G.R. No.

L-25246 September 12, 1974

BENJAMIN VICTORIANO, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. ELIZALDE ROPE WORKERS' UNION

and ELIZALDE ROPE FACTORY, INC., defendants, ELIZALDE ROPE WORKERS'
UNION, Defendant-Appellant.

Salonga, Ordonez, Yap, Sicat & Associates for plaintiff-appellee.

Cipriano Cid & Associates for defendant-appellant.

ZALDIVAR, J.:

Appeal to this Court on purely questions of law from the decision of the Court of First
Instance of Manila in its Civil Case No. 58894.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual
law library

The undisputed facts that spawned the instant case follow:chanrobles virtual law library

Benjamin Victoriano (hereinafter referred to as Appellee), a member of the religious sect

known as the "Iglesia ni Cristo", had been in the employ of the Elizalde Rope Factory, Inc.
(hereinafter referred to as Company) since 1958. As such employee, he was a member of
the Elizalde Rope Workers' Union (hereinafter referred to as Union) which had with the
Company a collective bargaining agreement containing a closed shop provision which
reads as follows:

Membership in the Union shall be required as a condition of employment for all permanent
employees workers covered by this Agreement.

The collective bargaining agreement expired on March 3, 1964 but was renewed the
following day, March 4, 1964.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Under Section 4(a), paragraph 4, of Republic Act No. 875, prior to its amendment by
Republic Act No. 3350, the employer was not precluded "from making an agreement with
a labor organization to require as a condition of employment membership therein, if such
labor organization is the representative of the employees." On June 18, 1961, however,
Republic Act No. 3350 was enacted, introducing an amendment to - paragraph (4)
subsection (a) of section 4 of Republic Act No. 875, as follows: ... "but such agreement
shall not cover members of any religious sects which prohibit affiliation of their members
in any such labor organization".chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Being a member of a religious sect that prohibits the affiliation of its members with any
labor organization, Appellee presented his resignation to appellant Union in 1962, and
when no action was taken thereon, he reiterated his resignation on September 3, 1974.
Thereupon, the Union wrote a formal letter to the Company asking the latter to separate
Appellee from the service in view of the fact that he was resigning from the Union as a
member. The management of the Company in turn notified Appellee and his counsel that
unless the Appellee could achieve a satisfactory arrangement with the Union, the
Company would be constrained to dismiss him from the service. This prompted Appellee
to file an action for injunction, docketed as Civil Case No. 58894 in the Court of First
Instance of Manila to enjoin the Company and the Union from dismissing Appellee.  1In its
answer, the Union invoked the "union security clause" of the collective bargaining
agreement; assailed the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 3350; and contended that
the Court had no jurisdiction over the case, pursuant to Republic Act No. 875, Sections 24
and 9 (d) and (e). 2Upon the facts agreed upon by the parties during the pre-trial
conference, the Court a quo rendered its decision on August 26, 1965, the dispositive
portion of which reads:

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, judgment is rendered enjoining the defendant Elizalde Rope
Factory, Inc. from dismissing the plaintiff from his present employment and sentencing
the defendant Elizalde Rope Workers' Union to pay the plaintiff P500 for attorney's fees
and the costs of this action. 3chanrobles virtual law library

1
From this decision, the Union appealed directly to this Court on purely questions of law,
assigning the following errors:

I. That the lower court erred when it did not rule that Republic Act No. 3350 is
unconstitutional.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

II. That the lower court erred when it sentenced appellant herein to pay plaintiff the sum
of P500 as attorney's fees and the cost thereof.

In support of the alleged unconstitutionality of Republic Act No. 3350, the Union
contented, firstly, that the Act infringes on the fundamental right to form lawful
associations; that "the very phraseology of said Republic Act 3350, that membership in a
labor organization is banned to all those belonging to such religious sect prohibiting
affiliation with any labor organization" 4, "prohibits all the members of a given religious
sect from joining any labor union if such sect prohibits affiliations of their members
thereto" 5; and, consequently, deprives said members of their constitutional right to form
or join lawful associations or organizations guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, and thus
becomes obnoxious to Article III, Section 1 (6) of the 1935 Constitution. 6chanrobles
virtual law library

