On-line Journal Modelling the New Europe

Issue no. 21/2016

HYBRID WARFARE: FROM “WAR DURING PEACE”

TO “NEO-IMPERIALIST AMBITIONS”.
THE CASE OF RUSSIA

Alexandru Constantin APETROE

M.A. Student
Faculty of European Studies, Babeş-Bolyai University
[email protected]

Abstract
The term “hybrid warfare” has been used to refer to the combined usage of unconventional military tactics such
as conventional warfare with irregular warfare and cyberwarfare, as well as the employment of other
instruments and tactics (subversive elements), to achieve a double goal: first to avoid responsibility and
retribution, and second to weaken and destabilize the enemy without direct involvement. The rigidity of the
current international system pertaining to the usage of non-peaceful methods of solving an international dispute
and/or furthering state interests, have made it increasing difficulty, without the support of the international
community (humanitarian interventions and UN-sanctioned interventions) to employ the ‘classical methods’
which pre-date the provisions of the UN Charter, relevant to what we now consider as “acts of aggression”.
Discussing the resurgence of the Russian Federation as a great power, we argue that because of the innate
historical and traditional factors of Russian geopolitics, it was only a matter of time until the Kremlin’s military
doctrine pivoted from the defensive phase it entered after the fall of the Soviet Union, to the pro-active
involvement at the limit of international law: Georgia in 2008, East Ukraine in 2013, Crimea in 2014, and Syria
in 2015. Therefore, in this article we will contend, firstly, by discussing the example of the perception of the so-
called Russian “Gerasimov doctrine”, that hybrid war can have two different connotations: “war during
peace” and “neo-imperial ambitions”. Secondly, we will try to argue that the NATO military doctrine of
deterrence has become obsolete, still envisaging the possible threats posed by a future Russian involvement in
the Baltic and Eastern Europe in cold-war terms and not in terms relevant to the shifting international security
environment.

Keywords: Russia; Hybrid warfare; Crimea; NATO; Neo-imperialism.

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Introduction

Following the involvement of Russia in Georgia in 2008, the annexation of Crimea in

2014, an event which literally took the world by surprise and the follow-up in Eastern
Ukraine 2014-present, western military analysts and NATO enthusiasts rushed to announce
the new threat posed by “Russia’s hybrid warfare against Ukraine” (Umland, 2016). This new
‘Russian invention’ could very well be used in the future against NATO member states in the
Baltic region or Eastern Europe. However, the frequency with which the term is employed
alongside Russia’s military involvements in the former Soviet space or furthering Russian
interests abroad seems, we believe, somewhat suspicious. If we simply analyse the phases of
which a “hybrid war” is composed (conventional and unconventional military tactics and
operations, direct foreign involvement such as the support of political protests, economic
warfare, cyberwarfare and (dis) informational and propaganda campaigns), we can reach the
conclusion that it is not a novelty.
Hybrid war, in its “classical interpretation” (i.e. the methods employed) is not strictly
limited to neither Russia (the US, some European member states, even some Asian states
have used it/are using it41), nor to nation-states or state-like entities (Daesh in Syria and Iraq,
other insurgent groups worldwide). Yet, according to Puyvelde, “the term ‘hybrid warfare’
appeared at least as early as 2005 and was subsequently used to describe the strategy used
by the Hezbollah in the 2006 Lebanon War”, adding that since then, “it has dominated much

41
In this respect, the Southeast Asia theatre (South China Sea) is comprised by a multitude of various small
states (compared to China’s might), insurgent/irredentist political entities, which are “ideologically or culturally
opaque for Chinese hybrid warfare actors”, therefore the finality or end-game envisaged by Beijing is not
territorial and/or political control (as we saw with Georgia, Crimea and the Donbass region) but rather economic
and regional dominance. Another factor is the limited interest of the region, considered as a de facto sphere of
influence of China, again, as compared to Ukraine and the Black Sea region which are very close to the political
and military borders of NATO and the EU, particularly if we invest in the interpretation of the political
dimension of US-NATO’s Aegis BMDS in Eastern Europe as a political rather than military claim in the area
(Miani, 2016).
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of the discussion about modern and future warfare, to the point where it has been adopted by
senior military leaders and promoted as a basis for modern military strategies” (Puyvelde,
2015).
In addition, in one opinion (Wither, 2016), the emergence of “hybrid warfare” poses a
series of interesting yet potentially dangerous consequences. First, he discusses the
superfluous usage of the term to address the “complexity of twenty-first-century warfare”,
which is difficult to understand by the traditional monochrome approach divided into ‘war
and peace’. Second, “hybrid warfare entered the public domain” arriving in the centre of
attention after the Russians ‘pulled one’ on the West with Crimea, thus becoming politically
infused and a major concern for Western governments” (Wither, 2016, p. 74).
Therefore, we pose the question “how has ‘hybrid warfare’ become the designated
denomination of Russia’s involvement in the former Soviet Union’s zone of control”? Firstly,
there is no legitimate proof that the Russian Federation switched from its former Soviet
“vital-space” geopolitical doctrine to the “Velikiy limitrofnyy doctrine”42 and then towards
the so-called “Gerasimov doctrine”43 in just a decade. Secondly, military doctrine-wise and

42
The post-Soviet Russian concept of “Velikiy limitrofnyy” (“Great Limitrophe” or Island Russia,) was a
reinterpretation of early pre-Soviet buffer-zones and satellite-states theory (creation of the Little USSR in
Eastern and Southern Europe), as to ‘shield’ and ‘protect’ the vulnerable Russian territory from the influence of
the West (Khatuntsev, 2008). While some argue that this type of geopolitical thinking is outdated, we disagree,
as we believe that this concept is very much in line with the main strategic advantage that Russia possesses – its
huge territory and large uninhabited hostile environment. Because of this, one cannot possibly conquer Russia
without first surrounding it, therefore, the control of the regions adjacent to it is of paramount importance
(Wilson, 2014).
43
*Discussing the “Gerasimov doctrine”, Douglas Farrah writes: “General Valery Gerasimov, the Chief of Staff
of the Russian Federation’s military, developed The Gerasimov Doctrine in recent years. The doctrine posits
that the rules of war have changed, that there is a “blurring of the lines between [the states of] war and peace”
(Farrah, 2016) and that “non-military means of achieving military and strategic goals has grown and, in many
cases, exceeded the power of weapons in their effectiveness.” Gerasimov argues for asymmetrical actions that
combine the use of Special Forces and information warfare that create “a permanently operating front through
the entire territory of the enemy state” (Galeotti, 2014).
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from Putin’s standpoint, hybrid warfare is considered simply as the means by which Russia
can reclaim the lost title of “great power”, and by judging the string of actions (from the 2008
war in Georgia to its 2015 involvement in Syria), simply as a military instrument devoid of
any higher political meaning above the one which the Kremlin has given it, of re-assessing its
former spheres of influence. Thirdly, on the international level, the importance of hybrid
warfare is that of either avoidance of responsibility, as it is very difficult in the current
Geneva system44 and UN Charter definition of aggression45, to pursue a state which is
suspected of breaking international law and the laws of war if the methods used add-up to
those which can be part of a hybrid warfare; or as a clear signal given to contesters and allies
alike by the use of intimidation (in the form of muscle-flexing and aggressive stance) and
also by taking some insurance (in the form of an example of what will happen) against the

