon sign to
predators, advertising “Easy, delicious dinner here!” But if these bright feathers only lower
peacocks’ chances at survival, why do they have them? The same can be asked of similar
characteristics of other animals, such as the large antlers of male stags or the wattles of
roosters, which also seem to be unfavorable to survival. Again, if these traits only make the
animals less likely to survive, why did they develop in the first place? And how have these
animals continued to survive with these traits over thousands and thousands of years?
Darwin’s answer to this conundrum was the theory of sexual selection: the evolution of
characteristics, not because of survival advantage, but because of mating advantage.
The second process of sexual selection is preferential mate choice, also called intersexual
selection. In this process, if members of one sex are attracted to certain qualities in mates—
such as brilliant plumage, signs of good health, or even intelligence—those desired qualities
get passed on in greater numbers, simply because their possessors mate more often. For
example, the colorful plumage of peacocks exists due to a long evolutionary history of peahens’
(the term for female peacocks) attraction to males with brilliantly colored feathers.
In all sexually-reproducing species, adaptations in both sexes (males and females) exist due
to survival selection and sexual selection. However, unlike other animals where one sex has
dominant control over mate choice, humans have “mutual mate choice.” That is, both women
and men typically have a say in choosing their mates. And both mates value qualities such as
kindness, intelligence, and dependability that are beneficial to long-term relationships—
qualities that make good partners and good parents.
In modern evolutionary theory, all evolutionary processes boil down to an organism’s genes.
Genes are the basic “units of heredity,” or the information that is passed along in DNA that
tells the cells and molecules how to “build” the organism and how that organism should
behave. Genes that are better able to encourage the organism to reproduce, and thus replicate
themselves in the organism’s offspring, have an advantage over competing genes that are
less able. For example, take female sloths: In order to attract a mate, they will scream as loudly
as they can, to let potential mates know where they are in the thick jungle. Now, consider two
types of genes in female sloths: one gene that allows them to scream extremely loudly, and
another that only allows them to scream moderately loudly. In this case, the sloth with the
gene that allows her to shout louder will attract more mates—increasing reproductive success
—which ensures that her genes are more readily passed on than those of the quieter sloth.
Essentially, genes can boost their own replicative success in two basic ways. First, they can
influence the odds for survival and reproduction of the organism they are in (individual
reproductive success or fitness—as in the example with the sloths). Second, genes can also
influence the organism to help other organisms who also likely contain those genes—known
as “genetic relatives”—to survive and reproduce (which is called inclusive fitness). For example,
why do human parents tend to help their own kids with the financial burdens of a college
education and not the kids next door? Well, having a college education increases one’s
attractiveness to other mates, which increases one’s likelihood for reproducing and passing
Evolutionary Theories in Psychology 73
on genes. And because parents’ genes are in their own children (and not the neighborhood
children), funding their children’s educations increases the likelihood that the parents’ genes
will be passed on.
Evolutionary Psychology
Evolutionary psychology aims the lens of modern evolutionary theory on the workings of the
human mind. It focuses primarily on psychological adaptations: mechanisms of the mind
that have evolved to solve specific problems of survival or reproduction. These kinds of
adaptations are in contrast to physiological adaptations, which are adaptations that occur in
the body as a consequence of one’s environment. One example of a physiological adaptation
is how our skin makes calluses. First, there is an “input,” such as repeated friction to the skin
on the bottom of our feet from walking. Second, there is a “procedure,” in which the skin grows
new skin cells at the afflicted area. Third, an actual callus forms as an “output” to protect the
underlying tissue—the final outcome of the physiological adaptation (i.e., tougher skin to
protect repeatedly scraped areas). On the other hand, a psychological adaptation is a
development or change of a mechanism in the mind. For example, take sexual jealousy. First,
there is an “input,” such as a romantic partner flirting with a rival. Second, there is a “procedure,”
in which the person evaluates the threat the rival poses to the romantic relationship. Third,
there is a behavioral output, which might range from vigilance (e.g., snooping through a
partner’s email) to violence (e.g., threatening the rival).
In evolutionary psychology, culture also has a major effect on psychological adaptations. For
example, status within one’s group is important in all cultures for achieving reproductive
Evolutionary Theories in Psychology 74
success, because higher status makes someone more attractive to mates. In individualistic
cultures, such as the United States, status is heavily determined by individual
accomplishments. But in more collectivist cultures, such as Japan, status is more heavily
determined by contributions to the group and by that group’s success. For example, consider
a group project. If you were to put in most of the effort on a successful group project, the
culture in the United States reinforces the psychological adaptation to try to claim that success
for yourself (because individual achievements are rewarded with higher status). However, the
culture in Japan reinforces the psychological adaptation to attribute that success to the whole
group (because collective achievements are rewarded with higher status). Another example
of cultural input is the importance of virginity as a desirable quality for a mate. Cultural norms
that advise against premarital sex persuade people to ignore their own basic interests because
they know that virginity will make them more attractive marriage partners. Evolutionary
psychology, in short, does not predict rigid robotic-like “instincts.” That is, there isn’t one rule
that works all the time. Rather, evolutionary psychology studies flexible, environmentally-
connected and culturally-influenced adaptations that vary according to the situation.
Sexual strategies theory is based on sexual selection theory. It proposes that humans have
evolved a list of different mating strategies, both short-term and long-term, that vary
depending on culture, social context, parental influence, and personal mate value (desirability
in the “mating market”).
In its initial formulation, sexual strategies theory focused on the differences between men
and women in mating preferences and strategies (Buss & Schmitt, 1993). It started by looking
at the minimum parental investment needed to produce a child. For women, even the
minimum investment is significant: after becoming pregnant, they have to carry that child for
nine months inside of them. For men, on the other hand, the minimum investment to produce
the same child is considerably smaller—simply the act of sex.
Evolutionary Theories in Psychology 75
An extensive body of empirical evidence supports these and related predictions (Buss &
Schmitt, 2011). Men express a desire for a larger number of sex partners than women do.
They let less time elapse before seeking sex. They are more willing to consent to sex with
strangers and are less likely to require emotional involvement with their sex partners. They
have more frequent sexual fantasies and fantasize about a larger variety of sex partners. They
are more likely to regret missed sexual opportunities. And they lower their standards in short-
term mating, showing a willingness to mate with a larger variety of women as long as the
costs and risks are low.
However, in situations where both the man and woman are interested in long-term mating,
both sexes tend to invest substantially in the relationship and in their children. In these cases,
the theory predicts that both sexes will be extremely choosy when pursuing a long-term mating
strategy. Much empirical research supports this prediction, as well. In fact, the qualities women
and men generally look for when choosing long-term mates are very similar: both want mates
who are intelligent, kind, understanding, healthy, dependable, honest, loyal, loving, and
Evolutionary Theories in Psychology 76
adaptable.
Nonetheless, women and men do differ in their preferences for a few key qualities in long-
term mating, because of somewhat distinct adaptive problems. Modern women have
inherited the evolutionary trait to desire mates who possess resources, have qualities linked
with acquiring resources (e.g., ambition, wealth, industriousness), and are willing to share
those resources with them. On the other hand, men more strongly desire youth and health
in women, as both are cues to fertility. These male and female differences are universal in
humans. They were first documented in 37 different cultures, from Australia to Zambia (Buss,
1989), and have been replicated by dozens of researchers in dozens of additional cultures (for
summaries, see Buss, 2012).
As we know, though, just because we have these mating preferences (e.g., men with resources;
fertile women), people don't always get what they want. There are countless other factors
which influence who people ultimately select as their mate. For example, the sex ratio (the
percentage of men to women in the mating pool), cultural practices (such as arranged
marriages, which inhibit individuals’ freedom to act on their preferred mating strategies), the
strategies of others (e.g., if everyone else
is pursuing short-term sex, it’s more
difficult to pursue a long-term mating
strategy), and many others all influence
who we select as our mates.
If you were walking in the woods and heard a sound in the bushes Error Management Theory
you might be startled and act on the worst case scenario—such as
the threat of a wild animal—by moving in the opposite direction.
This is evolutionary psychology at work, keeping you safe so you Error management theory (EMT) deals
can survive and reproduce. [Image: Nicholas T, https://goo.gl/ with the evolution of how we think, make
gZ3zEL, CC BY 2.0, https://goo.gl/9uSnqN] decisions, and evaluate uncertain
Evolutionary Theories in Psychology 77
situations—that is, situations where there's no clear answer how we should behave. (Haselton
& Buss, 2000; Haselton, Nettle, & Andrews, 2005). Consider, for example, walking through the
woods at dusk. You hear a rustle in the leaves on the path in front of you. It could be a snake.
Or, it could just be the wind blowing the leaves. Because you can't really tell why the leaves
rustled, it’s an uncertain situation. The important question then is, what are the costs of errors
in judgment? That is, if you conclude that it’s a dangerous snake so you avoid the leaves, the
costs are minimal (i.e., you simply make a short detour around them). However, if you assume
the leaves are safe and simply walk over them—when in fact it is a dangerous snake—the
decision could cost you your life.
Now, think about our evolutionary history and how generation after generation was
confronted with similar decisions, where one option had low cost but great reward (walking
around the leaves and not getting bitten) and the other had a low reward but high cost (walking
through the leaves and getting bitten). These kinds of choices are called “cost asymmetries.”
If during our evolutionary history we encountered decisions like these generation after
generation, over time an adaptive bias would be created: we would make sure to err in favor
of the least costly (in this case, least dangerous) option (e.g., walking around the leaves). To
put it another way, EMT predicts that whenever uncertain situations present us with a safer
versus more dangerous decision, we will psychologically adapt to prefer choices that minimize
the cost of errors.
EMT is a general evolutionary psychological theory that can be applied to many different
domains of our lives, but a specific example of it is the visual descent illusion. To illustrate: Have
you ever thought it would be no problem to jump off of a ledge, but as soon as you stood up
there, it suddenly looked much higher than you thought? The visual descent illusion (Jackson
& Cormack, 2008) states that people will overestimate the distance when looking down from
a height (compared to looking up) so that people will be especially wary of falling from great
heights—which would result in injury or death. Another example of EMT is the auditory looming
bias: Have you ever noticed how an ambulance seems closer when it's coming toward you,
but suddenly seems far away once it's immediately passed? With the auditory looming bias,
people overestimate how close objects are when the sound is moving toward them compared
to when it is moving away from them. From our evolutionary history, humans learned, "It’s
better to be safe than sorry." Therefore, if we think that a threat is closer to us when it’s moving
toward us (because it seems louder), we will be quicker to act and escape. In this regard, there
may be times we ran away when we didn’t need to (a false alarm), but wasting that time is a
less costly mistake than not acting in the first place when a real threat does exist.
EMT has also been used to predict adaptive biases in the domain of mating. Consider
something as simple as a smile. In one case, a smile from a potential mate could be a sign of
Evolutionary Theories in Psychology 78
sexual or romantic interest. On the other hand, it may just signal friendliness. Because of the
costs to men of missing out on chances for reproduction, EMT predicts that men have a sexual
overperception bias: they often misread sexual interest from a woman, when really it’s just a
friendly smile or touch. In the mating domain, the sexual overperception bias is one of the
best-documented phenomena. It’s been shown in studies in which men and women rated
the sexual interest between people in photographs and videotaped interactions. As well, it’s
been shown in the laboratory with participants engaging in actual “speed dating,” where the
men interpret sexual interest from the women more often than the women actually intended
it (Perilloux, Easton, & Buss, 2012). In short, EMT predicts that men, more than women, will
over-infer sexual interest based on minimal cues, and empirical research confirms this
adaptive mating bias.
Conclusion
Sexual strategies theory and error management theory are two evolutionary psychological
theories that have received much empirical support from dozens of independent researchers.
But, there are many other evolutionary psychological theories, such as social exchange theory
for example, that also make predictions about our modern day behavior and preferences,
too. The merits of each evolutionary psychological theory, however, must be evaluated
separately and treated like any scientific theory. That is, we should only trust their predictions
and claims to the extent they are supported by scientific studies. However, even if the theory
is scientifically grounded, just because a psychological adaptation was advantageous in our
history, it doesn't mean it's still useful today. For example, even though women may have
preferred men with resources in generations ago, our modern society has advanced such that
these preferences are no longer apt or necessary. Nonetheless, it's important to consider how
our evolutionary history has shaped our automatic or "instinctual" desires and reflexes of
today, so that we can better shape them for the future ahead.
Evolutionary Theories in Psychology 79
Outside Resources
FAQs
http://www.anth.ucsb.edu/projects/human/evpsychfaq.html
Web: Main international scientific organization for the study of evolution and human
behavior, HBES
http://www.hbes.com/
Discussion Questions
1. How does change take place over time in the living world?
2. Which two potential psychological adaptations to problems of survival are not discussed
in this module?
3. What are the psychological and behavioral implications of the fact that women bear heavier
costs to produce a child than men do?
4. Can you formulate a hypothesis about an error management bias in the domain of social
interaction?
Evolutionary Theories in Psychology 80
Vocabulary
Adaptations
Evolved solutions to problems that historically contributed to reproductive success.
Evolution
Change over time. Is the definition changing?
Intersexual selection
A process of sexual selection by which evolution (change) occurs as a consequences of the
mate preferences of one sex exerting selection pressure on members of the opposite sex.
Intrasexual competition
A process of sexual selection by which members of one sex compete with each other, and the
victors gain preferential mating access to members of the opposite sex.
Natural selection
Differential reproductive success as a consequence of differences in heritable attributes.
Psychological adaptations
Mechanisms of the mind that evolved to solve specific problems of survival or reproduction;
conceptualized as information processing devices.
Sexual selection
The evolution of characteristics because of the mating advantage they give organisms.
adaptive problems women and men face when pursuing these strategies, and the evolved
solutions to these mating problems.
Evolutionary Theories in Psychology 82
References
Buss, D. M. (2012). Evolutionary psychology: The new science of the mind (4th ed.). Boston,
MA: Allyn & Bacon.
Buss, D. M., & Schmitt, D. P. (2011). Evolutionary psychology and feminism. Sex Roles, 64, 768–
787.
Buss, D. M., & Schmitt, D. P. (1993). Sexual strategies theory: An evolutionary perspective on
human mating. Psychological Review, 100, 204–232.
Haselton, M. G., & Buss, D. M. (2000). Error management theory: A new perspective on biases
in cross-sex mind reading. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 78, 81–91.
Haselton, M. G., Nettle, D., & Andrews, P. W. (2005). The evolution of cognitive bias. In D. M.
Buss (Ed.), The handbook of evolutionary psychology (pp. 724–746). New York, NY: Wiley.
Jackson, R. E., & Cormack, J. K. (2008). Evolved navigation theory and the environmental vertical
illusion. Evolution and Human Behavior, 29, 299–304.
Perilloux, C., Easton, J. A., & Buss, D. M. (2012). The misperception of sexual interest.
Psychological Science, 23, 146–151.
6
The Nature-Nurture Question
Eric Turkheimer
People have a deep intuition about what has been called the “nature–nurture question.” Some
aspects of our behavior feel as though they originate in our genetic makeup, while others feel
like the result of our upbringing or our own hard work. The scientific field of behavior genetics
attempts to study these differences empirically, either by examining similarities among family
members with different degrees of genetic relatedness, or, more recently, by studying
differences in the DNA of people with different behavioral traits. The scientific methods that
have been developed are ingenious, but often inconclusive. Many of the difficulties
encountered in the empirical science of behavior genetics turn out to be conceptual, and our
intuitions about nature and nurture get more complicated the harder we think about them.
In the end, it is an oversimplification to ask how “genetic” some particular behavior is. Genes
and environments always combine to produce behavior, and the real science is in the discovery
of how they combine for a given behavior.
Learning Objectives
• Understand what the nature–nurture debate is and why the problem fascinates us.
• Know the major research designs that can be used to study nature–nurture questions.
• Appreciate the complexities of nature–nurture and why questions that seem simple turn
out not to have simple answers.
Introduction
The Nature-Nurture Question 84
There are three related problems at the intersection of philosophy and science that are
fundamental to our understanding of our relationship to the natural world: the mind–body
problem, the free will problem, and the nature–nurture problem. These great questions have
a lot in common. Everyone, even those without much knowledge of science or philosophy,
has opinions about the answers to these questions that come simply from observing the
world we live in. Our feelings about our relationship with the physical and biological world
often seem incomplete. We are in control of our actions in some ways, but at the mercy of
our bodies in others; it feels obvious that our consciousness is some kind of creation of our
physical brains, at the same time we sense that our awareness must go beyond just the
physical. This incomplete knowledge of our relationship with nature leaves us fascinated and
a little obsessed, like a cat that climbs into a paper bag and then out again, over and over,
mystified every time by a relationship between inner and outer that it can see but can’t quite
understand.
It may seem obvious that we are born with certain characteristics while others are acquired,
and yet of the three great questions about humans’ relationship with the natural world, only
nature–nurture gets referred to as a “debate.” In the history of psychology, no other question
has caused so much controversy and offense: We are so concerned with nature–nurture
because our very sense of moral character seems to depend on it. While we may admire the
athletic skills of a great basketball player, we think of his height as simply a gift, a payoff in
the “genetic lottery.” For the same reason, no one blames a short person for his height or
someone’s congenital disability on poor decisions: To state the obvious, it’s “not their fault.”
But we do praise the concert violinist (and perhaps her parents and teachers as well) for her
dedication, just as we condemn cheaters, slackers, and bullies for their bad behavior.
The problem is, most human characteristics aren’t usually as clear-cut as height or instrument-
mastery, affirming our nature–nurture expectations strongly one way or the other. In fact,
even the great violinist might have some inborn qualities—perfect pitch, or long, nimble fingers
—that support and reward her hard work. And the basketball player might have eaten a diet
while growing up that promoted his genetic tendency for being tall. When we think about our
own qualities, they seem under our control in some respects, yet beyond our control in others.
And often the traits that don’t seem to have an obvious cause are the ones that concern us
the most and are far more personally significant. What about how much we drink or worry?
What about our honesty, or religiosity, or sexual orientation? They all come from that uncertain
zone, neither fixed by nature nor totally under our own control.
One major problem with answering nature-nurture questions about people is, how do you
set up an experiment? In nonhuman animals, there are relatively straightforward experiments
for tackling nature–nurture questions. Say, for example, you are interested in aggressiveness
The Nature-Nurture Question 85
With people, however, we can’t assign babies to parents at random, or select parents with
certain behavioral characteristics to mate, merely in the interest of science (though history
does include horrific examples of such practices, in misguided attempts at “eugenics,” the
shaping of human characteristics through intentional breeding). In typical human families,
children’s biological parents raise them, so it is very difficult to know whether children act like
their parents due to genetic (nature) or environmental (nurture) reasons. Nevertheless,
despite our restrictions on setting up human-based experiments, we do see real-world
examples of nature-nurture at work in the human sphere—though they only provide partial
answers to our many questions.
The science of how genes and environments work together to influence behavior is called
behavioral genetics. The easiest opportunity we have to observe this is the adoption study.
When children are put up for adoption, the parents who give birth to them are no longer the
parents who raise them. This setup isn’t quite the same as the experiments with dogs (children
The Nature-Nurture Question 86
aren’t assigned to random adoptive parents in order to suit the particular interests of a
scientist) but adoption still tells us some interesting things, or at least confirms some basic
expectations. For instance, if the biological child of tall parents were adopted into a family of
short people, do you suppose the child’s growth would be affected? What about the biological
child of a Spanish-speaking family adopted at birth into an English-speaking family? What
language would you expect the child to speak? And what might these outcomes tell you about
the difference between height and language in terms of nature-nurture?
Twin and adoption studies are two instances of a much broader class of methods for observing
nature-nurture called quantitative genetics, the scientific discipline in which similarities
among individuals are analyzed based on how biologically related they are. We can do these
studies with siblings and half-siblings, cousins, twins who have been separated at birth and
The Nature-Nurture Question 87
raised separately (Bouchard, Lykken, McGue, & Segal, 1990; such twins are very rare and play
a smaller role than is commonly believed in the science of nature–nurture), or with entire
extended families (see Plomin, DeFries, Knopik, & Neiderhiser, 2012, for a complete
introduction to research methods relevant to nature–nurture).
For better or for worse, contentions about nature–nurture have intensified because
quantitative genetics produces a number called a heritability coefficient, varying from 0 to
1, that is meant to provide a single measure of genetics’ influence of a trait. In a general way,
a heritability coefficient measures how strongly differences among individuals are related to
differences among their genes. But beware: Heritability coefficients, although simple to
compute, are deceptively difficult to interpret. Nevertheless, numbers that provide simple
answers to complicated questions tend to have a strong influence on the human imagination,
and a great deal of time has been spent discussing whether the heritability of intelligence or
personality or depression is equal to one number or another.
sequenced at the turn of the 21st century; and heritability coefficient which measures how strongly
differences among individuals for a trait are related to
we are now on the verge of being able to
differences among their genes. [Image: EMSL, https://goo.gl/
obtain the specific DNA sequence of anyone
IRfn9g, CC BY-NC-SA 2.0, https://goo.gl/fbv27n]
at a relatively low cost. No one knows what
this new genetic knowledge will mean for the study of nature–nurture, but as we will see in
the next section, answers to nature–nurture questions have turned out to be far more difficult
and mysterious than anyone imagined.
The Nature-Nurture Question 88
It would be satisfying to be able to say that nature–nurture studies have given us conclusive
and complete evidence about where traits come from, with some traits clearly resulting from
genetics and others almost entirely from environmental factors, such as childrearing practices
and personal will; but that is not the case. Instead, everything has turned out to have some
footing in genetics. The more genetically-related people are, the more similar they are—for
everything: height, weight, intelligence, personality, mental illness, etc. Sure, it seems like
common sense that some traits have a genetic bias. For example, adopted children resemble
their biological parents even if they have never met them, and identical twins are more similar
to each other than are fraternal twins. And while certain psychological traits, such as
personality or mental illness (e.g., schizophrenia), seem reasonably influenced by genetics, it
turns out that the same is true for political attitudes, how much television people watch
(Plomin, Corley, DeFries, & Fulker, 1990), and whether or not they get divorced (McGue &
Lykken, 1992).
fact that the best predictors of an adopted child’s personality or mental health are found in
the biological parents he or she has never met, rather than in the adoptive parents who raised
him or her, presents a significant challenge to purely environmental explanations of
personality or psychopathology. The message is clear: You can’t leave genes out of the
equation. But keep in mind, no behavioral traits are completely inherited, so you can’t leave
the environment out altogether, either.
Trying to untangle the various ways nature-nurture influences human behavior can be messy,
and often common-sense notions can get in the way of good science. One very significant
contribution of behavioral genetics that has changed psychology for good can be very helpful
to keep in mind: When your subjects are biologically-related, no matter how clearly a situation
may seem to point to environmental influence, it is never safe to interpret a behavior as wholly
the result of nurture without further evidence. For example, when presented with data
showing that children whose mothers read to them often are likely to have better reading
scores in third grade, it is tempting to conclude that reading to your kids out loud is important
to success in school; this may well be true, but the study as described is inconclusive, because
there are genetic as well as environmental pathways between the parenting practices of
mothers and the abilities of their children. This is a case where “correlation does not imply
causation,” as they say. To establish that reading aloud causes success, a scientist can either
study the problem in adoptive families (in which the genetic pathway is absent) or by finding
a way to randomly assign children to oral reading conditions.
The outcomes of nature–nurture studies have fallen short of our expectations (of establishing
clear-cut bases for traits) in many ways. The most disappointing outcome has been the inability
to organize traits from more- to less-genetic. As noted earlier, everything has turned out to be
at least somewhat heritable (passed down), yet nothing has turned out to be absolutely
heritable, and there hasn’t been much consistency as to which traits are more heritable and
which are less heritable once other considerations (such as how accurately the trait can be
measured) are taken into account (Turkheimer, 2000). The problem is conceptual: The
heritability coefficient, and, in fact, the whole quantitative structure that underlies it, does not
match up with our nature–nurture intuitions. We want to know how “important” the roles of
genes and environment are to the development of a trait, but in focusing on “important”
maybe we’re emphasizing the wrong thing. First of all, genes and environment are both crucial
to every trait; without genes the environment would have nothing to work on, and too, genes
cannot develop in a vacuum. Even more important, because nature–nurture questions look
at the differences among people, the cause of a given trait depends not only on the trait itself,
but also on the differences in that trait between members of the group being studied.
The classic example of the heritability coefficient defying intuition is the trait of having two
The Nature-Nurture Question 90
arms. No one would argue against the development of arms being a biological, genetic process.
But fraternal twins are just as similar for “two-armedness” as identical twins, resulting in a
heritability coefficient of zero for the trait of having two arms. Normally, according to the
heritability model, this result (coefficient of zero) would suggest all nurture, no nature, but we
know that’s not the case. The reason this result is not a tip-off that arm development is less
genetic than we imagine is because people do not vary in the genes related to arm development
—which essentially upends the heritability formula. In fact, in this instance, the opposite is
likely true: the extent that people differ in arm number is likely the result of accidents and,
therefore, environmental. For reasons like these, we always have to be very careful when
asking nature–nurture questions, especially when we try to express the answer in terms of a
single number. The heritability of a trait is not simply a property of that trait, but a property
of the trait in a particular context of relevant genes and environmental factors.
Another issue with the heritability coefficient is that it divides traits’ determinants into two
portions—genes and environment—which are then calculated together for the total
variability. This is a little like asking how much of the experience of a symphony comes from
the horns and how much from the strings; the ways instruments or genes integrate is more
complex than that. It turns out to be the case that, for many traits, genetic differences affect
behavior under some environmental
circumstances but not others—a phenomenon
called gene-environment interaction, or G x
E. In one well-known example, Caspi et al.
(2002) showed that among maltreated
children, those who carried a particular
allele of the MAOA gene showed a
predisposition to violence and antisocial
behavior, while those with other alleles did
not. Whereas, in children who had not been
maltreated, the gene had no effect. Making
matters even more complicated are very
recent studies of what is known as
epigenetics (see module, “Epigenetics”
http://noba.to/37p5cb8v), a process in
which the DNA itself is modified by The answer to the nature –nurture question has not turned
out to be as straightforward as we would like. The many
environmental events, and those genetic
questions we can ask about the relationships among genes,
changes transmitted to children. environments, and human traits may have many different
answers, and the answer to one tells us little about the answers
Some common questions about nature– to the others. [Image: Sundaram Ramaswamy, https://goo.gl/
change, how malleable is it, and do we “have a choice” about it? These questions are much
more complex than they may seem at first glance. For example, phenylketonuria is an inborn
error of metabolism caused by a single gene; it prevents the body from metabolizing
phenylalanine. Untreated, it causes intellectual disability and death. But it can be treated
effectively by a straightforward environmental intervention: avoiding foods containing
phenylalanine. Height seems like a trait firmly rooted in our nature and unchangeable, but
the average height of many populations in Asia and Europe has increased significantly in the
past 100 years, due to changes in diet and the alleviation of poverty. Even the most modern
genetics has not provided definitive answers to nature–nurture questions. When it was first
becoming possible to measure the DNA sequences of individual people, it was widely thought
that we would quickly progress to finding the specific genes that account for behavioral
characteristics, but that hasn’t happened. There are a few rare genes that have been found
to have significant (almost always negative) effects, such as the single gene that causes
Huntington’s disease, or the Apolipoprotein gene that causes early onset dementia in a small
percentage of Alzheimer’s cases. Aside from these rare genes of great effect, however, the
genetic impact on behavior is broken up over many genes, each with very small effects. For
most behavioral traits, the effects are so small and distributed across so many genes that we
have not been able to catalog them in a meaningful way. In fact, the same is true of
environmental effects. We know that extreme environmental hardship causes catastrophic
effects for many behavioral outcomes, but fortunately extreme environmental hardship is
very rare. Within the normal range of environmental events, those responsible for differences
(e.g., why some children in a suburban third-grade classroom perform better than others) are
much more difficult to grasp.
The difficulties with finding clear-cut solutions to nature–nurture problems bring us back to
the other great questions about our relationship with the natural world: the mind-body
problem and free will. Investigations into what we mean when we say we are aware of
something reveal that consciousness is not simply the product of a particular area of the brain,
nor does choice turn out to be an orderly activity that we can apply to some behaviors but
not others. So it is with nature and nurture: What at first may seem to be a straightforward
matter, able to be indexed with a single number, becomes more and more complicated the
closer we look. The many questions we can ask about the intersection among genes,
environments, and human traits—how sensitive are traits to environmental change, and how
common are those influential environments; are parents or culture more relevant; how
sensitive are traits to differences in genes, and how much do the relevant genes vary in a
particular population; does the trait involve a single gene or a great many genes; is the trait
more easily described in genetic or more-complex behavioral terms?—may have different
answers, and the answer to one tells us little about the answers to the others.
The Nature-Nurture Question 92
It is tempting to predict that the more we understand the wide-ranging effects of genetic
differences on all human characteristics—especially behavioral ones—our cultural, ethical,
legal, and personal ways of thinking about ourselves will have to undergo profound changes
in response. Perhaps criminal proceedings will consider genetic background. Parents,
presented with the genetic sequence of their children, will be faced with difficult decisions
about reproduction. These hopes or fears are often exaggerated. In some ways, our thinking
may need to change—for example, when we consider the meaning behind the fundamental
American principle that all men are created equal. Human beings differ, and like all evolved
organisms they differ genetically. The Declaration of Independence predates Darwin and
Mendel, but it is hard to imagine that Jefferson—whose genius encompassed botany as well
as moral philosophy—would have been alarmed to learn about the genetic diversity of
organisms. One of the most important things modern genetics has taught us is that almost
all human behavior is too complex to be nailed down, even from the most complete genetic
information, unless we’re looking at identical twins. The science of nature and nurture has
demonstrated that genetic differences among people are vital to human moral equality,
freedom, and self-determination, not opposed to them. As Mordecai Kaplan said about the
role of the past in Jewish theology, genetics gets a vote, not a veto, in the determination of
human behavior. We should indulge our fascination with nature–nurture while resisting the
temptation to oversimplify it.
The Nature-Nurture Question 93
Outside Resources
Discussion Questions
1. Is your personality more like one of your parents than the other? If you have a sibling, is
his or her personality like yours? In your family, how did these similarities and differences
develop? What do you think caused them?
2. Can you think of a human characteristic for which genetic differences would play almost
no role? Defend your choice.
3. Do you think the time will come when we will be able to predict almost everything about
someone by examining their DNA on the day they are born?
4. Identical twins are more similar than fraternal twins for the trait of aggressiveness, as well
as for criminal behavior. Do these facts have implications for the courtroom? If it can be
shown that a violent criminal had violent parents, should it make a difference in culpability
or sentencing?
The Nature-Nurture Question 94
Vocabulary
Adoption study
A behavior genetic research method that involves comparison of adopted children to their
adoptive and biological parents.
Behavioral genetics
The empirical science of how genes and environments combine to generate behavior.
Heritability coefficient
An easily misinterpreted statistical construct that purports to measure the role of genetics in
the explanation of differences among individuals.
Quantitative genetics
Scientific and mathematical methods for inferring genetic and environmental processes based
on the degree of genetic and environmental similarity among organisms.
Twin studies
A behavior genetic research method that involves comparison of the similarity of identical
(monozygotic; MZ) and fraternal (dizygotic; DZ) twins.
The Nature-Nurture Question 95
References
Bouchard, T. J., Lykken, D. T., McGue, M., & Segal, N. L. (1990). Sources of human psychological
differences: The Minnesota study of twins reared apart. Science, 250(4978), 223–228.
Caspi, A., McClay, J., Moffitt, T. E., Mill, J., Martin, J., Craig, I. W., Taylor, A. & Poulton, R. (2002).
Role of genotype in the cycle of violence in maltreated children. Science, 297(5582), 851–
854.
McGue, M., & Lykken, D. T. (1992). Genetic influence on risk of divorce. Psychological Science,
3(6), 368–373.
Plomin, R., Corley, R., DeFries, J. C., & Fulker, D. W. (1990). Individual differences in television
viewing in early childhood: Nature as well as nurture. Psychological Science, 1(6), 371–377.
Plomin, R., DeFries, J. C., Knopik, V. S., & Neiderhiser, J. M. (2012). Behavioral genetics. New
York, NY: Worth Publishers.
Scott, J. P., & Fuller, J. L. (1998). Genetics and the social behavior of the dog. Chicago, IL:
University of Chicago Press.
Turkheimer, E. (2000). Three laws of behavior genetics and what they mean. Current Directions
in Psychological Science, 9(5), 160–164.
7
Gender
Christia Spears Brown, Jennifer A. Jewell & Michelle J. Tam
This module discusses gender and its related concepts, including sex, gender roles, gender
identity, sexual orientation, and sexism. In addition, this module includes a discussion of
differences that exist between males and females and how these real gender differences
compare to the stereotypes society holds about gender differences. In fact, there are
significantly fewer real gender differences than one would expect relative to the large number
of stereotypes about gender differences. This module then discusses theories of how gender
roles develop and how they contribute to strong expectations for gender differences. Finally,
the module concludes with a discussion of some of the consequences of relying on and
expecting gender differences, such as gender discrimination, sexual harassment, and
ambivalent sexism.
Learning Objectives
• Distinguish gender and sex, as well as gender identity and sexual orientation.
• Discuss gender differences that exist, as well as those that do not actually exist.
• Understand and explain different theories of how gender roles are formed.
Introduction
Before we discuss gender in detail, it is important to understand what gender actually is. The
terms sex and gender are frequently used interchangeably, though they have different
Gender 97
meanings. In this context, sex refers to the biological category of male or female, as defined
by physical differences in genetic composition and in reproductive anatomy and function. On
the other hand, gender refers to the cultural, social, and psychological meanings that are
associated with masculinity and femininity (Wood & Eagly, 2002). You can think of “male” and
“female” as distinct categories of sex (a person is typically born a male or a female), but
“masculine” and “feminine” as continuums associated with gender (everyone has a certain
degree of masculine and feminine traits and qualities).
Defining Gender
Historically, the terms gender and sex have been used interchangeably. Because of this, gender
is often viewed as a binary – a person is either male or female – and it is assumed that a
person’s gender matches their biological sex. This is not always the case, however, and more
recent research has separated these two terms. While the majority of people do identify with
the gender that matches their biological sex (cisgender), an estimated 0.6% of the population
Gender 98
identify with a gender that does not match their biological sex (transgender; Flores, Herman,
Gates, & Brown, 2016). For example, an individual who is biologically male may identify as
female, or vice versa.
In addition to separating gender and sex, recent research has also begun to conceptualize
gender in ways beyond the gender binary. Genderqueer or gender nonbinary are umbrella
terms used to describe a wide range of individuals who do not identify with and/or conform
to the gender binary. These terms encompass a variety of more specific labels individuals
may use to describe themselves. Some common labels are genderfluid, agender, and
bigender. An individual who is genderfluid may identify as male, female, both, or neither at
different times and in different circumstances. An individual who is agender may have no
gender or describe themselves as having a neutral gender, while bigender individuals identify
as two genders.
It is important to remember that sex and gender do not always match and that gender is not
always binary; however, a large majority of prior research examining gender has not made
these distinctions. As such, the following sections will discuss gender as a binary.
Text Box 1
Gender Differences
Differences between males and females can be based on (a) actual gender differences (i.e.,
men and women are actually different in some abilities), (b) gender roles (i.e., differences in
how men and women are supposed to act), or (c) gender stereotypes (i.e., differences in how
we think men and women are). Sometimes gender stereotypes and gender roles reflect actual
Gender 99
What are actual gender differences? In terms of language and language skills, girls develop
language skills earlier and know more words than boys; this does not, however, translate into
long-term differences. Girls are also more likely than boys to offer praise, to agree with the
person they’re talking to, and to elaborate on the other person’s comments; boys, in contrast,
are more likely than girls to assert their opinion and offer criticisms (Leaper & Smith, 2004). In
terms of temperament, boys are slightly less able to suppress inappropriate responses and
slightly more likely to blurt things out than girls (Else-Quest, Hyde, Goldsmith, & Van Hulle,
2006).
completely disappeared.
Figure 1. While our gender stereotypes paint males and females as drastically different from
each other, even when a difference exists, there is considerable overlap in the presence of
that trait between genders. This graph shows the average difference in self-esteem between
boys and girls. Boys have a higher average self-esteem than girls, but the average scores are
Many domains we assume differ across genders are really based on gender stereotypes and
not actual differences. Based on large meta-analyses, the analyses of thousands of studies
across more than one million people, research has shown: Girls are not more fearful, shy, or
scared of new things than boys; boys are not more angry than girls and girls are not more
emotional than boys; boys do not perform better at math than girls; and girls are not more
talkative than boys (Hyde, 2005).
In the following sections, we’ll investigate gender roles, the part they play in creating these
stereotypes, and how they can affect the development of real gender differences.
Gender Roles
As mentioned earlier, gender roles are well-established social constructions that may change
from culture to culture and over time. In American culture, we commonly think of gender roles
in terms of gender stereotypes, or the beliefs and expectations people hold about the typical
Gender 101
By the time we are adults, our gender roles are a stable part of our personalities, and we
usually hold many gender stereotypes. When do children start to learn about gender? Very
early. By their first birthday, children can distinguish faces by gender. By their second birthday,
they can label others’ gender and even sort objects into gender-typed categories. By the third
birthday, children can consistently identify their own gender (see Martin, Ruble, & Szkrybalo,
2002, for a review). At this age, children believe sex is determined by external attributes, not
biological attributes. Between 3 and 6 years of age, children learn that gender is constant and
can’t change simply by changing external attributes, having developed gender constancy.
During this period, children also develop strong and rigid gender stereotypes. Stereotypes
can refer to play (e.g., boys play with trucks, and girls play with dolls), traits (e.g., boys are
strong, and girls like to cry), and occupations (e.g., men are doctors and women are nurses).
These stereotypes stay rigid until children reach about age 8 or 9. Then they develop cognitive
abilities that allow them to be more flexible in their thinking about others.
Figure 2: Children develop the ability to classify gender very early in life.
How do our gender roles and gender stereotypes develop and become so strong? Many of
our gender stereotypes are so strong because we emphasize gender so much in culture (Bigler
& Liben, 2007). For example, males and females are treated differently before they are even
born. When someone learns of a new pregnancy, the first question asked is “Is it a boy or a
girl?” Immediately upon hearing the answer, judgments are made about the child: Boys will
be rough and like blue, while girls will be delicate and like pink. Developmental intergroup
theory postulates that adults’ heavy focus on gender leads children to pay attention to gender
as a key source of information about themselves and others, to seek out any possible gender
differences, and to form rigid stereotypes based on gender that are subsequently difficult to
change.
Gender 102
A second theory that attempts to explain the formation of gender roles in children is social
learning theory. Social learning theory argues that gender roles are learned through
reinforcement, punishment, and modeling. Children are rewarded and reinforced for
behaving in concordance with gender roles and punished for breaking gender roles. In
addition, social learning theory argues that children learn many of their gender roles by
modeling the behavior of adults and older children and, in doing so, develop ideas about what
behaviors are appropriate for each gender. Social learning theory has less support than gender
schema theory—research shows that parents do reinforce gender-appropriate play, but for
the most part treat their male and female children similarly (Lytton & Romney, 1991).
Treating boys and girls, and men and women, differently is both a consequence of gender
Gender 103
differences and a cause of gender differences. Differential treatment on the basis of gender
is also referred to gender discrimination and is an inevitable consequence of gender
stereotypes. When it is based on unwanted treatment related to sexual behaviors or
appearance, it is called sexual harassment. By the time boys and girls reach the end of high
school, most have experienced some form of sexual harassment, most commonly in the form
of unwanted touching or comments, being the target of jokes, having their body parts rated,
or being called names related to sexual orientation.
Different treatment by gender begins with parents. A meta-analysis of research from the
United States and Canada found that parents most frequently treated sons and daughters
differently by encouraging gender-stereotypical activities (Lytton & Romney, 1991). Fathers,
more than mothers, are particularly likely to encourage gender-stereotypical play, especially
in sons. Parents also talk to their children differently based on stereotypes. For example,
parents talk about numbers and counting twice as often with sons than daughters (Chang,
Sandhofer, & Brown, 2011) and talk to sons in more detail about science than with daughters.
Parents are also much more likely to discuss emotions with their daughters than their sons.
In recent years, gender and related concepts have become a common focus of social change
and social debate. Many societies, including American society, have seen a rapid change in
perceptions of gender roles, media portrayals of gender, and legal trends relating to gender.
For example, there has been an increase in children’s toys attempting to cater to both genders
(such as Legos marketed to girls), rather than catering to traditional stereotypes. Nationwide,
the drastic surge in acceptance of homosexuality and gender questioning has resulted in a
Gender 104
rapid push for legal change to keep up with social change. Laws such as “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell”
and the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), both of which were enacted in the 1990s, have met
severe resistance on the grounds of being discriminatory toward sexual minority groups and
have been accused of unconstitutionality less than 20 years after their implementation.
Change in perceptions of gender is also evident in social issues such as sexual harassment,
a term that only entered the mainstream mindset in the 1991 Clarence Thomas/Anita Hill
scandal. As society’s gender roles and gender restrictions continue to fluctuate, the legal
system and the structure of American society will continue to change and adjust.
1964 -- Congress passes Civil Rights Act, which outlaws sex discrimination
1969 -- Stonewall riots in NYC, forcing gay rights into the American spotlight
1972 --Congress passes Equal Rights Amendment; TitleIX prohibits sex discrimination is schools
and sports
1987 -- Average woman earned $0.68 for every $1.00 earned by a man
1993 -- Supreme Court rules that sexual harassment in the workplace is illegal
2011 -- Don't Ask Don't Tell is repealed, allowing people who identify as gay serve openly in the
US military
Gender 105
2012 -- President Barack Obama becomes the first American president to openly support
LGBT rights and marriage equality
Gender 106
Outside Resources
Discussion Questions
1. What are the differences and associations among gender, sex, gender identity, and sexual
orientation?
2. Are the gender differences that exist innate (biological) differences or are they caused by
other variables?
3. Discuss the theories relating to the development of gender roles and gender stereotypes.
Which theory do you support? Why?
4. Using what you’ve read in this module: a. Why do you think gender stereotypes are so
inflated compared with actual gender differences? b. Why do you think people continue
to believe in such strong gender differences despite evidence to the contrary?
5. Brainstorm additional forms of gender discrimination aside from sexual harassment. Have
you seen or experienced gender discrimination personally?
Vocabulary
Agender
An individual who may have no gender or may describe themselves as having a neutral gender.
Ambivalent sexism
A concept of gender attitudes that encompasses both positive and negative qualities.
Benevolent sexism
The “positive” element of ambivalent sexism, which recognizes that women are perceived as
needing to be protected, supported, and adored by men.
Bigender
An individual who identifies as two genders.
Binary
The idea that gender has two separate and distinct categories (male and female) and that a
person must be either one or the other.
Cisgender
A term used to describe individuals whose gender matches their biological sex.
Gender
The cultural, social, and psychological meanings that are associated with masculinity and
femininity.
Gender constancy
The awareness that gender is constant and does not change simply by changing external
attributes; develops between 3 and 6 years of age.
Gender discrimination
Differential treatment on the basis of gender.
Gender 108
Gender identity
A person’s psychological sense of being male or female.
Gender roles
The behaviors, attitudes, and personality traits that are designated as either masculine or
feminine in a given culture.
Gender stereotypes
The beliefs and expectations people hold about the typical characteristics, preferences, and
behaviors of men and women.
Genderfluid
An individual who may identify as male, female, both, or neither at different times and in
different circumstances.
Hostile sexism
The negative element of ambivalent sexism, which includes the attitudes that women are
inferior and incompetent relative to men.
Schemas
The gender categories into which, according to gender schema theory, children actively
organize others’ behavior, activities, and attributes.
Sex
Biological category of male or female as defined by physical differences in genetic composition
and in reproductive anatomy and function.
Sexual harassment
A form of gender discrimination based on unwanted treatment related to sexual behaviors
or appearance.
Gender 109
Sexual orientation
Refers to the direction of emotional and erotic attraction toward members of the opposite
sex, the same sex, or both sexes.
Transgender
A term used to describe individuals whose gender does not match their biological sex.
Gender 110
References
Barnett, B. S., Nesbit, A. E., & Sorrentino, R. M. (2018). The transgender bathroom debate at
the intersection of politics, law, ethics, and science. The Journal of the American Academy of
Psychiatry and the Law, 46(2), 232-241.
Bigler, R. S., & Liben, L. S. (2007). Developmental intergroup theory: Explaining and reducing
children\'s social stereotyping and prejudice. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 16
(3), 162–166. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-8721.2007.00496.x
Chang, A. Sandhofer, C., & Brown, C. S. (2011). Gender biases in early number exposure to
preschool-aged children. Journal of Language and Social Psychology. doi: 10.1177/0261927X11416207
Else-Quest, N. M., Hyde, J. S., Goldsmith, H. H., & Van Hulle, C. A. (2006). Gender differences
in temperament: A meta-analysis. Psychological Bulletin, 132(1), 33–72. doi:
10.1037/0033-2909.132.1.33
Flores, A.R., Herman, J.L., Gates, G.J., & Brown, T.N.T. (2016). How Many Adults Identify as
Transgender in the United States? Los Angeles, CA: The Williams Institute.
Glick, P., & Fiske, S. T. (2001). An ambivalent alliance: Hostile and benevolent sexism as
complementary justifications for gender inequality. American Psychologist, 56(2), 109–118.
doi: 10.1037/0003-066X.56.2.109
Hyde, J. S. (2005). The gender similarities hypothesis. American Psychologist, 60(6), 581–592.
doi: 10.1037/0003-066X.60.6.581
Leaper, C., & Smith, T. E. (2004). A meta-analytic review of gender variations in children’s
language use: Talkativeness, affiliative speech, and assertive speech. Developmental
Psychology, 40(6), 993–1027. doi: 10.1037/0012-1649.40.6.993
Lytton, H., & Romney, D. M. (1991). Parents’ differential socialization of boys and girls: A meta-
analysis. Psychological Bulletin, 109(2), 267–296. doi: 10.1037/0033-2909.109.2.267
Maccoby, E. E. (1998). The two sexes: Growing up apart, coming together. Cambridge, MA: Belknap
Press/Harvard University Press.
Martin, C. L., Ruble, D. N., & Szkrybalo, J. (2002). Cognitive theories of early gender
development. Psychological Bulletin, 128(6), 903–933. doi: 10.1037/0033-2909.128.6.903
Tzuriel, D., & Egozi, G. (2010). Gender differences in spatial ability of young children: The effects
of training and processing strategies. Child Development, 81(5), 1417–1430. doi: 10.1111/
Gender 111
j.1467-8624.2010.01482.x
Wood, W., & Eagly, A. H. (2002). A cross-cultural analysis of the behavior of women and men:
Implications for the origins of sex differences. Psychological Bulletin, 128(5), 699–727. doi:
10.1037/0033-2909.128.5.699
Developmental Psychology
8
Cognitive Development in Childhood
Robert Siegler
This module examines what cognitive development is, major theories about how it occurs,
the roles of nature and nurture, whether it is continuous or discontinuous, and how research
in the area is being used to improve education.
Learning Objectives
• Be able to describe major theories of cognitive development and what distinguishes them.
• Understand how nature and nurture work together to produce cognitive development.
• Know some ways in which research on cognitive development is being used to improve
education.
Introduction
By the time you reach adulthood you have learned a few things about how the world works.
You know, for instance, that you can’t walk through walls or leap into the tops of trees. You
know that although you cannot see your car keys they’ve got to be around here someplace.
What’s more, you know that if you want to communicate complex ideas like ordering a triple-
shot soy vanilla latte with chocolate sprinkles it’s better to use words with meanings attached
to them rather than simply gesturing and grunting. People accumulate all this useful
Cognitive Development in Childhood 114
are not usually associated with cognitive many important ways. [Image: One Laptop per Child, https://
As the name suggests, cognitive development is about change. Children’s thinking changes
in dramatic and surprising ways. Consider DeVries’s (1969) study of whether young children
understand the difference between appearance and reality. To find out, she brought an
unusually even-tempered cat named Maynard to a psychology laboratory and allowed the 3-
to 6-year-old participants in the study to pet and play with him. DeVries then put a mask of a
fierce dog on Maynard’s head, and asked the children what Maynard was. Despite all of the
children having identified Maynard previously as a cat, now most 3-year-olds said that he was
a dog and claimed that he had a dog’s bones and a dog’s stomach. In contrast, the 6-year-olds
weren’t fooled; they had no doubt that Maynard remained a cat. Understanding how children’s
thinking changes so dramatically in just a few years is one of the fascinating challenges in
studying cognitive development.
There are several main types of theories of child development. Stage theories, such as Piaget’s
stage theory, focus on whether children progress through qualitatively different stages of
Cognitive Development in Childhood 115
development. Sociocultural theories, such as that of Lev Vygotsky, emphasize how other
people and the attitudes, values, and beliefs of the surrounding culture, influence children’s
development. Information processing theories, such as that of David Klahr, examine the
mental processes that produce thinking at any one time and the transition processes that
lead to growth in that thinking.
At the heart of all of these theories, and indeed of all research on cognitive development, are
two main questions: (1) How do nature and nurture interact to produce cognitive
development? (2) Does cognitive development progress through qualitatively distinct stages?
In the remainder of this module, we examine the answers that are emerging regarding these
questions, as well as ways in which cognitive developmental research is being used to improve
education.
The most basic question about child development is how nature and nurture together shape
development. Nature refers to our biological endowment, the genes we receive from our
parents. Nurture refers to the environments, social as well as physical, that influence our
development, everything from the womb in which we develop before birth to the homes in
which we grow up, the schools we attend, and the many people with whom we interact.
The nature-nurture issue is often presented as an either-or question: Is our intelligence (for
example) due to our genes or to the environments in which we live? In fact, however, every
aspect of development is produced by the interaction of genes and environment. At the most
basic level, without genes, there would be no child, and without an environment to provide
nurture, there also would be no child.
The way in which nature and nurture work together can be seen in findings on visual
development. Many people view vision as something that people either are born with or that
is purely a matter of biological maturation, but it also depends on the right kind of experience
at the right time. For example, development of depth perception, the ability to actively
perceive the distance from oneself to objects in the environment, depends on seeing
patterned light and having normal brain activity in response to the patterned light, in infancy
(Held, 1993). If no patterned light is received, for example when a baby has severe cataracts
or blindness that is not surgically corrected until later in development, depth perception
remains abnormal even after the surgery.
Adding to the complexity of the nature-nurture interaction, children’s genes lead to their
Cognitive Development in Childhood 116
Some aspects of the development of living organisms, such as the growth of the width of a
pine tree, involve quantitative changes, with the tree getting a little wider each year. Other
changes, such as the life cycle of a ladybug, involve qualitative changes, with the creature
Cognitive Development in Childhood 117
becoming a totally different type of entity after a transition than before (Figure 1). The existence
of both gradual, quantitative changes and relatively sudden, qualitative changes in the world
has led researchers who study cognitive development to ask whether changes in children’s
thinking are gradual and continuous or sudden and discontinuous.
gradual change.
The great Swiss psychologist Jean Piaget proposed that children’s thinking progresses through
a series of four discrete stages. By “stages,” he meant periods during which children reasoned
similarly about many superficially different problems, with the stages occurring in a fixed
order and the thinking within different stages differing in fundamental ways. The four stages
that Piaget hypothesized were the sensorimotor stage (birth to 2 years), the preoperational
reasoning stage (2 to 6 or 7 years), the concrete operational reasoning stage (6 or 7 to 11
or 12 years), and the formal operational reasoning stage (11 or 12 years and throughout the
rest of life).
During the sensorimotor stage, children’s thinking is largely realized through their perceptions
of the world and their physical interactions with it. Their mental representations are very
limited. Consider Piaget’s object permanence task, which is one of his most famous problems.
If an infant younger than 9 months of age is playing with a favorite toy, and another person
removes the toy from view, for example by putting it under an opaque cover and not letting
the infant immediately reach for it, the infant is very likely to make no effort to retrieve it and
to show no emotional distress (Piaget, 1954). This is not due to their being uninterested in
the toy or unable to reach for it; if the same toy is put under a clear cover, infants below 9
Cognitive Development in Childhood 118
months readily retrieve it (Munakata, McClelland, Johnson, & Siegler, 1997). Instead, Piaget
claimed that infants less than 9 months do not understand that objects continue to exist even
when out of sight.
During the preoperational stage, according to Piaget, children can solve not only this simple
problem (which they actually can solve after 9 months) but show a wide variety of other
symbolic-representation capabilities, such as those involved in drawing and using language.
However, such 2- to 7-year-olds tend to focus on a single dimension, even when solving
problems would require them to consider multiple dimensions. This is evident in Piaget’s
(1952) conservation problems. For example, if a glass of water is poured into a taller, thinner
glass, children below age 7 generally say that there now is more water than before. Similarly,
if a clay ball is reshaped into a long, thin sausage, they claim that there is now more clay, and
if a row of coins is spread out, they claim that there are now more coins. In all cases, the
children are focusing on one dimension, while ignoring the changes in other dimensions (for
example, the greater width of the glass and the clay ball).
Children overcome this tendency to focus on a single dimension during the concrete
operations stage, and think logically in most situations. However, according to Piaget, they
still cannot think in systematic scientific ways, even when such thinking would be useful. Thus,
if asked to find out which variables influence the period that a pendulum takes to complete
its arc, and given weights that they can attach to strings in order to do experiments with the
pendulum to find out, most children younger than age 12, perform biased experiments from
which no conclusion can be drawn, and then conclude that whatever they originally believed
is correct. For example, if a boy believed that weight was the only variable that mattered, he
might put the heaviest weight on the shortest string and push it the hardest, and then conclude
that just as he thought, weight is the only variable that matters (Inhelder & Piaget, 1958).
Finally, in the formal operations period, children attain the reasoning power of mature adults,
which allows them to solve the pendulum problem and a wide range of other problems.
However, this formal operations stage tends not to occur without exposure to formal
education in scientific reasoning, and appears to be largely or completely absent from some
societies that do not provide this type of education.
Although Piaget’s theory has been very influential, it has not gone unchallenged. Many more
recent researchers have obtained findings indicating that cognitive development is
considerably more continuous than Piaget claimed. For example, Diamond (1985) found that
on the object permanence task described above, infants show earlier knowledge if the waiting
period is shorter. At age 6 months, they retrieve the hidden object if the wait is no longer than
2 seconds; at 7 months, they retrieve it if the wait is no longer than 4 seconds; and so on. Even
earlier, at 3 or 4 months, infants show surprise in the form of longer looking times if objects
suddenly appear to vanish with no obvious cause (Baillargeon, 1987). Similarly, children’s
specific experiences can greatly influence when developmental changes occur. Children of
pottery makers in Mexican villages, for example, know that reshaping clay does not change
the amount of clay at much younger ages than children who do not have similar experiences
(Price-Williams, Gordon, & Ramirez, 1969).
Applications to Education
Understanding how children think and learn has proven useful for improving education. One
example comes from the area of reading. Cognitive developmental research has shown that
phonemic awareness—that is, awareness of the component sounds within words—is a
crucial skill in learning to read. To measure awareness of the component sounds within words,
researchers ask children to decide whether two words rhyme, to decide whether the words
start with the same sound, to identify the component sounds within words, and to indicate
what would be left if a given sound were removed from a word. Kindergartners’ performance
on these tasks is the strongest predictor of reading achievement in third and fourth grade,
even stronger than IQ or social class background (Nation, 2008). Moreover, teaching these
skills to randomly chosen 4- and 5-year-olds results in their being better readers years later
(National Reading Panel, 2000).
Playing this numerical board game for roughly 1 hour, distributed over a 2-week period,
improved low-income children’s knowledge of numerical magnitudes, ability to read printed
numbers, and skill at learning novel arithmetic problems. The gains lasted for months after
the game-playing experience (Ramani & Siegler, 2008; Siegler & Ramani, 2009). An advantage
of this type of educational intervention is that it has minimal if any cost—a parent could just
draw a game on a piece of paper.
a part of the brain called the prefrontal cortex, which is located at the front of the brain and
is particularly involved with planning and flexible problem solving, continues to develop
throughout adolescence (Blakemore & Choudhury, 2006). Such new research domains, as
well as enduring issues such as nature and nurture, continuity and discontinuity, and how to
apply cognitive development research to education, insure that cognitive development will
continue to be an exciting area of research in the coming years.
Conclusion
Research into cognitive development has shown us that minds don’t just form according to a
uniform blueprint or innate intellect, but through a combination of influencing factors. For
instance, if we want our kids to have a strong grasp of language we could concentrate on
phonemic awareness early on. If we want them to be good at math and science we could
engage them in numerical games and activities early on. Perhaps most importantly, we no
longer think of brains as empty vessels waiting to be filled up with knowledge but as adaptable
organs that develop all the way through early adulthood.
Cognitive Development in Childhood 123
Outside Resources
Book: Frye, D., Baroody, A., Burchinal, M., Carver, S. M., Jordan, N. C., & McDowell, J. (2013).
Teaching math to young children: A practice guide. Washington, DC: National Center for
Education Evaluation and Regional Assistance (NCEE), Institute of Education Sciences, U.S.
Department of Education.
Book: Kuhn, D., & Siegler, R. S. (Vol. Eds.). (2006). Volume 2: Cognition, perception, and
language. In W. Damon & R. M. Lerner (Series Eds.), Handbook of child psychology (6th ed.).
Hoboken, NJ: Wiley.
Book: Miller, P. H. (2011). Theories of developmental psychology (5th ed.). New York: Worth.
Book: Siegler, R. S., & Alibali, M. W. (2004). Children's thinking (4th ed.). Upper Saddle River,
NJ: Prentice-Hall.
Discussion Questions
1. Why are there different theories of cognitive development? Why don’t researchers agree
on which theory is the right one?
4. Can you think of ways other than those described in the module in which research on
cognitive development could be used to improve education?
Cognitive Development in Childhood 124
Vocabulary
Conservation problems
Problems pioneered by Piaget in which physical transformation of an object or set of objects
changes a perceptually salient dimension but not the quantity that is being asked about.
Continuous development
Ways in which development occurs in a gradual incremental manner, rather than through
sudden jumps.
Depth perception
The ability to actively perceive the distance from oneself of objects in the environment.
Discontinuous development
Discontinuous development
Nature
The genes that children bring with them to life and that influence all aspects of their
development.
Numerical magnitudes
The sizes of numbers.
Cognitive Development in Childhood 125
Nurture
The environments, starting with the womb, that influence all aspects of children’s
development.
Phonemic awareness
Awareness of the component sounds within words.
Piaget’s theory
Theory that development occurs through a sequence of discontinuous stages: the
sensorimotor, preoperational, concrete operational, and formal operational stages.
Qualitative changes
Large, fundamental change, as when a caterpillar changes into a butterfly; stage theories such
as Piaget’s posit that each stage reflects qualitative change relative to previous stages.
Quantitative changes
Gradual, incremental change, as in the growth of a pine tree’s girth.
Sensorimotor stage
Period within Piagetian theory from birth to age 2 years, during which children come to
represent the enduring reality of objects.
Sociocultural theories
Theory founded in large part by Lev Vygotsky that emphasizes how other people and the
attitudes, values, and beliefs of the surrounding culture influence children’s development.
Cognitive Development in Childhood 126
References
Baker, L., Dreher, M. J., & Guthrie, J. T., (Eds.). (2000). Engaging young readers: Promoting
achievement and motivation. New York: Guilford.
Bartrip, J., Morton, J., & De Schonen, S. (2001). Responses to mother's face in 3-week to 5-
month old infants. British Journal of Developmental Psychology, 19, 219–232
Blakemore, S.-J., & Choudhury, S. (2006). Development of the adolescent brain: Implications
for executive function and social cognition. Journal of Child Psychiatry and Psychology, 47,
296–312.
Booth, J. L., & Siegler, R. S. (2006). Developmental and individual differences in pure numerical
estimation. Developmental Psychology, 41, 189–201.
DeVries, R. (1969). Constancy of genetic identity in the years three to six. Monographs of the
Society for Research in Child Development, 34, 127.
Diamond, A. (1985). Development of the ability to use recall to guide action, as indicated by
infants' performance on AB. Child Development, 56, 868–883.
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9
Social and Personality Development in
Childhood
Ross Thompson
Childhood social and personality development emerges through the interaction of social
influences, biological maturation, and the child’s representations of the social world and the
self. This interaction is illustrated in a discussion of the influence of significant relationships,
the development of social understanding, the growth of personality, and the development of
social and emotional competence in childhood.
Learning Objectives
• Provide specific examples of how the interaction of social experience, biological maturation,
and the child’s representations of experience and the self provide the basis for growth in
social and personality development.
• Explain what is “social and emotional competence“ and provide some examples of how it
develops in childhood.
Introduction
Social and Personality Development in Childhood 129
“How have I become the kind of person I am today?” Every adult ponders this question from
time to time. The answers that readily come to mind include the influences of parents, peers,
temperament, a moral compass, a strong sense of self, and sometimes critical life experiences
such as parental divorce. Social and personality development encompasses these and many
other influences on the growth of the person. In addition, it addresses questions that are at
the heart of understanding how we develop as unique people. How much are we products of
nature or nurture? How enduring are the influences of early experiences? The study of social
and personality development offers perspective on these and other issues, often by showing
how complex and multifaceted are the influences on developing children, and thus the
intricate processes that have made you the person you are today (Thompson, 2006a).
Relationships
This interaction can be observed in the development of the earliest relationships between
infants and their parents in the first year. Virtually all infants living in normal circumstances
develop strong emotional attachments to those who care for them. Psychologists believe that
the development of these attachments is as biologically natural as learning to walk and not
simply a byproduct of the parents’ provision of food or warmth. Rather, attachments have
evolved in humans because they promote children’s motivation to stay close to those who
care for them and, as a consequence, to benefit from the learning, security, guidance, warmth,
Social and Personality Development in Childhood 130
Infants can be securely or insecurely attached with mothers, fathers, and other regular
caregivers, and they can differ in their security with different people. The security of
attachment is an important cornerstone of social and personality development, because
infants and young children who are securely attached have been found to develop stronger
friendships with peers, more advanced emotional understanding and early conscience
Social and Personality Development in Childhood 131
development, and more positive self-concepts, compared with insecurely attached children
(Thompson, 2008). This is consistent with attachment theory’s premise that experiences of
care, resulting in secure or insecure attachments, shape young children’s developing concepts
of the self, as well as what people are like, and how to interact with them.
Parental roles in relation to their children change in other ways, too. Parents increasingly
become mediators (or gatekeepers) of their children’s involvement with peers and activities
outside the family. Their communication and practice of values contributes to children’s
academic achievement, moral development, and activity preferences. As children reach
adolescence, the parent-child relationship increasingly becomes one of “coregulation,” in
which both the parent(s) and the child recognizes the child’s growing competence and
autonomy, and together they rebalance authority relations. We often see evidence of this as
parents start accommodating their teenage kids’ sense of independence by allowing them to
Social and Personality Development in Childhood 132
Family relationships are significantly affected by conditions outside the home. For instance,
the Family Stress Model describes how financial difficulties are associated with parents’
depressed moods, which in turn lead to marital problems and poor parenting that contributes
to poorer child adjustment (Conger, Conger, & Martin, 2010). Within the home, parental marital
difficulty or divorce affects more than half the children growing up today in the United States.
Divorce is typically associated with economic stresses for children and parents, the
renegotiation of parent-child relationships (with one parent typically as primary custodian
and the other assuming a visiting relationship), and many other significant adjustments for
children. Divorce is often regarded by children as a sad turning point in their lives, although
for most it is not associated with long-term problems of adjustment (Emery, 1999).
Peer Relationships
by their parents.
However, peer relationships can be challenging as well as supportive (Rubin, Coplan, Chen,
Bowker, & McDonald, 2011). Being accepted by other children is an important source of
affirmation and self-esteem, but peer rejection can foreshadow later behavior problems
(especially when children are rejected due to aggressive behavior). With increasing age,
children confront the challenges of bullying, peer victimization, and managing conformity
pressures. Social comparison with peers is an important means by which children evaluate
their skills, knowledge, and personal qualities, but it may cause them to feel that they do not
measure up well against others. For example, a boy who is not athletic may feel unworthy of
his football-playing peers and revert to shy behavior, isolating himself and avoiding
conversation. Conversely, an athlete who doesn’t “get” Shakespeare may feel embarrassed
and avoid reading altogether. Also, with the approach of adolescence, peer relationships
become focused on psychological intimacy, involving personal disclosure, vulnerability, and
loyalty (or its betrayal)—which significantly affects a child’s outlook on the world. Each of these
aspects of peer relationships requires developing very different social and emotional skills
than those that emerge in parent-child relationships. They also illustrate the many ways that
peer relationships influence the growth of personality and self-concept.
Social Understanding
As we have seen, children’s experience of relationships at home and the peer group
contributes to an expanding repertoire of social and emotional skills and also to broadened
social understanding. In these relationships, children develop expectations for specific people
(leading, for example, to secure or insecure attachments to parents), understanding of how
to interact with adults and peers, and developing self-concept based on how others respond
to them. These relationships are also significant forums for emotional development.
Remarkably, young children begin developing social understanding very early in life. Before
the end of the first year, infants are aware that other people have perceptions, feelings, and
other mental states that affect their behavior, and which are different from the child’s own
mental states. This can be readily observed in a process called social referencing, in which
an infant looks to the mother’s face when confronted with an unfamiliar person or situation
(Feinman, 1992). If the mother looks calm and reassuring, the infant responds positively as if
the situation is safe. If the mother looks fearful or distressed, the infant is likely to respond
with wariness or distress because the mother’s expression signals danger. In a remarkably
insightful manner, therefore, infants show an awareness that even though they are uncertain
about the unfamiliar situation, their mother is not, and that by “reading” the emotion in her
Social and Personality Development in Childhood 134
face, infants can learn about whether the circumstance is safe or dangerous, and how to
respond.
Although developmental scientists used to believe that infants are egocentric—that is, focused
on their own perceptions and experience—they now realize that the opposite is true. Infants
are aware at an early stage that people have different mental states, and this motivates them
to try to figure out what others are feeling, intending, wanting, and thinking, and how these
mental states affect their behavior. They are beginning, in other words, to develop a theory
of mind, and although their understanding of mental states begins very simply, it rapidly
expands (Wellman, 2011). For example, if an 18-month-old watches an adult try repeatedly
to drop a necklace into a cup but inexplicably fail each time, they will immediately put the
necklace into the cup themselves—thus completing what the adult intended, but failed, to
do. In doing so, they reveal their awareness of the intentions underlying the adult’s behavior
(Meltzoff, 1995). Carefully designed experimental studies show that by late in the preschool
years, young children understand that another’s beliefs can be mistaken rather than correct,
that memories can affect how you feel, and that one’s emotions can be hidden from others
(Wellman, 2011). Social understanding grows significantly as children’s theory of mind
develops.
How do these achievements in social understanding occur? One answer is that young children
are remarkably sensitive observers of other people, making connections between their
emotional expressions, words, and behavior to derive simple inferences about mental states
(e.g., concluding, for example, that what Mommy is looking at is in her mind) (Gopnik, Meltzoff,
& Kuhl, 2001). This is especially likely to occur in relationships with people whom the child
knows well, consistent with the ideas of attachment theory discussed above. Growing language
skills give young children words with which to represent these mental states (e.g., “mad,”
“wants”) and talk about them with others. Thus in conversation with their parents about
everyday experiences, children learn much about people’s mental states from how adults talk
about them (“Your sister was sad because she thought Daddy was coming home.”) (Thompson,
2006b). Developing social understanding is, in other words, based on children’s everyday
interactions with others and their careful interpretations of what they see and hear. There
are also some scientists who believe that infants are biologically prepared to perceive people
in a special way, as organisms with an internal mental life, and this facilitates their
interpretation of people’s behavior with reference to those mental states (Leslie, 1994).
Personality
Parents look into the faces of their newborn infants and wonder, “What kind of person will
Social and Personality Development in Childhood 135
Personality develops from temperament in other ways (Thompson, Winer, & Goodvin, 2010).
As children mature biologically, temperamental characteristics emerge and change over time.
A newborn is not capable of much self-control, but as brain-based capacities for self-control
advance, temperamental changes in self-regulation become more apparent. For example, a
newborn who cries frequently doesn’t necessarily have a grumpy personality; over time, with
sufficient parental support and increased sense of security, the child might be less likely to cry.
Indeed, personality development begins with the biological foundations of temperament but
becomes increasingly elaborated, extended, and refined over time. The newborn that parents
gazed upon thus becomes an adult with a personality of depth and nuance.
Social and personality development is built from the social, biological, and representational
influences discussed above. These influences result in important developmental outcomes
that matter to children, parents, and society: a young adult’s capacity to engage in socially
constructive actions (helping, caring, sharing with others), to curb hostile or aggressive
impulses, to live according to meaningful moral values, to develop a healthy identity and sense
of self, and to develop talents and achieve success in using them. These are some of the
developmental outcomes that denote social and emotional competence.
These achievements of social and personality development derive from the interaction of
many social, biological, and representational influences. Consider, for example, the
development of conscience, which is an early foundation for moral development. Conscience
consists of the cognitive, emotional, and social influences that cause young children to create
and act consistently with internal standards of conduct (Kochanska, 2002). Conscience
emerges from young children’s experiences with parents, particularly in the development of
a mutually responsive relationship that motivates young children to respond constructively
to the parents’ requests and expectations. Biologically based temperament is involved, as
some children are temperamentally more capable of motivated self-regulation (a quality called
effortful control) than are others, while some children are dispositionally more prone to the
fear and anxiety that parental disapproval can evoke. Conscience development grows through
a good fit between the child’s temperamental qualities and how parents communicate and
reinforce behavioral expectations. Moreover, as an illustration of the interaction of genes and
experience, one research group found that young children with a particular gene allele (the
5-HTTLPR) were low on measures of conscience development when they had previously
experienced unresponsive maternal care, but children with the same allele growing up with
responsive care showed strong later performance on conscience measures (Kochanska, Kim,
Barry, & Philibert, 2011).
Conscience development also expands as young children begin to represent moral values and
think of themselves as moral beings. By the end of the preschool years, for example, young
children develop a “moral self” by which they think of themselves as people who want to do
the right thing, who feel badly after misbehaving, and who feel uncomfortable when others
misbehave. In the development of conscience, young children become more socially and
Social and Personality Development in Childhood 137
emotionally competent in a manner that provides a foundation for later moral conduct
(Thompson, 2012).
Conclusion
As the preceding sentence suggests, social and personality development continues through
adolescence and the adult years, and it is influenced by the same constellation of social,
biological, and representational influences discussed for childhood. Changing social
relationships and roles, biological maturation and (much later) decline, and how the individual
represents experience and the self continue to form the bases for development throughout
life. In this respect, when an adult looks forward rather than retrospectively to ask, “what kind
of person am I becoming?”—a similarly fascinating, complex, multifaceted interaction of
developmental processes lies ahead.
Social and Personality Development in Childhood 138
Outside Resources
Discussion Questions
1. If parent–child relationships naturally change as the child matures, would you expect that
the security of attachment might also change over time? What reasons would account for
your expectation?
2. In what ways does a child’s developing theory of mind resemble how scientists create,
refine, and use theories in their work? In other words, would it be appropriate to think of
children as informal scientists in their development of social understanding?
4. What are the contributions that parents offer to the development of social and emotional
competence in children? Answer this question again with respect to peer contributions.
Social and Personality Development in Childhood 139
Vocabulary
Authoritative
A parenting style characterized by high (but reasonable) expectations for children’s behavior,
good communication, warmth and nurturance, and the use of reasoning (rather than coercion)
as preferred responses to children’s misbehavior.
Conscience
The cognitive, emotional, and social influences that cause young children to create and act
consistently with internal standards of conduct.
Effortful control
A temperament quality that enables children to be more successful in motivated self-
regulation.
Gender schemas
Organized beliefs and expectations about maleness and femaleness that guide children’s
thinking about gender.
Goodness of fit
The match or synchrony between a child’s temperament and characteristics of parental care
that contributes to positive or negative personality development. A good “fit” means that
parents have accommodated to the child’s temperamental attributes, and this contributes to
positive personality growth and better adjustment.
Security of attachment
An infant’s confidence in the sensitivity and responsiveness of a caregiver, especially when
he or she is needed. Infants can be securely attached or insecurely attached.
Social referencing
The process by which one individual consults another’s emotional expressions to determine
how to evaluate and respond to circumstances that are ambiguous or uncertain.
Social and Personality Development in Childhood 140
Temperament
Early emerging differences in reactivity and self-regulation, which constitutes a foundation
for personality development.
Theory of mind
Children’s growing understanding of the mental states that affect people’s behavior.
Social and Personality Development in Childhood 141
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Traditionally, research on aging described only the lives of people over age 65 and the very
old. Contemporary theories and research recognizes that biogenetic and psychological
processes of aging are complex and lifelong. Functioning in each period of life is influenced
by what happened earlier and, in turn, affects subsequent change. We all age in specific social
and historical contexts. Together, these multiple influences on aging make it difficult to define
when middle-age or old age begins. This module describes central concepts and research
about adult development and aging. We consider contemporary questions about cognitive
aging and changes in personality, self-related beliefs, social relationships, and subjective well-
being. These four aspects of psychosocial aging are related to health and longevity
Learning Objectives
• Describe cognitive, psychosocial, and physical changes that occur with age.
• Provide examples of how age-related changes in these domains are observed in the context
of everyday life.
Introduction
We are currently living in an aging society (Rowe, 2009). Indeed, by 2030 when the last of the
Baby Boomers reach age 65, the U.S. older population will be double that of 2010. Furthermore,
because of increases in average life expectancy, each new generation can expect to live longer
Aging 144
Just as young adults differ from one another, older adults are also not all the same. In each
decade of adulthood, we observe substantial heterogeneity in cognitive functioning,
personality, social relationships, lifestyle, beliefs, and satisfaction with life. This heterogeneity
reflects differences in rates of biogenetic and psychological aging and the sociocultural
contexts and history of people's lives (Bronfenbrenner, 1979; Fingerman, Berg, Smith, &
Antonucci, 2011). Theories of aging describe how these multiple factors interact and change
over time. They describe why functioning differs on average between young, middle-aged,
young-old, and very old adults and why there is heterogeneity within these age groups. Life
course theories, for example, highlight the effects of social expectations and the normative
timing of life events and social roles (e.g., becoming a parent, retirement). They also consider
the lifelong cumulative effects of membership in specific cohorts (generations) and
sociocultural subgroups (e.g., race, gender, socioeconomic status) and exposure to historical
events (e.g., war, revolution, natural disasters; Elder, Johnson, & Crosnoe, 2003; Settersten,
2005). Life span theories complement the life-course perspective with a greater focus on
processes within the individual (e.g., the aging brain). This approach emphasizes the
patterning of lifelong intra- and inter-individual differences in the shape (gain, maintenance,
Aging 145
loss), level, and rate of change (Baltes, 1987, 1997). Both life course and life span researchers
generally rely on longitudinal studies to examine hypotheses about different patterns of
aging associated with the effects of biogenetic, life history, social, and personal factors. Cross-
sectional studies provide information about age-group differences, but these are confounded
with cohort, time of study, and historical effects.
Cognitive Aging
Researchers have identified areas of both losses and gains in cognition in older age. Cognitive
ability and intelligence are often measured using standardized tests and validated measures.