Secondly, the Union contended that Republic Act No. 3350 is unconstitutional for
impairing the obligation of contracts in that, while the Union is obliged to comply with its
collective bargaining agreement containing a "closed shop provision," the Act relieves the
employer from its reciprocal obligation of cooperating in the maintenance of union
membership as a condition of employment; and that said Act, furthermore, impairs the
Union's rights as it deprives the union of dues from members who, under the Act, are
relieved from the obligation to continue as such members.  7chanrobles virtual law library

Thirdly, the Union contended that Republic Act No. 3350 discriminatorily favors those
religious sects which ban their members from joining labor unions, in violation of Article
Ill, Section 1 (7) of the 1935 Constitution; and while said Act unduly protects certain
religious sects, it leaves no rights or protection to labor organizations.  8chanrobles virtual
law library

Fourthly, Republic Act No. 3350, asserted the Union, violates the constitutional provision
that "no religious test shall be required for the exercise of a civil right," in that the
laborer's exercise of his civil right to join associations for purposes not contrary to law has
to be determined under the Act by his affiliation with a religious sect; that conversely, if a
worker has to sever his religious connection with a sect that prohibits membership in a
labor organization in order to be able to join a labor organization, said Act would violate
religious freedom. 9chanrobles virtual law library

Fifthly, the Union contended that Republic Act No. 3350, violates the "equal protection of
laws" clause of the Constitution, it being a discriminately legislation, inasmuch as by
exempting from the operation of closed shop agreement the members of the "Iglesia ni
Cristo", it has granted said members undue advantages over their fellow workers, for
while the Act exempts them from union obligation and liability, it nevertheless entitles
them at the same time to the enjoyment of all concessions, benefits and other
emoluments that the union might secure from the employer. 10chanrobles virtual law
library

Sixthly, the Union contended that Republic Act No. 3350 violates the constitutional
provision regarding the promotion of social justice. 11chanrobles virtual law library

Appellant Union, furthermore, asserted that a "closed shop provision" in a collective

bargaining agreement cannot be considered violative of religious freedom, as to call for
the amendment introduced by Republic Act No. 3350; 12and that unless Republic Act No.
3350 is declared unconstitutional, trade unionism in this country would be wiped out as
employers would prefer to hire or employ members of the Iglesia ni Cristo in order to do
away with labor organizations. 13chanrobles virtual law library

Appellee, assailing appellant's arguments, contended that Republic Act No. 3350 does not
violate the right to form lawful associations, for the right to join associations includes the
2
right not to join or to resign from a labor organization, if one's conscience does not allow
his membership therein, and the Act has given substance to such right by prohibiting the
compulsion of workers to join labor organizations; 14that said Act does not impair the
obligation of contracts for said law formed part of, and was incorporated into, the terms of
the closed shop agreement; 15that the Act does not violate the establishment of religion
clause or separation of Church and State, for Congress, in enacting said law, merely
accommodated the religious needs of those workers whose religion prohibits its members
from joining labor unions, and balanced the collective rights of organized labor with the
constitutional right of an individual to freely exercise his chosen religion; that the
constitutional right to the free exercise of one's religion has primacy and preference over
union security measures which are merely contractual 16; that said Act does not violate
the constitutional provision of equal protection, for the classification of workers under the
Act depending on their religious tenets is based on substantial distinction, is germane to
the purpose of the law, and applies to all the members of a given class; 17that said Act,
finally, does not violate the social justice policy of the Constitution, for said Act was
enacted precisely to equalize employment opportunities for all citizens in the midst of the
diversities of their religious beliefs." 18chanrobles virtual law library

I. Before We proceed to the discussion of the first assigned error, it is necessary to

premise that there are some thoroughly established principles which must be followed in
all cases where questions of constitutionality as obtains in the instant case are involved.
All presumptions are indulged in favor of constitutionality; one who attacks a statute,
alleging unconstitutionality must prove its invalidity beyond a reasonable doubt, that a law
may work hardship does not render it unconstitutional; that if any reasonable basis may
be conceived which supports the statute, it will be upheld, and the challenger must negate
all possible bases; that the courts are not concerned with the wisdom, justice, policy, or
expediency of a statute; and that a liberal interpretation of the constitution in favor of the
constitutionality of legislation should be adopted. 19chanrobles virtual law library