**Valery Gerasimov also writes, in the context of the Syrian civil war, of the existence of “non-linear conflicts”
and he elaborates some on the usage of integrating military tactic into a broader and larger principal direction.
He formulates that: “the focus of applied methods of conflict has altered in the direction of the broad use of
political, economic, informational, humanitarian, and other non-military measures—applied in coordination
with the protest potential of the population. All this is supplemented by military means of a concealed character,
including carrying out actions of informational conflict and the actions of special-operations forces. The open
use of forces – often under the guise of peacekeeping and crisis regulation – is resorted to only at a certain stage,
primarily for the achievement of final success in the conflict” (Gerasimov, 2013, p. 476).
44
Referring to the employment of unofficially recognized armed forces, in particular those without distinctive
signs or military insignia, their usage is condemned as a breach of the Laws of war. (Pfanner, 2004, pp. 103-
118).
45
“This definition makes a distinction between aggression (which "gives rise to international responsibility")
and war of aggression (which is "a crime against international peace"). Acts of aggression are defined as armed
invasions or attacks, bombardments, blockades, armed violations of territory, permitting other states to use one's
own territory to perpetrate acts of aggression and the employment of armed irregulars or mercenaries to carry
out acts of aggression. A war of aggression is a series of acts committed with a sustained intent. The definition's
distinction between an act of aggression and a war of aggression make it clear that not every act of aggression
would constitute a crime against peace; only war of aggression does. States would nonetheless be held
responsible for acts of aggression” (Dinstein, 2003, p. 118); Definition of Aggression, General Assembly
Resolution 3314 (XXIX) 14 December 1974.
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prospective perfidy of allies.

As such, we consider that “hybrid warfare” cannot be totally equated or considered as
Russia’s definitive replacement doctrine or as a purposely novel military theory or
particularly, a new type of Russian threat towards NATO’s borders. Taking into consideration
the “hybrid” character of hybrid warfare, it seems very difficult to us to assume that any
military doctrine involving the hybridisation and combination of Cold War era tactics with
modern ones will become an original concept employed only by the Kremlin. It seems, from
the perspective of NATO and the US, that labelling Russian involvement in Ukraine and the
Crimea is a reactionary and tardive response to a rapid upscaling, military investment and
political muscle-flexing on the part of the Russian Federation which has surprised everyone,
even though nobody seemed to think the same in 2008 as Putin invaded Georgia. However
NATO and the EU felt seriously threatened by the Russian annexation of Crimea and the war
in the Donbass. Consequently, a plethora of military analysts have rushed to classify the ‘new
Russian threat of hybrid warfare’ in an effort to understand why all except the Russians have
been caught off-guard in the shifting realm of modern warfare46. But, continuing to envisage
the Kremlin’s actions in Cold War terms poses in our opinion two significant draw-backs.
First, from NATO’s perspective, is shows the complacency and the strategic imbalance in
which it finds itself as its military doctrine of deterrence has become obsolete, being severely
limited by the Article 5 provisions, and by the fact the NATO cannot respond fast enough to
the non-linear threats of today’s challenging security environment. Second, from the
European perspective, Russia, still being viewed as a possible aggressor, is theoretically
capable of launching an attack with great chances of success47, because the mainstay of

46
Though we do not support this view, it is interesting to see a very wide debate over the real nature of hybrid
warfare, which many consider it as being a tool of the Kremlin, as some authors write: “For now, Russia seems
to hold the edge in the Hybrid War in Ukraine: it has successfully annexed Crimea and effectively turned
Ukraine in a state on the brink of wider failure” (Bachmann and Gunneriusson, 2015, p. 207).
47
There are fears, particularly in the Baltic region, that Russia is developing capabilities so as to disrupt, if not
fully control, the maritime lines of communication between the Baltic States, Poland and NATO. In respect to
the A2/AD (“anti-access/area denial”) Russia has developed a multitude of weapons systems, complex areal
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NATO’s military hardware is deployed in the Western part of Europe, and not the Eastern
part, in which countries like Poland and the Baltic states, perceive the threat of a Russian
aggression much more higher than Italy, Germany or France.

Defining “Hybrid warfare”, a heuristically flawed concept?

The usage of the term “hybrid warfare” is not a new choice of words48, neither from
the syntax nor from the rhetoric aspects. War has never been a static field, it changed
alongside the development of human society and in fact, all wars were more or less hybrid, in
the sense that they combined different tactics, aspects, instruments and methods to insure the
victor’s advantage. However, the recent decades saw war change rapidly. This happened not
particularly in the sense of a positive shift towards modern military technology and increased
capabilities, but in the sense of a limitation of traditional operations. This is characterized by
a change from the classic land-air-sea based warfare, theorized in the Cold War period,
towards a more subtle deployment of forces (Special Forces, Black Ops etc.) such as surgical

defence systems, and coastal defence systems, as well as land- and sea-based as well as air-launched cruise
missiles and tactical ballistic missile platforms. This poses a threat that these capabilities can be used by Russia
in a complex joint-arms attack by coordinating its naval surface and submarine forces, electronic and cyber
warfare, and other capabilities, targeting special areas, designated as “bubbles”. (Shirreff and Olex-Szczytowski,
2016, p. 2).
48
Bertina Renz (2016, p. 287) cites that the term “hybrid warfare” was first coined by Frank Hoffman (2007) as
a response to the mutations in the post-Cold war environment which he observed in the conflict areas of interest
to the US, in the sense of trying to define “the success achieved by comparatively weak opponents – non-state
actors such as the Taliban, Al Qaeda or Hezbollah – against the vastly technologically and numerically superior
militaries of the US coalition forces in Afghanistan and Iraq and Israeli forces in the 2006 Lebanon war” and
“the coordinated and combined use of different modes of warfare, both military (use of force) and non-military
(irregular tactics, criminal disorder, terrorist acts, and so on), to achieve ‘synergistic effects in the physical and
psychological dimensions of conflict’ within the main battlespace”.
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strikes, drone warfare, cyberwarfare and non-peaceful methods of settling disputes49. If we