The psychometric approach has identified two categories of intelligence that show different
rates of change across the life span (Schaie & Willis, 1996). Fluid intelligence refers to
information processing abilities, such as logical reasoning, remembering lists, spatial ability,
and reaction time. Crystallized intelligence encompasses abilities that draw upon experience
and knowledge. Measures of crystallized intelligence include vocabulary tests, solving number
problems, and understanding texts.
2006). The ability to process information drawing on personal experience and knowledge. And they tend
to outperform young adults when it comes to social and
quickly also decreases with age. This slowing
emotional challenges. [Image: Alex E. Proimos, https://goo.
of processing speed may explain age
gl/20SbW8, CC BY-NC 2.0, https://goo.gl/FIlc2e]
differences on many different cognitive
Aging 146
tasks (Salthouse, 2004). Some researchers have argued that inhibitory functioning, or the
ability to focus on certain information while suppressing attention to less pertinent
information, declines with age and may explain age differences in performance on cognitive
tasks (Hasher & Zacks, 1988). Finally, it is well established that our hearing and vision decline
as we age. Longitudinal research has proposed that deficits in sensory functioning explain
age differences in a variety of cognitive abilities (Baltes & Lindenberger, 1997).
Fewer age differences are observed when memory cues are available, such as for recognition
memory tasks, or when individuals can draw upon acquired knowledge or experience. For
example, older adults often perform as well if not better than young adults on tests of word
knowledge or vocabulary. With age often comes expertise, and research has pointed to areas
where aging experts perform as well or better than younger individuals. For example, older
typists were found to compensate for age-related declines in speed by looking farther ahead
at printed text (Salthouse, 1984). Compared to younger players, older chess experts are able
to focus on a smaller set of possible moves, leading to greater cognitive efficiency (Charness,
1981). Accrued knowledge of everyday tasks, such as grocery prices, can help older adults to
make better decisions than young adults (Tentori, Osheron, Hasher, & May, 2001).
How do changes or maintenance of cognitive ability affect older adults’ everyday lives?
Researchers have studied cognition in the context of several different everyday activities. One
example is driving. Although older adults often have more years of driving experience,
cognitive declines related to reaction time or attentional processes may pose limitations under
certain circumstances (Park & Gutchess, 2000). Research on interpersonal problem solving
suggested that older adults use more effective strategies than younger adults to navigate
through social and emotional problems (Blanchard-Fields, 2007). In the context of work,
researchers rarely find that older individuals perform poorer on the job (Park & Gutchess,
2000). Similar to everyday problem solving, older workers may develop more efficient
strategies and rely on expertise to compensate for cognitive decline.
In contrast to the relative stability of personality traits, theories about the aging self-propose
changes in self-related knowledge, beliefs, and autobiographical narratives. Responses to
questions such as “Tell me something about yourself. Who are you?” "What are your hopes
for the future?" provide insight into the characteristics and life themes that an individual
considers uniquely distinguish him or herself from others. These self-descriptions enhance
self-esteem and guide behavior (Markus & Nurius, 1986; McAdams, 2006). Theory suggests
that as we age, themes that were relatively unimportant in young and middle adulthood gain
in salience (e.g., generativity, health) and that people view themselves as improving over time
(Ross & Wilson, 2003). Reorganizing personal life narratives and self-descriptions are the major
tasks of midlife and young-old age due to transformations in professional and family roles
and obligations. In advanced old age, self-descriptions are often characterized by a life review
and reflections about having lived a long life. Birren and Schroots (2006), for example, found
the process of life review in late life helped individuals confront and cope with the challenges
of old age.
assesses an evaluative component of age identity. Whereas some aspects of age identity are
positively valued (e.g., acquiring seniority in a profession or becoming a grandparent), others
may be less valued, depending on societal context. Perceived physical age (i.e., the age one
looks in a mirror) is one aspect that requires considerable self-related adaptation in social
and cultural contexts that value young bodies. Feeling younger and being satisfied with one’s
own aging are expressions of positive self-perceptions of aging. They reflect the operation
of self-related processes that enhance well-being. Levy (2009) found that older individuals
who are able to adapt to and accept changes in their appearance and physical capacity in a
positive way report higher well-being, have better health, and live longer.
Social Relationships
Social ties to family, friends, mentors, and peers are primary resources of information, support,
and comfort. Individuals develop and age together with family and friends and interact with
others in the community. Across the life course, social ties are accumulated, lost, and
transformed. Already in early life, there are multiple sources of heterogeneity in the
characteristics of each person's social network of relationships (e.g., size, composition, and
quality). Life course and life span theories and research about age-related patterns in social
relationships focus on understanding changes in the processes underlying social connections.
Antonucci's Convoy Model of Social Relations (2001; Kahn & Antonucci, 1980), for example,
suggests that the social connections that people accumulate are held together by exchanges
in social support (e.g., tangible and emotional). The frequency, types, and reciprocity of the
exchanges change with age and in response to need, and in turn, these exchanges impact the
health and well-being of the givers and receivers in the convoy. In many relationships, it is not
the actual objective exchange of support that is critical but instead the perception that support
is available if needed (Uchino, 2009). Carstensen’s Socioemotional Selectivity Theory (1993;
Carstensen, Isaacowitz, & Charles, 1999) focuses on changes in motivation for actively seeking
social contact with others. She proposes that with increasing age our motivational goals
change from information gathering to emotion regulation. To optimize the experience of
positive affect, older adults actively restrict their social life to prioritize time spent with
emotionally close significant others. In line with this, older marriages are found to be
characterized by enhanced positive and reduced negative interactions and older partners
show more affectionate behavior during conflict discussions than do middle-aged partners
(Carstensen, Gottman, & Levenson, 1995). Research showing that older adults have smaller
networks compared to young adults and tend to avoid negative interactions also supports
this theory. Similar selective processes are also observed when time horizons for interactions
with close partners shrink temporarily for young adults (e.g., impending geographical
Aging 149
separations).
Much research focuses on the associations between specific effects of long-term social
relationships and health in later life. Older married individuals who receive positive social and
emotional support from their partner generally report better health than their unmarried
peers (Antonucci, 2001; Umberson, Williams, Powers, Liu, & Needham, 2006; Waite &
Gallagher, 2000). Despite the overall positive health effects of being married in old age
(compared with being widowed, divorced, or single), living as a couple can have a "dark side"
if the relationship is strained or if one partner is the primary caregiver. The consequences of
positive and negative aspects of relationships are complex (Birditt & Antonucci, 2008; Rook,
1998; Uchino, 2009). For example, in some circumstances, criticism from a partner may be
perceived as valid and useful feedback whereas in others it is considered unwarranted and
hurtful. In long-term relationships, habitual negative exchanges might have diminished
effects. Parent-child and sibling relationships are often the most long-term and emotion-laden
social ties. Across the life span, the parent-child tie, for example, is characterized by a paradox
of solidarity, conflict, and ambivalence (Fingerman, Chen, Hay, Cichy, & Lefkowitz, 2006).
As we get older, the likelihood of losing loved ones or experiencing declines in health increases.
Does the experience of such losses result in decreases in well-being in older adulthood?
Researchers have found that well-being differs across the life span and that the patterns of
these differences depend on how well-being is measured.
Measures of global subjective well-being assess individuals’ overall perceptions of their lives.
This can include questions about life satisfaction or judgments of whether individuals are
currently living the best life possible. What factors may contribute to how people respond to
these questions? Age, health, personality, social support, and life experiences have been
shown to influence judgments of global well-being. It is important to note that predictors of
well-being may change as we age. What is important to life satisfaction in young adulthood
can be different in later adulthood (George, 2010). Early research on well-being argued that
life events such as marriage or divorce can temporarily influence well-being, but people quickly
adapt and return to a neutral baseline (called the hedonic treadmill; Diener, Lucas, & Scollon,
2006). More recent research suggests otherwise. Using longitudinal data, researchers have
examined well-being prior to, during, and after major life events such as widowhood, marriage,
and unemployment (Lucas, 2007). Different life events influence well-being in different ways,
and individuals do not often adapt back to baseline levels of well-being. The influence of
events, such as unemployment, may have a lasting negative influence on well-being as people
Aging 150
age. Research suggests that global well-being is highest in early and later adulthood and
lowest in midlife (Stone, Schwartz, Broderick, & Deaton, 2010).
Hedonic well-being refers to the emotional component of well-being and includes measures
of positive (e.g., happiness, contentment) and negative affect (e.g., stress, sadness). The
pattern of positive affect across the adult life span is similar to that of global well-being, with
experiences of positive emotions such as happiness and enjoyment being highest in young
and older adulthood. Experiences of negative affect, particularly stress and anger, tend to
decrease with age. Experiences of sadness are lowest in early and later adulthood compared
to midlife (Stone et al., 2010). Other research finds that older adults report more positive and
less negative affect than middle age and younger adults (Magai, 2008; Mroczek, 2001). It should
be noted that both global well-being and positive affect tend to taper off during late older
adulthood and these declines may be accounted for by increases in health-related losses
during these years (Charles & Carstensen, 2010).
Vaupel, 2009). What environmental and behavioral factors contribute to a healthy long life?
Is it possible to intervene to slow processes of aging or to minimize cognitive decline, prevent
dementia, and ensure life quality at the end of life (Fratiglioni, Paillard-Borg, & Winblad, 2004;
Hertzog, Kramer, Wilson, & Lindenberger, 2009; Lang, Baltes, & Wagner, 2007)? Should
interventions focus on late life, midlife, or indeed begin in early life? Suggestions that
pathological change (e.g., dementia) is not an inevitable component of aging and that
pathology could at least be delayed until the very end of life led to theories about successful
aging and proposals about targets for intervention. Rowe and Kahn (1997) defined three
criteria of successful aging: (a) the relative avoidance of disease, disability, and risk factors
like high blood pressure, smoking, or obesity; (b) the maintenance of high physical and
cognitive functioning; and (c) active engagement in social and productive activities. Although
such definitions of successful aging are value-laden, research and behavioral interventions
have subsequently been guided by this model. For example, research has suggested that age-
related declines in cognitive functioning across the adult life span may be slowed through
physical exercise and lifestyle interventions (Kramer & Erickson, 2007). It is recognized,
however, that societal and environmental factors also play a role and that there is much room
for social change and technical innovation to accommodate the needs of the Baby Boomers
and later generations as they age in the next decades.
Aging 152
Outside Resources
Discussion Questions
1. How do age stereotypes and intergenerational social interactions shape quality of life in
older adults? What are the implications of the research of Levy and others?
2. Researchers suggest that there is both stability and change in Big Five personality traits
after age 30. What is stable? What changes?
3. Describe the Social Convoy Model of Antonucci. What are the implications of this model
for older adults?
4. Memory declines during adulthood. Is this statement correct? What does research show?
5. Is dementia inevitable in old age? What factors are currently thought to be protective?
6. What are the components of successful aging described by Rowe and Kahn (1998) and
others? What outcomes are used to evaluate successful aging?
Aging 153
Vocabulary
Age identity
How old or young people feel compared to their chronological age; after early adulthood,
most people feel younger than their chronological age.
Autobiographical narratives
A qualitative research method used to understand characteristics and life themes that an
individual considers to uniquely distinguish him- or herself from others.
Cohort
Group of people typically born in the same year or historical period, who share common
experiences over time; sometimes called a generation (e.g., Baby Boom Generation).
Cross-sectional studies
Research method that provides information about age group differences; age differences are
confounded with cohort differences and effects related to history and time of study.
Crystallized intelligence
Type of intellectual ability that relies on the application of knowledge, experience, and learned
information.
Fluid intelligence
Type of intelligence that relies on the ability to use information processing resources to reason
logically and solve novel problems.
Hedonic well-being
Component of well-being that refers to emotional experiences, often including measures of
positive (e.g., happiness, contentment) and negative affect (e.g., stress, sadness).
Heterogeneity
Inter-individual and subgroup differences in level and rate of change over time.
Inhibitory functioning
Ability to focus on a subset of information while suppressing attention to less relevant
information.
Longitudinal studies
Research method that collects information from individuals at multiple time points over time,
allowing researchers to track cohort differences in age-related change to determine
cumulative effects of different life experiences.
Processing speed
The time it takes individuals to perform cognitive operations (e.g., process information, react
to a signal, switch attention from one task to another, find a specific target object in a complex
picture).
Psychometric approach
Approach to studying intelligence that examines performance on tests of intellectual
functioning.
Recall
Aging 155
Type of memory task where individuals are asked to remember previously learned information
without the help of external cues.
Recognition
Type of memory task where individuals are asked to remember previously learned information
with the assistance of cues.
Self-perceptions of aging
An individual’s perceptions of their own aging process; positive perceptions of aging have
been shown to be associated with greater longevity and health.
Social network
Network of people with whom an individual is closely connected; social networks provide
emotional, informational, and material support and offer opportunities for social
engagement.
Subjective age
A multidimensional construct that indicates how old (or young) a person feels and into which
age group a person categorizes him- or herself
Successful aging
Includes three components: avoiding disease, maintaining high levels of cognitive and physical
functioning, and having an actively engaged lifestyle.
Working memory
Memory system that allows for information to be simultaneously stored and utilized or
manipulated.
Aging 156
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Sensation and Perception
11
Sensation and Perception
Adam John Privitera
The topics of sensation and perception are among the oldest and most important in all of
psychology. People are equipped with senses such as sight, hearing and taste that help us to
take in the world around us. Amazingly, our senses have the ability to convert real-world
information into electrical information that can be processed by the brain. The way we
interpret this information-- our perceptions-- is what leads to our experiences of the world.
In this module, you will learn about the biological processes of sensation and how these can
be combined to create perceptions.
Learning Objectives
• Outline the anatomy of the sense organs and their projections to the nervous system.
Introduction
"Once I was hiking at Cape Lookout State Park in Tillamook, Oregon. After passing through a vibrantly
colored, pleasantly scented, temperate rainforest, I arrived at a cliff overlooking the Pacific Ocean.
Sensation and Perception 162
I grabbed the cold metal railing near the edge and looked out at the sea. Below me, I could see a
pod of sea lions swimming in the deep blue water. All around me I could smell the salt from the
sea and the scent of wet, fallen leaves."
This description of a single memory highlights the way a person’s senses are so important to
our experience of the world around us.
Regardless of whether we are talking about sight or taste or any of the individual senses, there
are a number of basic principles that influence the way our sense organs work. The first of
these influences is our ability to detect an external stimulus. Each sense organ—our eyes or
tongue, for instance—requires a minimal amount of stimulation in order to detect a stimulus.
This absolute threshold explains why you don’t smell the perfume someone is wearing in a
classroom unless they are somewhat close to you.
The way we measure absolute thresholds is by using a method called signal detection. This
process involves presenting stimuli of varying intensities to a research participant in order to
Sensation and Perception 163
determine the level at which he or she can reliably detect stimulation in a given sense. During
one type of hearing test, for example, a person listens to increasingly louder tones (starting
from silence) in an effort to determine the threshold at which he or she begins to hear (see
Additional Resources for a video demonstration of a high-frequency ringtone that can only
be heard by young people). Correctly indicating that a sound was heard is called a hit; failing
to do so is called a miss. Additionally, indicating that a sound was heard when one wasn’t
played is called a false alarm, and correctly identifying when a sound wasn’t played is a correct
rejection.
Through these and other studies, we have been able to gain an understanding of just how
remarkable our senses are. For example, the human eye is capable of detecting candlelight
from 30 miles away in the dark. We are also capable of hearing the ticking of a watch in a quiet
environment from 20 feet away. If you think that’s amazing, I encourage you to read more
about the extreme sensory capabilities of nonhuman animals; many animals possess what
we would consider super-human abilities.
A similar principle to the absolute threshold discussed above underlies our ability to detect
the difference between two stimuli of different intensities. The differential threshold, or just
noticeable difference (JND), for each sense has been studied using similar methods to signal
detection. To illustrate, find a friend and a few objects of known weight (you’ll need objects
that weigh 1, 2, 10 and 11 lbs.—or in metric terms: 1, 2, 5 and 5.5 kg). Have your friend hold
the lightest object (1 lb. or 1 kg). Then, replace this object with the next heaviest and ask him
or her to tell you which one weighs more. Reliably, your friend will say the second object every
single time. It’s extremely easy to tell the difference when something weighs double what
another weighs! However, it is not so easy when the difference is a smaller percentage of the
overall weight. It will be much harder for your friend to reliably tell the difference between 10
and 11 lbs. (or 5 versus 5.5 kg) than it is for 1 and 2 lbs. This is phenomenon is called Weber’s
Law, and it is the idea that bigger stimuli require larger differences to be noticed.
Crossing into the world of perception, it is clear that our experience influences how our brain
processes things. You have tasted food that you like and food that you don’t like. There are
some bands you enjoy and others you can’t stand. However, during the time you first eat
something or hear a band, you process those stimuli using bottom-up processing. This is
when we build up to perception from the individual pieces. Sometimes, though, stimuli we’ve
experienced in our past will influence how we process new ones. This is called top-down
processing. The best way to illustrate these two concepts is with our ability to read. Read the
following quote out loud:
Notice anything odd while you were reading the text in the triangle? Did you notice the second
Sensation and Perception 164
“the”? If not, it’s likely because you were reading this from a top-down approach. Having a
second “the” doesn’t make sense. We know this. Our brain knows this and doesn’t expect there
to be a second one, so we have a tendency to skip right over it. In other words, your past
experience has changed the way you perceive the writing in the triangle! A beginning reader
—one who is using a bottom-up approach by carefully attending to each piece—would be
less likely to make this error.
Finally, it should be noted that when we experience a sensory stimulus that doesn’t change,
we stop paying attention to it. This is why we don’t feel the weight of our clothing, hear the
hum of a projector in a lecture hall, or see all the tiny scratches on the lenses of our glasses.
When a stimulus is constant and unchanging, we experience sensory adaptation. During this
process we become less sensitive to that stimulus. A great example of this occurs when we
leave the radio on in our car after we park it at home for the night. When we listen to the radio
on the way home from work the volume seems reasonable. However, the next morning when
we start the car, we might be startled by how loud the radio is. We don’t remember it being
that loud last night. What happened? What happened is that we adapted to the constant
stimulus of the radio volume over the course of the previous day. This required us to continue
to turn up the volume of the radio to combat the constantly decreasing sensitivity. However,
after a number of hours away from that constant stimulus, the volume that was once
reasonable is entirely too loud. We are no longer adapted to that stimulus!
Now that we have introduced some basic sensory principles, let us take on each one of our
fascinating senses individually.
Vision
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Vision is a tricky matter. When we see a pizza, a feather, or a hammer, we are actually seeing
light bounce off that object and into our eye. Light enters the eye through the pupil, a tiny
opening behind the cornea. The pupil regulates the amount of light entering the eye by
contracting (getting smaller) in bright light and dilating (getting larger) in dimmer light. Once
past the pupil, light passes through the lens, which focuses an image on a thin layer of cells
in the back of the eye, called the retina.
Because we have two eyes in different locations, the image focused on each retina is from a
slightly different angle (binocular disparity), providing us with our perception of 3D space
(binocular vision). You can appreciate this by holding a pen in your hand, extending your arm
in front of your face, and looking at the pen while closing each eye in turn. Pay attention to
the apparent position of the pen relative to objects in the background. Depending on which
eye is open, the pen appears to jump back and forth! This is how video game manufacturers
create the perception of 3D without special glasses; two slightly different images are presented
on top of one another.
BY 3.0, https://goo.gl/TSIsIq]
It is in the retina that light is transduced, or converted into electrical signals, by specialized
Sensation and Perception 166
cells called photoreceptors. The retina contains two main kinds of photoreceptors: rods and
cones. Rods are primarily responsible for our ability to see in dim light conditions, such as
during the night. Cones, on the other hand, provide us with the ability to see color and fine
detail when the light is brighter. Rods and cones differ in their distribution across the retina,
with the highest concentration of cones found in the fovea (the central region of focus), and
rods dominating the periphery (see Figure 2). The difference in distribution can explain why
looking directly at a dim star in the sky makes it seem to disappear; there aren’t enough rods
to process the dim light!
Next, the electrical signal is sent through a layer of cells in the retina, eventually traveling down
the optic nerve. After passing through the thalamus, this signal makes it to the primary visual
cortex, where information about light orientation and movement begin to come together
(Hubel & Wiesel, 1962). Information is then sent to a variety of different areas of the cortex
for more complex processing. Some of these cortical regions are fairly specialized—for
example, for processing faces (fusiform face area) and body parts (extrastriate body area).
Damage to these areas of the cortex can potentially result in a specific kind of agnosia, whereby
a person loses the ability to perceive visual stimuli. A great example of this is illustrated in the
writing of famous neurologist Dr. Oliver Sacks; he experienced prosopagnosia, the inability to
recognize faces. These specialized regions for visual recognition comprise the ventral
pathway (also called the “what” pathway). Other areas involved in processing location and
movement make up the dorsal pathway (also called the “where” pathway). Together, these
pathways process a large amount of information about visual stimuli (Goodale & Milner, 1992).
Phenomena we often refer to as optical illusions provide misleading information to these
“higher” areas of visual processing (see Additional Resources for websites containing amazing
optical illusions).
Humans have the ability to adapt to changes in light conditions. As mentioned before, rods
are primarily involved in our ability to see in dim light. They are the photoreceptors responsible
for allowing us to see in a dark room. You might notice that this night vision ability takes
around 10 minutes to turn on, a process called dark adaptation. This is because our rods
become bleached in normal light conditions and require time to recover. We experience the
opposite effect when we leave a dark movie theatre and head out into the afternoon sun.
During light adaptation, a large number of rods and cones are bleached at once, causing us
to be blinded for a few seconds. Light adaptation happens almost instantly compared with
dark adaptation. Interestingly, some people think pirates wore a patch over one eye in order
to keep it adapted to the dark while the other was adapted to the light. If you want to turn on
Sensation and Perception 167
a light without losing your night vision, don’t worry about wearing an eye patch, just use a red
light; this wavelength doesn’t bleach your rods.
Color vision
Hearing (Audition)
Some of the most well-known celebrities and top earners in the world are musicians. Our
worship of musicians may seem silly when you consider that all they are doing is vibrating
the air a certain way to create sound waves, the physical stimulus for audition.
People are capable of getting a large amount of information from the basic qualities of sound
waves. The amplitude (or intensity) of a sound wave codes for the loudness of a stimulus;
higher amplitude sound waves result in louder sounds. The pitch of a stimulus is coded in the
frequency of a sound wave; higher frequency sounds are higher pitched. We can also gauge
Sensation and Perception 168
the quality, or timbre, of a sound by the complexity of the sound wave. This allows us to tell
the difference between bright and dull sounds as well as natural and synthesized instruments
(Välimäki & Takala, 1996).
Figure 4. Diagram of the human ear. Notice the Cochlea labeled here: it is the location of the auditory
In order for us to sense sound waves from our environment they must reach our inner ear.
Lucky for us, we have evolved tools that allow those waves to be funneled and amplified
during this journey. Initially, sound waves are funneled by your pinna (the external part of
your ear that you can actually see) into your auditory canal (the hole you stick Q-tips into
despite the box advising against it). During their journey, sound waves eventually reach a thin,
stretched membrane called the tympanic membrane (eardrum), which vibrates against the
three smallest bones in the body—the malleus (hammer), the incus (anvil), and the stapes
(stirrup)—collectively called the ossicles. Both the tympanic membrane and the ossicles
amplify the sound waves before they enter the fluid-filled cochlea, a snail-shell-like bone
structure containing auditory hair cells arranged on the basilar membrane (see Figure 4)
according to the frequency they respond to (called tonotopic organization). Depending on
age, humans can normally detect sounds between 20 Hz and 20 kHz. It is inside the cochlea
that sound waves are converted into an electrical message.
Because we have an ear on each side of our head, we are capable of localizing sound in 3D
space pretty well (in the same way that having two eyes produces 3D vision). Have you ever
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dropped something on the floor without seeing where it went? Did you notice that you were
somewhat capable of locating this object based on the sound it made when it hit the ground?
We can reliably locate something based on which ear receives the sound first. What about
the height of a sound? If both ears receive a sound at the same time, how are we capable of
localizing sound vertically? Research in cats (Populin & Yin, 1998) and humans (Middlebrooks
& Green, 1991) has pointed to differences in the quality of sound waves depending on vertical
positioning.
After being processed by auditory hair cells, electrical signals are sent through the cochlear
nerve (a division of the vestibulocochlear nerve) to the thalamus, and then the primary
auditory cortex of the temporal lobe. Interestingly, the tonotopic organization of the cochlea
is maintained in this area of the cortex (Merzenich, Knight, & Roth, 1975; Romani, Williamson,
& Kaufman, 1982). However, the role of the primary auditory cortex in processing the wide
range of features of sound is still being explored (Walker, Bizley, & Schnupp, 2011).
The inner ear isn’t only involved in hearing; it’s also associated with our ability to balance and
detect where we are in space. The vestibular system is comprised of three semicircular canals
—fluid-filled bone structures containing cells that respond to changes in the head’s orientation
in space. Information from the vestibular system is sent through the vestibular nerve (the
other division of the vestibulocochlear nerve) to muscles involved in the movement of our
eyes, neck, and other parts of our body. This information allows us to maintain our gaze on
an object while we are in motion. Disturbances in the vestibular system can result in issues
with balance, including vertigo.
Touch
Who doesn’t love the softness of an old t-shirt or the smoothness of a clean shave? Who
actually enjoys having sand in their swimsuit? Our skin, the body’s largest organ, provides us
with all sorts of information, such as whether something is smooth or bumpy, hot or cold, or
even if it’s painful. Somatosensation—which includes our ability to sense touch, temperature
and pain—transduces physical stimuli, such as fuzzy velvet or scalding water, into electrical
potentials that can be processed by the brain.
Tactile sensation
Sensation and Perception 170
Tactile stimuli—those that are associated with texture—are transduced by special receptors
in the skin called mechanoreceptors. Just like photoreceptors in the eye and auditory hair
cells in the ear, these allow for the conversion of one kind of energy into a form the brain can
understand.
body.
After tactile stimuli are converted by mechanoreceptors, information is sent through the
thalamus to the primary somatosensory cortex for further processing. This region of the
cortex is organized in a somatotopic map where different regions are sized based on the
sensitivity of specific parts on the opposite side of the body (Penfield & Rasmussen, 1950).
Put simply, various areas of the skin, such as lips and fingertips, are more sensitive than others,
such as shoulders or ankles. This sensitivity can be represented with the distorted proportions
of the human body shown in Figure 5.
Pain
Sensation and Perception 171
Most people, if asked, would love to get rid of pain (nociception), because the sensation is
very unpleasant and doesn’t appear to have obvious value. But the perception of pain is our
body’s way of sending us a signal that something is wrong and needs our attention. Without
pain, how would we know when we are accidentally touching a hot stove, or that we should
rest a strained arm after a hard workout?
Phantom limbs
Records of people experiencing phantom limbs after amputations have been around for
centuries (Mitchell, 1871). As the name suggests, people with a phantom limb have the
sensations such as itching seemingly coming from their missing limb. A phantom limb can
also involve phantom limb pain, sometimes described as the muscles of the missing limb
uncomfortably clenching. While the mechanisms underlying these phenomena are not fully
understood, there is evidence to support that the damaged nerves from the amputation site
are still sending information to the brain (Weinstein, 1998) and that the brain is reacting to
this information (Ramachandran & Rogers-Ramachandran, 2000). There is an interesting
treatment for the alleviation of phantom limb pain that works by tricking the brain, using a
special mirror box to create a visual representation of the missing limb. The technique allows
the patient to manipulate this representation into a more comfortable position
(Ramachandran & Rogers-Ramachandran, 1996).
The two most underappreciated senses can be lumped into the broad category of chemical
senses. Both olfaction (smell) and gustation (taste) require the transduction of chemical
stimuli into electrical potentials. I say these senses are underappreciated because most people
would give up either one of these if they were forced to give up a sense. While this may not
shock a lot of readers, take into consideration how much money people spend on the perfume
industry annually ($29 billion US Dollars). Many of us pay a lot more for a favorite brand of
food because we prefer the taste. Clearly, we humans care about our chemical senses.
Olfaction (smell)
Unlike any of the other senses discussed so far, the receptors involved in our perception of
both smell and taste bind directly with the stimuli they transduce. Odorants in our
environment, very often mixtures of them, bind with olfactory receptors found in the olfactory
epithelium. The binding of odorants to receptors is thought to be similar to how a lock and
Sensation and Perception 172
key operates, with different odorants binding to different specialized receptors based on their
shape. However, the shape theory of olfaction isn’t universally accepted and alternative
theories exist, including one that argues that the vibrations of odorant molecules correspond
to their subjective smells (Turin, 1996). Regardless of how odorants bind with receptors, the
result is a pattern of neural activity. It is thought that our memories of these patterns of activity
underlie our subjective experience of smell (Shepherd, 2005). Interestingly, because olfactory
receptors send projections to the brain through the cribriform plate of the skull, head trauma
has the potential to cause anosmia, due to the severing of these connections. If you are in a
line of work where you constantly experience head trauma (e.g. professional boxer) and you
develop anosmia, don’t worry—your sense of smell will probably come back (Sumner, 1964).
Gustation (taste)
to think these tastes formed the basis for a peppers in the world, it’s 10 times hotter than a habanero,
and 400 times hotter than tabasco sauce. What do you think
map-like organization of the tongue; there
would happen to your taste receptor cells if you took a bite
was even a clever rationale for the concept,
out of this little guy? [Image: Richard Elzey, https://goo.gl/
about how the back of the tongue sensed suJHNg, CC BY 2.0, https://goo.gl/9uSnqN]
bitter so we would know to spit out poisons,
and the front of the tongue sensed sweet so we could identify high-energy foods. However,
we now know that all areas of the tongue with taste receptor cells are capable of responding
to every taste (Chandrashekar, Hoon, Ryba, & Zuker, 2006).
During the process of eating we are not limited to our sense of taste alone. While we are
Sensation and Perception 173
chewing, food odorants are forced back up to areas that contain olfactory receptors. This
combination of taste and smell gives us the perception of flavor. If you have doubts about
the interaction between these two senses, I encourage you to think back to consider how the
flavors of your favorite foods are impacted when you have a cold; everything is pretty bland
and boring, right?
Though we have spent the majority of this module covering the senses individually, our real-
world experience is most often multimodal, involving combinations of our senses into one
perceptual experience. This should be clear after reading the description of walking through
the forest at the beginning of the module; it was the combination of senses that allowed for
that experience. It shouldn’t shock you to find out that at some point information from each
of our senses becomes integrated. Information from one sense has the potential to influence
how we perceive information from another, a process called multimodal perception.
Interestingly, we actually respond more strongly to multimodal stimuli compared to the sum
of each single modality together, an effect called the superadditive effect of multisensory
integration. This can explain how you’re still able to understand what friends are saying to
you at a loud concert, as long as you are able to get visual cues from watching them speak. If
you were having a quiet conversation at a café, you likely wouldn’t need these additional cues.
In fact, the principle of inverse effectiveness states that you are less likely to benefit from
additional cues from other modalities if the initial unimodal stimulus is strong enough (Stein
& Meredith, 1993).
Because we are able to process multimodal sensory stimuli, and the results of those processes
are qualitatively different from those of unimodal stimuli, it’s a fair assumption that the brain
is doing something qualitatively different when they’re being processed. There has been a
growing body of evidence since the mid-90’s on the neural correlates of multimodal
perception. For example, neurons that respond to both visual and auditory stimuli have been
identified in the superior temporal sulcus (Calvert, Hansen, Iversen, & Brammer, 2001).
Additionally, multimodal “what” and “where” pathways have been proposed for auditory and
tactile stimuli (Renier et al., 2009). We aren’t limited to reading about these regions of the
brain and what they do; we can experience them with a few interesting examples (see
Additional Resources for the “McGurk Effect,” the “Double Flash Illusion,” and the “Rubber
Hand Illusion”).
Conclusion
Sensation and Perception 174
Our impressive sensory abilities allow us to experience the most enjoyable and most miserable
experiences, as well as everything in between. Our eyes, ears, nose, tongue and skin provide
an interface for the brain to interact with the world around us. While there is simplicity in
covering each sensory modality independently, we are organisms that have evolved the ability
to process multiple modalities as a unified experience.
Sensation and Perception 175
Outside Resources
Audio: Auditory Demonstrations from Richard Warren’s lab at the University of Wisconsin,
Milwaukee
http://www4.uwm.edu/APL/demonstrations.html
Book: Sacks, O. (1998). The man who mistook his wife for a hat: And other clinical tales.
Simon and Schuster.
http://www.oliversacks.com/books-by-oliver-sacks/man-mistook-wife-hat/
Video: Acquired knowledge and its impact on our three-dimensional interpretation of the
world - 3D Street Art
https://youtu.be/GwNeukAmxJw
Video: Acquired knowledge and its impact on our three-dimensional interpretation of the
world - Anamorphic Illusions
https://youtu.be/tBNHPk-Lnkk
Video: Cybersenses
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_8rPD6xLB4A
Web: A regularly updated website covering some of the amazing sensory capabilities of
non-human animals.
http://phenomena.nationalgeographic.com/category/animal-senses/
Sensation and Perception 176
Web: Amazing library with visual phenomena and optical illusions, explained
http://michaelbach.de/ot/index.html
Web: An article on the discoveries in echolocation: the use of sound in locating people and
things
http://www.psychologicalscience.org/index.php/publications/observer/2015/december-15/u
sing-sound-to-get-around.html
Web: Demonstration of illusory contrast and lateral inhibition. The Hermann grid
http://michaelbach.de/ot/lum_herGrid/
http://www.scholarpedia.org/article/What_and_where_pathways
Discussion Questions
1. What physical features would an organism need in order to be really good at localizing
sound in 3D space? Are there any organisms that currently excel in localizing sound? What
features allow them to do this?
2. What issues would exist with visual recognition of an object if a research participant had
his/her corpus callosum severed? What would you need to do in order to observe these
deficits?
3. There are a number of myths that exist about the sensory capabilities of infants. How would
you design a study to determine what the true sensory capabilities of infants are?
Sensation and Perception 178
Vocabulary
Absolute threshold
The smallest amount of stimulation needed for detection by a sense.
Agnosia
Loss of the ability to perceive stimuli.
Anosmia
Loss of the ability to smell.
Audition
Ability to process auditory stimuli. Also called hearing.
Auditory canal
Tube running from the outer ear to the middle ear.
Binocular disparity
Difference is images processed by the left and right eyes.
Binocular vision
Our ability to perceive 3D and depth because of the difference between the images on each
of our retinas.
Bottom-up processing
Building up to perceptual experience from individual pieces.
Chemical senses
Our ability to process the environmental stimuli of smell and taste.
Cochlea
Spiral bone structure in the inner ear containing auditory hair cells.
Cones
Photoreceptors of the retina sensitive to color. Located primarily in the fovea.
Sensation and Perception 180
Dark adaptation
Adjustment of eye to low levels of light.
Differential threshold
The smallest difference needed in order to differentiate two stimuli. (See Just Noticeable
Difference (JND))
Dorsal pathway
Pathway of visual processing. The “where” pathway.
Flavor
The combination of smell and taste.
Gustation
Ability to process gustatory stimuli. Also called taste.
Light adaptation
Adjustment of eye to high levels of light.
Mechanoreceptors
Mechanical sensory receptors in the skin that response to tactile stimulation.
Multimodal perception
The effects that concurrent stimulation in more than one sensory modality has on the
perception of events and objects in the world.
Nociception
Our ability to sense pain.
Odorants
Chemicals transduced by olfactory receptors.
Olfaction
Ability to process olfactory stimuli. Also called smell.
Sensation and Perception 181
Olfactory epithelium
Organ containing olfactory receptors.
Opponent-process theory
Theory proposing color vision as influenced by cells responsive to pairs of colors.
Ossicles
A collection of three small bones in the middle ear that vibrate against the tympanic
membrane.
Perception
The psychological process of interpreting sensory information.
Phantom limb
The perception that a missing limb still exists.
Pinna
Outermost portion of the ear.
Retina
Sensation and Perception 182
Rods
Photoreceptors of the retina sensitive to low levels of light. Located around the fovea.
Sensation
The physical processing of environmental stimuli by the sense organs.
Sensory adaptation
Decrease in sensitivity of a receptor to a stimulus after constant stimulation.
Signal detection
Method for studying the ability to correctly identify sensory stimuli.
Somatosensation
Ability to sense touch, pain and temperature.
Somatotopic map
Organization of the primary somatosensory cortex maintaining a representation of the
arrangement of the body.
Sound waves
Changes in air pressure. The physical stimulus for audition.
Tastants
Chemicals transduced by taste receptor cells.
Top-down processing
Experience influencing the perception of stimuli.
Sensation and Perception 183
Transduction
The conversion of one form of energy into another.
Trichromatic theory
Theory proposing color vision as influenced by three different cones responding preferentially
to red, green and blue.
Tympanic membrane
Thin, stretched membrane in the middle ear that vibrates in response to sound. Also called
the eardrum.
Ventral pathway
Pathway of visual processing. The “what” pathway.
Vestibular system
Parts of the inner ear involved in balance.
Weber’s law
States that just noticeable difference is proportional to the magnitude of the initial stimulus.
Sensation and Perception 184
References
Calvert, G. A., Hansen, P. C., Iversen, S. D., & Brammer, M. J. (2001). Detection of audio-visual
integration sites in humans by application of electrophysiological criteria to the BOLD effect.
Neuroimage, 14(2), 427-438.
Chandrashekar, J., Hoon, M. A., Ryba, N. J., & Zuker, C. S. (2006). The receptors and cells for
mammalian taste. Nature, 444(7117), 288-294.
Goodale, M. A., & Milner, A. D. (1992). Separate visual pathways for perception and action.
Trends in Neurosciences, 15(1), 20-25.
Hubel, D. H., & Wiesel, T. N. (1962). Receptive fields, binocular interaction and functional
architecture in the cat's visual cortex. The Journal of Physiology,160(1), 106.
Merzenich, M. M., Knight, P. L., & Roth, G. L. (1975). Representation of cochlea within primary
auditory cortex in the cat. Journal of Neurophysiology, 38(2), 231-249.
Middlebrooks, J. C., & Green, D. M. (1991). Sound localization by human listeners. Annual Review
of Psychology, 42(1), 135-159.
Mitchell, S. W. (1871). Phantom limbs. Lippincott's Magazine of Popular Literature and Science,
8, 563-569.
Penfield, W., & Rasmussen, T. (1950). The cerebral cortex of man; a clinical study of localization
of function. Oxford: England
Populin, L. C., & Yin, T. C. (1998). Behavioral studies of sound localization in the cat. The Journal
of Neuroscience, 18(6), 2147-2160.
Ramachandran, V. S., & Rogers-Ramachandran, D. (2000). Phantom limbs and neural plasticity.
Archives of Neurology, 57(3), 317-320.
Renier, L. A., Anurova, I., De Volder, A. G., Carlson, S., VanMeter, J., & Rauschecker, J. P. (2009).
Multisensory integration of sounds and vibrotactile stimuli in processing streams for “what”
and “where”. The Journal of Neuroscience, 29(35), 10950-10960.
Romani, G. L., Williamson, S. J., & Kaufman, L. (1982). Tonotopic organization of the human
auditory cortex. Science, 216(4552), 1339-1340.
Shepherd, G. M. (2005). Outline of a theory of olfactory processing and its relevance to humans.
Chemical Senses, 30(suppl 1), i3-i5.
Sensation and Perception 185
Stein, B. E., & Meredith, M. A. (1993). The merging of the senses. The MIT Press.
Stewart, J. E., Feinle-Bisset, C., Golding, M., Delahunty, C., Clifton, P. M., & Keast, R. S. (2010).
Oral sensitivity to fatty acids, food consumption and BMI in human subjects. British Journal
of Nutrition, 104(01), 145-152.
Svaetichin, G. (1955). Spectral response curves from single cones. Acta physiologica
Scandinavica. Supplementum, 39(134), 17-46.
Turin, L. (1996). A spectroscopic mechanism for primary olfactory reception. Chemical Senses,
21(6), 773-791.
Von Helmholtz, H. (1867). Handbuch der physiologischen Optik (Vol. 9). Voss.
Välimäki, V., & Takala, T. (1996). Virtual musical instruments—natural sound using physical
models. Organised Sound, 1(02), 75-86.
Walker, K. M., Bizley, J. K., King, A. J., & Schnupp, J. W. (2011). Multiplexed and robust
representations of sound features in auditory cortex. The Journal of Neuroscience, 31(41),
14565-14576.
Weinstein, S. M. (1998). Phantom limb pain and related disorders. Neurologic Clinics, 16(4),
919-935.
Young, T. (1802). The Bakerian lecture: On the theory of light and colours. Philosophical
transactions of the Royal Society of London, 12-48.
Consciousness
12
States of Consciousness
Robert Biswas-Diener & Jake Teeny
No matter what you’re doing--solving homework, playing a video game, simply picking out a
shirt--all of your actions and decisions relate to your consciousness. But as frequently as we
use it, have you ever stopped to ask yourself: What really is consciousness? In this module,
we discuss the different levels of consciousness and how they can affect your behavior in a
variety of situations. As well, we explore the role of consciousness in other, “altered” states
like hypnosis and sleep.
Learning Objectives
• Define consciousness and distinguish between high and low conscious states
• Understand the difference between popular portrayals of hypnosis and how it is currently
used therapeutically
Introduction
Have you ever had a fellow motorist stopped beside you at a red light, singing his brains out,
or picking his nose, or otherwise behaving in ways he might not normally do in public? There
is something about being alone in a car that encourages people to zone out and forget that
others can see them. Although these little lapses of attention are amusing for the rest of us,
they are also instructive when it comes to the topic of consciousness.
States of Consciousness 188
Upon reflection, it is easy to see how slippery a topic consciousness is. For example, are people
conscious when they are daydreaming? What about when they are drunk? In this module,
we will describe several levels of consciousness and then discuss altered states of
consciousness such as hypnosis and sleep.
Levels of Awareness
In 1957, a marketing researcher inserted the words “Eat Popcorn” onto one frame of a film
being shown all across the United States. And although that frame was only projected onto
the movie screen for 1/24th of a second—a speed too fast to be perceived by conscious
awareness—the researcher reported an increase in popcorn sales by nearly 60%. Almost
immediately, all forms of “subliminal messaging” were regulated in the US and banned in
countries such as Australia and the United Kingdom. Even though it was later shown that the
researcher had made up the data (he hadn’t even inserted the words into the film), this fear
about influences on our subconscious persists. At its heart, this issue pits various levels of
awareness against one another. On the one hand, we have the “low awareness” of subtle,
States of Consciousness 189
even subliminal influences. On the other hand, there is you—the conscious thinking, feeling
you which includes all that you are currently aware of, even reading this sentence. However,
when we consider these different levels of awareness separately, we can better understand
how they operate.
Low Awareness
You are constantly receiving and evaluating sensory information. Although each moment has
too many sights, smells, and sounds for them all to be consciously considered, our brains are
nonetheless processing all that information. For example, have you ever been at a party,
overwhelmed by all the people and conversation, when out of nowhere you hear your name
called? Even though you have no idea what else the person is saying, you are somehow
conscious of your name (for more on this, “the cocktail party effect,” see Noba’s Module on
Attention). So, even though you may not be aware of various stimuli in your environment,
your brain is paying closer attention than you think.
Similar to a reflex (like jumping when startled), some cues, or significant sensory information,
will automatically elicit a response from us even though we never consciously perceive it. For
example, Öhman and Soares (1994) measured subtle variations in sweating of participants
with a fear of snakes. The researchers flashed pictures of different objects (e.g., mushrooms,
flowers, and most importantly, snakes) on a screen in front of them, but did so at speeds that
left the participant clueless as to what he or she had actually seen. However, when snake
pictures were flashed, these participants started sweating more (i.e., a sign of fear), even
though they had no idea what they’d just viewed!
Although our brains perceive some stimuli without our conscious awareness, do they really
affect our subsequent thoughts and behaviors? In a landmark study, Bargh, Chen, and Burrows
(1996) had participants solve a word search puzzle where the answers pertained to words
about the elderly (e.g., “old,” “grandma”) or something random (e.g., “notebook,” “tomato”).
Afterward, the researchers secretly measured how fast the participants walked down the
hallway exiting the experiment. And although none of the participants were aware of a theme
to the answers, those who had solved a puzzle with elderly words (vs. those with other types
of words) walked more slowly down the hallway!
This effect is called priming (i.e., readily “activating” certain concepts and associations from
one’s memory) has been found in a number of other studies. For example, priming people
by having them drink from a warm glass (vs. a cold one) resulted in behaving more “warmly”
toward others (Williams & Bargh, 2008). Although all of these influences occur beneath one’s
States of Consciousness 190
High Awareness
Just because we may be influenced by these “invisible” factors, it doesn’t mean we are
helplessly controlled by them. The other side of the awareness continuum is known as “high
awareness.” This includes effortful attention and careful decision making. For example, when
you listen to a funny story on a date, or consider which class schedule would be preferable,
or complete a complex math problem, you are engaging a state of consciousness that allows
you to be highly aware of and focused on particular details in your environment.
States of Consciousness 191
An actual screenshot from an IAT (Implicit Association Test) that a person might
take to test their own mental representations of various cognitive constructs.
In this particular case, this is an item testing an individual’s unconscious reaction
towards members of various ethnic groups. [Image: Courtesy of Anthony
Humans alternate between low and high thinking states. That is, we shift between focused
attention and a less attentive default sate, and we have neural networks for both (Raichle,
2015). Interestingly, the the less we’re paying attention, the more likely we are to be influenced
by non-conscious stimuli (Chaiken, 1980). Although these subtle influences may affect us, we
can use our higher conscious awareness to protect against external influences. In what’s
known as the Flexible Correction Model (Wegener & Petty, 1997), people who are aware that
States of Consciousness 192
Hypnosis
States of Consciousness 193
If you’ve ever watched a stage hypnotist perform, it may paint a misleading portrait of this
state of consciousness. The hypnotized people on stage, for example, appear to be in a state
similar to sleep. However, as the hypnotist continues with the show, you would recognize
some profound differences between sleep and hypnosis. Namely, when you’re asleep, hearing
the word “strawberry” doesn’t make you flap your arms like a chicken. In stage performances,
the hypnotized participants appear to be highly suggestible, to the point that they are
seemingly under the hypnotist’s control. Such performances are entertaining but have a way
of sensationalizing the true nature of hypnotic states.
Over the years, researchers have proposed that hypnosis is a mental state characterized by
reduced peripheral awareness and increased focus on a singular stimulus, which results in
an enhanced susceptibility to suggestion (Kihlstrom, 2003). For example, the hypnotist will
usually induce hypnosis by getting the person to pay attention only to the hypnotist’s voice.
As the individual focuses more and more on that, s/he begins to forget the context of the
setting and responds to the hypnotist’s suggestions as if they were his or her own. Some
people are naturally more suggestible, and therefore more “hypnotizable” than are others,
and this is especially true for those who score high in empathy (Wickramasekera II & Szlyk,
2003). One common “trick” of stage hypnotists is to discard volunteers who are less suggestible
States of Consciousness 194
than others.
Dissociation is the separation of one’s awareness from everything besides what one is
centrally focused on. For example, if you’ve ever been daydreaming in class, you were likely
so caught up in the fantasy that you didn’t hear a word the teacher said. During hypnosis, this
dissociation becomes even more extreme. That is, a person concentrates so much on the
words of the hypnotist that s/he loses perspective of the rest of the world around them. As a
consequence of dissociation, a person is less effortful, and less self-conscious in consideration
of his or her own thoughts and behaviors. Similar to low awareness states, where one often
acts on the first thought that comes to mind, so, too, in hypnosis does the individual simply
follow the first thought that comes to mind, i.e., the hypnotist’s suggestion. Still, just because
one is more susceptible to suggestion under hypnosis, it doesn’t mean s/he will do anything
that’s ordered. To be hypnotized, you must first want to be hypnotized (i.e., you can’t be
hypnotized against your will; Lynn & Kirsh, 2006), and once you are hypnotized, you won’t do
anything you wouldn’t also do while in a more natural state of consciousness (Lynn, Rhue, &
Weekes, 1990).
Today, hypnotherapy is still used in a variety of formats, and it has evolved from Mesmer’s
early tinkering with the concept. Modern hypnotherapy often uses a combination of relaxation,
suggestion, motivation and expectancies to create a desired mental or behavioral state.
Although there is mixed evidence on whether hypnotherapy can help with addiction reduction
(e.g., quitting smoking; Abbot et al., 1998) there is some evidence that it can be successful in
treating sufferers of acute and chronic pain (Ewin, 1978; Syrjala et al., 1992). For example, one
study examined the treatment of burn patients with either hypnotherapy, pseudo-hypnosis
(i.e., a placebo condition), or no treatment at all. Afterward, even though people in the placebo
condition experienced a 16% decrease in pain, those in the actual hypnosis condition
experienced a reduction of nearly 50% (Patterson et al., 1996). Thus, even though hypnosis
may be sensationalized for television and movies, its ability to disassociate a person from
their environment (or their pain) in conjunction with increased suggestibility to a clinician’s
recommendations (e.g., “you will feel less anxiety about your chronic pain”) is a documented
practice with actual medical benefits.
Now, similar to hypnotic states, trance states also involve a dissociation of the self; however,
people in a trance state are said to have less voluntary control over their behaviors and actions.
Trance states often occur in religious ceremonies, where the person believes he or she is
“possessed” by an otherworldly being or force. While in trance, people report anecdotal
accounts of a “higher consciousness” or communion with a greater power. However, the body
of research investigating this phenomenon tends to reject the claim that these experiences
constitute an “altered state of consciousness.”
States of Consciousness 195
Most researchers today describe both hypnosis and trance states as “subjective” alterations
of consciousness, not an actually distinct or evolved form (Kirsch & Lynn, 1995). Just like you
feel different when you’re in a state of deep relaxation, so, too, are hypnotic and trance states
simply shifts from the standard conscious experience. Researchers contend that even though
both hypnotic and trance states appear and feel wildly different than the normal human
experience, they can be explained by standard socio-cognitive factors like imagination,
expectation, and the interpretation of the situation.
Sleep
Interestingly, sleep itself is more than shutting off for the night (or for a nap). Instead of turning
off like a light with a flick of a switch, your shift in consciousness is reflected in your brain’s
electrical activity. While you are awake and alert your brain activity is marked by beta waves.
Beta waves are characterized by being high in frequency but low in intensity. In addition, they
are the most inconsistent brain wave and this reflects the wide variation in sensory input that
a person processes during the day. As you begin to relax these change to alpha waves. These
States of Consciousness 196
waves reflect brain activity that is less frequent, more consistent and more intense. As you
slip into actual sleep you transition through many stages. Scholars differ on how they
characterize sleep stages with some experts arguing that there are four distinct stages
(Manoach et al., 2010), while others recognize five (Šušmáková, & Krakovská, 2008) but they
all distinguish between those that include rapid eye movement (REM) and those that are non-
rapid eye movement (NREM). In addition, each stage is typically characterized by its own unique
pattern of brain activity:
• Stage 1 (called NREM 1, or N1) is the "falling asleep" stage and is marked by theta waves.
• Stage 2 (called NREM 2, or N2) is considered a light sleep. Here, there are occasional “sleep
spindles,” or very high intensity brain waves. These are thought to be associated with the
processing of memories. NREM 2 makes up about 55% of all sleep.
• Stage 3 (called NREM 3, or N3) makes up between 20-25% of all sleep and is marked by
greater muscle relaxation and the appearance of delta waves.
• Finally, REM sleep is marked by rapid eye movement (REM). Interestingly, this stage—in
from being awake and throughout various stages of sleep. [Image: Noba]
States of Consciousness 197
terms of brain activity—is similar to wakefulness. That is, the brain waves occur less
intensely than in other stages of sleep. REM sleep accounts for about 20% of all sleep and
is associated with dreaming.
Dreams are, arguably, the most interesting aspect of sleep. Throughout history dreams have
been given special importance because of their unique, almost mystical nature. They have
been thought to be predictions of the future, hints of hidden aspects of the self, important
lessons about how to live life, or opportunities to engage in impossible deeds like flying. There
are several competing theories of why humans dream. One is that it is our nonconscious
attempt to make sense of our daily experiences and learning. Another, popularized by Freud,
is that dreams represent taboo or troublesome wishes or desires. Regardless of the specific
reason we know a few facts about dreams: all humans dream, we dream at every stage of
sleep, but dreams during REM sleep are especially vivid. One under-explored area of dream
research is the possible social functions of dreams: we often share our dreams with others
and use them for entertainment value.
Sleep serves many functions, one of which is to give us a period of mental and physical
restoration. Children generally need more sleep than adults since they are developing. It is
so vital, in fact, that a lack of sleep is associated with a wide range of problems. People who
do not receive adequate sleep are more irritable, have slower reaction time, have more
difficulty sustaining attention, and make poorer decisions. Interestingly, this is an issue
relevant to the lives of college students. In one highly cited study researchers found that 1 in
5 students took more than 30 minutes to fall asleep at night, 1 in 10 occasionally took sleep
medications, and more than half reported being “mostly tired” in the mornings (Buboltz, et
al, 2001).
Psychoactive Drugs
On April 16, 1943, Albert Hoffman—a Swiss chemist working in a pharmaceutical company—
accidentally ingested a newly synthesized drug. The drug—lysergic acid diethylimide (LSD)—
turned out to be a powerful hallucinogen. Hoffman went home and later reported the effects
of the drug, describing them as seeing the world through a “warped mirror” and experiencing
visions of “extraordinary shapes with intense, kaleidoscopic play of colors.” Hoffman had
discovered what members of many traditional cultures around the world already knew: there
are substances that, when ingested, can have a powerful effect on perception and on
consciousness.
Drugs operate on human physiology in a variety of ways and researchers and medical doctors
States of Consciousness 198
tend to classify drugs according to their effects. Here we will briefly cover 3 categories of drugs:
hallucinogens, depressants, and stimulants.
Hallucinogens
It is possible that hallucinogens are the substance that have, historically, been used the most
widely. Traditional societies have used plant-based hallucinogens such as peyote, ebene, and
psilocybin mushrooms in a wide range of religious ceremonies. Hallucinogens are substances
that alter a person’s perceptions, often by creating visions or hallucinations that are not real.
There are a wide range of hallucinogens and many are used as recreational substances in
industrialized societies. Common examples include marijuana, LSD, and MDMA (also known
as “ecstasy”). Marijuana is the dried flowers of the hemp plant and is often smoked to produce
euphoria. The active ingredient in marijuana is called THC and can produce distortions in the
perception of time, can create a sense of rambling, unrelated thoughts, and is sometimes
associated with increased hunger or excessive laughter. The use and possession of marijuana
is illegal in most places but this appears to be a trend that is changing. Uruguay, Bangladesh,
and several of the United States, have recently legalized marijuana. This may be due, in part,
to changing public attitudes or to the fact that marijuana is increasingly used for medical
purposes such as the management of nausea or treating glaucoma.
Depressants
Depressants are substances that, as their name suggests, slow down the body’s physiology
and mental processes. Alcohol is the most widely used depressant. Alcohol’s effects include
the reduction of inhibition, meaning that intoxicated people are more likely to act in ways they
would otherwise be reluctant to. Alcohol’s psychological effects are the result of it increasing
the neurotransmitter GABA. There are also physical effects, such as loss of balance and
coordination, and these stem from the way that alcohol interferes with the coordination of
the visual and motor systems of the brain. Despite the fact that alcohol is so widely accepted
in many cultures it is also associated with a variety of dangers. First, alcohol is toxic, meaning
that it acts like a poison because it is possible to drink more alcohol than the body can
effectively remove from the bloodstream. When a person’s blood alcohol content (BAC)
reaches .3 to .4% there is a serious risk of death. Second, the lack of judgment and physical
control associated with alcohol is associated with more risk taking behavior or dangerous
behavior such as drunk driving. Finally, alcohol is addictive and heavy drinkers often
experience significant interference with their ability to work effectively or in their close
States of Consciousness 199
relationships.
Other common depressants include opiates (also called “narcotics”), which are substances
synthesized from the poppy flower. Opiates stimulate endorphin production in the brain and
because of this they are often used as pain killers by medical professionals. Unfortunately,
because opiates such as Oxycontin so reliably produce euphoria they are increasingly used
—illegally—as recreational substances. Opiates are highly addictive.
Stimulants
There are other stimulants such as cocaine and methamphetamine (also known as “crystal
meth” or “ice”) that are illegal substances that are commonly used. These substances act by
blocking “re-uptake” of dopamine in the brain. This means that the brain does not naturally
clear out the dopamine and that it builds up in the synapse, creating euphoria and alertness.
As the effects wear off it stimulates strong cravings for more of the drug. Because of this these
powerful stimulants are highly addictive.
States of Consciousness 200
Conclusion
When you think about your daily life it is easy to get lulled into the belief that there is one
“setting” for your conscious thought. That is, you likely believe that you hold the same opinions,
values, and memories across the day and throughout the week. But “you” are like a dimmer
switch on a light that can be turned from full darkness increasingly on up to full brightness.
This switch is consciousness. At your brightest setting you are fully alert and aware; at dimmer
settings you are day dreaming; and sleep or being knocked unconscious represent dimmer
settings still. The degree to which you are in high, medium, or low states of conscious
awareness affect how susceptible you are to persuasion, how clear your judgment is, and how
much detail you can recall. Understanding levels of awareness, then, is at the heart of
understanding how we learn, decide, remember and many other vital psychological processes.
States of Consciousness 201
Outside Resources
Book: A wonderful book about how little we know about ourselves: Wilson, T. D. (2004).
Strangers to ourselves. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
http://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674013827
Book: Another wonderful book about free will—or its absence?: Wegner, D. M. (2002). The
illusion of conscious will. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
https://mitpress.mit.edu/books/illusion-conscious-will
The American Psychological Association has information on getting a good night’s sleep
as well as on sleep disorders
http://www.apa.org/helpcenter/sleep-disorders.aspx
The LSD simulator: This simulator uses optical illusions to simulate the halluginogenic
experience of LSD. Simply follow the instructions in this two minute video. After looking
away you may see the world around you in a warped or pulsating way similar to the effects
of LSD. The effect is temporary and will disappear in about a minute.
https://youtu.be/fVaLddnlafc
The National Sleep Foundation is a non-profit with videos on insomnia, sleep training in
children, and other topics
https://sleepfoundation.org/video-library
https://youtu.be/4PQAc_Z2OfQ
Video: Clip on the rubber hand illusion, from the BBC science series \\\\\\\"Horizon.\\\\\\\"
https://youtu.be/Qsmkgi7FgEo
Video: Clip showing a patient with blindsight, from the documentary \\\\\\\"Phantoms in
the Brain.\\\\\\\"
https://youtu.be/Cy8FSffrNDI
Video: Howie Mandel from America\\\'s Got Talent being hypnotized into shaking hands
with people:
https://youtu.be/UWKDFfpdIZI
Video: Imaging the Brain, Reading the Mind - A talk by Marsel Mesulam.
http://video.at.northwestern.edu/lores/SO_marsel.m4v
Video: Lucas Handwerker – a stage hypnotist discusses the therapeutic aspects of hypnosis:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zepp_H6K5wY
Video: Ted Talk - Simon Lewis: Don\\\\\\\'t take consciousness for granted
http://www.ted.com/talks/simon_lewis_don_t_take_consciousness_for_granted.html
Discussion Questions
1. If someone were in a coma after an accident, and you wanted to better understand how
“conscious” or aware s/he were, how might you go about it?
2. What are some of the factors in daily life that interfere with people’s ability to get adequate
sleep? What interferes with your sleep?
3. How frequently do you remember your dreams? Do you have recurring images or themes
in your dreams? Why do you think that is?
4. Consider times when you fantasize or let your mind wander? Describe these times: are
you more likely to be alone or with others? Are there certain activities you engage in that
seem particularly prone to daydreaming?
6. Do you think attitudes toward drug use are changing over time? If so, how? Why do you
think these changes occur?
7. Students in high school and college are increasingly using stimulants such as Adderol as
study aids and “performance enhancers.” What is your opinion of this trend?
States of Consciousness 204
Vocabulary
Circadian Rhythm
Circadian Rhythm: The physiological sleep-wake cycle. It is influenced by exposure to sunlight
as well as daily schedule and activity. Biologically, it includes changes in body temperature,
blood pressure and blood sugar.
Consciousness
Consciousness: the awareness or deliberate perception of a stimulus
Cues
Cues: a stimulus that has a particular significance to the perceiver (e.g., a sight or a sound
that has special relevance to the person who saw or heard it)
Depressants
Depressants: a class of drugs that slow down the body’s physiological and mental processes.
Dissociation
Dissociation: the heightened focus on one stimulus or thought such that many other things
around you are ignored; a disconnect between one’s awareness of their environment and the
one object the person is focusing on
Euphoria
Euphoria: an intense feeling of pleasure, excitement or happiness.
Hallucinogens
Hallucinogens: substances that, when ingested, alter a person’s perceptions, often by creating
States of Consciousness 205
Hypnosis
Hypnosis: the state of consciousness whereby a person is highly responsive to the suggestions
of another; this state usually involves a dissociation with one’s environment and an intense
focus on a single stimulus, which is usually accompanied by a sense of relaxation
Hypnotherapy
Hypnotherapy: The use of hypnotic techniques such as relaxation and suggestion to help
engineer desirable change such as lower pain or quitting smoking.
Jet Lag
Jet Lag: The state of being fatigued and/or having difficulty adjusting to a new time zone after
traveling a long distance (across multiple time zones).
Melatonin
Melatonin: A hormone associated with increased drowsiness and sleep.
Mindfulness
Mindfulness: a state of heightened focus on the thoughts passing through one’s head, as well
as a more controlled evaluation of those thoughts (e.g., do you reject or support the thoughts
you’re having?)
Priming
Priming: the activation of certain thoughts or feelings that make them easier to think of and
act upon
Stimulants
Stimulants: a class of drugs that speed up the body’s physiological and mental processes.
Trance States
Trance: a state of consciousness characterized by the experience of “out-of-body possession,”
or an acute dissociation between one’s self and the current, physical environment surrounding
them.
States of Consciousness 206
References
Abbot, N. C., Stead, L. F., White, A. R., Barnes, J., & Ernst, E. (1998). Hypnotherapy for smoking
cessation. Cochrane Database of Systematic Reviews, 2.
Bargh, J. A., Chen, M., & Burrows, L. (1996). Automaticity of social behavior: Direct effects of
trait construct and stereotype activation on action. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 71(2), 230.
Buboltz, W., Brown, F. & Soper, B. (2001). Sleep habits and patterns of college students: A
preliminary study. Journal of American College Health, 50, 131-135.
Chaiken, S. (1980). Heuristic versus systematic information processing and the use of source
versus message cues in persuasion. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 39(5), 752.
Ewin, D. M. (1978). Clinical use of hypnosis for attenuation of burn depth. Hypnosis at its
Bicentennial-Selected Papers from the Seventh International Congress of Hypnosis and
Psychosomatic Medicine. New York: Plenum Press.
Freud, S. (2001). The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud: The
Interpretation of Dreams (First Part) (Vol. 4). Random House.
Gilbert, D. T., & Hixon, J. G. (1991). The trouble of thinking: activation and application of
stereotypic beliefs. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 60(4), 509.
Greenwald, A. G., & Farnham, S. D. (2000). Using the Implicit Association Test to measure self-
esteem and self-concept. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 79, 1022-1038.
Greenwald, A. G., McGhee, D. E., & Schwartz, J. K. L. (1998). Measuring individual differences
in implicit cognition: The Implicit Association Test. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 74, 1464-1480.
Kihlstrom, J.F. (2003). Hypnosis and memory. In J.F. Byrne (Ed.), Learning and memory, 2nd ed.
(pp. 240-242). Farmington Hills, Mi.: Macmillan Reference
Kirsch, I., & Lynn, S. J. (1995). Altered state of hypnosis: Changes in the theoretical landscape.
American Psychologist, 50(10), 846.
Lynn S. J., and Kirsch I. (2006). Essentials of clinical hypnosis. Washington, DC: American
Psychological Association.
Lynn, S. J., Rhue, J. W., & Weekes, J. R. (1990). Hypnotic involuntariness: A social-cognitive
analysis. Psychological Review, 97, 169–184.
Manoach, D. S., Thakkar, K. N., Stroynowski, E., Ely, A., McKinley, S. K., Wamsley, E., ... & Stickgold,
R. (2010). Reduced overnight consolidation of procedural learning in chronic medicated
schizophrenia is related to specific sleep stages. Journal of Psychiatric Research, 44(2),
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112-120.
Nosek, B. A., Banaji, M. R., & Greenwald, A. G. (2002). Harvesting implicit group attitudes and
beliefs from a demonstration website. Group Dynamics, 6(1), 101-115.
Patterson, D. R., Everett, J. J., Burns, G. L., & Marvin, J. A. (1992). Hypnosis for the treatment of
burn pain. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 60, 713-17
Pekala, R. J., Kumar, V. K., Maurer, R., Elliott-Carter, N., Moon, E., & Mullen, K. (2010).
Suggestibility, expectancy, trance state effects, and hypnotic depth: I. Implications for
understanding hypnotism. American Journal of Clinical Hypnosis, 52(4), 275-290.
Petty, R. E., & Cacioppo, J. T. (1986). The Elaboration Likelihood Model of persuasion. In L.
Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances in Experimental Social Psychology (Vol. 19, pp. 123-205). New York:
Academic Press.
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433-447.
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sleep stages classification. Artificial Intelligence in Medicine, 44(3), 261-277.
Learning
13
Conditioning and Learning
Mark E. Bouton
Basic principles of learning are always operating and always influencing human behavior. This
module discusses the two most fundamental forms of learning -- classical (Pavlovian) and
instrumental (operant) conditioning. Through them, we respectively learn to associate 1)
stimuli in the environment, or 2) our own behaviors, with significant events, such as rewards
and punishments. The two types of learning have been intensively studied because they have
powerful effects on behavior, and because they provide methods that allow scientists to
analyze learning processes rigorously. This module describes some of the most important
things you need to know about classical and instrumental conditioning, and it illustrates some
of the many ways they help us understand normal and disordered behavior in humans. The
module concludes by introducing the concept of observational learning, which is a form of
learning that is largely distinct from classical and operant conditioning.
Learning Objectives
• Understand some important facts about each that tell us how they work.
• Understand how they work separately and together to influence human behavior in the
world outside the laboratory.
• Students will be able to list the four aspects of observational learning according to Social
Learning Theory.
Conditioning and Learning 210
Although Ivan Pavlov won a Nobel Prize for studying digestion, he is much more famous for
something else: working with a dog, a bell, and a bowl of saliva. Many people are familiar with
the classic study of “Pavlov’s dog,” but rarely do they understand the significance of its
discovery. In fact, Pavlov’s work helps explain why some people get anxious just looking at a
crowded bus, why the sound of a morning alarm is so hated, and even why we swear off
certain foods we’ve only tried once. Classical (or Pavlovian) conditioning is one of the
fundamental ways we learn about the world around us. But it is far more than just a theory
of learning; it is also arguably a theory of identity. For, once you understand classical
conditioning, you’ll recognize that your favorite music, clothes, even political candidate, might
all be a result of the same process that makes a dog drool at the sound of bell.
We now believe that this same learning process is engaged, for example, when humans
associate a drug they’ve taken with the environment in which they’ve taken it; when they
associate a stimulus (e.g., a symbol for vacation, like a big beach towel) with an emotional
event (like a burst of happiness); and when they associate the flavor of a food with getting
food poisoning. Although classical conditioning may seem “old” or “too simple” a theory, it is
Conditioning and Learning 211
still widely studied today for at least two reasons: First, it is a straightforward test of associative
learning that can be used to study other, more complex behaviors. Second, because classical
conditioning is always occurring in our lives, its effects on behavior have important
implications for understanding normal and disordered behavior in humans.
In a general way, classical conditioning occurs whenever neutral stimuli are associated with
psychologically significant events. With food poisoning, for example, although having fish for
dinner may not normally be something to be concerned about (i.e., a “neutral stimuli”), if it
causes you to get sick, you will now likely associate that neutral stimuli (the fish) with the
psychologically significant event of getting sick. These paired events are often described using
terms that can be applied to any situation.
The dog food in Pavlov’s experiment is called the unconditioned stimulus (US) because it
elicits an unconditioned response (UR). That is, without any kind of “training” or “teaching,”
the stimulus produces a natural or instinctual reaction. In Pavlov’s case, the food (US)
automatically makes the dog drool (UR). Other examples of unconditioned stimuli include
loud noises (US) that startle us (UR), or a hot shower (US) that produces pleasure (UR).
Another example you are probably very familiar with involves your alarm clock. If you’re like
most people, waking up early usually makes you unhappy. In this case, waking up early (US)
produces a natural sensation of grumpiness (UR). Rather than waking up early on your own,
though, you likely have an alarm clock that plays a tone to wake you. Before setting your alarm
to that particular tone, let’s imagine you had neutral feelings about it (i.e., the tone had no
prior meaning for you). However, now that you use it to wake up every morning, you
psychologically “pair” that tone (CS) with your feelings of grumpiness in the morning (UR).
Conditioning and Learning 212
After enough pairings, this tone (CS) will automatically produce your natural response of
grumpiness (CR). Thus, this linkage between the unconditioned stimulus (US; waking up early)
and the conditioned stimulus (CS; the tone) is so strong that the unconditioned response (UR;
being grumpy) will become a conditioned response (CR; e.g., hearing the tone at any point in
the day—whether waking up or walking down the street—will make you grumpy). Modern
studies of classical conditioning use a very wide range of CSs and USs and measure a wide
range of conditioned responses.
Now, once the rat recognizes that it receives a piece of food every time it presses the lever,
the behavior of lever-pressing becomes reinforced. That is, the food pellets serve as
reinforcers because they strengthen the rat’s desire to engage with the environment in this
particular manner. In a parallel example, imagine that you’re playing a street-racing video
game. As you drive through one city course multiple times, you try a number of different
streets to get to the finish line. On one of these trials, you discover a shortcut that dramatically
improves your overall time. You have learned this new path through operant conditioning.
Conditioning and Learning 213
That is, by engaging with your environment (operant responses), you performed a sequence
of behaviors that that was positively reinforced (i.e., you found the shortest distance to the
finish line). And now that you’ve learned how to drive this course, you will perform that same
sequence of driving behaviors (just as the rat presses on the lever) to receive your reward of
a faster finish.
Operant conditioning research studies how the effects of a behavior influence the probability
that it will occur again. For example, the effects of the rat’s lever-pressing behavior (i.e.,
receiving a food pellet) influences the probability that it will keep pressing the lever. For,
according to Thorndike’s law of effect, when a behavior has a positive (satisfying) effect or
consequence, it is likely to be repeated in the future. However, when a behavior has a negative
(painful/annoying) consequence, it is less likely to be repeated in the future. Effects that
increase behaviors are referred to as reinforcers, and effects that decrease them are referred
to as punishers.
An everyday example that helps to illustrate operant conditioning is striving for a good grade
in class—which could be considered a reward for students (i.e., it produces a positive emotional
response). In order to get that reward (similar to the rat learning to press the lever), the student
needs to modify his/her behavior. For example, the student may learn that speaking up in
class gets him/her participation points (a reinforcer), so the student speaks up repeatedly.
However, the student also learns that s/he shouldn’t speak up about just anything; talking
about topics unrelated to school actually costs points. Therefore, through the student’s freely
chosen behaviors, s/he learns which behaviors are reinforced and which are punished.
An important distinction of operant conditioning is that it provides a method for studying how
consequences influence “voluntary” behavior. The rat’s decision to press the lever is voluntary,
in the sense that the rat is free to make and repeat that response whenever it wants. Classical
The illustration above summarizes the basic elements of classical and instrumental
conditioning. The two types of learning differ in many ways. However, modern thinkers often
emphasize the fact that they differ—as illustrated here—in what is learned. In classical
conditioning, the animal behaves as if it has learned to associate a stimulus with a significant
event. In operant conditioning, the animal behaves as if it has learned to associate a behavior
with a significant event. Another difference is that the response in the classical situation (e.
g., salivation) is elicited by a stimulus that comes before it, whereas the response in the operant
case is not elicited by any particular stimulus. Instead, operant responses are said to be emitted.
The word “emitted” further conveys the idea that operant behaviors are essentially voluntary
in nature.
Understanding classical and operant conditioning provides psychologists with many tools for
understanding learning and behavior in the world outside the lab. This is in part because the
two types of learning occur continuously throughout our lives. It has been said that “much
like the laws of gravity, the laws of learning are always in effect” (Spreat & Spreat, 1982).
A classical CS (e.g., the bell) does not merely elicit a simple, unitary reflex. Pavlov emphasized
salivation because that was the only response he measured. But his bell almost certainly
elicited a whole system of responses that functioned to get the organism ready for the
upcoming US (food) (see Timberlake, 2001). For example, in addition to salivation, CSs (such
as the bell) that signal that food is near also elicit the secretion of gastric acid, pancreatic
enzymes, and insulin (which gets blood glucose into cells). All of these responses prepare the
body for digestion. Additionally, the CS elicits approach behavior and a state of excitement.
And presenting a CS for food can also cause animals whose stomachs are full to eat more
food if it is available. In fact, food CSs are so prevalent in modern society, humans are likewise
inclined to eat or feel hungry in response to cues associated with food, such as the sound of
a bag of potato chips opening, the sight of a well-known logo (e.g., Coca-Cola), or the feel of
the couch in front of the television.
Conditioning and Learning 215
Classical conditioning is also involved in other aspects of eating. Flavors associated with certain
nutrients (such as sugar or fat) can become preferred without arousing any awareness of the
pairing. For example, protein is a US that your body automatically craves more of once you
start to consume it (UR): since proteins are highly concentrated in meat, the flavor of meat
becomes a CS (or cue, that proteins are on the way), which perpetuates the cycle of craving
for yet more meat (this automatic bodily reaction now a CR).
In a similar way, flavors associated with stomach pain or illness become avoided and disliked.
For example, a person who gets sick after drinking too much tequila may acquire a profound
dislike of the taste and odor of tequila—a phenomenon called taste aversion conditioning.
The fact that flavors are often associated with so many consequences of eating is important
for animals (including rats and humans) that are frequently exposed to new foods. And it is
clinically relevant. For example, drugs used in chemotherapy often make cancer patients sick.
As a consequence, patients often acquire aversions to foods eaten just before treatment, or
even aversions to such things as the waiting room of the chemotherapy clinic itself (see
Bernstein, 1991; Scalera & Bavieri, 2009).
Another interesting effect of classical conditioning can occur when we ingest drugs. That is,
when a drug is taken, it can be associated with the cues that are present at the same time (e.
g., rooms, odors, drug paraphernalia). In this regard, if someone associates a particular smell
with the sensation induced by the drug, whenever that person smells the same odor afterward,
it may cue responses (physical and/or emotional) related to taking the drug itself. But drug
cues have an even more interesting property: They elicit responses that often “compensate”
for the upcoming effect of the drug (see Siegel, 1989). For example, morphine itself suppresses
pain; however, if someone is used to taking morphine, a cue that signals the “drug is coming
soon” can actually make the person more sensitive to pain. Because the person knows a pain
suppressant will soon be administered, the body becomes more sensitive, anticipating that
“the drug will soon take care of it.” Remarkably, such conditioned compensatory responses
in turn decrease the impact of the drug on the body—because the body has become more
sensitive to pain.