1. Appellant Union's contention that Republic Act No. 3350 prohibits and bans the
members of such religious sects that forbid affiliation of their members with labor unions
from joining labor unions appears nowhere in the wording of Republic Act No. 3350;
neither can the same be deduced by necessary implication therefrom. It is not surprising,
therefore, that appellant, having thus misread the Act, committed the error of contending
that said Act is obnoxious to the constitutional provision on freedom of
association.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Both the Constitution and Republic Act No. 875 recognize freedom of association. Section
1 (6) of Article III of the Constitution of 1935, as well as Section 7 of Article IV of the
Constitution of 1973, provide that the right to form associations or societies for purposes
not contrary to law shall not be abridged. Section 3 of Republic Act No. 875 provides that
employees shall have the right to self-organization and to form, join of assist labor
organizations of their own choosing for the purpose of collective bargaining and to engage
in concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining and other mutual aid or
protection. What the Constitution and the Industrial Peace Act recognize and guarantee is
the "right" to form or join associations. Notwithstanding the different theories propounded
by the different schools of jurisprudence regarding the nature and contents of a "right", it
can be safely said that whatever theory one subscribes to, a right comprehends at least
two broad notions, namely: first, liberty or freedom, i.e., the absence of legal restraint,
whereby an employee may act for himself without being prevented by law; and second,
power, whereby an employee may, as he pleases, join or refrain from Joining an
association. It is, therefore, the employee who should decide for himself whether he
should join or not an association; and should he choose to join, he himself makes up his
mind as to which association he would join; and even after he has joined, he still retains
the liberty and the power to leave and cancel his membership with said organization at
any time. 20It is clear, therefore, that the right to join a union includes the right to abstain
from joining any union. 21Inasmuch as what both the Constitution and the Industrial Peace
Act have recognized, and guaranteed to the employee, is the "right" to join associations of
his choice, it would be absurd to say that the law also imposes, in the same breath, upon
the employee the duty to join associations. The law does not enjoin an employee to sign
up with any association.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

3
The right to refrain from joining labor organizations recognized by Section 3 of the
Industrial Peace Act is, however, limited. The legal protection granted to such right to
refrain from joining is withdrawn by operation of law, where a labor union and an
employer have agreed on a closed shop, by virtue of which the employer may employ only
member of the collective bargaining union, and the employees must continue to be
members of the union for the duration of the contract in order to keep their jobs. Thus
Section 4 (a) (4) of the Industrial Peace Act, before its amendment by Republic Act No.
3350, provides that although it would be an unfair labor practice for an employer "to
discriminate in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of
employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization" the
employer is, however, not precluded "from making an agreement with a labor
organization to require as a condition of employment membership therein, if such labor
organization is the representative of the employees". By virtue, therefore, of a closed
shop agreement, before the enactment of Republic Act No. 3350, if any person, regardless
of his religious beliefs, wishes to be employed or to keep his employment, he must
become a member of the collective bargaining union. Hence, the right of said employee
not to join the labor union is curtailed and
withdrawn.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

To that all-embracing coverage of the closed shop arrangement, Republic Act No. 3350
introduced an exception, when it added to Section 4 (a) (4) of the Industrial Peace Act the
following proviso: "but such agreement shall not cover members of any religious sects
which prohibit affiliation of their members in any such labor organization". Republic Act
No. 3350 merely excludes ipso jure  from the application and coverage of the closed shop
agreement the employees belonging to any religious sects which prohibit affiliation of their
members with any labor organization. What the exception provides, therefore, is that
members of said religious sects cannot be compelled or coerced to join labor unions even
when said unions have closed shop agreements with the employers; that in spite of any
closed shop agreement, members of said religious sects cannot be refused employment or
dismissed from their jobs on the sole ground that they are not members of the collective
bargaining union. It is clear, therefore, that the assailed Act, far from infringing the
constitutional provision on freedom of association, upholds and reinforces it. It does not
prohibit the members of said religious sects from affiliating with labor unions. It still
leaves to said members the liberty and the power to affiliate, or not to affiliate, with labor
unions. If, notwithstanding their religious beliefs, the members of said religious sects
prefer to sign up with the labor union, they can do so. If in deference and fealty to their
religious faith, they refuse to sign up, they can do so; the law does not coerce them to
join; neither does the law prohibit them from joining; and neither may the employer or
labor union compel them to join. Republic Act No. 3350, therefore, does not violate the
constitutional provision on freedom of association.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library