consider the heavily criticised conceptualisations of Smith’s “modern wars” and Kaldor’s
“new wars” (as cited by Erol and Oğuz, 2015, p. 262), the scene was set for hybrid warfare as
a novel area for discussion in academic circles. Yet despite the fact that “both use of the term
and the study of hybrid warfare are new compared to the long history of warfare” (Erol and
Oğuz, 2015, p. 262), this changed because in the aftermath of the 9/11 and with the War and
Terror and other non-linear conflicts (the 2006 Israel-Lebanon War, and the 2008 Russo-
Georgian War), the asymmetric element became the defamatory characteristic of hybrid
warfare. In line with the above, Wither (Wither, 2016, p. 75-76) remarks on the inflection
point, the year 2014, as a defining point from which hybrid warfare changed. Before 2014,
the most cited example of hybrid warfare was the Israeli-Lebanese conflict (2006). After
2014 (Crimea and East Ukraine) the focus on Russia’s perceived success was at an all-time
high, with the former NATO Secretary General Rasmussen affirming that the Russian
involvement was a hybrid warfare.
Owning there is no clear or universally-accepted definition, in particularly when it is
being used either as a catch-all term for all non-linear threats (the US usage of the term
“hybrid threats”50) or as abstract term referring to irregular methods of countering a

49
Non-peaceful methods imply any accepted customary/codified institutions in public international law
(Lawrence, 1910), such as: reprisals, embargo, armed reprisals (not to be confused with military aggression or
simple reprisals, Hans Kelsen (as cited by Bernstorff, 2010), writes that: “armed reprisals are a limited
(decentralized) intervention into the sphere of state interests”).
50
In 2008, the US Army Chief of Staff defined a “hybrid threat” as “an adversary that incorporates diverse and
dynamic combinations of conventional, irregular, terrorist and criminal capabilities”. Also, the US Joint Forces
Command defines the concept as being “any adversary that simultaneously and adaptively employs a tailored
mix of conventional, irregular, terrorism and criminal means or activities in the operational battle space. Rather
than a single entity, a hybrid threat or challenger may be a combination of state and non-state actors”. In 2011,
the US Army came up with another definition, as “the diverse and dynamic combination of regular forces,
irregular forces, criminal elements, or a combination of these forces and elements all unified to achieve mutually
benefiting effects”. NATO’s definition is somewhat similar, using the term to describe “adversaries with the
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conventionally superior force (the case of modern guerrilla and insurgent warfare, adding
also the threat posed by Daesh), “hybrid warfare” can be interpreted differently, relevant to
the source of the hybrid actions: a state or a non-state actor51. This is important if we desire
to discern if the current Russian “Gerasimov doctrine”, which makes use heavily of hybrid
warfare (in certain situations), can be considered as being either a new type of “hybrid
warfare”, or has completely switched to “hybrid warfare” as their main military doctrine.
A definition of “hybrid warfare” could be formulated only by taking into account
certain elements and characteristics (Johnson and McCulloh, 2013, pp. 1-17). The first is the
existence of a non-standard, complex and fluid (hybrid) adversary52. The second implies that
the hybrid adversary uses a combination of conventional and irregular methods (hence the
hybridisation phase). Third, said adversary is flexible and adapts quickly (hence the term
fluid). Fourth, said adversary uses advanced weapons systems and other disruptive
technologies (this could imply the involvement of a stately and/or terrorist entity). Fifth, said
adversary employs mass communication for propaganda purposes (again, a more subtle
usage of hybridisation, albeit on a non-military level). Finally, according to one opinion
(Pindják, 2014), hybrid warfare takes place on three distinct battlefields: (a) the conventional
battlefield (operation theatres), (b) the indigenous population in the conflict zone (if we
consider insurgency and/or terrorist aspects53), and (c) at the level of the international
community.

ability to simultaneously employ conventional and non-conventional means adaptively in pursuit of their
objectives” (Fleming, 2011, pp. 1-3, 22-24).
51
For example, it is argued that both Russia and Daesh have used hybrid warfare, though we do not agree with
this opinion, that irrespective of the source (actors) hybrid warfare is the use of different tactics with either
similar or with the same results: “what characterizes the hybrid approach is the fact that all the means at a state
or non-state actor’s disposal […] are combined to achieve a political goal” (Lasconjarias and Larsen, 2015, pp.
3-4).
52
For example, the case of the 2006 Lebanon War, between Hezbollah and Israel (Grant, 2008).
53
For example, Daesh has been viewed as a “hybrid threat” because of its mixed usage of hybrid tactics, fluid
formations, cruel use of terror for propaganda purposes and recruitment tactics, all integrated within its
transnational aspirations, (Jasper and Moreland, 2014).
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Other interpretations take into account different elements or conditions. One of these
is represented by a clear political purpose: hybrid warfare is any action of the enemy which
instantly and coherently uses a complex combination of authorized weapons, guerrilla
warfare, terrorism and criminal behaviour on the battlefield, to achieve political goals
(Hoffman, 2009a, pp. 35-36). Another is the employment of all types of war, conventional,
irregular or terrorist, including even criminal behaviour (Hoffman, 2009b, p. 5)54. Also,
relative to tactical and military variations, hybrid war “erases the differences between
conventional and irregular wars” (Isherwood, 2009, p. 3), or as Johnson (2015, p. 11) puts it,
“blurring the line between peace and war”.
From an operational perspective (Balan, 2016, pp. 319-321), hybrid war can be
explained via the existence of several conditions: (1) the employment of a “combination of
state and non-state actors” in conducting the hybrid actions; (2) the “attribution of the
conflict” or “the absence of assumption” by the actors involved in the action; (3) the use of
“intermediaries” in conjecture with “informational warfare”. This interpretation shows that
strictly from the standpoint of the military, hybrid warfare is a relatively widespread tactic,
not at all limited to only a handful of actors.
Therefore, keeping in mind the abovementioned aspects, we would define “hybrid
warfare” as follows: a situation in which a non-standard, complex and fluid adversary is
using a combination of conventional and irregular methods, employing advanced weapons
systems and other disruptive technologies, whilst also employing means of mass
communication for propaganda purposes, in a mixed theatre of operations (conventional,
local, international) with the intent (overt or covert) of furthering the general interests of,
including but not limited to, a known emerging, established, political or stately entity.
However, the ambiguity and the complexity of the proposed definition is accentuated
by the fact that if some scholars prefer the term “hybrid warfare”, the military prefers the
term “hybrid threat”. As such, we can assume that in an in extenso interpretation, “hybrid