This conditioned compensatory response has many implications. For instance, a drug user
Conditioning and Learning 216
will be most “tolerant” to the drug in the presence of cues that have been associated with it
(because such cues elicit compensatory responses). As a result, overdose is usually not due
to an increase in dosage, but to taking the drug in a new place without the familiar cues—
which would have otherwise allowed the user to tolerate the drug (see Siegel, Hinson, Krank,
& McCully, 1982). Conditioned compensatory responses (which include heightened pain
sensitivity and decreased body temperature, among others) might also cause discomfort, thus
motivating the drug user to continue usage of the drug to reduce them. This is one of several
ways classical conditioning might be a factor in drug addiction and dependence.
A final effect of classical cues is that they motivate ongoing operant behavior (see Balleine,
2005). For example, if a rat has learned via operant conditioning that pressing a lever will give
it a drug, in the presence of cues that signal the “drug is coming soon” (like the sound of the
lever squeaking), the rat will work harder to press the lever than if those cues weren’t present
(i.e., there is no squeaking lever sound). Similarly, in the presence of food-associated cues (e.
g., smells), a rat (or an overeater) will work harder for food. And finally, even in the presence
of negative cues (like something that signals fear), a rat, a human, or any other organism will
work harder to avoid those situations that might lead to trauma. Classical CSs thus have many
effects that can contribute to significant behavioral phenomena.
As mentioned earlier, classical conditioning provides a method for studying basic learning
processes. Somewhat counterintuitively, though, studies show that pairing a CS and a US
together is not sufficient for an association to be learned between them. Consider an effect
called blocking (see Kamin, 1969). In this effect, an animal first learns to associate one CS—
call it stimulus A—with a US. In the illustration above, the sound of a bell (stimulus A) is paired
Conditioning and Learning 217
with the presentation of food. Once this association is learned, in a second phase, a second
stimulus—stimulus B—is presented alongside stimulus A, such that the two stimuli are paired
with the US together. In the illustration, a light is added and turned on at the same time the
bell is rung. However, because the animal has already learned the association between
stimulus A (the bell) and the food, the animal doesn’t learn an association between stimulus
B (the light) and the food. That is, the conditioned response only occurs during the presentation
of stimulus A, because the earlier conditioning of A “blocks” the conditioning of B when B is
added to A. The reason? Stimulus A already predicts the US, so the US is not surprising when
it occurs with Stimulus B.
Blocking and other related effects indicate that the learning process tends to take in the most
valid predictors of significant events and ignore the less useful ones. This is common in the
real world. For example, imagine that your supermarket puts big star-shaped stickers on
products that are on sale. Quickly, you learn that items with the big star-shaped stickers are
cheaper. However, imagine you go into a similar supermarket that not only uses these stickers,
but also uses bright orange price tags to denote a discount. Because of blocking (i.e., you
already know that the star-shaped stickers indicate a discount), you don’t have to learn the
color system, too. The star-shaped stickers tell you everything you need to know (i.e. there’s
no prediction error for the discount), and thus the color system is irrelevant.
Classical conditioning is strongest if the CS and US are intense or salient. It is also best if the
CS and US are relatively new and the organism hasn’t been frequently exposed to them before.
And it is especially strong if the organism’s biology has prepared it to associate a particular
CS and US. For example, rats and humans are naturally inclined to associate an illness with a
flavor, rather than with a light or tone. Because foods are most commonly experienced by
taste, if there is a particular food that makes us ill, associating the flavor (rather than the
appearance—which may be similar to other foods) with the illness will more greatly ensure
we avoid that food in the future, and thus avoid getting sick. This sorting tendency, which is
set up by evolution, is called preparedness.
Conditioning and Learning 218
There are many factors that affect the strength of classical conditioning, and these have been
the subject of much research and theory (see Rescorla & Wagner, 1972; Pearce & Bouton,
2001). Behavioral neuroscientists have also used classical conditioning to investigate many
of the basic brain processes that are involved in learning (see Fanselow & Poulos, 2005;
Thompson & Steinmetz, 2009).
After conditioning, the response to the CS can be eliminated if the CS is presented repeatedly
without the US. This effect is called extinction, and the response is said to become
“extinguished.” For example, if Pavlov kept ringing the bell but never gave the dog any food
afterward, eventually the dog’s CR (drooling) would no longer happen when it heard the CS
(the bell), because the bell would no longer be a predictor of food. Extinction is important for
many reasons. For one thing, it is the basis for many therapies that clinical psychologists use
to eliminate maladaptive and unwanted behaviors. Take the example of a person who has a
debilitating fear of spiders: one approach might include systematic exposure to spiders.
Whereas, initially the person has a CR (e.g., extreme fear) every time s/he sees the CS (e.g.,
the spider), after repeatedly being shown pictures of spiders in neutral conditions, pretty soon
the CS no longer predicts the CR (i.e., the person doesn’t have the fear reaction when seeing
spiders, having learned that spiders no longer serve as a “cue” for that fear). Here, repeated
exposure to spiders without an aversive consequence causes extinction.
Psychologists must accept one important fact about extinction, however: it does not
necessarily destroy the original learning (see Bouton, 2004). For example, imagine you strongly
associate the smell of chalkboards with the agony of middle school detention. Now imagine
that, after years of encountering chalkboards, the smell of them no longer recalls the agony
of detention (an example of extinction). However, one day, after entering a new building for
the first time, you suddenly catch a whiff of a chalkboard and WHAM!, the agony of detention
returns. This is called spontaneous recovery: following a lapse in exposure to the CS after
extinction has occurred, sometimes re-exposure to the CS (e.g., the smell of chalkboards) can
evoke the CR again (e.g., the agony of detention).
Another related phenomenon is the renewal effect: After extinction, if the CS is tested in a
new context, such as a different room or location, the CR can also return. In the chalkboard
example, the action of entering a new building—where you don’t expect to smell chalkboards
—suddenly renews the sensations associated with detention. These effects have been
interpreted to suggest that extinction inhibits rather than erases the learned behavior, and
this inhibition is mainly expressed in the context in which it is learned (see “context” in the
Conditioning and Learning 219
This does not mean that extinction is a bad treatment for behavior disorders. Instead, clinicians
can increase its effectiveness by using basic research on learning to help defeat these relapse
effects (see Craske et al., 2008). For example, conducting extinction therapies in contexts
where patients might be most vulnerable to relapsing (e.g., at work), might be a good strategy
for enhancing the therapy’s success.
Most of the things that affect the strength of classical conditioning also affect the strength of
instrumental learning—whereby we learn to associate our actions with their outcomes. As
noted earlier, the “bigger” the reinforcer (or punisher), the stronger the learning. And, if an
instrumental behavior is no longer reinforced, it will also be extinguished. Most of the rules
of associative learning that apply to classical conditioning also apply to instrumental learning,
but other facts about instrumental learning are also worth knowing.
As you know, the classic operant response in the laboratory is lever-pressing in rats, reinforced
by food. However, things can be arranged so that lever-pressing only produces pellets when
a particular stimulus is present. For example, lever-pressing can be reinforced only when a
light in the Skinner box is turned on; when the light is off, no food is released from lever-
pressing. The rat soon learns to discriminate between the light-on and light-off conditions,
and presses the lever only in the presence of the light (responses in light-off are extinguished).
In everyday life, think about waiting in the turn lane at a traffic light. Although you know that
green means go, only when you have the green arrow do you turn. In this regard, the operant
behavior is now said to be under stimulus control. And, as is the case with the traffic light, in
the real world, stimulus control is probably the rule.
The stimulus controlling the operant response is called a discriminative stimulus. It can be
associated directly with the response, or the reinforcer (see below). However, it usually does
not elicit the response the way a classical CS does. Instead, it is said to “set the occasion for”
the operant response. For example, a canvas put in front of an artist does not elicit painting
behavior or compel her to paint. It allows, or sets the occasion for, painting to occur.
Stimulus-control techniques are widely used in the laboratory to study perception and other
psychological processes in animals. For example, the rat would not be able to respond
Conditioning and Learning 220
appropriately to light-on and light-off conditions if it could not see the light. Following this
logic, experiments using stimulus-control methods have tested how well animals see colors,
hear ultrasounds, and detect magnetic fields. That is, researchers pair these discriminative
stimuli with those they know the animals already understand (such as pressing the lever). In
this way, the researchers can test if the animals can learn to press the lever only when an
ultrasound is played, for example.
These methods can also be used to study “higher” cognitive processes. For example, pigeons
can learn to peck at different buttons in a Skinner box when pictures of flowers, cars, chairs,
or people are shown on a miniature TV screen (see Wasserman, 1995). Pecking button 1 (and
no other) is reinforced in the presence of a flower image, button 2 in the presence of a chair
image, and so on. Pigeons can learn the discrimination readily, and, under the right conditions,
will even peck the correct buttons associated with pictures of new flowers, cars, chairs, and
people they have never seen before. The birds have learned to categorize the sets of stimuli.
Stimulus-control methods can be used to study how such categorization is learned.
acknowledges the fact that the effects of reinforcing one behavior depend crucially on how
much reinforcement is earned for the behavior’s alternatives. For example, if a pigeon learns
that pecking one light will reward two food pellets, whereas the other light only rewards one,
the pigeon will only peck the first light. However, what happens if the first light is more
strenuous to reach than the second one? Will the cost of energy outweigh the bonus of food?
Or will the extra food be worth the work? In general, a given reinforcer will be less reinforcing
if there are many alternative reinforcers in the environment. For this reason, alcohol, sex, or
drugs may be less powerful reinforcers if the person’s environment is full of other sources of
reinforcement, such as achievement at work or love from family members.
Modern research also indicates that reinforcers do more than merely strengthen or “stamp
in” the behaviors they are a consequence of, as was Thorndike’s original view. Instead, animals
learn about the specific consequences of each behavior, and will perform a behavior
depending on how much they currently want—or “value”—its consequence.
This idea is best illustrated by a phenomenon called the reinforcer devaluation effect (see
Colwill & Rescorla, 1986). A rat is first trained to perform two instrumental actions (e.g.,
pressing a lever on the left, and on the right), each paired with a different reinforcer (e.g., a
sweet sucrose solution, and a food pellet). At the end of this training, the rat tends to press
both levers, alternating between the sucrose solution and the food pellet. In a second phase,
one of the reinforcers (e.g., the sucrose) is then separately paired with illness. This conditions
a taste aversion to the sucrose. In a final test, the rat is returned to the Skinner box and allowed
to press either lever freely. No reinforcers are presented during this test (i.e., no sucrose or
Conditioning and Learning 222
food comes from pressing the levers), so behavior during testing can only result from the rat’s
memory of what it has learned earlier. Importantly here, the rat chooses not to perform the
response that once produced the reinforcer that it now has an aversion to (e.g., it won’t press
the sucrose lever). This means that the rat has learned and remembered the reinforcer
associated with each response, and can combine that knowledge with the knowledge that the
reinforcer is now “bad.” Reinforcers do not merely stamp in responses; the animal learns
much more than that. The behavior is said to be “goal-directed” (see Dickinson & Balleine,
1994), because it is influenced by the current value of its associated goal (i.e., how much the
rat wants/doesn’t want the reinforcer).
Things can get more complicated, however, if the rat performs the instrumental actions
frequently and repeatedly. That is, if the rat has spent many months learning the value of
pressing each of the levers, the act of pressing them becomes automatic and routine. And
here, this once goal-directed action (i.e., the rat pressing the lever for the goal of getting
sucrose/food) can become a habit. Thus, if a rat spends many months performing the lever-
pressing behavior (turning such behavior into a habit), even when sucrose is again paired with
illness, the rat will continue to press that lever (see Holland, 2004). After all the practice, the
instrumental response (pressing the lever) is no longer sensitive to reinforcer devaluation.
The rat continues to respond automatically, regardless of the fact that the sucrose from this
lever makes it sick.
Habits are very common in human experience, and can be useful. You do not need to relearn
each day how to make your coffee in the morning or how to brush your teeth. Instrumental
behaviors can eventually become habitual, letting us get the job done while being free to think
about other things.
Classical and operant conditioning are usually studied separately. But outside of the laboratory
they almost always occur at the same time. For example, a person who is reinforced for
drinking alcohol or eating excessively learns these behaviors in the presence of certain stimuli
—a pub, a set of friends, a restaurant, or possibly the couch in front of the TV. These stimuli
are also available for association with the reinforcer. In this way, classical and operant
conditioning are always intertwined.
The figure below summarizes this idea, and helps review what we have discussed in this
module. Generally speaking, any reinforced or punished operant response (R) is paired with
an outcome (O) in the presence of some stimulus or set of stimuli (S).
Conditioning and Learning 223
The figure illustrates the types of associations that can be learned in this very general scenario.
For one thing, the organism will learn to associate the response and the outcome (R – O). This
is instrumental conditioning. The learning process here is probably similar to classical
conditioning, with all its emphasis on surprise and prediction error. And, as we discussed
while considering the reinforcer devaluation effect, once R – O is learned, the organism will
be ready to perform the response if the outcome is desired or valued. The value of the
reinforcer can also be influenced by other reinforcers earned for other behaviors in the
situation. These factors are at the heart of instrumental learning.
Second, the organism can also learn to associate the stimulus with the reinforcing outcome
(S – O). This is the classical conditioning component, and as we have seen, it can have many
consequences on behavior. For one thing, the stimulus will come to evoke a system of
responses that help the organism prepare for the reinforcer (not shown in the figure): The
drinker may undergo changes in body temperature; the eater may salivate and have an
increase in insulin secretion. In addition, the stimulus will evoke approach (if the outcome is
positive) or retreat (if the outcome is
negative). Presenting the stimulus will
also prompt the instrumental response.
The final link in the figure is between the stimulus and the response-outcome association [S –
(R – O)]. More than just entering into a simple association with the R or the O, the stimulus
can signal that the R – O relationship is now in effect. This is what we mean when we say that
the stimulus can “set the occasion” for the operant response: It sets the occasion for the
Conditioning and Learning 224
response-reinforcer relationship. Through this mechanism, the painter might begin to paint
when given the right tools and the opportunity enabled by the canvas. The canvas theoretically
signals that the behavior of painting will now be reinforced by positive consequences.
The figure provides a framework that you can use to understand almost any learned behavior
you observe in yourself, your family, or your friends. If you would like to understand it more
deeply, consider taking a course on learning in the future, which will give you a fuller
appreciation of how classical learning, instrumental learning, habit learning, and occasion
setting actually work and interact.
Observational Learning
Not all forms of learning are accounted for entirely by classical and operant conditioning.
Imagine a child walking up to a group of children playing a game on the playground. The game
looks fun, but it is new and unfamiliar. Rather than joining the game immediately, the child
opts to sit back and watch the other children play a round or two. Observing the others, the
child takes note of the ways in which they behave while playing the game. By watching the
behavior of the other kids, the child can figure out the rules of the game and even some
strategies for doing well at the game.
This is called observational learning.
though they are the same age as the observer. By observing how the social models behave,
an individual is able to learn how to act in a certain situation. Other examples of observational
learning might include a child learning to place her napkin in her lap by watching her parents
at the dinner table, or a customer learning where to find the ketchup and mustard after
observing other customers at a hot dog stand.
Bandura theorizes that the observational learning process consists of four parts. The first is
attention—as, quite simply, one must pay attention to what s/he is observing in order to learn.
The second part is retention: to learn one must be able to retain the behavior s/he is observing
in memory.The third part of observational learning, initiation, acknowledges that the learner
must be able to execute (or initiate) the learned behavior. Lastly, the observer must possess
the motivation to engage in observational learning. In our vignette, the child must want to
learn how to play the game in order to properly engage in observational learning.
aggression group showed less aggressive behavior if they witnessed the adult model receive
punishment for aggressing against Bobo. Bandura referred to this process as vicarious
reinforcement, as the children did not experience the reinforcement or punishment directly,
yet were still influenced by observing it.
Conclusion
We have covered three primary explanations for how we learn to behave and interact with
the world around us. Considering your own experiences, how well do these theories apply to
you? Maybe when reflecting on your personal sense of fashion, you realize that you tend to
select clothes others have complimented you on (operant conditioning). Or maybe, thinking
back on a new restaurant you tried recently, you realize you chose it because its commercials
play happy music (classical conditioning). Or maybe you are now always on time with your
assignments, because you saw how others were punished when they were late (observational
learning). Regardless of the activity, behavior, or response, there’s a good chance your
“decision” to do it can be explained based on one of the theories presented in this module.
Conditioning and Learning 227
Outside Resources
Article: Rescorla, R. A. (1988). Pavlovian conditioning: It’s not what you think it is. American
Psychologist, 43, 151–160.
Book: Bouton, M. E. (2009). Learning theory. In B. J. Sadock, V. A. Sadock, & P. Ruiz (Eds.), Kaplan
& Sadock’s comprehensive textbook of psychiatry (9th ed., Vol. 1, pp. 647–658). New York, NY:
Lippincott Williams & Wilkins.
Book: Domjan, M. (2010). The principles of learning and behavior (6th ed.). Belmont, CA:
Wadsworth.
Discussion Questions
1. Describe three examples of Pavlovian (classical) conditioning that you have seen in your
own behavior, or that of your friends or family, in the past few days.
2. Describe three examples of instrumental (operant) conditioning that you have seen in your
own behavior, or that of your friends or family, in the past few days.
3. Drugs can be potent reinforcers. Discuss how Pavlovian conditioning and instrumental
conditioning can work together to influence drug taking.
4. In the modern world, processed foods are highly available and have been engineered to
be highly palatable and reinforcing. Discuss how Pavlovian and instrumental conditioning
can work together to explain why people often eat too much.
5. How does blocking challenge the idea that pairings of a CS and US are sufficient to cause
Pavlovian conditioning? What is important in creating Pavlovian learning?
6. How does the reinforcer devaluation effect challenge the idea that reinforcers merely
“stamp in” the operant response? What does the effect tell us that animals actually learn
in operant conditioning?
7. With regards to social learning do you think people learn violence from observing violence
Conditioning and Learning 228
8. What do you think you have learned through social learning? Who are your social models?
Conditioning and Learning 229
Vocabulary
Blocking
In classical conditioning, the finding that no conditioning occurs to a stimulus if it is combined
with a previously conditioned stimulus during conditioning trials. Suggests that information,
surprise value, or prediction error is important in conditioning.
Categorize
To sort or arrange different items into classes or categories.
Classical conditioning
The procedure in which an initially neutral stimulus (the conditioned stimulus, or CS) is paired
with an unconditioned stimulus (or US). The result is that the conditioned stimulus begins to
elicit a conditioned response (CR). Classical conditioning is nowadays considered important
as both a behavioral phenomenon and as a method to study simple associative learning.
Same as Pavlovian conditioning.
Context
Stimuli that are in the background whenever learning occurs. For instance, the Skinner box
or room in which learning takes place is the classic example of a context. However, “context”
can also be provided by internal stimuli, such as the sensory effects of drugs (e.g., being under
the influence of alcohol has stimulus properties that provide a context) and mood states (e.
g., being happy or sad). It can also be provided by a specific period in time—the passage of
time is sometimes said to change the “temporal context.”
Conditioning and Learning 230
Discriminative stimulus
In operant conditioning, a stimulus that signals whether the response will be reinforced. It is
said to “set the occasion” for the operant response.
Extinction
Decrease in the strength of a learned behavior that occurs when the conditioned stimulus is
presented without the unconditioned stimulus (in classical conditioning) or when the behavior
is no longer reinforced (in instrumental conditioning). The term describes both the procedure
(the US or reinforcer is no longer presented) as well as the result of the procedure (the learned
response declines). Behaviors that have been reduced in strength through extinction are said
to be “extinguished.”
Fear conditioning
A type of classical or Pavlovian conditioning in which the conditioned stimulus (CS) is associated
with an aversive unconditioned stimulus (US), such as a foot shock. As a consequence of
learning, the CS comes to evoke fear. The phenomenon is thought to be involved in the
development of anxiety disorders in humans.
Goal-directed behavior
Instrumental behavior that is influenced by the animal’s knowledge of the association between
the behavior and its consequence and the current value of the consequence. Sensitive to the
reinforcer devaluation effect.
Habit
Instrumental behavior that occurs automatically in the presence of a stimulus and is no longer
influenced by the animal’s knowledge of the value of the reinforcer. Insensitive to the reinforcer
devaluation effect.
Instrumental conditioning
Process in which animals learn about the relationship between their behaviors and their
consequences. Also known as operant conditioning.
Law of effect
The idea that instrumental or operant responses are influenced by their effects. Responses
that are followed by a pleasant state of affairs will be strengthened and those that are followed
by discomfort will be weakened. Nowadays, the term refers to the idea that operant or
instrumental behaviors are lawfully controlled by their consequences.
Observational learning
Conditioning and Learning 231
Operant
A behavior that is controlled by its consequences. The simplest example is the rat’s lever-
pressing, which is controlled by the presentation of the reinforcer.
Operant conditioning
See instrumental conditioning.
Pavlovian conditioning
See classical conditioning.
Prediction error
When the outcome of a conditioning trial is different from that which is predicted by the
conditioned stimuli that are present on the trial (i.e., when the US is surprising). Prediction
error is necessary to create Pavlovian conditioning (and associative learning generally). As
learning occurs over repeated conditioning trials, the conditioned stimulus increasingly
predicts the unconditioned stimulus, and prediction error declines. Conditioning works to
correct or reduce prediction error.
Preparedness
The idea that an organism’s evolutionary history can make it easy to learn a particular
association. Because of preparedness, you are more likely to associate the taste of tequila,
and not the circumstances surrounding drinking it, with getting sick. Similarly, humans are
more likely to associate images of spiders and snakes than flowers and mushrooms with
aversive outcomes like shocks.
Punisher
A stimulus that decreases the strength of an operant behavior when it is made a consequence
of the behavior.
Reinforcer
Any consequence of a behavior that strengthens the behavior or increases the likelihood that
Conditioning and Learning 232
Renewal effect
Recovery of an extinguished response that occurs when the context is changed after
extinction. Especially strong when the change of context involves return to the context in
which conditioning originally occurred. Can occur after extinction in either classical or
instrumental conditioning.
Social models
Authorities that are the targets for observation and who model behaviors.
Spontaneous recovery
Recovery of an extinguished response that occurs with the passage of time after extinction.
Can occur after extinction in either classical or instrumental conditioning.
Stimulus control
When an operant behavior is controlled by a stimulus that precedes it.
Vicarious reinforcement
Learning that occurs by observing the reinforcement or punishment of another person.
Conditioning and Learning 233
References
Bandura, A. (1977). Social learning theory. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall
Bandura, A., Ross, D., Ross, S (1963). Imitation of film-mediated aggressive models. Journal of
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485–494.
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Rescorla, R. A., & Wagner, A. R. (1972). A theory of Pavlovian conditioning: Variations in the
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Memory
14
Memory (Encoding, Storage, Retrieval)
Kathleen B. McDermott & Henry L. Roediger
“Memory” is a single term that reflects a number of different abilities: holding information
briefly while working with it (working memory), remembering episodes of one’s life (episodic
memory), and our general knowledge of facts of the world (semantic memory), among other
types. Remembering episodes involves three processes: encoding information (learning it, by
perceiving it and relating it to past knowledge), storing it (maintaining it over time), and then
retrieving it (accessing the information when needed). Failures can occur at any stage, leading
to forgetting or to having false memories. The key to improving one’s memory is to improve
processes of encoding and to use techniques that guarantee effective retrieval. Good encoding
techniques include relating new information to what one already knows, forming mental
images, and creating associations among information that needs to be remembered. The key
to good retrieval is developing effective cues that will lead the rememberer back to the encoded
information. Classic mnemonic systems, known since the time of the ancient Greeks and still
used by some today, can greatly improve one’s memory abilities.
Learning Objectives
• Define and note differences between the following forms of memory: working memory,
episodic memory, semantic memory, collective memory.
• Describe strategies that can be used to enhance the original learning or encoding of
information.
• Describe why the classic mnemonic device, the method of loci, works so well.
Memory (Encoding, Storage, Retrieval) 237
Introduction
In 2013, Simon Reinhard sat in front of 60 people in a room at Washington University, where
he memorized an increasingly long series of digits. On the first round, a computer generated
10 random digits—6 1 9 4 8 5 6 3 7 1—on a screen for 10 seconds. After the series disappeared,
Simon typed them into his computer. His recollection was perfect. In the next phase, 20 digits
appeared on the screen for 20 seconds. Again, Simon got them all correct. No one in the
audience (mostly professors, graduate students, and undergraduate students) could recall
the 20 digits perfectly. Then came 30 digits, studied for 30 seconds; once again, Simon didn’t
misplace even a single digit. For a final trial, 50 digits appeared on the screen for 50 seconds,
and again, Simon got them all right. In fact, Simon would have been happy to keep going. His
record in this task—called “forward digit span”—is 240 digits!
to be in the top two of “memory athletes.” In 2012, he came in second place in the World
Memory Championships (composed of 11 tasks), held in London. He currently ranks second
in the world, behind another German competitor, Johannes Mallow. In this module, we reveal
what psychologists and others have learned about memory, and we also explain the general
principles by which you can improve your own memory for factual material.
Varieties of Memory
collection of facts about the world (e.g., there how the other player could counter each of your planned
moves. [Image: karpidis, https://goo.gl/EhzMKM, CC BY-SA 2.0,
are 196 countries in the world, and 206
https://goo.gl/jSSrcO]
bones in your body). Collective memory refers
to the kind of memory that people in a group
share (whether family, community, schoolmates, or citizens of a state or a country). For
example, residents of small towns often strongly identify with those towns, remembering the
local customs and historical events in a unique way. That is, the community’s collective memory
passes stories and recollections between neighbors and to future generations, forming a
memory system unto itself.
Psychologists continue to debate the classification of types of memory, as well as which types
rely on others (Tulving, 2007), but for this module we will focus on episodic memory. Episodic
memory is usually what people think of when they hear the word “memory.” For example,
Memory (Encoding, Storage, Retrieval) 239
when people say that an older relative is “losing her memory” due to Alzheimer’s disease, the
type of memory-loss they are referring to is the inability to recall events, or episodic memory.
(Semantic memory is actually preserved in early-stage Alzheimer’s disease.) Although
remembering specific events that have happened over the course of one’s entire life (e.g.,
your experiences in sixth grade) can be referred to as autobiographical memory, we will focus
primarily on the episodic memories of more recent events.
Psychologists distinguish between three necessary stages in the learning and memory
process: encoding, storage, and retrieval (Melton, 1963). Encoding is defined as the initial
learning of information; storage refers to maintaining information over time; retrieval is the
ability to access information when you need it. If you meet someone for the first time at a
party, you need to encode her name (Lyn Goff) while you associate her name with her face.
Then you need to maintain the information over time. If you see her a week later, you need
to recognize her face and have it serve as a cue to retrieve her name. Any successful act of
remembering requires that all three stages be intact. However, two types of errors can also
occur. Forgetting is one type: you see the person you met at the party and you cannot recall
her name. The other error is misremembering (false recall or false recognition): you see
someone who looks like Lyn Goff and call the person by that name (false recognition of the
face). Or, you might see the real Lyn Goff, recognize her face, but then call her by the name
of another woman you met at the party (misrecall of her name).
Whenever forgetting or misremembering occurs, we can ask, at which stage in the learning/
memory process was there a failure?—though it is often difficult to answer this question with
precision. One reason for this inaccuracy is that the three stages are not as discrete as our
description implies. Rather, all three stages depend on one another. How we encode
information determines how it will be stored and what cues will be effective when we try to
retrieve it. And too, the act of retrieval itself also changes the way information is subsequently
remembered, usually aiding later recall of the retrieved information. The central point for now
is that the three stages—encoding, storage, and retrieval—affect one another, and are
inextricably bound together.
Encoding
Encoding refers to the initial experience of perceiving and learning information. Psychologists
often study recall by having participants study a list of pictures or words. Encoding in these
situations is fairly straightforward. However, “real life” encoding is much more challenging.
Memory (Encoding, Storage, Retrieval) 240
When you walk across campus, for example, you encounter countless sights and sounds—
friends passing by, people playing Frisbee, music in the air. The physical and mental
environments are much too rich for you to encode all the happenings around you or the
internal thoughts you have in response to them. So, an important first principle of encoding
is that it is selective: we attend to some events in our environment and we ignore others. A
second point about encoding is that it is prolific; we are always encoding the events of our
lives—attending to the world, trying to understand it. Normally this presents no problem, as
our days are filled with routine occurrences, so we don’t need to pay attention to everything.
But if something does happen that seems strange—during your daily walk across campus,
you see a giraffe—then we pay close attention and try to understand why we are seeing what
we are seeing.
event stand out as quite different from a https://goo.gl/Cci2yl, CC BY-SA 2.0, https://goo.gl/jSSrcO]
In addition, when vivid memories are tinged with strong emotional content, they often seem
to leave a permanent mark on us. Public tragedies, such as terrorist attacks, often create vivid
memories in those who witnessed them. But even those of us not directly involved in such
events may have vivid memories of them, including memories of first hearing about them.
Memory (Encoding, Storage, Retrieval) 241
For example, many people are able to recall their exact physical location when they first
learned about the assassination or accidental death of a national figure. The term flashbulb
memory was originally coined by Brown and Kulik (1977) to describe this sort of vivid memory
of finding out an important piece of news. The name refers to how some memories seem to
be captured in the mind like a flash photograph; because of the distinctiveness and
emotionality of the news, they seem to become permanently etched in the mind with
exceptional clarity compared to other memories.
Take a moment and think back on your own life. Is there a particular memory that seems
sharper than others? A memory where you can recall unusual details, like the colors of
mundane things around you, or the exact positions of surrounding objects? Although people
have great confidence in flashbulb memories like these, the truth is, our objective accuracy
with them is far from perfect (Talarico & Rubin, 2003). That is, even though people may have
great confidence in what they recall, their memories are not as accurate (e.g., what the actual
colors were; where objects were truly placed) as they tend to imagine. Nonetheless, all other
things being equal, distinctive and emotional events are well-remembered.
Details do not leap perfectly from the world into a person’s mind. We might say that we went
to a party and remember it, but what we remember is (at best) what we encoded. As noted
above, the process of encoding is selective, and in complex situations, relatively few of many
possible details are noticed and
encoded. The process of encoding
always involves recoding—that is, taking
the information from the form it is
delivered to us and then converting it in
a way that we can make sense of it. For
example, you might try to remember the
colors of a rainbow by using the acronym
ROY G BIV (red, orange, yellow, green,
blue, indigo, violet). The process of
recoding the colors into a name can help
us to remember. However, recoding can
also introduce errors—when we accidentally
add information during encoding, then
remember that new material as if it had
been part of the actual experience (as
Although it requires more effort, using images and associations can discussed below).
improve the process of recoding. [Image: psd, https://goo.gl/9xjcDe,
recoding strategies that can be used during study to improve retention. First, research advises
that, as we study, we should think of the meaning of the events (Craik & Lockhart, 1972), and
we should try to relate new events to information we already know. This helps us form
associations that we can use to retrieve information later. Second, imagining events also
makes them more memorable; creating vivid images out of information (even verbal
information) can greatly improve later recall (Bower & Reitman, 1972). Creating imagery is
part of the technique Simon Reinhard uses to remember huge numbers of digits, but we can
all use images to encode information more effectively. The basic concept behind good
encoding strategies is to form distinctive memories (ones that stand out), and to form links
or associations among memories to help later retrieval (Hunt & McDaniel, 1993). Using study
strategies such as the ones described here is challenging, but the effort is well worth the
benefits of enhanced learning and retention.
We emphasized earlier that encoding is selective: people cannot encode all information they
are exposed to. However, recoding can add information that was not even seen or heard
during the initial encoding phase. Several of the recoding processes, like forming associations
between memories, can happen without our awareness. This is one reason people can
sometimes remember events that did not actually happen—because during the process of
recoding, details got added. One common way of inducing false memories in the laboratory
employs a word-list technique (Deese, 1959; Roediger & McDermott, 1995). Participants hear
lists of 15 words, like door, glass, pane, shade, ledge, sill, house, open, curtain, frame, view, breeze,
sash, screen, and shutter. Later, participants are given a test in which they are shown a list of
words and asked to pick out the ones they’d heard earlier. This second list contains some
words from the first list (e.g., door, pane, frame) and some words not from the list (e.g., arm,
phone, bottle). In this example, one of the words on the test is window, which—importantly—
does not appear in the first list, but which is related to other words in that list. When subjects
were tested, they were reasonably accurate with the studied words (door, etc.), recognizing
them 72% of the time. However, when window was on the test, they falsely recognized it as
having been on the list 84% of the time (Stadler, Roediger, & McDermott, 1999). The same
thing happened with many other lists the authors used. This phenomenon is referred to as
the DRM (for Deese-Roediger-McDermott) effect. One explanation for such results is that,
while students listened to items in the list, the words triggered the students to think about
window, even though window was never presented. In this way, people seem to encode events
that are not actually part of their experience.
Because humans are creative, we are always going beyond the information we are given: we
automatically make associations and infer from them what is happening. But, as with the
word association mix-up above, sometimes we make false memories from our inferences—
remembering the inferences themselves as if they were actual experiences. To illustrate this,
Memory (Encoding, Storage, Retrieval) 243
Brewer (1977) gave people sentences to remember that were designed to elicit pragmatic
inferences. Inferences, in general, refer to instances when something is not explicitly stated,
but we are still able to guess the undisclosed intention. For example, if your friend told you
that she didn’t want to go out to eat, you may infer that she doesn’t have the money to go
out, or that she’s too tired. With pragmatic inferences, there is usually one particular inference
you’re likely to make. Consider the statement Brewer (1977) gave her participants: “The karate
champion hit the cinder block.” After hearing or seeing this sentence, participants who were
given a memory test tended to remember the statement as having been, “The karate champion
broke the cinder block.” This remembered statement is not necessarily a logical inference (i.
e., it is perfectly reasonable that a karate champion could hit a cinder block without breaking
it). Nevertheless, the pragmatic conclusion from hearing such a sentence is that the block was
likely broken. The participants remembered this inference they made while hearing the
sentence in place of the actual words that were in the sentence (see also McDermott & Chan,
2006).
Storage
note to remind you of something, the brain the past. [Simon Bierdwald, https://goo.gl/JDhdCE, CC BY-NC-
physical composition to do so. The basic idea is that events (occurrences in our environment)
create engrams through a process of consolidation: the neural changes that occur after
learning to create the memory trace of an experience. Although neurobiologists are concerned
with exactly what neural processes change when memories are created, for psychologists,
the term memory trace simply refers to the physical change in the nervous system (whatever
that may be, exactly) that represents our experience.
Although the concept of engram or memory trace is extremely useful, we shouldn’t take the
term too literally. It is important to understand that memory traces are not perfect little packets
of information that lie dormant in the brain, waiting to be called forward to give an accurate
report of past experience. Memory traces are not like video or audio recordings, capturing
experience with great accuracy; as discussed earlier, we often have errors in our memory,
which would not exist if memory traces were perfect packets of information. Thus, it is wrong
to think that remembering involves simply “reading out” a faithful record of past experience.
Rather, when we remember past events, we reconstruct them with the aid of our memory
traces—but also with our current belief of what happened. For example, if you were trying to
recall for the police who started a fight at a bar, you may not have a memory trace of who
pushed whom first. However, let’s say you remember that one of the guys held the door open
for you. When thinking back to the start of the fight, this knowledge (of how one guy was
friendly to you) may unconsciously influence your memory of what happened in favor of the
nice guy. Thus, memory is a construction of what you actually recall and what you believe
happened. In a phrase, remembering is reconstructive (we reconstruct our past with the aid
of memory traces) not reproductive (a perfect reproduction or recreation of the past).
Psychologists refer to the time between learning and testing as the retention interval.
Memories can consolidate during that time, aiding retention. However, experiences can also
occur that undermine the memory. For example, think of what you had for lunch yesterday
Memory (Encoding, Storage, Retrieval) 245
—a pretty easy task. However, if you had to recall what you had for lunch 17 days ago, you
may well fail (assuming you don’t eat the same thing every day). The 16 lunches you’ve had
since that one have created retroactive interference. Retroactive interference refers to new
activities (i.e., the subsequent lunches) during the retention interval (i.e., the time between
the lunch 17 days ago and now) that interfere with retrieving the specific, older memory (i.e.,
the lunch details from 17 days ago). But just as newer things can interfere with remembering
older things, so can the opposite happen. Proactive interference is when past memories
interfere with the encoding of new ones. For example, if you have ever studied a second
language, often times the grammar and vocabulary of your native language will pop into your
head, impairing your fluency in the foreign language.
Retroactive interference is one of the main causes of forgetting (McGeoch, 1932). In the module
Eyewitness Testimony and Memory Biases http://noba.to/uy49tm37 Elizabeth Loftus describes
her fascinating work on eyewitness memory, in which she shows how memory for an event
can be changed via misinformation supplied during the retention interval. For example, if you
witnessed a car crash but subsequently heard people describing it from their own perspective,
this new information may interfere with or disrupt your own personal recollection of the crash.
In fact, you may even come to remember the event happening exactly as the others described
it! This misinformation effect in eyewitness memory represents a type of retroactive
interference that can occur during the retention interval (see Loftus [2005] for a review). Of
course, if correct information is given during the retention interval, the witness’s memory will
usually be improved.
Although interference may arise between the occurrence of an event and the attempt to recall
it, the effect itself is always expressed when we retrieve memories, the topic to which we turn next.
Retrieval
Endel Tulving argued that “the key process in memory is retrieval” (1991, p. 91). Why should
retrieval be given more prominence than encoding or storage? For one thing, if information
were encoded and stored but could not be retrieved, it would be useless. As discussed
previously in this module, we encode and store thousands of events—conversations, sights
and sounds—every day, creating memory traces. However, we later access only a tiny portion
of what we’ve taken in. Most of our memories will never be used—in the sense of being brought
back to mind, consciously. This fact seems so obvious that we rarely reflect on it. All those
events that happened to you in the fourth grade that seemed so important then? Now, many
years later, you would struggle to remember even a few. You may wonder if the traces of
those memories still exist in some latent form. Unfortunately, with currently available
Memory (Encoding, Storage, Retrieval) 246
Psychologists distinguish information that is available in memory from that which is accessible
(Tulving & Pearlstone, 1966). Available information is the information that is stored in memory
—but precisely how much and what types are stored cannot be known. That is, all we can
know is what information we can retrieve—accessible information. The assumption is that
accessible information represents only a tiny slice of the information available in our brains.
Most of us have had the experience of trying to remember some fact or event, giving up, and
then—all of a sudden!—it comes to us at a later time, even after we’ve stopped trying to
remember it. Similarly, we all know the experience of failing to recall a fact, but then, if we are
given several choices (as in a multiple-choice test), we are easily able to recognize it.
or a different one. As a result of encoding specificity, the students who took the test in the
same place they learned the words were actually able to recall more words (Godden &
Baddeley, 1975) than the students who took the test in a new setting. In this instance, the
physical context itself provided cues for retrieval. This is why it’s good to study for midterms
and finals in the same room you’ll be taking them in.
One caution with this principle, though, is that, for the cue to work, it can’t match too many
other experiences (Nairne, 2002; Watkins, 1975). Consider a lab experiment. Suppose you
study 100 items; 99 are words, and one is a picture—of a penguin, item 50 in the list. Afterwards,
the cue “recall the picture” would evoke “penguin” perfectly. No one would miss it. However,
if the word “penguin” were placed in the same spot among the other 99 words, its memorability
would be exceptionally worse. This outcome shows the power of distinctiveness that we
discussed in the section on encoding: one picture is perfectly recalled from among 99 words
because it stands out. Now consider what would happen if the experiment were repeated,
but there were 25 pictures distributed within the 100-item list. Although the picture of the
penguin would still be there, the probability that the cue “recall the picture” (at item 50) would
be useful for the penguin would drop correspondingly. Watkins (1975) referred to this outcome
as demonstrating the cue overload principle. That is, to be effective, a retrieval cue cannot
be overloaded with too many memories. For the cue “recall the picture” to be effective, it
should only match one item in the target set (as in the one-picture, 99-word case).
To sum up how memory cues function: for a retrieval cue to be effective, a match must exist
between the cue and the desired target memory; furthermore, to produce the best retrieval,
the cue-target relationship should be distinctive. Next, we will see how the encoding specificity
principle can work in practice.
We usually think of recognition tests as being quite easy, because the cue for retrieval is a
copy of the actual event that was presented for study. After all, what could be a better cue
than the exact target (memory) the person is trying to access? In most cases, this line of
reasoning is true; nevertheless, recognition tests do not provide perfect indexes of what is
stored in memory. That is, you can fail to recognize a target staring you right in the face, yet
Memory (Encoding, Storage, Retrieval) 248
be able to recall it later with a different set of cues (Watkins & Tulving, 1975). For example,
suppose you had the task of recognizing the surnames of famous authors. At first, you might
think that being given the actual last name would always be the best cue. However, research
has shown this not necessarily to be true (Muter, 1984). When given names such as Tolstoy,
Shaw, Shakespeare, and Lee, subjects might well say that Tolstoy and Shakespeare are famous
authors, whereas Shaw and Lee are not. But, when given a cued recall test using first names,
people often recall items (produce them) that they had failed to recognize before. For example,
in this instance, a cue like George Bernard ________ often leads to a recall of “Shaw,” even though
people initially failed to recognize Shaw as a famous author’s name. Yet, when given the cue
“William,” people may not come up with Shakespeare, because William is a common name
that matches many people (the cue overload principle at work). This strange fact—that recall
can sometimes lead to better performance than recognition—can be explained by the
encoding specificity principle. As a cue, George Bernard _________ matches the way the famous
writer is stored in memory better than does his surname, Shaw, does (even though it is the
target). Further, the match is quite distinctive with George Bernard ___________, but the cue
William _________________ is much more overloaded (Prince William, William Yeats, William
Faulkner, will.i.am).
The phenomenon we have been describing is called the recognition failure of recallable words,
which highlights the point that a cue will be most effective depending on how the information
has been encoded (Tulving & Thomson, 1973). The point is, the cues that work best to evoke
retrieval are those that recreate the event or name to be remembered, whereas sometimes
even the target itself, such as Shaw in the above example, is not the best cue. Which cue will
be most effective depends on how the information has been encoded.
Whenever we think about our past, we engage in the act of retrieval. We usually think that
retrieval is an objective act because we tend to imagine that retrieving a memory is like pulling
a book from a shelf, and after we are done with it, we return the book to the shelf just as it
was. However, research shows this assumption to be false; far from being a static repository
of data, the memory is constantly changing. In fact, every time we retrieve a memory, it is
altered. For example, the act of retrieval itself (of a fact, concept, or event) makes the retrieved
memory much more likely to be retrieved again, a phenomenon called the testing effect or the
retrieval practice effect (Pyc & Rawson, 2009; Roediger & Karpicke, 2006). However, retrieving
some information can actually cause us to forget other information related to it, a
phenomenon called retrieval-induced forgetting (Anderson, Bjork, & Bjork, 1994). Thus the act
of retrieval can be a double-edged sword—strengthening the memory just retrieved (usually
by a large amount) but harming related information (though this effect is often relatively small).
bits and pieces of events in with assumptions and preferences to form a coherent story
(Bartlett, 1932). For example, if during your 10th birthday, your dog got to your cake before
you did, you would likely tell that story for years afterward. Say, then, in later years you
misremember where the dog actually found the cake, but repeat that error over and over
during subsequent retellings of the story. Over time, that inaccuracy would become a basic
fact of the event in your mind. Just as retrieval practice (repetition) enhances accurate
memories, so will it strengthen errors or false memories (McDermott, 2006). Sometimes
memories can even be manufactured just from hearing a vivid story. Consider the following
episode, recounted by Jean Piaget, the famous developmental psychologist, from his
childhood:
One of my first memories would date, if it were true, from my second year. I can still see,
most clearly, the following scene, in which I believed until I was about 15. I was sitting in
my pram . . . when a man tried to kidnap me. I was held in by the strap fastened round
me while my nurse bravely tried to stand between me and the thief. She received various
scratches, and I can still vaguely see those on her face. . . . When I was about 15, my parents
received a letter from my former nurse saying that she had been converted to the Salvation
Army. She wanted to confess her past faults, and in particular to return the watch she
had been given as a reward on this occasion. She had made up the whole story, faking
the scratches. I therefore must have heard, as a child, this story, which my parents believed,
and projected it into the past in the form of a visual memory. . . . Many real memories are
doubtless of the same order. (Norman & Schacter, 1997, pp. 187–188)
Piaget’s vivid account represents a case of a pure reconstructive memory. He heard the tale
told repeatedly, and doubtless told it (and thought about it) himself. The repeated telling
cemented the events as though they had really happened, just as we are all open to the
possibility of having “many real memories ... of the same order.” The fact that one can
remember precise details (the location, the scratches) does not necessarily indicate that the
memory is true, a point that has been confirmed in laboratory studies, too (e.g., Norman &
Schacter, 1997).
A central theme of this module has been the importance of the encoding and retrieval
processes, and their interaction. To recap: to improve learning and memory, we need to encode
information in conjunction with excellent cues that will bring back the remembered events
when we need them. But how do we do this? Keep in mind the two critical principles we have
discussed: to maximize retrieval, we should construct meaningful cues that remind us of the
Memory (Encoding, Storage, Retrieval) 250
original experience, and those cues should be distinctive and not associated with other
memories. These two conditions are critical in maximizing cue effectiveness (Nairne, 2002).
So, how can these principles be adapted for use in many situations? Let’s go back to how we
started the module, with Simon Reinhard’s ability to memorize huge numbers of digits.
Although it was not obvious, he applied these same general memory principles, but in a more
deliberate way. In fact, all mnemonic devices, or memory aids/tricks, rely on these
fundamental principles. In a typical case, the person learns a set of cues and then applies
these cues to learn and remember information. Consider the set of 20 items below that are
easy to learn and remember (Bower & Reitman, 1972).
It would probably take you less than 10 minutes to learn this list and practice recalling it several
times (remember to use retrieval practice!). If you were to do so, you would have a set of peg
words on which you could “hang” memories. In fact, this mnemonic device is called the peg
word technique. If you then needed to remember some discrete items—say a grocery list, or
points you wanted to make in a speech—this method would let you do so in a very precise
yet flexible way. Suppose you had to remember bread, peanut butter, bananas, lettuce, and
so on. The way to use the method is to form a vivid image of what you want to remember
and imagine it interacting with your peg words (as many as you need). For example, for these
items, you might imagine a large gun (the first peg word) shooting a loaf of bread, then a jar
of peanut butter inside a shoe, then large bunches of bananas hanging from a tree, then a
door slamming on a head of lettuce with leaves flying everywhere. The idea is to provide good,
distinctive cues (the weirder the better!) for the information you need to remember while you
are learning it. If you do this, then retrieving it later is relatively easy. You know your cues
perfectly (one is gun, etc.), so you simply go through your cue word list and “look” in your
Memory (Encoding, Storage, Retrieval) 251
Many books exist on how to improve memory using mnemonic devices, but all involve forming
distinctive encoding operations and then having an infallible set of memory cues. We should
add that to develop and use these memory systems beyond the basic peg system outlined
Memory (Encoding, Storage, Retrieval) 252
above takes a great amount of time and concentration. The World Memory Championships
are held every year and the records keep improving. However, for most common purposes,
just keep in mind that to remember well you need to encode information in a distinctive way
and to have good cues for retrieval. You can adapt a system that will meet most any purpose.
Memory (Encoding, Storage, Retrieval) 253
Outside Resources
Book: Brown, P.C., Roediger, H. L. & McDaniel, M. A. (2014). Make it stick: The science of
successful learning. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
https://www.amazon.com/Make-Stick-Science-Successful-Learning/dp/0674729013
Student Video 3: Ang Rui Xia & Ong Jun Hao\\\\\\\'s - The Misinformation Effect. Another
student-made video exploring the misinformation effect. Also an award winner from 2014.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gsn9iKmOJLQ
Web: Retrieval Practice, a website with research, resources, and tips for both educators
and learners around the memory-strengthening skill of retrieval practice.
http://www.retrievalpractice.org/
Discussion Questions
1. Mnemonists like Simon Reinhard develop mental “journeys,” which enable them to use the
method of loci. Develop your own journey, which contains 20 places, in order, that you
know well. One example might be: the front walkway to your parents’ apartment; their
doorbell; the couch in their living room; etc. Be sure to use a set of places that you know
well and that have a natural order to them (e.g., the walkway comes before the doorbell).
Now you are more than halfway toward being able to memorize a set of 20 nouns, in order,
rather quickly. As an optional second step, have a friend make a list of 20 such nouns and
read them to you, slowly (e.g., one every 5 seconds). Use the method to attempt to
Memory (Encoding, Storage, Retrieval) 254
2. Recall a recent argument or misunderstanding you have had about memory (e.g., a debate
over whether your girlfriend/boyfriend had agreed to something). In light of what you have
just learned about memory, how do you think about it? Is it possible that the disagreement
can be understood by one of you making a pragmatic inference?
3. Think about what you’ve learned in this module and about how you study for tests. On the
basis of what you have learned, is there something you want to try that might help your
study habits?
Memory (Encoding, Storage, Retrieval) 255
Vocabulary
Autobiographical memory
Memory for the events of one’s life.
Consolidation
The process occurring after encoding that is believed to stabilize memory traces.
Distinctiveness
The principle that unusual events (in a context of similar events) will be recalled and recognized
better than uniform (nondistinctive) events.
Encoding
The initial experience of perceiving and learning events.
Engrams
A term indicating the change in the nervous system representing an event; also, memory trace.
Episodic memory
Memory for events in a particular time and place.
Flashbulb memory
Vivid personal memories of receiving the news of some momentous (and usually emotional)
event.
Memory traces
A term indicating the change in the nervous system representing an event.
Misinformation effect
When erroneous information occurring after an event is remembered as having been part of
Memory (Encoding, Storage, Retrieval) 256
Mnemonic devices
A strategy for remembering large amounts of information, usually involving imaging events
occurring on a journey or with some other set of memorized cues.
Recoding
The ubiquitous process during learning of taking information in one form and converting it
to another form, usually one more easily remembered.
Retrieval
The process of accessing stored information.
Retroactive interference
The phenomenon whereby events that occur after some particular event of interest will usually
cause forgetting of the original event.
Semantic memory
The more or less permanent store of knowledge that people have.
Storage
The stage in the learning/memory process that bridges encoding and retrieval; the persistence
of memory over time.
Memory (Encoding, Storage, Retrieval) 257
References
Anderson, M. C., Bjork, R., & Bjork, E. L. (1994). Remembering can cause forgetting: Retrieval
dynamics in long-term memory. Journal of Experimental Psychology-Learning Memory and
Cognition, 20, 1063–1087.
Bower, G. H., & Reitman, J. S. (1972). Mnemonic elaboration in multilist learning. Journal of
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15
Eyewitness Testimony and Memory
Biases
Cara Laney & Elizabeth F. Loftus
Eyewitnesses can provide very compelling legal testimony, but rather than recording
experiences flawlessly, their memories are susceptible to a variety of errors and biases. They
(like the rest of us) can make errors in remembering specific details and can even remember
whole events that did not actually happen. In this module, we discuss several of the common
types of errors, and what they can tell us about human memory and its interactions with the
legal system.
Learning Objectives
• Describe the kinds of mistakes that eyewitnesses commonly make and some of the ways
that this can impede justice.
• Describe some of the important research that has demonstrated human memory errors
and their consequences.
Eyewitness testimony is what happens when a person witnesses a crime (or accident, or other
legally important event) and later gets up on the stand and recalls for the court all the details
of the witnessed event. It involves a more complicated process than might initially be
Eyewitness Testimony and Memory Biases 261
presumed. It includes what happens during the actual crime to facilitate or hamper witnessing,
as well as everything that happens from the time the event is over to the later courtroom
appearance. The eyewitness may be interviewed by the police and numerous lawyers, describe
the perpetrator to several different people, and make an identification of the perpetrator,
among other things.
What can happen to our memory from the time we witness an event to the retelling
of that event later? What can influence how we remember, or misremember, highly
significant events like a crime or accident? [Image: Robert Couse-Baker, https://goo.
When an eyewitness stands up in front of the court and describes what happened from her
own perspective, this testimony can be extremely compelling—it is hard for those hearing
this testimony to take it “with a grain of salt,” or otherwise adjust its power. But to what extent
is this necessary?
There is now a wealth of evidence, from research conducted over several decades, suggesting
that eyewitness testimony is probably the most persuasive form of evidence presented in
court, but in many cases, its accuracy is dubious. There is also evidence that mistaken
eyewitness evidence can lead to wrongful conviction—sending people to prison for years or
decades, even to death row, for crimes they did not commit. Faulty eyewitness testimony has
been implicated in at least 75% of DNA exoneration cases—more than any other cause
(Garrett, 2011). In a particularly famous case, a man named Ronald Cotton was identified by
Eyewitness Testimony and Memory Biases 262
a rape victim, Jennifer Thompson, as her rapist, and was found guilty and sentenced to life in
prison. After more than 10 years, he was exonerated (and the real rapist identified) based on
DNA evidence. For details on this case and other (relatively) lucky individuals whose false
convictions were subsequently overturned with DNA evidence, see the Innocence Project
website (http://www.innocenceproject.org/).
There is also hope, though, that many of the errors may be avoidable if proper precautions
are taken during the investigative and judicial processes. Psychological science has taught us
what some of those precautions might involve, and we discuss some of that science now.
Misinformation
exposed to after they witness an event (see Frenda, Nichols, & Loftus, 2011; Loftus, 2005). The
misinformation in these studies has led people to incorrectly remember everything from small
but crucial details of a perpetrator’s appearance to objects as large as a barn that wasn’t there
at all.
These studies have demonstrated that young adults (the typical research subjects in
psychology) are often susceptible to misinformation, but that children and older adults can
be even more susceptible (Bartlett & Memon, 2007; Ceci & Bruck, 1995). In addition,
misinformation effects can occur easily, and without any intention to deceive (Allan & Gabbert,
2008). Even slight differences in the wording of a question can lead to misinformation effects.
Subjects in one study were more likely to say yes when asked “Did you see the broken
headlight?” than when asked “Did you see a broken headlight?” (Loftus, 1975).
Other studies have shown that misinformation can corrupt memory even more easily when
it is encountered in social situations (Gabbert, Memon, Allan, & Wright, 2004). This is a problem
particularly in cases where more than one person witnesses a crime. In these cases, witnesses
tend to talk to one another in the immediate aftermath of the crime, including as they wait
for police to arrive. But because different witnesses are different people with different
perspectives, they are likely to see or notice different things, and thus remember different
things, even when they witness the same event. So when they communicate about the crime
later, they not only reinforce common memories for the event, they also contaminate each
other’s memories for the event (Gabbert, Memon, & Allan, 2003; Paterson & Kemp, 2006;
Takarangi, Parker, & Garry, 2006).
The misinformation effect has been modeled in the laboratory. Researchers had subjects
watch a video in pairs. Both subjects sat in front of the same screen, but because they wore
differently polarized glasses, they saw two different versions of a video, projected onto a
screen. So, although they were both watching the same screen, and believed (quite reasonably)
that they were watching the same video, they were actually watching two different versions
of the video (Garry, French, Kinzett, & Mori, 2008).
In the video, Eric the electrician is seen wandering through an unoccupied house and helping
himself to the contents thereof. A total of eight details were different between the two videos.
After watching the videos, the “co-witnesses” worked together on 12 memory test questions.
Four of these questions dealt with details that were different in the two versions of the video,
so subjects had the chance to influence one another. Then subjects worked individually on
20 additional memory test questions. Eight of these were for details that were different in the
two videos. Subjects’ accuracy was highly dependent on whether they had discussed the
details previously. Their accuracy for items they had not previously discussed with their co-
Eyewitness Testimony and Memory Biases 264
witness was 79%. But for items that they had discussed, their accuracy dropped markedly, to
34%. That is, subjects allowed their co-witnesses to corrupt their memories for what they had
seen.
Identifying Perpetrators
In addition to correctly remembering many details of the crimes they witness, eyewitnesses
often need to remember the faces and other identifying features of the perpetrators of those
crimes. Eyewitnesses are often asked to describe that perpetrator to law enforcement and
later to make identifications from books of mug shots or lineups. Here, too, there is a
substantial body of research demonstrating that eyewitnesses can make serious, but often
understandable and even predictable, errors (Caputo & Dunning, 2007; Cutler & Penrod, 1995).
In most jurisdictions in the United States, lineups are typically conducted with pictures, called
photo spreads, rather than with actual people standing behind one-way glass (Wells, Memon,
& Penrod, 2006). The eyewitness is given a set of small pictures of perhaps six or eight
individuals who are dressed similarly and photographed in similar circumstances. One of
these individuals is the police suspect, and the remainder are “foils” or “fillers” (people known
to be innocent of the particular crime under investigation). If the eyewitness identifies the
suspect, then the investigation of that
suspect is likely to progress. If a witness
identifies a foil or no one, then the police
may choose to move their investigation in
another direction.
perpetrator out of the lineup. The particular details of the witnessing experience, the
instructions, and the lineup members can all influence the extent to which the mock witness
is likely to pick the perpetrator out of the lineup, or indeed to make any selection at all. Mock
witnesses (and indeed real witnesses) can make errors in two different ways. They can fail to
pick the perpetrator out of a target present lineup (by picking a foil or by neglecting to make
a selection), or they can pick a foil in a target absent lineup (wherein the only correct choice
is to not make a selection).
Some factors have been shown to make eyewitness identification errors particularly likely.
These include poor vision or viewing conditions during the crime, particularly stressful
witnessing experiences, too little time to view the perpetrator or perpetrators, too much delay
between witnessing and identifying, and being asked to identify a perpetrator from a race
other than one’s own (Bornstein, Deffenbacher, Penrod, & McGorty, 2012; Brigham, Bennett,
Meissner, & Mitchell, 2007; Burton, Wilson, Cowan, & Bruce, 1999; Deffenbacher, Bornstein,
Penrod, & McGorty, 2004).
It is hard for the legal system to do much about most of these problems. But there are some
things that the justice system can do to help lineup identifications “go right.” For example,
investigators can put together high-quality, fair lineups. A fair lineup is one in which the suspect
and each of the foils is equally likely to be chosen by someone who has read an eyewitness
description of the perpetrator but who did not actually witness the crime (Brigham, Ready, &
Spier, 1990). This means that no one in the lineup should “stick out,” and that everyone should
match the description given by the eyewitness. Other important recommendations that have
come out of this research include better ways to conduct lineups, “double blind” lineups,
unbiased instructions for witnesses, and conducting lineups in a sequential fashion (see
Technical Working Group for Eyewitness Evidence, 1999; Wells et al., 1998; Wells & Olson,
2003).
Memory is also susceptible to a wide variety of other biases and errors. People can forget
events that happened to them and people they once knew. They can mix up details across
time and place. They can even remember whole complex events that never happened at all.
Importantly, these errors, once made, can be very hard to unmake. A memory is no less
“memorable” just because it is wrong.
Some small memory errors are commonplace, and you have no doubt experienced many of
them. You set down your keys without paying attention, and then cannot find them later when
Eyewitness Testimony and Memory Biases 266
patterns by forming and using schemata, with information overload. However, they may make it difficult
or impossible to recall certain details of a situation later. Do you
or memory templates (Alba & Hasher,
recall the library as it actually was or the library as approximated
1983; Brewer & Treyens, 1981). Thus, we by your library schemata? [Dan Kleinman, https://goo.
know to expect that a library will have gl/07xyDD, CC BY 2.0, https://goo.gl/BRvSA7]
shelves and tables and librarians, and so
we don’t have to spend energy noticing these at the time. The result of this lack of attention,
however, is that one is likely to remember schema-consistent information (such as tables),
and to remember them in a rather generic way, whether or not they were actually present.
False Memory
Some memory errors are so “large” that they almost belong in a class of their own: false
memories. Back in the early 1990s a pattern emerged whereby people would go into therapy
for depression and other everyday problems, but over the course of the therapy develop
memories for violent and horrible victimhood (Loftus & Ketcham, 1994). These patients’
therapists claimed that the patients were recovering genuine memories of real childhood
abuse, buried deep in their minds for years or even decades. But some experimental
psychologists believed that the memories were instead likely to be false—created in therapy.
These researchers then set out to see whether it would indeed be possible for wholly false
memories to be created by procedures similar to those used in these patients’ therapy.
In early false memory studies, undergraduate subjects’ family members were recruited to
provide events from the students’ lives. The student subjects were told that the researchers
Eyewitness Testimony and Memory Biases 267
had talked to their family members and learned about four different events from their
childhoods. The researchers asked if the now undergraduate students remembered each of
these four events—introduced via short hints. The subjects were asked to write about each
of the four events in a booklet and then were interviewed two separate times. The trick was
that one of the events came from the researchers rather than the family (and the family had
actually assured the researchers that this event had not happened to the subject). In the first
such study, this researcher-introduced event was a story about being lost in a shopping mall
and rescued by an older adult. In this study, after just being asked whether they remembered
these events occurring on three separate occasions, a quarter of subjects came to believe
that they had indeed been lost in the mall (Loftus & Pickrell, 1995). In subsequent studies,
similar procedures were used to get subjects to believe that they nearly drowned and had
been rescued by a lifeguard, or that they had spilled punch on the bride’s parents at a family
wedding, or that they had been attacked by a vicious animal as a child, among other events
(Heaps & Nash, 1999; Hyman, Husband, & Billings, 1995; Porter, Yuille, & Lehman, 1999).
More recent false memory studies have used a variety of different manipulations to produce
false memories in substantial minorities and even occasional majorities of manipulated
subjects (Braun, Ellis, & Loftus, 2002; Lindsay, Hagen, Read, Wade, & Garry, 2004; Mazzoni,
Loftus, Seitz, & Lynn, 1999; Seamon, Philbin, & Harrison, 2006; Wade, Garry, Read, & Lindsay,
2002). For example, one group of researchers used a mock-advertising study, wherein subjects
were asked to review (fake) advertisements for Disney vacations, to convince subjects that
they had once met the character Bugs Bunny at Disneyland—an impossible false memory
because Bugs is a Warner Brothers character (Braun et al., 2002). Another group of researchers
photoshopped childhood photographs of their subjects into a hot air balloon picture and then
asked the subjects to try to remember and describe their hot air balloon experience (Wade
et al., 2002). Other researchers gave subjects unmanipulated class photographs from their
childhoods along with a fake story about a class prank, and thus enhanced the likelihood that
subjects would falsely remember the prank (Lindsay et al., 2004).
Using a false feedback manipulation, we have been able to persuade subjects to falsely
remember having a variety of childhood experiences. In these studies, subjects are told
(falsely) that a powerful computer system has analyzed questionnaires that they completed
previously and has concluded that they had a particular experience years earlier. Subjects
apparently believe what the computer says about them and adjust their memories to match
this new information. A variety of different false memories have been implanted in this way.
In some studies, subjects are told they once got sick on a particular food (Bernstein, Laney,
Morris, & Loftus, 2005). These memories can then spill out into other aspects of subjects’ lives,
such that they often become less interested in eating that food in the future (Bernstein &
Loftus, 2009b). Other false memories implanted with this methodology include having an
Eyewitness Testimony and Memory Biases 268
unpleasant experience with the character Pluto at Disneyland and witnessing physical violence
between one’s parents (Berkowitz, Laney, Morris, Garry, & Loftus, 2008; Laney & Loftus, 2008).
Importantly, once these false memories are implanted—whether through complex methods
or simple ones—it is extremely difficult to tell them apart from true memories (Bernstein &
Loftus, 2009a; Laney & Loftus, 2008).
Conclusion
To conclude, eyewitness testimony is very powerful and convincing to jurors, even though it
is not particularly reliable. Identification errors occur, and these errors can lead to people
being falsely accused and even convicted. Likewise, eyewitness memory can be corrupted by
leading questions, misinterpretations of events, conversations with co-witnesses, and their
own expectations for what should have happened. People can even come to remember whole
events that never occurred.
The problems with memory in the legal system are real. But what can we do to start to fix
them? A number of specific recommendations have already been made, and many of these
are in the process of being implemented (e.g., Steblay & Loftus, 2012; Technical Working Group
for Eyewitness Evidence, 1999; Wells et al., 1998). Some of these recommendations are aimed
at specific legal procedures, including when and how witnesses should be interviewed, and
how lineups should be constructed and conducted. Other recommendations call for
appropriate education (often in the form of expert witness testimony) to be provided to jury
members and others tasked with assessing eyewitness memory. Eyewitness testimony can
be of great value to the legal system, but decades of research now argues that this testimony
is often given far more weight than its accuracy justifies.
Eyewitness Testimony and Memory Biases 269
Outside Resources
Video 2: Ang Rui Xia & Ong Jun Hao's - The Misinformation Effect. Another student-made
video exploring the misinformation effect. Also an award winner from 2014.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gsn9iKmOJLQ
Discussion Questions
1. Imagine that you are a juror in a murder case where an eyewitness testifies. In what ways
might your knowledge of memory errors affect your use of this testimony?
2. How true to life do you think television shows such as CSI or Law & Order are in their
portrayals of eyewitnesses?
3. Many jurisdictions in the United States use “show-ups,” where an eyewitness is brought to
a suspect (who may be standing on the street or in handcuffs in the back of a police car)
and asked, “Is this the perpetrator?” Is this a good or bad idea, from a psychological
perspective? Why?
Eyewitness Testimony and Memory Biases 270
Vocabulary
False memories
Memory for an event that never actually occurred, implanted by experimental manipulation
or other means.
Foils
Any member of a lineup (whether live or photograph) other than the suspect.
Misinformation effect
A memory error caused by exposure to incorrect information between the original event (e.
g., a crime) and later memory test (e.g., an interview, lineup, or day in court).
Mock witnesses
A research subject who plays the part of a witness in a study.
Photo spreads
A selection of normally small photographs of faces given to a witness for the purpose of
identifying a perpetrator.
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Cognition, Language and Intelligence
16
Judgment and Decision Making
Max H. Bazerman
Humans are not perfect decision makers. Not only are we not perfect, but we depart from
perfection or rationality in systematic and predictable ways. The understanding of these
systematic and predictable departures is core to the field of judgment and decision making.
By understanding these limitations, we can also identify strategies for making better and more
effective decisions.
Learning Objectives
• Understand the systematic biases that affect our judgment and decision making.
Introduction
Every day you have the opportunity to make countless decisions: should you eat dessert,
cheat on a test, or attend a sports event with your friends. If you reflect on your own history
of choices you will realize that they vary in quality; some are rational and some are not. This
module provides an overview of decision making and includes discussion of many of the
common biases involved in this process.
In his Nobel Prize–winning work, psychologist Herbert Simon (1957; March & Simon, 1958)
argued that our decisions are bounded in their rationality. According to the bounded
Judgment and Decision Making 276
rationality framework, human beings try to make rational decisions (such as weighing the
costs and benefits of a choice) but our cognitive limitations prevent us from being fully rational.
Time and cost constraints limit the quantity and quality of the information that is available to
us. Moreover, we only retain a relatively small amount of information in our usable memory.
And limitations on intelligence and perceptions constrain the ability of even very bright
decision makers to accurately make the best choice based on the information that is available.
About 15 years after the publication of Simon’s seminal work, Tversky and Kahneman (1973,
1974; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) produced their own Nobel Prize–winning research, which
provided critical information about specific systematic and predictable biases, or mistakes,
that influence judgment (Kahneman received the prize after Tversky’s death). The work of
Simon, Tversky, and Kahneman paved the way to our modern understanding of judgment
and decision making. And their two Nobel prizes signaled the broad acceptance of the field
of behavioral decision research as a mature area of intellectual study.
I strongly advise people to think through important decisions such as this in a manner similar
to this process. Unfortunately, we often don’t. Many of us rely on our intuitions far more than
we should. And when we do try to think systematically, the way we enter data into such formal
decision-making processes is often biased.
Fortunately, psychologists have learned a great deal about the biases that affect our thinking.
This knowledge about the systematic and predictable mistakes that even the best and the
brightest make can help you identify flaws in your thought processes and reach better
decisions.
Simon’s concept of bounded rationality taught us that judgment deviates from rationality, but
it did not tell us how judgment is biased. Tversky and Kahneman’s (1974) research helped to
diagnose the specific systematic, directional biases that affect human judgment. These biases
are created by the tendency to short-circuit a rational decision process by relying on a number
of simplifying strategies, or rules of thumb, known as heuristics. Heuristics allow us to cope
with the complex environment surrounding our decisions. Unfortunately, they also lead to
systematic and predictable biases.
To highlight some of these biases please answer the following three quiz items:
Listed below are 10 uncertain quantities. Do not look up any information on these items. For
each, write down your best estimate of the quantity. Next, put a lower and upper bound
around your estimate, such that you are 98 percent confident that your range surrounds the
actual quantity. Respond to each of these items even if you admit to knowing very little about
these quantities.
We know that executive fraud occurs and that it has been associated with many recent financial
scandals. And, we know that many cases of management fraud go undetected even when
annual audits are performed. Do you think that the incidence of significant executive-level
management fraud is more than 10 in 1,000 firms (that is, 1 percent) audited by Big Four
accounting firms?
1. Yes, more than 10 in 1,000 Big Four clients have significant executive-level management
fraud.
2. No, fewer than 10 in 1,000 Big Four clients have significant executive-level management
fraud.
What is your estimate of the number of Big Four clients per 1,000 that have significant
executive-level management fraud? (Fill in the blank below with the appropriate number.)
________ in 1,000 Big Four clients have significant executive-level management fraud.
Imagine that the United States is preparing for the outbreak of an unusual avian disease that
is expected to kill 600 people. Two alternative programs to combat the disease have been
proposed. Assume that the exact scientific estimates of the consequences of the programs
are as follows.
2. Program B: If Program B is adopted, there is a one-third probability that 600 people will be
saved and a two-thirds probability that no people will be saved.
Overconfidence
On the first problem, if you set your ranges so that you were justifiably 98 percent confident,
you should expect that approximately 9.8, or nine to 10, of your ranges would include the
actual value. So, let’s look at the correct answers:
1. 1901
2. 14th of July
7. $6.007 billion
9. 4,321
10. 52
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Anchoring
Regarding the second problem, people vary a great deal in their final assessment of the level
of executive-level management fraud, but most think that 10 out of 1,000 is too low. When I
run this exercise in class, half of the students respond to the question that I asked you to
answer. The other half receive a similar problem, but instead are asked whether the correct
answer is higher or lower than 200 rather than 10. Most people think that 200 is high. But,
again, most people claim that this “anchor” does not affect their final estimate. Yet, on average,
Judgment and Decision Making 280
people who are presented with the question that focuses on the number 10 (out of 1,000)
give answers that are about one-half the size of the estimates of those facing questions that
use an anchor of 200. When we are making decisions, any initial anchor that we face is likely
to influence our judgments, even if the anchor is arbitrary. That is, we insufficiently adjust our
judgments away from the anchor.
Framing
Turning to Problem 3, most people choose Program A, which saves 200 lives for sure, over
Program B. But, again, if I was in front of a classroom, only half of my students would receive
this problem. The other half would have received the same set-up, but with the following two
options:
2. Program D: If Program D is adopted, there is a one-third probability that no one will die
and a two-thirds probability that 600 people will die.
Careful review of the two versions of this problem clarifies that they are objectively the same.
Saving 200 people (Program A) means losing 400 people (Program C), and Programs B and D
are also objectively identical. Yet, in one of the most famous problems in judgment and
decision making, most individuals choose Program A in the first set and Program D in the
second set (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). People respond very differently to saving versus
losing lives—even when the difference is based just on the “framing” of the choices.
The problem that I asked you to respond to was framed in terms of saving lives, and the
implied reference point was the worst outcome of 600 deaths. Most of us, when we make
decisions that concern gains, are risk averse; as a consequence, we lock in the possibility of
saving 200 lives for sure. In the alternative version, the problem is framed in terms of losses.
Now the implicit reference point is the best outcome of no deaths due to the avian disease.
And in this case, most people are risk seeking when making decisions regarding losses.
These are just three of the many biases that affect even the smartest among us. Other research
shows that we are biased in favor of information that is easy for our minds to retrieve, are
insensitive to the importance of base rates and sample sizes when we are making inferences,
assume that random events will always look random, search for information that confirms
our expectations even when disconfirming information would be more informative, claim a
Judgment and Decision Making 281
priori knowledge that didn’t exist due to the hindsight bias, and are subject to a host of other
effects that continue to be developed in the literature (Bazerman & Moore, 2013).
Contemporary Developments
My colleagues and I have recently added two other important bounds to the list. Chugh,
Banaji, and Bazerman (2005) and Banaji and Bhaskar (2000) introduced the concept of
bounded ethicality, which refers to the notion that our ethics are limited in ways we are not
even aware of ourselves. Second, Chugh and Bazerman (2007) developed the concept of
bounded awareness to refer to the broad array of focusing failures that affect our judgment,
specifically the many ways in which we fail to notice obvious and important information that
is available to us.
A final development is the application of judgment and decision-making research to the areas
of behavioral economics, behavioral finance, and behavioral marketing, among others. In
Judgment and Decision Making 282
each case, these fields have been transformed by applying and extending research from the
judgment and decision-making literature.
Ample evidence documents that even smart people are routinely impaired by biases. Early
research demonstrated, unfortunately, that awareness of these problems does little to reduce
bias (Fischhoff, 1982). The good news is that more recent research documents interventions
that do help us overcome our faulty thinking (Bazerman & Moore, 2013).
One critical path to fixing our biases is provided in Stanovich and West’s (2000) distinction
between System 1 and System 2 decision making. System 1 processing is our intuitive system,
which is typically fast, automatic, effortless, implicit, and emotional. System 2 refers to decision
making that is slower, conscious, effortful, explicit, and logical. The six logical steps of decision
making outlined earlier describe a System 2 process.
Clearly, a complete System 2 process is not required for every decision we make. In most
situations, our System 1 thinking is quite sufficient; it would be impractical, for example, to
logically reason through every choice we make while shopping for groceries. But, preferably,
System 2 logic should influence our most important decisions. Nonetheless, we use our
System 1 processes for most decisions in life, relying on it even when making important
decisions.
The key to reducing the effects of bias and improving our decisions is to transition from trusting
our intuitive System 1 thinking toward engaging more in deliberative System 2 thought.
Unfortunately, the busier and more rushed people are, the more they have on their minds,
and the more likely they are to rely on System 1 thinking (Chugh, 2004). The frantic pace of
professional life suggests that executives often rely on System 1 thinking (Chugh, 2004).
Fortunately, it is possible to identify conditions where we rely on intuition at our peril and
substitute more deliberative thought. One fascinating example of this substitution comes
from journalist Michael Lewis’ (2003) account of how Billy Beane, the general manager of the
Oakland Athletics, improved the outcomes of the failing baseball team after recognizing that
the intuition of baseball executives was limited and systematically biased and that their
intuitions had been incorporated into important decisions in ways that created enormous
mistakes. Lewis (2003) documents that baseball professionals tend to overgeneralize from
their personal experiences, be overly influenced by players’ very recent performances, and
overweigh what they see with their own eyes, despite the fact that players’ multiyear records
Judgment and Decision Making 283
provide far better data. By substituting valid predictors of future performance (System 2
thinking), the Athletics were able to outperform expectations given their very limited payroll.