2. Appellant Union also contends that the Act is unconstitutional for impairing the
obligation of its contract, specifically, the "union security clause" embodied in its Collective
Bargaining Agreement with the Company, by virtue of which "membership in the union
was required as a condition for employment for all permanent employees workers". This
agreement was already in existence at the time Republic Act No. 3350 was enacted on
June 18, 1961, and it cannot, therefore, be deemed to have been incorporated into the
agreement. But by reason of this amendment, Appellee, as well as others similarly
situated, could no longer be dismissed from his job even if he should cease to be a
member, or disaffiliate from the Union, and the Company could continue employing him
notwithstanding his disaffiliation from the Union. The Act, therefore, introduced a change
into the express terms of the union security clause; the Company was partly absolved by
law from the contractual obligation it had with the Union of employing only Union
members in permanent positions, It cannot be denied, therefore, that there was indeed an
impairment of said union security clause.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library

According to Black, any statute which introduces a change into the express terms of the
contract, or its legal construction, or its validity, or its discharge, or the remedy for its
enforcement, impairs the contract. The extent of the change is not material. It is not a
question of degree or manner or cause, but of encroaching in any respect on its obligation
or dispensing with any part of its force. There is an impairment of the contract if either
4
party is absolved by law from its performance. 22Impairment has also been predicated on
laws which, without destroying contracts, derogate from substantial contractual
rights. 23chanrobles virtual law library

It should not be overlooked, however, that the prohibition to impair the obligation of
contracts is not absolute and unqualified. The prohibition is general, affording a broad
outline and requiring construction to fill in the details. The prohibition is not to be read
with literal exactness like a mathematical formula, for it prohibits unreasonable
impairment only. 24In spite of the constitutional prohibition, the State continues to possess
authority to safeguard the vital interests of its people. Legislation appropriate to
safeguarding said interests may modify or abrogate contracts already in effect. 25For not
only are existing laws read into contracts in order to fix the obligations as between the
parties, but the reservation of essential attributes of sovereign power is also read into
contracts as a postulate of the legal order. All contracts made with reference to any
matter that is subject to regulation under the police power must be understood as made
in reference to the possible exercise of that power. 26Otherwise, important and valuable
reforms may be precluded by the simple device of entering into contracts for the purpose
of doing that which otherwise may be prohibited. The policy of protecting contracts
against impairment presupposes the maintenance of a government by virtue of which
contractual relations are worthwhile a government which retains adequate authority to
secure the peace and good order of society. The contract clause of the Constitution must,
therefore, be not only in harmony with, but also in subordination to, in appropriate
instances, the reserved power of the state to safeguard the vital interests of the people. It
follows that not all legislations, which have the effect of impairing a contract, are
obnoxious to the constitutional prohibition as to impairment, and a statute passed in the
legitimate exercise of police power, although it incidentally destroys existing contract
rights, must be upheld by the courts. This has special application to contracts regulating
relations between capital and labor which are not merely contractual, and said labor
contracts, for being impressed with public interest, must yield to the common
good. 27chanrobles virtual law library

In several occasions this Court declared that the prohibition against impairing the
obligations of contracts has no application to statutes relating to public subjects within the
domain of the general legislative powers of the state involving public welfare. 28Thus, this
Court also held that the Blue Sunday Law was not an infringement of the obligation of a
contract that required the employer to furnish work on Sundays to his employees, the law
having been enacted to secure the well-being and happiness of the laboring class, and
being, furthermore, a legitimate exercise of the police power. 29chanrobles virtual law
library

In order to determine whether legislation unconstitutionally impairs contract obligations,

no unchanging yardstick, applicable at all times and under all circumstances, by which the
validity of each statute may be measured or determined, has been fashioned, but every
case must be determined upon its own circumstances. Legislation impairing the obligation
of contracts can be sustained when it is enacted for the promotion of the general good of
the people, and when the means adopted to secure that end are reasonable. Both the end
sought and the means adopted must be legitimate, i.e., within the scope of the reserved
power of the state construed in harmony with the constitutional limitation of that
power. 30chanrobles virtual law library

What then was the purpose sought to be achieved by Republic Act No. 3350? Its purpose
was to insure freedom of belief and religion, and to promote the general welfare by
preventing discrimination against those members of religious sects which prohibit their
members from joining labor unions, confirming thereby their natural, statutory and
constitutional right to work, the fruits of which work are usually the only means whereby
they can maintain their own life and the life of their dependents. It cannot be gainsaid
that said purpose is legitimate.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