54
Hoffman gives the example of Hezbollah, which has evolved from a non-state actor towards a hybrid of
guerrillas and regular troops, by “studying and deconstructing the capabilities employed by Western forces”.
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threats”, which are perceived as emanating from a stately entity or are conducted and/or
benefit a certain state, are transformed via the infusion of political interests (“political
warfare”55) in “hybrid warfare”. As a result, they become immoral and barely-legitimated
(from the perspective of international law) methods of eluding international responsibility for
acts which, in normal circumstances, would attract the culpability of the state in question.
Thus we can assume that the definition of “political warfare” proposed by Kennan 56 can very
well overlap with the one of “hybrid warfare”, though in the sense of a hybridisation between
complex political interests and compound military tactics.
With regard to the roots of “hybrid threats”, Fleming considers that the contemporary
usage of mixed tactics correspond and operate “from the same principles the Soviets
envisaged for conventional war” adding that using a multidimensional matrix, “they
aggregate a combination of simultaneous and sequential military actions to attain political
and military objectives” (Fleming, 2011, p. 30). Interestingly, Fleming also speaks about the
“sine qua non condition of hybrid threats” (Fleming, 2011, p. 29), which he calls
“unrestricted form of operational art”, also citing the definition of the concept of “operational
art” given by US Joint Chiefs of Staff:
“Application of creative imagination by commanders and staff supported by
their skill, knowledge, and experience to design strategies, campaigns, and
major operations and organize and employ military forces. Operational art
integrates ends, ways, and means across the levels of war…without operational

55
The concept of “political warfare” could be explained as a means to limit the effects of a conflict or any other
possible threat to national security, whilst keeping the state’s interests abroad well supported. In the words of
Michael Noonan, “while the publics’ mood for involvement in further overseas adventures is less than sanguine,
it still remains important for the United States to at least try to be able to shape events on the ground overseas
with as little force as possible or else live with the consequences of outcomes that may call for the use of more
force down the road” (Noonan as cited by Hoffman, 2014).
56
George Kennan defined political warfare as “the employment of all the means at a nation’s command, short of
war, to achieve its national objectives” (Kennan, 1948).
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art, campaigns and operations would be a set of disconnected engagements”. 57

This vision makes sense since the military and the political spheres are highly
dependent one from the other, almost becoming a single entity. This is largely due to the
extreme difficulty in dissociating politics from the military, especially in states without a
clear separation of powers, and where the society is more or less familiarised with
authoritarian regimes.

The different perspectives of “hybrid warfare” as the “new Russian military

doctrine” and as a “deterrence factor” against perceived Russian “hybrid threats”

Discussing the perception of the recent Russian involvements in East Ukraine and
Syria, it is important to understand how the Russian Federation’s military doctrine has
evolved and how it was integrated into the larger geopolitical context of the time. Starting
from the classic military doctrine of the Soviet Union (the vital space, buffer-zones), deeply
influenced by defensive realism as the USSR was considered as a “one-dimensional
superpower” (Odom, 1988). After the fall of the Soviet Union, the Kremlin opted towards a
doctrine characterized by revolutionary expansionism and initiative-taking actions as to
insure its defence and interests abroad. A good example of this are the BRICS initiative and
the pivot towards Asia as “coexistence and soft-power policy” envisaged as “complex three-
stage strategy: soft power helps to build up normative power which in turn helps to shape the
future world order in Russia’s and BRICS’ image” (Sergunin, 2015). Though it can be
considered that the current conflict in Ukraine has challenged the classical concepts of
warfare (divided into irregular and conventional) “the current crisis […] does not fit neat
Western categories of ‘war’, in one sense it’s a civil war, or perhaps a proxy war that pits
Ukraine against Russia” (Hoffman, 2014). This is largely due to the complexity of the actors
involved: the national government, the separatist forces, the ultra-nationalists, foreign
volunteers and Russian military personnel.

57
Joint Operation Planning, Joint Publication (5-0, IV-1), (Fleming, 2011, p. 29).
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From NATO’s perspective, the situation in Ukraine is a convincing argument that

hybrid warfare has two main purposes. At ground level, hybrid conflicts involve complex
multidimensional efforts (clandestine actions) designed to “destabilise a functioning state and
polarize its society”, and as a direct consequence “unlike conventional warfare, the ‘centre of
gravity’ is […] a target population”. At the international level, it tries to “influence influential
policy-makers and key decision makers by combining kinetic operations with subversive
efforts”, with the goal of “avoiding attribution or retribution” (Pindják, 2014). The end-result
will be difficult to interpret, as NATO cannot initiate any retaliatory actions outside the
provisions of Article 5, being limited only to deterrence measures. This is particularly so in
the Baltic region, though the deployment costs of a deterrence force and the difficult
decision-taking process at NATO’s level are, in absolute terms, a significant drawback to any
re-deployment plans. Though, some argue (Shlapak and Johnson, 2016) that: “it is hard to say
that it is a fortiori unaffordable, especially in comparison to the potential costs of failing to
defend NATO’s most exposed and vulnerable allies”.
Yet it is also true that the so-called “red line” has never been crossed (Michel, 2015),
because Putin does not have the desire to provoke a conflict between NATO and Russia. On
this account, the whole bellicose posture in which NATO finds itself now, is not actually
needed, with the exception as a badly needed reassurance factor for the Baltic and Eastern
Europe NATO member states. However, we believe that it’s very difficult from the
perspective of abovementioned states to ‘trust’ Russia with not attacking them. If we take for
example, the 2007 cyberattacks on Estonia (Kozlowski, 2014, p. 238), Georgia in 2008
(Bachmann, 2011, p. 16), the coup de main in Crimea58 and the protracted conflict in East
Ukraine, all of these attest to the reluctance of the Eastern NATO Member states in their
relationship with Russia. Also, there are some who voice the threats posed by the “fifth
columns”: “groups of individuals, usually acting covertly, embedded within a much larger
58
Renz (2016, p. 298) writes that “the description of Russian foreign policy vis-à-vis the West as ‘hybrid
warfare’ unnecessarily militarizes the language of international politics in an already tense situation. The reason
why ‘hybrid warfare’ is considered ‘hybrid’ in the first place is because it uses a mixture of both military and
non-military approaches”.
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population that they seek to undermine” (Lanoszka, 2016, p. 179) as the casus belli to
intervene. This tactic, which has been used in the Luhansk and Donetsk regions (the Russian-
speaking minority), brought into discussion the Russian minority in the Baltic States (Estonia
in particular) (Lanoszka, 2016, p. 187) as a possible vulnerability for a Russian involvement.
In addition, to complicate the situation, deterrence59 has always been seen as the best
option. NATO is vaguely trying to keep-up to Moscow’s muscle-flexing reminiscent of Cold
War days, as a response to their large military exercises in the Baltic and Arctic regions 60,
some of them involving the deployment of strategic ballistic missiles (Michel, 2015). This
was seen as crucial after the independence of Kosovo in 2008 and the so-called “five-day”
war in Georgia in the same year. However, this was the case until recently (2014), when
Russia decided to destabilise Ukraine and annex Crimea. Furthermore in 2015, Russia
decided to simultaneously involve itself into both the Syrian Civil War and the fight against
Daesh, taking the world by surprise once more.
Notwithstanding the ambiguity of the term “hybrid warfare”, Russia’s actions can be,