Similarly, Johnson and Goldstein’s (2003) cross-European organ donation study reveals that
countries that have opt-in organ donation policies, where the default is not to harvest people’s
organs without their prior consent, sacrifice thousands of lives in comparison to opt-out
policies, where the default is to harvest organs. The United States and too many other
countries require that citizens opt in to organ donation through a proactive effort; as a
consequence, consent rates range between 4.25%–44% across these countries. In contrast,
changing the decision architecture to an opt-out policy improves consent rates to 85.9% to
99.98%. Designing the donation system with knowledge of the power of defaults can
dramatically change donation rates without changing the options available to citizens. In
contrast, a more intuitive strategy, such as the one in place in the United States, inspires
defaults that result in many unnecessary deaths.
Judgment and Decision Making 284
Concluding Thoughts
Our days are filled with decisions ranging from the small (what should I wear today?) to the
important (should we get married?). Many have real world consequences on our health,
finances and relationships. Simon, Kahneman, and Tversky created a field that highlights the
surprising and predictable deficiencies of the human mind when making decisions. As we
understand more about our own biases and thinking shortcomings we can begin to take them
into account or to avoid them. Only now have we reached the frontier of using this knowledge
to help people make better decisions.
Judgment and Decision Making 285
Outside Resources
Book: Bazerman, M. H., & Moore, D. (2013). Judgment in managerial decision making (8th ed.).
John Wiley & Sons Inc.
Book: Kahneman, D. (2011) Thinking, Fast and Slow. New York, NY: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
Book: Thaler, R. H., & Sunstein, C. R. (2008). Nudge: Improving Decisions about Health,
Wealth, and Happiness. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Discussion Questions
Vocabulary
Anchoring
The bias to be affected by an initial anchor, even if the anchor is arbitrary, and to insufficiently
adjust our judgments away from that anchor.
Biases
The systematic and predictable mistakes that influence the judgment of even very talented
human beings.
Bounded awareness
The systematic ways in which we fail to notice obvious and important information that is
available to us.
Bounded ethicality
The systematic ways in which our ethics are limited in ways we are not even aware of ourselves.
Bounded rationality
Model of human behavior that suggests that humans try to make rational decisions but are
bounded due to cognitive limitations.
Bounded self-interest
The systematic and predictable ways in which we care about the outcomes of others.
Bounded willpower
The tendency to place greater weight on present concerns rather than future concerns.
Framing
The bias to be systematically affected by the way in which information is presented, while
holding the objective information constant.
Heuristics
cognitive (or thinking) strategies that simplify decision making by using mental short-cuts
Overconfident
The bias to have greater confidence in your judgment than is warranted based on a rational
assessment.
Judgment and Decision Making 287
System 1
Our intuitive decision-making system, which is typically fast, automatic, effortless, implicit,
and emotional.
System 2
Our more deliberative decision-making system, which is slower, conscious, effortful, explicit,
and logical.
Judgment and Decision Making 288
References
Alpert, M., & Raiffa, H. (1969). A progress report on the training of probability assessors.
Unpublished Report.
Banaji, M. R., & Bhaskar, R. (2000). Implicit stereotypes and memory: The bounded rationality
of social beliefs. In D. L. Schacter & E. Scarry (Eds.), Memory, brain, and belief (pp. 139–175).
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Bazerman, M. H., & Moore, D. (2013). Judgment in managerial decision making (8th ed.). John
Wiley & Sons Inc.
Beshears, J., Choi, J. J., Laibson, D., & Madrian, B. C. (2008). The importance of default options
for retirement saving outcomes: Evidence from the United States. In S. J. Kay & T. Sinha
(Eds.), Lessons from pension reform in the Americas (pp. 59–87). Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
Chugh, D. (2004). Societal and managerial implications of implicit social cognition: Why
milliseconds matter. Social Justice Research, 17(2), 203–222.
Chugh, D., & Bazerman, M. H. (2007). Bounded awareness: What you fail to see can hurt you.
Mind & Society, 6(1), 1–18.
Chugh, D., Banaji, M. R., & Bazerman, M. H. (2005). Bounded ethicality as a psychological barrier
to recognizing conflicts of interest. In D. Moore, D. M. Cain, G. Loewenstein, & M. H.
Bazerman (Eds.), Conflicts of Interest (pp. 74–95). New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
Fischhoff, B. (1982). Debiasing. In D. Kahneman, P. Slovic, & A. Tversky (Eds.), Judgment under
uncertainty: Heuristics and biases (pp. 422–444). New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
Johnson, E. J., & Goldstein, D. (2003). Do defaults save lives? Science 302(5649), 1338–1339.
Joyce, E. J., & Biddle, G. C. (1981). Are auditors’ judgments sufficiently regressive? Journal of
Accounting Research, 19(2), 323–349.
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1979). Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk.
Econometrica, 47(2), 263–292.
Lewis, M. (2003). Moneyball: The art of winning an unfair game. New York, NY: W.W. Norton &
Company Ltd.
Simon, H. A. (1957). Models of man, social and rational: Mathematical essays on rational human
behavior in a social setting. New York, NY: John Wiley & Sons.
Stanovich, K. E., & West, R. F. (2000). Individual differences in reasoning: Implications for the
rationality debate? Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 23, 645–726.
Judgment and Decision Making 289
Thaler, R. H., & Sunstein, C. R. (2008). Nudge: Improving decisions about health, wealth, and
happiness. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1981). The framing of decisions and the psychology of choice.
Science, New Series, 211(4481), 453–458.
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1974). Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases. Science,
New Series, 185(4157), 1124–1131.
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1973). Availability: A heuristic for judging frequency and
probability. Cognitive Psychology, 5(2), 207–232.
17
Language and Language Use
Yoshihisa Kashima
Humans have the capacity to use complex language, far more than any other species on Earth.
We cooperate with each other to use language for communication; language is often used to
communicate about and even construct and maintain our social world. Language use and
human sociality are inseparable parts of Homo sapiens as a biological species.
Learning Objectives
• Describe the process by which people can share new information by using language.
Introduction
Imagine two men of 30-something age, Adam and Ben, walking down the corridor. Judging
from their clothing, they are young businessmen, taking a break from work. They then have
this exchange.
If you are watching this scene and hearing their conversation, what can you guess from this?
First of all, you’d guess that Gary bought a ring for Mary, whoever Gary and Mary might be.
Perhaps you would infer that Gary is getting married to Mary. What else can you guess?
Perhaps that Adam and Ben are fairly close colleagues, and both of them know Gary and Mary
reasonably well. In other words, you can guess the social relationships surrounding the people
who are engaging in the conversation and the people whom they are talking about.
language spontaneously with minimum lives we do. Much of contemporary human civilization wouldn’t
have been possible without it. [Image: Marc Wathieu, https://goo.
input from adults. In Nicaragua in the
gl/jNSzTC, CC BY-NC 2.0, https://goo.gl/VnKlK8]
1980s, deaf children who were separately
raised in various locations were brought
together to schools for the first time. Teachers tried to teach them Spanish with little success.
However, they began to notice that the children were using their hands and gestures,
apparently to communicate with each other. Linguists were brought in to find out what was
happening—it turned out the children had developed their own sign language by themselves.
That was the birth of a new language, Nicaraguan Sign Language (Kegl, Senghas, & Coppola,
1999). Language is ubiquitous, and we humans are born to use it.
If language is so ubiquitous, how do we actually use it? To be sure, some of us use it to write
diaries and poetry, but the primary form of language use is interpersonal. That’s how we learn
Language and Language Use 292
language, and that’s how we use it. Just like Adam and Ben, we exchange words and utterances
to communicate with each other. Let’s consider the simplest case of two people, Adam and
Ben, talking with each other. According to Clark (1996), in order for them to carry out a
conversation, they must keep track of common ground. Common ground is a set of knowledge
that the speaker and listener share and they think, assume, or otherwise take for granted that
they share. So, when Adam says, “Gary bought a ring,” he takes for granted that Ben knows
the meaning of the words he is using, whom Gary is, and what buying a ring means. When
Ben says, “For Mary, isn’t it?” he takes for granted that Adam knows the meaning of these
words, who Mary is, and what buying a ring for someone means. All these are part of their
common ground.
Common ground helps people coordinate their language use. For instance, when a speaker
says something to a listener, he or she takes into account their common ground, that is, what
the speaker thinks the listener knows. Adam said what he did because he knew Ben would
know who Gary was. He’d have said, “A friend of mine is getting married,” to another colleague
Language and Language Use 293
who wouldn’t know Gary. This is called audience design (Fussell & Krauss, 1992); speakers
design their utterances for their audiences by taking into account the audiences’ knowledge.
If their audiences are seen to be knowledgeable about an object (such as Ben about Gary),
they tend to use a brief label of the object (i.e., Gary); for a less knowledgeable audience, they
use more descriptive words (e.g., “a friend of mine”) to help the audience understand their
utterances (Box 1).
Pickering and Garrod (2004) argue that we achieve our conversational coordination by virtue
of our ability to interactively align each other’s actions at different levels of language use:
lexicon (i.e., words and expressions), syntax (i.e., grammatical rules for arranging words and
expressions together), as well as speech rate and accent. For instance, when one person uses
a certain expression to refer to an object in a conversation, others tend to use the same
expression (e.g., Clark & Wilkes-Gibbs, 1986). Furthermore, if someone says “the cowboy
offered a banana to the robber,” rather than “the cowboy offered the robber a banana,” others
are more likely to use the same syntactic structure (e.g., “the girl gave a book to the boy” rather
Language and Language Use 294
than “the girl gave the boy a book”) even if different words are involved (Branigan, Pickering,
& Cleland, 2000). Finally, people in conversation tend to exhibit similar accents and rates of
speech, and they are often associated with people’s social identity (Giles, Coupland, &
Coupland, 1991). So, if you have lived in different places where people have somewhat
different accents (e.g., United States and United Kingdom), you might have noticed that you
speak with Americans with an American accent, but speak with Britons with a British accent.
Pickering and Garrod (2004) suggest that these interpersonal alignments at different levels
of language use can activate similar situation models in the minds of those who are engaged
in a conversation. Situation models are representations about the topic of a conversation. So,
if you are talking about Gary and Mary with your friends, you might have a situation model
of Gary giving Mary a ring in your mind. Pickering and Garrod’s theory is that as you describe
this situation using language, others in the conversation begin to use similar words and
grammar, and many other aspects of language use converge. As you all do so, similar situation
models begin to be built in everyone’s mind through the mechanism known as priming.
Priming occurs when your thinking about one concept (e.g., “ring”) reminds you about other
related concepts (e.g., “marriage”, “wedding ceremony”). So, if everyone in the conversation
knows about Gary, Mary, and the usual course of events associated with a ring—engagement,
wedding, marriage, etc.— everyone is likely
to construct a shared situation model
about Gary and Mary. Thus, making use of
our highly developed interpersonal ability
to imitate (i.e., executing the same action
as another person) and cognitive ability to
infer (i.e., one idea leading to other ideas),
we humans coordinate our common
ground, share situation models, and
communicate with each other.
Well, when naturally occurring conversations were actually observed (Dunbar, Marriott, &
Duncan, 1997), a staggering 60%–70% of everyday conversation, for both men and women,
turned out to be gossip—people talk about themselves and others whom they know. Just like
Adam and Ben, more often than not, people use language to communicate about their social
world.
Gossip may sound trivial and seem to belittle our noble ability for language—surely one of
the most remarkable human abilities of all that distinguish us from other animals. Au contraire,
some have argued that gossip—activities to think and communicate about our social world
—is one of the most critical uses to which language has been put. Dunbar (1996) conjectured
that gossiping is the human equivalent of grooming, monkeys and primates attending and
tending to each other by cleaning each other’s fur. He argues that it is an act of socializing,
signaling the importance of one’s partner. Furthermore, by gossiping, humans can
communicate and share their representations about their social world—who their friends
and enemies are, what the right thing to do is under what circumstances, and so on. In so
doing, they can regulate their social world—making more friends and enlarging one’s own
group (often called the ingroup, the group to which one belongs) against other groups
(outgroups) that are more likely to be one’s enemies. Dunbar has argued that it is these social
effects that have given humans an evolutionary advantage and larger brains, which, in turn,
help humans to think more complex and abstract thoughts and, more important, maintain
larger ingroups. Dunbar (1993) estimated an equation that predicts average group size of
nonhuman primate genera from their average neocortex size (the part of the brain that
supports higher order cognition). In line with his social brain hypothesis, Dunbar showed
that those primate genera that have larger brains tend to live in larger groups. Furthermore,
using the same equation, he was able to estimate the group size that human brains can
support, which turned out to be about 150—approximately the size of modern hunter-
gatherer communities. Dunbar’s argument is that language, brain, and human group living
have co-evolved—language and human sociality are inseparable.
can convey the permanency and stability of an actor’s tendency to act in a certain way—verbs
convey particularity, whereas adjectives convey permanency. Intriguingly, people tend to
describe positive actions of their ingroup members using adjectives (e.g., he is generous)
rather than verbs (e.g., he gave a blind man some change), and negative actions of outgroup
members using adjectives (e.g., he is cruel) rather than verbs (e.g., he kicked a dog). Maass,
Salvi, Arcuri, and Semin (1989) called this a linguistic intergroup bias, which can produce and
reproduce the representation of intergroup relationships by painting a picture favoring the
ingroup. That is, ingroup members are typically good, and if they do anything bad, that’s more
an exception in special circumstances; in contrast, outgroup members are typically bad, and
if they do anything good, that’s more an exception.
recently, Kashima (2000) conducted a similar experiment using a story that contained
a sequence of events that described a young couple’s interaction that included both
stereotypical and counter-stereotypical actions (e.g., a man watching sports on TV on Sunday
vs. a man vacuuming the house). After the retelling of this story, much of the counter-
stereotypical information was dropped, and stereotypical information was more likely to be
retained. Because stereotypes are part of the common ground shared by the community, this
finding too suggests that conversational retellings are likely to reproduce conventional
content.
What are the psychological consequences of language use? When people use language to
describe an experience, their thoughts and feelings are profoundly shaped by the linguistic
representation that they have produced rather than the original experience per se (Holtgraves
& Kashima, 2008). For example, Halberstadt (2003) showed a picture of a person displaying
an ambiguous emotion and examined how people evaluated the displayed emotion. When
people verbally explained why the target person was expressing a particular emotion, they
tended to remember the person as feeling that emotion more intensely than when they simply
labeled the emotion.
because of these effects of verbalizing psychological well-being. [Image: Drew Herron, https://goo.gl/
negative past life events improved people’s psychological well-being, but just thinking about
them worsened it. There are many other examples of effects of language use on memory and
decision making (Holtgraves & Kashima,
2008).
instance, some linguistic practice seems to be associated even with cultural values and social
institution. Pronoun drop is the case in point. Pronouns such as “I” and “you” are used to
represent the speaker and listener of a speech in English. In an English sentence, these
pronouns cannot be dropped if they are used as the subject of a sentence. So, for instance,
“I went to the movie last night” is fine, but “Went to the movie last night” is not in standard
English. However, in other languages such as Japanese, pronouns can be, and in fact often
are, dropped from sentences. It turned out that people living in those countries where pronoun
drop languages are spoken tend to have more collectivistic values (e.g., employees having
greater loyalty toward their employers) than those who use non–pronoun drop languages
such as English (Kashima & Kashima, 1998). It was argued that the explicit reference to “you”
and “I” may remind speakers the distinction between the self and other, and the differentiation
between individuals. Such a linguistic practice may act as a constant reminder of the cultural
value, which, in turn, may encourage people to perform the linguistic practice.
Conclusion
Language and language use constitute a central ingredient of human psychology. Language
is an essential tool that enables us to live the kind of life we do. Can you imagine a world in
which machines are built, farms are cultivated, and goods and services are transported to our
household without language? Is it possible for us to make laws and regulations, negotiate
contracts, and enforce agreements and settle disputes without talking? Much of contemporary
human civilization wouldn’t have been possible without the human ability to develop and use
language. Like the Tower of Babel, language can divide humanity, and yet, the core of humanity
includes the innate ability for language use. Whether we can use it wisely is a task before us
in this globalized world.
Language and Language Use 300
Discussion Questions
3. What sorts of unintended consequences can language use bring to your psychological
processes?
Language and Language Use 301
Vocabulary
Audience design
Constructing utterances to suit the audience’s knowledge.
Common ground
Information that is shared by people who engage in a conversation.
Ingroup
Group to which a person belongs.
Lexicon
Words and expressions.
Outgroup
Group to which a person does not belong.
Priming
A stimulus presented to a person reminds him or her about other ideas associated with the
stimulus.
Sapir-Whorf hypothesis
The hypothesis that the language that people use determines their thoughts.
Situation model
A mental representation of an event, object, or situation constructed at the time of
comprehending a linguistic description.
Social networks
Networks of social relationships among individuals through which information can travel.
Language and Language Use 302
Syntax
Rules by which words are strung together to form sentences.
Language and Language Use 303
References
Branigan, H. P., Pickering, M. J., & Cleland, A. A. (2000). Syntactic co-ordination in dialogue.
Cognition, 75, B13–25.
Clark, H. H., & Wilkes-Gibbs, D. (1986). Referring as a collaborative process. Cognition, 22, 1–39.
Dunbar, R. (1996). Grooming, gossip, and the evolution of language. Boston, MA: Harvard
University Press.
Dunbar, R. I. M. (1993). Coevolution of neorcortical size, group size and language in humans.
Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 16, 681–735.
Dunbar, R. I. M., Duncan, N. D. C., & Nettle, D. (1995). Size and structure of freely forming
conversational groups. Human Nature, 6, 67–78.
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18
Intelligence
Robert Biswas-Diener
Intelligence is among the oldest and longest studied topics in all of psychology. The
development of assessments to measure this concept is at the core of the development of
psychological science itself. This module introduces key historical figures, major theories of
intelligence, and common assessment strategies related to intelligence. This module will also
discuss controversies related to the study of group differences in intelligence.
Learning Objectives
Introduction
Every year hundreds of grade school students converge on Washington, D.C., for the annual
Scripps National Spelling Bee. The “bee” is an elite event in which children as young as 8 square
off to spell words like “cymotrichous” and “appoggiatura.” Most people who watch the bee
think of these kids as being “smart” and you likely agree with this description.
What makes a person intelligent? Is it heredity (two of the 2014 contestants in the bee have
siblings who have previously won)(National Spelling Bee, 2014a)? Is it interest (the most
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Scientists point to the social nature of primates as one evolutionary source of their intelligence.
Primates live together in troops or family groups and are, therefore, highly social creatures.
As such, primates tend to have brains that are better developed for communication and long
term thinking than most other animals. For instance, the complex social environment has led
primates to develop deception, altruism, numerical concepts, and “theory of mind” (a sense
of the self as a unique individual separate from others in the group; Gallup, 1982; Hauser,
MacNeilage & Ware, 1996).[Also see Noba module Theory of Mind http://noba.to/a8wpytg3]
The question of what constitutes human intelligence is one of the oldest inquiries in
psychology. When we talk about intelligence we typically mean intellectual ability. This broadly
encompasses the ability to learn, remember and use new information, to solve problems and
Intelligence 307
to adapt to novel situations. An early scholar of intelligence, Charles Spearman, proposed the
idea that intelligence was one thing, a “general factor” sometimes known as simply “g.” He
based this conclusion on the observation that people who perform well in one intellectual
area such as verbal ability also tend to perform well in other areas such as logic and reasoning
(Spearman, 1904).
test.”
Table 1: Examples of the types of items you might see on an intelligence test.
“IQ” or “intelligence quotient” is a name given to the score of the Binet-Simon test. The score
is derived by dividing a child’s mental age (the score from the test) by their chronological age
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to create an overall quotient. These days, the phrase “IQ” does not apply specifically to the
Binet-Simon test and is used to generally denote intelligence or a score on any intelligence
test. In the early 1900s the Binet-Simon test was adapted by a Stanford professor named
Lewis Terman to create what is, perhaps, the most famous intelligence test in the world, the
Stanford-Binet (Terman, 1916). The major advantage of this new test was that it was
standardized. Based on a large sample of children Terman was able to plot the scores in a
normal distribution, shaped like a “bell curve” (see Fig. 1). To understand a normal distribution
think about the height of people. Most people are average in height with relatively fewer being
tall or short, and fewer still being extremely tall or extremely short. Terman (1916) laid out
intelligence scores in exactly the same way, allowing for easy and reliable categorizations and
comparisons between individuals.
Looking at another modern intelligence test—the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS)—
can provide clues to a definition of intelligence itself. Motivated by several criticisms of the
Stanford-Binet test, psychologist David Wechsler sought to create a superior measure of
intelligence. He was critical of the way that the Stanford-Binet relied so heavily on verbal ability
and was also suspicious of using a single score to capture all of intelligence. To address these
issues Wechsler created a test that tapped a wide range of intellectual abilities. This
understanding of intelligence—that it is made up of a pool of specific abilities—is a notable
departure from Spearman’s concept of general intelligence. The WAIS assesses people's ability
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to remember, compute, understand language, reason well, and process information quickly
(Wechsler, 1955).
One interesting by-product of measuring intelligence for so many years is that we can chart
changes over time. It might seem strange to you that intelligence can change over the decades
but that appears to have happened over the last 80 years we have been measuring this topic.
Here’s how we know: IQ tests have an average score of 100. When new waves of people are
asked to take older tests they tend to outperform the original sample from years ago on which
the test was normed. This gain is known as the “Flynn Effect,” named after James Flynn, the
researcher who first identified it (Flynn, 1987). Several hypotheses have been put forth to
explain the Flynn Effect including better nutrition (healthier brains!), greater familiarity with
testing in general, and more exposure to visual stimuli. Today, there is no perfect agreement
among psychological researchers with regards to the causes of increases in average scores
on intelligence tests. Perhaps if you choose a career in psychology you will be the one to
discover the answer!
Types of Intelligence
David Wechsler’s approach to testing intellectual ability was based on the fundamental idea
that there are, in essence, many aspects to intelligence. Other scholars have echoed this idea
by going so far as to suggest that there are actually even different types of intelligence. You
likely have heard distinctions made between “street smarts” and “book learning.” The former
refers to practical wisdom accumulated through experience while the latter indicates formal
education. A person high in street smarts might have a superior ability to catch a person in a
lie, to persuade others, or to think quickly under pressure. A person high in book learning, by
contrast, might have a large vocabulary and be able to remember a large number of references
to classic novels. Although psychologists don’t use street smarts or book smarts as
professional terms they do believe that intelligence comes in different types.
There are many ways to parse apart the concept of intelligence. Many scholars believe that
Carroll ‘s (1993) review of more than 400 data sets provides the best currently existing single
source for organizing various concepts related to intelligence. Carroll divided intelligence into
three levels, or strata, descending from the most abstract down to the most specific (see Fig.
2). To understand this way of categorizing simply think of a “car.” Car is a general word that
denotes all types of motorized vehicles. At the more specific level under “car” might be various
types of cars such as sedans, sports cars, SUVs, pick-up trucks, station wagons, and so forth.
More specific still would be certain models of each such as a Honda Civic or Ferrari Enzo. In
the same manner, Carroll called the highest level (stratum III) the general intelligence factor
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“g.” Under this were more specific stratum II categories such as fluid intelligence and visual
perception and processing speed. Each of these, in turn, can be sub-divided into very specific
components such as spatial scanning, reaction time, and word fluency.
Thinking of intelligence as Carroll (1993) does, as a collection of specific mental abilities, has
helped researchers conceptualize this topic in new ways. For example, Horn and Cattell (1966)
distinguish between “fluid” and “crystalized” intelligence, both of which show up on stratum
II of Carroll’s model. Fluid intelligence is the ability to “think on your feet;” that is, to solve
problems. Crystalized intelligence, on the other hand, is the ability to use language, skills and
experience to address problems. The former is associated more with youth while the latter
increases with age. You may have noticed the way in which younger people can adapt to new
situations and use trial and error to quickly figure out solutions. By contrast, older people
tend to rely on their relatively superior store of knowledge to solve problems.
Harvard professor Howard Gardner is another figure in psychology who is well-known for
championing the notion that there are different types of intelligence. Gardner’s theory is
appropriately, called “multiple intelligences.” Gardner’s theory is based on the idea that people
process information through different “channels” and these are relatively independent of one
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There is one last point that is important to bear in mind about intelligence. It turns out that
the way an individual thinks about his or her own intelligence is also important because it
predicts performance. Researcher Carol Dweck has made a career out of looking at the
differences between high IQ children who perform well and those who do not, so-called “under
achievers.” Among her most interesting findings is that it is not gender or social class that sets
apart the high and low performers. Instead, it is their mindset. The children who believe that
their abilities in general—and their intelligence specifically—is a fixed trait tend to
underperform. By contrast, kids who believe that intelligence is changeable and evolving tend
to handle failure better and perform better (Dweck, 1986). Dweck refers to this as a person’s
“mindset” and having a growth mindset appears to be healthier.
Correlates of Intelligence
The research on mindset is interesting but there can also be a temptation to interpret it as
suggesting that every human has an unlimited potential for intelligence and that becoming
smarter is only a matter of positive thinking. There is some evidence that genetics is an
Intelligence 313
important factor in the intelligence equation. For instance, a number of studies on genetics
in adults have yielded the result that intelligence is largely, but not totally, inherited
(Bouchard,2004). Having a healthy attitude about the nature of smarts and working hard can
both definitely help intellectual performance but it also helps to have the genetic leaning
toward intelligence.
Carol Dweck’s research on the mindset of children also brings one of the most interesting and
controversial issues surrounding intelligence research to the fore: group differences. From
the very beginning of the study of intelligence researchers have wondered about differences
between groups of people such as men and women. With regards to potential differences
between the sexes some people have noticed that women are under-represented in certain
fields. In 1976, for example, women comprised just 1% of all faculty members in engineering
(Ceci, Williams & Barnett, 2009).
many of the sex differences found in math and similar intellectual abilities.
A more interesting question, and perhaps a more sensitive one, might be to inquire in which
ways men and women might differ in intellectual ability, if at all. That is, researchers should
not seek to prove that one group or another is better but might examine the ways that they
might differ and offer explanations for any differences that are found. Researchers have
investigated sex differences in intellectual ability. In a review of the research literature Halpern
(1997) found that women appear, on average, superior to men on measures of fine motor
skill, acquired knowledge, reading comprehension, decoding non-verbal expression, and
generally have higher grades in school. Men, by contrast, appear, on average, superior to
women on measures of fluid reasoning related to math and science, perceptual tasks that
involve moving objects, and tasks that require transformations in working memory such as
mental rotations of physical spaces. Halpern also notes that men are disproportionately
represented on the low end of cognitive functioning including in intellectual disability , dyslexia,
and attention deficit disorders (Halpern, 1997).
Other researchers have examined various explanatory hypotheses for why sex differences in
intellectual ability occur. Some studies have provided mixed evidence for genetic factors while
others point to evidence for social factors (Neisser, et al, 1996; Nisbett, et al., 2012). One
interesting phenomenon that has received research scrutiny is the idea of stereotype threat.
Stereotype threat is the idea that mental access to a particular stereotype can have real-world
impact on a member of the stereotyped group. In one study (Spencer, Steele, & Quinn, 1999),
for example, women who were informed that women tend to fare poorly on math exams just
before taking a math test actually performed worse relative to a control group who did not
hear the stereotype. Research on stereotype has yielded mixed results and we are currently
uncertain about exactly how and when this effect might occur. One possible antidote to
stereotype threat, at least in the case of women, is to make a self-affirmation (such as listing
positive personal qualities) before the threat occurs. In one study, for instance, Martens and
her colleagues (2006) had women write about personal qualities that they valued before taking
a math test. The affirmation largely erased the effect of stereotype by improving math scores
for women relative to a control group but similar affirmations had little effect for men (Martens,
Johns, Greenberg, & Schimel, 2006).
These types of controversies compel many lay people to wonder if there might be a problem
with intelligence measures. It is natural to wonder if they are somehow biased against certain
groups. Psychologists typically answer such questions by pointing out that bias in the testing
sense of the word is different than how people use the word in everyday speech. Common
use of bias denotes a prejudice based on group membership. Scientific bias, on the other
hand, is related to the psychometric properties of the test such as validity and reliability.
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Validity is the idea that an assessment measures what it claims to measure and that it can
predict future behaviors or performance. To this end, intelligence tests are not biased because
they are fairly accurate measures and predictors. There are, however, real biases, prejudices,
and inequalities in the social world that might benefit some advantaged group while hindering
some disadvantaged others.
Conclusion
Although you might not be able to spell “esquamulose” or “staphylococci” – indeed, you might
not even know what they mean—you don’t need to count yourself out in the intelligence
department. Now that we have examined intelligence in depth we can return to our intuitive
view of those students who compete in the National Spelling Bee. Are they smart? Certainly,
they seem to have high verbal intelligence. There is also the possibility that they benefit from
either a genetic boost in intelligence, a supportive social environment, or both. Watching them
spell difficult words there is also much we do not know about them. We cannot tell, for instance,
how emotionally intelligent they are or how they might use bodily-kinesthetic intelligence.
This highlights the fact that intelligence is a complicated issue. Fortunately, psychologists
continue to research this fascinating topic and their studies continue to yield new insights.
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Outside Resources
Blog: Dr. Jonathan Wai has an excellent blog on Psychology Today discussing many of the
most interesting issue related to intelligence.
http://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/finding-the-next-einstein
Video: Hank Green gives a fun and interesting overview of the concept of intelligence in
this installment of the Crash Course series.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9xTz3QjcloI
Discussion Questions
1. Do you think that people get smarter as they get older? In what ways might people gain
or lose intellectual abilities as they age?
2. When you meet someone who strikes you as being smart what types of cues or information
do you typically attend to in order to arrive at this judgment?
3. How do you think socio-economic status affects an individual taking an intellectual abilities
test?
4. Should psychologists be asking about group differences in intellectual ability? What do you
think?
5. Which of Howard Gardner’s 8 types of intelligence do you think describes the way you learn
best?
Intelligence 317
Vocabulary
G
Short for “general factor” and is often used to be synonymous with intelligence itself.
Intelligence
An individual’s cognitive capability. This includes the ability to acquire, process, recall and
apply information.
IQ
Short for “intelligence quotient.” This is a score, typically obtained from a widely used measure
of intelligence that is meant to rank a person’s intellectual ability against that of others.
Norm
Assessments are given to a representative sample of a population to determine the range of
scores for that population. These “norms” are then used to place an individual who takes that
assessment on a range of scores in which he or she is compared to the population at large.
Standardize
Assessments that are given in the exact same manner to all people . With regards to intelligence
tests standardized scores are individual scores that are computed to be referenced against
normative scores for a population (see “norm”).
Stereotype threat
The phenomenon in which people are concerned that they will conform to a stereotype or
that their performance does conform to that stereotype, especially in instances in which the
stereotype is brought to their conscious awareness.
Intelligence 318
References
Binet, A. (1894). Psychologie des grands calculateurs et joueurs d'échecs. Paris: Librairie Hachette.
Bouchard, T.J. (2004). Genetic influence on human psychological traits - A survey. Current
Directions in Psychological Science 13(4), 148–151.
Ceci, S. J., Williams, W. & Barnett, S. M. (2009). Women’s underrepresentation in science: socio
cultural and biological considerations. Psychological Bulletin, 135, 218-261.
Flynn J. R. (1987). "Massive IQ gains in 14 nations: What IQ tests really measure". Psychological
Bulletin 101, 171–191.
Gallup, G. G. (1982). Self‐awareness and the emergence of mind in primates. American Journal
of Primatology, 2(3), 237-248.
Gardner, H. (1985). Frames of mind: The theory of multiple intelligences. New York: Basic Books.
Hauser, M. D., MacNeilage, P., & Ware, M. (1996). Numerical representations in primates.
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 93(4), 1514-1517.
Horn, J. L., & Cattell, R. B. (1966). Refinement and test of the theory of fluid and crystallized
general intelligences. Journal of Educational Psychology, 57(5), 253-270.
Hunt, M. (2009). The story of psychology. New York: Random House, LLC.
Hunt, M. (2009). The story of psychology. New York: Random House, LLC.
Lopes, P. N., Grewal, D., Kadis, J., Gall, M., & Salovey, P. (2006). Evidence that emotional
intelligence is related to job performance and affect and attitudes at work. Psicothema, 18
Intelligence 319
(Suppl.), 132–138.
Martens, A., Johns, M., Greenberg, J., & Schimel, J. (2006). Combating stereotype threat: The
effect of self-affirmation on women’s intellectual performance. Journal of Experimental
Social Psychology, 42(2), 236-243.
Martens, A., Johns, M., Greenberg, J., & Schimel, J. (2006). Combating stereotype threat: The
effect of self-affirmation on women’s intellectual performance. Journal of Experimental
Social Psychology, 42(2), 236-243.
Mayer, J. D., & Salovey, P. (1997). What is emotional intelligence? In P. Salovey & D. J. Sluyter
(Eds.), Emotional development and emotional intelligence: Educational implications (pp. 3–34).
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National Spelling Bee. (2014b). Get to Know the Competition. Retrieved from:
http://www.spellingbee.com/UserFiles/topblog----good2341418.html
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Emotion and Motivation
19
Drive States
Sudeep Bhatia & George Loewenstein
Our thoughts and behaviors are strongly influenced by affective experiences known as drive
states. These drive states motivate us to fulfill goals that are beneficial to our survival and
reproduction. This module provides an overview of key drive states, including information
about their neurobiology and their psychological effects.
Learning Objectives
• Outline the neurobiological basis of drive states such as hunger and arousal
• Discuss the main moderators and determinants of drive states such as hunger and arousal
Introduction
What is the longest you’ve ever gone without eating? A couple of hours? An entire day? How
did it feel? Humans rely critically on food for nutrition and energy, and the absence of food
can create drastic changes, not only in physical appearance, but in thoughts and behaviors.
If you’ve ever fasted for a day, you probably noticed how hunger can take over your mind,
directing your attention to foods you could be eating (a cheesy slice of pizza, or perhaps some
sweet, cold ice cream), and motivating you to obtain and consume these foods. And once you
have eaten and your hunger has been satisfied, your thoughts and behaviors return to normal.
Drive States 322
Different drive states have different triggers. Most drive states respond to both internal and
external cues, but the combinations of internal and external cues, and the specific types of
cues, differ between drives. Hunger, for example, depends on internal, visceral signals as well
as sensory signals, such as the sight or smell of tasty food. Different drive states also result
in different cognitive and emotional states, and are associated with different behaviors. Yet
despite these differences, there are a number of properties common to all drive states.
Homeostasis
Humans, like all organisms, need to maintain a stable state in their various physiological
systems. For example, the excessive loss of body water results in dehydration, a dangerous
and potentially fatal state. However, too much water can be damaging as well. Thus, a
moderate and stable level of body fluid is ideal. The tendency of an organism to maintain this
stability across all the different physiological systems in the body is called homeostasis.
Drive States 323
Homeostasis is maintained via two key factors. First, the state of the system being regulated
must be monitored and compared to an ideal level, or a set point. Second, there need to be
mechanisms for moving the system back to this set point—that is, to restore homeostasis
when deviations from it are detected. To better understand this, think of the thermostat in
your own home. It detects when the current temperature in the house is different than the
temperature you have it set at (i.e., the set point). Once the thermostat recognizes the
difference, the heating or air conditioning turns on to bring the overall temperature back to
the designated level.
As drive states intensify, they direct attention toward elements, activities, and forms of
consumption that satisfy the biological needs associated with the drive. Hunger, for example,
draws attention toward food. Outcomes and objects that are not related to satisfying hunger
Drive States 324
lose their value (Easterbrook, 1959). For instance, has anyone ever invited you to do a fun
activity while you were hungry? Likely your response was something like: “I’m not doing
anything until I eat first.” Indeed, at a sufficient level of intensity, individuals will sacrifice almost
any quantity of goods that do not address the needs signaled by the drive state. For example,
cocaine addicts, according to Gawin (1991:1581), “report that virtually all thoughts are focused
on cocaine during binges; nourishment, sleep, money, loved ones, responsibility, and survival
lose all significance.”
Yet a third form of attention-narrowing involves thoughts and outcomes related to the self
versus others. Intense drive states tend to narrow one’s focus inwardly and to undermine
altruism—or the desire to do good for others. People who are hungry, in pain, or craving drugs
tend to be selfish. Indeed, popular interrogation methods involve depriving individuals of
sleep, food, or water, so as to trigger intense drive states leading the subject of the
interrogation to divulge information that may betray comrades, friends, and family (Biderman,
1960).
Thus far we have considered drive states abstractly. We have discussed the ways in which
they relate to other affective and motivational mechanisms, as well as their main biological
purpose and general effects on thought and behavior. Yet, despite serving the same broader
goals, different drive states are often remarkably different in terms of their specific properties.
To understand some of these specific properties, we will explore two different drive states
Drive States 325
that play very important roles in determining behavior, and in ensuring human survival:
hunger and sexual arousal.
Hunger
Hunger is a classic example of a drive state, one that results in thoughts and behaviors related
to the consumption of food. Hunger is generally triggered by low glucose levels in the blood
(Rolls, 2000), and behaviors resulting from hunger aim to restore homeostasis regarding those
glucose levels. Various other internal and external cues can also cause hunger. For example,
when fats are broken down in the body for energy, this initiates a chemical cue that the body
should search for food (Greenberg, Smith, & Gibbs, 1990). External cues include the time of
day, estimated time until the next feeding (hunger increases immediately prior to food
consumption), and the sight, smell, taste, and even touch of food and food-related stimuli.
Note that while hunger is a generic feeling, it has nuances that can provoke the eating of
specific foods that correct for nutritional imbalances we may not even be conscious of. For
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Activation of the LH can not only increase the desirability of food but can also reduce the
desirability of nonfood-related items. For example, Brendl, Markman, and Messner (2003)
found that participants who were given a handful of popcorn to trigger hunger not only had
higher ratings of food products, but also had lower ratings of nonfood products—compared
with participants whose appetites were not similarly primed. That is, because eating had
become more important, other non-food products lost some of their value.
Hunger is only part of the story of when and why we eat. A related process, satiation, refers
to the decline of hunger and the eventual termination of eating behavior. Whereas the feeling
of hunger gets you to start eating, the feeling of satiation gets you to stop. Perhaps surprisingly,
hunger and satiation are two distinct processes, controlled by different circuits in the brain
and triggered by different cues. Distinct from the LH, which plays an important role in hunger,
the ventromedial hypothalamus (VMH) plays an important role in satiety. Though lesions of
the VMH can cause an animal to overeat to the point of obesity, the relationship between the
LH and the VMB is quite complicated. Rats with VMH lesions can also be quite finicky about
their food (Teitelbaum, 1955).
Other brain areas, besides the LH and VMH, also play important roles in eating behavior. The
Drive States 327
sensory cortices (visual, olfactory, and taste), for example, are important in identifying food
items. These areas provide informational value, however, not hedonic evaluations. That is,
these areas help tell a person what is good or safe to eat, but they don’t provide the pleasure
(or hedonic) sensations that actually eating the food produces. While many sensory functions
are roughly stable across different psychological states, other functions, such as the detection
of food-related stimuli, are enhanced when the organism is in a hungry drive state.
After identifying a food item, the brain also needs to determine its reward value, which affects
the organism’s motivation to consume the food. The reward value ascribed to a particular
item is, not surprisingly, sensitive to the level of hunger experienced by the organism. The
hungrier you are, the greater the reward value of the food. Neurons in the areas where reward
values are processed, such as the orbitofrontal cortex, fire more rapidly at the sight or taste
of food when the organism is hungry relative to if it is satiated.
Sexual Arousal
However, once having secured a sexual partner, rats with lesioned preoptic areas will show
no further inclination to actually initiate sex.
For females, though, the preoptic area fulfills different roles, such as functions involved with
eating behaviors. Instead, there is a different region of the brain, the ventromedial
hypothalamus (the lower, central part) that plays a similar role for females as the preoptic
area does for males. Neurons in the ventromedial hypothalamus determine the excretion of
estradiol, an estrogen hormone that regulates sexual receptivity (or the willingness to accept
a sexual partner). In many mammals, these neurons send impulses to the periaqueductal
gray (a region in the midbrain) which is responsible for defensive behaviors, such as freezing
immobility, running, increases in blood pressure, and other motor responses. Typically, these
defensive responses might keep the female rat from interacting with the male one. However,
during sexual arousal, these defensive responses are weakened and lordosis behavior, a
physical sexual posture that serves as an invitation to mate, is initiated (Kow and Pfaff, 1998).
Thus, while the preoptic area encourages males to engage in sexual activity, the ventromedial
hypothalamus fulfills that role for females.
Other differences between males and females involve overlapping functions of neural
modules. These neural modules often provide clues about the biological roles played by sexual
arousal and sexual activity in males and females. Areas of the brain that are important for
male sexuality overlap to a great extent with areas that are also associated with aggression.
In contrast, areas important for female sexuality overlap extensively with those that are also
connected to nurturance (Panksepp, 2004).
One region of the brain that seems to play an important role in sexual pleasure for both males
and females is the septal nucleus, an area that receives reciprocal connections from many
other brain regions, including the hypothalamus and the amygdala (a region of the brain
primarily involved with emotions). This region shows considerable activity, in terms of rhythmic
spiking, during sexual orgasm. It is also one of the brain regions that rats will most reliably
voluntarily self-stimulate (Olds & Milner, 1954). In humans, placing a small amount of
acetylcholine into this region, or stimulating it electrically, has been reported to produce a
feeling of imminent orgasm (Heath, 1964).
Conclusion
Drive states are evolved motivational mechanisms designed to ensure that organisms take
self-beneficial actions. In this module, we have reviewed key properties of drive states, such
as homeostasis and the narrowing of attention. We have also discussed, in some detail, two
Drive States 329
There are many drive states besides hunger and sexual arousal that affect humans on a daily
basis. Fear, thirst, exhaustion, exploratory and maternal drives, and drug cravings are all drive
states that have been studied by researchers (see e.g., Buck, 1999; Van Boven & Loewenstein,
2003). Although these drive states share some of the properties discussed in this module,
each also has unique features that allow it to effectively fulfill its evolutionary function.
One key difference between drive states is the extent to which they are triggered by internal
as opposed to external stimuli. Thirst, for example, is induced both by decreased fluid levels
and an increased concentration of salt in the body. Fear, on the other hand, is induced by
perceived threats in the external environment. Drug cravings are triggered both by internal
homeostatic mechanisms and by external visual, olfactory, and contextual cues. Other drive
states, such as those pertaining to maternity, are triggered by specific events in the organism’s
life. Differences such as these make the study of drive states a scientifically interesting and
important endeavor. Drive states are rich in their diversity, and many questions involving their
neurocognitive underpinnings, environmental determinants, and behavioral effects, have yet
to be answered.
One final thing to consider, not discussed in this module, relates to the real-world
consequences of drive states. Hunger, sexual arousal, and other drive states are all
psychological mechanisms that have evolved gradually over millions of years. We share these
drive states not only with our human ancestors but with other animals, such as monkeys,
dogs, and rats. It is not surprising then that these drive states, at times, lead us to behave in
ways that are ill-suited to our modern lives. Consider, for example, the obesity epidemic that
is affecting countries around the world. Like other diseases of affluence, obesity is a product
of drive states that are too easily fulfilled: homeostatic mechanisms that once worked well
when food was scarce now backfire when meals rich in fat and sugar are readily available.
Unrestricted sexual arousal can have similarly perverse effects on our well-being. Countless
politicians have sacrificed their entire life’s work (not to mention their marriages) by indulging
adulterous sexual impulses toward colleagues, staffers, prostitutes, and others over whom
they have social or financial power. It not an overstatement to say that many problems of the
21st century, from school massacres to obesity to drug addiction, are influenced by the
mismatch between our drive states and our uniquely modern ability to fulfill them at a
moment’s notice.
Drive States 330
Outside Resources
Discussion Questions
1. The ability to maintain homeostasis is important for an organism’s survival. What are the
ways in which homeostasis ensures survival? Do different drive states accomplish
homeostatic goals differently?
2. Drive states result in the narrowing of attention toward the present and toward the self.
Which drive states lead to the most pronounced narrowing of attention toward the present?
Which drive states lead to the most pronounced narrowing of attention toward the self?
3. What are important differences between hunger and sexual arousal, and in what ways do
these differences reflect the biological needs that hunger and sexual arousal have been
evolved to address?
4. Some of the properties of sexual arousal vary across males and females. What other drives
states affect males and females differently? Are there drive states that vary with other
differences in humans (e.g., age)?
Drive States 331
Vocabulary
Drive state
Affective experiences that motivate organisms to fulfill goals that are generally beneficial to
their survival and reproduction.
Homeostasis
The tendency of an organism to maintain a stable state across all the different physiological
systems in the body.
Hypothalamus
A portion of the brain involved in a variety of functions, including the secretion of various
hormones and the regulation of hunger and sexual arousal.
Lordosis
A physical sexual posture in females that serves as an invitation to mate.
Preoptic area
A region in the anterior hypothalamus involved in generating and regulating male sexual
behavior.
Reward value
A neuropsychological measure of an outcome’s affective importance to an organism.
Satiation
The state of being full to satisfaction and no longer desiring to take on more.
Drive States 332
References
Anand, B. K., & Brobeck, J. R. (1951). Hypothalamic control of food intake in rats and cats. The
Yale journal of biology and medicine, 24(2), 123.
Andersson, B. (1951). The effect and localization of electrical stimulation of certain parts of
the brain stem in sheep and goats. Acta Physiologica Scandinavica, 23(1), 8–23.
Ariely, D., & Loewenstein, G. (2006). The heat of the moment: The effect of sexual arousal on
sexual decision making. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 19(2), 87–98
Brendl, C. M., Markman, A. B., & Messner, C. (2003). The devaluation effect: Activating a need
devalues unrelated objects. Journal of Consumer Research, 29(4), 463–473.
Buck, R. (1999). The biological affects: A typology. Psychological Review, 106, 301–336.
Easterbrook, J. A. (1959). The effect of emotion on cue utilization and the organization of
behavior. Psychological Review, 66(3).
Giordano, L. A., Bickel, W. K., Loewenstein, G., Jacobs, E. A., Marsch, L., & Badger, G. J. (2002).
Mild opioid deprivation increases the degree that opioid-dependent outpatients discount
delayed heroin and money. Psychopharmacology, 163(2), 174–182.
Greenberg, D., Smith, G. P., & Gibbs, J. (1990). Intraduodenal infusions of fats elicit satiety in
sham-feeding rats. American Journal of Physiology-Regulatory, Integrative, and Comparative
Physiology, 259(1), 110–118.
Heath, R. G. (1964). Pleasure response of human subjects to direct stimulation of the brain:
Physiologic and psychodynamic considerations. In R. G. Heath (Ed.), The role of pleasure in
behavior (pp. 219–243). New York, NY: Hoeber.
Kow, L. M., & Pfaff, D. W. (1998). Mapping of neural and signal transduction pathways for
lordosis in the search for estrogen actions on the central nervous system. Behavioural Brain
Research, 92(2), 169–180
Olds, J., & Milner, P. (1954). Positive reinforcement produced by electrical stimulation of septal
area and other regions of rat brain. Journal of Comparative and Physiological Psychology, 47
(6), 419.
Panksepp, J. (2004). Affective neuroscience: The foundations of human and animal emotions (Vol.
4). New York, NY: Oxford University Press U.S.
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Rolls, E. T. (2000). The orbitofrontal cortex and reward. Cerebral Cortex, 10(3), 284-294.
Van Boven, L., & Loewenstein, G. (2003). Projection of transient drive states. Personality and
Social Psychology Bulletin, 29, 1159–1168.
Walker, P. (2014). Castaway's sea savvy could have helped him survive year adrift, says expert.
The Guardian. Retried from http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/feb/04/castaway-j
ose-salvador-alvarenga-survival-expert
Zajonc, R. B. (1998). Emotions. In Gilbert, D. T., Fiske, S. T., & Lindzey, G. (Eds.), The handbook
of social psychology (Vols. 1 and 2, 4th ed., pp. 591–632). New York, NY: McGraw-Hill.
20
Culture and Emotion
Jeanne Tsai
How do people’s cultural ideas and practices shape their emotions (and other types of
feelings)? In this module, we will discuss findings from studies comparing North American
(United States, Canada) and East Asian (Chinese, Japanese, Korean) contexts. These studies
reveal both cultural similarities and differences in various aspects of emotional life.
Throughout, we will highlight the scientific and practical importance of these findings and
conclude with recommendations for future research.
Learning Objectives
• Learn about recent empirical findings and theories of culture and emotion
Take a moment and imagine you are traveling in a country you’ve never been to before.
Everything—the sights, the smells, the sounds—seems strange. People are speaking a
language you don’t understand and wearing clothes unlike yours. But they greet you with a
smile and you sense that, despite the differences you observe, deep down inside these people
have the same feelings as you. But is this true? Do people from opposite ends of the world
really feel the same emotions? While most scholars agree that members of different cultures
may vary in the foods they eat, the languages they speak, and the holidays they celebrate,
there is disagreement about the extent to which culture shapes people’s emotions and feelings
Culture and Emotion 335
—including what people feel, what they express, and what they do during an emotional event.
Understanding how culture shapes people’s emotional lives and what impact emotion has on
psychological health and well-being in different cultures will not only advance the study of
human behavior but will also benefit multicultural societies. Across a variety of settings—
academic, business, medical—people worldwide are coming into more contact with people
from foreign cultures. In order to communicate and function effectively in such situations, we
must understand the ways cultural ideas and practices shape our emotions.
Historical Background
In the 1950s and 1960s, social scientists tended to fall into either one of two camps. The
universalist camp claimed that, despite cultural differences in customs and traditions, at a
fundamental level all humans feel similarly. These universalists believed that emotions evolved
as a response to the environments of our primordial ancestors, so they are the same across
all cultures. Indeed, people often describe their emotions as “automatic,” “natural,”
“physiological,” and “instinctual,” supporting the view that emotions are hard-wired and
universal.
In the 1970s, Paul Ekman conducted one of the first scientific studies to address the
universalist–social constructivist debate. He and Wallace Friesen devised a system to measure
people’s facial muscle activity, called the Facial Action Coding System (FACS; Ekman & Friesen,
1978). Using FACS, Ekman and Friesen analyzed people’s facial expressions and identified
specific facial muscle configurations associated with specific emotions, such as happiness,
anger, sadness, fear, disgust. Ekman and Friesen then took photos of people posing with
these different expressions (Figure 1). With the help of colleagues at different universities
around the world, Ekman and Friesen showed these pictures to members of vastly different
cultures, gave them a list of emotion words (translated into the relevant languages), and asked
them to match the facial expressions in the photos with their corresponding emotion words
on the list (Ekman & Friesen, 1971; Ekman et al., 1987).
Across cultures, participants “recognized” the emotional facial expressions, matching each
picture with its “correct” emotion word at levels greater than chance. This led Ekman and his
colleagues to conclude that there are universally recognized emotional facial expressions. At
the same time, though, they found considerable variability across cultures in recognition rates.
For instance, whereas 95% of U.S. participants associated a smile with “happiness,” only 69%
of Sumatran participants did. Similarly, 86% of U.S. participants associated wrinkling of the
nose with “disgust,” but only 60% of Japanese did (Ekman et al., 1987). Ekman and colleagues
interpreted this variation as demonstrating cultural differences in “display rules,” or rules
about what emotions are appropriate to show in a given situation (Ekman, 1972). Indeed,
since this initial work, Matsumoto and his colleagues have demonstrated widespread cultural
differences in display rules (Safdar et al., 2009). One prominent example of such differences
is biting one’s tongue. In India, this signals embarrassment; however, in the U.S. this expression
has no such meaning (Haidt & Keltner, 1999).
Figure 1. Facial expressions associated with happiness, sadness, disgust, and anger based on the Facial
These findings suggest both cultural similarities and differences in the recognition of
emotional facial expressions (although see Russell, 1994, for criticism of this work).
Interestingly, since the mid-2000s, increasing research has demonstrated cultural differences
not only in display rules, but also the degree to which people focus on the face (versus other
aspects of the social context; Masuda, Ellsworth, Mesquita, Leu, Tanida, & Van de Veerdonk,
2008), and on different features of the face (Yuki, Maddux, & Matsuda, 2007) when perceiving
others’ emotions. For example, people from the United States tend to focus on the mouth
when interpreting others’ emotions, whereas people from Japan tend to focus on the eyes.
But how does culture shape other aspects of emotional life—such as how people emotionally
respond to different situations, how they want to feel generally, and what makes them happy?
Today, most scholars agree that emotions and other related states are multifaceted, and that
cultural similarities and differences exist for each facet. Thus, rather than classifying emotions
as either universal or socially-constructed, scholars are now attempting to identify the specific
similarities and differences of emotional life across cultures. These endeavors are yielding
new insights into the effects of cultural on emotion.
Given the wide range of cultures and facets of emotion in the world, for the remainder of the
module we will limit our scope to the two cultural contexts that have received the most
empirical attention by social scientists: North America (United States, Canada) and East Asia
(China, Japan, and Korea). Social scientists have focused on North American and East Asian
contexts because they differ in obvious ways, including their geographical locations, histories,
languages, and religions. Moreover, since the 1980s large-scale studies have revealed that
North American and East Asian contexts differ in their overall values and attitudes, such as
the prioritization of personal vs. group needs (individualism vs. collectivism; Hofstede, 2001).
Whereas North American contexts encourage members to prioritize personal over group
needs (to be “individualistic”), East Asian contexts encourage members to prioritize group
over personal needs (to be “collectivistic”).
In a landmark paper, cultural psychologists Markus and Kitayama (1991) proposed that
previously observed differences in individualism and collectivism translated into different
models of the self—or one’s personal concept of who s/he is as a person. Specifically, the
researchers argued that in North American contexts, the dominant model of the self is an
independent one, in which being a person means being distinct from others and behaving
Culture and Emotion 338
accordingly across situations. In East Asian contexts, however, the dominant model of the self
is an interdependent one, in which being a person means being fundamentally connected to
others and being responsive to situational demands. For example, in a classic study (Cousins,
1989), American and Japanese students were administered the Twenty Statements Test, in
which they were asked to complete the sentence stem, “I am ______,” twenty times. U.S.
participants were more likely than Japanese participants to complete the stem with
psychological attributes (e.g., friendly, cheerful); Japanese participants, on the other hand,
were more likely to complete the stem with references to social roles and responsibilities (e.
g., a daughter, a student) (Cousins, 1989). These different models of the self result in different
principles for interacting with others. An independent model of self teaches people to express
themselves and try to influence others (i.e., change their environments to be consistent with
their own beliefs and desires). In contrast, an interdependent model of self teaches people
to suppress their own beliefs and desires and adjust to others’ (i.e., fit in with their
environment) (Heine, Lehman, Markus, & Kitayama, 1999; Morling, Kitayama, & Miyamoto,
2002; Weisz, Rothbaum, & Blackburn, 1984). Markus and Kitayama (1991) argue that these
different models of self have significant implications for how people in Western and East Asian
contexts feel.
A considerable body of empirical research suggests that these different models of self shape
various aspects of emotional dynamics. Next we will discuss several ways culture shapes
emotion, starting with emotional response.
How does culture influence people’s responses to emotional events? Studies of emotional
response tend to focus on three components: physiology (e.g., how fast one’s heart beats),
subjective experience (e.g., feeling intensely happy or sad), and facial expressive behavior (e.
g., smiling or frowning). Although only a few studies have simultaneously measured these
different aspects of emotional response, those that do tend to observe more similarities than
differences in physiological responses between cultures. That is, regardless of culture, people
tend to respond similarly in terms of physiological (or bodily) expression. For instance, in one
study, European American and Hmong (pronounced “muhng”) American participants were
Culture and Emotion 339
comparing European Americans with differences in facial expressions in response to those emotions.
[Image: Andrew Sweeney, https://goo.gl/Npc7Wm, CC BY-NC-SA
Chinese Americans during different
4.0, https://goo.gl/H2QaA8]
emotion-eliciting tasks (Tsai et al., 2002;
Tsai, Levenson, & McCoy, 2006; Tsai,
Levenson, & Carstensen, 2000). Thus, while the physiological aspects of emotional responses
appear to be similar across cultures, their accompanying facial expressions are more culturally
distinctive.
Again, these differences in facial expressions during positive emotional events are consistent
with findings from cross-cultural studies of display rules, and stem from the models of self-
description discussed above: In North American contexts that promote an independent self
, individuals tend to express their emotions to influence others. Conversely, in East Asian
contexts that promote an interdependent self, individuals tend to control and suppress their
emotions to adjust to others.
If the cultural ideal in North American contexts is to express oneself, then suppressing
emotions (not showing how one feels) should have negative consequences. This is the
Culture and Emotion 340
assumption underlying hydraulic models of emotion: the idea that emotional suppression
and repression impair psychological functioning (Freud, 1910). Indeed, significant empirical
research shows that suppressing emotions can have negative consequences for psychological
well-being in North American contexts (Gross, 1998). However, Soto and colleagues (2011)
find that the relationship between suppression and psychological well-being varies by culture.
True, with European Americans, emotional suppression is associated with higher levels of
depression and lower levels of life satisfaction. (Remember, in these individualistic societies,
the expression of emotion is a fundamental aspect of positive interactions with others.) On
the other hand, since for Hong Kong Chinese, emotional suppression is needed to adjust to
others (in this interdependent community, suppressing emotions is how to appropriately
interact with others), it is simply a part of normal life and therefore not associated with
depression or life satisfaction.
These findings are consistent with research suggesting that factors related to clinical
depression vary between European Americans and Asian Americans. European Americans
diagnosed with depression show dampened or muted emotional responses (Bylsma, Morris,
& Rottenberg, 2008). For instance, when shown sad or amusing film clips, depressed European
Americans respond less intensely than their nondepressed counterparts.However, other
studies have shown that depressed East
Asian Americans (i.e., people of East Asian
descent who live in the United States)
demonstrate similar or increased emotional
responses compared with their nondepressed
counterparts (Chentsova-Dutton et al.,
2007; Chentsova-Dutton, Tsai, & Gotlib,
2010). In other words, depressed European
Americans show reduced emotional
expressions, but depressed East Asian
Americans do not—and, in fact, may
express more emotion. Thus, muted
responses (which resemble suppression)
are associated with depression in
European American contexts, but not in
East Asian contexts.
Someone from a collectivist culture is more likely to think about
how their own accomplishments might impact others. An
otherwise positive achievement for one person could cause People Feel Good During
another to feel something negative, with mixed emotions as the
result. [Image: lian xiaoxiao, https://goo.gl/js5jDw, CC BY-SA 2.0,
Positive Events, but Culture
https://goo.gl/jSSrcO] Influences Whether People
Culture and Emotion 341
What about people’s subjective emotional experiences? Do people across cultures feel the
same emotions in similar situations, despite how they show them? Recent studies indicate
that culture affects whether people are likely to feel bad during good events. In North American
contexts, people rarely feel bad after good experiences. However, a number of research teams
have observed that, compared with people in North American contexts, people in East Asian
contexts are more likely to feel bad and good (“mixed” emotions) during positive events (e.g.,
feeling worried after winning an important competition; Miyamoto, Uchida, & Ellsworth, 2010).
This may be because, compared with North Americans, East Asians engage in more dialectical
thinking (i.e., they are more tolerant of contradiction and change). Therefore, they accept that
positive and negative feelings can occur simultaneously. In addition, whereas North Americans
value maximizing positive states and minimizing negative ones, East Asians value a greater
balance between the two (Sims, Tsai, Wang, Fung, & Zhang, 2013). To better understand this,
think about how you would feel after getting the top score on a test that’s graded on a curve.
In North American contexts, such success is considered an individual achievement and worth
celebrating. But what about the other students who will now receive a lower grade because
you “raised the curve” with your good grade? In East Asian contexts, not only would students
be more thoughtful of the overall group’s success, but they would also be more comfortable
acknowledging both the positive (their own success on the test) and the negative (their
classmates’ lower grades).
Again, these differences can be linked to cultural differences in models of the self. An
interdependent model encourages people to think about how their accomplishments might
affect others (e.g., make others feel bad or jealous). Thus, awareness of negative emotions
during positive events may discourage people from expressing their excitement and standing
out (as in East Asian contexts). Such emotional suppression helps individuals feel in sync with
those around them. An independent model, however, encourages people to express
themselves and stand out, so when something good happens, they have no reason to feel bad.
Everyone welcomes positive feelings, but cultures vary in the specific types of positive
affective states (see Figure 2) their people favor. An affective state is essentially the type of
emotional arousal one feels coupled with its intensity—which can vary from pleasant to
unpleasant (e.g., happy to sad), with high to low arousal (e.g., energetic to passive). Although
people of all cultures experience this range of affective states, they can vary in their preferences
for each. For example, people in North American contexts lean toward feeling excited,
enthusiastic, energetic, and other “high arousal positive” states. People in East Asian contexts,
however, generally prefer feeling calm, peaceful, and other “low arousal positive” states (Tsai,
Knutson, & Fung, 2006). These cultural differences have been observed in young children
between the ages of 3 and 5, college students, and adults between the ages of 60 and 80 (Tsai,
Louie, Chen, & Uchida, 2007; Tsai, Sims, Thomas, & Fung, 2013), and are reflected in widely-
distributed cultural products. For example, wherever you look in American contexts—women’s
magazines, children’s storybooks, company websites, and even Facebook profiles (Figure 3)
—you will find more open, excited smiles and fewer closed, calm smiles compared to Chinese
contexts (Chim, Moon, Ang, Tsai, 2013; Tsai, 2007;Tsai, Louie, et al., 2007).
Figure 2: Adapted from Feldman, Barrett, and Russell (1999); Larsen and Diener
Again, these differences in ideal affect (i.e., the emotional states that people believe are best)
correspond to the independent and interdependent models described earlier: Independent
selves want to influence others, which requires action (doingsomething), and action involves
high arousal states. Conversely, interdependent selves want to adjust to others, which requires
suspending action and attending to others—both of which involve low arousal states. Thus,
the more that individuals and cultures want to influence others (as in North American
contexts), the more they value excitement, enthusiasm, and other high arousal positive states.
And, the more that individuals and cultures want to adjust to others (as in East Asian contexts),
the more they value calm, peacefulness, and other low arousal positive states (Tsai, Miao,
Seppala, Fung, & Yeung, 2007).
Figure 3: Sample Hong Kong Chinese (left) and European American (right) Facebook
pages.
Because one’s ideal affect functions as a guide for behavior and a way of evaluating one’s
emotional states, cultural differences in ideal affect can result in different emotional lives. For
example, several studies have shown that people engage in activities (e.g., recreational
pastimes, musical styles) consistent with their cultural ideal affect. That is, people from North
American contexts (who value high arousal affective states) tend to prefer thrilling activities
like skydiving, whereas people from East Asian contexts (who value low arousal affective states)
prefer tranquil activities like lounging on the beach (Tsai, 2007). In addition, people base their
conceptions of well-being and happiness on their ideal affect. Therefore, European Americans
are more likely to define well-being in terms of excitement, whereas Hong Kong Chinese are
more likely to define well-being in terms of calmness. Indeed, among European Americans,
the less people experience high arousal positive states, the more depressed they are. But,
among Hong Kong Chinese—you guessed it!—the less people experience low arousal positive
states, the more depressed they are (Tsai, Knutson, & Fung, 2006).
Culture and Emotion 344
Again, these findings are consistent with cultural differences in models of the self. In North
American, independent contexts, feelings about the self matter more, whereas in East Asian,
interdependent contexts, feelings about others matter as much as or even more than feelings
Culture and Emotion 345
In this brief review, we’ve focused primarily on comparisons between North American and
East Asian contexts because most of the research in cultural psychology has focused on these
comparisons. However, there are obviously a multitude of other cultural contexts in which
emotional differences likely exist. For example, although Western contexts are similar in many
ways, specific Western contexts (e.g., American vs. German) also differ from each other in
substantive ways related to emotion (Koopmann-Holm & Matsumoto, 2011). Thus, future
research examining other cultural contexts is needed. Such studies may also reveal additional,
uninvestigated dimensions or models that have broad implications for emotion. In addition,
Culture and Emotion 346
because more and more people are being raised within multiple cultural contexts (e.g., for
many Chinese Americans, a Chinese immigrant culture at home and mainstream American
culture at school), more research is needed to examine how people negotiate and integrate
these different cultures in their emotional lives (for examples, see De Leersnyder, Mesquita,
& Kim, 2011; Perunovic, Heller, & Rafaeli, 2007).
An alternative explanation for cultural differences in emotion is that they are due to
temperamental factors—that is, biological predispositions to respond in certain ways. (Might
European Americans just be more emotional than East Asians because of genetics?) Indeed,
most models of emotion acknowledge that both culture and temperament play roles in
emotional life, yet few if any models indicate how. Nevertheless, most researchers believe
that despite genetic differences in founder populations (i.e., the migrants from a population
who leave to create their own societies), culture has a greater impact on emotions. For instance,
one theoretical framework, Affect Valuation Theory, proposes that cultural factors shape how
people want to feel (“ideal affect”) more than how they actually feel (“actual affect”); conversely,
temperamental factors influence how people actually feel more than how they want to feel
(Tsai, 2007) (see Figure 4).
To test this hypothesis, European American, Asian American, and Hong Kong Chinese
participants completed measures of temperament (i.e., stable dispositions, such as
neuroticism or extraversion), actual affect (i.e., how people actually feel in given situations),
ideal affect (i.e., how people would like to feel in given situations), and influential cultural
values (i.e., personal beliefs transmitted through culture). When researchers analyzed the
participants’ responses, they found that differences in ideal affect between cultures were
associated more with cultural factors than with temperamental factors (Tsai, Knutson, & Fung,
2006). However, when researchers examined actual affect, they found this to be reversed:
actual affect was more strongly associated with temperamental factors than cultural factors.
Not all of the studies described above have ruled out a temperamental explanation, though,
and more studies are needed to rule out the possibility that the observed group differences
Figure 4: Affect valuation theory. Thicker lines indicate stronger predicted relationships.
Culture and Emotion 348
are due to genetic factors instead of, or in addition to, cultural factors. Moreover, future studies
should examine whether the links between temperament and emotions might vary across
cultures, and how cultural and temperamental factors work together to shape emotion.
Summary
Based on studies comparing North American and East Asian contexts, there is clear evidence
for cultural similarities and differences in emotions, and most of the differences can be traced
to different cultural models of the self.
Consider your own concept of self for a moment. What kinds of pastimes do you prefer—
activities that make you excited, or ones that make you calm? What kinds of feelings do you
strive for? What is your ideal affect? Because emotions seem and feel so instinctual to us, it’s
hard to imagine that the way we experience them and the ones we desire are anything other
than biologically programmed into us. However, as current research has shown (and as future
research will continue to explore), there are myriad ways in which culture, both consciously
and unconsciously, shapes people’s emotional lives.
Culture and Emotion 349
Outside Resources
Audio Interview: The Really Big Questions “What Are Emotions?” Interview with Paul
Ekman, Martha Nussbaum, Dominique Moisi, and William Reddy
http://www.trbq.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=category&layout=blog&id=16&Itemid=43
Book: Hazel Markus: Clash: 8 Cultural Conflicts That Make Us Who We Are
Video: The Really Big Questions “Culture and Emotion,” Dr. Jeanne Tsai
http://youtu.be/RQaEaUwNoiw
Web: Experts In Emotion Series, Dr. June Gruber, Department of Psychology, Yale University
http://www.yalepeplab.com/teaching/psych131_summer2013/expertseries.php
Discussion Questions
1. What cultural ideas and practices related to emotion were you exposed to when you were
a child? What cultural ideas and practices related to emotion are you currently exposed to
as an adult? How do you think they shape your emotional experiences and expressions?
2. How can researchers avoid inserting their own beliefs about emotion in their research?
3. Most of the studies described above are based on self-report measures. What are some
of the advantages and disadvantages of using self-report measures to understand the
cultural shaping of emotion? How might the use of other behavioral methods (e.g.,
neuroimaging) address some of these limitations?
4. Do the empirical findings described above change your beliefs about emotion? How?
5. Imagine you are a manager of a large American company that is beginning to do work in
China and Japan. How will you apply your current knowledge about culture and emotion
to prevent misunderstandings between you and your Chinese and Japanese employees?
Culture and Emotion 351
Vocabulary
Affect
Feelings that can be described in terms of two dimensions, the dimensions of arousal and
valence (Figure 2). For example, high arousal positive states refer to excitement, elation, and
enthusiasm. Low arousal positive states refer to calm, peacefulness, and relaxation. Whereas
“actual affect” refers to the states that people actually feel, “ideal affect” refers to the states
that people ideally want to feel.
Culture
Shared, socially transmitted ideas (e.g., values, beliefs, attitudes) that are reflected in and
reinforced by institutions, products, and rituals.
Emotions
Changes in subjective experience, physiological responding, and behavior in response to a
meaningful event. Emotions tend to occur on the order of seconds (in contract to moods
which may last for days).
Feelings
A general term used to describe a wide range of states that include emotions, moods, traits
and that typically involve changes in subjective experience, physiological responding, and
behavior in response to a meaningful event. Emotions typically occur on the order of seconds,
whereas moods may last for days, and traits are tendencies to respond a certain way across
various situations.
Independent self
A model or view of the self as distinct from others and as stable across different situations.
The goal of the independent self is to express and assert the self, and to influence others.
This model of self is prevalent in many individualistic, Western contexts (e.g., the United States,
Australia, Western Europe).
Interdependent self
A model or view of the self as connected to others and as changing in response to different
situations. The goal of the interdependent self is to suppress personal preferences and desires,
and to adjust to others. This model of self is prevalent in many collectivistic, East Asian contexts
(e.g., China, Japan, Korea).
Social constructivism
Culture and Emotion 352
Social constructivism proposes that knowledge is first created and learned within a social
context and is then adopted by individuals.
Universalism
Universalism proposes that there are single objective standards, independent of culture, in
basic domains such as learning, reasoning, and emotion that are a part of all human
experience.
Culture and Emotion 353
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21
Motives and Goals
Ayelet Fishbach & Maferima Touré-Tillery
Your decisions and behaviors are often the result of a goal or motive you possess. This module
provides an overview of the main theories and findings on goals and motivation. We address
the origins, manifestations, and types of goals, and the various factors that influence
motivation in goal pursuit. We further address goal conflict and, specifically, the exercise of
self-control in protecting long-term goals from momentary temptations.
Learning Objectives
• Define the basic terminology related to goals, motivation, self-regulation, and self-control.
• Describe the factors that influence motivation in the course of goal pursuit.
Introduction
Every New Year, many people make resolutions—or goals—that go unsatisfied: eat healthier;
pay better attention in class; lose weight. As much as we know our lives would improve if we
actually achieved these goals, people quite often don’t follow through. But what if that didn’t
have to be the case? What if every time we made a goal, we actually accomplished it? Each
day, our behavior is the result of countless goals—maybe not goals in the way we think of
Motives and Goals 358
them, like getting that beach body or being the first person to land on Mars. But even with
“mundane” goals, like getting food from the grocery store, or showing up to work on time, we
are often enacting the same psychological processes involved with achieving loftier dreams.
To understand how we can better attain our goals, let’s begin with defining what a goal is and
what underlies it, psychologically.
Social psychologists recognize that goal pursuit and the motivations that underlie it do not
depend solely on an individual’s personality. Rather, they are products of personal
characteristics and situational factors. Indeed, cues in a person’s immediate environment—
including images, words, sounds, and the presence of other people—can activate, or prime,
a goal. This activation can be conscious, such that the person is aware of the environmental
cues influencing his/her pursuit of a goal. However, this activation can also occur outside a
person’s awareness, and lead to nonconscious goal pursuit. In this case, the person is unaware
Motives and Goals 359
of why s/he is pursuing a goal and may not even realize that s/he is pursuing it.
In this module, we review key aspects of goals and motivation. First, we discuss the origins
and manifestation of goals. Then, we review factors that influence individuals’ motivation in
the course of pursuing a goal (self-regulation). Finally, we discuss what motivates individuals
to keep following their goals when faced with other conflicting desires—for example, when a
tempting opportunity to socialize on Facebook presents itself in the course of studying for an
exam (self-control).
Goal Adoption
What makes us commit to a goal? Researchers tend to agree that commitment stems from
the sense that a goal is both valuable and attainable, and that we adopt goals that are highly
likely to bring positive outcomes (i.e., one’s commitment = the value of the goal × the expectancy
it will be achieved) (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1974; Liberman & Förster, 2008). This process of
committing to a goal can occur without
much conscious deliberation. For example,
people infer value and attainability, and
will nonconsciously determine their
commitment based on those factors, as
well as the outcomes of past goals. Indeed,
people often learn about themselves the
same way they learn about other people
—by observing their behaviors (in this
case, their own) and drawing inferences
about their preferences. For example,
after taking a kickboxing class, you might
infer from your efforts that you are indeed
committed to staying physically fit
(Fishbach, Zhang, & Koo, 2009).
What does this image represent to you, a number or a letter?
Consequences of Goal Activation Training to run the Boston Marathon? Need to pass 13 credit
hours to graduate this semester? The details of your goals may
influence how you interpret the world around you. [Image: Leo
The activation of a goal and the Reynolds, https://goo.gl/TXhu3C, CC BY-NC-SA 2.0, https://goo.gl/
influence many aspects of behavior and judgment, including how people perceive, evaluate,
and feel about the world around them. Indeed, motivational states can even alter something
as fundamental as visual perception. For example, Balcetis and Dunning (2006) showed
participants an ambiguous figure (e.g., “I3”) and asked them whether they saw the letter B or
the number 13. The researchers found that when participants had the goal of seeing a letter
(e.g., because seeing a number required the participants to drink a gross tasting juice), they
in fact saw a B. It wasn’t that the participants were simply lying, either; their goal literally
changed how they perceived the world!
Goals can also exert a strong influence on how people evaluate the objects (and people)
around them. When pursuing a goal such as quenching one’s thirst, people evaluate goal-
relevant objects (e.g., a glass) more positively than objects that are not relevant to the goal (e.
g., a pencil). Furthermore, those with the goal of quenching their thirst rate the glass more
positively than people who are not pursuing the goal (Ferguson & Bargh, 2004).
Many of the behaviors we like to engage in are inconsistent with achieving our goals. For
example, you may want to be physically fit, but you may also really like German chocolate
cake. Self-regulation refers to the process through which individuals alter their perceptions,
feelings, and actions in the pursuit of a goal. For example, filling up on fruits at a dessert party
is one way someone might alter his or her actions to help with goal attainment. In the following
section, we review the main theories and findings on self-regulation.
Self-regulation involves two basic stages, each with its own distinct mindset. First, a person
must decide which of many potential goals to pursue at a given point in time (deliberative
phase). While in the deliberative phase, a person often has a mindset that fosters an effective
assessment of goals. That is, one tends to be open-minded and realistic about available goals
to pursue. However, such scrutiny of one’s choices sometimes hinders action. For example,
in the deliberative phase about how to spend time, someone might consider improving health,
academic performance, or developing a hobby. At the same time, though, this deliberation
involves considering realistic obstacles, such as one’s busy schedule, which may discourage
the person from believing the goals can likely be achieved (and thus, doesn’t work toward any
of them).