The questioned Act also provides protection to members of said religious sects against two
aggregates of group strength from which the individual needs protection. The individual
employee, at various times in his working life, is confronted by two aggregates of power -
collective labor, directed by a union, and collective capital, directed by management. The
union, an institution developed to organize labor into a collective force and thus protect
5
the individual employee from the power of collective capital, is, paradoxically, both the
champion of employee rights, and a new source of their frustration. Moreover, when the
Union interacts with management, it produces yet a third aggregate of group strength
from which the individual also needs protection - the collective bargaining
relationship. 31chanrobles virtual law library

The aforementioned purpose of the amendatory law is clearly seen in the Explanatory
Note to House Bill No. 5859, which later became Republic Act No. 3350, as follows:

It would be unthinkable indeed to refuse employing a person who, on account of his

religious beliefs and convictions, cannot accept membership in a labor organization
although he possesses all the qualifications for the job. This is tantamount to punishing
such person for believing in a doctrine he has a right under the law to believe in. The law
would not allow discrimination to flourish to the detriment of those whose religion discards
membership in any labor organization. Likewise, the law would not commend the
deprivation of their right to work and pursue a modest means of livelihood, without in any
manner violating their religious faith and/or belief. 32chanrobles virtual law library

It cannot be denied, furthermore, that the means adopted by the Act to achieve that
purpose - exempting the members of said religious sects from coverage of union security
agreements - is reasonable.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

It may not be amiss to point out here that the free exercise of religious profession or
belief is superior to contract rights. In case of conflict, the latter must, therefore, yield to
the former. The Supreme Court of the United States has also declared on several
occasions that the rights in the First Amendment, which include freedom of religion, enjoy
a preferred position in the constitutional system. 33Religious freedom, although not
unlimited, is a fundamental personal right and liberty, 34and has a preferred position in
the hierarchy of values. Contractual rights, therefore, must yield to freedom of religion. It
is only where unavoidably necessary to prevent an immediate and grave danger to the
security and welfare of the community that infringement of religious freedom may be
justified, and only to the smallest extent necessary to avoid the
danger.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

3. In further support of its contention that Republic Act No. 3350 is unconstitutional,
appellant Union averred that said Act discriminates in favor of members of said religious
sects in violation of Section 1 (7) of Article Ill of the 1935 Constitution, and which is now
Section 8 of Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, which provides:

No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free

exercise thereof, and the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship,
without discrimination and preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious test shall be
required for the exercise of civil or political rights.

The constitutional provision into only prohibits legislation for the support of any religious
tenets or the modes of worship of any sect, thus forestalling compulsion by law of the
acceptance of any creed or the practice of any form of worship, 35but also assures the free
exercise of one's chosen form of religion within limits of utmost amplitude. It has been
said that the religion clauses of the Constitution are all designed to protect the broadest
possible liberty of conscience, to allow each man to believe as his conscience directs, to
profess his beliefs, and to live as he believes he ought to live, consistent with the liberty
of others and with the common good. 36Any legislation whose effect or purpose is to
impede the observance of one or all religions, or to discriminate invidiously between the
religions, is invalid, even though the burden may be characterized as being only
indirect. 37But if the stage regulates conduct by enacting, within its power, a general law
which has for its purpose and effect to advance the state's secular goals, the statute is
valid despite its indirect burden on religious observance, unless the state can accomplish
its purpose without imposing such burden. 38chanrobles virtual law library

In Aglipay v. Ruiz 39, this Court had occasion to state that the government should not be
precluded from pursuing valid objectives secular in character even if the incidental result
would be favorable to a religion or sect. It has likewise been held that the statute, in order
to withstand the strictures of constitutional prohibition, must have a secular legislative
6
purpose and a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion. 40Assessed by
these criteria, Republic Act No. 3350 cannot be said to violate the constitutional inhibition
of the "no-establishment" (of religion) clause of the
Constitution.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