59
Discussing about deterrence, it is important to add that this concept (alongside containment) were devised to
deal with the threats posed by the former Soviet Union and not the Russian Federation. In today’s terms,
NATO’s defensive stance is not sufficiently aggressive to achieve the deterrence result. This is due to the fact
that NATO, as comprised by its 28 member states, requires a complicated system of prior approvals integrated
in a slow decision-making process, which cannot hope (as it has been envisaged) to compete with the swiftness
of Kremlin’s small group of decedents. This clearly shows that NATO was designed not as a pro-active and
offensive military alliance, but rather as a passive-defensive emanation of a political consensus in the military
sphere. A good example of NATO’s intrinsic weakness is the self-limitation imposed as not to antagonize
Russia while investing in defensive cyber capabilities (i.e. refraining from using offensive cyber operations) and
helping Ukraine with its similar project which is equal with limiting the field options and giving your enemy the
advantage of initiating first contact (El Fertasi and de Vivo, 2016).
60
For example the “Zapad” (“West”) military exercise in 2013 held jointly with Belorussia (Druzhinin, 2013),
which followed an established pattern by rehearsing offensive operations towards the West (the Baltic States).
The main purpose of the exercise was strengthening the cooperation between the various branches and sectors of
the military, the use of joint actions, usage of modern technologies, “with emphasis on the experimental use of
automated command and control, and combining civilian agencies and the military in a mobilized format”.
(Shirreff and Olex-Szczytowski, 2016, p. 6).
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therefore, interpreted in various ways, giving rise to the fear of a suspicious overextension of
its sphere of influence. In one opinion, “there can be no credible defence, and therefore
deterrence, without an effective joint defence plan that unifies military capabilities […]
maritime, land, air, cyber, and space domains” (Shirreff and Olex-Szczytowski, 2016, p. 12).
Yet if we analyse the phrase we can clearly see that is points towards elements of “hybrid
warfare” and therefore, NATO’s response towards the Russian threat of “hybrid warfare”
would be a “hybrid warfare” of its own, to ensure that the deterrence factor is being
implemented. Yet what is most concerning is fact that the Russians have the advantage in
using a relatively flexible decision-taking system (due to the concentration of powers61), as
compared with NATO’s system characterized by the fact that it uses complicated and time-
consuming consensus and consultation procedures. Thus, NATO is forced to act as a
defensive alliance and at the same time invest in deterrence moves to counter the “hybrid
threat” posed by Russia to reassure its Eastern members. However, the decrease in
capabilities during the last decades, in particular that of the Land Forces personnel, “were
significant” (Shirreff and Olex-Szczytowski, 2016, p. 9). They were replaced by light
counter-terrorist and counter-insurgency units which were better suited to counter the
problems posed by today’s security threats and which were shaped by the expeditionary
tactics used in Iraq and Afghanistan. As such, NATO which abandoned “standard tactics”
finds itself in a difficult position to mount a defence against a possible traditional threat from
Russia, threat which would involve, in its majority, conventional weapons and not elements
of hybrid war. The Very High Readiness Joint Task Force of approx. 5000 troops, even if
they manage to mobilize quickly, may still be too late to “deter Russian adventurism”
(Wither, 2016, p. 85). In addition, one of the biggest problems we see when countering
Russian hybrid tactics is their flexibility and adaptability. If we take the example of Ukraine,
in late 2014, the Russian switched from hybrid tactics to a series of surgical strikes, meant to