However, after deciding which goal to follow, the second stage involves planning specific
Motives and Goals 361
actions related to the goal (implemental phase). In the implemental phase, a person tends
to have a mindset conducive to the effective implementation of a goal through immediate
action—i.e., with the planning done, we’re ready to jump right into attaining our goal.
Unfortunately, though, this mindset often leads to closed-mindedness and unrealistically
positive expectations about the chosen goal (Gollwitzer, Heckhausen, & Steller, 1990;
Kruglanski et al., 2000; Thaler & Shefrin, 1981). For example, in order to follow a health goal,
a person might register for a gym membership and start exercising. In doing so, s/he assumes
this is all that’s needed to achieve the goal (closed-mindedness), and after a few weeks, it
should be accomplished (unrealistic expectations).
To compare these two strategies, consider the goal of saving money. Prevention-focused
people will save money because they believe it’s what they should be doing (an ought), and
because they’re concerned about not having any money (avoiding a harm). Promotion-focused
people, on the other hand, will save money because they want to have extra funds (a desire)
so they can do new and fun activities (attaining an advancement). Although these two
strategies result in very similar behaviors, emphasizing potential losses will motivate
individuals with a prevention focus, whereas emphasizing potential gains will motivate
individuals with a promotion focus. And these orientations—responding better to either a
prevention or promotion focus— differ across individuals (chronic regulatory focus) and
situations (momentary regulatory focus; Higgins, 1997).
Self-regulation depends on feelings that arise from comparing actual progress to expected
progress. During goal pursuit, individuals calculate the discrepancy between their current
state (i.e., all goal-related actions completed so far) and their desired end state (i.e., what they
view as “achieving the goal”). After determining this difference, the person then acts to close
that gap (Miller, Galanter, & Pribram, 1960; Powers, 1973). In this cybernetic process of self-
regulation (or, internal system directing how a person should control behavior), a higher-than-
expected rate of closing the discrepancy creates a signal in the form of positive feelings. For
example, if you’re nearly finished with a class project (i.e., a low discrepancy between your
progress and what it will take to completely finish), you feel good about yourself. However,
these positive feelings tend to make individuals “coast,” or reduce their efforts on the focal
goal, and shift their focus to other goals (e.g., you’re almost done with your project for one
class, so you start working on a paper for another). By contrast, a lower-than-expected rate
of closing the gap elicits negative feelings, which leads to greater effort investment on the
focal goal (Carver & Scheier, 1998). If it is the day before a project’s due and you’ve hardly
started it, you will likely feel anxious and stop all other activities to make progress on your
project.
When we’ve completed steps toward achieving our goal, looking back on the behaviors or
actions that helped us make such progress can have implications for future behaviors and
actions (see The Dynamics of Self-Regulation framework; Fishbach et al., 2009). Remember,
commitment results from the perceived value and attainability of a goal, whereas progress
describes the perception of a reduced discrepancy between the current state and desired end
state (i.e., the cybernetic process). After achieving a goal, when people interpret their previous
Motives and Goals 363
actions as a sign of commitment to it, they tend to highlight the pursuit of that goal, prioritizing
it and putting more effort toward it. However, when people interpret their previous actions
as a sign of progress, they tend to balance between the goal and other goals, putting less
effort into the focal goal. For example, if buying a product on sale reinforces your commitment
to the goal of saving money, you will continue to behave financially responsibly. However, if
you perceive the same action (buying the sale item) as evidence of progress toward the goal
of saving money, you might feel like you can “take a break” from your goal, justifying splurging
on a subsequent purchase. Several factors can influence the meanings people assign to
previous goal actions. For example, the more confident a person is about a commitment to
a goal, the more likely s/he is to infer progress rather than commitment from his/her actions
(Koo & Fishbach, 2008).
in the process.
Mischel, Shoda, and Rodriguez (1989) identified enduring individual differences in self-control
and found that the persistent capacity to postpone immediate gratification for the sake of
future interests leads to greater cognitive and social competence over the course of a lifetime.
In a famous series of lab experiments (first conducted by Mischel & Baker, 1975), preschoolers
3–5 years old were asked to choose between getting a smaller treat immediately (e.g., a single
marshmallow) or waiting as long as 15 minutes to get a better one (e.g., two marshmallows).
Some children were better-able to exercise self-control than others, resisting the temptation
to take the available treat and waiting for the better one. Following up with these preschoolers
ten years later, the researchers found that the children who were able to wait longer in the
experiment for the second marshmallow (vs. those who more quickly ate the single
marshmallow) performed better academically and socially, and had better psychological
coping skills as adolescents.
Although factors such as resources and personal characteristics contribute to the successful
exercise of self-control, identifying the self-control conflict inherent to a particular situation
is an important—and often overlooked—prerequisite. For example, if you have a long-term
goal of getting better sleep but don’t perceive that staying up late on a Friday night is
inconsistent with this goal, you won’t have a self-control conflict. The successful pursuit of a
goal in the face of temptation requires that individuals first identify they are having impulses
that need to be controlled. However, individuals often fail to identify self-control conflicts
because many everyday temptations seem to have very minimal negative consequences: one
bowl of ice cream is unlikely to destroy a person’s health, but what about 200 bowls of ice
cream over the course of a few months?
People are more likely to identify a self-control conflict, and exercise self-control, when they
think of a choice as part of a broader pattern of repeated behavior rather than as an isolated
choice. For example, rather than seeing one bowl of ice cream as an isolated behavioral
decision, the person should try to recognize that this “one bowl of ice cream” is actually part
of a nightly routine. Indeed, when considering broader decision patterns, consistent
temptations become more problematic for long-term interests (Rachlin, 2000; Read,
Loewenstein, & Kalyanaraman, 1999). Moreover, conflict identification is more likely if people
see their current choices as similar to their future choices.
The protection of a valued goal involves several cognitive and behavioral strategies ultimately
aimed at “counteracting” the pull of temptations and pushing oneself toward goal-related
alternatives (Fishbach & Trope, 2007). One such cognitive process involves decreasing the
value of temptations and increasing the value of goal-consistent objects or actions. For
example, health-conscious individuals might tell themselves a sugary treat is less appealing
than a piece of fruit in order to direct their choice toward the latter. Other behavioral strategies
include a precommitment to pursue goals and forgo temptation (e.g., leaving one’s credit card
Motives and Goals 366
at home before going to the mall), establishing rewards for goals and penalties for temptations,
or physically approaching goals and distancing oneself from temptations (e.g., pushing away
a dessert plate). These self-control processes can benefit individuals’ long-term interests,
either consciously or without conscious awareness. Thus, at times, individuals automatically
activate goal-related thoughts in response to temptation, and inhibit temptation-related
thoughts in the presence of goal cues (Fishbach, Friedman, & Kruglanski, 2003).
Conclusion
People often make New Year’s resolutions with the idea that attaining one’s goals is simple:
“I just have to choose to eat healthier, right?” However, after going through this module and
learning a social-cognitive approach to the main theories and findings on goals and motivation,
we see that even the most basic decisions take place within a much larger and more complex
mental framework. Looking back on prior goal failures, it may seem impossible to achieve
some of our desires. But, through understanding our own mental representation of our goals
(i.e., the values and expectancies behind them), we can help cognitively modify our behavior
to achieve our dreams. If you do, who knows?—maybe you will be the first person to step on
Mars.
Motives and Goals 367
Discussion Questions
3. How do positive and negative feelings inform goal pursuit in a cybernetic self-regulation
process?
4. Describe the characteristics of the deliberative mindset that allows individuals to decide
between different goals. How might these characteristics hinder the implemental phase
of self-regulation?
5. You just read a module on “Goals and Motivation,” and you believe it is a sign of commitment
to the goal of learning about social psychology. Define commitment in this context. How
would interpreting your efforts as a sign of commitment influence your motivation to read
more about social psychology? By contrast, how would interpreting your efforts as a sign
of progress influence your motivation to read more?
6. Mel and Alex are friends. Mel has a prevention focus self-regulatory orientation, whereas
Alex has a promotion focus. They are both training for a marathon and are looking for
motivational posters to hang in their respective apartments. While shopping, they find a
poster with the following Confucius quote: “The will to win, the desire to succeed, the urge
to reach your full potential ... . These are the keys that will unlock the door to personal
excellence.” Who is this poster more likely to help stay motivated for the marathon (Mel
or Alex)? Why? Find or write a quote that might help the other friend.
7. Give an example in which an individual fails to exercise self-control. What are some factors
that can cause such a self-control failure?
Motives and Goals 368
Vocabulary
Commitment
The sense that a goal is both valuable and attainable
Deliberative phase
The first of the two basic stages of self-regulation in which individuals decide which of many
potential goals to pursue at a given point in time.
Ego-depletion
The exhaustion of physiological and/or psychological resources following the completion of
effortful self-control tasks, which subsequently leads to reduction in the capacity to exert
more self-control.
Extrinsic motivation
Motivation stemming from the benefits associated with achieving a goal such as obtaining a
monetary reward.
Goal
The cognitive representation of a desired state (outcome).
Highlighting a goal
Prioritizing a focal goal over other goals or temptations by putting more effort into the focal
goal.
Implemental phase
The second of the two basic stages of self-regulation in which individuals plan specific actions
related to their selected goal.
Intrinsic motivation
Motivation stemming from the benefits associated with the process of pursuing a goal such
Motives and Goals 369
Motivation
The psychological driving force that enables action in the course of goal pursuit.
Prevention focus
One of two self-regulatory orientations emphasizing safety, responsibility, and security needs,
and viewing goals as “oughts.” This self-regulatory focus seeks to avoid losses (the presence
of negatives) and approach non-losses (the absence of negatives).
Progress
The perception of reducing the discrepancy between one’s current state and one’s desired
state in goal pursuit.
Promotion focus
One of two self-regulatory orientations emphasizing hopes, accomplishments, and
advancement needs, and viewing goals as “ideals.” This self-regulatory focus seeks to approach
gains (the presence of positives) and avoid non-gains (the absence of positives).
Self-control
The capacity to control impulses, emotions, desires, and actions in order to resist a temptation
and adhere to a valued goal.
Self-regulation
The processes through which individuals alter their emotions, desires, and actions in the
course of pursuing a goal.
Motives and Goals 370
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Personality traits reflect people’s characteristic patterns of thoughts, feelings, and behaviors.
Personality traits imply consistency and stability—someone who scores high on a specific trait
like Extraversion is expected to be sociable in different situations and over time. Thus, trait
psychology rests on the idea that people differ from one another in terms of where they stand
on a set of basic trait dimensions that persist over time and across situations. The most widely
used system of traits is called the Five-Factor Model. This system includes five broad traits
that can be remembered with the acronym OCEAN: Openness, Conscientiousness,
Extraversion, Agreeableness, and Neuroticism. Each of the major traits from the Big Five can
be divided into facets to give a more fine-grained analysis of someone's personality. In addition,
some trait theorists argue that there are other traits that cannot be completely captured by
the Five-Factor Model. Critics of the trait concept argue that people do not act consistently
from one situation to the next and that people are very influenced by situational forces. Thus,
one major debate in the field concerns the relative power of people’s traits versus the situations
in which they find themselves as predictors of their behavior.
Learning Objectives
• List and describe the “Big Five” (“OCEAN”) personality traits that comprise the Five-Factor
Model of personality.
• Describe each of the Big Five personality traits, and the low and high end of the dimension.
• Give examples of each of the Big Five personality traits, including both a low and high
example.
Personality Traits 374
• Describe how traits and social learning combine to predict your social activities.
• Describe your theory of how personality traits get refined by social learning.
Introduction
When we observe people around us, one of the first things that strikes us is how different
people are from one another. Some people are very talkative while others are very quiet.
Some are active whereas others are couch potatoes. Some worry a lot, others almost never
seem anxious. Each time we use one of these words, words like “talkative,” “quiet,” “active,”
or “anxious,” to describe those around us, we are talking about a person’s personality—the
characteristic ways that people differ from one another. Personality psychologists try to
describe and understand these differences.
distinct personality types. This means that when Nguyen Hung Vu, https://goo.gl/qKJUAC, CC BY 2.0,
A challenge of the trait approach was to discover the major traits on which all people differ.
Scientists for many decades generated hundreds of new traits, so that it was soon difficult to
keep track and make sense of them. For instance, one psychologist might focus on individual
differences in “friendliness,” whereas another might focus on the highly related concept of
“sociability.” Scientists began seeking ways to reduce the number of traits in some systematic
way and to discover the basic traits that describe most of the differences between people.
The way that Gordon Allport and his colleague Henry Odbert approached this was to search
Personality Traits 376
the dictionary for all descriptors of personality (Allport & Odbert, 1936). Their approach was
guided by the lexical hypothesis, which states that all important personality characteristics
should be reflected in the language that we use to describe other people. Therefore, if we
want to understand the fundamental ways in which people differ from one another, we can
turn to the words that people use to describe one another. So if we want to know what words
people use to describe one another, where should we look? Allport and Odbert looked in the
most obvious place—the dictionary. Specifically, they took all the personality descriptors that
they could find in the dictionary (they started with almost 18,000 words but quickly reduced
that list to a more manageable number) and then used statistical techniques to determine
which words “went together.” In other words, if everyone who said that they were “friendly”
also said that they were “sociable,” then this might mean that personality psychologists would
only need a single trait to capture individual differences in these characteristics. Statistical
techniques were used to determine whether a small number of dimensions might underlie
all of the thousands of words we use to describe people.
Research that used the lexical approach showed that many of the personality descriptors
found in the dictionary do indeed overlap. In other words, many of the words that we use to
describe people are synonyms. Thus, if we want to know what a person is like, we do not
necessarily need to ask how sociable they are, how friendly they are, and how gregarious they
are. Instead, because sociable people tend to be friendly and gregarious, we can summarize
this personality dimension with a single term. Someone who is sociable, friendly, and
gregarious would typically be described as an “Extravert.” Once we know she is an extravert,
we can assume that she is sociable, friendly, and gregarious.
Scores on the Big Five traits are mostly independent. That means that a person’s standing on
one trait tells very little about their standing on the other traits of the Big Five. For example,
a person can be extremely high in Extraversion and be either high or low on Neuroticism.
Personality Traits 377
Similarly, a person can be low in Agreeableness and be either high or low in Conscientiousness.
Thus, in the Five-Factor Model, you need five scores to describe most of an individual’s
personality.
In the Appendix to this module, we present a short scale to assess the Five-Factor Model of
personality (Donnellan, Oswald, Baird, & Lucas, 2006). You can take this test to see where you
stand in terms of your Big Five scores. John Johnson has also created a helpful website that
has personality scales that can be used and taken by the general public:
http://www.personal.psu.edu/j5j/IPIP/ipipneo120.htm
After seeing your scores, you can judge for yourself whether you think such tests are valid.
Traits are important and interesting because they describe stable patterns of behavior that
persist for long periods of time (Caspi, Roberts, & Shiner, 2005). Importantly, these stable
patterns can have broad-ranging consequences for many areas of our life (Roberts, Kuncel,
Shiner, Caspi, & Goldberg, 2007). For instance, think about the factors that determine success
in college. If you were asked to guess what factors predict good grades in college, you might
guess something like intelligence. This guess would be correct, but we know much more about
who is likely to do well. Specifically, personality researchers have also found the personality
traits like Conscientiousness play an important role in college and beyond, probably because
highly conscientious individuals study hard, get their work done on time, and are less
distracted by nonessential activities that take time away from school work. In addition, highly
conscientious people are often healthier than people low in conscientiousness because they
are more likely to maintain healthy diets, to exercise, and to follow basic safety procedures
like wearing seat belts or bicycle helmets. Over the long term, this consistent pattern of
Personality Traits 378
Figure 3. Example behaviors for those scoring low and high for the big 5 traits
behaviors can add up to meaningful differences in health and longevity. Thus, personality
traits are not just a useful way to describe people you know; they actually help psychologists
predict how good a worker someone will be, how long he or she will live, and the types of jobs
and activities the person will enjoy. Thus, there is growing interest in personality psychology
among psychologists who work in applied settings, such as health psychology or
organizational psychology.
So how does it feel to be told that your entire personality can be summarized with scores on
just five personality traits? Do you think these five scores capture the complexity of your own
and others’ characteristic patterns of thoughts, feelings, and behaviors? Most people would
probably say no, pointing to some exception in their behavior that goes against the general
pattern that others might see. For instance, you may know people who are warm and friendly
and find it easy to talk with strangers at a party yet are terrified if they have to perform in
front of others or speak to large groups of people. The fact that there are different ways of
being extraverted or conscientious shows that there is value in considering lower-level units
of personality that are more specific than the Big Five traits. These more specific, lower-level
units of personality are often called facets.
To give you a sense of what these narrow units are like, Figure 4 shows facets for each of the
Personality Traits 379
Despite the popularity of the Five-Factor Model, it is certainly not the only model that exists.
Some suggest that there are more than five major traits, or perhaps even fewer. For example,
in one of the first comprehensive models to be proposed, Hans Eysenck suggested that
Personality Traits 380
Extraversion and Neuroticism are most important. Eysenck believed that by combining
people’s standing on these two major traits, we could account for many of the differences in
personality that we see in people (Eysenck, 1981). So for instance, a neurotic introvert would
be shy and nervous, while a stable introvert might avoid social situations and prefer solitary
activities, but he may do so with a calm, steady attitude and little anxiety or emotion.
Interestingly, Eysenck attempted to link these two major dimensions to underlying differences
in people’s biology. For instance, he suggested that introverts experienced too much sensory
stimulation and arousal, which made them want to seek out quiet settings and less stimulating
environments. More recently, Jeffrey Gray suggested that these two broad traits are related
to fundamental reward and avoidance systems in the brain—extraverts might be motivated
to seek reward and thus exhibit assertive, reward-seeking behavior, whereas people high in
neuroticism might be motivated to avoid punishment and thus may experience anxiety as a
result of their heightened awareness of the threats in the world around them (Gray, 1981.
This model has since been updated; see Gray & McNaughton, 2000). These early theories
have led to a burgeoning interest in identifying the physiological underpinnings of the
individual differences that we observe.
Another revision of the Big Five is the HEXACO model of traits (Ashton & Lee, 2007). This model
is similar to the Big Five, but it posits slightly different versions of some of the traits, and its
proponents argue that one important class of individual differences was omitted from the
Five-Factor Model. The HEXACO adds Honesty-Humility as a sixth dimension of personality.
People high in this trait are sincere, fair, and modest, whereas those low in the trait are
manipulative, narcissistic, and self-centered. Thus, trait theorists are agreed that personality
traits are important in understanding behavior, but there are still debates on the exact number
and composition of the traits that are most important.
There are other important traits that are not included in comprehensive models like the Big
Five. Although the five factors capture much that is important about personality, researchers
have suggested other traits that capture interesting aspects of our behavior. In Figure 5 below
we present just a few, out of hundreds, of the other traits that have been studied by
personologists.
Not all of the above traits are currently popular with scientists, yet each of them has
experienced popularity in the past. Although the Five-Factor Model has been the target of
more rigorous research than some of the traits above, these additional personality
characteristics give a good idea of the wide range of behaviors and attitudes that traits can
cover.
The ideas described in this module should probably seem familiar, if not obvious to you. When
asked to think about what our friends, enemies, family members, and colleagues are like,
some of the first things that come to mind are their personality characteristics. We might think
about how warm and helpful our first teacher was, how irresponsible and careless our brother
is, or how demanding and insulting our first boss was. Each of these descriptors reflects a
personality trait, and most of us generally think that the descriptions that we use for individuals
accurately reflect their “characteristic pattern of thoughts, feelings, and behaviors,” or in other
Personality Traits 382
Mischel and others argued that it was these social-cognitive processes that underlie people’s
reactions to specific situations that provide some consistency when situational features are
the same. If so, then studying these broad traits might be more fruitful than cataloging and
measuring narrow, context-free traits like Extraversion or Neuroticism.
In the years after the publication of Mischel’s (1968) book, debates raged about whether
personality truly exists, and if so, how it should be studied. And, as is often the case, it turns
out that a more moderate middle ground than what the situationists proposed could be
reached. It is certainly true, as Mischel pointed out, that a person’s behavior in one specific
situation is not a good guide to how that person will behave in a very different specific situation.
Someone who is extremely talkative at one specific party may sometimes be reticent to speak
up during class and may even act like a wallflower at a different party. But this does not mean
that personality does not exist, nor does it mean that people’s behavior is completely
determined by situational factors. Indeed, research conducted after the person-situation
debate shows that on average, the effect of the “situation” is about as large as that of
personality traits. However, it is also true that if psychologists assess a broad range of
behaviors across many different situations, there are general tendencies that emerge.
Personality traits give an indication about how people will act on average, but frequently they
are not so good at predicting how a person will act in a specific situation at a certain moment
in time. Thus, to best capture broad traits, one must assess aggregate behaviors, averaged
over time and across many different types of situations. Most modern personality researchers
agree that there is a place for broad personality traits and for the narrower units such as those
studied by Walter Mischel.
Appendix
Instructions: Below are phrases describing people’s behaviors. Please use the rating scale
below to describe how accurately each statement describes you. Describe yourself as you
generally are now, not as you wish to be in the future. Describe yourself as you honestly see
yourself, in relation to other people you know of the same sex as you are, and roughly your
same age. Please read each statement carefully, and put a number from 1 to 5 next to it to
describe how accurately the statement describes you.
1 = Very inaccurate
Personality Traits 384
2 = Moderately inaccurate
4 = Moderately accurate
5 = Very accurate
8. _______ Often forget to put things back in their proper place (C)
Scoring: The first thing you must do is to reverse the items that are worded in the opposite
direction. In order to do this, subtract the number you put for that item from 6. So if you put
a 4, for instance, it will become a 2. Cross out the score you put when you took the scale, and
Personality Traits 385
put the new number in representing your score subtracted from the number 6.
Items to be reversed in this way: 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20
Next, you need to add up the scores for each of the five OCEAN scales (including the reversed
numbers where relevant). Each OCEAN score will be the sum of four items. Place the sum
next to each scale below.
Compare your scores to the norms below to see where you stand on each scale. If you are
low on a trait, it means you are the opposite of the trait label. For example, low on Extraversion
is Introversion, low on Openness is Conventional, and low on Agreeableness is Assertive.
11–13 Neither high nor low; in the middle, 8–10 Low, 6–7 Very low, 4–5 Extremely low
Personality Traits 386
Outside Resources
Video 2: Michael Harris’ – Personality Traits: The Big 5 and More. This is a student-made
video that looks at characteristics of the OCEAN traits through a series of funny vignettes.
It also presents on the Person vs Situation Debate. It was one of the winning entries in the
2016-17 Noba + Psi Chi Student Video Award.
https://vimeo.com/218245492
Video 3: David M. Cole’s – Grouchy with a Chance of Stomping. This is a student-made video
that makes a very important point about the relationship between personality traits and
behavior using a handy weather analogy. It was one of the winning entries in the 2016-17
Noba + Psi Chi Student Video Award.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GnaFMjaJtlY
Discussion Questions
1. Consider different combinations of the Big Five, such as O (Low), C (High), E (Low), A (High),
and N (Low). What would this person be like? Do you know anyone who is like this? Can
you select politicians, movie stars, and other famous people and rate them on the Big Five?
Personality Traits 387
2. How do you think learning and inherited personality traits get combined in adult
personality?
3. Can you think of instances where people do not act consistently—where their personality
traits are not good predictors of their behavior?
5. Can you think of a personality trait not mentioned in this module that describes how people
differ from one another?
6. When do extremes in personality traits become harmful, and when are they unusual but
productive of good outcomes?
Personality Traits 388
Vocabulary
Agreeableness
A personality trait that reflects a person’s tendency to be compassionate, cooperative, warm,
and caring to others. People low in agreeableness tend to be rude, hostile, and to pursue their
own interests over those of others.
Conscientiousness
A personality trait that reflects a person’s tendency to be careful, organized, hardworking, and
to follow rules.
Continuous distributions
Characteristics can go from low to high, with all different intermediate values possible. One
does not simply have the trait or not have it, but can possess varying amounts of it.
Extraversion
A personality trait that reflects a person’s tendency to be sociable, outgoing, active, and
assertive.
Facets
Broad personality traits can be broken down into narrower facets or aspects of the trait. For
example, extraversion has several facets, such as sociability, dominance, risk-taking and so
forth.
Factor analysis
A statistical technique for grouping similar things together according to how highly they are
associated.
Five-Factor Model
(also called the Big Five) The Five-Factor Model is a widely accepted model of personality traits.
Advocates of the model believe that much of the variability in people’s thoughts, feelings, and
behaviors can be summarized with five broad traits. These five traits are Openness,
Conscientiousness, Extraversion, Agreeableness, and Neuroticism.
HEXACO model
The HEXACO model is an alternative to the Five-Factor Model. The HEXACO model includes
six traits, five of which are variants of the traits included in the Big Five (Emotionality [E],
Extraversion [X], Agreeableness [A], Conscientiousness [C], and Openness [O]). The sixth
Personality Traits 389
Independent
Two characteristics or traits are separate from one another-- a person can be high on one
and low on the other, or vice-versa. Some correlated traits are relatively independent in that
although there is a tendency for a person high on one to also be high on the other, this is not
always the case.
Lexical hypothesis
The lexical hypothesis is the idea that the most important differences between people will be
encoded in the language that we use to describe people. Therefore, if we want to know which
personality traits are most important, we can look to the language that people use to describe
themselves and others.
Neuroticism
A personality trait that reflects the tendency to be interpersonally sensitive and the tendency
to experience negative emotions like anxiety, fear, sadness, and anger.
Openness to Experience
A personality trait that reflects a person’s tendency to seek out and to appreciate new things,
including thoughts, feelings, values, and experiences.
Personality
Enduring predispositions that characterize a person, such as styles of thought, feelings and
behavior.
Personality traits
Enduring dispositions in behavior that show differences across individuals, and which tend
to characterize the person across varying types of situations.
Person-situation debate
The person-situation debate is a historical debate about the relative power of personality
traits as compared to situational influences on behavior. The situationist critique, which
started the person-situation debate, suggested that people overestimate the extent to which
personality traits are consistent across situations.
Personality Traits 390
References
Allport, G. W., & Odbert, H. S. (1936). Trait names: A psycholexical study. Psychological
Monographs, 47, 211.
Ashton, M. C., & Lee, K. (2007). Empirical, theoretical, and practical advantages of the HEXACO
model of personality structure. Personality and Social Psychological Review, 11, 150–166.
Caspi, A., Roberts, B. W., & Shiner, R. L. (2005). Personality development: Stability and change.
Annual Reviews of Psychology, 56, 453–484.
Donnellan, M. B., Oswald, F. L., Baird, B. M., & Lucas, R. E. (2006). The mini-IPIP scales: Tiny-
yet-effective measures of the Big Five factors of personality. Psychological Assessment, 18,
192–203.
Goldberg, L. R. (1990). An alternative description of personality: The Big Five personality traits.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 59, 1216–1229.
Gray, J. A. & McNaughton, N. (2000). The neuropsychology of anxiety: An enquiry into the functions
of the septo-hippocampal system (second edition).Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Matthews, G., Deary, I. J., & Whiteman, M. C. (2003). Personality traits. Cambridge, UK:
Cambridge University Press.
McCrae, R. R., & Costa, P. T. (1987). Validation of the five-factor model of personality across
instruments and observers. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 52, 81–90.
McCrae, R. R. & John, O. P. (1992). An introduction to the five-factor model and its applications.
Journal of Personality, 60, 175–215.
Paunonen, S. V., & Ashton, M. S. (2001). Big five factors and facets and the prediction of
behavior. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 81, 524–539.
Roberts, B. W., Kuncel, N. R., Shiner, R., Caspi, A., & Golberg, L. R. (2007). The power of
personality: The comparative validity of personality traits, socioeconomic status, and
cognitive ability for predicting important life outcomes. Perspectives on Psychological Science,
2, 313-345.
23
Personality Assessment
David Watson
This module provides a basic overview to the assessment of personality. It discusses objective
personality tests (based on both self-report and informant ratings), projective and implicit
tests, and behavioral/performance measures. It describes the basic features of each method,
as well as reviewing the strengths, weaknesses, and overall validity of each approach.
Learning Objectives
• Appreciate the diversity of methods that are used to measure personality characteristics.
• Gain a better sense of the overall validity and range of applications of personality tests.
Introduction
Personality is the field within psychology that studies the thoughts, feelings, behaviors, goals,
and interests of normal individuals. It therefore covers a very wide range of important
psychological characteristics. Moreover, different theoretical models have generated very
different strategies for measuring these characteristics. For example, humanistically oriented
models argue that people have clear, well-defined goals and are actively striving to achieve
them (McGregor, McAdams, & Little, 2006). It, therefore, makes sense to ask them directly
about themselves and their goals. In contrast, psychodynamically oriented theories propose
that people lack insight into their feelings and motives, such that their behavior is influenced
by processes that operate outside of their awareness (e.g., McClelland, Koestner, &
Personality Assessment 392
Weinberger, 1989; Meyer & Kurtz, 2006). Given that people are unaware of these processes,
it does not make sense to ask directly about them. One, therefore, needs to adopt an entirely
different approach to identify these nonconscious factors. Not surprisingly, researchers have
adopted a wide range of approaches to measure important personality characteristics. The
most widely used strategies will be summarized in the following sections.
gl/Toc0ZF]
Objective Tests
Definition
Objective tests (Loevinger, 1957; Meyer & Kurtz, 2006) represent the most familiar and widely
used approach to assessing personality. Objective tests involve administering a standard set
of items, each of which is answered using a limited set of response options (e.g., true or false;
strongly disagree, slightly disagree, slightly agree, strongly agree). Responses to these items
then are scored in a standardized, predetermined way. For example, self-ratings on items
assessing talkativeness, assertiveness, sociability, adventurousness, and energy can be
Personality Assessment 393
It must be emphasized that the term “objective” refers to the method that is used to score a
person’s responses, rather than to the responses themselves. As noted by Meyer and Kurtz
(2006, p. 233), “What is objective about such a procedure is that the psychologist administering
the test does not need to rely on judgment to classify or interpret the test-taker’s response;
the intended response is clearly indicated and scored according to a pre-existing key.” In fact,
as we will see, a person’s test responses may be highly subjective and can be influenced by a
number of different rating biases.
Self-report measures
Objective personality tests can be further subdivided into two basic types. The first type—
which easily is the most widely used in modern personality research—asks people to describe
themselves. This approach offers two key advantages. First, self-raters have access to an
unparalleled wealth of information: After all, who knows more about you than you yourself?
In particular, self-raters have direct access to their own thoughts, feelings, and motives, which
may not be readily available to others (Oh, Wang, & Mount, 2011; Watson, Hubbard, & Weise,
2000). Second, asking people to describe themselves is the simplest, easiest, and most cost-
effective approach to assessing personality. Countless studies, for instance, have involved
administering self-report measures to college students, who are provided some relatively
simple incentive (e.g., extra course credit) to participate.
The items included in self-report measures may consist of single words (e.g., assertive), short
phrases (e.g., am full of energy), or complete sentences (e.g., I like to spend time with others).
Table 1 presents a sample self-report measure assessing the general traits comprising the
influential five-factor model (FFM) of personality: neuroticism, extraversion, openness,
agreeableness, and conscientiousness (John & Srivastava, 1999; McCrae, Costa, & Martin,
2005). The sentences shown in Table 1 are modified versions of items included in the
International Personality Item Pool (IPIP) (Goldberg et al., 2006), which is a rich source of
personality-related content in the public domain (for more information about IPIP, go to:
http://ipip.ori.org/).
Self-report personality tests show impressive validity in relation to a wide range of important
Personality Assessment 394
assessed several decades later. Finally, self-reported personality has important and pervasive
links to psychopathology. Most notably, self-ratings of neuroticism are associated with a wide
array of clinical syndromes, including anxiety disorders, depressive disorders, substance use
disorders, somatoform disorders, eating disorders, personality and conduct disorders, and
schizophrenia/schizotypy (Kotov, Gamez, Schmidt, & Watson, 2010; Mineka, Watson, & Clark,
1998).
At the same time, however, it is clear that this method is limited in a number of ways. First,
raters may be motivated to present themselves in an overly favorable, socially desirable way
(Paunonen & LeBel, 2012). This is a particular concern in “high-stakes testing,” that is,
situations in which test scores are used to make important decisions about individuals (e.g.,
when applying for a job). Second, personality ratings reflect a self-enhancement bias (Vazire
& Carlson, 2011); in other words, people are motivated to ignore (or at least downplay) some
of their less desirable characteristics and to focus instead on their more positive attributes.
Third, self-ratings are subject to the reference group effect (Heine, Buchtel, & Norenzayan,
2008); that is, we base our self-perceptions, in part, on how we compare to others in our
sociocultural reference group. For instance, if you tend to work harder than most of your
friends, you will see yourself as someone who is relatively conscientious, even if you are not
particularly conscientious in any absolute sense.
Informant ratings
Another approach is to ask someone who knows a person well to describe his or her
personality characteristics. In the case of children or adolescents, the informant is most likely
to be a parent or teacher. In studies of older participants, informants may be friends,
roommates, dating partners, spouses, children, or bosses (Oh et al., 2011; Vazire & Carlson,
2011; Watson et al., 2000).
Generally speaking, informant ratings are similar in format to self-ratings. As was the case
with self-report, items may consist of single words, short phrases, or complete sentences.
Indeed, many popular instruments include parallel self- and informant-rating versions, and
it often is relatively easy to convert a self-report measure so that it can be used to obtain
informant ratings. Table 2 illustrates how the self-report instrument shown in Table 1 can be
converted to obtain spouse-ratings (in this case, having a husband describe the personality
characteristics of his wife).
Informant ratings are particularly valuable when self-ratings are impossible to collect (e.g.,
when studying young children or cognitively impaired adults) or when their validity is suspect
Personality Assessment 396
(e.g., as noted earlier, people may not be entirely honest in high-stakes testing situations).
They also may be combined with self-ratings of the same characteristics to produce more
reliable and valid measures of these attributes (McCrae, 1994).
life outcomes that is comparable to that discussed earlier for self-ratings. Indeed, they
outperform self-ratings in certain circumstances, particularly when the assessed traits are
highly evaluative in nature (e.g., intelligence, charm, creativity; see Vazire & Carlson, 2011).
For example, Oh et al. (2011) found that informant ratings were more strongly related to job
performance than were self-ratings. Similarly, Oltmanns and Turkheimer (2009) summarized
evidence indicating that informant ratings of Air Force cadets predicted early, involuntary
discharge from the military better than self-ratings.
Nevertheless, informant ratings also are subject to certain problems and limitations. One
general issue is the level of relevant information that is available to the rater (Funder, 2012).
For instance, even under the best of circumstances, informants lack full access to the thoughts,
feelings, and motives of the person they are rating. This problem is magnified when the
informant does not know the person particularly well and/or only sees him or her in a limited
range of situations (Funder, 2012; Beer & Watson, 2010).
Comprehensiveness
In addition to the source of the scores, there are at least two other important dimensions on
which personality tests differ. The first such dimension concerns the extent to which an
instrument seeks to assess personality in a reasonably comprehensive manner. At one
extreme, many widely used measures are designed to assess a single core attribute. Examples
of these types of measures include the Toronto Alexithymia Scale (Bagby, Parker, & Taylor,
1994), the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (Rosenberg, 1965), and the Multidimensional
Experiential Avoidance Questionnaire (Gamez, Chmielewski, Kotov, Ruggero, & Watson, 2011).
At the other extreme, a number of omnibus inventories contain a large number of specific
scales and purport to measure personality in a reasonably comprehensive manner. These
instruments include the California Psychological Inventory (Gough, 1987), the Revised HEXACO
Personality Inventory (HEXACO-PI-R) (Lee & Ashton, 2006), the Multidimensional Personality
Questionnaire (Patrick, Curtin, & Tellegen, 2002), the NEO Personality Inventory-3 (NEO-PI-3)
(McCrae et al., 2005), the Personality Research Form (Jackson, 1984), and the Sixteen
Personality Factor Questionnaire (Cattell, Eber, & Tatsuoka, 1980).
Some popular personality instruments are designed to assess only the broad, general traits.
For example, similar to the sample instrument displayed in Table 1, the Big Five Inventory
(John & Srivastava, 1999) contains brief scales assessing the broad traits of neuroticism,
extraversion, openness, agreeableness, and conscientiousness. In contrast, many
instruments—including several of the omnibus inventories mentioned earlier—were
Personality Assessment 399
designed primarily to assess a large number of more specific characteristics. Finally, some
inventories—including the HEXACO-PI-R and the NEO-PI-3—were explicitly designed to
provide coverage of both general and specific trait characteristics. For instance, the NEO-PI-3
contains six specific facet scales (e.g., Gregariousness, Assertiveness, Positive Emotions,
Excitement Seeking) that then can be combined to assess the broad trait of extraversion.
Projective Tests
For instance, one TAT picture depicts an elderly woman with her back turned to a young man;
the latter looks downward with a somewhat perplexed expression. Another picture displays
a man clutched from behind by three mysterious hands. What stories could you generate in
response to these pictures?
In comparison to objective tests, projective tests tend to be somewhat cumbersome and labor
intensive to administer. The biggest challenge, however, has been to develop a reliable and
Personality Assessment 400
valid scheme to score the extensive set of responses generated by each respondent. The most
widely used Rorschach scoring scheme is the Comprehensive System developed by Exner
(2003). The most influential TAT scoring system was developed by McClelland, Atkinson and
colleagues between 1947 and 1953 (McClelland et al., 1989; see also Winter, 1998), which can
be used to assess motives such as the need for achievement.
The validity of the Rorschach has been a matter of considerable controversy (Lilienfeld et al.,
2000; Mihura, Meyer, Dumitrascu, & Bombel, 2012; Society for Personality Assessment, 2005).
Most reviews acknowledge that Rorschach scores do show some ability to predict important
outcomes. Its critics, however, argue that it fails to provide important incremental information
beyond other, more easily acquired information, such as that obtained from standard self-
report measures (Lilienfeld et al., 2000).
Validity evidence is more impressive for the TAT. In particular, reviews have concluded that
TAT-based measures of the need for achievement (a) show significant validity to predict
important criteria and (b) provide important information beyond that obtained from objective
measures of this motive (McClelland et al., 1989; Spangler, 1992). Furthermore, given the
relatively weak associations between objective and projective measures of motives,
McClelland et al. (1989) argue that they tap somewhat different processes, with the latter
assessing implicit motives (Schultheiss, 2008).
Implicit Tests
In recent years, researchers have begun to use implicit measures of personality (Back,
Schmuckle, & Egloff, 2009; Vazire & Carlson, 2011). These tests are based on the assumption
that people form automatic or implicit associations between certain concepts based on their
previous experience and behavior. If two concepts (e.g., me and assertive) are strongly
associated with each other, then they should be sorted together more quickly and easily than
two concepts (e.g., me and shy) that are less strongly associated. Although validity evidence
for these measures still is relatively sparse, the results to date are encouraging: Back et al.
(2009), for example, showed that implicit measures of the FFM personality traits predicted
behavior even after controlling for scores on objective measures of these same characteristics.
Behavioral measures offer several advantages over other approaches to assessing personality.
First, because behavior is sampled directly, this approach is not subject to the types of response
biases (e.g., self-enhancement bias, reference group effect) that can distort scores on objective
tests. Second, as is illustrated by the Mehl et al. (2006) and Gosling et al. (2002) studies, this
approach allows people to be studied in their daily lives and in their natural environments,
thereby avoiding the artificiality of other methods (Mehl et al., 2006). Finally, this is the only
approach that actually assesses what people do, as opposed to what they think or feel (see
Baumeister, Vohs, & Funder, 2007).
At the same time, however, this approach also has some disadvantages. This assessment
strategy clearly is much more cumbersome and labor intensive than using objective tests,
particularly self-report. Moreover, similar to projective tests, behavioral measures generate
a rich set of data that then need to be scored in a reliable and valid way. Finally, even the most
ambitious study only obtains relatively small samples of behavior that may provide a
somewhat distorted view of a person’s true characteristics. For example, your behavior during
a “getting acquainted” conversation on a single given day inevitably will reflect a number of
Personality Assessment 402
transient influences (e.g., level of stress, quality of sleep the previous night) that are
idiosyncratic to that day.
Conclusion
No single method of assessing personality is perfect or infallible; each of the major methods
has both strengths and limitations. By using a diversity of approaches, researchers can
overcome the limitations of any single method and develop a more complete and integrative
view of personality.
Personality Assessment 403
Discussion Questions
1. Under what conditions would you expect self-ratings to be most similar to informant
ratings? When would you expect these two sets of ratings to be most different from each
other?
2. The findings of Gosling, et al. (2002) demonstrate that we can obtain important clues about
students’ personalities from their dorm rooms. What other aspects of people’s lives might
give us important information about their personalities?
3. Suppose that you were planning to conduct a study examining the personality trait of
honesty. What method or methods might you use to measure it?
Personality Assessment 404
Vocabulary
Big Five
Five, broad general traits that are included in many prominent models of personality. The five
traits are neuroticism (those high on this trait are prone to feeling sad, worried, anxious, and
dissatisfied with themselves), extraversion (high scorers are friendly, assertive, outgoing,
cheerful, and energetic), openness to experience (those high on this trait are tolerant,
intellectually curious, imaginative, and artistic), agreeableness (high scorers are polite,
considerate, cooperative, honest, and trusting), and conscientiousness (those high on this
trait are responsible, cautious, organized, disciplined, and achievement-oriented).
High-stakes testing
Settings in which test scores are used to make important decisions about individuals. For
example, test scores may be used to determine which individuals are admitted into a college
or graduate school, or who should be hired for a job. Tests also are used in forensic settings
to help determine whether a person is competent to stand trial or fits the legal definition of
sanity.
Honeymoon effect
The tendency for newly married individuals to rate their spouses in an unrealistically positive
manner. This represents a specific manifestation of the letter of recommendation effect when
applied to ratings made by current romantic partners. Moreover, it illustrates the very
important role played by relationship satisfaction in ratings made by romantic partners: As
marital satisfaction declines (i.e., when the “honeymoon is over”), this effect disappears.
Implicit motives
These are goals that are important to a person, but that he/she cannot consciously express.
Because the individual cannot verbalize these goals directly, they cannot be easily assessed
via self-report. However, they can be measured using projective devices such as the Thematic
Apperception Test (TAT).
desirable manner.
Projective hypothesis
The theory that when people are confronted with ambiguous stimuli (that is, stimuli that can
be interpreted in more than one way), their responses will be influenced by their unconscious
thoughts, needs, wishes, and impulses. This, in turn, is based on the Freudian notion of
projection, which is the idea that people attribute their own undesirable/unacceptable
characteristics to other people or objects.
Reliablility
The consistency of test scores across repeated assessments. For example, test-retest reliability
examines the extent to which scores change over time.
Self-enhancement bias
The tendency for people to see and/or present themselves in an overly favorable way. This
tendency can take two basic forms: defensiveness (when individuals actually believe they are
better than they really are) and impression management (when people intentionally distort
their responses to try to convince others that they are better than they really are). Informants
also can show enhancement biases. The general form of this bias has been called the letter-
of-recommendation effect, which is the tendency of informants who like the person they are
rating (e.g., friends, relatives, romantic partners) to describe them in an overly favorable way.
In the case of newlyweds, this tendency has been termed the honeymoon effect.
Validity
Evidence related to the interpretation and use of test scores. A particularly important type of
evidence is criterion validity, which involves the ability of a test to predict theoretically relevant
outcomes. For example, a presumed measure of conscientiousness should be related to
academic achievement (such as overall grade point average).
Personality Assessment 407
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For human beings, the self is what happens when “I” encounters “Me.” The central
psychological question of selfhood, then, is this: How does a person apprehend and
understand who he or she is? Over the past 100 years, psychologists have approached the
study of self (and the related concept of identity) in many different ways, but three central
metaphors for the self repeatedly emerge. First, the self may be seen as a social actor, who
enacts roles and displays traits by performing behaviors in the presence of others. Second,
the self is a motivated agent, who acts upon inner desires and formulates goals, values, and
plans to guide behavior in the future. Third, the self eventually becomes an autobiographical
author, too, who takes stock of life — past, present, and future — to create a story about who
I am, how I came to be, and where my life may be going. This module briefly reviews central
ideas and research findings on the self as an actor, an agent, and an author, with an emphasis
on how these features of selfhood develop over the human life course.
Learning Objectives
• Explain the basic idea of reflexivity in human selfhood—how the “I” encounters and makes
sense of itself (the “Me”).
• Describe fundamental distinctions between three different perspectives on the self: the
self as actor, agent, and author.
• Describe how a sense of self as a social actor emerges around the age of 2 years and how
it develops going forward.
• Describe the development of the self’s sense of motivated agency from the emergence of
the child’s theory of mind to the articulation of life goals and values in adolescence and
beyond.
• Define the term narrative identity, and explain what psychological and cultural functions
Self and Identity 412
Introduction
In the Temple of Apollo at Delphi, the ancient Greeks inscribed the words: “Know thyself.” For
at least 2,500 years, and probably longer, human beings have pondered the meaning of the
ancient aphorism. Over the past century, psychological scientists have joined the effort. They
have formulated many theories and tested countless hypotheses that speak to the central
question of human selfhood: How does a person know who he or she is?
Imagine for a moment that you have decided to improve yourself. You might, say, go on a diet
to improve your appearance. Or you might decide to be nicer to your mother, in order to
improve that important social role. Or maybe the problem is at work—you need to find a
Self and Identity 413
better job or go back to school to prepare for a different career. Perhaps you just need to
work harder. Or get organized. Or recommit yourself to religion. Or maybe the key is to begin
thinking about your whole life story in a completely different way, in a way that you hope will
bring you more happiness, fulfillment, peace, or excitement.
Although there are many different ways you might reflect upon and try to improve the self, it
turns out that many, if not most, of them fall roughly into three broad psychological categories
(McAdams & Cox, 2010). The I may encounter the Me as (a) a social actor, (b) a motivated
agent, or (c) an autobiographical author.
social (Wilson, 2012). For a few million and follow scripts every day. [Image: Brian, https://goo.gl/z0VI3t,
consummate evolutionary sense, therefore, that the human "I" should apprehend the "Me"
first and foremost as a social actor.
For human beings, the sense of the self as a social actor begins to emerge around the age of
18 months. Numerous studies have shown that by the time they reach their second birthday
most toddlers recognize themselves in mirrors and other reflecting devices (Lewis & Brooks-
Gunn, 1979; Rochat, 2003). What they see is an embodied actor who moves through space
and time. Many children begin to use words such as “me” and “mine” in the second year of
life, suggesting that the I now has linguistic labels that can be applied reflexively to itself: I call
myself “me.” Around the same time, children also begin to express social emotions such as
embarrassment, shame, guilt, and pride (Tangney, Stuewig, & Mashek, 2007). These emotions
tell the social actor how well he or she is performing in the group. When I do things that win
the approval of others, I feel proud of myself. When I fail in the presence of others, I may feel
embarrassment or shame. When I violate a social rule, I may experience guilt, which may
motivate me to make amends.
Many of the classic psychological theories of human selfhood point to the second year of life
as a key developmental period. For example, Freud (1923/1961) and his followers in the
psychoanalytic tradition traced the emergence of an autonomous ego back to the second
year. Freud used the term “ego” (in German das Ich, which also translates into “the I”) to refer
to an executive self in the personality. Erikson (1963) argued that experiences of trust and
interpersonal attachment in the first year of life help to consolidate the autonomy of the ego
in the second. Coming from a more sociological perspective, Mead (1934) suggested that the
I comes to know the Me through reflection, which may begin quite literally with mirrors but
later involves the reflected appraisals of others. I come to know who I am as a social actor,
Mead argued, by noting how other people in my social world react to my performances. In the
development of the self as a social actor, other people function like mirrors—they reflect who
I am back to me.
Research has shown that when young children begin to make attributions about themselves,
they start simple (Harter, 2006). At age 4, Jessica knows that she has dark hair, knows that she
lives in a white house, and describes herself to others in terms of simple behavioral traits. She
may say that she is “nice,” or “helpful,” or that she is “a good girl most of the time.” By the time,
she hits fifth grade (age 10), Jessica sees herself in more complex ways, attributing traits to
the self such as “honest,” “moody,” “outgoing,” “shy,” “hard-working,” “smart,” “good at math
but not gym class,” or “nice except when I am around my annoying brother.” By late childhood
and early adolescence, the personality traits that people attribute to themselves, as well as
those attributed to them by others, tend to correlate with each other in ways that conform
to a well-established taxonomy of five broad trait domains, repeatedly derived in studies of
Self and Identity 415
adult personality and often called the Big Five: (1) extraversion, (2) neuroticism, (3)
agreeableness, (4) conscientiousness, and (5) openness to experience (Roberts, Wood, & Caspi,
2008). By late childhood, moreover, self-conceptions will likely also include important social
roles: “I am a good student,” “I am the oldest daughter,” or “I am a good friend to Sarah.”
Traits and roles, and variations on these notions, are the main currency of the self as social
actor (McAdams & Cox, 2010). Trait terms capture perceived consistencies in social
performance. They convey what I reflexively perceive to be my overall acting style, based in
part on how I think others see me as an actor in many different social situations. Roles capture
the quality, as I perceive it, of important structured relationships in my life. Taken together,
traits and roles make up the main features of my social reputation, as I apprehend it in my
own mind (Hogan, 1982).
If you have ever tried hard to change yourself, you may have taken aim at your social
reputation, targeting your central traits or your social roles. Maybe you woke up one day and
decided that you must become a more optimistic and emotionally upbeat person. Taking into
consideration the reflected appraisals of others, you realized that even your friends seem to
avoid you because you bring them down. In addition, it feels bad to feel so bad all the time:
Wouldn’t it be better to feel good, to have more energy and hope? In the language of traits,
you have decided to “work on” your “neuroticism.” Or maybe instead, your problem is the trait
of “conscientiousness”: You are undisciplined and don’t work hard enough, so you resolve to
make changes in that area. Self-improvement efforts such as these—aimed at changing one’s
traits to become a more effective social actor—are sometimes successful, but they are very
hard—kind of like dieting. Research suggests that broad traits tend to be stubborn, resistant
to change, even with the aid of psychotherapy. However, people often have more success
working directly on their social roles. To become a more effective social actor, you may want
to take aim at the important roles you play in life. What can I do to become a better son or
daughter? How can I find new and meaningful roles to perform at work, or in my family, or
among my friends, or in my church and community? By doing concrete things that enrich your
performances in important social roles, you may begin to see yourself in a new light, and
others will notice the change, too. Social actors hold the potential to transform their
performances across the human life course. Each time you walk out on stage, you have a
chance to start anew.
Whether we are talking literally about the theatrical stage or more figuratively, as I do in this
module, about the everyday social environment for human behavior, observers can never
Self and Identity 416
To be an agent is to act with direction and purpose, to move forward into the future in pursuit
of self-chosen and valued goals. In a sense, human beings are agents even as infants, for
babies can surely act in goal-directed ways. By age 1 year, moreover, infants show a strong
preference for observing and imitating the goal-directed, intentional behavior of others, rather
than random behaviors (Woodward, 2009). Still, it is one thing to act in goal-directed ways; it
is quite another for the I to know itself (the Me) as an intentional and purposeful force who
moves forward in life in pursuit of self-chosen goals, values, and other desired end states. In
order to do so, the person must first realize that people indeed have desires and goals in their
minds and that these inner desires and goals motivate (initiate, energize, put into motion)
their behavior. According to a strong line of research in developmental psychology, attaining
this kind of understanding means acquiring a theory of mind (Wellman, 1993), which occurs
for most children by the age of 4. Once a child understands that other people’s behavior is
often motivated by inner desires and goals, it is a small step to apprehend the self in similar
terms.
Building on theory of mind and other cognitive and social developments, children begin to
construct the self as a motivated agent in the elementary school years, layered over their still-
developing sense of themselves as social actors. Theory and research on what developmental
psychologists call the age 5-to-7 shift converge to suggest that children become more planful,
Self and Identity 417
intentional, and systematic in their pursuit of valued goals during this time (Sameroff & Haith,
1996). Schooling reinforces the shift in that teachers and curricula place increasing demands
on students to work hard, adhere to schedules, focus on goals, and achieve success in
particular, well-defined task domains. Their relative success in achieving their most cherished
goals, furthermore, goes a long way in determining children’s self-esteem (Robins, Tracy, &
Trzesniewski, 2008). Motivated agents feel good about themselves to the extent they believe
that they are making good progress in achieving their goals and advancing their most
important values.
Goals and values become even more important for the self in adolescence, as teenagers begin
to confront what Erikson (1963) famously termed the developmental challenge of identity.
For adolescents and young adults, establishing a psychologically efficacious identity involves
exploring different options with respect to life goals, values, vocations, and intimate
relationships and eventually committing to a motivational and ideological agenda for adult
life—an integrated and realistic sense of what I want and value in life and how I plan to achieve
it (Kroger & Marcia, 2011). Committing oneself to an integrated suite of life goals and values
is perhaps the greatest achievement for the self as motivated agent. Establishing an adult
identity has implications, as well, for how a person moves through life as a social actor, entailing
new role commitments and, perhaps, a changing understanding of one’s basic dispositional
traits. According to Erikson, however, identity achievement is always provisional, for adults
continue to work on their identities as they move into midlife and beyond, often relinquishing
old goals in favor of new ones, investing themselves in new projects and making new plans,
exploring new relationships, and shifting their priorities in response to changing life
circumstances (Freund & Riediger, 2006; Josselson, 1996).
There is a sense whereby any time you try to change yourself, you are assuming the role of a
motivated agent. After all, to strive to change something is inherently what an agent does.
However, what particular feature of selfhood you try to change may correspond to your self
as actor, agent, or author, or some combination. When you try to change your traits or roles,
you take aim at the social actor. By contrast, when you try to change your values or life goals,
you are focusing on yourself as a motivated agent. Adolescence and young adulthood are
periods in the human life course when many of us focus attention on our values and life goals.
Perhaps you grew up as a traditional Catholic, but now in college you believe that the values
inculcated in your childhood no longer function so well for you. You no longer believe in the
central tenets of the Catholic Church, say, and are now working to replace your old values
with new ones. Or maybe you still want to be Catholic, but you feel that your new take on
faith requires a different kind of personal ideology. In the realm of the motivated agent,
moreover, changing values can influence life goals. If your new value system prioritizes
alleviating the suffering of others, you may decide to pursue a degree in social work, or to
Self and Identity 418
become a public interest lawyer, or to live a simpler life that prioritizes people over material
wealth. A great deal of the identity work we do in adolescence and young adulthood is about
values and goals, as we strive to articulate a personal vision or dream for what we hope to
accomplish in the future.
Even as the “I”continues to develop a sense of the “Me” as both a social actor and a motivated
agent, a third standpoint for selfhood gradually emerges in the adolescent and early-adult
years. The third perspective is a response to Erikson’s (1963) challenge of identity. According
to Erikson, developing an identity involves more than the exploration of and commitment to
life goals and values (the self as motivated agent), and more than committing to new roles
and re-evaluating old traits (the self as social actor). It also involves achieving a sense of
temporal continuity in life—a reflexive understanding of how I have come to be the person I am
becoming, or put differently, how my past self has developed into my present self, and how
my present self will, in turn, develop into an envisioned future self. In his analysis of identity
formation in the life of the 15th-century Protestant reformer Martin Luther, Erikson (1958)
describes the culmination of a young adult’s search for identity in this way:
"To be adult means among other things to see one’s own life in continuous perspective, both
in retrospect and prospect. By accepting some definition of who he is, usually on the basis of
a function in an economy, a place in the sequence of generations, and a status in the structure
of society, the adult is able to selectively reconstruct his past in such a way that, step for step, it
seems to have planned him, or better, he seems to have planned it. In this sense, psychologically
we do choose our parents, our family history, and the history of our kings, heroes, and gods.
By making them our own, we maneuver ourselves into the inner position of proprietors, of
creators."
In this rich passage, Erikson intimates that the development of a mature identity in young
adulthood involves the I’s ability to construct a retrospective and prospective story about the
Me (McAdams, 1985). In their efforts to find a meaningful identity for life, young men and
women begin “to selectively reconstruct” their past, as Erikson wrote, and imagine their future
to create an integrative life story, or what psychologists today often call a narrative identity.
A narrative identity is an internalized and evolving story of the self that reconstructs the past
and anticipates the future in such a way as to provide a person’s life with some degree of
unity, meaning, and purpose over time (McAdams, 2008; McLean, Pasupathi, & Pals, 2007).
Self and Identity 419
The self typically becomes an autobiographical author in the early-adult years, a way of being
that is layered over the motivated agent, which is layered over the social actor. In order to
provide life with the sense of temporal continuity and deep meaning that Erikson believed
identity should confer, we must author a personalized life story that integrates our
understanding of who we once were, who we are today, and who we may become in the
future. The story helps to explain, for the author and for the author’s world, why the social
actor does what it does and why the motivated agent wants what it wants, and how the person
as a whole has developed over time, from the past’s reconstructed beginning to the future’s
imagined ending.
By the time they are 5 or 6 years of age, children can tell well-formed stories about personal
events in their lives (Fivush, 2011). By the end of childhood, they usually have a good sense
of what a typical biography contains and how it is sequenced, from birth to death (Thomsen
& Bernsten, 2008). But it is not until adolescence, research shows, that human beings express
advanced storytelling skills and what psychologists call autobiographical reasoning
(Habermas & Bluck, 2000; McLean & Fournier, 2008). In autobiographical reasoning, a narrator
is able to derive substantive conclusions about the self from analyzing his or her own personal
experiences. Adolescents may develop the ability to string together events into causal chains
and inductively derive general themes about life from a sequence of chapters and scenes
(Habermas & de Silveira, 2008). For example, a 16-year-old may be able to explain to herself
and to others how childhood experiences
in her family have shaped her vocation in
life. Her parents were divorced when she
was 5 years old, the teenager recalls, and
this caused a great deal of stress in her
family. Her mother often seemed anxious
and depressed, but she (the now-teenager
when she was a little girl—the story’s
protagonist) often tried to cheer her
mother up, and her efforts seemed to
work. In more recent years, the teenager
notes that her friends often come to her
with their boyfriend problems. She seems
to be very adept at giving advice about love
and relationships, which stems, the
Young people often "try on" many variations of identities to see
teenager now believes, from her early
which best fits their private sense of themselves. [Image: experiences with her mother. Carrying this
Sangudo, https://goo.gl/Ay3UMR, CC BY-NC-SA 2.0, https://goo. causal narrative forward, the teenager now
gl/Toc0ZF] thinks that she would like to be a marriage
Self and Identity 420
Unlike children, then, adolescents can tell a full and convincing story about an entire human
life, or at least a prominent line of causation within a full life, explaining continuity and change
in the story’s protagonist over time. Once the cognitive skills are in place, young people seek
interpersonal opportunities to share and refine their developing sense of themselves as
storytellers (the I) who tell stories about themselves (the Me). Adolescents and young adults
author a narrative sense of the self by telling stories about their experiences to other people,
monitoring the feedback they receive from the tellings, editing their stories in light of the
feedback, gaining new experiences and telling stories about those, and on and on, as selves
create stories that, in turn, create new selves (McLean et al., 2007). Gradually, in fits and starts,
through conversation and introspection, the I develops a convincing and coherent narrative
about the Me.
Contemporary research on the self as autobiographical author emphasizes the strong effect
of culture on narrative identity (Hammack, 2008). Culture provides a menu of favored plot
lines, themes, and character types for the construction of self-defining life stories.
Autobiographical authors sample selectively from the cultural menu, appropriating ideas that
seem to resonate well with their own life experiences. As such, life stories reflect the culture,
wherein they are situated as much as they reflect the authorial efforts of the autobiographical
I.
As one example of the tight link between culture and narrative identity, McAdams (2013) and
others (e.g., Kleinfeld, 2012) have highlighted the prominence of redemptive narratives in
American culture. Epitomized in such iconic cultural ideals as the American dream, Horatio
Alger stories, and narratives of Christian atonement, redemptive stories track the move from
suffering to an enhanced status or state, while scripting the development of a chosen
protagonist who journeys forth into a dangerous and unredeemed world (McAdams, 2013).
Hollywood movies often celebrate redemptive quests. Americans are exposed to similar
narrative messages in self-help books, 12-step programs, Sunday sermons, and in the rhetoric
of political campaigns. Over the past two decades, the world’s most influential spokesperson
for the power of redemption in human lives may be Oprah Winfrey, who tells her own story
of overcoming childhood adversity while encouraging others, through her media outlets and
philanthropy, to tell similar kinds of stories for their own lives (McAdams, 2013). Research has
demonstrated that American adults who enjoy high levels of mental health and civic
engagement tend to construct their lives as narratives of redemption, tracking the move from
sin to salvation, rags to riches, oppression to liberation, or sickness/abuse to health/recovery
(McAdams, Diamond, de St. Aubin, & Mansfield, 1997; McAdams, Reynolds, Lewis, Patten, &
Bowman, 2001; Walker & Frimer, 2007). In American society, these kinds of stories are often
Self and Identity 421
seen to be inspirational.
At the same time, McAdams (2011, 2013) has pointed to shortcomings and limitations in the
redemptive stories that many Americans tell, which mirror cultural biases and stereotypes in
American culture and heritage. McAdams has argued that redemptive stories support
happiness and societal engagement for some Americans, but the same stories can encourage
moral righteousness and a naïve expectation that suffering will always be redeemed. For
better and sometimes for worse, Americans seem to love stories of personal redemption and
often aim to assimilate their autobiographical memories and aspirations to a redemptive
form. Nonetheless, these same stories may not work so well in cultures that espouse different
values and narrative ideals (Hammack, 2008). It is important to remember that every culture
offers its own storehouse of favored narrative forms. It is also essential to know that no single
narrative form captures all that is good (or bad) about a culture. In American society, the
redemptive narrative is but one of many different kinds of stories that people commonly
employ to make sense of their lives.
What is your story? What kind of a narrative are you working on? As you look to the past and
imagine the future, what threads of continuity, change, and meaning do you discern? For
many people, the most dramatic and fulfilling efforts to change the self happen when the I
works hard, as an autobiographical author, to construct and, ultimately, to tell a new story
about the Me. Storytelling may be the most powerful form of self-transformation that human
beings have ever invented. Changing one’s life story is at the heart of many forms of
psychotherapy and counseling, as well as religious conversions, vocational epiphanies, and
other dramatic transformations of the self that people often celebrate as turning points in
their lives (Adler, 2012). Storytelling is often at the heart of the little changes, too, minor edits
in the self that we make as we move through daily life, as we live and experience life, and as
we later tell it to ourselves and to others.
Conclusion
For human beings, selves begin as social actors, but they eventually become motivated agents
and autobiographical authors, too. The I first sees itself as an embodied actor in social space;
with development, however, it comes to appreciate itself also as a forward-looking source of
self-determined goals and values, and later yet, as a storyteller of personal experience,
oriented to the reconstructed past and the imagined future. To “know thyself” in mature
adulthood, then, is to do three things: (a) to apprehend and to perform with social approval
my self-ascribed traits and roles, (b) to pursue with vigor and (ideally) success my most valued
goals and plans, and (c) to construct a story about life that conveys, with vividness and cultural
Self and Identity 422
resonance, how I became the person I am becoming, integrating my past as I remember it,
my present as I am experiencing it, and my future as I hope it to be.
Self and Identity 423
Outside Resources
Web: The website for the Foley Center for the Study of Lives, at Northwestern University.
The site contains research materials, interview protocols, and coding manuals for
conducting studies of narrative identity.
http://www.sesp.northwestern.edu/foley/
Discussion Questions
1. Back in the 1950s, Erik Erikson argued that many adolescents and young adults experience
a tumultuous identity crisis. Do you think this is true today? What might an identity crisis
look and feel like? And, how might it be resolved?
2. Many people believe that they have a true self buried inside of them. From this perspective,
the development of self is about discovering a psychological truth deep inside. Do you
believe this to be true? How does thinking about the self as an actor, agent, and author
bear on this question?
3. Psychological research shows that when people are placed in front of mirrors they often
behave in a more moral and conscientious manner, even though they sometimes
experience this procedure as unpleasant. From the standpoint of the self as a social actor,
how might we explain this phenomenon?
4. By the time they reach adulthood, does everybody have a narrative identity? Do some
people simply never develop a story for their life?
5. What happens when the three perspectives on self—the self as actor, agent, and author
—conflict with each other? Is it necessary for people’s self-ascribed traits and roles to line
up well with their goals and their stories?
6. William James wrote that the self includes all things that the person considers to be “mine.”
If we take James literally, a person’s self might extend to include his or her material
possessions, pets, and friends and family. Does this make sense?
7. To what extent can we control the self? Are some features of selfhood easier to control
than others?
8. What cultural differences may be observed in the construction of the self? How might
gender, ethnicity, and class impact the development of the self as actor, as agent, and as
author?
Self and Identity 424
Vocabulary
Autobiographical reasoning
The ability, typically developed in adolescence, to derive substantive conclusions about the
self from analyzing one’s own personal experiences.
Big Five
A broad taxonomy of personality trait domains repeatedly derived from studies of trait ratings
in adulthood and encompassing the categories of (1) extraversion vs. introversion, (2)
neuroticism vs. emotional stability, (3) agreeable vs. disagreeableness, (4) conscientiousness
vs. nonconscientiousness, and (5) openness to experience vs. conventionality. By late
childhood and early adolescence, people’s self-attributions of personality traits, as well as the
trait attributions made about them by others, show patterns of intercorrelations that confirm
with the five-factor structure obtained in studies of adults.
Ego
Sigmund Freud’s conception of an executive self in the personality. Akin to this module’s notion
of “the I,” Freud imagined the ego as observing outside reality, engaging in rational though,
and coping with the competing demands of inner desires and moral standards.
Identity
Sometimes used synonymously with the term “self,” identity means many different things in
psychological science and in other fields (e.g., sociology). In this module, I adopt Erik Erikson’s
conception of identity as a developmental task for late adolescence and young adulthood.
Forming an identity in adolescence and young adulthood involves exploring alternative roles,
values, goals, and relationships and eventually committing to a realistic agenda for life that
productively situates a person in the adult world of work and love. In addition, identity
formation entails commitments to new social roles and reevaluation of old traits, and
importantly, it brings with it a sense of temporal continuity in life, achieved though the
construction of an integrative life story.
Narrative identity
An internalized and evolving story of the self designed to provide life with some measure of
temporal unity and purpose. Beginning in late adolescence, people craft self-defining stories
that reconstruct the past and imagine the future to explain how the person came to be the
person that he or she is becoming.
Redemptive narratives
Self and Identity 425
Life stories that affirm the transformation from suffering to an enhanced status or state. In
American culture, redemptive life stories are highly prized as models for the good self, as in
classic narratives of atonement, upward mobility, liberation, and recovery.
Reflexivity
The idea that the self reflects back upon itself; that the I (the knower, the subject) encounters
the Me (the known, the object). Reflexivity is a fundamental property of human selfhood.
Self-esteem
The extent to which a person feels that he or she is worthy and good. The success or failure
that the motivated agent experiences in pursuit of valued goals is a strong determinant of
self-esteem.
Social reputation
The traits and social roles that others attribute to an actor. Actors also have their own
conceptions of what they imagine their respective social reputations indeed are in the eyes
of others.
The “I”
The self as knower, the sense of the self as a subject who encounters (knows, works on) itself
(the Me).
Self and Identity 426
The “Me”
The self as known, the sense of the self as the object or target of the I’s knowledge and work.
Theory of mind
Emerging around the age of 4, the child’s understanding that other people have minds in
which are located desires and beliefs, and that desires and beliefs, thereby, motivate behavior.
Self and Identity 427
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Anxiety is a natural part of life and, at normal levels, helps us to function at our best. However,
for people with anxiety disorders, anxiety is overwhelming and hard to control. Anxiety
disorders develop out of a blend of biological (genetic) and psychological factors that, when
combined with stress, may lead to the development of ailments. Primary anxiety-related
diagnoses include generalized anxiety disorder, panic disorder, specific phobia, social anxiety
disorder (social phobia), post traumatic stress disorder, and obsessive-compulsive disorder.
In this module, we summarize the main clinical features of each of these disorders and discuss
their similarities and differences with everyday experiences of anxiety.
Learning Objectives
Introduction
What is anxiety? Most of us feel some anxiety almost every day of our lives. Maybe you have
an important test coming up for school. Or maybe there’s that big game next Saturday, or
that first date with someone new you are hoping to impress. Anxiety can be defined as a
negative mood state that is accompanied by bodily symptoms such as increased heart rate,
Anxiety and Related Disorders 432
muscle tension, a sense of unease, and apprehension about the future (APA, 2013; Barlow,
2002).
Anxiety and closely related disorders While everyone may experience some level of anxiety at one
emerge from “triple vulnerabilities,”a time or another, those with anxiety disorders experience it
combination of biological, psychological, consistently and so intensely that it has a significantly negative
impact on their quality of life. [Image: Bada Bing, https://goo.gl/
and specific factors that increase our risk
aawyLi, CC BY-NC-SA 2.0, https://goo.gl/Toc0ZF]
for developing a disorder (Barlow, 2002;
Suárez, Bennett, Goldstein, & Barlow,
2009). Biological vulnerabilities refer to specific genetic and neurobiological factors that
might predispose someone to develop anxiety disorders. No single gene directly causes
anxiety or panic, but our genes may make us more susceptible to anxiety and influence how
our brains react to stress (Drabant et al., 2012; Gelernter & Stein, 2009; Smoller, Block, &
Young, 2009). Psychological vulnerabilities refer to the influences that our early experiences
have on how we view the world. If we were confronted with unpredictable stressors or
traumatic experiences at younger ages, we may come to view the world as unpredictable and
uncontrollable, even dangerous (Chorpita & Barlow, 1998; Gunnar & Fisher, 2006). Specific
vulnerabilities refer to how our experiences lead us to focus and channel our anxiety (Suárez
et al., 2009). If we learned that physical illness is dangerous, maybe through witnessing our
family’s reaction whenever anyone got sick, we may focus our anxiety on physical sensations.
If we learned that disapproval from others has negative, even dangerous consequences, such
as being yelled at or severely punished for even the slightest offense, we might focus our
anxiety on social evaluation. If we learn that the “other shoe might drop” at any moment, we
may focus our anxiety on worries about the future. None of these vulnerabilities directly
Anxiety and Related Disorders 433
causes anxiety disorders on its own—instead, when all of these vulnerabilities are present,
and we experience some triggering life stress, an anxiety disorder may be the result (Barlow,
2002; Suárez et al., 2009). In the next sections, we will briefly explore each of the major anxiety
based disorders, found in the fifth edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders (DSM-5) (APA, 2013).
Most of us worry some of the time, and this worry can actually be useful in helping us to plan
for the future or make sure we remember to do something important. Most of us can set
aside our worries when we need to focus on other things or stop worrying altogether whenever
a problem has passed. However, for someone with generalized anxiety disorder (GAD), these
worries become difficult, or even impossible, to turn off. They may find themselves worrying
excessively about a number of different things, both minor and catastrophic. Their worries
also come with a host of other symptoms such as muscle tension, fatigue, agitation or
restlessness, irritability, difficulties with sleep (either falling asleep, staying asleep, or both),
or difficulty concentrating.The DSM-5 criteria specify that at least six months of excessive
anxiety and worry of this type must be ongoing, happening more days than not for a good
proportion of the day, to receive a diagnosis of GAD. About 5.7% of the population has met
criteria for GAD at some point during their lifetime (Kessler, Berglund, et al., 2005), making it
one of the most common anxiety disorders (see Table 1).
Table 1: Prevalence rates for major anxiety disorders. [1] Kessler et al. (2005), [2]Kessler, Chiu, Demler, Merikangas, & Walters
(2005), [3]Kessler, Sonnega, Bromet, Hughes, & Nelson (1995), [4]Craske et al. (1996).
Anxiety and Related Disorders 434
What makes a person with GAD worry more than the average person? Research shows that
individuals with GAD are more sensitive and vigilant toward possible threats than people who
are not anxious (Aikins & Craske, 2001; Barlow, 2002; Bradley, Mogg, White, Groom, & de Bono,
1999). This may be related to early stressful experiences, which can lead to a view of the world
as an unpredictable, uncontrollable, and even dangerous place. Some have suggested that
people with GAD worry as a way to gain some control over these otherwise uncontrollable or
unpredictable experiences and against uncertain outcomes (Dugas, Gagnon, Ladouceur, &
Freeston, 1998). By repeatedly going through all of the possible “What if?” scenarios in their
mind, the person might feel like they are less vulnerable to an unexpected outcome, giving
them the sense that they have some control over the situation (Wells, 2002). Others have
suggested people with GAD worry as a way to avoid feeling distressed (Borkovec, Alcaine, &
Behar, 2004). For example, Borkovec and Hu (1990) found that those who worried when
confronted with a stressful situation had less physiological arousal than those who didn’t
worry, maybe because the worry “distracted” them in some way.
The problem is, all of this “what if?”-ing doesn’t get the person any closer to a solution or an
answer and, in fact, might take them away from important things they should be paying
attention to in the moment, such as finishing an important project. Many of the catastrophic
outcomes people with GAD worry about are very unlikely to happen, so when the catastrophic
event doesn’t materialize, the act of worrying gets reinforced (Borkovec, Hazlett-Stevens, &
Diaz, 1999). For example, if a mother spends all night worrying about whether her teenage
daughter will get home safe from a night out and the daughter returns home without incident,
the mother could easily attribute her daughter’s safe return to her successful “vigil.” What the
mother hasn’t learned is that her daughter would have returned home just as safe if she had
been focusing on the movie she was watching with her husband, rather than being
preoccupied with worries. In this way, the cycle of worry is perpetuated, and, subsequently,
people with GAD often miss out on many otherwise enjoyable events in their lives.
Have you ever gotten into a near-accident or been taken by surprise in some way? You may
have felt a flood of physical sensations, such as a racing heart, shortness of breath, or tingling
sensations. This alarm reaction is called the “fight or flight” response (Cannon, 1929) and is
your body’s natural reaction to fear, preparing you to either fight or escape in response to
threat or danger. It’s likely you weren’t too concerned with these sensations, because you
knew what was causing them. But imagine if this alarm reaction came “out of the blue,” for
no apparent reason, or in a situation in which you didn’t expect to be anxious or fearful. This
is called an “unexpected” panic attack or a false alarm. Because there is no apparent reason
Anxiety and Related Disorders 435
or cue for the alarm reaction, you might react to the sensations with intense fear, maybe
thinking you are having a heart attack, or going crazy, or even dying. You might begin to
associate the physical sensations you felt during this attack with this fear and may start to go
out of your way to avoid having those sensations again.
during the beginnings of a panic attack. For has subsided. When this anxiety leads to deliberate avoidance
of particular places and situations a person may be given a
example, someone who experienced a
diagnosis of agoraphobia. [Image: Nate Steiner, https://goo.gl/
racing heart during a panic attack might
dUYWDf, Public Domain]
avoid exercise or caffeine. Someone who
experienced choking sensations might avoid wearing high-necked sweaters or necklaces.
Avoidance of these internal bodily or somatic cues for panic has been termed interoceptive
avoidance (Barlow & Craske, 2007; Brown, White, & Barlow, 2005; Craske & Barlow, 2008;
Shear et al., 1997).