The purpose of Republic Act No. 3350 is secular, worldly, and temporal, not spiritual or
religious or holy and eternal. It was intended to serve the secular purpose of advancing
the constitutional right to the free exercise of religion, by averting that certain persons be
refused work, or be dismissed from work, or be dispossessed of their right to work and of
being impeded to pursue a modest means of livelihood, by reason of union security
agreements. To help its citizens to find gainful employment whereby they can make a
living to support themselves and their families is a valid objective of the state. In fact, the
state is enjoined, in the 1935 Constitution, to afford protection to labor, and regulate the
relations between labor and capital and industry. 41More so now in the 1973 Constitution
where it is mandated that "the State shall afford protection to labor, promote full
employment and equality in employment, ensure equal work opportunities regardless of
sex, race or creed and regulate the relation between workers and employers. 42chanrobles
virtual law library

The primary effects of the exemption from closed shop agreements in favor of members
of religious sects that prohibit their members from affiliating with a labor organization, is
the protection of said employees against the aggregate force of the collective bargaining
agreement, and relieving certain citizens of a burden on their religious beliefs; and by
eliminating to a certain extent economic insecurity due to unemployment, which is a
serious menace to the health, morals, and welfare of the people of the State, the Act also
promotes the well-being of society. It is our view that the exemption from the effects of
closed shop agreement does not directly advance, or diminish, the interests of any
particular religion. Although the exemption may benefit those who are members of
religious sects that prohibit their members from joining labor unions, the benefit upon the
religious sects is merely incidental and indirect. The "establishment clause" (of religion)
does not ban regulation on conduct whose reason or effect merely happens to coincide or
harmonize with the tenets of some or all religions. 43The free exercise clause of the
Constitution has been interpreted to require that religious exercise be preferentially
aided. 44chanrobles virtual law library

We believe that in enacting Republic Act No. 3350, Congress acted consistently with the
spirit of the constitutional provision. It acted merely to relieve the exercise of religion, by
certain persons, of a burden that is imposed by union security agreements. It was
Congress itself that imposed that burden when it enacted the Industrial Peace Act
(Republic Act 875), and, certainly, Congress, if it so deems advisable, could take away the
same burden. It is certain that not every conscience can be accommodated by all the laws
of the land; but when general laws conflict with scrupples of conscience, exemptions
ought to be granted unless some "compelling state interest" intervenes. 45In the instant
case, We see no such compelling state interest to withhold
exemption.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Appellant bewails that while Republic Act No. 3350 protects members of certain religious
sects, it leaves no right to, and is silent as to the protection of, labor organizations. The
purpose of Republic Act No. 3350 was not to grant rights to labor unions. The rights of
labor unions are amply provided for in Republic Act No. 875 and the new Labor Code. As
to the lamented silence of the Act regarding the rights and protection of labor unions,
suffice it to say, first, that the validity of a statute is determined by its provisions, not by
its silence 46; and, second, the fact that the law may work hardship does not render it
unconstitutional. 47chanrobles virtual law library

It would not be amiss to state, regarding this matter, that to compel persons to join and
remain members of a union to keep their jobs in violation of their religious scrupples,
would hurt, rather than help, labor unions, Congress has seen it fit to exempt religious
objectors lest their resistance spread to other workers, for religious objections have
contagious potentialities more than political and philosophic
objections.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

7
Furthermore, let it be noted that coerced unity and loyalty even to the country, and
a fortiori  to a labor - union assuming that such unity and loyalty can be attained through
coercion - is not a goal that is constitutionally obtainable at the expense of religious
liberty. 48A desirable end cannot be promoted by prohibited
means.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

4. Appellants' fourth contention, that Republic Act No. 3350 violates the constitutional
prohibition against requiring a religious test for the exercise of a civil right or a political
right, is not well taken. The Act does not require as a qualification, or condition, for joining
any lawful association membership in any particular religion or in any religious sect;
neither does the Act require affiliation with a religious sect that prohibits its members
from joining a labor union as a condition or qualification for withdrawing from a labor
union. Joining or withdrawing from a labor union requires a positive act. Republic Act No.
3350 only exempts members with such religious affiliation from the coverage of closed
shop agreements. So, under this Act, a religious objector is not required to do a positive
act - to exercise the right to join or to resign from the union. He is exempted ipso
jure  without need of any positive act on his part. A conscientious religious objector need
not perform a positive act or exercise the right of resigning from the labor union - he is
exempted from the coverage of any closed shop agreement that a labor union may have
entered into. How then can there be a religious test required for the exercise of a right
when no right need be exercised?chanrobles virtual law library