61
Or as Johnson (2015, p. 10) sees it, as a modern STAVKA, as he argues that Putin has placed the entire
Russian military and its population “at or near war footing”, by centralizing and restructuring the entire
decision-making system.
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crush the Ukrainian army. It will be very problematic we believe, if NATO troops, trained to
counter hybrid treats, will meet conventional enemy troops on the battlefield.
The Russian perspective on “hybrid warfare” mirrors the Western one. This is done
by assuming that it, more precisely the highly controversial Russian-style of “hybrid
warfare”, is in fact legitimate or gains legitimacy as a valid countermeasure. In this light,
Russia will continue to view the US run NATO as the main antagonist and as its principal
security threat. As such, the relationship between Russia and the West will always be marred
by fears of conflict, in spite of any actions undertaken to stabilize the situation. Discussing
this theory, Samuel Charap writes that:
“[…] both perspectives are equally misguided; Russian strategists use the term
‘hybrid war’ to refer to alleged US efforts to weaken and ultimately overthrow
unfriendly governments, particularly, but not exclusively, the Russian
government, using a variety of kinetic and non-kinetic means” (Charap, 2015,
p. 51).
He also writes that, in the case in Ukraine, the Kremlin considered that is was in fact
the US which launched a ‘successful operation’ (or “hybrid war”) to replace the former
President Yanukovych with a puppet government, so as to forcefully rip Ukraine from the
sphere of influence of Russia. Also, it was done as a military exercise for a future similar
operation in Russia (Charap, 2015, pp. 51-52). Discussing the so-called “Gerasimov
doctrine”, McDermott (2016, pp. 101-102) writes that General Gerasimov, learning from the
experience of the Syrian Civil War, “examines hybrid warfare in connection with high-
technology weaponry”, and that he interprets hybrid war “as a foreign rather than a Russian”,
connecting what he considers a negative Western influence in Syria (Arab Spring) with the
threats posed by a similar intervention into Russia (the Colour revolutions). McDermott’s
argues that in essence, what Gerasimov postulates is the paradoxical idea that if Russia’s
adversaries possess “hybrid capabilities” and may seek to destabilize Russia through colour-
type revolutions, “Moscow then needs its own form of hybrid capability to counteract this
threat” (McDermott, 2016, p. 101 and Kofman, 2016).
Approaching the so-called “Gerasimov doctrine”, Michael Kofman argues that:
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“it seems unlikely that after barely a few months on the job Gerasimov wrote
the Rosetta Stone for Russian military thinking, […] and that within a year
the Russian General Staff had moved this collection of observations […] into
a brilliant hybrid warfare campaign in Ukraine” (Kofman, 2016).
In support of this view, Charles Bartles writes: “[…] it is important to keep in mind
that Gerasimov is simply explaining his view of the operational environment and the nature
of future war, and not proposing a new Russian way of warfare or military doctrine” (Bartles,
2016, pp. 30-37).
In our opinion, McDermott, Hoffman and Bartles have some credit, in the sense that if
we look at Russia’s post-Soviet period, in particular towards the Caucasus, we can clearly
observe that their involvement in the area (The Chechen Wars) have made them more open to
what Gerasimov calls “non-linear war” (Gerasimov, 2013). In essence, this represents the
adaptation of traditional warfare tactics to modern guerrilla warfare, and the combined
support from other instruments controlled by the state (media, cyber-security, economy, etc.)
As such, “the purpose of using non-military means of achieving political and strategic goals
has grown” and, in many cases, “have exceeded the power of force of weapons in their
effectiveness” (Gerasimov, as cited by Charap, p. 53). Therefore, the result of this was to use
the past experiences for consolidating Russia’s defences against all possible threats. Charap
continues with the fact that this is not actually a new military doctrine, but in fact, an analysis
of the ways and methods used by the United States in their military involvements abroad,
again for defensive purposes. Therefore, the Russian perspective on “hybrid warfare” seems
almost the same as the Western one, with the big difference that the source of “hybrid
warfare” is each other, and with the fact that the Russians have taken a more pro-active
stance involving threats which they perceive as “vital”.

The Russian involvement in Ukraine – a classic case of “hybrid warfare” or the

“new war” in practice?

After the Euromaidan protests which led to the Ukrainian Revolution of 2014 and the
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flight of the deposed president Viktor Yanukovych, Russian soldiers without insignias (the
“little green men”62) took control of strategic positions and infrastructure within Crimea. This
lead to the Annexation of the Crimean Peninsula in March 2014 and the subsequent tensions
in Eastern Ukraine (the Donbass regions of Luhansk and Donetsk) which erupted into an all-
out civil war. In the first phase of the conflict (from March-July until September 2014)
Russian military personnel contributed to the defeat of the Ukrainian army. In November
2014, by using humanitarian aid convoys, Russia supplied the separatists with a variety of
military hardware and ammunition. These events, which repeated in August 2015, were
observed by the OSCE, which reported a number of special transit zones alongside the
Donbass-Russian porous border, controlled by mixed separatist-Russian security forces.
If we return to the example of Crimea, some consider this as a clear sign of “new
war”, (Galeotti, 2016, p. 285) with emphasis on the “the distinctiveness [which] appears not
so much in essence, but in degree” (Galeotti, 2016, p. 285), which is interpreted as referring
to the Western perception of Russian counterinsurgency tactics in Crimea as a ‘traditional
war’ between two stately entities (Russia vs. Ukraine) but enacted using ‘hybrid tactics’.
Other authors, though, contest this interpretation, accentuating a supportive (adjacent)
presence, dismissing the primary role given to the presence of Russian Special Forces’
elements in Crimea:
“in the annexation of Crimea, which was a classic covert operation to enable a
conventional invasion — the lead element was Russia’s 810th Naval Infantry
Brigade, already based in Crimea as part of the Black Sea Fleet […] there were
some irregular aspects, like an information warfare element and a circus of
inconsequential auxiliaries, but what measurable significance did they have in
relation to Russia’s deployment of special forces, elite infantry, and
conventional capability?” (Kofman, 2016).
62
Multiple sources cite that the “little green men” (in Western media) or (“polite people” – “вежливые люди,
vezhlivye lyudi” in Russian-oriented media (Oliphant, 2014)) were in fact members of Russian Spetsnaz Special
Forces: the 45th Detached Guards Regiment, 3rd Brigade, as well as elements of the 16th Brigade (Galeotti,
2016, p. 284 and Bukkvoll, 2016, pp. 15-17)
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Furthermore, we must take into consideration the fact that “hybrid tactics are neither
new, nor exclusively (or primarily) a Russian invention, […] Western states have often used
elements of it quite effectively, at least on a tactical level” (Popescu, 2015). In the early 2015,
the Kremlin decided to abandon the ‘hybrid tactics’ it has used up until then and concentrate
on ‘traditional tactics’ (Charap, 2015, p. 55) such as shelling Ukrainian Army positions from
over the border (Borger and Higgins, 2015) and using “volunteers” to boost the ranks of the
separatist forces. Also, some evidence (provided by NATO) has surfaced which positively
identifies elements of Russian armour used by separatist forces. Most importantly, NATO
experts pointed out that the tanks in question did not have any military markings (a
previously used tactic from Crimea and subsequently used in the Donbass) and that the
camouflage paint used on the vehicles was not like any used by the Ukrainian army, thus
“voiding the argument that all tanks were simply captured from Ukrainian military stockpiles
or from attacks on military bases” (Abbot, 2016, pp. 12-13).
In addition, we can view Ukraine not as a “hybrid warfare in the experimental phase”,
but rather as “the only hybrid warfare” which Russia can fully support (for now). By
analysing the underlying causes of the Russian intervention in the East of Ukraine, we can
discern that the relative success which the Russian enjoyed is not at all due to their “new type
of war” or the greatness of the “Gerasimov doctrine” but rather due to the special
characteristics of Ukraine and the very special circumstances in which it finds itself.
First, the nature of the intervention was to prevent an ‘illegal’ government to seize
control of strategic zones previously under Russian influence (the port of Sevastopol, home to
Russia’s Black Sea Fleet and the industrial hub of Donbass). Second. the relative ease with
which Russia annexed Crimea and the ongoing conflict in Eastern Ukraine are mostly due to
the pre-existing connections and interests in the region which pre-date the Soviet era
altogether. As Charap (2015, p. 54) writes: “the region is the most permissive environment
outside Russia’s borders for this kind of operation […] eastern Ukraine is perhaps the only
place beyond Russia’s borders where Moscow can sustain an insurgency”.
Consequently, the Russian involvement in Ukraine was certainly full of “hybrid
warfare” elements but it did not constitute the sort of operation envisaged by the West, since
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it merely “stopped Ukraine from completely pivoting towards the West” (DSC 2015 General
Report, NATO-PA, p. 5). While Russia did intend to ‘convince’ the leaders from Kiev to take
a step back from their pro-Western journey, they clearly failed, as Ukraine is pursuing a
closer integration with NATO and the EU. Though we cannot ignore that the costs for
Ukraine are, at worst, a protracted civil war which will severely affect its economy and
stability (FDI’s typically avoid conflict areas) and at its best, a staple post-Soviet “frozen
conflict”.