The individual may also have experienced an overwhelming urge to escape during the
unexpected panic attack. This can lead to a sense that certain places or situations—particularly
situations where escape might not be possible—are not “safe.” These situations become
external cues for panic. If the person begins to avoid several places or situations, or still
endures these situations but does so with a significant amount of apprehension and anxiety,
then the person also has agoraphobia (Barlow, 2002; Craske & Barlow, 1988; Craske & Barlow,
2008). Agoraphobia can cause significant disruption to a person’s life, causing them to go out
of their way to avoid situations, such as adding hours to a commute to avoid taking the train
Anxiety and Related Disorders 436
or only ordering take-out to avoid having to enter a grocery store. In one tragic case seen by
our clinic, a woman suffering from agoraphobia had not left her apartment for 20 years and
had spent the past 10 years confined to one small area of her apartment, away from the view
of the outside. In some cases, agoraphobia develops in the absence of panic attacks and
therefor is a separate disorder in DSM-5. But agoraphobia often accompanies panic disorder.
About 4.7% of the population has met criteria for PD or agoraphobia over their lifetime (Kessler,
Chiu, Demler, Merikangas, & Walters, 2005; Kessler et al., 2006) (see Table 1). In all of these
cases of panic disorder, what was once an adaptive natural alarm reaction now becomes a
learned, and much feared, false alarm.
Specific Phobia
The majority of us might have certain things we fear, such as bees, or needles, or heights
(Myers et al., 1984). But what if this fear is so consuming that you can’t go out on a summer’s
day, or get vaccines needed to go on a special trip, or visit your doctor in her new office on
the 26th floor? To meet criteria for a diagnosis of specific phobia, there must be an irrational
fear of a specific object or situation that substantially interferes with the person’s ability to
function. For example, a patient at our clinic turned down a prestigious and coveted artist
residency because it required spending time near a wooded area, bound to have insects.
Another patient purposely left her house two hours early each morning so she could walk
past her neighbor’s fenced yard before they let their dog out in the morning.
increased heart rate and blood pressure, maybe even a panic attack. However, people with
BII type phobias usually experience a marked drop in heart rate and blood pressure and may
even faint. In this way, those with BII phobias almost always differ in their physiological reaction
from people with other types of phobia (Barlow & Liebowitz, 1995; Craske, Antony, & Barlow,
2006; Hofmann, Alpers, & Pauli, 2009; Ost, 1992). BII phobia also runs in families more strongly
than any phobic disorder we know (Antony & Barlow, 2002; Page & Martin, 1998). Specific
phobia is one of the most common psychological disorders in the United States, with 12.5%
of the population reporting a lifetime history of fears significant enough to be considered a
“phobia” (Arrindell et al., 2003; Kessler, Berglund, et al., 2005) (see Table 1). Most people who
suffer from specific phobia tend to have multiple phobias of several types (Hofmann, Lehman,
& Barlow, 1997).
Many people consider themselves shy, and most people find social evaluation uncomfortable
at best, or giving a speech somewhat mortifying. Yet, only a small proportion of the population
fear these types of situations significantly enough to merit a diagnosis of social anxiety
disorder (SAD) (APA, 2013). SAD is more than exaggerated shyness (Bogels et al., 2010;
Schneier et al., 1996). To receive a diagnosis of SAD, the fear and anxiety associated with social
situations must be so strong that the person avoids them entirely, or if avoidance is not
possible, the person endures them with a great deal of distress. Further, the fear and avoidance
of social situations must get in the way of the person’s daily life, or seriously limit their academic
or occupational functioning. For example, a patient at our clinic compromised her perfect 4.0
grade point average because she could not complete a required oral presentation in one of
her classes, causing her to fail the course. Fears of negative evaluation might make someone
repeatedly turn down invitations to social events or avoid having conversations with people,
leading to greater and greater isolation.
The specific social situations that trigger anxiety and fear range from one-on-one interactions,
such as starting or maintaining a conversation; to performance-based situations, such as
giving a speech or performing on stage; to assertiveness, such as asking someone to change
disruptive or undesirable behaviors. Fear of social evaluation might even extend to such things
as using public restrooms, eating in a restaurant, filling out forms in a public place, or even
reading on a train. Any type of situation that could potentially draw attention to the person
can become a feared social situation. For example, one patient of ours went out of her way
to avoid any situation in which she might have to use a public restroom for fear that someone
would hear her in the bathroom stall and think she was disgusting. If the fear is limited to
performance-based situations, such as public speaking, a diagnosis of SAD performance only
Anxiety and Related Disorders 438
is assigned.
What causes someone to fear social situations to such a large extent? The person may have
learned growing up that social evaluation in particular can be dangerous, creating a specific
psychological vulnerability to develop social anxiety (Bruch & Heimberg, 1994; Lieb et al., 2000;
Rapee & Melville, 1997). For example, the person’s caregivers may have harshly criticized and
punished them for even the smallest mistake, maybe even punishing them physically.
will panic the next time they are in that ihtatho, https://goo.gl/dTzrdj, CC BY-NC 2.0, https://goo.gl/
With stories of war, natural disasters, and physical and sexual assault dominating the news,
it is clear that trauma is a reality for many people. Many individual traumas that occur every
day never even make the headlines, such as a car accident, domestic abuse, or the death of
a loved one. Yet, while many people face traumatic events, not everyone who faces a trauma
Anxiety and Related Disorders 439
develops a disorder. Some, with the help of family and friends, are able to recover and continue
on with their lives (Friedman, 2009). For some, however, the months and years following a
trauma are filled with intrusive reminders of the event, a sense of intense fear that another
traumatic event might occur, or a sense of isolation and emotional numbing. They may engage
in a host of behaviors intended to protect themselves from being vulnerable or unsafe, such
as constantly scanning their surroundings to look for signs of potential danger, never sitting
with their back to the door, or never allowing themselves to be anywhere alone. This lasting
reaction to trauma is what characterizes posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD).
A diagnosis of PTSD begins with the traumatic event itself. An individual must have been
exposed to an event that involves actual or threatened death, serious injury, or sexual violence.
To receive a diagnosis of PTSD, exposure to the event must include either directly experiencing
the event, witnessing the event happening to someone else, learning that the event occurred
to a close relative or friend, or having repeated or extreme exposure to details of the event
(such as in the case of first responders). The person subsequently re-experiences the event
through both intrusive memories and nightmares. Some memories may come back so vividly
that the person feels like they are experiencing the event all over again, what is known as
having a flashback. The individual may avoid anything that reminds them of the trauma,
including conversations, places, or even specific types of people. They may feel emotionally
numb or restricted in their ability to feel, which may interfere in their interpersonal
relationships. The person may not be able to remember certain aspects of what happened
during the event. They may feel a sense of a foreshortened future, that they will never marry,
have a family, or live a long, full life. They may be jumpy or easily startled, hypervigilant to
their surroundings, and quick to anger. The prevalence of PTSD among the population as a
whole is relatively low, with 6.8% having experienced PTSD at some point in their life (Kessler,
Berglund, et al., 2005) (see Table 1). Combat and sexual assault are the most common
precipitating traumas (Kessler, Sonnega, Bromet, Hughes, & Nelson, 1995). Whereas PTSD
was previously categorized as an Anxiety Disorder, in the most recent version of the DSM
(DSM-5; APA, 2013) it has been reclassified under the more specific category of Trauma- and
Stressor-Related Disorders.
A person with PTSD is particularly sensitive to both internal and external cues that serve as
reminders of their traumatic experience. For example, as we saw in PD, the physical sensations
of arousal present during the initial trauma can become threatening in and of themselves,
becoming a powerful reminder of the event. Someone might avoid watching intense or
emotional movies in order to prevent the experience of emotional arousal. Avoidance of
conversations, reminders, or even of the experience of emotion itself may also be an attempt
to avoid triggering internal cues. External stimuli that were present during the trauma can
also become strong triggers. For example, if a woman is raped by a man wearing a red t-shirt,
Anxiety and Related Disorders 440
she may develop a strong alarm reaction to the sight of red shirts, or perhaps even more
indiscriminately to anything with a similar color red. A combat veteran who experienced a
strong smell of gasoline during a roadside bomb attack may have an intense alarm reaction
when pumping gas back at home. Individuals with a psychological vulnerability toward viewing
the world as uncontrollable and unpredictable may particularly struggle with the possibility
of additional future, unpredictable traumatic events, fueling their need for hypervigilance and
avoidance, and perpetuating the symptoms of PTSD.
Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder
Have you ever had a strange thought pop into your mind, such as picturing the stranger next
to you naked? Or maybe you walked past a crooked picture on the wall and couldn’t resist
straightening it. Most people have occasional strange thoughts and may even engage in some
“compulsive” behaviors, especially when they are stressed (Boyer & Liénard, 2008; Fullana et
al., 2009). But for most people, these thoughts are nothing more than a passing oddity, and
the behaviors are done (or not done) without a second thought. For someone with obsessive-
compulsive disorder (OCD), however, these thoughts and compulsive behaviors don’t just
come and go. Instead, strange or unusual thoughts are taken to mean something much more
important and real, maybe even something dangerous or frightening. The urge to engage in
some behavior, such as straightening a picture, can become so intense that it is nearly
impossible not to carry it out, or causes
significant anxiety if it can’t be carried out.
Further, someone with OCD might become
preoccupied with the possibility that the
behavior wasn’t carried out to completion
and feel compelled to repeat the behavior
again and again, maybe several times
before they are “satisfied.”
anything might give you cancer), or aggressive thoughts or images that are unprovoked or
nonsensical. Compulsions may be carried out in an attempt to neutralize some of these
thoughts, providing temporary relief from the anxiety the obsessions cause, or they may be
nonsensical in and of themselves. Either way, compulsions are distinct in that they must be
repetitive or excessive, the person feels “driven” to carry out the behavior, and the person
feels a great deal of distress if they can’t engage in the behavior. Some examples of compulsive
behaviors are repetitive washing (often in response to contamination obsessions), repetitive
checking (locks, door handles, appliances often in response to doubting obsessions), ordering
and arranging things to ensure symmetry, or doing things according to a specific ritual or
sequence (such as getting dressed or ready for bed in a specific order). To meet diagnostic
criteria for OCD, engaging in obsessions and/or compulsions must take up a significant amount
of the person’s time, at least an hour per day, and must cause significant distress or impairment
in functioning. About 1.6% of the population has met criteria for OCD over the course of a
lifetime (Kessler, Berglund, et al., 2005) (see Table 1). Whereas OCD was previously categorized
as an Anxiety Disorder, in the most recent version of the DSM (DSM-5; APA, 2013) it has been
reclassified under the more specific category of Obsessive-Compulsive and Related Disorders.
People with OCD often confuse having an intrusive thought with their potential for carrying
out the thought. Whereas most people when they have a strange or frightening thought are
able to let it go, a person with OCD may become “stuck” on the thought and be intensely afraid
that they might somehow lose control and act on it. Or worse, they believe that having the
thought is just as bad as doing it. This is called thought-action fusion. For example, one patient
of ours was plagued by thoughts that she would cause harm to her young daughter. She
experienced intrusive images of throwing hot coffee in her daughter’s face or pushing her
face underwater when she was giving her a bath. These images were so terrifying to the
patient that she would no longer allow herself any physical contact with her daughter and
would leave her daughter in the care of a babysitter if her husband or another family was not
available to “supervise” her. In reality, the last thing she wanted to do was harm her daughter,
and she had no intention or desire to act on the aggressive thoughts and images, nor does
anybody with OCD act on these thoughts, but these thoughts were so horrifying to her that
she made every attempt to prevent herself from the potential of carrying them out, even if it
meant not being able to hold, cradle, or cuddle her daughter. These are the types of struggles
people with OCD face every day.
Many successful treatments for anxiety and related disorders have been developed over the
years. Medications (anti-anxiety drugs and antidepressants) have been found to be beneficial
Anxiety and Related Disorders 442
for disorders other than specific phobia, but relapse rates are high once medications are
stopped (Heimberg et al., 1998; Hollon et al., 2005), and some classes of medications (minor
tranquilizers or benzodiazepines) can be habit forming.
Typically 50% to 80% of patients receiving drugs or CBT will show a good initial response, with
the effect of CBT more durable. Newer developments in the treatment of anxiety disorders
are focusing on novel interventions, such as the use of certain medications to enhance learning
during CBT (Otto et al., 2010), and transdiagnostic treatments targeting core, underlying
vulnerabilities (Barlow et al., 2011). As we advance our understanding of anxiety and related
disorders, so too will our treatments advance, with the hopes that for the many people
suffering from these disorders, anxiety can once again become something useful and
adaptive, rather than something debilitating.
Anxiety and Related Disorders 443
Outside Resources
Discussion Questions
1. Name and describe the three main vulnerabilities contributing to the development of
anxiety and related disorders. Do you think these disorders could develop out of biological
factors alone? Could these disorders develop out of learning experiences alone?
2. Many of the symptoms in anxiety and related disorders overlap with experiences most
people have. What features differentiate someone with a disorder versus someone
without?
3. What is an “alarm reaction?” If someone experiences an alarm reaction when they are about
to give a speech in front of a room full of people, would you consider this a “true alarm”
or a “false alarm?”
4. Many people are shy. What differentiates someone who is shy from someone with social
anxiety disorder? Do you think shyness should be considered an anxiety disorder?
Vocabulary
Agoraphobia
A sort of anxiety disorder distinguished by feelings that a place is uncomfortable or may be
unsafe because it is significantly open or crowded.
Anxiety
A mood state characterized by negative affect, muscle tension, and physical arousal in which
a person apprehensively anticipates future danger or misfortune.
Biological vulnerability
A specific genetic and neurobiological factor that might predispose someone to develop
anxiety disorders.
Conditioned response
A learned reaction following classical conditioning, or the process by which an event that
automatically elicits a response is repeatedly paired with another neutral stimulus
(conditioned stimulus), resulting in the ability of the neutral stimulus to elicit the same
response on its own.
External cues
Stimuli in the outside world that serve as triggers for anxiety or as reminders of past traumatic
events.
Flashback
Sudden, intense re-experiencing of a previous event, usually trauma-related.
Interoceptive avoidance
Anxiety and Related Disorders 445
Psychological vulnerabilities
Influences that our early experiences have on how we view the world.
Reinforced response
Following the process of operant conditioning, the strengthening of a response following
either the delivery of a desired consequence (positive reinforcement) or escape from an
aversive consequence.
Specific vulnerabilities
How our experiences lead us to focus and channel our anxiety.
Thought-action fusion
The tendency to overestimate the relationship between a thought and an action, such that
one mistakenly believes a “bad” thought is the equivalent of a “bad” action.
Anxiety and Related Disorders 446
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Versiani, M. (1996). Social Phobia. In T. A. Widiger, A. J. Frances, H. A. Pincus, R. Ross, M. B.
First & W. W. Davis (Eds.), DSM-IV sourcebook (Vol. 2, pp. 507-548). Washington, D.C.:
American Psychiatric Association.
Shear, M. K., Brown, T. A., Barlow, D. H., Money, R., Sholomskas, D. E., Woods, S. W., . . . Papp,
L. A. (1997). Multicenter collaborative panic disorder severity scale. American Journal of
Psychiatry, 154(11), 1571-1575.
Smoller, J. W., Block, S. R., & Young, M. M. (2009). Genetics of anxiety disorders: the complex
road from DSM to DNA. Depression and Anxiety, 26(11), 965-975. doi: 10.1002/da.20623
Suárez, L, Bennett, S., Goldstein, C., & Barlow, D.H. (2009). Understanding anxiety disorders
from a "triple vulnerabilities" framework. In M.M. Antony & M.B. Stein (Eds.), Oxford
Handbook of anxiety and related disorders (pp. 153-172). New York, NY: Oxford University
Press.
Everyone feels down or euphoric from time to time, but this is different from having a mood
disorder such as major depressive disorder or bipolar disorder. Mood disorders are extended
periods of depressed, euphoric, or irritable moods that in combination with other symptoms
cause the person significant distress and interfere with his or her daily life, often resulting in
social and occupational difficulties. In this module, we describe major mood disorders,
including their symptom presentations, general prevalence rates, and how and why the rates
of these disorders tend to vary by age, gender, and race. In addition, biological and
environmental risk factors that have been implicated in the development and course of mood
disorders, such as heritability and stressful life events, are reviewed. Finally, we provide an
overview of treatments for mood disorders, covering treatments with demonstrated
effectiveness, as well as new treatment options showing promise.
Learning Objectives
• Understand age, gender, and ethnic differences in prevalence rates of mood disorders.
The actress Brooke Shields published a memoir titled Down Came the Rain: My Journey
through Postpartum Depression in which she described her struggles with depression
following the birth of her daughter. Despite the fact that about one in 20 women experience
Mood Disorders 452
Feelings of shame are not unique to perinatal depression. Stigma applies to other types of
depressive and bipolar disorders and contributes to people not always receiving the necessary
support and treatment for these disorders. In fact, the World Health Organization ranks both
major depressive disorder (MDD) and bipolar disorder (BD) among the top 10 leading causes
of disability worldwide. Further, MDD and BD carry a high risk of suicide. It is estimated that
25%–50% of people diagnosed with BD will attempt suicide at least once in their lifetimes
(Goodwin & Jamison, 2007).
Mood Episodes
Everyone experiences brief periods of sadness, irritability, or euphoria. This is different than
having a mood disorder, such as MDD or BD, which are characterized by a constellation of
symptoms that causes people significant distress or impairs their everyday functioning.
Mood Disorders 453
A major depressive episode (MDE) refers to symptoms that co-occur for at least two weeks
and cause significant distress or impairment in functioning, such as interfering with work,
school, or relationships. Core symptoms include feeling down or depressed or experiencing
anhedonia—loss of interest or pleasure in things that one typically enjoys. According to the
fifth edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM-5; APA, 2013), the criteria for an MDE
require five or more of the following nine symptoms, including one or both of the first two
symptoms, for most of the day, nearly every day:
1. depressed mood
4. insomnia or hypersomnia
The core criterion for a manic or hypomanic episode is a distinct period of abnormally and
persistently euphoric, expansive, or irritable mood and persistently increased goal-directed
activity or energy. The mood disturbance must be present for one week or longer in mania
(unless hospitalization is required) or four days or longer in hypomania. Concurrently, at least
three of the following symptoms must be present in the context of euphoric mood (or at least
four in the context of irritable mood):
5. distractibility
6. increased talkativeness
Manic episodes are distinguished from hypomanic episodes by their duration and associated
impairment; whereas manic episodes must last one week and are defined by a significant
impairment in functioning, hypomanic episodes are shorter and not necessarily accompanied
by impairment in functioning.
Mood Disorders
Two major types of unipolar disorders described by the DSM-5 (APA, 2013) are major depressive
disorder and persistent depressive disorder (PDD; dysthymia). MDD is defined by one or more
MDEs, but no history of manic or hypomanic episodes. Criteria for PDD are feeling depressed
most of the day for more days than not, for at least two years. At least two of the following
symptoms are also required to meet criteria for PDD:
2. insomnia or hypersomnia
4. low self-esteem
6. feelings of hopelessness
Like MDD, these symptoms need to cause significant distress or impairment and cannot be
due to the effects of a substance or a general medical condition. To meet criteria for PDD, a
person cannot be without symptoms for more than two months at a time. PDD has overlapping
symptoms with MDD. If someone meets criteria for an MDE during a PDD episode, the person
will receive diagnoses of PDD and MDD.
Mood Disorders 455
It is important to note that the DSM-5 was published in 2013, and findings based on the updated
manual will be forthcoming. Consequently, the research presented below was largely based
on a similar, but not identical, conceptualization of mood disorders drawn from the DSM-IV
(APA, 2000).
Depressive Disorders
In a nationally representative sample, lifetime prevalence rate for MDD is 16.6% (Kessler,
Berglund, Demler, Jin, Merikangas, & Walters, 2005). This means that nearly one in five
Americans will meet the criteria for MDD during their lifetime. The 12-month prevalence—
the proportion of people who meet criteria for a disorder during a 12-month period—for PDD
is approximately 0.5% (APA, 2013).
Mood Disorders 456
Women experience two to three times higher rates of MDD than do men (Nolen-Hoeksema
& Hilt, 2009). This gender difference emerges during puberty (Conley & Rudolph, 2009). Before
puberty, boys exhibit similar or higher prevalence rates of MDD than do girls (Twenge & Nolen-
Hoeksema, 2002). MDD is inversely correlated with socioeconomic status (SES), a person’s
economic and social position based on income, education, and occupation. Higher prevalence
rates of MDD are associated with lower SES (Lorant, Deliege, Eaton, Robert, Philippot, &
Ansseau, 2003), particularly for adults over 65 years old (Kessler et al., 2010). Independent
of SES, results from a nationally representative sample found that European Americans had
a higher prevalence rate of MDD than did African Americans and Hispanic Americans, whose
rates were similar (Breslau, Aguilar-Gaxiola, Kendler, Su, Williams, & Kessler, 2006). The course
of MDD for African Americans is often more severe and less often treated than it is for European
Americans, however (Williams et al., 2007). Native Americans have a higher prevalence rate
than do European Americans, African Americans, or Hispanic Americans (Hasin, Goodwin,
Stinson & Grant, 2005). Depression is not limited to industrialized or western cultures; it is
Mood Disorders 457
found in all countries that have been examined, although the symptom presentation as well
as prevalence rates vary across cultures (Chentsova-Dutton & Tsai, 2009).
Bipolar Disorders
With regard to ethnicity, data from studies not confounded by SES or inaccuracies in diagnosis
are limited, but available reports suggest rates of BD among European Americans are similar
to those found among African Americans (Blazer et al., 1985) and Hispanic Americans (Breslau,
Kendler, Su, Gaxiola-Aguilar, & Kessler, 2005). Another large community-based study found
that although prevalence rates of mood disorders were similar across ethnic groups, Hispanic
Americans and African Americans with a mood disorder were more likely to remain
Mood Disorders 458
persistently ill than European Americans (Breslau et al., 2005). Compared with European
Americans with BD, African Americans tend to be underdiagnosed for BD (and over-diagnosed
for schizophrenia) (Kilbourne, Haas, Mulsant, Bauer, & Pincus, 2004; Minsky, Vega, Miskimen,
Gara, & Escobar, 2003), and Hispanic Americans with BD have been shown to receive fewer
psychiatric medication prescriptions and specialty treatment visits (Gonzalez et al., 2007).
Misdiagnosis of BD can result in the underutilization of treatment or the utilization of
inappropriate treatment, and thus profoundly impact the course of illness.
As with MDD, adolescence is known to be a significant risk period for BD; mood symptoms
start by adolescence in roughly half of BD cases (Leverich et al., 2007; Perlis et al., 2004).
Longitudinal studies show that those diagnosed with BD prior to adulthood experience a more
pernicious course of illness relative to those with adult onset, including more episode
recurrence, higher rates of suicidality, and profound social, occupational, and economic
repercussions (e.g., Lewinsohn, Seeley, Buckley, & Klein, 2002). The prevalence of BD is
substantially lower in older adults compared with younger adults (1% vs. 4%) (Merikangas et
al., 2007).
Depressive Disorders
effects (e.g., romantic relationships) play or the death of a spouse. [Image: CC0 Public Domain]
Mood Disorders 459
an important role, too. By contrast, the contribution of shared environmental effect by siblings
is negligible (Sullivan, Neale & Kendler, 2000). The mode of inheritance is not fully understood
although no single genetic variation has been found to increase the risk of MDD significantly.
Instead, several genetic variants and environmental factors most likely contribute to the risk
for MDD (Lohoff, 2010).
One environmental stressor that has received much support in relation to MDD is stressful
life events. In particular, severe stressful life events—those that have long-term consequences
and involve loss of a significant relationship (e.g., divorce) or economic stability (e.g.,
unemployment) are strongly related to depression (Brown & Harris, 1989; Monroe et al., 2009).
Stressful life events are more likely to predict the first MDE than subsequent episodes
(Lewinsohn, Allen, Seeley, & Gotlib, 1999). In contrast, minor events may play a larger role in
subsequent episodes than the initial episodes (Monroe & Harkness, 2005).
Depression research has not been limited to examining reactivity to stressful life events. Much
research, particularly brain imagining research using functional magnetic resonance imaging
(fMRI), has centered on examining neural circuitry—the interconnections that allow multiple
brain regions to perceive, generate, and encode information in concert. A meta-analysis of
neuroimaging studies showed that when viewing negative stimuli (e.g., picture of an angry
face, picture of a car accident), compared with healthy control participants, participants with
MDD have greater activation in brain regions involved in stress response and reduced
activation of brain regions involved in positively motivated behaviors (Hamilton, Etkin, Furman,
Lemus, Johnson, & Gotlib, 2012).
Other environmental factors related to increased risk for MDD include experiencing early
adversity (e.g., childhood abuse or neglect; Widom, DuMont, & Czaja, 2007), chronic stress
(e.g., poverty) and interpersonal factors. For example, marital dissatisfaction predicts
increases in depressive symptoms in both men and women. On the other hand, depressive
symptoms also predict increases in marital dissatisfaction (Whisman & Uebelacker, 2009).
Research has found that people with MDD generate some of their interpersonal stress
(Hammen, 2005). People with MDD whose relatives or spouses can be described as critical
and emotionally overinvolved have higher relapse rates than do those living with people who
are less critical and emotionally overinvolved (Butzlaff & Hooley, 1998).
People’s attributional styles or their general ways of thinking, interpreting, and recalling
information have also been examined in the etiology of MDD (Gotlib & Joormann, 2010).
People with a pessimistic attributional style tend to make internal (versus external), global
(versus specific), and stable (versus unstable) attributions to negative events, serving as a
vulnerability to developing MDD. For example, someone who when he fails an exam thinks
Mood Disorders 460
that it was his fault (internal), that he is stupid (global), and that he will always do poorly (stable)
has a pessimistic attribution style. Several influential theories of depression incorporate
attributional styles (Abramson, Metalsky, & Alloy, 1989; Abramson Seligman, & Teasdale, 1978).
Bipolar Disorders
Although there have been important advances in research on the etiology, course, and
treatment of BD, there remains a need to understand the mechanisms that contribute to
episode onset and relapse. There is compelling evidence for biological causes of BD, which is
known to be highly heritable (McGuffin, Rijsdijk, Andrew, Sham, Katz, & Cardno, 2003). It may
be argued that a high rate of heritability demonstrates that BD is fundamentally a biological
phenomenon. However, there is much variability in the course of BD both within a person
across time and across people (Johnson, 2005). The triggers that determine how and when
this genetic vulnerability is expressed are not yet understood; however, there is evidence to
suggest that psychosocial triggers may play an important role in BD risk (e.g., Johnson et al.,
2008; Malkoff-Schwartz et al., 1998).
However, there is little consensus as to whether a particular brain region becomes more or
less active in response to an emotional stimulus among people with BD compared with healthy
controls. Mixed findings are in part due to samples consisting of participants who are at various
phases of illness at the time of testing (manic, depressed, inter-episode). Sample sizes tend
to be relatively small, making comparisons between subgroups difficult. Additionally, the use
of a standardized stimulus (e.g., facial expression of anger) may not elicit a sufficiently strong
response. Personally engaging stimuli, such as recalling a memory, may be more effective in
inducing strong emotions (Isacowitz, Gershon, Allard, & Johnson, 2013).
Within the psychosocial level, research has focused on the environmental contributors to BD.
A series of studies show that environmental stressors, particularly severe stressors (e.g., loss
of a significant relationship), can adversely impact the course of BD. People with BD have
substantially increased risk of relapse (Ellicott, Hammen, Gitlin, Brown, & Jamison, 1990) and
Mood Disorders 461
suffer more depressive symptoms (Johnson, Winett, Meyer, Greenhouse, & Miller, 1999)
following a severe life stressor. Interestingly, positive life events can also adversely impact the
course of BD. People with BD suffer more manic symptoms after life events involving
attainment of a desired goal (Johnson et al., 2008). Such findings suggest that people with BD
may have a hypersensitivity to rewards.
Evidence from the life stress literature has also suggested that people with mood disorders
may have a circadian vulnerability that renders them sensitive to stressors that disrupt their
sleep or rhythms. According to social zeitgeber theory (Ehlers, Frank, & Kupfer, 1988; Frank
et al., 1994), stressors that disrupt sleep, or that disrupt the daily routines that entrain the
biological clock (e.g., meal times) can trigger episode relapse. Consistent with this theory,
studies have shown that life events that involve a disruption in sleep and daily routines, such
as overnight travel, can increase bipolar symptoms in people with BD (Malkoff-Schwartz et
al., 1998).
Depressive Disorders
Other biological treatments for people with depression include electroconvulsive therapy
(ECT), transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS), and deep brain stimulation. ECT involves
inducing a seizure after a patient takes muscle relaxants and is under general anesthesia. ECT
is viable treatment for patients with severe depression or who show resistance to
antidepressants although the mechanisms through which it works remain unknown. A
common side effect is confusion and memory loss, usually short-term (Schulze-
Rauschenbach, Harms, Schlaepfer, Maier, Falkai, & Wagner, 2005). Repetitive TMS is a
noninvasive technique administered while a patient is awake. Brief pulsating magnetic fields
are delivered to the cortex, inducing electrical activity. TMS has fewer side effects than ECT
(Schulze-Rauschenbach et al., 2005), and while outcome studies are mixed, there is evidence
that TMS is a promising treatment for patients with MDD who have shown resistance to other
treatments (Rosa et al., 2006). Most recently, deep brain stimulation is being examined as a
treatment option for patients who did not respond to more traditional treatments like those
already described. Deep brain stimulation involves implanting an electrode in the brain. The
electrode is connected to an implanted neurostimulator, which electrically stimulates that
particular brain region. Although there is some evidence of its effectiveness (Mayberg et al.,
2005), additional research is needed.
Several psychosocial treatments have received strong empirical support, meaning that
independent investigations have achieved similarly positive results—a high threshold for
examining treatment outcomes. These treatments include but are not limited to behavior
therapy, cognitive therapy, and interpersonal therapy. Behavior therapies focus on increasing
the frequency and quality of experiences that are pleasant or help the patient achieve mastery.
Mood Disorders 463
Cognitive therapies primarily focus on helping patients identify and change distorted
automatic thoughts and assumptions (e.g., Beck, 1967). Cognitive-behavioral therapies are
based on the rationale that thoughts, behaviors, and emotions affect and are affected by each
other. Interpersonal Therapy for Depression focuses largely on improving interpersonal
relationships by targeting problem areas, specifically unresolved grief, interpersonal role
disputes, role transitions, and interpersonal deficits. Finally, there is also some support for
the effectiveness of Short-Term Psychodynamic Therapy for Depression (Leichsenring, 2001).
The short-term treatment focuses on a limited number of important issues, and the therapist
tends to be more actively involved than in more traditional psychodynamic therapy.
Bipolar Disorders
Patients with BD are typically treated with pharmacotherapy. Antidepressants such as SSRIs
and SNRIs are the primary choice of treatment for depression, whereas for BD, lithium is the
first line treatment choice. This is because SSRIs and SNRIs have the potential to induce mania
or hypomania in patients with BD. Lithium acts on several neurotransmitter systems in the
brain through complex mechanisms, including reduction of excitatory (dopamine and
glutamate) neurotransmission, and increasing of inhibitory (GABA) neurotransmission (Lenox
& Hahn, 2000). Lithium has strong efficacy for the treatment of BD (Geddes, Burgess, Hawton,
Jamison, & Goodwin, 2004). However, a number of side effects can make lithium treatment
difficult for patients to tolerate. Side effects include impaired cognitive function (Wingo, Wingo,
Harvey, & Baldessarini, 2009), as well as physical symptoms such as nausea, tremor, weight
gain, and fatigue (Dunner, 2000). Some of these side effects can improve with continued use;
however, medication noncompliance remains an ongoing concern in the treatment of patients
with BD. Anticonvulsant medications (e.g., carbamazepine, valproate) are also commonly used
to treat patients with BD, either alone or in conjunction with lithium.
There are several adjunctive treatment options for people with BD. Interpersonal and social
rhythm therapy (IPSRT; Frank et al., 1994) is a psychosocial intervention focused on addressing
the mechanism of action posited in social zeitgeber theory to predispose patients who have
BD to relapse, namely sleep disruption. A growing body of literature provides support for the
central role of sleep dysregulation in BD (Harvey, 2008). Consistent with this literature, IPSRT
aims to increase rhythmicity of patients’ lives and encourage vigilance in maintaining a stable
rhythm. The therapist and patient work to develop and maintain a healthy balance of activity
and stimulation such that the patient does not become overly active (e.g., by taking on too
many projects) or inactive (e.g., by avoiding social contact). The efficacy of IPSRT has been
demonstrated in that patients who received this treatment show reduced risk of episode
recurrence and are more likely to remain well (Frank et al., 2005).
Mood Disorders 464
Conclusion
Everyone feels down or euphoric from time to time. For some people, these feelings can last
for long periods of time and can also co-occur with other symptoms that, in combination,
interfere with their everyday lives. When people experience an MDE or a manic episode, they
see the world differently. During an MDE, people often feel hopeless about the future, and
may even experience suicidal thoughts. During a manic episode, people often behave in ways
that are risky or place them in danger. They may spend money excessively or have unprotected
sex, often expressing deep shame over these decisions after the episode. MDD and BD cause
significant problems for people at school, at work, and in their relationships and affect people
regardless of gender, age, nationality, race, religion, or sexual orientation. If you or someone
you know is suffering from a mood disorder, it is important to seek help. Effective treatments
are available and continually improving. If you have an interest in mood disorders, there are
many ways to contribute to their understanding, prevention, and treatment, whether by
engaging in research or clinical work.
Mood Disorders 465
Outside Resources
Web: Visit the Association for Behavioral and Cognitive Therapies to find a list of the
recommended therapists and evidence-based treatments.
http://www.abct.org
Web: Visit the Depression and Bipolar Support Alliance for educational information and
social support options.
http://www.dbsalliance.org/
Discussion Questions
1. What factors might explain the large gender difference in the prevalence rates of MDD?
2. Why might American ethnic minority groups experience more persistent BD than European
Americans?
3. Why might the age of onset for MDD be decreasing over time?
4. Why might overnight travel constitute a potential risk for a person with BD?
5. What are some reasons positive life events may precede the occurrence of manic episode?
Mood Disorders 466
Vocabulary
Anhedonia
Loss of interest or pleasure in activities one previously found enjoyable or rewarding.
Attributional style
The tendency by which a person infers the cause or meaning of behaviors or events.
Chronic stress
Discrete or related problematic events and conditions which persist over time and result in
prolonged activation of the biological and/or psychological stress response (e.g.,
unemployment, ongoing health difficulties, marital discord).
Early adversity
Single or multiple acute or chronic stressful events, which may be biological or psychological
in nature (e.g., poverty, abuse, childhood illness or injury), occurring during childhood and
resulting in a biological and/or psychological stress response.
Grandiosity
Inflated self-esteem or an exaggerated sense of self-importance and self-worth (e.g., believing
one has special powers or superior abilities).
Hypersomnia
Excessive daytime sleepiness, including difficulty staying awake or napping, or prolonged
sleep episodes.
Psychomotor agitation
Increased motor activity associated with restlessness, including physical actions (e.g.,
fidgeting, pacing, feet tapping, handwringing).
Psychomotor retardation
A slowing of physical activities in which routine activities (e.g., eating, brushing teeth) are
performed in an unusually slow manner.
Social zeitgeber
Zeitgeber is German for “time giver.” Social zeitgebers are environmental cues, such as meal
times and interactions with other people, that entrain biological rhythms and thus sleep-wake
cycle regularity.
Mood Disorders 467
Suicidal ideation
Recurring thoughts about suicide, including considering or planning for suicide, or
preoccupation with suicide.
Mood Disorders 468
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JCP.08r04972
27
Schizophrenia Spectrum Disorders
Deanna M. Barch
Schizophrenia and the other psychotic disorders are some of the most impairing forms of
psychopathology, frequently associated with a profound negative effect on the individual’s
educational, occupational, and social function. Sadly, these disorders often manifest right at
time of the transition from adolescence to adulthood, just as young people should be evolving
into independent young adults. The spectrum of psychotic disorders includes schizophrenia,
schizoaffective disorder, delusional disorder, schizotypal personality disorder, schizophreniform
disorder, brief psychotic disorder, as well as psychosis associated with substance use or
medical conditions. In this module, we summarize the primary clinical features of these
disorders, describe the known cognitive and neurobiological changes associated with
schizophrenia, describe potential risk factors and/or causes for the development of
schizophrenia, and describe currently available treatments for schizophrenia.
Learning Objectives
• Describe the signs and symptoms of schizophrenia and related psychotic disorders.
• Describe the most well-replicated cognitive and neurobiological changes associated with
schizophrenia.
• Describe the controversies associated with “clinical high risk” approaches to identifying
individuals at risk for the development of schizophrenia.
• Describe the treatments that work for some of the symptoms of schizophrenia.
Schizophrenia Spectrum Disorders 475
Most of you have probably had the experience of walking down the street in a city and seeing
a person you thought was acting oddly. They may have been dressed in an unusual way,
perhaps disheveled or wearing an unusual collection of clothes, makeup, or jewelry that did
not seem to fit any particular group or subculture. They may have been talking to themselves
or yelling at someone you could not see. If you tried to speak to them, they may have been
difficult to follow or understand, or they may have acted paranoid or started telling a bizarre
story about the people who were plotting against them. If so, chances are that you have
encountered an individual with schizophrenia or another type of psychotic disorder. If you
have watched the movie A Beautiful Mind or The Fisher King, you have also seen a portrayal of
someone thought to have schizophrenia. Sadly, a few of the individuals who have committed
some of the recently highly publicized mass murders may have had schizophrenia, though
most people who commit such crimes do not have schizophrenia. It is also likely that you have
met people with schizophrenia without ever knowing it, as they may suffer in silence or stay
isolated to protect themselves from the horrors they see, hear, or believe are operating in the
outside world. As these examples begin to illustrate, psychotic disorders involve many
different types of symptoms, including delusions, hallucinations, disorganized speech and
behavior, abnormal motor behavior (including catatonia), and negative symptoms such
anhedonia/amotivation and blunted affect/
reduced speech.
groups are trying to hurt, harm, or plot against the person in some way. These can be people
that the person knows (people at work, the neighbors, family members), or more abstract
groups (the FBI, the CIA, aliens, etc.). Other types of delusions include grandiose delusions,
where the person believes that they have some special power or ability (e.g., I am the new
Buddha, I am a rock star); referential delusions, where the person believes that events or
objects in the environment have special meaning for them (e.g., that song on the radio is
being played specifically for me); or other types of delusions where the person may believe
that others are controlling their thoughts and actions, their thoughts are being broadcast
aloud, or that others can read their mind (or they can read other people’s minds).
When you see a person on the street talking to themselves or shouting at other people, they
are experiencing hallucinations. These are perceptual experiences that occur even when
there is no stimulus in the outside world generating the experiences. They can be auditory,
visual, olfactory (smell), gustatory (taste), or somatic (touch). The most common hallucinations
in psychosis (at least in adults) are auditory, and can involve one or more voices talking about
the person, commenting on the person’s behavior, or giving them orders. The content of the
hallucinations is frequently negative (“you are a loser,” “that drawing is stupid,” “you should
go kill yourself”) and can be the voice of someone the person knows or a complete stranger.
Sometimes the voices sound as if they are coming from outside the person’s head. Other
times the voices seem to be coming from inside the person’s head, but are not experienced
the same as the person’s inner thoughts or inner speech.
include catatonia, which refers to a differently. This can include hallucinations, delusions, and
disorganized thinking. [Image: Noba Project CCBYNCSA 4.0 https://
variety of behaviors that seem to reflect
tinyurl.com/y3k6qoz4]
a reduction in responsiveness to the
external environment. This can include
Schizophrenia Spectrum Disorders 477
holding unusual postures for long periods of time, failing to respond to verbal or motor
prompts from another person, or excessive and seemingly purposeless motor activity.
Some of the most debilitating symptoms of schizophrenia are difficult for others to see. These
include what people refer to as “negative symptoms” or the absence of certain things we
typically expect most people to have. For example, anhedonia or amotivation reflect a lack of
apparent interest in or drive to engage in social or recreational activities. These symptoms
can manifest as a great amount of time spent in physical immobility. Importantly, anhedonia
and amotivation do not seem to reflect a lack of enjoyment in pleasurable activities or events
(Cohen & Minor, 2010; Kring & Moran, 2008; Llerena, Strauss, & Cohen, 2012) but rather a
reduced drive or ability to take the steps necessary to obtain the potentially positive outcomes
(Barch & Dowd, 2010). Flat affect and reduced speech (alogia) reflect a lack of showing
emotions through facial expressions, gestures, and speech intonation, as well as a reduced
amount of speech and increased pause frequency and duration.
In many ways, the types of symptoms associated with psychosis are the most difficult for us
to understand, as they may seem far outside the range of our normal experiences. Unlike
depression or anxiety, many of us may not have had experiences that we think of as on the
same continuum as psychosis. However, just like many of the other forms of psychopathology
described in this book, the types of psychotic symptoms that characterize disorders like
schizophrenia are on a continuum with “normal” mental experiences. For example, work by
Jim van Os in the Netherlands has shown that a surprisingly large percentage of the general
population (10%+) experience psychotic-like symptoms, though many fewer have multiple
experiences and most will not continue to experience these symptoms in the long run (Verdoux
& van Os, 2002). Similarly, work in a general population of adolescents and young adults in
Kenya has also shown that a relatively high percentage of individuals experience one or more
psychotic-like experiences (~19%) at some point in their lives (Mamah et al., 2012; Ndetei et
al., 2012), though again most will not go on to develop a full-blown psychotic disorder.
Schizophrenia is the primary disorder that comes to mind when we discuss “psychotic”
disorders (see Table 1 for diagnostic criteria), though there are a number of other disorders
that share one or more features with schizophrenia. In the remainder of this module, we will
use the terms “psychosis” and “schizophrenia” somewhat interchangeably, given that most of
the research has focused on schizophrenia. In addition to schizophrenia (see Table 1), other
psychotic disorders include schizophreniform disorder (a briefer version of schizophrenia),
schizoaffective disorder (a mixture of psychosis and depression/mania symptoms), delusional
disorder (the experience of only delusions), and brief psychotic disorder (psychotic symptoms
that last only a few days or weeks).
Schizophrenia Spectrum Disorders 478
Table 1: Types of Psychotic Disorders (Simplified from the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual - 5th Edition (DSM-5) (APA, 2013)
As described above, when we think of the core symptoms of psychotic disorders such as
schizophrenia, we think of people who hear voices, see visions, and have false beliefs about
reality (i.e., delusions). However, problems in cognitive function are also a critical aspect of
psychotic disorders and of schizophrenia in particular. This emphasis on cognition in
Schizophrenia Spectrum Disorders 479
schizophrenia is in part due to the growing body of research suggesting that cognitive
problems in schizophrenia are a major source of disability and loss of functional capacity
(Green, 2006; Nuechterlein et al., 2011). The cognitive deficits that are present in schizophrenia
are widespread and can include problems with episodic memory (the ability to learn and
retrieve new information or episodes in one’s life), working memory (the ability to maintain
information over a short period of time, such as 30 seconds), and other tasks that require one
to “control” or regulate one’s behavior (Barch & Ceaser, 2012; Bora, Yucel, & Pantelis, 2009a;
Fioravanti, Carlone, Vitale, Cinti, & Clare, 2005; Forbes, Carrick, McIntosh, & Lawrie, 2009;
Mesholam-Gately, Giuliano, Goff, Faraone, & Seidman, 2009). Individuals with schizophrenia
also have difficulty with what is referred to as “processing speed” and are frequently slower
than healthy individuals on almost all tasks. Importantly, these cognitive deficits are present
prior to the onset of the illness (Fusar-Poli et al., 2007) and are also present, albeit in a milder
form, in the first-degree relatives of people with schizophrenia (Snitz, Macdonald, & Carter,
2006). This suggests that cognitive impairments in schizophrenia reflect part of the risk for
the development of psychosis, rather than being an outcome of developing psychosis. Further,
people with schizophrenia who have more severe cognitive problems also tend to have more
severe negative symptoms and more disorganized speech and behavior (Barch, Carter, &
Cohen, 2003; Barch et al., 1999; Dominguez Mde, Viechtbauer, Simons, van Os, & Krabbendam,
2009; Ventura, Hellemann, Thames, Koellner, & Nuechterlein, 2009; Ventura, Thames, Wood,
Guzik, & Hellemann, 2010). In addition,
people with more cognitive problems have
worse function in everyday life (Bowie et
al., 2008; Bowie, Reichenberg, Patterson,
Heaton, & Harvey, 2006; Fett et al., 2011).
Individuals with schizophrenia who have more problems with social cognition also tend to
have more negative and disorganized symptoms (Ventura, Wood, & Hellemann, 2011), as well
as worse community function (Fett et al., 2011).
The advent of neuroimaging techniques such as structural and functional magnetic resonance
imaging and positron emission tomography opened up the ability to try to understand the
brain mechanisms of the symptoms of schizophrenia as well as the cognitive impairments
found in psychosis. For example, a number of studies have suggested that delusions in
psychosis may be associated with problems in “salience” detection mechanisms supported
by the ventral striatum (Jensen & Kapur, 2009; Jensen et al., 2008; Kapur, 2003; Kapur, Mizrahi,
& Li, 2005; Murray et al., 2008) and the anterior prefrontal cortex (Corlett et al., 2006; Corlett,
Honey, & Fletcher, 2007; Corlett, Murray, et al., 2007a, 2007b). These are regions of the brain
that normally increase their activity when something important (aka “salient”) happens in the
environment. If these brain regions misfire, it may lead individuals with psychosis to mistakenly
attribute importance to irrelevant or unconnected events. Further, there is good evidence
that problems in working memory and cognitive control in schizophrenia are related to
problems in the function of a region of the brain called the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex
(DLPFC) (Minzenberg, Laird, Thelen, Carter, & Glahn, 2009; Ragland et al., 2009). These
problems include changes in how the DLPFC works when people are doing working-memory
or cognitive-control tasks, and problems with how this brain region is connected to other brain
regions important for working memory and cognitive control, including the posterior parietal
cortex (e.g., Karlsgodt et al., 2008; J. J. Kim et al., 2003; Schlosser et al., 2003), the anterior
cingulate (Repovs & Barch, 2012), and temporal cortex (e.g., Fletcher et al., 1995; Meyer-
Lindenberg et al., 2001). In terms of understanding episodic memory problems in
schizophrenia, many researchers have focused on medial temporal lobe deficits, with a specific
focus on the hippocampus (e.g., Heckers & Konradi, 2010). This is because there is much data
from humans and animals showing that the hippocampus is important for the creation of
new memories (Squire, 1992). However, it has become increasingly clear that problems with
the DLPFC also make important contributions to episodic memory deficits in schizophrenia
(Ragland et al., 2009), probably because this part of the brain is important for controlling our
use of memory.
In addition to problems with regions such as the DLFPC and medial temporal lobes in
schizophrenia described above, magnitude resonance neuroimaging studies have also
identified changes in cellular architecture, white matter connectivity, and gray matter volume
in a variety of regions that include the prefrontal and temporal cortices (Bora et al., 2011).
People with schizophrenia also show reduced overall brain volume, and reductions in brain
volume as people get older may be larger in those with schizophrenia than in healthy people
(Olabi et al., 2011). Taking antipsychotic medications or taking drugs such as marijuana,
Schizophrenia Spectrum Disorders 481
alcohol, and tobacco may cause some of these structural changes. However, these structural
changes are not completely explained by medications or substance use alone. Further, both
functional and structural brain changes are seen, again to a milder degree, in the first-degree
relatives of people with schizophrenia (Boos, Aleman, Cahn, Pol, & Kahn, 2007; Brans et al.,
2008; Fusar-Poli et al., 2007; MacDonald, Thermenos, Barch, & Seidman, 2009). This again
suggests that that neural changes associated with schizophrenia are related to a genetic risk
for this illness.
It is clear that there are important genetic contributions to the likelihood that someone will
develop schizophrenia, with consistent evidence from family, twin, and adoption studies.
(Sullivan, Kendler, & Neale, 2003). However, there is no “schizophrenia gene” and it is likely
that the genetic risk for schizophrenia reflects the summation of many different genes that
each contribute something to the likelihood of developing psychosis (Gottesman & Shields,
1967; Owen, Craddock, & O'Donovan, 2010). Further, schizophrenia is a very heterogeneous
disorder, which means that two different people with “schizophrenia” may each have very
different symptoms (e.g., one has hallucinations and delusions, the other has disorganized
speech and negative symptoms). This
makes it even more challenging to identify
specific genes associated with risk for
psychosis. Importantly, many studies also
now suggest that at least some of the genes
potentially associated with schizophrenia
are also associated with other mental
health conditions, including bipolar disorder,
depression, and autism (Gejman, Sanders,
& Kendler, 2011; Y. Kim, Zerwas, Trace, &
Sullivan, 2011; Owen et al., 2010; Rutter,
Kim-Cohen, & Maughan, 2006).
In addition, complications that occur at the time of birth and which cause hypoxia (lack of
oxygen) are also associated with an increased risk for developing schizophrenia (M. Cannon,
Jones, & Murray, 2002; Miller et al., 2011). Children born to older fathers are also at a somewhat
increased risk of developing schizophrenia. Further, using cannabis increases risk for
developing psychosis, especially if you have other risk factors (Casadio, Fernandes, Murray,
& Di Forti, 2011; Luzi, Morrison, Powell, di Forti, & Murray, 2008). The likelihood of developing
schizophrenia is also higher for kids who grow up in urban settings (March et al., 2008) and
for some minority ethnic groups (Bourque, van der Ven, & Malla, 2011). Both of these factors
may reflect higher social and environmental stress in these settings. Unfortunately, none of
these risk factors is specific enough to be particularly useful in a clinical setting, and most
people with these “risk” factors do not develop schizophrenia. However, together they are
beginning to give us clues as the neurodevelopmental factors that may lead someone to be
at an increased risk for developing this disease.
An important research area on risk for psychosis has been work with individuals who may be
at “clinical high risk.” These are individuals who are showing attenuated (milder) symptoms
of psychosis that have developed recently and who are experiencing some distress or disability
associated with these symptoms. When people with these types of symptoms are followed
over time, about 35% of them develop a psychotic disorder (T. D. Cannon et al., 2008), most
frequently schizophrenia (Fusar-Poli, McGuire, & Borgwardt, 2012). In order to identify these
individuals, a new category of diagnosis, called “Attenuated Psychotic Syndrome,” was added
to Section III (the section for disorders in need of further study) of the DSM-5 (see Table 1 for
symptoms) (APA, 2013). However, adding this diagnostic category to the DSM-5 created a good
deal of controversy (Batstra & Frances, 2012; Fusar-Poli & Yung, 2012). Many scientists and
clinicians have been worried that including “risk” states in the DSM-5 would create mental
disorders where none exist, that these individuals are often already seeking treatment for
other problems, and that it is not clear that we have good treatments to stop these individuals
from developing to psychosis. However, the counterarguments have been that there is
evidence that individuals with high-risk symptoms develop psychosis at a much higher rate
than individuals with other types of psychiatric symptoms, and that the inclusion of Attenuated
Psychotic Syndrome in Section III will spur important research that might have clinical benefits.
Further, there is some evidence that non-invasive treatments such as omega-3 fatty acids and
intensive family intervention may help reduce the development of full-blown psychosis (Preti
& Cella, 2010) in people who have high-risk symptoms.
Treatment of Schizophrenia
The currently available treatments for schizophrenia leave much to be desired, and the search
Schizophrenia Spectrum Disorders 483
for more effective treatments for both the psychotic symptoms of schizophrenia (e.g.,
hallucinations and delusions) as well as cognitive deficits and negative symptoms is a highly
active area of research. The first line of treatment for schizophrenia and other psychotic
disorders is the use of antipsychotic medications. There are two primary types of antipsychotic
medications, referred to as “typical” and “atypical.” The fact that “typical” antipsychotics helped
some symptoms of schizophrenia was discovered serendipitously more than 60 years ago
(Carpenter & Davis, 2012; Lopez-Munoz et al., 2005). These are drugs that all share a common
feature of being a strong block of the D2 type dopamine receptor. Although these drugs can
help reduce hallucinations, delusions, and disorganized speech, they do little to improve
cognitive deficits or negative symptoms and can be associated with distressing motor side
effects. The newer generation of antipsychotics is referred to as “atypical” antipsychotics.
These drugs have more mixed mechanisms of action in terms of the receptor types that they
influence, though most of them also influence D2 receptors. These newer antipsychotics are
not necessarily more helpful for schizophrenia but have fewer motor side effects. However,
many of the atypical antipsychotics are associated with side effects referred to as the
“metabolic syndrome,” which includes weight gain and increased risk for cardiovascular illness,
Type-2 diabetes, and mortality (Lieberman et al., 2005).
The evidence that cognitive deficits also contribute to functional impairment in schizophrenia
has led to an increased search for treatments that might enhance cognitive function in
schizophrenia. Unfortunately, as of yet, there are no pharmacological treatments that work
consistently to improve cognition in schizophrenia, though many new types of drugs are
currently under exploration. However, there is a type of psychological intervention, referred
to as cognitive remediation, which has shown some evidence of helping cognition and function
in schizophrenia. In particular, a version of this treatment called Cognitive Enhancement
Therapy (CET) has been shown to improve cognition, functional outcome, social cognition,
and to protect against gray matter loss (Eack et al., 2009; Eack, Greenwald, Hogarty, &
Keshavan, 2010; Eack et al., 2010; Eack, Pogue-Geile, Greenwald, Hogarty, & Keshavan, 2010;
Hogarty, Greenwald, & Eack, 2006) in young individuals with schizophrenia. The development
of new treatments such as Cognitive Enhancement Therapy provides some hope that we will
be able to develop new and better approaches to improving the lives of individuals with this
serious mental health condition and potentially even prevent it some day.
Schizophrenia Spectrum Disorders 484
Outside Resources
Book: Ben Behind His Voices: One family’s journal from the chaos of schizophrenia to hope
(2011). Randye Kaye. Rowman and Littlefield.
Book: Conquering Schizophrenia: A father, his son, and a medical breakthrough (1997). Peter
Wyden. Knopf.
Book: Henry’s Demons: Living with schizophrenia, a father and son’s story (2011). Henry and
Patrick Cockburn. Scribner Macmillan.
Book: Recovered, Not Cured: A journey through schizophrenia (2005). Richard McLean. Allen
and Unwin.
Book: The Center Cannot Hold: My journey through madness (2008). Elyn R. Saks. Hyperion.
Book: The Quiet Room: A journal out of the torment of madness (1996). Lori Schiller. Grand
Central Publishing.
Book: Welcome Silence: My triumph over schizophrenia (2003). Carol North. CSS Publishing.
Web: National Alliance for the Mentally Ill. This is an excellent site for learning more about
advocacy for individuals with major mental illnesses such as schizophrenia.
http://www.nami.org/
Web: National Institute of Mental Health. This website has information on NIMH-funded
schizophrenia research.
http://www.nimh.nih.gov/health/topics/schizophrenia/index.shtml
Web: Schizophrenia Research Forum. This is an excellent website that contains a broad
array of information about current research on schizophrenia.
http://www.schizophreniaforum.org/
Discussion Questions
Schizophrenia Spectrum Disorders 485
2. How would one be able to tell when an individual is “delusional” versus having non-
delusional beliefs that differ from the societal normal? How should cultural and sub-cultural
variation been taken into account when assessing psychotic symptoms?
4. Why has the inclusion of a new diagnosis (Attenuated Psychotic Syndrome) in Section III
of the DSM-5 created controversy?
5. What are some of the factors associated with increased risk for developing schizophrenia?
If we know whether or not someone has these risk factors, how well can we tell whether
they will develop schizophrenia?
7. Do antipsychotic medications work well for all symptoms of schizophrenia? If not, which
symptoms respond better to antipsychotic medications?
8. Are there any treatments besides antipsychotic medications that help any of the symptoms
of schizophrenia? If so, what are they?
Schizophrenia Spectrum Disorders 486
Vocabulary
Alogia
A reduction in the amount of speech and/or increased pausing before the initiation of speech.
Anhedonia/amotivation
A reduction in the drive or ability to take the steps or engage in actions necessary to obtain
the potentially positive outcome.
Catatonia
Behaviors that seem to reflect a reduction in responsiveness to the external environment.
This can include holding unusual postures for long periods of time, failing to respond to verbal
or motor prompts from another person, or excessive and seemingly purposeless motor
activity.
Delusions
False beliefs that are often fixed, hard to change even in the presence of conflicting
information, and often culturally influenced in their content.
Diagnostic criteria
The specific criteria used to determine whether an individual has a specific type of psychiatric
disorder. Commonly used diagnostic criteria are included in the Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorder, 5th Edition (DSM-5) and the Internal Classification of Disorders,
Version 9 (ICD-9).
Disorganized behavior
Behavior or dress that is outside the norm for almost all subcultures. This would include odd
dress, odd makeup (e.g., lipstick outlining a mouth for 1 inch), or unusual rituals (e.g., repetitive
hand gestures).
Disorganized speech
Speech that is difficult to follow, either because answers do not clearly follow questions or
because one sentence does not logically follow from another.
Dopamine
A neurotransmitter in the brain that is thought to play an important role in regulating the
function of other neurotransmitters.
Schizophrenia Spectrum Disorders 487
Episodic memory
The ability to learn and retrieve new information or episodes in one’s life.
Flat affect
A reduction in the display of emotions through facial expressions, gestures, and speech
intonation.
Functional capacity
The ability to engage in self-care (cook, clean, bathe), work, attend school, and/or engage in
social relationships.
Hallucinations
Perceptual experiences that occur even when there is no stimulus in the outside world
generating the experiences. They can be auditory, visual, olfactory (smell), gustatory (taste),
or somatic (touch).
Neurodevelopmental
Processes that influence how the brain develops either in utero or as the child is growing up.
Processing speed
The speed with which an individual can perceive auditory or visual information and respond
to it.
Psychopathology
Illnesses or disorders that involve psychological or psychiatric symptoms.
Working memory
The ability to maintain information over a short period of time, such as 30 seconds or less.
Schizophrenia Spectrum Disorders 488
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28
Personality Disorders
Cristina Crego & Thomas Widiger
The purpose of this module is to define what is meant by a personality disorder, identify the
five domains of general personality (i.e., neuroticism, extraversion, openness, agreeableness,
and conscientiousness), identify the six personality disorders proposed for retention in the
5th edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-5) (i.e.,
borderline, antisocial, schizotypal, avoidant, obsessive-compulsive, and narcissistic),
summarize the etiology for antisocial and borderline personality disorder, and identify the
treatment for borderline personality disorder (i.e., dialectical behavior therapy and
mentalization therapy).
Learning Objectives
Introduction
Everybody has their own unique personality; that is, their characteristic manner of thinking,
feeling, behaving, and relating to others (John, Robins, & Pervin, 2008). Some people are
typically introverted, quiet, and withdrawn; whereas others are more extraverted, active, and
Personality Disorders 496
outgoing. Some individuals are invariably conscientiousness, dutiful, and efficient; whereas
others might be characteristically undependable and negligent. Some individuals are
consistently anxious, self-conscious, and apprehensive; whereas others are routinely relaxed,
self-assured, and unconcerned. Personality traits refer to these characteristic, routine ways
of thinking, feeling, and relating to others. There are signs or indicators of these traits in
childhood, but they become particularly evident when the person is an adult. Personality traits
are integral to each person’s sense of self, as they involve what people value, how they think
and feel about things, what they like to do, and, basically, what they are like most every day
throughout much of their lives.
There are literally hundreds of different personality traits. All of these traits can be organized
into the broad dimensions referred to as the Five-Factor Model (John, Naumann, & Soto,
2008). These five broad domains are inclusive; there does not appear to be any traits of
Table I: Illustrative traits for both poles across Five-Factor Model personality dimensions.
Personality Disorders 497
personality that lie outside of the Five-Factor Model. This even applies to traits that you may
use to describe yourself. Table I provides illustrative traits for both poles of the five domains
of this model of personality. A number of the traits that you see in this table may describe
you. If you can think of some other traits that describe yourself, you should be able to place
them somewhere in this table.
When personality traits result in significant distress, social impairment, and/or occupational
impairment, they are considered to be a personality disorder (American Psychiatric
Association, 2013). The authoritative manual for what constitutes a personality disorder is
provided by the American Psychiatric Association’s (APA) Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorders (DSM), the current version of which is DSM-5 (APA, 2013). The DSM provides
a common language and standard criteria for the classification and diagnosis of mental
disorders. This manual is used by clinicians, researchers, health insurance companies, and
policymakers. DSM-5 includes 10 personality disorders: antisocial, avoidant, borderline,
dependent, histrionic, narcissistic, obsessive-compulsive, paranoid, schizoid, and schizotypal.
All 10 of these personality disorders will be included in the next edition of the diagnostic
manual, DSM-5.
This list of 10 though does not fully cover all of the different ways in which a personality can
be maladaptive. DSM-5 also includes a “wastebasket” diagnosis of other specified personality
disorder (OSPD) and unspecified personality disorder (UPD). This diagnosis is used when a
clinician believes that a patient has a personality disorder but the traits that constitute this
disorder are not well covered by one of the 10 existing diagnoses. OSPD and UPD or as they
used to be referred to in previous editions - PDNOS (personality disorder not otherwise
specified) are often one of the most frequently used diagnoses in clinical practice, suggesting
that the current list of 10 is not adequately comprehensive (Widiger & Trull, 2007).
Description
submissiveness, clinging behavior, and fears of separation (APA, 2013), for the most part a
combination of traits of neuroticism (anxious, uncertain, pessimistic, and helpless) and
maladaptive agreeableness (e.g., gullible, guileless, meek, subservient, and self-effacing).
Antisocial personality disorder is, for the most part, a combination of traits from antagonism
(e.g., dishonest, manipulative, exploitative, callous, and merciless) and low conscientiousness
(e.g., irresponsible, immoral, lax, hedonistic, and rash). See the 1967 movie, Bonnie and Clyde,
starring Warren Beatty, for a nice portrayal of someone with antisocial personality disorder.
this personality disorder); and histrionic believe that there isn't enough time to accomplish important
personality disorder is largely a disorder of tasks. [Image: CC0 Public Domain, https://goo.gl/m25gce]
It should be noted though that a complete description of each DSM-5 personality disorder
would typically include at least some traits from other domains. For example, antisocial
personality disorder (or psychopathy) also includes some traits from low neuroticism (e.g.,
fearlessness and glib charm) and extraversion (e.g., excitement-seeking and assertiveness);
borderline includes some traits from antagonism (e.g., manipulative and oppositional) and
low conscientiousness (e.g., rash); and histrionic includes some traits from antagonism (e.g.,
vanity) and low conscientiousness (e.g., impressionistic). Narcissistic personality disorder
Personality Disorders 499
includes traits from neuroticism (e.g., reactive anger, reactive shame, and need for admiration),
extraversion (e.g., exhibitionism and authoritativeness), antagonism (e.g., arrogance,
entitlement, and lack of empathy), and conscientiousness (e.g., acclaim-seeking). Schizotypal
personality disorder includes traits from neuroticism (e.g., social anxiousness and social
discomfort), introversion (e.g., social withdrawal), unconventionality (e.g., odd, eccentric,
peculiar, and aberrant ideas), and antagonism (e.g., suspiciousness).
Validity
It is quite possible that in future revisions of the DSM some of the personality disorders
included in DSM-5 and DSM-IV-TR will no longer be included. In fact, for DSM-5 it was originally
proposed that four be deleted. The personality disorders that were slated for deletion were
histrionic, schizoid, paranoid, and dependent (APA, 2012). The rationale for the proposed
deletions was in large part because they are said to have less empirical support than the
diagnoses that were at the time being retained (Skodol, 2012). There is agreement within the
field with regard to the empirical support for the borderline, antisocial, and schizotypal
personality disorders (Mullins-Sweat, Bernstein, & Widiger, 2012; Skodol, 2012). However,
there is a difference of opinion with respect to the empirical support for the dependent
personality disorder (Bornstein, 2012; Livesley, 2011; Miller, Widiger, & Campbell, 2010;
Mullins-Sweat et al., 2012).
Little is known about the specific etiology for most of the DSM-5 personality disorders. Because
each personality disorder represents a constellation of personality traits, the etiology for the
syndrome will involve a complex interaction of an array of different neurobiological
vulnerabilities and dispositions with a variety of environmental, psychosocial events.
Personality Disorders 500
To the extent that one considers the DSM-5 personality disorders to be maladaptive variants
of general personality structure, as described, for instance, within the Five-Factor Model, there
would be a considerable body of research to support the validity for all of the personality
disorders, including even the histrionic, schizoid, and paranoid. There is compelling
multivariate behavior genetic support with respect to the precise structure of the Five-Factor
Model (e.g., Yamagata et al., 2006), childhood antecedents (Caspi, Roberts, & Shiner, 2005),
universality (Allik, 2005), temporal stability across the lifespan (Roberts & DelVecchio, 2000),
ties with brain structure (DeYoung, Hirsh, Shane, Papademetris, Rajeevan, & Gray, 2010), and
even molecular genetic support for neuroticism (Widiger, 2009).
Treatment
The presence of a personality disorder will often have an impact on the treatment of other
mental disorders, typically inhibiting or impairing responsivity. Antisocial persons will tend to
be irresponsible and negligent; borderline persons can form intensely manipulative
attachments to their therapists; paranoid patients will be unduly suspicious and accusatory;
narcissistic patients can be dismissive and denigrating; and dependent patients can become
overly attached to and feel helpless without their therapists.
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Dialectical behavior therapy (Lynch & Cuyper, 2012) and mentalization therapy (Bateman &
Fonagy, 2012): Dialectical behavior therapy is a form of cognitive-behavior therapy that draws
on principles from Zen Buddhism, dialectical philosophy, and behavioral science. The
treatment has four components: individual therapy, group skills training, telephone coaching,
and a therapist consultation team, and will typically last a full year. As such, it is a relatively
expensive form of treatment, but research has indicated that its benefits far outweighs its
costs, both financially and socially.
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It is unclear why specific and explicit treatment manuals have not been developed for the
other personality disorders. This may reflect a regrettable assumption that personality
disorders are unresponsive to treatment. It may also reflect the complexity of their treatment.
As noted earlier, each DSM-5 disorder is a heterogeneous constellation of maladaptive
personality traits. In fact, a person can meet diagnostic criteria for the antisocial, borderline,
schizoid, schizotypal, narcissistic, and avoidant personality disorders and yet have only one
diagnostic criterion in common. For example, only five of nine features are necessary for the
diagnosis of borderline personality disorder; therefore, two persons can meet criteria for this
disorder and yet have only one feature in common. In addition, patients meeting diagnostic
criteria for one personality disorder will often meet diagnostic criteria for another. This degree
of diagnostic overlap and heterogeneity of membership hinders tremendously any effort to
identify a specific etiology, pathology, or treatment for a respective personality disorder as
there is so much variation within any particular group of patients sharing the same diagnosis
(Smith & Zapolski, 2009).
Of course, this diagnostic overlap and complexity did not prevent researchers and clinicians
from developing dialectical behavior therapy and mentalization therapy. A further reason for
the weak progress in treatment development is that, as noted earlier, persons rarely seek
treatment for their personality disorder. It would be difficult to obtain a sufficiently large group
of people with, for instance, narcissistic or obsessive–compulsive disorder to participate in a
Personality Disorders 503
treatment outcome study, one receiving the manualized treatment protocol, the other
receiving treatment as usual.
Conclusions
It is evident that all individuals have a personality, as indicated by their characteristic way of
thinking, feeling, behaving, and relating to others. For some people, these traits result in a
considerable degree of distress and/or impairment, constituting a personality disorder. A
considerable body of research has accumulated to help understand the etiology, pathology,
and/or treatment for some personality disorders (i.e., antisocial, schizotypal, borderline,
dependent, and narcissistic), but not so much for others (e.g., histrionic, schizoid, and
paranoid). However, researchers and clinicians are now shifting toward a more dimensional
understanding of personality disorders, wherein each is understood as a maladaptive variant
of general personality structure, thereby bringing to bear all that is known about general
personality functioning to an understanding of these maladaptive variants.
Personality Disorders 504
Outside Resources
Discussion Questions
1. Do you think that any of the personality disorders, or some of their specific traits, are ever
good or useful to have?
2. If someone with a personality disorder commits a crime, what is the right way for society
to respond? For example, does or should meeting diagnostic criteria for antisocial
personality disorder mitigate (lower) a person’s responsibility for committing a crime?
3. Given what you know about personality disorders and the traits that comprise each one,
would you say there is any personality disorder that is likely to be diagnosed in one gender
more than the other? Why or why not?
5. The authors suggested Clyde Barrow as an example of antisocial personality disorder and
Blanche Dubois for histrionic personality disorder. Can you think of a person from the
media or literature who would have at least some of the traits of narcissistic personality
disorder?
Personality Disorders 505
Vocabulary
Antisocial
A pervasive pattern of disregard and violation of the rights of others. These behaviors may
be aggressive or destructive and may involve breaking laws or rules, deceit or theft.
Avoidant
A pervasive pattern of social inhibition, feelings of inadequacy, and hypersensitivity to negative
evaluation.
Borderline
A pervasive pattern of instability of interpersonal relationships, self-image, and affects, and
marked impulsivity.
Dependent
A pervasive and excessive need to be taken care of that leads to submissive and clinging
behavior and fears of separation.
Five-Factor Model
Five broad domains or dimensions that are used to describe human personality.
Histrionic
A pervasive pattern of excessive emotionality and attention seeking.
Narcissistic
A pervasive pattern of grandiosity (in fantasy or behavior), need for admiration, and lack of
empathy.
Obsessive-compulsive
A pervasive pattern of preoccupation with orderliness, perfectionism, and mental and
interpersonal control, at the expense of flexibility, openness, and efficiency.
Paranoid
A pervasive distrust and suspiciousness of others such that their motives are interpreted as
malevolent.
Personality
Characteristic, routine ways of thinking, feeling, and relating to others.
Personality Disorders 506
Personality disorders
When personality traits result in significant distress, social impairment, and/or occupational
impairment.
Schizoid
A pervasive pattern of detachment from social relationships and a restricted range of
expression of emotions in interpersonal settings.
Schizotypal
A pervasive pattern of social and interpersonal deficits marked by acute discomfort with, and
reduced capacity for, close relationships as well as perceptual distortions and eccentricities
of behavior.
Personality Disorders 507
References
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232.
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Pages/PersonalityDisorders.aspx.
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Personality Disorders 509
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Therapies
29
Therapeutic Orientations
Hannah Boettcher, Stefan G. Hofmann & Q. Jade Wu
In the past century, a number of psychotherapeutic orientations have gained popularity for
treating mental illnesses. This module outlines some of the best-known therapeutic
approaches and explains the history, techniques, advantages, and disadvantages associated
with each. The most effective modern approach is cognitive behavioral therapy (CBT). We also
discuss psychoanalytic therapy, person-centered therapy, and mindfulness-based
approaches. Drug therapy and emerging new treatment strategies will also be briefly explored.
Learning Objectives
• For each therapeutic approach, consider: history, goals, key techniques, and empirical
support.
Introduction
The history of mental illness can be traced as far back as 1500 BCE, when the ancient Egyptians
noted cases of “distorted concentration” and “emotional distress in the heart or mind” (Nasser,
1987). Today, nearly half of all Americans will experience mental illness at some point in their
lives, and mental health problems affect more than one-quarter of the population in any given
year (Kessler et al., 2005). Fortunately, a range of psychotherapies exist to treat mental
illnesses. This module provides an overview of some of the best-known schools of thought in
Therapeutic Orientations 512
psychotherapy. Currently, the most effective approach is called Cognitive Behavioral Therapy
(CBT); however, other approaches, such as psychoanalytic therapy, person-centered therapy,
and mindfulness-based therapies are also used—though the effectiveness of these
treatments aren’t as clear as they are for CBT. Throughout this module, note the advantages
and disadvantages of each approach, paying special attention to their support by empirical
research.
CBT is an approach to treating mental illness that involves work with a therapist as well
as homework assignments between sessions. It has proven to be very effective for
virtually all psychiatric illnesses. [Image: DFAT, https://goo.gl/bWmzaa, CC BY 2.0, https://
goo.gl/BRvSA7]
The earliest organized therapy for mental disorders was psychoanalysis. Made famous in the
early 20th century by one of the best-known clinicians of all time, Sigmund Freud, this approach
stresses that mental health problems are rooted in unconscious conflicts and desires. In order
to resolve the mental illness, then, these unconscious struggles must be identified and
addressed. Psychoanalysis often does this through exploring one’s early childhood
experiences that may have continuing repercussions on one’s mental health in the present
and later in life. Psychoanalysis is an intensive, long-term approach in which patients and
therapists may meet multiple times per week, often for many years.
Therapeutic Orientations 513
Freud initially suggested that mental health problems arise from efforts to push inappropriate
sexual urges out of conscious awareness (Freud, 1895/1955). Later, Freud suggested more
generally that psychiatric problems are the result of tension between different parts of the
mind: the id, the superego, and the ego. In Freud’s structural model, the id represents pleasure-
driven unconscious urges (e.g., our animalistic desires for sex and aggression), while the
superego is the semi-conscious part of the mind where morals and societal judgment are
internalized (e.g., the part of you that automatically knows how society expects you to behave).
The ego—also partly conscious—mediates between the id and superego. Freud believed that
bringing unconscious struggles like these (where the id demands one thing and the superego
another) into conscious awareness would relieve the stress of the conflict (Freud, 1920/1955)
—which became the goal of psychoanalytic therapy.
Although psychoanalysis is still practiced today, it has largely been replaced by the more
broadly defined psychodynamic therapy. This latter approach has the same basic tenets as
psychoanalysis, but is briefer, makes more of an effort to put clients in their social and
interpersonal context, and focuses more on relieving psychological distress than on changing
the person.
Techniques in Psychoanalysis
thoughts.
Sometimes, free association exercises are applied specifically to childhood recollections. That
is, psychoanalysts believe a person’s childhood relationships with caregivers often determine
the way that person relates to others, and predicts later psychiatric difficulties. Thus, exploring
these childhood memories, through free association or otherwise, can provide therapists with
insights into a patient’s psychological makeup.
Because we don’t always have the ability to consciously recall these deep memories,
psychoanalysts also discuss their patients’ dreams. In Freudian theory, dreams contain not
only manifest (or literal) content, but also latent (or symbolic) content (Freud, 1900; 1955). For
example, someone may have a dream that his/her teeth are falling out—the manifest or actual
content of the dream. However, dreaming that one’s teeth are falling out could be a reflection
of the person’s unconscious concern about losing his or her physical attractiveness—the latent
or metaphorical content of the dream. It is the therapist’s job to help discover the latent
content underlying one’s manifest content through dream analysis.
The key to psychoanalytic theory is to have patients uncover the buried, conflicting content
of their mind, and therapists use various tactics—such as seating patients to face away from
them—to promote a freer self-disclosure. And, as a therapist spends more time with a patient,
the therapist can come to view his or her relationship with the patient as another reflection
of the patient’s mind.