We have said that it was within the police power of the State to enact Republic Act No.
3350, and that its purpose was legal and in consonance with the Constitution. It is never
an illegal evasion of a constitutional provision or prohibition to accomplish a desired
result, which is lawful in itself, by discovering or following a legal way to do
it. 49chanrobles virtual law library

5. Appellant avers as its fifth ground that Republic Act No. 3350 is a discriminatory
legislation, inasmuch as it grants to the members of certain religious sects undue
advantages over other workers, thus violating Section 1 of Article III of the 1935
Constitution which forbids the denial to any person of the equal protection of the
laws. 50chanrobles virtual law library

The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of equality in the
application of the laws upon all citizens of the state. It is not, therefore, a requirement, in
order to avoid the constitutional prohibition against inequality, that every man, woman
and child should be affected alike by a statute. Equality of operation of statutes does not
mean indiscriminate operation on persons merely as such, but on persons according to
the circumstances surrounding them. It guarantees equality, not identity of rights. The
Constitution does not require that things which are different in fact be treated in law as
though they were the same. The equal protection clause does not forbid discrimination as
to things that are different. 51It does not prohibit legislation which is limited either in the
object to which it is directed or by the territory within which it is to
operate.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows classification.
Classification in law, as in the other departments of knowledge or practice, is the grouping
of things in speculation or practice because they agree with one another in certain
particulars. A law is not invalid because of simple inequality. 52The very idea of
classification is that of inequality, so that it goes without saying that the mere fact of
inequality in no manner determines the matter of constitutionality. 53All that is required of
a valid classification is that it be reasonable, which means that the classification should be
based on substantial distinctions which make for real differences; that it must be germane
to the purpose of the law; that it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and that
it must apply equally to each member of the class. 54This Court has held that the standard
is satisfied if the classification or distinction is based on a reasonable foundation or
rational basis and is not palpably arbitrary. 55chanrobles virtual law library

In the exercise of its power to make classifications for the purpose of enacting laws over
matters within its jurisdiction, the state is recognized as enjoying a wide range of
discretion. 56It is not necessary that the classification be based on scientific or marked
differences of things or in their relation. 57Neither is it necessary that the classification be
8
made with mathematical nicety. 58Hence legislative classification may in many cases
properly rest on narrow distinctions, 59for the equal protection guaranty does not preclude
the legislature from recognizing degrees of evil or harm, and legislation is addressed to
evils as they may appear.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

We believe that Republic Act No. 3350 satisfies the aforementioned requirements. The Act
classifies employees and workers, as to the effect and coverage of union shop security
agreements, into those who by reason of their religious beliefs and convictions cannot sign
up with a labor union, and those whose religion does not prohibit membership in labor
unions. Tile classification rests on real or substantial, not merely imaginary or whimsical,
distinctions. There is such real distinction in the beliefs, feelings and sentiments of
employees. Employees do not believe in the same religious faith and different religions
differ in their dogmas and cannons. Religious beliefs, manifestations and practices, though
they are found in all places, and in all times, take so many varied forms as to be almost
beyond imagination. There are many views that comprise the broad spectrum of religious
beliefs among the people. There are diverse manners in which beliefs, equally paramount
in the lives of their possessors, may be articulated. Today the country is far more
heterogenous in religion than before, differences in religion do exist, and these differences
are important and should not be ignored.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library

Even from the phychological point of view, the classification is based on real and
important differences. Religious beliefs are not mere beliefs, mere ideas existing only in
the mind, for they carry with them practical consequences and are the motives of certain
rules. of human conduct and the justification of certain acts. 60Religious sentiment makes
a man view things and events in their relation to his God. It gives to human life its
distinctive character, its tone, its happiness or unhappiness its enjoyment or irksomeness.
Usually, a strong and passionate desire is involved in a religious belief. To certain persons,
no single factor of their experience is more important to them than their religion, or their
not having any religion. Because of differences in religious belief and sentiments, a very
poor person may consider himself better than the rich, and the man who even lacks the
necessities of life may be more cheerful than the one who has all possible luxuries. Due to
their religious beliefs people, like the martyrs, became resigned to the inevitable and
accepted cheerfully even the most painful and excruciating pains. Because of differences
in religious beliefs, the world has witnessed turmoil, civil strife, persecution, hatred,
bloodshed and war, generated to a large extent by members of sects who were intolerant
of other religious beliefs. The classification, introduced by Republic Act No. 3350,
therefore, rests on substantial distinctions.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual
law library

