EN BANC

[A.C. No. 3360. January 30, 1990.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES , complainant, vs. ATTY. FE T. TUANDA ,

respondent.

SYLLABUS

1. LEGAL ETHICS; ATTORNEYS; GROUNDS FOR SUSPENSION FROM THE PRACTICE OF

LAW; CASE AT BAR. — The Court af rms the suspension from the practice of law imposed
by the Court of Appeals upon respondent Tuanda. The Court of Appeals correctly ruled
that "the offense [of] which she is found guilty involved moral turpitude." We should add
that violation of B.P. Blg. 22 is a serious criminal offense which deleteriously affects public
interest and public order. Respondent was thus correctly suspended from the practice of
law because she had been convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude. Sections 27 and
28 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court provide as follows: "Sec. 27. Attorneys
removed or suspended by Supreme Court on what grounds. — A member of the bar may
be removed or suspended from his of ce as attorney by the Supreme Court of any deceit,
malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such of ce, grossly immoral conduct, or by
reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath
which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience of
any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or wilfully appearing as an attorney for
a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the
purpose of gain either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes
malpractice." "Sec. 28. Suspension of Attorney by the Court of Appeals or a Court of First
Instance. — The Court of Appeals or a Court of First Instance may suspend an attorney
from practice for any of the causes named in the last preceding section, and after such
suspension such attorney shall not practice his profession until further action of the
Supreme Court in the premises."
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; CONVICTION OF A CRIME INVOLVING MORAL TURPITUDE, VALID GROUND
THEREFOR; RATIONALE. — The crimes of which respondent was convicted also import
deceit and violation of her attorney's oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility
under both of which she was bound to "obey the laws of the land." Conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude might not (as in the instant case, violation of B.P. Blg. 22 does
not) relate to the exercise of the profession of a lawyer; however, it certainly relates to and
affects the good moral character of a person convicted of such offense. In Melendrez v.
Decena, this Court stressed that: "the nature of the of ce of an attorney at law requires
that she shall be a person of good moral character. This quali cation is not only a
condition precedent to an admission to the practice of law; its continued possession is
also essential for remaining in the practice of law."

RESOLUTION

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 PER CURIAM : p

In a Motion to Lift Order of Suspension dated 12 July 1989, respondent Fe T. Tuanda, a

member of the Philippine Bar, asks this Court to lift the suspension from the practice of
law imposed upon her by a decision of the Court of Appeals dated 17 October 1988 in
C.A.-G.R. CR No. 05093.
On 17 December 1983, respondent received from one Herminia A. Marquez several pieces
of jewelry, with a total stated value of P36,000.00, for sale on a commission basis, with the
condition that the respondent would turn over the sales proceeds and return the unsold
items to Ms. Marquez on or before 14 February 1984. Sometime in February 1984,
respondent, instead of returning the unsold pieces of jewelry which then amounted to
approximately P26,250.00, issued three checks: (a) a check dated 16 February 1984 for
the amount of P5,400.00; (b) a check dated 23 February 1984 also for the amount of
P5,400.00; and (c) a check dated 25 February 1984 for the amount of P15,450.00. Upon
presentment for payment within ninety (90) days after their issuance, all three (3) checks
were dishonored by the drawee bank, Traders Royal Bank, for insuf ciency of funds.
Notwithstanding receipt of the notice of dishonor, respondent made no arrangements with
the bank concerning the honoring of checks which had bounced and made no effort to
settle her obligations to Ms. Marquez. LLpr

Consequently, four (4) informations were led against respondent with the Regional Trial
Court of Manila: (a) one for estafa, docketed as Criminal Case No. 85-38358; and (b) three
(3) for violation of B.P. Blg. 22, docketed respectively as Criminal Cases Nos. 85-38359,
85-38360 and 85-38361. In due time, after trial, the trial court rendered a decision dated
25 August 1987 which:
(a) acquitted respondent of the charge of estafa; and

(b) convicted respondent of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 in all three (3) cases,
and sentenced respondent to pay a ne of P6,000.00, with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency and to indemnify the complainant in
the amount of P5,400.00 in Criminal Case No. 85-38359;.

(c) to pay a ne of P6,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of

insolvency and to indemnify the complainant in the amount of P5,400.00,
in Criminal Case No. 85-38360; and

(d) to pay a ne of P16,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of

insolvency, and to indemnify the complainant in the amount of
P15,450.00, in Criminal Case No. 85-38361, and to pay the costs in all three
(3) cases.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CR No. 05093 af rmed in toto the decision of
the trial court but, in addition, suspended respondent Tuanda from the practice of law. The
pertinent portion of the decision reads as follows:
"For reasons above stated and nding the evidence suf cient to sustain the
conviction, the judgment is hereby AFFIRMED subject to this modification.