Psychoanalysis was once the only type of psychotherapy available, but presently the number
of therapists practicing this approach is decreasing around the world. Psychoanalysis is not
appropriate for some types of patients, including those with severe psychopathology or
intellectual disability. Further, psychoanalysis is often expensive because treatment usually
Therapeutic Orientations 515
lasts many years. Still, some patients and therapists find the prolonged and detailed analysis
very rewarding.
Perhaps the greatest disadvantage of psychoanalysis and related approaches is the lack of
empirical support for their effectiveness. The limited research that has been conducted on
these treatments suggests that they do not reliably lead to better mental health outcomes (e.
g., Driessen et al., 2010). And, although there are some reviews that seem to indicate that
long-term psychodynamic therapies might be beneficial (e.g., Leichsenring & Rabung, 2008),
other researchers have questioned the validity of these reviews. Nevertheless, psychoanalytic
theory was history’s first attempt at formal treatment of mental illness, setting the stage for
the more modern approaches used today.
One of the next developments in therapy for mental illness, which arrived in the mid-20th
century, is called humanistic or person-centered therapy (PCT). Here, the belief is that mental
health problems result from an inconsistency between patients’ behavior and their true
personal identity. Thus, the goal of PCT is to create conditions under which patients can
discover their self-worth, feel comfortable exploring their own identity, and alter their behavior
to better reflect this identity.
An important aspect of the PCT relationship is the therapist’s unconditional positive regard
for the patient’s feelings and behaviors. That is, the therapist is never to condemn or criticize
the patient for what s/he has done or thought; the therapist is only to express warmth and
empathy. This creates an environment free of approval or disapproval, where patients come
to appreciate their value and to behave in ways that are congruent with their own identity.
Although both psychoanalysis and PCT are still used today, another therapy, cognitive-
behavioral therapy (CBT), has gained more widespread support and practice. CBT refers to
a family of therapeutic approaches whose goal is to alleviate psychological symptoms by
changing their underlying cognitions and behaviors. The premise of CBT is that thoughts,
behaviors, and emotions interact and contribute to various mental disorders. For example,
let’s consider how a CBT therapist would view a patient who compulsively washes her hands
for hours every day. First, the therapist would identify the patient’s maladaptive thought: “If
I don’t wash my hands like this, I will get a disease and die.” The therapist then identifies how
this maladaptive thought leads to a maladaptive emotion: the feeling of anxiety when her
hands aren’t being washed. And finally, this maladaptive emotion leads to the maladaptive
behavior: the patient washing her hands for hours every day.
CBT is a present-focused therapy (i.e., focused on the “now” rather than causes from the past,
such as childhood relationships) that uses behavioral goals to improve one’s mental illness.
Often, these behavioral goals involve between-session homework assignments. For example,
the therapist may give the hand-washing patient a worksheet to take home; on this worksheet,
the woman is to write down every time she feels the urge to wash her hands, how she deals
with the urge, and what behavior she replaces that urge with. When the patient has her next
therapy session, she and the therapist review her “homework” together. CBT is a relatively
behavioral therapy.
Therapeutic Orientations 518
CBT developed from clinical work conducted in the mid-20th century by Dr. Aaron T. Beck, a
psychiatrist, and Albert Ellis, a psychologist. Beck used the term automatic thoughts to refer
to the thoughts depressed patients report experiencing spontaneously. He observed that
these thoughts arise from three belief systems, or schemas: beliefs about the self, beliefs
about the world, and beliefs about the future. In treatment, therapy initially focuses on
identifying automatic thoughts (e.g., “If I don’t wash my hands constantly, I’ll get a disease”),
testing their validity, and replacing maladaptive thoughts with more adaptive thoughts (e.g.,
“Washing my hands three times a day is sufficient to prevent a disease”). In later stages of
treatment, the patient’s maladaptive schemas are examined and modified. Ellis (1957) took
a comparable approach, in what he called rational-emotive-behavioral therapy (REBT), which
also encourages patients to evaluate their own thoughts about situations.
Techniques in CBT
Beck and Ellis strove to help patients identify maladaptive appraisals, or the untrue judgments
and evaluations of certain thoughts. For example, if it’s your first time meeting new people,
you may have the automatic thought, “These people won’t like me because I have nothing
interesting to share.” That thought itself is not what’s troublesome; the appraisal (or
evaluation) that it might have merit is what’s troublesome. The goal of CBT is to help people
make adaptive, instead of maladaptive, appraisals (e.g., “I do know interesting things!”). This
technique of reappraisal, or cognitive restructuring, is a fundamental aspect of CBT. With
cognitive restructuring, it is the therapist’s job to help point out when a person has an
inaccurate or maladaptive thought, so that the patient can either eliminate it or modify it to
be more adaptive.
For many mental health problems, especially anxiety disorders, CBT incorporates what is
known as exposure therapy. During exposure therapy, a patient confronts a problematic
situation and fully engages in the experience instead of avoiding it. For example, imagine a
man who is terrified of spiders. Whenever he encounters one, he immediately screams and
panics. In exposure therapy, the man would be forced to confront and interact with spiders,
rather than simply avoiding them as he usually does. The goal is to reduce the fear associated
with the situation through extinction learning, a neurobiological and cognitive process by which
the patient “unlearns” the irrational fear. For example, exposure therapy for someone terrified
of spiders might begin with him looking at a cartoon of a spider, followed by him looking at
pictures of real spiders, and later, him handling a plastic spider. After weeks of this incremental
exposure, the patient may even be able to hold a live spider. After repeated exposure (starting
small and building one’s way up), the patient experiences less physiological fear and
maladaptive thoughts about spiders, breaking his tendency for anxiety and subsequent
avoidance.
CBT interventions tend to be relatively brief, making them cost-effective for the average
consumer. In addition, CBT is an intuitive treatment that makes logical sense to patients. It
can also be adapted to suit the needs of many different populations. One disadvantage,
however, is that CBT does involve significant effort on the patient’s part, because the patient
is an active participant in treatment. Therapists often assign “homework” (e.g., worksheets
for recording one’s thoughts and behaviors) between sessions to maintain the cognitive and
behavioral habits the patient is working on. The greatest strength of CBT is the abundance of
empirical support for its effectiveness. Studies have consistently found CBT to be equally or
more effective than other forms of treatment, including medication and other therapies
(Butler, Chapman, Forman, & Beck, 2006; Hofmann et al., 2012). For this reason, CBT is
considered a first-line treatment for many mental disorders.
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The central notion of CBT is the idea that a person’s behavioral and emotional responses are
causally influenced by one’s thinking. The stoic Greek philosopher Epictetus is quoted as
saying, “men are not moved by things, but by the view they take of them.” Meaning, it is not
the event per se, but rather one’s assumptions (including interpretations and perceptions) of
the event that are responsible for one’s emotional response to it. Beck calls these assumptions
Therapeutic Orientations 520
about events and situations automatic thoughts (Beck, 1979), whereas Ellis (1962) refers to
these assumptions as self-statements. The cognitive model assumes that these cognitive
processes cause the emotional and behavioral responses to events or stimuli. This causal
chain is illustrated in Ellis’s ABC model, in which A stands for the antecedent event, B stands
for belief, and C stands for consequence. During CBT, the person is encouraged to carefully
observe the sequence of events and the response to them, and then explore the validity of
the underlying beliefs through behavioral experiments and reasoning, much like a detective
or scientist.
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Unlike the preceding therapies, which were developed in the 20th century, this next one was
born out of age-old Buddhist and yoga practices. Mindfulness, or a process that tries to
cultivate a nonjudgmental, yet attentive, mental state, is a therapy that focuses on one’s
awareness of bodily sensations, thoughts, and the outside environment. Whereas other
therapies work to modify or eliminate these sensations and thoughts, mindfulness focuses
on nonjudgmentally accepting them (Kabat-Zinn, 2003; Baer, 2003). For example, whereas
CBT may actively confront and work to change a maladaptive thought, mindfulness therapy
works to acknowledge and accept the thought, understanding that the thought is spontaneous
and not what the person truly believes. There are two important components of mindfulness:
(1) self-regulation of attention, and (2) orientation toward the present moment (Bishop et al.,
2004). Mindfulness is thought to improve mental health because it draws attention away from
past and future stressors, encourages acceptance of troubling thoughts and feelings, and
promotes physical relaxation.
MBSR uses meditation, yoga, and attention to physical experiences to reduce stress. The hope
is that reducing a person’s overall stress will allow that person to more objectively evaluate
his or her thoughts. In MBCT, rather than reducing one’s general stress to address a specific
problem, attention is focused on one’s thoughts and their associated emotions. For example,
Therapeutic Orientations 521
DBT is founded on the perspective of a dialectical worldview. That is, rather than thinking of
the world as “black and white,” or “only good and only bad,” it focuses on accepting that some
things can have characteristics of both “good” and “bad.” So, in a case involving maladaptive
thoughts, instead of teaching that a thought is entirely bad, DBT tries to help patients be less
judgmental of their thoughts (as with mindfulness-based therapy) and encourages change
through therapeutic progress, using cognitive-behavioral techniques as well as mindfulness
Therapeutic Orientations 522
exercises.
Another form of treatment that also uses mindfulness techniques is acceptance and
commitment therapy (ACT) (Hayes, Strosahl, & Wilson, 1999). In this treatment, patients are
taught to observe their thoughts from a detached perspective (Hayes et al., 1999). ACT
encourages patients not to attempt to change or avoid thoughts and emotions they observe
in themselves, but to recognize which are beneficial and which are harmful. However, the
differences among ACT, CBT, and other mindfulness-based treatments are a topic of
controversy in the current literature.
Two key advantages of mindfulness-based therapies are their acceptability and accessibility
to patients. Because yoga and meditation are already widely known in popular culture,
consumers of mental healthcare are often interested in trying related psychological therapies.
Currently, psychologists have not come to a consensus on the efficacy of MBT, though growing
evidence supports its effectiveness for treating mood and anxiety disorders. For example,
one review of MBT studies for anxiety and depression found that mindfulness-based
interventions generally led to moderate symptom improvement (Hofmann et al., 2010).
treatments. Furthermore, smartphones help extend therapy to patients’ daily lives, allowing
for symptom tracking, homework reminders, and more frequent therapist contact.
Another benefit of technology is cognitive bias modification. Here, patients are given
exercises, often through the use of video games, aimed at changing their problematic thought
processes. For example, researchers might use a mobile app to train alcohol abusers to avoid
stimuli related to alcohol. One version of this game flashes four pictures on the screen—three
alcohol cues (e.g., a can of beer, the front of a bar) and one health-related image (e.g., someone
drinking water). The goal is for the patient to tap the healthy picture as fast as s/he can. Games
like these aim to target patients’ automatic, subconscious thoughts that may be difficult to
direct through conscious effort. That is, by repeatedly tapping the healthy image, the patient
learns to “ignore” the alcohol cues, so when those cues are encountered in the environment,
they will be less likely to trigger the urge to drink. Approaches like these are promising because
of their accessibility, however they require further research to establish their effectiveness.
Yet another emerging treatment employs CBT-enhancing pharmaceutical agents. These are
drugs used to improve the effects of therapeutic interventions. Based on research from animal
experiments, researchers have found that certain drugs influence the biological processes
known to be involved in learning. Thus, if people take these drugs while going through
psychotherapy, they are better able to “learn” the techniques for improvement. For example,
the antibiotic d-cycloserine improves treatment for anxiety disorders by facilitating the
learning processes that occur during exposure therapy. Ongoing research in this exciting area
may prove to be quite fruitful.
Pharmacological Treatments
Up until this point, all the therapies we have discussed have been talk-based or meditative
practices. However, psychiatric medications are also frequently used to treat mental disorders,
including schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, depression, and anxiety disorders. Psychiatric drugs
are commonly used, in part, because they can be prescribed by general medical practitioners,
whereas only trained psychologists are qualified to deliver effective psychotherapy. While
drugs and CBT therapies tend to be almost equally effective, choosing the best intervention
depends on the disorder and individual being treated, as well as other factors—such as
treatment availability and comorbidity (i.e., having multiple mental or physical disorders at
once). Although many new drugs have been introduced in recent decades, there is still much
we do not understand about their mechanism in the brain. Further research is needed to
refine our understanding of both pharmacological and behavioral treatments before we can
make firm claims about their effectiveness.
Therapeutic Orientations 524
Conclusion
Throughout human history we have had to deal with mental illness in one form or another.
Over time, several schools of thought have emerged for treating these problems. Although
various therapies have been shown to work for specific individuals, cognitive behavioral
therapy is currently the treatment most widely supported by empirical research. Still, practices
like psychodynamic therapies, person-centered therapy, mindfulness-based treatments, and
acceptance and commitment therapy have also shown success. And, with recent advances in
research and technology, clinicians are able to enhance these and other therapies to treat
more patients more effectively than ever before. However, what is important in the end is
that people actually seek out mental health specialists to help them with their problems. One
of the biggest deterrents to doing so is that people don’t understand what psychotherapy
really entails. Through understanding how current practices work, not only can we better
educate people about how to get the help they need, but we can continue to advance our
treatments to be more effective in the future.
Therapeutic Orientations 525
Outside Resources
Video: CBT (cognitive behavioral therapy) is one of the most common treatments for a
range of mental health problems, from anxiety, depression, bipolar, OCD or schizophrenia.
This animation explains the basics and how you can decide whether it's best for you or not.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9c_Bv_FBE-c
Web: An overview of the purpose and practice of cognitive behavioral therapy (CBT)
http://psychcentral.com/lib/in-depth-cognitive-behavioral-therapy/
Discussion Questions
3. Some people have argued that all therapies are about equally effective, and that they all
Therapeutic Orientations 526
affect change through common factors such as the involvement of a supportive therapist.
Does this claim sound reasonable to you? Why or why not?
4. When choosing a psychological treatment for a specific patient, what factors besides the
treatment’s demonstrated efficacy should be taken into account?
Therapeutic Orientations 527
Vocabulary
Automatic thoughts
Thoughts that occur spontaneously; often used to describe problematic thoughts that
maintain mental disorders.
Comorbidity
Describes a state of having more than one psychological or physical disorder at a given time.
Dialectical worldview
A perspective in DBT that emphasizes the joint importance of change and acceptance.
Exposure therapy
A form of intervention in which the patient engages with a problematic (usually feared)
situation without avoidance or escape.
Free association
In psychodynamic therapy, a process in which the patient reports all thoughts that come to
mind without censorship, and these thoughts are interpreted by the therapist.
Mindfulness
A process that reflects a nonjudgmental, yet attentive, mental state.
Mindfulness-based therapy
A form of psychotherapy grounded in mindfulness theory and practice, often involving
meditation, yoga, body scan, and other features of mindfulness exercises.
Person-centered therapy
A therapeutic approach focused on creating a supportive environment for self-discovery.
Psychoanalytic therapy
Sigmund Freud’s therapeutic approach focusing on resolving unconscious conflicts.
Psychodynamic therapy
Treatment applying psychoanalytic principles in a briefer, more individualized format.
Schema
A mental representation or set of beliefs about something.
References
Beck, A. T. (1979). Cognitive therapy and the emotional disorders. New York, NY: New American
Library/Meridian.
Bishop, S. R., Lau, M., Shapiro, S., Carlson, L., Anderson, N. D., Carmody, J., Segal, Z. V., Abbey,
S., Speca, M., Velting, D., & Devins, G. (2004). Mindfulness: A proposed operational definition.
Clinical Psychology: Science and Practice, 11, 230–241.
Butler, A. C., Chapman, J. E., Forman, E. M., & Beck, A. T. (2006). The empirical status of cognitive
behavioral therapy: A review of meta-analyses. Clinical Psychology Review, 26, 17–31.
Cuijpers, P., Driessen, E., Hollon, S.D., van Oppen, P., Barth, J., & Andersson, G. (2012). The
efficacy of non-directive supportive therapy for adult depression: A meta-analysis. Clinical
Psychology Review, 32, 280–291.
Driessen, E., Cuijpers, P., de Maat, S. C. M., Abbass, A. A., de Jonghe, F., & Dekker, J. J. M. (2010).
The efficacy of short-term psychodynamic psychotherapy for depression: A meta-analysis.
Clinical Psychology Review, 30, 25–36.
Ellis, A. (1962). Reason and emotion in psychotherapy. New York, NY: Lyle Stuart.
Freud, S. (1955). The interpretation of dreams. London, UK: Hogarth Press (Original work
published 1900).
Freud, S. (1955). Studies on hysteria. London, UK: Hogarth Press (Original work published 1895).
Freud. S. (1955). Beyond the pleasure principle. H London, UK: Hogarth Press (Original work
published 1920).
Friedli, K., King, M. B., Lloyd, M., & Horder, J. (1997). Randomized controlled assessment of
non-directive psychotherapy versus routine general-practitioner care. Lancet, 350,\\n1662–
1665.
Hayes, S. C., Strosahl, K., & Wilson, K. G. (1999). Acceptance and Commitment Therapy. New\\
nYork, NY: Guilford Press.
Hofmann, S. G., Asnaani, A., Vonk, J. J., Sawyer, A. T., & Fang, A. (2012). The efficacy of cognitive
behavioral therapy: A review of meta-analyses. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 36, 427–440.
Hofmann, S. G., Sawyer, A. T., Witt, A., & Oh, D. (2010). The effect of mindfulness-based therapy
on anxiety and depression: A meta-analytic review. Journal of Consulting and Clinical
Therapeutic Orientations 530
Kabat-Zinn, J. (1982). An outpatient program in behavioral medicine for chronic pain patients\\
nbased on the practice of mindfulness meditation: Theoretical considerations and
preliminary results. General Hospital Psychiatry, 4, 33–47.
Kessler, R. C., Berglund, P., Demler, O., Jin, R., Merikangas, K. R., & Walters, E. E. (2005). Lifetime
prevalence and age of onset distribution of DSM-IV disorders in the National Comorbidity
Survey Replication. Archives of General Psychiatry, 62, 593–602.
Linehan, M. M., Amstrong, H.-E., Suarez, A., Allmon, D., & Heard, H. L. (1991). Cognitive-
behavioral treatment of chronically suicidal borderline patients. Archives of General
Psychiatry, 48, 1060–1064.
Nasser, M. (1987). Psychiatry in ancient Egypt. Bulletin of the Royal College of Psychiatrists, 11,
420-422.
Norcross, J. C. & Goldfried, M. R. (2005). Handbook of Psychotherapy Integration. New York, NY:
Oxford University Press.
Segal, Z. V., Williams, J. M. G., & Teasdale, J. D. (2002). Mindfulness-Based Cognitive Therapy\\nfor
Depression: A New Approach to Preventing Relapse. New York, NY: Guilford Press.
30
Psychopharmacology
Susan Barron
Psychopharmacology is the study of how drugs affect behavior. If a drug changes your
perception, or the way you feel or think, the drug exerts effects on your brain and nervous
system. We call drugs that change the way you think or feel psychoactive or psychotropic
drugs, and almost everyone has used a psychoactive drug at some point (yes, caffeine counts).
Understanding some of the basics about psychopharmacology can help us better understand
a wide range of things that interest psychologists and others. For example, the
pharmacological treatment of certain neurodegenerative diseases such as Parkinson’s disease
tells us something about the disease itself. The pharmacological treatments used to treat
psychiatric conditions such as schizophrenia or depression have undergone amazing
development since the 1950s, and the drugs used to treat these disorders tell us something
about what is happening in the brain of individuals with these conditions. Finally,
understanding something about the actions of drugs of abuse and their routes of
administration can help us understand why some psychoactive drugs are so addictive. In this
module, we will provide an overview of some of these topics as well as discuss some current
controversial areas in the field of psychopharmacology.
Learning Objectives
• How does the route of administration affect how rewarding a drug might be?
• Why might individualized drug doses based on genetic screening be helpful for treating
conditions like depression?
• Why is there controversy regarding pharmacotherapy for children, adolescents, and the
elderly?
Psychopharmacology 532
Introduction
Psychopharmacology, the study of how drugs affect the brain and behavior, is a relatively new
science, although people have probably been taking drugs to change how they feel from early
in human history (consider the of eating fermented fruit, ancient beer recipes, chewing on
the leaves of the cocaine plant for stimulant properties as just some examples). The word
psychopharmacology itself tells us that this is a field that bridges our understanding of behavior
(and brain) and pharmacology, and the range of topics included within this field is extremely
broad.
understanding that virtually all psychoactive communication between neurons in the brain. [Image: https://
drugs interfere with or alter how neurons goo.gl/oQCafL, CC0 Public Domain, https://goo.gl/m25gce]
provided.
Table 1
A very useful link at the end of this module shows the various steps involved in
neurotransmission and some ways drugs can alter this.
Table 2 provides examples of drugs and their primary mechanism of action, but it is very
important to realize that drugs also have effects on other neurotransmitters. This contributes
to the kinds of side effects that are observed when someone takes a particular drug. The
reality is that no drugs currently available work only exactly where we would like in the brain
or only on a specific neurotransmitter. In many cases, individuals are sometimes prescribed
one psychotropic drug but then may also have to take additional drugs to reduce the side
effects caused by the initial drug. Sometimes individuals stop taking medication because the
side effects can be so profound.
While this section may sound more like pharmacology, it is important to realize how important
pharmacokinetics can be when considering psychoactive drugs. Pharmacokinetics refers to
how the body handles a drug that we take. As mentioned earlier, psychoactive drugs exert
Psychopharmacology 534
Table 2
their effects on behavior by altering neuronal communication in the brain, and the majority
of drugs reach the brain by traveling in the blood. The acronym ADME is often used with A
standing for absorption (how the drug gets
into the blood), Distribution (how the drug
gets to the organ of interest – in this
module, that is the brain), Metabolism (how
the drug is broken down so it no longer
exerts its psychoactive effects), and
Excretion (how the drug leaves the body).
We will talk about a couple of these to show
their importance for considering psychoactive
drugs.
Drug Administration
surprisingly – often the most variable and complex route of administration. Drugs enter the
stomach and then get absorbed by the blood supply and capillaries that line the small intestine.
The rate of absorption can be affected by a variety of factors including the quantity and the
type of food in the stomach (e.g., fats vs. proteins). This is why the medicine label for some
drugs (like antibiotics) may specifically state foods that you should or should NOT consume
within an hour of taking the drug because they can affect the rate of absorption. Two of the
most rapid routes of administration include inhalation (i.e., smoking or gaseous anesthesia)
and intravenous (IV) in which the drug is injected directly into the vein and hence the blood
supply. Both of these routes of administration can get the drug to brain in less than 10 seconds.
IV administration also has the distinction of being the most dangerous because if there is an
adverse drug reaction, there is very little time to administer any antidote, as in the case of an
IV heroin overdose.
Why might how quickly a drug gets to the brain be important? If a drug activates the reward
circuits in the brain AND it reaches the brain very quickly, the drug has a high risk for abuse
and addiction. Psychostimulants like amphetamine or cocaine are examples of drugs that
have high risk for abuse because they are agonists at DA neurons involved in reward AND
because these drugs exist in forms that can be either smoked or injected intravenously. Some
argue that cigarette smoking is one of the hardest addictions to quit, and although part of
the reason for this may be that smoking gets the nicotine into the brain very quickly (and
indirectly acts on DA neurons), it is a more complicated story. For drugs that reach the brain
very quickly, not only is the drug very addictive, but so are the cues associated with the drug
(see Rohsenow, Niaura, Childress, Abrams, & Monti, 1990). For a crack user, this could be the
pipe that they use to smoke the drug. For a cigarette smoker, however, it could be something
as normal as finishing dinner or waking up in the morning (if that is when the smoker usually
has a cigarette). For both the crack user and the cigarette smoker, the cues associated with
the drug may actually cause craving that is alleviated by (you guessed it) – lighting a cigarette
or using crack (i.e., relapse). This is one of the reasons individuals that enroll in drug treatment
programs, especially out-of-town programs, are at significant risk of relapse if they later find
themselves in proximity to old haunts, friends, etc. But this is much more difficult for a cigarette
smoker. How can someone avoid eating? Or avoid waking up in the morning, etc. These
examples help you begin to understand how important the route of administration can be
for psychoactive drugs.
Drug Metabolism
Metabolism involves the breakdown of psychoactive drugs, and this occurs primarily in the
liver. The liver produces enzymes (proteins that speed up a chemical reaction), and these
Psychopharmacology 536
enzymes help catalyze a chemical reaction that breaks down psychoactive drugs. Enzymes
exist in “families,” and many psychoactive drugs are broken down by the same family of
enzymes, the cytochrome P450 superfamily. There is not a unique enzyme for each drug;
rather, certain enzymes can break down a wide variety of drugs. Tolerance to the effects of
many drugs can occur with repeated exposure; that is, the drug produces less of an effect
over time, so more of the drug is needed to get the same effect. This is particularly true for
sedative drugs like alcohol or opiate-based painkillers. Metabolic tolerance is one kind of
tolerance and it takes place in the liver. Some drugs (like alcohol) cause enzyme induction –
an increase in the enzymes produced by the liver. For example, chronic drinking results in
alcohol being broken down more quickly, so the alcoholic needs to drink more to get the same
effect – of course, until so much alcohol is consumed that it damages the liver (alcohol can
cause fatty liver or cirrhosis).
depression. A link at the end of this module gives the latest list of drugs reported to have this
unusual interaction.
Mental illnesses contribute to more disability in western countries than all other illnesses
including cancer and heart disease. Depression alone is predicted to be the second largest
contributor to disease burden by 2020 (World Health Organization, 2004). The numbers of
people affected by mental health issues are pretty astonishing, with estimates that 25% of
adults experience a mental health issue in any given year, and this affects not only the
individual but their friends and family. One in 17 adults experiences a serious mental illness
(Kessler, Chiu, Demler, & Walters, 2005). Newer antidepressants are probably the most
frequently prescribed drugs for treating mental health issues, although there is no “magic
bullet” for treating depression or other conditions. Pharmacotherapy with psychological
therapy may be the most beneficial treatment approach for many psychiatric conditions, but
there are still many unanswered questions. For example, why does one antidepressant help
one individual yet have no effect for another? Antidepressants can take 4 to 6 weeks to start
improving depressive symptoms, and we don’t really understand why. Many people do not
respond to the first antidepressant prescribed and may have to try different drugs before
finding something that works for them. Other people just do not improve with antidepressants
(Ioannidis, 2008). As we better understand why individuals differ, the easier and more rapidly
we will be able to help people in distress.
One area that has received interest recently has to do with an individualized treatment
approach. We now know that there are genetic differences in some of the cytochrome P450
enzymes and their ability to break down drugs. The general population falls into the following
4 categories: 1) ultra-extensive metabolizers break down certain drugs (like some of the current
antidepressants) very, very quickly, 2) extensive metabolizers are also able to break down drugs
fairly quickly, 3) intermediate metabolizers break down drugs more slowly than either of the
two above groups, and finally 4) poor metabolizers break down drugs much more slowly than
all of the other groups. Now consider someone receiving a prescription for an antidepressant –
what would the consequences be if they were either an ultra-extensive metabolizer or a poor
metabolizer? The ultra-extensive metabolizer would be given antidepressants and told it will
probably take 4 to 6 weeks to begin working (this is true), but they metabolize the medication
so quickly that it will never be effective for them. In contrast, the poor metabolizer given the
same daily dose of the same antidepressant may build up such high levels in their blood
(because they are not breaking the drug down), that they will have a wide range of side effects
Psychopharmacology 538
and feel really badly – also not a positive outcome. What if – instead – prior to prescribing an
antidepressant, the doctor could take a blood sample and determine which type of
metabolizer a patient actually was? They could then make a much more informed decision
about the best dose to prescribe. There are new genetic tests now available to better
individualize treatment in just this way. A blood sample can determine (at least for some
drugs) which category an individual fits into, but we need data to determine if this actually is
effective for treating depression or other mental illnesses (Zhou, 2009). Currently, this genetic
test is expensive and not many health insurance plans cover this screen, but this may be an
important component in the future of psychopharmacology.
A recent Centers for Disease Control (CDC) report has suggested that as many as 1 in 5 children
between the ages of 5 and 17 may have some type of mental disorder (e.g., ADHD, autism,
anxiety, depression) (CDC, 2013). The incidence of bipolar disorder in children and adolescents
has also increased 40 times in the past decade (Moreno, Laje, Blanco, Jiang, Schmidt, & Olfson,
2007), and it is now estimated that 1 in 88 children have been diagnosed with an autism
spectrum disorder (CDC, 2011). Why has
there been such an increase in these
numbers? There is no single answer to this
important question. Some believe that
greater public awareness has contributed
to increased teacher and parent referrals.
Others argue that the increase stems from
changes in criterion currently used for
diagnosing. Still others suggest environmental
factors, either prenatally or postnatally,
have contributed to this upsurge.
adults, but few have been tested for safety 2.0, https://goo.gl/Toc0ZF]
Psychopharmacology 539
Another population that has not typically been included in clinical trials to determine the
safety or effectiveness of psychotropic drugs is the elderly. Currently, there is very little high-
quality evidence to guide prescribing for older people – clinical trials often exclude people
with multiple comorbidities (other diseases, conditions, etc.), which are typical for elderly
populations (see Hilmer and Gnjidict, 2008; Pollock, Forsyth, & Bies, 2008). This is a serious
issue because the elderly consume a disproportionate number of the prescription meds
prescribed. The term polypharmacy refers to the use of multiple drugs, which is very common
Table 3. Characteristics if clinical trial subjects vs. actual patients. (Reprinted by permission
in elderly populations in the United States. As our population ages, some estimate that the
proportion of people 65 or older will reach 20% of the U.S. population by 2030, with this group
consuming 40% of the prescribed medications. As shown in Table 3 (from Schwartz and
Abernethy, 2008), it is quite clear why the typical clinical trial that looks at the safety and
effectiveness of psychotropic drugs can be problematic if we try to interpret these results for
an elderly population.
Metabolism of drugs is often slowed considerably for elderly populations, so less drug can
produce the same effect (or all too often, too much drug can result in a variety of side effects).
One of the greatest risk factors for elderly populations is falling (and breaking bones), which
can happen if the elderly person gets dizzy from too much of a drug. There is also evidence
that psychotropic medications can reduce bone density (thus worsening the consequences
if someone falls) (Brown & Mezuk, 2012). Although we are gaining an awareness about some
of the issues facing pharmacotherapy in older populations, this is a very complex area with
many medical and ethical questions.
This module provided an introduction of some of the important areas in the field of
psychopharmacology. It should be apparent that this module just touched on a number of
topics included in this field. It should also be apparent that understanding more about
psychopharmacology is important to anyone interested in understanding behavior and that
our understanding of issues in this field has important implications for society.
Psychopharmacology 541
Outside Resources
Video: Neurotransmission
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FR4S1BqdFG4
Web: Description of how some drugs work and the brain areas involved - 1
http://www.drugabuse.gov/news-events/nida-notes/2007/10/impacts-drugs-neurotransmission
Web: Description of how some drugs work and the brain areas involved - 2
http://learn.genetics.utah.edu/content/addiction/mouse/
Web: Information about how neurons communicate and the reward pathways
http://learn.genetics.utah.edu/content/addiction/rewardbehavior/
Web: Neurotransmission
https://science.education.nih.gov/supplements/nih2/Addiction/activities/lesson2_neurotransmission.html
Web: Report of the Working Group on Psychotropic Medications for Children and
Adolescents: Psychopharmacological, Psychosocial, and Combined Interventions for
Childhood Disorders: Evidence Base, Contextual Factors, and Future Directions (2008):
http://www.apa.org/pi/families/resources/child-medications.pdf
Discussion Questions
1. What are some of the issues surrounding prescribing medications for children and
Psychopharmacology 542
2. What are some of the factors that can affect relapse to an addictive drug?
3. How might prescribing medications for depression be improved in the future to increase
the likelihood that a drug would work and minimize side effects?
Psychopharmacology 543
Vocabulary
Agonists
A drug that increases or enhances a neurotransmitter’s effect.
Antagonist
A drug that blocks a neurotransmitter’s effect.
Enzyme
A protein produced by a living organism that allows or helps a chemical reaction to occur.
Enzyme induction
Process through which a drug can enhance the production of an enzyme.
Metabolism
Breakdown of substances.
Neurotransmitter
A chemical substance produced by a neuron that is used for communication between neurons.
Pharmacokinetics
The action of a drug through the body, including absorption, distribution, metabolism, and
excretion.
Polypharmacy
The use of many medications.
Psychoactive drugs
A drug that changes mood or the way someone feels.
Psychotropic drug
A drug that changes mood or emotion, usually used when talking about drugs prescribed for
various mental conditions (depression, anxiety, schizophrenia, etc.).
Synapse
The tiny space separating neurons.
Psychopharmacology 544
References
Bailey D. G., Dresser G., & Arnold J. M. (2013). Grapefruit-medication interactions: forbidden
fruit or avoidable consequences? Canadian Medical Association Journal, 185, 309–316.
Brown, M. J., & Mezuk, B. (2012). Brains, bones, and aging: psychotropic medications and bone
health among older adults. Current Osteoporosis Reports, 10, 303–311.
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (2011) Prevalence of autism spectrum disorders –
autism and developmental disabilities monitoring network, 14 sites, United States, 2008.
Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report 61(SS03) 1–19.
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. (2013) Mental health surveillance among
children – United States, 2005—2011. Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report 62 Suppl, 1-35.
Hilmer, N., & Gnjidict, D. (2008). The effects of polypharmacy in older adults. Clinical
Pharmacology & Therapeutics, 85, 86–88.
Kessler, R. C., Chiu, W. T., Demler, O., & Walters, E. E. (2005). Prevalence, severity, and
comorbidity of twelve-month DSM-IV disorders in the National Comorbidity Survey
Replication (NCS-R). Archives of General Psychiatry, 62, 617–627.
Moreno, C., Laje, G., Blanco, C., Jiang, H., Schmidt, A. B., & Olfson, M., (2007). National trends
in the outpatient diagnosis and treatment of bipolar disorder in youth. Archives of General
Psychiatry, 64(9), 1032–1039.
Pollock, B. G., Forsyth, C. E., & Bies, R. R. (2008). The critical role of clinical pharmacology in
geriatric psychopharmacology. Clinical Pharmacology & Therapeutics, 85, 89–93.
Rohsenow, D. J., Niaura, R. S., Childress, A. R., Abrams, D. B., &, Monti, P. M. (1990). Cue reactivity
in addictive behaviors: Theoretical and treatment implications. International Journal of
Addiction, 25, 957–993.
Schwartz, J. B., & Abernethy, D. R. (2008). Aging and medications: Past, present, future. Clinical
Pharmacology & Therapeutics, 85, 3–10.
World Health Organization. (2004). Promoting mental health: concepts, emerging evidence,
practice (Summary Report). Geneva, Switzerland: Author. Retrieved from
http://www.who.int/mental_health/evidence/en/promoting_mhh.pdf
Zhou, S. F. (2009). Polymorphism of human cytochrome P450 2D6 and its clinical significance:
Part II. Clinical Pharmacokinetics, 48, 761–804.
Social Psychology
31
Social Cognition and Attitudes
Yanine D. Hess & Cynthia L. Pickett
Social cognition is the area of social psychology that examines how people perceive and think
about their social world. This module provides an overview of key topics within social cognition
and attitudes, including judgmental heuristics, social prediction, affective and motivational
influences on judgment, and explicit and implicit attitudes.
Learning Objectives
• Learn how we simplify the vast array of information in the world in a way that allows us to
make decisions and navigate our environments efficiently.
• Determine if our reasoning processes are always conscious, and if not, what some of the
effects of automatic/nonconscious cognition are.
• Understand the difference between explicit and implicit attitudes, and the implications
they have for behavior.
Introduction
Imagine you are walking toward your classroom and you see your teacher and a fellow student
you know to be disruptive in class whispering together in the hallway. As you approach, both
of them quit talking, nod to you, and then resume their urgent whispers after you pass by.
What would you make of this scene? What story might you tell yourself to help explain this
interesting and unusual behavior?
Social Cognition and Attitudes 547
People know intuitively that we can better understand others’ behavior if we know the
thoughts contributing to the behavior. In this example, you might guess that your teacher
harbors several concerns about the disruptive student, and therefore you believe their
whispering is related to this. The area of social psychology that focuses on how people think
about others and about the social world is called social cognition.
Researchers of social cognition study how people make sense of themselves and others to
make judgments, form attitudes, and make predictions about the future. Much of the research
in social cognition has demonstrated that humans are adept at distilling large amounts of
information into smaller, more usable chunks, and that we possess many cognitive tools that
allow us to efficiently navigate our environments. This research has also illuminated many
social factors that can influence these judgments and predictions. Not only can our past
experiences, expectations, motivations, and moods impact our reasoning, but many of our
decisions and behaviors are driven by unconscious processes and implicit attitudes we are
unaware of having. The goal of this module is to highlight the mental tools we use to navigate
and make sense of our complex social world, and describe some of the emotional,
motivational, and cognitive factors that affect our reasoning.
Consider how much information you come across on any given day; just looking around your
bedroom, there are hundreds of objects, smells, and sounds. How do we simplify all this
information to attend to what is important and make decisions quickly and efficiently? In part,
we do it by forming schemas of the various people, objects, situations, and events we
encounter. A schema is a mental model, or representation, of any of the various things we
come across in our daily lives. A schema (related to the word schematic) is kind of like a mental
blueprint for how we expect something to be or behave. It is an organized body of general
information or beliefs we develop from direct encounters, as well as from secondhand sources.
Rather than spending copious amounts of time learning about each new individual object (e.
g., each new dog we see), we rely on our schemas to tell us that a newly encountered dog
probably barks, likes to fetch, and enjoys treats. In this way, our schemas greatly reduce the
amount of cognitive work we need to do and allow us to “go beyond the information given”
(Bruner, 1957).
We can hold schemas about almost anything—individual people (person schemas), ourselves
(self-schemas), and recurring events (event schemas, or scripts). Each of these types of schemas
is useful in its own way. For example, event schemas allow us to navigate new situations
efficiently and seamlessly. A script for dining at a restaurant would indicate that one should
Social Cognition and Attitudes 548
wait to be seated by the host or hostess, that food should be ordered from a menu, and that
one is expected to pay the check at the end of the meal. Because the majority of dining
situations conform to this general format, most diners just need to follow their mental scripts
to know what to expect and how they should behave, greatly reducing their cognitive workload.
prestigious university or a truck driver, the representativeness heuristic might lead one to
guess he’s a professor. However, considering the base-rates, we know there are far fewer
university classics professors than truck drivers. Therefore, although the man fits the mental
image of a professor, the actual probability of him being one (considering the number of
professors out there) is lower than that of being a truck driver.
In addition to judging whether things belong to particular categories, we also attempt to judge
the likelihood that things will happen. A commonly employed heuristic for making this type
of judgment is called the availability heuristic. People use the availability heuristic to evaluate
the frequency or likelihood of an event based on how easily instances of it come to mind
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1973). Because more commonly occurring events are more likely to be
cognitively accessible (or, they come to mind more easily), use of the availability heuristic can
lead to relatively good approximations of frequency. However, the heuristic can be less reliable
when judging the frequency of relatively infrequent but highly accessible events. For example,
do you think there are more words that begin with “k,” or more that have “k” as the third letter?
To figure this out, you would probably make a list of words that start with “k” and compare it
to a list of words with “k” as the third letter. Though such a quick test may lead you to believe
there are more words that begin with “k,” the truth is that there are 3 times as many words
that have “k” as the third letter (Schwarz et al., 1991). In this case, words beginning with “k”
are more readily available to memory (i.e., more accessible), so they seem to be more
numerous. Another example is the very common fear of flying: dying in a plane crash is
extremely rare, but people often overestimate the probability of it occurring because plane
crashes tend to be highly memorable and publicized.
In summary, despite the vast amount of information we are bombarded with on a daily basis,
the mind has an entire kit of “tools” that allows us to navigate that information efficiently. In
addition to category and frequency judgments, another common mental calculation we
perform is predicting the future. We rely on our predictions about the future to guide our
actions. When deciding what entrée to select for dinner, we may ask ourselves, “How happy
will I be if I choose this over that?” The answer we arrive at is an example of a future prediction.
In the next section, we examine individuals’ ability to accurately predict others’ behaviors, as
well as their own future thoughts, feelings, and behaviors, and how these predictions can
impact their decisions.
Whenever we face a decision, we predict our future behaviors or feelings in order to choose
the best course of action. If you have a paper due in a week and have the option of going out
Social Cognition and Attitudes 550
to a party or working on the paper, the decision of what to do rests on a few things: the amount
of time you predict you will need to write the paper, your prediction of how you will feel if you
do poorly on the paper, and your prediction of how harshly the professor will grade it.
In general, we make predictions about others quickly, based on relatively little information.
Research on “thin-slice judgments” has shown that perceivers are able to make surprisingly
accurate inferences about another person’s emotional state, personality traits, and even
sexual orientation based on just snippets of information—for example, a 10-second video
clip (Ambady, Bernieri, & Richeson, 2000; Ambady, Hallahan, & Conner, 1999; Ambady &
Rosenthal, 1993). Furthermore, these judgments are predictive of the target’s future
behaviors. For example, one study found that students’ ratings of a teacher’s warmth,
enthusiasm, and attentiveness from a 30-second video clip strongly predicted that teacher’s
final student evaluations after an entire semester (Ambady & Rosenthal, 1993). As might be
expected, the more information there is available, the more accurate many of these judgments
become (Carney, Colvin, & Hall, 2007).
traits does predict certain behavioral ticket will make us feel good, we tend to overestimate both how
good we'll feel and for how long. [Image: CC0 Public Domain,
tendencies better than peer assessment of
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our personality, for certain behaviors, peer
reports are more accurate than self-reports
(Kolar, Funder, & Colvin, 1996; Vazire, 2010). Similarly, although we are generally aware of our
knowledge, abilities, and future prospects, our perceptions are often overly positive, and we
display overconfidence in their accuracy and potential (Metcalfe, 1998). For example, we tend
Social Cognition and Attitudes 551
to underestimate how much time it will take us to complete a task, whether it is writing a
paper, finishing a project at work, or building a bridge—a phenomenon known as the planning
fallacy (Buehler, Griffin, & Ross, 1994). The planning fallacy helps explain why so many college
students end up pulling all-nighters to finish writing assignments or study for exams. The
tasks simply end up taking longer than expected. On the positive side, the planning fallacy
can also lead individuals to pursue ambitious projects that may turn out to be worthwhile.
That is, if they had accurately predicted how much time and work it would have taken them,
they may have never started it in the first place.
The other important factor that affects decision-making is our ability to predict how we will
feel about certain outcomes. Not only do we predict whether we will feel positively or
negatively, we also make predictions about how strongly and for how long we will feel that
way. Research demonstrates that these predictions of one’s future feelings—known as
affective forecasting—are accurate in some ways but limited in others (Gilbert & Wilson,
2007). We are adept at predicting whether a future event or situation will make us feel positively
or negatively (Wilson & Gilbert, 2003), but we often incorrectly predict the strength or duration
of those emotions. For example, you may predict that if your favorite sports team loses an
important match, you will be devastated. Although you’re probably right that you will feel
negative (and not positive) emotions, will you be able to accurately estimate how negative
you’ll feel? What about how long those negative feelings will last?
Predictions about future feelings are influenced by the impact bias : the tendency for a person
to overestimate the intensity of their future feelings. For example, by comparing people’s
estimates of how they expected to feel after a specific event to their actual feelings after the
event, research has shown that people generally overestimate how badly they will feel after
a negative event—such as losing a job—and they also overestimate how happy they will feel
after a positive event—such as winning the lottery (Brickman, Coates, & Janoff-Bullman, 1978).
Another factor in these estimations is the durability bias. The durability bias refers to the
tendency for people to overestimate how long (or, the duration) positive and negative events
will affect them. This bias is much greater for predictions regarding negative events than
positive events, and occurs because people are generally unaware of the many psychological
mechanisms that help us adapt to and cope with negative events (Gilbert, Pinel, Wilson,
Blumberg, & Wheatley, 1998;Wilson, Wheatley, Meyers, Gilbert, & Axsom, 2000).
In summary, individuals form impressions of themselves and others, make predictions about
the future, and use these judgments to inform their decisions. However, these judgments are
shaped by our tendency to view ourselves in an overly positive light and our inability to
appreciate our habituation to both positive and negative events. In the next section, we will
discuss how motivations, moods, and desires also shape social judgment.
Social Cognition and Attitudes 552
Although we may believe we are always capable of rational and objective thinking (for example,
when we methodically weigh the pros and cons of two laundry detergents in an unemotional
—i.e., “cold”—manner), our reasoning is often influenced by our motivations and mood. Hot
cognition refers to the mental processes that are influenced by desires and feelings. For
example, imagine you receive a poor grade on a class assignment. In this situation, your ability
to reason objectively about the quality of your assignment may be limited by your anger
toward the teacher, upset feelings over the bad grade, and your motivation to maintain your
belief that you are a good student. In this sort of scenario, we may want the situation to turn
out a particular way or our belief to be the truth. When we have these directional goals, we
are motivated to reach a particular outcome or judgment and do not process information in
a cold, objective manner.
Motivated skepticism is a bias that can easily impact our views There are also situations in which we do not
of political candidates or issues. It may be more difficult to have wishes for a particular outcome but
objectively evaluate the merits of a political argument if it comes
our goals bias our reasoning, anyway. For
from someone we don't expect to vote for. [Image: Senado
example, being motivated to reach an
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accurate conclusion can influence our
VnKlK8]
reasoning processes by making us more
cautious—leading to indecision. In contrast, sometimes individuals are motivated to make a
quick decision, without being particularly concerned about the quality of it. Imagine trying to
Social Cognition and Attitudes 553
choose a restaurant with a group of friends when you’re really hungry. You may choose
whatever’s nearby without caring if the restaurant is the best or not. This need for closure
(the desire to come to a firm conclusion) is often induced by time constraints (when a decision
needs to be made quickly) as well as by individual differences in the need for closure (Webster
& Kruglanski, 1997). Some individuals are simply more uncomfortable with ambiguity than
others, and are thus more motivated to reach clear, decisive conclusions.
Just as our goals and motivations influence our reasoning, our moods and feelings also shape
our thinking process and ultimate decisions. Many of our decisions are based in part on our
memories of past events, and our retrieval of memories is affected by our current mood. For
example, when you are sad, it is easier to recall the sad memory of your dog’s death than the
happy moment you received the dog. This tendency to recall memories similar in valence to
our current mood is known as mood-congruent memory (Blaney, 1986; Bower 1981, 1991;
DeSteno, Petty, Wegener, & Rucker, 2000; Forgas, Bower, & Krantz, 1984; Schwarz, Strack,
Kommer, & Wagner, 1987). The mood we were in when the memory was recorded becomes
a retrieval cue; our present mood primes these congruent memories, making them come to
mind more easily (Fiedler, 2001). Furthermore, because the availability of events in our
memory can affect their perceived frequency (the availability heuristic), the biased retrieval
of congruent memories can then impact the subsequent judgments we make (Tversky &
Kahneman, 1973). For example, if you are retrieving many sad memories, you might conclude
that you have had a tough, depressing life.
In addition to our moods influencing the specific memories we retrieve, our moods can also
influence the broader judgments we make. This sometimes leads to inaccuracies when our
current mood is irrelevant to the judgment at hand. In a classic study demonstrating this
effect, researchers found that study participants rated themselves as less-satisfied with their
lives in general if they were asked on a day when it happened to be raining vs. sunny (Schwarz
& Clore, 1983). However, this occurred only if the participants were not aware that the weather
might be influencing their mood. In essence, participants were in worse moods on rainy days
than sunny days, and, if unaware of the weather’s effect on their mood, they incorrectly used
their mood as evidence of their overall life satisfaction.
In summary, our mood and motivations can influence both the way we think and the decisions
we ultimately make. Mood can shape our thinking even when the mood is irrelevant to the
judgment, and our motivations can influence our thinking even if we have no particular
preference about the outcome. Just as we might be unaware of how our reasoning is influenced
by our motives and moods, research has found that our behaviors can be determined by
unconscious processes rather than intentional decisions, an idea we will explore in the next
Social Cognition and Attitudes 554
section.
Automaticity
Do we actively choose and control all our behaviors or do some of these behaviors occur
automatically? A large body of evidence now suggests that many of our behaviors are, in fact,
automatic. A behavior or process is considered automatic if it is unintentional, uncontrollable,
occurs outside of conscious awareness, or is cognitively efficient (Bargh & Chartrand, 1999).
A process may be considered automatic even if it does not have all these features; for example,
driving is a fairly automatic process, but is clearly intentional. Processes can become automatic
through repetition, practice, or repeated associations. Staying with the driving example:
although it can be very difficult and cognitively effortful at the start, over time it becomes a
relatively automatic process, and aspects of it can occur outside conscious awareness.
When concepts and behaviors have been repeatedly associated with each other, one of them
Social Cognition and Attitudes 555
In a now classic study, Patricia Devine (1989) primed study participants with words typically
associated with Blacks (e.g., “blues,” “basketball”) in order to activate the stereotype of Blacks.
Devine found that study participants who were primed with the Black stereotype judged a
target’s ambiguous behaviors as being more hostile (a trait stereotypically associated with
Blacks) than nonprimed participants. Research in this area suggests that our social context—
which constantly bombards us with concepts—may prime us to form particular judgments
and influence our thoughts and behaviors.
In summary, there are many cognitive processes and behaviors that occur outside of our
awareness and despite our intentions. Because automatic thoughts and behaviors do not
require the same level of cognitive processing as conscious, deliberate thinking and acting,
automaticity provides an efficient way for individuals to process and respond to the social
world. However, this efficiency comes at a cost, as unconsciously held stereotypes and
attitudes can sometimes influence us to behave in unintended ways. We will discuss the
consequences of both consciously and unconsciously held attitudes in the next section.
When we encounter a new object or person, we often form an attitude toward it (him/her).
An attitude is a “psychological tendency that is expressed by evaluating a particular entity
with some degree of favor or disfavor” (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993, p. 1). In essence, our attitudes
are our general evaluations of things (i.e., do you regard this thing positively or negatively?)
that can bias us toward having a particular response to it. For example, a negative attitude
toward mushrooms would predispose you to avoid them and think negatively of them in other
ways. This bias can be long- or short-term and can be overridden by another experience with
Social Cognition and Attitudes 556
the object. Thus, if you encounter a delicious mushroom dish in the future, your negative
attitude could change to a positive one.
Traditionally, attitudes have been measured through explicit attitude measures, in which
participants are directly asked to provide their attitudes toward various objects, people, or
issues (e.g., a survey).
In order to avoid some of these limitations, many researchers use more subtle or covert ways
of measuring attitudes that do not suffer from such self-presentation concerns (Fazio & Olson,
2003). An implicit attitude is an attitude that a person does not verbally or overtly express.
For example, someone may have a positive, explicit attitude toward his job; however,
nonconsciously, he may have a lot of negative associations with it (e.g., having to wake up
Social Cognition and Attitudes 557
early, the long commute, the office heating is broken) which results in an implicitly negative
attitude. To learn what a person’s implicit attitude is, you have to use implicit measures of
attitudes. These measures infer the participant’s attitude rather than having the participant
explicitly report it. Many implicit measures accomplish this by recording the time it takes a
participant (i.e., the reaction time) to label or categorize an attitude object (i.e., the person,
concept, or object of interest) as positive or negative. For example, the faster someone
categorizes his or her job (measured in milliseconds) as negative compared to positive, the
more negative the implicit attitude is (i.e., because a faster categorization implies that the two
concepts—“work” and “negative”—are closely related in one’s mind).
One common implicit measure is the Implicit Association Test (IAT;Greenwald & Banaji, 1995;
Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998), which does just what the name suggests, measuring
how quickly the participant pairs a concept (e.g., cats) with an attribute (e.g., good or bad).
The participant’s response time in pairing the concept with the attribute indicates how strongly
the participant associates the two. Another common implicit measure is the evaluative
priming task (Fazio, Jackson, Dunton, & Williams, 1995), which measures how quickly the
participant labels the valence (i.e., positive or negative) of the attitude object when it appears
immediately after a positive or negative image. The more quickly a participant labels the
attitude object after being primed with a positive versus negative image indicates how
positively the participant evaluates the object.
Individuals’ implicit attitudes are sometimes inconsistent with their explicitly held attitudes.
Hence, implicit measures may reveal biases that participants do not report on explicit
measures. As a result, implicit attitude measures are especially useful for examining the
pervasiveness and strength of controversial attitudes and stereotypic associations, such as
racial biases or associations between race and violence. For example, research using the IAT
has shown that about 66% of white respondents have a negative bias toward Blacks (Nosek,
Banaji, & Greenwald, 2002), that bias on the IAT against Blacks is associated with more
discomfort during interracial interactions (McConnell, & Leibold, 2001), and that implicit
associations linking Blacks to violence are associated with a greater tendency to shoot
unarmed Black targets in a video game (Payne, 2001). Thus, even though individuals are often
unaware of their implicit attitudes, these attitudes can have serious implications for their
behavior, especially when these individuals do not have the cognitive resources available to
override the attitudes’ influence.
Conclusion
Decades of research on social cognition and attitudes have revealed many of the “tricks” and
Social Cognition and Attitudes 558
“tools” we use to efficiently process the limitless amounts of social information we encounter.
These tools are quite useful for organizing that information to arrive at quick decisions. When
you see an individual engage in a behavior, such as seeing a man push an elderly woman to
the ground, you form judgments about his personality, predictions about the likelihood of
him engaging in similar behaviors in the future, as well as predictions about the elderly
woman’s feelings and how you would feel if you were in her position. As the research presented
in this module demonstrates, we are adept and efficient at making these judgments and
predictions, but they are not made in a vacuum. Ultimately, our perception of the social world
is a subjective experience, and, consequently, our decisions are influenced by our experiences,
expectations, emotions, motivations, and current contexts. Being aware of when our
judgments are most accurate, and how our judgments are shaped by social influences,
prepares us to be in a much better position to appreciate, and potentially counter, their effects.
Social Cognition and Attitudes 559
Outside Resources
Web: BBC Horizon documentary How to Make Better Decisions that discusses many module
topics (Part 1).
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ul-FqOfX-t8
Discussion Questions
1. Describe your event-schema, or script, for an event that you encounter regularly (e.g.,
dining at a restaurant). Now, attempt to articulate a script for an event that you have
encountered only once or a few times. How are these scripts different? How confident are
you in your ability to navigate these two events?
2. Think of a time when you made a decision that you thought would make you very happy
(e.g., purchasing an item). To what extent were you accurate or inaccurate? In what ways
were you wrong, and why do you think you were wrong?
3. What is an issue you feel strongly about (e.g., abortion, death penalty)? How would you
react if research demonstrated that your opinion was wrong? What would it take before
you would believe the evidence?
Vocabulary
Affective forecasting
Predicting how one will feel in the future after some event or decision.
Attitude
A psychological tendency that is expressed by evaluating a particular entity with some degree
of favor or disfavor.
Automatic
A behavior or process has one or more of the following features: unintentional, uncontrollable,
occurring outside of conscious awareness, and cognitively efficient.
Availability heuristic
A heuristic in which the frequency or likelihood of an event is evaluated based on how easily
instances of it come to mind.
Chameleon effect
The tendency for individuals to nonconsciously mimic the postures, mannerisms, facial
expressions, and other behaviors of one’s interaction partners.
Directional goals
The motivation to reach a particular outcome or judgment.
Durability bias
A bias in affective forecasting in which one overestimates for how long one will feel an emotion
(positive or negative) after some event.
Explicit attitude
An attitude that is consciously held and can be reported on by the person holding the attitude.
Heuristics
A mental shortcut or rule of thumb that reduces complex mental problems to more simple
Social Cognition and Attitudes 561
rule-based decisions.
Hot cognition
The mental processes that are influenced by desires and feelings.
Impact bias
A bias in affective forecasting in which one overestimates the strength or intensity of emotion
one will experience after some event.
Implicit attitude
An attitude that a person cannot verbally or overtly state.
Mood-congruent memory
The tendency to be better able to recall memories that have a mood similar to our current
mood.
Motivated skepticism
A form of bias that can result from having a directional goal in which one is skeptical of evidence
despite its strength because it goes against what one wants to believe.
Planning fallacy
A cognitive bias in which one underestimates how long it will take to complete a task.
Primed
A process by which a concept or behavior is made more cognitively accessible or likely to
occur through the presentation of an associated concept.
Representativeness heuristic
Social Cognition and Attitudes 562
Schema
A mental model or representation that organizes the important information about a thing,
person, or event (also known as a script).
Social cognition
The study of how people think about the social world.
Stereotypes
Our general beliefs about the traits or behaviors shared by group of people.
Social Cognition and Attitudes 563
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32
Conformity and Obedience
Jerry M. Burger
We often change our attitudes and behaviors to match the attitudes and behaviors of the
people around us. One reason for this conformity is a concern about what other people think
of us. This process was demonstrated in a classic study in which college students deliberately
gave wrong answers to a simple visual judgment task rather than go against the group. Another
reason we conform to the norm is because other people often have information we do not,
and relying on norms can be a reasonable strategy when we are uncertain about how we are
supposed to act. Unfortunately, we frequently misperceive how the typical person acts, which
can contribute to problems such as the excessive binge drinking often seen in college students.
Obeying orders from an authority figure can sometimes lead to disturbing behavior. This
danger was illustrated in a famous study in which participants were instructed to administer
painful electric shocks to another person in what they believed to be a learning experiment.
Despite vehement protests from the person receiving the shocks, most participants continued
the procedure when instructed to do so by the experimenter. The findings raise questions
about the power of blind obedience in deplorable situations such as atrocities and genocide.
They also raise concerns about the ethical treatment of participants in psychology
experiments.
Learning Objectives
• Become aware of how widespread conformity is in our lives and some of the ways each of
us changes our attitudes and behavior to match the norm.
• Understand the two primary reasons why people often conform to perceived norms.
• Appreciate how obedience to authority has been examined in laboratory studies and some
of the implications of the findings from these investigations.
• Consider some of the remaining issues and sources of controversy surrounding Milgram’s
Conformity and Obedience 568
obedience studies.
Introduction
When he was a teenager, my son often enjoyed looking at photographs of me and my wife
taken when we were in high school. He laughed at the hairstyles, the clothing, and the kind
of glasses people wore “back then.” And when he was through with his ridiculing, we would
point out that no one is immune to fashions and fads and that someday his children will
probably be equally amused by his high school photographs and the trends he found so
normal at the time.
Everyday observation confirms that we often adopt the actions and attitudes of the people
around us. Trends in clothing, music, foods, and entertainment are obvious. But our views on
political issues, religious questions, and lifestyles also reflect to some degree the attitudes of
the people we interact with. Similarly, decisions about behaviors such as smoking and drinking
are influenced by whether the people we spend time with engage in these activities.
Psychologists refer to this widespread tendency to act and think like the people around us as
conformity.
Conformity
What causes all this conformity? To start, humans may possess an inherent tendency to imitate
the actions of others. Although we usually are not aware of it, we often mimic the gestures,
body posture, language, talking speed, and many other behaviors of the people we interact
with. Researchers find that this mimicking increases the connection between people and
allows our interactions to flow more smoothly (Chartrand & Bargh, 1999).
Beyond this automatic tendency to imitate others, psychologists have identified two primary
reasons for conformity. The first of these is normative influence. When normative influence
is operating, people go along with the crowd because they are concerned about what others
think of them. We don’t want to look out of step or become the target of criticism just because
we like different kinds of music or dress differently than everyone else. Fitting in also brings
rewards such as camaraderie and compliments.
How powerful is normative influence? Consider a classic study conducted many years ago by
Solomon Asch (1956). The participants were male college students who were asked to engage
in a seemingly simple task. An experimenter standing several feet away held up a card that
depicted one line on the left side and three lines on the right side. The participant’s job was
to say aloud which of the three lines on the right was the same length as the line on the left.
Sixteen cards were presented one at a time, and the correct answer on each was so obvious
as to make the task a little boring. Except for one thing. The participant was not alone. In fact,
there were six other people in the room who also gave their answers to the line-judgment
task aloud. Moreover, although they pretended to be fellow participants, these other
individuals were, in fact, confederates working with the experimenter. The real participant
was seated so that he always gave his answer after hearing what five other “participants” said.
Everything went smoothly until the third trial, when inexplicably the first “participant” gave
an obviously incorrect answer. The mistake might have been amusing, except the second
participant gave the same answer. As did the third, the fourth, and the fifth participant.
Suddenly the real participant was in a difficult situation. His eyes told him one thing, but five
out of five people apparently saw something else.
It’s one thing to wear your hair a certain way or like certain foods because everyone around
you does. But, would participants intentionally give a wrong answer just to conform with the
other participants? The confederates uniformly gave incorrect answers on 12 of the 16 trials,
and 76 percent of the participants went along with the norm at least once and also gave the
wrong answer. In total, they conformed with the group on one-third of the 12 test trials.
Although we might be impressed that the majority of the time participants answered honestly,
Conformity and Obedience 570
The other reason we sometimes go along with the crowd is that people are often a source of
information. Psychologists refer to this process as informational influence. Most of us, most
of the time, are motivated to do the right thing. If society deems that we put litter in a proper
container, speak softly in libraries, and tip our waiter, then that’s what most of us will do. But
sometimes it’s not clear what society expects of us. In these situations, we often rely on
descriptive norms (Cialdini, Reno, & Kallgren, 1990). That is, we act the way most people—or
most people like us—act. This is not an unreasonable strategy. Other people often have
information that we do not, especially when we find ourselves in new situations. If you have
ever been part of a conversation that went something like this,
to consider all the students not attending the increase the numbers of people who re-use bath towels
(reducing water and energy use) by informing them on signs
party. As a result, students typically
in their rooms that re-using towels is a typical behavior of
overestimate the descriptive norm for
other hotel guests. [Image: Infrogmation of New Orleans,
college student drinking (Borsari & Carey,
https://goo.gl/5P5F0v, CC BY 2.0, https://goo.gl/BRvSA7]
2003; Perkins, Haines, & Rice, 2005). Most
students believe they consume significantly less alcohol than the norm, a miscalculation that
creates a dangerous push toward more and more excessive alcohol consumption. On the
positive side, providing students with accurate information about drinking norms has been
found to reduce overindulgent drinking (Burger, LaSalvia, Hendricks, Mehdipour, & Neudeck,
2011; Neighbors, Lee, Lewis, Fossos, & Walter, 2009).
did (Goldstein, Cialdini, & Griskevicius, 2008). And more people began using the stairs instead
of the elevator when informed that the vast majority of people took the stairs to go up one
or two floors (Burger & Shelton, 2011).
Obedience
Although we may be influenced by the people around us more than we recognize, whether
we conform to the norm is up to us. But sometimes decisions about how to act are not so
easy. Sometimes we are directed by a more powerful person to do things we may not want
to do. Researchers who study obedience are interested in how people react when given an
order or command from someone in a position of authority. In many situations, obedience
is a good thing. We are taught at an early age to obey parents, teachers, and police officers.
It’s also important to follow instructions from judges, firefighters, and lifeguards. And a military
would fail to function if soldiers stopped obeying orders from superiors. But, there is also a
dark side to obedience. In the name of “following orders” or “just doing my job,” people can
violate ethical principles and break laws. More disturbingly, obedience often is at the heart
of some of the worst of human behavior—massacres, atrocities, and even genocide.
out. These citizens signed up for what they believed to be an experiment on learning and
memory. In particular, they were told the research concerned the effects of punishment on
learning. Three people were involved in each session. One was the participant. Another was
the experimenter. The third was a confederate who pretended to be another participant.
The experimenter explained that the study consisted of a memory test and that one of the
men would be the teacher and the other the learner. Through a rigged drawing, the real
participant was always assigned the teacher’s role and the confederate was always the learner.
The teacher watched as the learner was strapped into a chair and had electrodes attached
to his wrist. The teacher then moved to the room next door where he was seated in front of
a large metal box the experimenter identified as a “shock generator.” The front of the box
displayed gauges and lights and, most noteworthy, a series of 30 levers across the bottom.
Each lever was labeled with a voltage figure, starting with 15 volts and moving up in 15-volt
increments to 450 volts. Labels also indicated the strength of the shocks, starting with “Slight
Shock” and moving up to “Danger: Severe Shock” toward the end. The last two levers were
simply labeled “XXX” in red.
Through a microphone, the teacher administered a memory test to the learner in the next
room. The learner responded to the multiple-choice items by pressing one of four buttons
that were barely within reach of his strapped-down hand. If the teacher saw the correct answer
light up on his side of the wall, he simply moved on to the next item. But if the learner got the
item wrong, the teacher pressed one of the shock levers and, thereby, delivered the learner’s
punishment. The teacher was instructed to start with the 15-volt lever and move up to the
next highest shock for each successive wrong answer.
In reality, the learner received no shocks. But he did make a lot of mistakes on the test, which
forced the teacher to administer what he believed to be increasingly strong shocks. The
purpose of the study was to see how far the teacher would go before refusing to continue.
The teacher’s first hint that something was amiss came after pressing the 75-volt lever and
hearing through the wall the learner say “Ugh!” The learner’s reactions became stronger and
louder with each lever press. At 150 volts, the learner yelled out, “Experimenter! That’s all. Get
me out of here. I told you I had heart trouble. My heart’s starting to bother me now. Get me
out of here, please. My heart’s starting to bother me. I refuse to go on. Let me out.”
The experimenter’s role was to encourage the participant to continue. If at any time the teacher
asked to end the session, the experimenter responded with phrases such as, “The experiment
requires that you continue,” and “You have no other choice, you must go on.” The experimenter
ended the session only after the teacher stated four successive times that he did not want to
continue. All the while, the learner’s protests became more intense with each shock. After 300
Conformity and Obedience 574
Milgram conducted many variations of this basic procedure to explore some of the factors
that affect obedience. He found that obedience rates decreased when the learner was in the
same room as the experimenter and declined even further when the teacher had to physically
touch the learner to administer the punishment. Participants also were less willing to continue
the procedure after seeing other teachers refuse to press the shock levers, and they were
significantly less obedient when the instructions to continue came from a person they believed
to be another participant rather than from the experimenter. Finally, Milgram found that
women participants followed the experimenter’s instructions at exactly the same rate the
men had.
Conformity and Obedience 575
Milgram’s obedience research has been the subject of much controversy and discussion.
Psychologists continue to debate the extent to which Milgram’s studies tell us something
about atrocities in general and about the behavior of German citizens during the Holocaust
in particular (Miller, 2004). Certainly, there are important features of that time and place that
cannot be recreated in a laboratory, such as a pervasive climate of prejudice and
dehumanization. Another issue concerns the relevance of the findings. Some people have
argued that today we are more aware of the dangers of blind obedience than we were when
the research was conducted back in the 1960s. However, findings from partial and modified
replications of Milgram’s procedures conducted in recent years suggest that people respond
to the situation today much like they did a half a century ago (Burger, 2009).
If you had been "a teacher" in the Milgram experiment, would you have behaved
differently than the majority who delivered what they thought were massive 450-
volt shocks? [Image: Sharon Drummond, https://goo.gl/uQZGtZ, CC BY-NC-SA 2.0,
https://goo.gl/Toc0ZF]
unanswered questions, conducting a full replication of his experiment remains out of bounds
by today’s standards.
Social psychologists are fond of saying that we are all influenced by the people around us
more than we recognize. Of course, each person is unique, and ultimately each of us makes
choices about how we will and will not act. But decades of research on conformity and
obedience make it clear that we live in a social world and that—for better or worse—much
of what we do is a reflection of the people we encounter.
Conformity and Obedience 577
Outside Resources
Student Video: Christine N. Winston and Hemali Maher's 'The Milgram Experiment' gives
an excellent 3-minute overview of one of the most famous experiments in the history of
psychology. It was one of the winning entries in the 2015 Noba Student Video Award.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uVIUZwkM_G0
Web: Website devoted to scholarship and research related to Milgram’s obedience studies
http://www.stanleymilgram.com
Discussion Questions
1. In what ways do you see normative influence operating among you and your peers? How
difficult would it be to go against the norm? What would it take for you to not do something
just because all your friends were doing it?
2. What are some examples of how informational influence helps us do the right thing? How
can we use descriptive norm information to change problem behaviors?
3. Is conformity more likely or less likely to occur when interacting with other people through
social media as compared to face-to-face encounters?
4. When is obedience to authority a good thing and when is it bad? What can be done to
prevent people from obeying commands to engage in truly deplorable behavior such as
atrocities and massacres?
5. In what ways do Milgram’s experimental procedures fall outside the guidelines for research
with human participants? Are there ways to conduct relevant research on obedience to
authority without violating these guidelines?
Conformity and Obedience 578
Vocabulary
Conformity
Changing one’s attitude or behavior to match a perceived social norm.
Descriptive norm
The perception of what most people do in a given situation.
Informational influence
Conformity that results from a concern to act in a socially approved manner as determined
by how others act.
Normative influence
Conformity that results from a concern for what other people think of us.
Obedience
Responding to an order or command from a person in a position of authority.
Conformity and Obedience 579
References
Bond, R. (2005). Group size and conformity. Group Processes & Intergroup Relations, 8, 331–354.
Bond, R., & Smith, P. B. (1996). Culture and conformity: A meta-analysis of studies using Asch’s
(1952b, 1956) line judgment task. Psychological Bulletin, 119, 111–137.
Borsari, B., & Carey, K. B. (2003). Descriptive and injunctive norms in college drinking: A meta-
analytic integration. Journal of Studies on Alcohol, 64, 331–341.
Burger, J. M. (2009). Replicating Milgram: Would people still obey today? American Psychologist,
64, 1–11.
Burger, J. M., & Shelton, M. (2011). Changing everyday health behaviors through descriptive
norm manipulations. Social Influence, 6, 69–77.
Burger, J. M., Bell, H., Harvey, K., Johnson, J., Stewart, C., Dorian, K., & Swedroe, M. (2010).
Nutritious or delicious? The effect of descriptive norm information on food choice. Journal
of Social and Clinical Psychology, 29, 228–242.
Burger, J. M., LaSalvia, C. T., Hendricks, L. A., Mehdipour, T., & Neudeck, E. M. (2011). Partying
before the party gets started: The effects of descriptive norms on pre-gaming behavior.
Basic and Applied Social Psychology, 33, 220–227.
Chartrand, T. L., & Bargh, J. A. (1999). The chameleon effect: The perception-behavior link and
social interaction. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 76, 893–910.
Cialdini, R. B., Reno, R. R., & Kallgren, C. A. (1990). A focus theory of normative conduct: Recycling
the concept of norms to reduce littering in public places. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 58, 1015–1026.
Deutsch, M., & Gerard, H. B. (1955). A study of normative and informational social influences
upon individual judgment. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 51, 629–636.
Goldstein, N. J., Cialdini, R. B., & Griskevicius, V. (2008). A room with a viewpoint:Using social
norms to motivate environmental conservation in hotels. Journal of Consumer Research, 35,
472–482.
Milgram, S. (1974). Obedience to authority: An experimental view. New York, NY: Harper & Row.
Conformity and Obedience 580
Milgram, S. (1963). Behavioral study of obedience. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology,
67, 371.
Miller, A. G. (2004). What can the Milgram obedience experiments tell us about the Holocaust?
Generalizing from the social psychology laboratory. In A. G. Miller (Ed.), The social psychology
of good and evil (pp. 193–239). New York, NY: Guilford Press.
Mita, M. (2009). College binge drinking still on the rise. JAMA: Journal of the American Medical
Association, 302, 836–837.
Neighbors, C., Lee, C. M., Lewis, M. A., Fossos, N., & Larimer, M. E. (2007). Are social norms the
best predictor of outcomes among heavy-drinking college students? Journal of Studies on
Alcohol and Drugs, 68, 556–565.
Neighbors, C., Lee, C. M., Lewis, M. A., Fossos, N., & Walter, T. (2009). Internet-based
personalized feedback to reduce 21st-birthday drinking: A randomized controlled trial of
an even-specific prevention intervention. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 77,
51–63.
Perkins, H. W., Haines, M. P., & Rice, R. (2005). Misperceiving the college drinking norm and
related problems: A nationwide study of exposure to prevention information, perceived
norms, and student alcohol misuse. Journal of Studies on Alcohol, 66, 470–478.
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constructive, destructive, and reconstructive power of social norms. Psychological Science,
18, 429–434.
33
Persuasion: So Easily Fooled
Robert V. Levine
This module introduces several major principles in the process of persuasion. It offers an
overview of the different paths to persuasion. It then describes how mindless processing
makes us vulnerable to undesirable persuasion and some of the “tricks” that may be used
against us.
Learning Objectives
• Recognize the difference between the central and peripheral routes to persuasion.
• Understand the concepts of trigger features, fixed action patterns, heuristics, and mindless
thinking, and how these processes are essential to our survival but, at the same time, leave
us vulnerable to exploitation.
• Understand some common “tricks” persuasion artists may use to take advantage of us.
Introduction
Have you ever tried to swap seats with a stranger on an airline? Ever negotiated the price of
a car? Ever tried to convince someone to recycle, quit smoking, or make a similar change in
health behaviors? If so, you are well versed with how persuasion can show up in everyday life.
Persuasion has been defined as “the process by which a message induces change in beliefs,
attitudes, or behaviors” (Myers, 2011). Persuasion can take many forms. It may, for example,
Persuasion: So Easily Fooled 582
Whatever the content, however, there is a similarity to the form of the persuasion process
itself. As the advertising commentator Sid Bernstein once observed, “Of course, you sell
candidates for political office the same way you sell soap or sealing wax or whatever; because,
when you get right down to it, that’s the only way anything is sold” (Levine, 2003).
Persuasion is one of the most studied of all social psychology phenomena. This module
provides an introduction to several of its most important components.
goo.gl/VnKlK8]
Persuasion theorists distinguish between the central and peripheral routes to persuasion
(Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). The central route employs direct, relevant, logical messages. This
Persuasion: So Easily Fooled 583
method rests on the assumption that the audience is motivated, will think carefully about
what is presented, and will react on the basis of your arguments. The central route is intended
to produce enduring agreement. For example, you might decide to vote for a particular political
candidate after hearing her speak and finding her logic and proposed policies to be convincing.
The peripheral route, on the other hand, relies on superficial cues that have little to do with
logic. The peripheral approach is the salesman’s way of thinking. It requires a target who isn’t
thinking carefully about what you are saying. It requires low effort from the target and often
exploits rule-of-thumb heuristics that trigger mindless reactions (see below). It may be
intended to persuade you to do something you do not want to do and might later be sorry
you did. Advertisements, for example, may show celebrities, cute animals, beautiful scenery,
or provocative sexual images that have nothing to do with the product. The peripheral
approach is also common in the darkest of persuasion programs, such as those of dictators
and cult leaders. Returning to the example of voting, you can experience the peripheral route
in action when you see a provocative, emotionally charged political advertisement that tugs
at you to vote a particular way.
The central route emphasizes objective communication of information. The peripheral route
relies on psychological techniques. These techniques may take advantage of a target’s not
thinking carefully about the message. The process mirrors a phenomenon in animal behavior
known as fixed action patterns (FAPs). These are sequences of behavior that occur in exactly
the same fashion, in exactly the same order, every time they’re elicited. Cialdini (2008)
compares it to a prerecorded tape that is turned on and, once it is, always plays to its finish.
He describes it is as if the animal were turning on a tape recorder (Cialdini, 2008). There is the
feeding tape, the territorial tape, the migration tape, the nesting tape, the aggressive tape—
each sequence ready to be played when a situation calls for it.