The bi-dimensional characteristic of Russia’s “hybrid warfare” – “war during

peace” and “neo-imperialist” tendencies

The first dimension, or “war during peace”, refers to the confusion and the elusive
behaviour of a state actor by employing hybrid warfare (or elements associated to it) so as to
escape international responsibility for actions which, under ‘normal circumstances’, would be
punishable. Though the Russian Federation did receive sanctions after the Annexation of the
Crimean Peninsula in 2014, they did little damage, as it made Moscow aware of the
reactionary politics embraced by the West, and it gave a reason to strengthen the cooperation
with the rest of the BRICS countries. Needless to say that the EU suffered more because of
the sanctions imposed, as it had to find different economic partners to whom to sell their
goods which were banned from Russian markets. Also, “war during peace”63 can also refer to
the actions of Moscow with regard to the situation in the East of Ukraine. Since Russia is
involved in a unilateral proxy war, with the assumed objective to weaken and break the
country by supporting the separatist pro-Russian elements in the Donbass region, its main

63
We use the collocation “war during peace” from the perspective of international law (relative to the provisions
of the UN Charter and the current system of UN Security Council’s approval). For an opinion (with which we
do not agree with) outside of the “operational perspective” (the theoretical model of ‘kinetic’ hybrid warfare)
see (Dayspring, 2015) which writes that hybrid warfare: “begins by establishing strategic objectives and
employing means that violate another state’s sovereignty during a time of peace […] when coercive violence is
timed to minimize the chances of international military response”.
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goal is to re-adjust Ukraine as a satellite-state in its orbit, much like Belorussia, Kazakhstan
or other former Soviet republics. Geopolitically speaking, Ukraine presents two serious
problems. First, it represents a potential threat to the regional hegemony of Russia in the
post-Soviet space, Russia must never allow that. Second, in the case in which the now
Western-supported Ukraine will be forced to yield before the might of Russia, it will show
that the West is weak and reactionary. This must also not be allowed to happen, since it will
produce a double-victory for the Kremlin: (a) as a lesson to other Eastern European states, not
to interfere with the geopolitical goals of Russia; and (b) as a show of force, that the neo-
imperial ambitions of Russia have been finally met, the weak Russia of the Yeltsin years is
no more. If we take a closer look at what the Russians have been doing in Ukraine, we can
clearly observe a trend in Western media to ridicule and to “caricaturise how Moscow uses its
instruments of national power” (Kofman, 2016). This is because we have long been
accustomed to see an enemy in Russia and even if we are all aware of the changes which the
world suffered after the fall of the USSR, we cannot avoid the feeling that Russia is re-
enacting previous scenarios. To cut a long story short, we understand that times have
changed, yet we still use pre-Cold War instruments to analyse and predict Russian foreign
policy.
Depending on the economic ties and proximity (more or less) it is still not a viable
solution to choose not to invest in real technologies and strengthen the cooperation between
NATO member states, steps which could prove critical in the future. Though we do not agree
with what the Russians have been doing in Ukraine, we cannot say that Putin’s Russia is not
doing what some Western countries have been doing for a long time, irrespective of the
reasons or rationale behind their actions. If the Kremlin has been using “war during peace”, it
is because the West first pioneered its use, since Russia is not capable to sustain a veritable
hybrid conflict outside its area of control, in which sadly, Georgia, Ukraine, Moldova and the
Baltic States are located.
The second dimension, is the neo-imperialist dimension of “hybrid warfare” seen
from the perspective of Russia’s resurgence as a great power. Starting from 2008 (Georgia),
Russia has systematically targeted weak and vulnerable former-Soviet republics in an effort
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to re-establish itself as the successor of the Soviet Union, in fact and not in name only. Van
Harpen (2014, p. 5) argues that “Russia is both a post-imperial state and a pre-imperial state”,
giving the examples of certain moves64 (soft power and influence ‘building’) that the Kremlin
made to insure its interests in the adjacent regions are respected. Van Harpen (2014, p. 248)
also cites the former the President of the Czech Republic, Vaclav Havel, who said that “if the
West does not stabilize the East, the East will destabilize the West”. Subsequently, he added
that if Ukraine does not tread carefully, Russia could provoke tensions in Eastern Ukraine
(where a considerable Russian minority lives) and this could lead to a repeat of the Georgian
scenario of 2008, where the Kremlin invoked the protection of Russian nationals as an excuse
to intervene in South Ossetia (Harpen, 2014, p. 248).
Kushnir (2016, p. 3) writes that the involvement of Russia in Ukraine is a violent yet
‘understandable’ reaction towards a very serious threat posed by the loss of influence in a
country which has a very important role to play from multiple angles: geopolitical, as a
buffer-zone, energetic, as the transit-zone for Russia’s gas pipelines, economic as a market
and source of labour, etc. Also, one must not underestimate the “historical, political,
economic, cultural, and other ties between states provide the explicit rationale for them to
intervene in Ukraine's affairs”. He also discusses that the political philosophy of Russia has
changed little from the Soviet era. For example, he talks about Aleksandr Dughin (Putin’s
favourite ideologist) who “continued to perceive Russian expansionism – especially in its
Eurasian dimension – as something natural and inescapable, contributing to the idea of Russia
as the Third Rome […] Russia finds itself in an eternal struggle with the global maritime
Carthage, which is the US” (Kushnir, 2016, p. 5).
The motivations behind the Kremlin’s actions are difficult to discover, due to the
sheer number of scholars and analysts which still consider Russia as the direct descendant of
the Soviet Union. As such, Russia’s goals are the same as they were in the past: the

64
For example, the suggestion made by Putin to Lukashenko that Belorussia should join the Russian Federation
(2003), or the historical claims on the Crimea (now redundant), the ‘gift’ of Russian citizenship en masse to
nationals living in the Eastern Ukraine, the suggestion for the Federalization of Ukraine (2004)
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restoration of the Kremlin's rule over former Soviet lands (Bernd, 2016), and the defeat of the
American archenemy. Alternatively, we can also look at the aggressive stance of Russia from
the point of view of domestic politics, as a means to distract the populace’s attention from
the difficult situation which gripped Russia after the Financial Crisis and the drop in oil and
gas prices.