It appearing from the records that the accused Fe Tuanda is a member of the Bar,
and the offense for (sic) which she is found guilty involved moral turpitude, she is
hereby ordered suspended from the practice of law and shall not practice her
profession until further action from the Supreme Court, in accordance with
Sections 27 and 28 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. A copy of this decision
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 must be forwarded to the Supreme Court as required by Section 29 of the same
Rule.
SO ORDERED." 1

On 16 December 1988, respondent led a Notice of Appeal with the Court of Appeals. The
Court of Appeals, in a Resolution dated 9 January 1989, noted respondent's Notice of
Appeal and advised her "to address her Notice of Appeal to the Honorable Supreme Court,
the proper forum." On 1 February 1989, respondent filed with this Court a Notice of Appeal.
In a Resolution dated 31 May 1989, the Supreme Court noted without action respondent's
Notice of Appeal and declared that the Court of Appeals' decision of 17 October 1988 had
become nal and executory upon expiration of the period for ling a petition for review on
certiorari on 16 December 1988. In that Resolution, the Court found that respondent had
lost her right to appeal by certiorari when she posted with this Court a Notice of Appeal
instead of ling a petition for review on certiorari under Section 1, Rule 45 of the Revised
Rules of Court within the reglementary period.
In the instant Motion to Lift Order of Suspension, respondent states:
"that suspension from the practice of law is indeed a harsh if not a painful
penalty aggravating the lower court's penalty of ne considering that
accused-appellant's action on the case during the trial on the merits at the
lower court has always been motivated purely by sincere belief that she is
innocent of the offenses charged nor of the intention to cause damage to
the herein plaintiff-appellee."
We read the above statement as a claim by the respondent that, she had not violated
her oath as a member of the Philippine Bar upon the ground that when she issued the
checks which bounced, she did not intend to cause damage to complainant Ms.
Marquez. llcd

The Court af rms the suspension from the practice of law imposed by the Court of
Appeals upon respondent Tuanda. The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that "the offense
[of] which she is found guilty involved moral turpitude." We should add that violation of B.P.
Blg. 22 is a serious criminal offense which deleteriously affects public interest and public
order. In Lozano v. Martinez , 2 the Court explained the nature of the offense of violation of
B.P. Blg. 22 in the following terms:
"xxx xxx xxx
The gravamen of the offense punished by B.P. Blg. 22 is the act of
making and issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its
presentation for payment. xxx The thrust of the law is to prohibit under pain
of penal sanctions, the making of worthless checks and putting them in
circulation. Because of its deleterious effects on the public interest, the
practice is proscribed by the law. The law punishes the act not as an offense
against property but an offense against public order.
xxx xxx xxx
The effects of the issuance of a worthless check transcends the
private interests of the parties directly involved in the transaction and
touches the interests of the community at large. The mischief it creates is
not only a wrong to the payee or holder, but also an injury to the public . The
harmful practice of putting valueless commercial papers in circulation,
multiplied a thousand fold, can very well pollute the channels of trade and
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 commerce, injure the banking system and eventually hurt the welfare of
society and the public interest." 3 (Emphasis supplied)

Respondent was thus correctly suspended from the practice of law because she had been
convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude. Sections 27 and 28 of Rule 138 of the
Revised Rules of Court provide as follows:
"Sec. 27. Attorneys removed or suspended by Supreme Court on what grounds. —
A member of the bar may be removed or suspended from his office as attorney by
the Supreme Court of any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such
of ce, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to
take before admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience of any lawful order
of a superior court, or for corruptly or wilfully appearing as an attorney for a party
to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the
purpose of gain either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes
malpractice." (Emphasis supplied)

"Sec. 28. Suspension of Attorney by the Court of Appeals or a Court of First

Instance. — The Court of Appeals or a Court of First Instance may suspend an
attorney from practice for any of the causes named in the last preceding section,
and after such suspension such attorney shall not practice his profession until
further action of the Supreme Court in the premises." (Emphasis supplied)

We should add that the crimes of which respondent was convicted also import deceit
and violation of her attorney's oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility under
both of which she was bound to "obey the laws of the land." Conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude might not (as in the instant case, violation of B.P. Blg. 22 does
not) relate to the exercise of the profession of a lawyer; however, it certainly relates to
and affects the good moral character of a person convicted of such offense. In
Melendrez v. Decena, 4 this Court stressed that:
"the nature of the of ce of an attorney at law requires that she shall be a person
of good moral character. This quali cation is not only a condition precedent to an
admission to the practice of law; its continued possession is also essential for
remaining in the practice of law." 5
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to DENY the Motion to Lift Order of Suspension.
Respondent shall remain suspended from the practice of law until further orders from this
Court. A copy of this Resolution shall be forwarded to the Bar Con dant and to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and spread on the record of respondent. prLL

Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin,
Sarmiento, Cortes and Griño-Aquino, JJ., concur.
Gutierrez, Jr., Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur in the result.

Footnotes

1. Court of Appeals' Decision, p. 7; Rollo p. 14; emphasis supplied.

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 2. 146 SCRA 323 (1986).
3. 146 SCRA at 338 and 340.
4. Administrative Case No. 2104, promulgated 24 August 1989.

5. Id., slip op., p. 16; Emphasis supplied.

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