In humans fixed action patterns include many of the activities we engage in while mentally
on "auto-pilot." These behaviors are so automatic that it is very difficult to control them. If
you ever feed a baby, for instance, nearly everyone mimics each bite the baby takes by opening
and closing their own mouth! If two people near you look up and point you will automatically
look up yourself. We also operate in a reflexive, non-thinking way when we make many
decisions. We are more likely, for example, to be less critical about medical advice dispensed
from a doctor than from a friend who read an interesting article on the topic in a popular
Persuasion: So Easily Fooled 584
magazine.
A notable characteristic of fixed action patterns is how they are activated. At first glance, it
appears the animal is responding to the overall situation. For example, the maternal tape
appears to be set off when a mother sees her hungry baby, or the aggressive tape seems to
be activated when an enemy invades the animal’s territory. It turns out, however, that the on/
off switch may actually be controlled by a specific, minute detail of the situation—maybe a
sound or shape or patch of color. These are the hot buttons of the biological world—what
Cialdini refers to as “trigger features” and biologists call “releasers.”
The effectiveness of peripheral persuasion relies on our frequent reliance on these sorts of
fixed action patterns and trigger features. These mindless, rules-of-thumb are generally
effective shortcuts for coping with the overload of information we all must confront. They
serve as heuristics—mental shortcuts-- that enable us to make decisions and solve problems
quickly and efficiently. They also, however, make us vulnerable to uninvited exploitation
Persuasion: So Easily Fooled 585
Effective persuasion requires trusting the source of the communication. Studies have
identified three characteristics that lead to trust: perceived authority, honesty, and likability.
When the source appears to have any or all of these characteristics, people not only are more
willing to agree to their request but are willing to do so without carefully considering the facts.
We assume we are on safe ground and are happy to shortcut the tedious process of informed
decision making. As a result, we are more susceptible to messages and requests, no matter
their particular content or how peripheral they may be.
Authority
From earliest childhood, we learn to rely on authority figures for sound decision making
because their authority signifies status and power, as well as expertise. These two facets often
work together. Authorities such as parents and teachers are not only our primary sources of
wisdom while we grow up, but they control us and our access to the things we want. In
addition, we have been taught to believe that respect for authority is a moral virtue. As adults,
it is natural to transfer this respect to society’s designated authorities, such as judges, doctors,
bosses, and religious leaders. We assume their positions give them special access to
information and power. Usually we are correct, so that our willingness to defer to authorities
becomes a convenient shortcut to sound decision making. Uncritical trust in authority may,
however, lead to bad decisions. Perhaps the most famous study ever conducted in social
psychology demonstrated that, when conditions were set up just so, two-thirds of a sample
Persuasion: So Easily Fooled 586
of psychologically normal men were willing to administer potentially lethal shocks to a stranger
when an apparent authority in a laboratory coat ordered them to do so (Milgram, 1974; Burger,
2009).
Uncritical trust in authority can be problematic for several reasons. First, even if the source
of the message is a legitimate, well-intentioned authority, they may not always be correct.
Second, when respect for authority becomes mindless, expertise in one domain may be
confused with expertise in general. To assume there is credibility when a successful actor
promotes a cold remedy, or when a psychology professor offers his views about politics, can
lead to problems. Third, the authority may not be legitimate. It is not difficult to fake a college
degree or professional credential or to buy an official-looking badge or uniform.
Honesty
Likability
People tend to favor products that are associated with people
they like. This is the key ingredient to celebrity endorsements.
While there are a lot of factors that can contribute to likability,
If we know that celebrities aren’t really
being physically attractive is one of the most influential. [Image: experts, and that they are being paid to say
DFID, https://goo.gl/KfFvvi, CC BY-NC-SA 2.0, https://goo.gl/ what they’re saying, why do their
Toc0ZF] endorsements sell so many products?
Persuasion: So Easily Fooled 587
Ultimately, it is because we like them. More than any single quality, we trust people we like.
Roger Ailes, a public relations adviser to Presidents Reagan and George H.W. Bush, observed:
“If you could master one element of personal communication that is more powerful than
anything . . . it is the quality of being likable. I call it the magic bullet, because if your audience
likes you, they’ll forgive just about everything else you do wrong. If they don’t like you, you
can hit every rule right on target and it doesn’t matter.”
The mix of qualities that make a person likable are complex and often do not generalize from
one situation to another. One clear finding, however, is that physically attractive people tend
to be liked more. In fact, we prefer them to a disturbing extent: Various studies have shown
we perceive attractive people as smarter, kinder, stronger, more successful, more socially
skilled, better poised, better adjusted, more exciting, more nurturing, and, most important,
of higher moral character. All of this is based on no other information than their physical
appearance (e.g., Dion, Berscheid, & Walster, 1972).
This technique employs someone who people already trust to testify about the product or
message being sold. The technique goes back to the earliest days of advertising when satisfied
customers might be shown describing how a patent medicine cured their life-long battle with
“nerves” or how Dr. Scott’s Electric Hair Brush healed their baldness (“My hair (was) falling out,
and I was rapidly becoming bald, but since using the brush a thick growth of hair has made
its appearance, quite equal to that I had before previous to its falling out,” reported a satisfied
Persuasion: So Easily Fooled 588
customer in an 1884 ad for the product). Similarly, Kodak had Prince Henri D’Orleans and
others endorse the superior quality of their camera (“The results are marvellous[sic]. The
enlargements which you sent me are superb,“ stated Prince Henri D’Orleans in a 1888 ad).
Celebrity endorsements are a frequent feature in commercials aimed at children. The practice
has aroused considerable ethical concern, and research shows the concern is warranted. In
a study funded by the Federal Trade Commission, more than 400 children ages 8 to 14 were
shown one of various commercials for a model racing set. Some of the commercials featured
an endorsement from a famous race car driver, some included real racing footage, and others
included neither. Children who watched the celebrity endorser not only preferred the toy cars
more but were convinced the endorser was an expert about the toys. This held true for children
of all ages. In addition, they believed the toy race cars were bigger, faster, and more complex
than real race cars they saw on film. They were also less likely to believe the commercial was
staged (Ross et al., 1984).
The message may be framed as objective information. Salespeople, for example, may try to
convey the impression they are less interested in selling a product than helping you make the
best decision. The implicit message is that being informed is in everyone’s best interest,
because they are confident that when you understand what their product has to offer that
you will conclude it is the best choice. Levine (2003) describes how, during training for a job
as a used car salesman, he was instructed: “If the customer tells you they do not want to be
bothered by a salesperson, your response is ‘I’m not a salesperson, I’m a product consultant.
I don’t give prices or negotiate with you. I’m simply here to show you our inventory and help
you find a vehicle that will fit your needs.’”
Word of Mouth
Imagine you read an ad that claims a new restaurant has the best food in your city. Now,
imagine a friend tells you this new restaurant has the best food in the city. Who are you more
likely to believe? Surveys show we turn to people around us for many decisions. A 1995 poll
found that 70% of Americans rely on personal advice when selecting a new doctor. The same
poll found that 53% of moviegoers are influenced by the recommendation of a person they
know. In another survey, 91% said they’re likely to use another person’s recommendation
when making a major purchase.
Persuasion professionals may exploit these tendencies. Often, in fact, they pay for the surveys.
Persuasion: So Easily Fooled 589
Using this data, they may try to disguise their message as word of mouth from your peers.
For example, Cornerstone Promotion, a leading marketing firm that advertises itself as under-
the-radar marketing specialists, sometimes hires children to log into chat rooms and pretend
to be fans of one of their clients or pays students to throw parties where they subtly circulate
marketing material among their classmates.
The Maven
More persuasive yet, however, is to involve peers face-to-face. Rather than over-investing in
formal advertising, businesses and organizations may plant seeds at the grassroots level
hoping that consumers themselves will then spread the word to each other. The seeding
process begins by identifying so-called information hubs—individuals the marketers believe
can and will reach the most other people.
The seeds may be planted with established opinion leaders. Software companies, for example,
give advance copies of new computer programs to professors they hope will recommend it
to students and colleagues. Pharmaceutical companies regularly provide travel expenses and
speaking fees to researchers willing to lecture to health professionals about the virtues of
their drugs. Hotels give travel agents free weekends at their resorts in the hope they’ll later
recommend them to clients seeking advice.
There is a Yiddish word, maven, which refers to a person who’s an expert or a connoisseur,
as in a friend who knows where to get the best price on a sofa or the co-worker you can turn
to for advice about where to buy a computer. They (a) know a lot of people, (b) communicate
a great deal with people, (c) are more likely than others to be asked for their opinions, and (d)
enjoy spreading the word about what they know and think. Most important of all, they are
trusted. As a result, mavens are often targeted by persuasion professionals to help spread
their message.
There are many other mindless, mental shortcuts—heuristics and fixed action patterns—that
leave us susceptible to persuasion. A few examples:
• Social Proof
• Getting a Foot-in-the-Door
Persuasion: So Easily Fooled 590
• A Door-in-the-Face
Reciprocity
“There is no duty more indispensable than that of returning a kindness,” wrote Cicero. Humans
are motivated by a sense of equity and fairness. When someone does something for us or
gives us something, we feel obligated to return the favor in kind. It triggers one of the most
powerful of social norms, the reciprocity rule, whereby we feel compelled to repay, in equitable
value, what another person has given to us.
Gouldner (1960), in his seminal study of the reciprocity rule, found it appears in every culture.
It lays the basis for virtually every type of social relationship, from the legalities of business
arrangements to the subtle exchanges within a romance. A salesperson may offer free gifts,
concessions, or their valuable time in order to get us to do something for them in return. For
example, if a colleague helps you when you’re busy with a project, you might feel obliged to
support her ideas for improving team processes. You might decide to buy more from a supplier
if they have offered you an aggressive discount. Or, you might give money to a charity
fundraiser who has given you a flower in the street (Cialdini, 2008; Levine, 2003).
Social Proof
If everyone is doing it, it must be right. People are more likely to work late if others on their
team are doing the same, to put a tip in a jar that already contains money, or eat in a restaurant
that is busy. This principle derives from two extremely powerful social forces—social
comparison and conformity. We compare our behavior to what others are doing and, if there
is a discrepancy between the other person and ourselves, we feel pressure to change (Cialdini,
2008).
The principle of social proof is so common that it easily passes unnoticed. Advertisements,
for example, often consist of little more than attractive social models appealing to our desire
to be one of the group. For example, the German candy company Haribo suggests that when
you purchase their products you are joining a larger society of satisfied customers: “Kids and
grown-ups love it so-- the happy world of Haribo”. Sometimes social cues are presented with
such specificity that it is as if the target is being manipulated by a puppeteer—for example,
Persuasion: So Easily Fooled 591
Westerners have a desire to both feel and be perceived to act consistently. Once we have
made an initial commitment, it is more likely that we will agree to subsequent commitments
that follow from the first. Knowing this, a clever persuasion artist might induce someone to
agree to a difficult-to-refuse small request and follow this with progressively larger requests
that were his target from the beginning. The process is known as getting a foot in the door
and then slowly escalating the commitments.
Paradoxically, we are less likely to say “No” to a large request than we are to a small request
when it follows this pattern. This can have costly consequences. Levine (2003), for example,
found ex-cult members tend to agree with the statement: “Nobody ever joins a cult. They just
postpone the decision to leave.”
forlorn, they now follow this with a smaller request, which, unknown to the customer, was
their target all along.
In one study, for example, Mowen and Cialdini (1980), posing as representatives of the fictitious
“California Mutual Insurance Co.,” asked university students walking on campus if they’d be
willing to fill out a survey about safety in the home or dorm. The survey, students were told,
would take about 15 minutes. Not surprisingly, most of the students declined—only one out
of four complied with the request. In another condition, however, the researchers door-in-
the-faced them by beginning with a much larger request. “The survey takes about two hours,”
students were told. Then, after the subject declined to participate, the experimenters retreated
to the target request: “. . . look, one part of the survey is particularly important and is fairly
short. It will take only 15 minutes to administer.” Almost twice as many now complied.
The that’s-not-all technique also begins with the salesperson asking a high price. This is
followed by several seconds’ pause during which the customer is kept from responding. The
salesperson then offers a better deal by either lowering the price or adding a bonus product.
That’s-not-all is a variation on door-in-the-face. Whereas the latter begins with a request that
will be rejected, however, that’s-not-all gains its influence by putting the customer on the
fence, allowing them to waver and then offering them a comfortable way off.
Burger (1986) demonstrated the technique in a series of field experiments. In one study, for
example, an experimenter-salesman told customers at a student bake sale that cupcakes cost
75 cents. As this price was announced, another salesman held up his hand and said, “Wait a
second,” briefly consulted with the first salesman, and then announced (“that’s-not-all”) that
the price today included two cookies. In a control condition, customers were offered the
cupcake and two cookies as a package for 75 cents right at the onset. The bonus worked
magic: Almost twice as many people bought cupcakes in the that’s-not-all condition (73%)
than in the control group (40%).
leave that group. Consider the advice of billionaire investor Warren Buffet: “When you find
yourself in a hole, the best thing you can do is stop digging” (Levine, 2003).
Research shows that much of that 2-year-old remains in adults, too. People resent being
controlled. When a person seems too pushy, we get suspicious, annoyed, often angry, and
yearn to retain our freedom of choice more than before. Brehm (1966) labeled this the principle
of psychological reactance.
The most effective way to circumvent psychological reactance is to first get a foot in the door
and then escalate the demands so gradually that there is seemingly nothing to react against.
Hassan (1988), who spent many years as a higher-up in the “Moonies” cult, describes how
they would shape behaviors subtly at first, then more forcefully. The material that would make
up the new identity of a recruit was doled out gradually, piece by piece, only as fast as the
person was deemed ready to assimilate it. The rule of thumb was to “tell him only what he
Persuasion: So Easily Fooled 594
can accept.” He continues: “Don’t sell them [the converts] more than they can handle . . . . If
a recruit started getting angry because he was learning too much about us, the person working
on him would back off and let another member move in .....”
The most commonly used approach to help people defend against unwanted persuasion is
known as the “inoculation” method. Research has shown that people who are subjected to
weak versions of a persuasive message are less vulnerable to stronger versions later on, in
much the same way that being exposed to small doses of a virus immunizes you against full-
blown attacks. In a classic study by McGuire (1964), subjects were asked to state their opinion
on an issue. They were then mildly attacked for their position and then given an opportunity
to refute the attack. When later confronted by a powerful argument against their initial
opinion, these subjects were more resistant than were a control group. In effect, they
developed defenses that rendered them immune.
Sagarin and his colleagues have developed a more aggressive version of this technique that
they refer to as “stinging” (Sagarin, Cialdini, Rice, & Serna, 2002). Their studies focused on the
popular advertising tactic whereby well-known authority figures are employed to sell products
they know nothing about, for example, ads showing a famous astronaut pontificating on Rolex
watches. In a first experiment, they found that simply forewarning people about the
deviousness of these ads had little effect on peoples’ inclination to buy the product later. Next,
they stung the subjects. This time, they were immediately confronted with their gullibility.
“Take a look at your answer to the first question. Did you find the ad to be even somewhat
convincing? If so, then you got fooled. ... Take a look at your answer to the second question.
Did you notice that this ‘stockbroker’ was a fake?” They were then asked to evaluate a new set
of ads. The sting worked. These subjects were not only more likely to recognize the
manipulativeness of deceptive ads; they were also less likely to be persuaded by them.
Anti-vulnerability trainings such as these can be helpful. Ultimately, however, the most
effective defense against unwanted persuasion is to accept just how vulnerable we are. One
must, first, accept that it is normal to be vulnerable and, second, to learn to recognize the
danger signs when we are falling prey. To be forewarned is to be forearmed.
Conclusion
This module has provided a brief introduction to the psychological processes and subsequent
“tricks” involved in persuasion. It has emphasized the peripheral route of persuasion because
Persuasion: So Easily Fooled 595
this is when we are most vulnerable to psychological manipulation. These vulnerabilities are
side effects of “normal” and usually adaptive psychological processes. Mindless heuristics
offer shortcuts for coping with a hopelessly complicated world. They are necessities for human
survival. All, however, underscore the dangers that accompany any mindless thinking.
Persuasion: So Easily Fooled 596
Outside Resources
Book: Cialdini, R. B. (2008). Influence: Science and practice (5th ed.). Boston, MA: Allyn and
Bacon.
Book: Gass, R., & Seiter, J. (2010). Persuasion, social influence, and compliance gaining (4th
ed.). Boston, MA: Pearson.
Book: Kahneman, D. (2012). Thinking fast and slow. New York, NY: Farrar, Straus & Giroux.
Book: Levine, R. (2006). The power of persuasion: how we\\\'re bought and sold. Hoboken,
NJ: Wiley
http://www.amazon.com/The-Power-Persuasion-Were-Bought/dp/0471763179
Book: Tavris, C., & Aronson, E. (2011). Mistakes were made (but not by me). New York, NY:
Farrar, Straus & Giroux.
Student Video 1: Kyle Ball and Brandon Do\'s \'Principles of Persuasion\'. This is a student-
made video highlighting 6 key principles of persuasion that we encounter in our everyday
lives. It was one of the winning entries in the 2015 Noba Student Video Award.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Orkt0wiEGt4
Student Video 2: \'Persuasion\', created by Jake Teeny and Ben Oliveto, compares the
central and peripheral routes to persuasion and also looks at how techniques of persuasion
such as Scarcity and Social Proof influence our consumer choices. It was one of the winning
entries in the 2015 Noba Student Video Award.
https://vimeo.com/123205124
Video: A brief, entertaining interview with the celebrity pickpocket shows how easily we
can be fooled. See A Pickpocket’s Tale at
Persuasion: So Easily Fooled 597
http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/culture/2013/01/video-the-art-of-pickpocketing.html
Video: Cults employ extreme versions of many of the principles in this module. An excellent
documentary tracing the history of the Jonestown cult is the PBS “American Experience”
production, Jonestown: The Life and Death of Peoples Temple at
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/americanexperience/features/introduction/jonestown-introduction/
Video: The documentary Outfoxed provides an excellent example of how persuasion can
be masked as news and education.
http://www.outfoxed.org/
Video: The video, The Science of Countering Terrorism: Psychological Perspectives, a talk
by psychologist Fathali Moghaddam, is an excellent introduction to the process of terrorist
recruitment and thinking
http://sciencestage.com/v/32330/fathali-moghaddam-science-cafe-the-science-of-counterin
g-terrorism-psychological-perspectives.html
Discussion Questions
1. Imagine you are commissioned to create an ad to sell a new beer. Can you give an example
of an ad that would rely on the central route? Can you give an example of an ad that would
rely on the peripheral route?
2. The reciprocity principle can be exploited in obvious ways, such as giving a customer a free
sample of a product. Can you give an example of a less obvious way it might be exploited?
What is a less obvious way that a cult leader might use it to get someone under his or her
grip?
3. Which “trick” in this module are you, personally, most prone to? Give a personal example
of this. How might you have avoided it?
Persuasion: So Easily Fooled 598
Vocabulary
Heuristics
Mental shortcuts that enable people to make decisions and solve problems quickly and
efficiently.
Psychological reactance
A reaction to people, rules, requirements, or offerings that are perceived to limit freedoms.
Social proof
The mental shortcut based on the assumption that, if everyone is doing it, it must be right.
and likable.
Trigger features
Specific, sometimes minute, aspects of a situation that activate fixed action patterns.
Persuasion: So Easily Fooled 600
References
Barrett, D. (2010). Supernormal stimuli: How primal urges overran their evolutionary purpose.
New York, NY: W.W. Norton.
Brehm, J. W. (1966). A theory of psychological reactance. New York, NY: Academic Press.
Brehm, S. S., & Weinraub, M. (1977). Physical barriers and psychological reactance: Two-year-
olds’ responses to threats to freedom. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 35, 830–
836.
Burger, J. M. (2009). Replicating Milgram: Would people still obey today? American Psychologist,
64(1), 1–11.
Burger, J. M. (1986). Increasing compliance by improving the deal: The that’s-not-all technique.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 51, 277–283.
Cialdini, R. B. (2008). Influence: Science and practice (5th ed.). Boston, MA: Allyn and Bacon.
Dion, K., Berscheid, E., & Walster, E. (1972). What is beautiful is good. Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology, 24, 285–290
Fox, Stephen (1997). The mirror makers: A history of American advertising and its creators.
Champaign, IL: University of Illinois Press.
Hassan, S. (1988). Combating cult mind control. Rochester, VT: Park Street Press.
Levine, R. (2003). The power of persuasion: How we’re bought and sold. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley.
Levine, R. (2003). The power of persuasion: How we're bought and sold. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley
& Sons
Milgram, S. (1974). Obedience to authority: An experimental view. New York, NY: Harper & Row.
Myers, David (2011). Social psychology (10th ed.). New York, NY: Worth.
Petty, R. E., & Cacioppo, J. T. (1986). The elaboration likelihood model of persuasion. In L.
Persuasion: So Easily Fooled 601
Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology (Vol. 19, pp. 123–205). San Diego,
CA: Academic Press.
Ross, R. P., Campbell, T., Wright, J. C., Huston, A. C., Rice, M. L., & Turk, P. (1984). When celebrities
talk, children listen: An experimental analysis of children’s responses to TV ads with celebrity
endorsement. Journal of Applied Developmental Psychology, 5, 185–202.
Sagarin, B. J., Cialdini, R. B., Rice, W. E., & Serna, S. B. (2002). Dispelling the illusion of
invulnerability: The motivations and mechanisms of resistance to persuasion. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 83, 526–541.
34
Prejudice, Discrimination, and Stereotyping
Susan T. Fiske
People are often biased against others outside of their own social group, showing prejudice
(emotional bias), stereotypes (cognitive bias), and discrimination (behavioral bias). In the past,
people used to be more explicit with their biases, but during the 20th century, when it became
less socially acceptable to exhibit bias, such things like prejudice, stereotypes, and
discrimination became more subtle (automatic, ambiguous, and ambivalent). In the 21st
century, however, with social group categories even more complex, biases may be
transforming once again.
Learning Objectives
• Understand subtle, unexamined biases that are automatic, ambiguous, and ambivalent.
• Understand 21st century biases that may break down as identities get more complicated.
Introduction
Even in one’s own family, everyone wants to be seen for who they are, not as “just another
typical X.” But still, people put other people into groups, using that label to inform their
evaluation of the person as a whole—a process that can result in serious consequences. This
Prejudice, Discrimination, and Stereotyping 603
You would be hard pressed to find someone today who openly admits they don’t believe in
equality. Regardless of one’s demographics, most people believe everyone is entitled to the
same, natural rights. However, as much as we now collectively believe this, not too far back
in our history, this ideal of equality was an unpracticed sentiment. Of all the countries in the
world, only a few have equality in their constitution, and those who do, originally defined it
for a select group of people.
At the time, old-fashioned biases were simple: people openly put down those not from their
own group. For example, just 80 years ago, American college students unabashedly thought
Turkish people were “cruel, very religious, and treacherous” (Katz & Braly, 1933). So where did
they get those ideas, assuming that most of them had never met anyone from Turkey? Old-
fashioned stereotypes were overt, unapologetic, and expected to be shared by others—what
Prejudice, Discrimination, and Stereotyping 604
Blatant biases are conscious beliefs, feelings, and behavior that people are perfectly willing
to admit, which mostly express hostility toward other groups (outgroups) while unduly favoring
one’s own group (in-group). For example, organizations that preach contempt for other races
(and praise for their own) is an example of a blatant bias. And scarily, these blatant biases
tend to run in packs: People who openly hate one outgroup also hate many others. To illustrate
this pattern, we turn to two personality scales next.
Although research has shown that people higher in SDO are more likely to be politically
conservative, there are other traits that more strongly predict one’s SDO. For example,
researchers have found that those who score higher on SDO are usually lower than average
on tolerance, empathy, altruism, and community orientation. In general, those high in SDO
Prejudice, Discrimination, and Stereotyping 605
have a strong belief in work ethic—that hard work always pays off and leisure is a waste of
time. People higher on SDO tend to choose and thrive in occupations that maintain existing
group hierarchies (police, prosecutors, business), compared to those lower in SDO, who tend
to pick more equalizing occupations (social work, public defense, psychology).
The point is that SDO—a preference for inequality as normal and natural—also predicts
endorsing the superiority of certain groups: men, native-born residents, heterosexuals, and
believers in the dominant religion. This means seeing women, minorities, homosexuals, and
non-believers as inferior. Understandably, the first list of groups tend to score higher on SDO,
while the second group tends to score lower. For example, the SDO gender difference (men
higher, women lower) appears all over the world.
At its heart, SDO rests on a fundamental belief that the world is tough and competitive with
only a limited number of resources. Thus, those high in SDO see groups as battling each other
for these resources, with winners at the top of the social hierarchy and losers at the bottom
(see Table 1).
Right-wing Authoritarianism
Right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) focuses on value conflicts, whereas SDO focuses on the
economic ones. That is, RWA endorses respect for obedience and authority in the service of
group conformity (Altemeyer, 1988). Returning to an example from earlier, the homeowner
who’s high in SDO may dislike the outgroup member moving into his or her neighborhood
because it “threatens” one’s economic resources (e.g. lowering the value of one’s house; fewer
openings in the school; etc.). Those high in RWA may equally dislike the outgroup member
moving into the neighborhood but for different reasons. Here, it’s because this outgroup
Prejudice, Discrimination, and Stereotyping 606
member brings in values or beliefs that the person high in RWA disagrees with, thus
“threatening” the collective values of his or her group. RWA respects group unity over individual
preferences, wanting to maintain group values in the face of differing opinions. Despite its
name, though, RWA is not necessarily limited to people on the right (conservatives). Like SDO,
there does appear to be an association between this personality scale (i.e. the preference for
order, clarity, and conventional values) and conservative beliefs. However, regardless of
political ideology, RWA focuses on groups’ competing frameworks of values. Extreme scores
on RWA predict biases against outgroups while demanding in-group loyalty and conformity
Notably, the combination of high RWA and high SDO predicts joining hate groups that openly
endorse aggression against minority groups, immigrants, homosexuals, and believers in non-
dominant religions (Altemeyer, 2004).
Fortunately, old-fashioned biases have diminished over the 20th century and into the 21st
century. Openly expressing prejudice is like blowing second-hand cigarette smoke in
someone’s face: It’s just not done any more in most circles, and if it is, people are readily
criticized for their behavior. Still, these biases exist in people; they’re just less in view than
before. These subtle biases are unexamined
and sometimes unconscious but real in
their consequences. They are automatic,
ambiguous, and ambivalent, but nonetheless
biased, unfair, and disrespectful to the
belief in equality.
Automatic Biases
other groups less. And whether you recognize this “favoritism” as wrong, this trade-off is
relatively automatic, that is, unintended, immediate, and irresistible.
Social psychologists have developed several ways to measure this relatively automatic own-
group preference, the most famous being the Implicit Association Test (IAT;Greenwald, Banaji,
Rudman, Farnham, Nosek, & Mellott, 2002; Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998). The test
itself is rather simple and you can experience it yourself if you Google “implicit” or go
to understandingprejudice.org. Essentially, the IAT is done on the computer and measures how
quickly you can sort words or pictures into different categories. For example, if you were asked
to categorize “ice cream” as good or bad, you would quickly categorize it as good. However,
imagine if every time you ate ice cream, you got a brain freeze. When it comes time to categorize
ice cream as good or bad, you may still categorize it as “good,” but you will likely be a little
slower in doing so compared to someone who has nothing but positive thoughts about ice
cream. Related to group biases, people may explicitly claim they don’t discriminate against
outgroups—and this is very likely true. However, when they’re given this computer task to
categorize people from these outgroups, that automatic or unconscious hesitation (a result
of having mixed evaluations about the outgroup) will show up in the test. And as countless
studies have revealed, people are mostly faster at pairing their own group with good
categories, compared to pairing others’ groups. In fact, this finding generally holds regardless
if one’s group is measured according race, age, religion, nationality, and even temporary,
insignificant memberships.
This all-too-human tendency would remain a mere interesting discovery except that people’s
reaction time on the IAT predicts actual feelings about individuals from other groups, decisions
about them, and behavior toward them, especially nonverbal behavior (Greenwald, Poehlman,
Uhlmann, & Banaji, 2009). For example, although a job interviewer may not be “blatantly
biased,” his or her “automatic or implicit biases” may result in unconsciously acting distant
and indifferent, which can have devastating effects on the hopeful interviewee’s ability to
perform well (Word, Zanna, & Cooper, 1973). Although this is unfair, sometimes the automatic
associations—often driven by society’s stereotypes—trump our own, explicit values (Devine,
1989). And sadly, this can result in consequential discrimination, such as allocating fewer
resources to disliked outgroups (Rudman & Ashmore, 2009). See Table 2 for a summary of
this section and the next two sections on subtle biases.
Ambiguous Biases
favoritism toward itself and the fact that outside our own group. [Image: Keira McPhee, https://goo.gl/
only one group can play on the soccer field gkaKBe, CC BY 2.0, https://goo.gl/BRvSA7]
the simple, natural human tendency to be more comfortable with people like yourself.
A specific case of comfort with the ingroup is called aversive racism, so-called because people
do not like to admit their own racial biases to themselves or others (Dovidio & Gaertner, 2010).
Tensions between, say, a White person’s own good intentions and discomfort with the perhaps
novel situation of interacting closely with a Black person may cause the White person to feel
uneasy, behave stiffly, or be distracted. As a result, the White person may give a good excuse
to avoid the situation altogether and prevent any awkwardness that could have come from
it. However, such a reaction will be ambiguous to both parties and hard to interpret. That is,
was the White person right to avoid the situation so that neither person would feel
uncomfortable? Indicators of aversive racism correlate with discriminatory behavior, despite
being the ambiguous result of good intentions gone bad.
Not all stereotypes of outgroups are all bad. For example, ethnic Asians living in the United
States are commonly referred to as the “model minority” because of their perceived success
in areas such as education, income, and social stability. Another example includes people
who feel benevolent toward traditional women but hostile toward nontraditional women. Or
even ageist people who feel respect toward older adults but, at the same time, worry about
the burden they place on public welfare programs. A simple way to understand these mixed
feelings, across a variety of groups, results from the Stereotype Content Model (Fiske, Cuddy,
& Glick, 2007).
When people learn about a new group, they first want to know if its intentions of the people
in this group are for good or ill. Like the guard at night: “Who goes there, friend or foe?” If the
other group has good, cooperative intentions, we view them as warm and trustworthy and
often consider them part of “our side.” However, if the other group is cold and competitive or
full of exploiters, we often view them as a threat and treat them accordingly. After learning
the group’s intentions, though, we also want to know whether they are competent enough to
act on them (if they are incompetent, or unable, their intentions matter less). These two simple
dimensions—warmth and competence—together map how groups relate to each other in
society.
There are common stereotypes of people from all sorts of categories and occupations that
lead them to be classified along these two dimensions. For example, a stereotypical
“housewife” would be seen as high in warmth but lower in competence. This is not to suggest
that actual housewives are not competent, of course, but that they are not widely admired
Prejudice, Discrimination, and Stereotyping 610
for their competence in the same way as scientific pioneers, trendsetters, or captains of
industry. At another end of the spectrum are homeless people and drug addicts, stereotyped
as not having good intentions (perhaps exploitative for not trying to play by the rules), and
likewise being incompetent (unable) to do anything useful. These groups reportedly make
society more disgusted than any other groups do.
Some group stereotypes are mixed, high on one dimension and low on the other. Groups
stereotyped as competent but not warm, for example, include rich people and outsiders good
at business. These groups that are seen as “competent but cold” make people feel some envy,
admitting that these others may have some talent but resenting them for not being “people
like us.” The “model minority” stereotype mentioned earlier includes people with this excessive
competence but deficient sociability.
The other mixed combination is high warmth but low competence. Groups who fit this
combination include older people and disabled people. Others report pitying them, but only
so long as they stay in their place. In an effort to combat this negative stereotype, disability-
and elderly-rights activists try to eliminate that pity, hopefully gaining respect in the process.
Altogether, these four kinds of stereotypes and their associated emotional prejudices (pride,
disgust, envy, pity) occur all over the world for each of society’s own groups. These maps of
the group terrain predict specific types of discrimination for specific kinds of groups,
underlining how bias is not exactly equal opportunity.
Prejudice, Discrimination, and Stereotyping 611
prejudices.
Outside Resources
Web: Website that provides helpful information about prejudice including definition and
statistics. This content is provided by OnlinePsychology@Pepperdine, the Online Master
of Psychology program from Pepperdine University.
https://onlinepsych.pepperdine.edu/blog/prejudice-discrimination-coping-skills/
Discussion Questions
1. Do you know more people from different kinds of social groups than your parents did?
2. How often do you hear people criticizing groups without knowing anything about them?
3. Take the IAT. Could you feel that some associations are easier than others?
4. What groups illustrate ambivalent biases, seemingly competent but cold, or warm but
incompetent?
5. Do you or someone you know believe that group hierarchies are inevitable? Desirable?
6. How can people learn to get along with people who seem different from them?
Prejudice, Discrimination, and Stereotyping 613
Vocabulary
Automatic bias
Automatic biases are unintended, immediate, and irresistible.
Aversive racism
Aversive racism is unexamined racial bias that the person does not intend and would reject,
but that avoids inter-racial contact.
Blatant biases
Blatant biases are conscious beliefs, feelings, and behavior that people are perfectly willing
to admit, are mostly hostile, and openly favor their own group.
Discrimination
Discrimination is behavior that advantages or disadvantages people merely based on their
group membership.
Prejudice
Prejudice is an evaluation or emotion toward people merely based on their group
membership.
Right-wing authoritarianism
Right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) focuses on value conflicts but endorses respect for
obedience and authority in the service of group conformity.
Self-categorization theory
Self-categorization theory develops social identity theory’s point that people categorize
themselves, along with each other into groups, favoring their own group.
Social identity theory notes that people categorize each other into groups, favoring their own
group.
Stereotypes
Stereotype is a belief that characterizes people based merely on their group membership.
Subtle biases
Subtle biases are automatic, ambiguous, and ambivalent, but real in their consequences.
Prejudice, Discrimination, and Stereotyping 615
References
Altemeyer, B. (2004). Highly dominating, highly authoritarian personalities. The Journal of Social
Psychology, 144(4), 421-447. doi:10.3200/SOCP.144.4.421-448
Bodenhausen, G. V., & Peery, D. (2009). Social categorization and stereotyping in vivo: The
VUCA challenge. Social and Personality Psychology Compass, 3(2), 133-151. doi:10.1111/
j.1751-9004.2009.00167.x
Brewer, M. B., & Brown, R. J. (1998). Intergroup relations. In D. T. Gilbert, S. T. Fiske, & G. Lindzey
(Eds.), The handbook of social psychology, Vols. 1 and 2 (4th ed.) (pp. 554-594). New York:
McGraw-Hill.
Devine, P. G. (1989). Stereotypes and prejudice: Their automatic and controlled components.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 56(1), 5-18. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.56.1.5
Dovidio, J. F., & Gaertner, S. L. (2010). Intergroup bias. In S. T. Fiske, D. T. Gilbert, & G. Lindzey
(Eds.), Handbook of social psychology, Vol. 2 (5th ed.) (pp. 1084-1121). Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley.
Fiske, S. T., Cuddy, A. J. C., & Glick, P. (2007). Universal dimensions of social cognition: Warmth
and competence. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 11(2), 77-83. doi:10.1016/j.tics.2006.11.005
Greenwald, A. G., Banaji, M. R., Rudman, L. A., Farnham, S. D., Nosek, B. A., & Mellott, D. S.
(2002). A unified theory of implicit attitudes, stereotypes, self-esteem, and self-concept.
Psychological Review, 109(1), 3-25. doi:10.1037/0033-295X.109.1.3
Greenwald, A. G., McGhee, D. E., & Schwartz, J. L. K. (1998). Measuring individual differences
in implicit cognition: The implicit association test. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,
74(6), 1464-1480. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.74.6.1464
Greenwald, A. G., Poehlman, T. A., Uhlmann, E. L., & Banaji, M. R. (2009). Understanding and
using the Implicit Association Test: III. Meta-analysis of predictive validity. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 97(1), 17-41. doi:10.1037/a0015575
Katz, D., & Braly, K. (1933). Racial stereotypes of one hundred college students. The Journal of
Abnormal and Social Psychology, 28(3), 280-290. doi:10.1037/h0074049
Rudman, L. A., & Ashmore, R. D. (2007). Discrimination and the implicit association test. Group
Processes & Intergroup Relations, 10(3), 359-372. doi:10.1177/1368430207078696
Prejudice, Discrimination, and Stereotyping 616
Sidanius, J., & Pratto, F. (1999). Social dominance: An intergroup theory of social hierarchy and
oppression. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Tajfel, H., Billig, M. G., Bundy, R. P., & Flament, C. (1971). Social categorization and intergroup
behaviour. European Journal of Social Psychology, 1(2), 149-178. doi:10.1002/
ejsp.2420010202
Turner, J. C. (1975). Social comparison and social identity: Some prospects for intergroup
behaviour. European Journal of Social Psychology, 5(1), 5-34. doi:10.1002/ejsp.2420050102
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prophecies in interracial interaction. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 10(2),
109-120. doi:10.1016/0022-1031(74)90059-6
Psychological Health
35
Happiness: The Science of Subjective
Well-Being
Edward Diener
Subjective well-being (SWB) is the scientific term for happiness and life satisfaction—thinking
and feeling that your life is going well, not badly. Scientists rely primarily on self-report surveys
to assess the happiness of individuals, but they have validated these scales with other types
of measures. People’s levels of subjective well-being are influenced by both internal factors,
such as personality and outlook, and external factors, such as the society in which they live.
Some of the major determinants of subjective well-being are a person’s inborn temperament,
the quality of their social relationships, the societies they live in, and their ability to meet their
basic needs. To some degree people adapt to conditions so that over time our circumstances
may not influence our happiness as much as one might predict they would. Importantly,
researchers have also studied the outcomes of subjective well-being and have found that
“happy” people are more likely to be healthier and live longer, to have better social
relationships, and to be more productive at work. In other words, people high in subjective
well-being seem to be healthier and function more effectively compared to people who are
chronically stressed, depressed, or angry. Thus, happiness does not just feel good, but it is
good for people and for those around them.
Learning Objectives
• Be able to list two internal causes of subjective well-being and two external causes of
subjective well-being.
• Describe the types of societies that experience the most and least happiness, and why they
do.
• Describe the typical course of adaptation to events in terms of the time course of SWB.
Happiness: The Science of Subjective Well-Being 619
Introduction
Types of Happiness
Philosophers debated the nature of happiness for thousands of years, but scientists have
recently discovered that happiness means different things. Three major types of happiness
are high life satisfaction, frequent positive feelings, and infrequent negative feelings (Diener,
Happiness: The Science of Subjective Well-Being 620
1984). “Subjective well-being” is the label given by scientists to the various forms of happiness
taken together. Although there are additional forms of SWB, the three in the table below have
been studied extensively. The table also shows that the causes of the different types of
happiness can be somewhat different.
You can see in the table that there are different causes of happiness, and that these causes
are not identical for the various types of SWB. Therefore, there is no single key, no magic wand
—high SWB is achieved by combining several different important elements (Diener & Biswas-
Diener, 2008). Thus, people who promise to know the key to happiness are oversimplifying.
Some people experience all three elements of happiness—they are very satisfied, enjoy life,
and have only a few worries or other unpleasant emotions. Other unfortunate people are
missing all three. Most of us also know individuals who have one type of happiness but not
another. For example, imagine an elderly person who is completely satisfied with her life—
she has done most everything she ever wanted—but is not currently enjoying life that much
because of the infirmities of age. There are others who show a different pattern, for example,
who really enjoy life but also experience a lot of stress, anger, and worry. And there are those
who are having fun, but who are dissatisfied and believe they are wasting their lives. Because
there are several components to happiness, each with somewhat different causes, there is
no magic single cure-all that creates all forms of SWB. This means that to be happy, individuals
must acquire each of the different elements that cause it.
There are external influences on people’s happiness—the circumstances in which they live. It
is possible for some to be happy living in poverty with ill health, or with a child who has a
serious disease, but this is difficult. In contrast, it is easier to be happy if one has supportive
family and friends, ample resources to meet one’s needs, and good health. But even here
there are exceptions—people who are depressed and unhappy while living in excellent
circumstances. Thus, people can be happy or unhappy because of their personalities and the
way they think about the world or because of the external circumstances in which they live.
People vary in their propensity to happiness—in their personalities and outlook—and this
means that knowing their living conditions is not enough to predict happiness.
In the table below are shown internal and external circumstances that influence happiness.
There are individual differences in what makes people happy, but the causes in the table are
important for most people (Diener, Suh, Lucas, & Smith, 1999; Lyubomirsky, 2013; Myers,
1992).
When people consider their own happiness, they tend to think of their relationships, successes
and failures, and other personal factors. But a very important influence on how happy people
are is the society in which they live. It is easy to forget how important societies and
neighborhoods are to people’s happiness or unhappiness. In Figure 1, I present life satisfaction
around the world. You can see that some nations, those with the darkest shading on the map,
are high in life satisfaction. Others, the lightest shaded areas, are very low. The grey areas in
the map are places we could not collect happiness data—they were just too dangerous or
inaccessible.
Figure 1
Can you guess what might make some societies happier than others? Much of North America
Happiness: The Science of Subjective Well-Being 623
and Europe have relatively high life satisfaction, and much of Africa is low in life satisfaction.
For life satisfaction living in an economically developed nation is helpful because when people
must struggle to obtain food, shelter, and other basic necessities, they tend to be dissatisfied
with lives. However, other factors, such as trusting and being able to count on others, are also
crucial to the happiness within nations. Indeed, for enjoying life our relationships with others
seem more important than living in a wealthy society. One factor that predicts unhappiness
is conflict—individuals in nations with high internal conflict or conflict with neighboring nations
tend to experience low SWB.
Will money make you happy? A certain level of income is needed to meet our needs, and very
poor people are frequently dissatisfied with life (Diener & Seligman, 2004). However, having
more and more money has diminishing returns—higher and higher incomes make less and
less difference to happiness. Wealthy nations tend to have higher average life satisfaction
than poor nations, but the United States has not experienced a rise in life satisfaction over
the past decades, even as income has doubled. The goal is to find a level of income that you
can live with and earn. Don’t let your aspirations continue to rise so that you always feel poor,
no matter how much money you have. Research shows that materialistic people often tend
to be less happy, and putting your emphasis on relationships and other areas of life besides
just money is a wise strategy. Money can help life satisfaction, but when too many other
valuable things are sacrificed to earn a lot of money—such as relationships or taking a less
enjoyable job—the pursuit of money can harm happiness.
There are stories of wealthy people who are unhappy and of janitors who are very happy. For
instance, a number of extremely wealthy people in South Korea have committed suicide
recently, apparently brought down by stress and other negative feelings. On the other hand,
there is the hospital janitor who loved her life because she felt that her work in keeping the
hospital clean was so important for the patients and nurses. Some millionaires are dissatisfied
because they want to be billionaires. Conversely, some people with ordinary incomes are
quite happy because they have learned to live within their means and enjoy the less expensive
things in life.
It is important to always keep in mind that high materialism seems to lower life satisfaction
—valuing money over other things such as relationships can make us dissatisfied. When
people think money is more important than everything else, they seem to have a harder time
being happy. And unless they make a great deal of money, they are not on average as happy
as others. Perhaps in seeking money they sacrifice other important things too much, such as
Happiness: The Science of Subjective Well-Being 624
relationships, spirituality, or following their interests. Or it may be that materialists just can
never get enough money to fulfill their dreams—they always want more.
To sum up what makes for a happy life, let’s take the example of Monoj, a rickshaw driver in
Calcutta. He enjoys life, despite the hardships, and is reasonably satisfied with life. How could
he be relatively happy despite his very low income, sometimes even insufficient to buy enough
food for his family? The things that make Monoj happy are his family and friends, his religion,
and his work, which he finds meaningful. His low income does lower his life satisfaction to
some degree, but he finds his children to be very rewarding, and he gets along well with his
neighbors. I also suspect that Monoj’s positive temperament and his enjoyment of social
relationships help to some degree to overcome his poverty and earn him a place among the
happy. However, Monoj would also likely be even more satisfied with life if he had a higher
income that allowed more food, better housing, and better medical care for his family.
Adaptation to Circumstances
Happiness: The Science of Subjective Well-Being 625
The process of adaptation is important in understanding happiness. When good and bad
events occur, people often react strongly at first, but then their reactions adapt over time and
they return to their former levels of happiness. For instance, many people are euphoric when
they first marry, but over time they grow accustomed to the marriage and are no longer
ecstatic. The marriage becomes commonplace and they return to their former level of
happiness. Few of us think this will happen to us, but the truth is that it usually does. Some
people will be a bit happier even years after marriage, but nobody carries that initial “high”
through the years.
People also adapt over time to bad events. However, people take a long time to adapt to
certain negative events such as unemployment. People become unhappy when they lose their
work, but over time they recover to some extent. But even after a number of years, unemployed
individuals sometimes have lower life satisfaction, indicating that they have not completely
habituated to the experience. However, there are strong individual differences in adaptation,
too. Some people are resilient and bounce back quickly after a bad event, and others are
fragile and do not ever fully adapt to the bad event. Do you adapt quickly to bad events and
bounce back, or do you continue to dwell on a bad event and let it keep you down?
An example of adaptation to circumstances is shown in Figure 3, which shows the daily moods
of “Harry,” a college student who had Hodgkin’s lymphoma (a form of cancer). As can be seen,
over the 6-week period when I studied Harry’s moods, they went up and down. A few times
his moods dropped into the negative zone below the horizontal blue line. Most of the time
Harry’s moods were in the positive zone above the line. But about halfway through the study
Harry was told that his cancer was in remission—effectively cured—and his moods on that
day spiked way up. But notice that he quickly adapted—the effects of the good news wore
off, and Harry adapted back toward where he was before. So even the very best news one
can imagine—recovering from cancer—was not enough to give Harry a permanent “high.”
Notice too, however, that Harry’s moods averaged a bit higher after cancer remission. Thus,
the typical pattern is a strong response to the event, and then a dampening of this joy over
time. However, even in the long run, the person might be a bit happier or unhappier than
before.
Is the state of happiness truly a good thing? Is happiness simply a feel-good state that leaves
us unmotivated and ignorant of the world’s problems? Should people strive to be happy, or
are they better off to be grumpy but “realistic”? Some have argued that happiness is actually
a bad thing, leaving us superficial and uncaring. Most of the evidence so far suggests that
Happiness: The Science of Subjective Well-Being 626
happy people are healthier, more sociable, more productive, and better citizens (Diener &
Tay, 2012; Lyubomirsky, King, & Diener, 2005). Research shows that the happiest individuals
are usually very sociable. The table below summarizes some of the major findings.
Although it is beneficial generally to be happy, this does not mean that people should be
constantly euphoric. In fact, it is appropriate and helpful sometimes to be sad or to worry. At
times a bit of worry mixed with positive feelings makes people more creative. Most successful
people in the workplace seem to be those who are mostly positive but sometimes a bit
negative. Thus, people need not be a superstar in happiness to be a superstar in life. What is
not helpful is to be chronically unhappy. The important question is whether people are satisfied
with how happy they are. If you feel mostly positive and satisfied, and yet occasionally worry
and feel stressed, this is probably fine as long as you feel comfortable with this level of
happiness. If you are a person who is chronically unhappy much of the time, changes are
needed, and perhaps professional intervention would help as well.
Measuring Happiness
SWB researchers have relied primarily on self-report scales to assess happiness—how people
rate their own happiness levels on self-report surveys. People respond to numbered scales
to indicate their levels of satisfaction, positive feelings, and lack of negative feelings. You can
see where you stand on these scales by going to http://internal.psychology.illinois.edu/~e
diener/scales.html or by filling out the Flourishing Scale below. These measures will give you
an idea of what popular scales of happiness are like.
The self-report scales have proved to be relatively valid (Diener, Inglehart, & Tay, 2012),
although people can lie, or fool themselves, or be influenced by their current moods or
situational factors. Because the scales are imperfect, well-being scientists also sometimes use
biological measures of happiness (e.g., the strength of a person’s immune system, or
measuring various brain areas that are associated with greater happiness). Scientists also use
reports by family, coworkers, and friends—these people reporting how happy they believe
the target person is. Other measures are used as well to help overcome some of the
shortcomings of the self-report scales, but most of the field is based on people telling us how
happy they are using numbered scales.
There are scales to measure life satisfaction (Pavot & Diener, 2008), positive and negative
feelings, and whether a person is psychologically flourishing (Diener et al., 2009). Flourishing
has to do with whether a person feels meaning in life, has close relationships, and feels a
sense of mastery over important life activities. You can take the well-being scales created in
Happiness: The Science of Subjective Well-Being 628
the Diener laboratory, and let others take them too, because they are free and open for use.
Most people are fairly happy, but many of them also wish they could be a bit more satisfied
and enjoy life more. Prescriptions about how to achieve more happiness are often
oversimplified because happiness has different components and prescriptions need to be
aimed at where each individual needs improvement—one size does not fit all. A person might
be strong in one area and deficient in other areas. People with prolonged serious unhappiness
Happiness: The Science of Subjective Well-Being 629
might need help from a professional. Thus, recommendations for how to achieve happiness
are often appropriate for one person but not for others. With this in mind, I list in Table 4
below some general recommendations for you to be happier (see also Lyubomirsky, 2013):
Table 4: Self-Examination
Happiness: The Science of Subjective Well-Being 630
Outside Resources
Discussion Questions
1. Which do you think is more important, the “top-down” personality influences on happiness
or the “bottom-up” situational circumstances that influence it? In other words, discuss
whether internal sources such as personality and outlook or external factors such
situations, circumstances, and events are more important to happiness. Can you make an
argument that both are very important?
2. Do you know people who are happy in one way but not in others? People who are high in
life satisfaction, for example, but low in enjoying life or high in negative feelings? What
should they do to increase their happiness across all three types of subjective well-being?
3. Certain sources of happiness have been emphasized in this book, but there are others.
Can you think of other important sources of happiness and unhappiness? Do you think
religion, for example, is a positive source of happiness for most people? What about age
Happiness: The Science of Subjective Well-Being 631
or ethnicity? What about health and physical handicaps? If you were a researcher, what
question might you tackle on the influences on happiness?
4. Are you satisfied with your level of happiness? If not, are there things you might do to
change it? Would you function better if you were happier?
5. How much happiness is helpful to make a society thrive? Do people need some worry and
sadness in life to help us avoid bad things? When is satisfaction a good thing, and when is
some dissatisfaction a good thing?
6. How do you think money can help happiness? Interfere with happiness? What level of
income will you need to be satisfied?
Happiness: The Science of Subjective Well-Being 632
Vocabulary
Adaptation
The fact that after people first react to good or bad events, sometimes in a strong way, their
feelings and reactions tend to dampen down over time and they return toward their original
level of subjective well-being.
Happiness
The popular word for subjective well-being. Scientists sometimes avoid using this term
because it can refer to different things, such as feeling good, being satisfied, or even the causes
of high subjective well-being.
Life satisfaction
A person reflects on their life and judges to what degree it is going well, by whatever standards
that person thinks are most important for a good life.
Negative feelings
Undesirable and unpleasant feelings that people tend to avoid if they can. Moods and
emotions such as depression, anger, and worry are examples.
Positive feelings
Desirable and pleasant feelings. Moods and emotions such as enjoyment and love are
examples.
Subjective well-being
The name that scientists give to happiness—thinking and feeling that our lives are going very
well.
References
Diener, E., & Biswas-Diener, R. (2008). Happiness: Unlocking the mysteries of psychological wealth.
Malden, MA: Wiley/Blackwell.
Diener, E., & Seligman, M. E. P. (2004). Beyond money: Toward an economy of well-being.
Psychological Science in the Public Interest, 5, 1–31.
Diener, E., & Tay, L. (2012). The remarkable benefits of happiness for successful and healthy
living. Report of the Well-Being Working Group, Royal Government of Bhutan. Report to
the United Nations General Assembly: Well-Being and Happiness: A New Development
Paradigm.
Diener, E., Inglehart, R., & Tay, L. (2012). Theory and validity of life satisfaction scales. Social
Indicators Research, in press.
Diener, E., Suh, E. M., Lucas, R. E., & Smith, H. L. (1999). Subjective well-being: Three decades
of progress. Psychological Bulletin, 125, 276–302.
Diener, E., Wirtz, D., Tov, W., Kim-Prieto, C., Choi, D., Oishi, S., & Biswas-Diener, R. (2009). New
measures of well-being: Flourishing and positive and negative feelings. Social Indicators
Research, 39, 247–266.
Lyubomirsky, S. (2013). The myths of happiness: What should make you happy, but doesn’t, what
shouldn’t make you happy, but does. New York, NY: Penguin.
Lyubomirsky, S., King, L., & Diener, E. (2005). The benefits of frequent positive affect: Does
happiness lead to success? Psychological Bulletin, 131, 803–855.
Myers, D. G. (1992). The pursuit of happiness: Discovering pathways to fulfillment, well-being, and
enduring personal joy. New York, NY: Avon.
Pavot, W., & Diener, E. (2008). The Satisfaction with life scale and the emerging construct of
life satisfaction. The Journal of Positive Psychology, 3, 137–152.
36
The Healthy Life
Emily Hooker & Sarah Pressman
Our emotions, thoughts, and behaviors play an important role in our health. Not only do they
influence our day-to-day health practices, but they can also influence how our body functions.
This module provides an overview of health psychology, which is a field devoted to
understanding the connections between psychology and health. Discussed here are examples
of topics a health psychologist might study, including stress, psychosocial factors related to
health and disease, how to use psychology to improve health, and the role of psychology in
medicine.
Learning Objectives
• Explain theoretical models of health, as well as the role of psychological stress in the
development of disease.
Today, we face more chronic disease than ever before because we are living longer lives while
also frequently behaving in unhealthy ways. One example of a chronic disease is coronary
heart disease (CHD): It is the number one cause of death worldwide (World Health
Organization, 2013). CHD develops slowly over time and typically appears midlife, but related
The Healthy Life 636
heart problems can persist for years after the original diagnosis or cardiovascular event. In
managing illnesses that persist over time (other examples might include cancer, diabetes, and
long-term disability) many psychological factors will determine the progression of the ailment.
For example, do patients seek help when appropriate? Do they follow doctor
recommendations? Do they develop negative psychological symptoms due to lasting illness
(e.g., depression)? Also important is that psychological factors can play a significant role in
who develops these diseases, the prognosis, and the nature of the symptoms related to the
illness. Health psychology is a relatively new, interdisciplinary field of study that focuses on
these very issues, or more specifically, the role of psychology in maintaining health, as well
as preventing and treating illness.
Health psychology relies on the Biopsychosocial Model of Health. This model posits that
biology, psychology, and social factors are just as important in the development of disease as
biological causes (e.g., germs, viruses), which is consistent with the World Health Organization
(1946) definition of health. This model replaces the older Biomedical Model of Health, which
primarily considers the physical, or pathogenic, factors contributing to illness. Thanks to
The Healthy Life 637
You probably know exactly what it’s like to feel stress, but what you may not know is that it
can objectively influence your health. Answers to questions like, “How stressed do you feel?”
or “How overwhelmed do you feel?” can predict your likelihood of developing both minor
illnesses as well as serious problems like future heart attack (Cohen, Janicki-Deverts, & Miller,
2007). (Want to measure your own stress level? Check out the links at the end of the module.)
To understand how health psychologists study these types of associations, we will describe
one famous example of a stress and health study. Imagine that you are a research subject
for a moment. After you check into a hotel room as part of the study, the researchers ask you
to report your general levels of stress. Not too surprising; however, what happens next is that
you receive droplets of cold virus into your nose! The researchers intentionally try to make
you sick by exposing you to an infectious illness. After they expose you to the virus, the
researchers will then evaluate you for several days by asking you questions about your
symptoms, monitoring how much mucus you are producing by weighing your used tissues,
and taking body fluid samples—all to see if you are objectively ill with a cold. Now, the
interesting thing is that not everyone who has drops of cold virus put in their nose develops
the illness. Studies like this one find that people who are less stressed and those who are
more positive at the beginning of the study are at a decreased risk of developing a cold (Cohen,
Tyrrell, & Smith, 1991; Cohen, Alper, Doyle, Treanor, & Turner, 2006) (see Figure 1 for an
example).
Importantly, it is not just major life stressors (e.g., a family death, a natural disaster) that
increase the likelihood of getting sick. Even small daily hassles like getting stuck in traffic or
fighting with your girlfriend can raise your blood pressure, alter your stress hormones, and
even suppress your immune system function (DeLongis, Folkman, & Lazarus, 1988; Twisk,
Snel, Kemper, & van Machelen, 1999).
It is clear that stress plays a major role in our mental and physical health, but what exactly is
it? The term stress was originally derived from the field of mechanics where it is used to
describe materials under pressure. The word was first used in a psychological manner by
researcher Hans Selye. He was examining the effect of an ovarian hormone that he thought
caused sickness in a sample of rats. Surprisingly, he noticed that almost any injected hormone
produced this same sickness. He smartly realized that it was not the hormone under
investigation that was causing these problems, but instead, the aversive experience of being
handled and injected by researchers that led to high physiological arousal and, eventually, to
health problems like ulcers. Selye (1946) coined the term stressor to label a stimulus that had
this effect on the body and developed a model of the stress response called the General
Adaptation Syndrome. Since then, psychologists have studied stress in a myriad of ways,
including stress as negative events (e.g., natural disasters or major life changes like dropping
out of school), as chronically difficult situations (e.g., taking care of a loved one with
Alzheimer’s), as short-term hassles, as a biological fight-or-flight response, and even as clinical
illness like post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). It continues to be one of the most important
and well-studied psychological correlates of illness, because excessive stress causes
potentially damaging wear and tear on the body and can influence almost any imaginable
disease process.
An important question that health psychologists ask is: What keeps us protected from disease
and alive longer? When considering this issue of resilience (Rutter, 1985), five factors are
often studied in terms of their ability to protect (or sometimes harm) health. They are:
1. Coping
The Healthy Life 639
3. Social Relationships
5. Stress Management
Coping Strategies
How individuals cope with the stressors they face can have a significant impact on health.
Coping is often classified into two categories: problem-focused coping or emotion-focused
coping (Carver, Scheier, & Weintraub, 1989). Problem-focused coping is thought of as actively
addressing the event that is causing stress in an effort to solve the issue at hand. For example,
say you have an important exam coming up next week. A problem-focused strategy might
be to spend additional time over the weekend studying to make sure you understand all of
the material. Emotion-focused coping, on the other hand, regulates the emotions that come
with stress. In the above examination example, this might mean watching a funny movie to
take your mind off the anxiety you are feeling. In the short term, emotion-focused coping
might reduce feelings of stress, but problem-focused coping seems to have the greatest impact
on mental wellness (Billings & Moos, 1981; Herman-Stabl, Stemmler, & Petersen, 1995). That
being said, when events are uncontrollable (e.g., the death of a loved one), emotion-focused
coping directed at managing your feelings, at first, might be the better strategy. Therefore, it
is always important to consider the match
of the stressor to the coping strategy when
evaluating its plausible benefits.
control over the noise, the control belief aided them in completing the task. In similar studies,
perceived control benefited immune system functioning (Sieber et al., 1992). Outside of the
laboratory, studies have shown that older residents in assisted living facilities, which are
notorious for low control, lived longer and showed better health outcomes when given control
over something as simple as watering a plant or choosing when student volunteers came to
visit (Rodin & Langer, 1977; Schulz & Hanusa, 1978). In addition, feeling in control of a
threatening situation can actually change stress hormone levels (Dickerson & Kemeny, 2004).
Believing that you have control over your own behaviors can also have a positive influence
on important outcomes like smoking cessation, contraception use, and weight management
(Wallston & Wallston, 1978). When individuals do not believe they have control, they do not
try to change. Self-efficacy is closely related to control, in that people with high levels of this
trait believe they can complete tasks and reach their goals. Just as feeling in control can reduce
stress and improve health, higher self-efficacy can reduce stress and negative health
behaviors, and is associated with better health (O’Leary, 1985).
Social Relationships
Research has shown that the impact of social isolation on our risk for disease and death is
similar in magnitude to the risk associated with smoking regularly (Holt-Lunstad, Smith, &
Layton, 2010; House, Landis, & Umberson, 1988). In fact, the importance of social relationships
for our health is so significant that some scientists believe our body has developed a
physiological system that encourages us to seek out our relationships, especially in times of
stress (Taylor et al., 2000). Social integration is the concept used to describe the number of
social roles that you have (Cohen & Wills, 1985), as well as the lack of isolation. For example,
you might be a daughter, a basketball team member, a Humane Society volunteer, a coworker,
and a student. Maintaining these different roles can improve your health via encouragement
from those around you to maintain a healthy lifestyle. Those in your social network might
also provide you with social support (e.g., when you are under stress). This support might
include emotional help (e.g., a hug when you need it), tangible help (e.g., lending you money),
or advice. By helping to improve health behaviors and reduce stress, social relationships can
have a powerful, protective impact on health, and in some cases, might even help people with
serious illnesses stay alive longer (Spiegel, Kraemer, Bloom, & Gottheil, 1989).
Negative dispositions and personality traits have been strongly tied to an array of health risks.
One of the earliest negative trait-to-health connections was discovered in the 1950s by two
cardiologists. They made the interesting discovery that there were common behavioral and
The Healthy Life 641
psychological patterns among their heart patients that were not present in other patient
samples. This pattern included being competitive, impatient, hostile, and time urgent. They
labeled it Type A Behavior. Importantly, it was found to be associated with double the risk of
heart disease as compared with Type B Behavior (Friedman & Rosenman, 1959). Since the
1950s, researchers have discovered that it is the hostility and competitiveness components
of Type A that are especially harmful to heart health (Iribarren et al., 2000; Matthews, Glass,
Rosenman, & Bortner, 1977; Miller, Smith, Turner, Guijarro, & Hallet, 1996). Hostile individuals
are quick to get upset, and this angry arousal can damage the arteries of the heart. In addition,
given their negative personality style, hostile people often lack a heath-protective supportive
social network.
Positive traits and states, on the other hand, are often health protective. For example,
characteristics like positive emotions (e.g., feeling happy or excited) have been tied to a wide
range of benefits such as increased longevity, a reduced likelihood of developing some
illnesses, and better outcomes once you are diagnosed with certain diseases (e.g., heart
disease, HIV) (Pressman & Cohen, 2005). Across the world, even in the most poor and
underdeveloped nations, positive emotions are consistently tied to better health (Pressman,
Gallagher, & Lopez, 2013). Positive emotions can also serve as the “antidote” to stress,
protecting us against some of its damaging effects (Fredrickson, 2001; Pressman & Cohen,
2005; see Figure 2). Similarly, looking on the bright side can also improve health. Optimism
has been shown to improve coping, reduce stress, and predict better disease outcomes like
recovering from a heart attack more rapidly (Kubzansky, Sparrow, Vokonas, & Kawachi, 2001;
Nes & Segerstrom, 2006; Scheier & Carver, 1985; Segerstrom, Taylor, Kemeny, & Fahey, 1998).
Stress Management
About 20 percent of Americans report having stress, with 18–33 year-olds reporting the highest
levels (American Psychological Association, 2012). Given that the sources of our stress are
often difficult to change (e.g., personal finances, current job), a number of interventions have
been designed to help reduce the aversive responses to duress. For example, relaxation
activities and forms of meditation are techniques that allow individuals to reduce their stress
via breathing exercises, muscle relaxation, and mental imagery. Physiological arousal from
stress can also be reduced via biofeedback, a technique where the individual is shown bodily
information that is not normally available to them (e.g., heart rate), and then taught strategies
to alter this signal. This type of intervention has even shown promise in reducing heart and
hypertension risk, as well as other serious conditions (e.g., Moravec, 2008; Patel, Marmot, &
Terry, 1981). But reducing stress does not have to be complicated! For example, exercise is
a great stress reduction activity (Salmon, 2001) that has a myriad of health benefits.
As a student, you probably strive to maintain good grades, to have an active social life, and
to stay healthy (e.g., by getting enough sleep), but there is a popular joke about what it’s like
to be in college: you can only pick two of these things (see Figure 3 for an example). The busy
life of a college student doesn’t always allow you to maintain all three areas of your life,
especially during test-taking periods. In one study, researchers found that students taking
exams were more stressed and, thus, smoked more, drank more caffeine, had less physical
activity, and had worse sleep habits (Oaten & Chang, 2005), all of which could have detrimental
effects on their health. Positive health practices are especially important in times of stress
when your immune system is compromised due to high stress and the elevated frequency of
exposure to the illnesses of your fellow students in lecture halls, cafeterias, and dorms.
Psychologists study both health behaviors and health habits. The former are behaviors that
can improve or harm your health. Some examples include regular exercise, flossing, and
The Healthy Life 643
Figure 3: A popular joke about how difficult it is to stay balanced and healthy during college.
wearing sunscreen, versus negative behaviors like drunk driving, pulling all-nighters, or
smoking. These behaviors become habits when they are firmly established and performed
automatically. For example, do you have to think about putting your seatbelt on or do you
do it automatically? Habits are often developed early in life thanks to parental encouragement
or the influence of our peer group.
While these behaviors sound minor, studies have shown that those who engaged in more of
these protective habits (e.g., getting 7–8 hours of sleep regularly, not smoking or drinking
excessively, exercising) had fewer illnesses, felt better, and were less likely to die over a 9–12-
year follow-up period (Belloc & Breslow 1972; Breslow & Enstrom 1980). For college students,
health behaviors can even influence academic performance. For example, poor sleep quality
and quantity are related to weaker learning capacity and academic performance (Curcio,
Ferrara, & De Gennaro, 2006). Due to the effects that health behaviors can have, much effort
is put forward by psychologists to understand how to change unhealthy behaviors, and to
understand why individuals fail to act in healthy ways. Health promotion involves enabling
individuals to improve health by focusing on behaviors that pose a risk for future illness, as
well as spreading knowledge on existing risk factors. These might be genetic risks you are
born with, or something you developed over time like obesity, which puts you at risk for Type
2 diabetes and heart disease, among other illnesses.
There are many psychological factors that influence medical treatment outcomes. For
example, older individuals, (Meara, White, & Cutler, 2004), women (Briscoe, 1987), and those
from higher socioeconomic backgrounds (Adamson, Ben-Shlomo, Chaturvedi, & Donovan,
2008) are all more likely to seek medical care. On the other hand, some individuals who need
care might avoid it due to financial obstacles or preconceived notions about medical
practitioners or the illness. Thanks to the growing amount of medical information online,
many people now use the Internet for health information and 38% percent report that this
influences their decision to see a doctor (Fox & Jones, 2009). Unfortunately, this is not always
a good thing because individuals tend to do a poor job assessing the credibility of health
information. For example, college-student participants reading online articles about HIV and
syphilis rated a physician’s article and a college student’s article as equally credible if the
participants said they were familiar with the health topic (Eastin, 2001). Credibility of health
information often means how accurate or trustworthy the information is, and it can be
influenced by irrelevant factors, such as the website’s design, logos, or the organization’s
contact information (Freeman & Spyridakis, 2004). Similarly, many people post health
questions on online, unmoderated forums where anyone can respond, which allows for the
possibility of inaccurate information being provided for serious medical conditions by
unqualified individuals.
While the Internet has increased the amount of medical information available to the public
and created greater access, there are real concerns about how people are making decisions
about their health based on that information. [Image: Mapbox, https://goo.gl/UNhmx5, CC BY
2.0, https://goo.gl/BRvSA7]
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After individuals decide to seek care, there is also variability in the information they give their
medical provider. Poor communication (e.g., due to embarrassment or feeling rushed) can
influence the accuracy of the diagnosis and the effectiveness of the prescribed treatment.
Similarly, there is variation following a visit to the doctor. While most individuals are tasked
with a health recommendation (e.g., buying and using a medication appropriately, losing
weight, going to another expert), not everyone adheres to medical recommendations (Dunbar-
Jacob & Mortimer-Stephens, 2010). For example, many individuals take medications
inappropriately (e.g., stopping early, not filling prescriptions) or fail to change their behaviors
(e.g., quitting smoking). Unfortunately, getting patients to follow medical orders is not as easy
as one would think. For example, in one study, over one third of diabetic patients failed to
get proper medical care that would prevent or slow down diabetes-related blindness
(Schoenfeld, Greene, Wu, & Leske, 2001)! Fortunately, as mobile technology improves,
physicians now have the ability to monitor adherence and work to improve it (e.g., with pill
bottles that monitor if they are opened at the right time). Even text messages are useful for
improving treatment adherence and outcomes in depression, smoking cessation, and weight
loss (Cole-Lewis, & Kershaw, 2010).
Training as a clinical health psychologist provides a variety of possible career options. Clinical
health psychologists often work on teams of physicians, social workers, allied health
professionals, and religious leaders. These teams may be formed in locations like
rehabilitation centers, hospitals, primary care offices, emergency care centers, or in chronic
illness clinics. Work in each of these settings will pose unique challenges in patient care, but
the primary responsibility will be the same. Clinical health psychologists will evaluate physical,
personal, and environmental factors contributing to illness and preventing improved health.
In doing so, they will then help create a treatment strategy that takes into account all
dimensions of a person’s life and health, which maximizes its potential for success. Those
who specialize in health psychology can also conduct research to discover new health
predictors and risk factors, or develop interventions to prevent and treat illness. Researchers
studying health psychology work in numerous locations, such as universities, public health
departments, hospitals, and private organizations. In the related field of behavioral medicine,
careers focus on the application of this type of research. Occupations in this area might
include jobs in occupational therapy, rehabilitation, or preventative medicine. Training as a
health psychologist provides a wide skill set applicable in a number of different professional
settings and career paths.
Much of the past medical research literature provides an incomplete picture of human health.
“Health care” is often “illness care.” That is, it focuses on the management of symptoms and
illnesses as they arise. As a result, in many developed countries, we are faced with several
health epidemics that are difficult and costly to treat. These include obesity, diabetes, and
cardiovascular disease, to name a few. The National Institutes of Health have called for
researchers to use the knowledge we have about risk factors to design effective interventions
to reduce the prevalence of preventable illness. Additionally, there are a growing number of
individuals across developed countries with multiple chronic illnesses and/or lasting
disabilities, especially with older age. Addressing their needs and maintaining their quality
of life will require skilled individuals who understand how to properly treat these populations.
Health psychologists will be on the forefront of work in these areas.
With this focus on prevention, it is important that health psychologists move beyond studying
risk (e.g., depression, stress, hostility, low socioeconomic status) in isolation, and move toward
studying factors that confer resilience and protection from disease. There is, fortunately, a
growing interest in studying the positive factors that protect our health (e.g., Diener & Chan,
2011; Pressman & Cohen, 2005; Richman, Kubzansky, Maselko, Kawachi, Choo, & Bauer, 2005)
with evidence strongly indicating that people with higher positivity live longer, suffer fewer
illnesses, and generally feel better. Seligman (2008) has even proposed a field of “Positive
Health” to specifically study those who exhibit “above average” health—something we do not
think about enough. By shifting some of the research focus to identifying and understanding
these health-promoting factors, we may capitalize on this information to improve public
health.
Innovative interventions to improve health are already in use and continue to be studied.
With recent advances in technology, we are starting to see great strides made to improve
health with the aid of computational tools. For example, there are hundreds of simple
applications (apps) that use email and text messages to send reminders to take medication,
as well as mobile apps that allow us to monitor our exercise levels and food intake (in the
growing mobile-health, or m-health, field). These m-health applications can be used to raise
health awareness, support treatment and compliance, and remotely collect data on a variety
of outcomes. Also exciting are devices that allow us to monitor physiology in real time; for
example, to better understand the stressful situations that raise blood pressure or heart rate.
With advances like these, health psychologists will be able to serve the population better,
learn more about health and health behavior, and develop excellent health-improving
strategies that could be specifically targeted to certain populations or individuals. These leaps
in equipment development, partnered with growing health psychology knowledge and
exciting advances in neuroscience and genetic research, will lead health researchers and
practitioners into an exciting new time where, hopefully, we will understand more and more
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Outside Resources
Quiz: Hostility
http://www.mhhe.com/socscience/hhp/fahey7e/wellness_worksheets/wellness_worksheet_090.html
Discussion Questions
2. Which psychosocial constructs and behaviors might help protect us from the damaging
effects of stress?
3. What kinds of interventions might help to improve resilience? Who will these interventions
help the most?
4. How should doctors use research in health psychology when meeting with patients?
5. Why do clinical health psychologists play a critical role in improving public health?
The Healthy Life 649
Vocabulary
Adherence
In health, it is the ability of a patient to maintain a health behavior prescribed by a physician.
This might include taking medication as prescribed, exercising more, or eating less high-fat
food.
Behavioral medicine
A field similar to health psychology that integrates psychological factors (e.g., emotion,
behavior, cognition, and social factors) in the treatment of disease. This applied field includes
clinical areas of study, such as occupational therapy, hypnosis, rehabilitation or medicine, and
preventative medicine.
Biofeedback
The process by which physiological signals, not normally available to human perception, are
transformed into easy-to-understand graphs or numbers. Individuals can then use this
information to try to change bodily functioning (e.g., lower blood pressure, reduce muscle
tension).
Chronic disease
A health condition that persists over time, typically for periods longer than three months (e.
g., HIV, asthma, diabetes).
Control
Feeling like you have the power to change your environment or behavior if you need or want
to.
Daily hassles
Irritations in daily life that are not necessarily traumatic, but that cause difficulties and
repeated stress.
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Emotion-focused coping
Coping strategy aimed at reducing the negative emotions associated with a stressful event.
Health
According to the World Health Organization, it is a complete state of physical, mental, and
social well-being and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity.
Health behavior
Any behavior that is related to health—either good or bad.
Hostility
An experience or trait with cognitive, behavioral, and emotional components. It often includes
cynical thoughts, feelings of emotion, and aggressive behavior.
Mind–body connection
The idea that our emotions and thoughts can affect how our body functions.
Problem-focused coping
A set of coping strategies aimed at improving or changing stressful situations.
Psychoneuroimmunology
A field of study examining the relationship among psychology, brain function, and immune
function.
Psychosomatic medicine
An interdisciplinary field of study that focuses on how biological, psychological, and social
processes contribute to physiological changes in the body and health over time.
Resilience
The ability to “bounce back” from negative situations (e.g., illness, stress) to normal functioning
or to simply not show poor outcomes in the face of adversity. In some cases, resilience may
lead to better functioning following the negative experience (e.g., post-traumatic growth).
Self-efficacy
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Social integration
The size of your social network, or number of social roles (e.g., son, sister, student, employee,
team member).
Social support
The perception or actuality that we have a social network that can help us in times of need
and provide us with a variety of useful resources (e.g., advice, love, money).
Stress
A pattern of physical and psychological responses in an organism after it perceives a
threatening event that disturbs its homeostasis and taxes its abilities to cope with the event.
Stressor
An event or stimulus that induces feelings of stress.
Type A Behavior
Type A behavior is characterized by impatience, competitiveness, neuroticism, hostility, and
anger.
Type B Behavior
Type B behavior reflects the absence of Type A characteristics and is represented by less
competitive, aggressive, and hostile behavior patterns.
The Healthy Life 652
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Index