Conclusions

Trying to make sense of “hybrid warfare” has become a new trend in the scholarly
field concerned with the subject of military and operational tactics. If hybrid warfare has been
something used from Antiquity, why does it still cause such debates? The answer to this
comes when hybrid warfare is mixed with power politics and ruthlessness in pursuing
national interests. To complicate things, today’s world (particularly in the West) is
constructed in a monochrome fashion: the public always knows who the hero is and who the
enemy is. Hybrid warfare changes all that. It uses any other means short of war to achieve its
purpose. It blurs the lines between opposites and creates a grey space where nuances are more
important than the relative truths. Hybrid warfare has multiple dimensions, each specifically
connected to a set of objectives and precise purposes. From the Russian perspective we
believe that they are, as we stated in this article, eliminating the limitations of the current
international system and eluding international responsibility (“war during peace”) and a
resurgence of Russia as the successor of both the Tsarist and Soviet Empires (“neo-
imperialist ambitions”).
On Russia’s intervention in Ukraine and the claims that it is using the concerted
attacks as a rehearsal for a future involvement in Eastern Europe, the chances of a repeat of
so-called Crimea or a Donbass scenarios elsewhere are, in our opinion, fortunately low.
However, we do not believe that “hybrid warfare” is a weak concept, only that its current
interpretation is somewhat lacking. Simply equating “hybrid warfare” with a Russian plan for
world domination is just not feasible. Yet we do believe that Russia is using certain elements
which some authors consider as being sine qua non conditions for the existence of “hybrid
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warfare/threats”. In this respect, Russia’s intervention in Ukraine should be interpreted using

a different set of optics, that of the coordinated employment of certain instruments (military,
economic, diplomatic, informational and cyber) in its perceived sphere of influence so as to
ensure that its vested, national or vital interests are protected.
Though not a new invention, in the past decade, “hybrid warfare” has become the
“catchall phrase” for a number of highly controversial actions undertaken by the Kremlin. In
our opinion, the rhetoric used in Western circles, or more correctly, the over-emphasis on
trying to discern the ulterior motives in all of Putin’s moves, has made the West blind to the
real problems as terrorism has clearly become the major threat for Europe’s well-being. On
the Asian theatre, the cooperation between the BRICS countries (half of them having nuclear
capabilities), the increasingly cordial relations between Turkey (a key-NATO member state)
and Russia, the economic and financial partnership between Russia and China which is
heralding a ‘golden age’ of Eurasian economic ties and the words of President-Elect Donald
Trump who no longer considers Russia an existential threat, are clear signs that an important
change will come to pass.
Therefore, we will see more of this “hybrid warfare” in the future, but not between the
old powerful actors (the US, Russia, Europe) but rather between the regional powers such as
China, Japan, Iran and Saudi Arabia. Also, between state actors and non-state actors,
revealing once more the threat posed by terrorism. As we saw in 2015 and 2016, Europe is
not threatened by Russia, the menace posed by Daesh is the primary concern in Western
Europe. Comparatively, in Eastern Europe, where the terrorist threat is minimal, the major
concern remains Russian aggression. This dichotomy is important because it shows the
differences in the approach and interpretations on the foreign policy moves made by the
Kremlin.
Vis-à-vis Russian interests in Europe, we can distinguish, on one side, the Western
EU and NATO Member States, on the other, the former satellite states in Eastern Europe.
This dual approach is not to be taken lightly, the West has always taken advantage of the fear
and complex historical relationship between Russia and Eastern Europe. One example is
NATO’s enlargement process (2004, 2007), the other, the missile defence systems in states
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like Poland and Romania, originally ‘planted’ by the US, now under NATO control
(Deveselu, Romania). On the opposite side, the close relationship between Russia and
countries like France, Germany, and even Italy, constitutes the argument behind the idea that
maybe the West has always used the East as a bargaining chip in its dealings with Russia. As
such, blaming the Kremlin of ‘inventing’ and ‘deploying’ hybrid warfare or hybrid tactics
against NATO and the EU are, in our opinion, speculations and machinations in the grand
scheme of legitimating NATO’s ever fledgling purpose in a changed world.
Addressing the problem from the perspective of international law, Russia does not
have many options. Due to the impediments within the UN Security Council, a repeat of the
United Sates’ endeavours in Kosovo (1999) and Iraq (2003) are no longer possible, let alone
achievable by Russia. Consequently, born from the desire to circumvent an impossible vote
on a resolution approving intervention, the usage of hybrid warfare is, in our opinion, a
feasible bargain. Blurring the lines between war and peace and the usage of “war during
peace” may be the only way to achieve the compromise between vital state interests and the
current rigid international framework. Yet, if we accept this rationale, then hybrid warfare
will not be associated with Russian interests, but with the interests of all important
international actors. It comes as no surprise why the US and NATO are insisting so much on
the ‘Russian’ element in “hybrid warfare”.
Russia’s ‘political war’ is interpreted by the West as a ‘hybrid war’. To be blunt,
Russia is doing exactly what other powerful states have done before, ruthlessly following
their national interests, though with a certain aura reminiscent of Soviet times (maskirovka).
In a similar optic, we see that NATO has (finally) taken the ‘initiative’ of switching from its
characteristically defensive posture of deterrence. Though a step forward in itself, it seems
like a timid effort to keep-up to the changing times. The façade which NATO has put up until
now rested on the image of Russia as the everlasting enemy of Europe. Unfortunately for
NATO, this is not the case anymore. The weak Russia of the 90s exists only in history books
and biased interpretations. To keep-up the façade in order to continue to give NATO a raison
d’être seems unwise, if not foolish. In NATO’s terms, interpreting hybrid warfare” as the
new military doctrine of Russia, or putting ‘Russia’ and ‘hybrid warfare’ in the same
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sentence for propagandistic purposes can rebound with serious consequences. If we take the
positive aspect, it will encourage cooperation at the national level, giving NATO the much-
needed breath of fresh air. However, if it will backfire, it will, paradoxically, make Europe
and NATO weak by over-investing in countering the so-called hybrid threats from state
actors, a threat which may never come. The danger is that, whilst investing in defences
against a clear source, it will also mean ignoring the serious threats posed by hybrid threats
originating non-state actors.

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