The classification introduced by said Act is also germane to its purpose. The purpose of
the law is precisely to avoid those who cannot, because of their religious belief, join labor
unions, from being deprived of their right to work and from being dismissed from their
work because of union shop security agreements.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library

Republic Act No. 3350, furthermore, is not limited in its application to conditions existing
at the time of its enactment. The law does not provide that it is to be effective for a
certain period of time only. It is intended to apply for all times as long as the conditions to
which the law is applicable exist. As long as there are closed shop agreements between an
employer and a labor union, and there are employees who are prohibited by their religion
from affiliating with labor unions, their exemption from the coverage of said agreements
continues.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Finally, the Act applies equally to all members of said religious sects; this is evident from
its provision. The fact that the law grants a privilege to members of said religious sects
cannot by itself render the Act unconstitutional, for as We have adverted to, the Act only
restores to them their freedom of association which closed shop agreements have taken
away, and puts them in the same plane as the other workers who are not prohibited by
their religion from joining labor unions. The circumstance, that the other employees,
because they are differently situated, are not granted the same privilege, does not render
the law unconstitutional, for every classification allowed by the Constitution by its nature
involves inequality.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
9
The mere fact that the legislative classification may result in actual inequality is not
violative of the right to equal protection, for every classification of persons or things for
regulation by law produces inequality in some degree, but the law is not thereby rendered
invalid. A classification otherwise reasonable does not offend the constitution simply
because in practice it results in some inequality. 61Anent this matter, it has been said that
whenever it is apparent from the scope of the law that its object is for the benefit of the
public and the means by which the benefit is to be obtained are of public character, the
law will be upheld even though incidental advantage may occur to individuals beyond
those enjoyed by the general public. 62chanrobles virtual law library

6. Appellant's further contention that Republic Act No. 3350 violates the constitutional
provision on social justice is also baseless. Social justice is intended to promote the
welfare of all the people. 63Republic Act No. 3350 promotes that welfare insofar as it looks
after the welfare of those who, because of their religious belief, cannot join labor unions;
the Act prevents their being deprived of work and of the means of livelihood. In
determining whether any particular measure is for public advantage, it is not necessary
that the entire state be directly benefited - it is sufficient that a portion of the state be
benefited thereby.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Social justice also means the adoption by the Government of measures calculated to
insure economic stability of all component elements of society, through the maintenance
of a proper economic and social equilibrium in the inter-relations of the members of the
community. 64Republic Act No. 3350 insures economic stability to the members of a
religious sect, like the Iglesia ni Cristo, who are also component elements of society, for it
insures security in their employment, notwithstanding their failure to join a labor union
having a closed shop agreement with the employer. The Act also advances the proper
economic and social equilibrium between labor unions and employees who cannot join
labor unions, for it exempts the latter from the compelling necessity of joining labor
unions that have closed shop agreements and equalizes, in so far as opportunity to work
is concerned, those whose religion prohibits membership in labor unions with those whose
religion does not prohibit said membership. Social justice does not imply social equality,
because social inequality will always exist as long as social relations depend on personal
or subjective proclivities. Social justice does not require legal equality because legal
equality, being a relative term, is necessarily premised on differentiations based on
personal or natural conditions. 65Social justice guarantees equality of opportunity 66, and
this is precisely what Republic Act No. 3350 proposes to accomplish - it gives laborers,
irrespective of their religious scrupples, equal opportunity for
work.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

7. As its last ground, appellant contends that the amendment introduced by Republic Act
No. 3350 is not called for - in other words, the Act is not proper, necessary or desirable.
Anent this matter, it has been held that a statute which is not necessary is not, for that
reason, unconstitutional; that in determining the constitutional validity of legislation, the
courts are unconcerned with issues as to the necessity for the enactment of the legislation
in question. 67Courts do inquire into the wisdom of laws. 68Moreover, legislatures, being
chosen by the people, are presumed to understand and correctly appreciate the needs of
the people, and it may change the laws accordingly. 69The fear is entertained by appellant
that unless the Act is declared unconstitutional, employers will prefer employing members
of religious sects that prohibit their members from joining labor unions, and thus be a
fatal blow to unionism. We do not agree. The threat to unionism will depend on the
number of employees who are members of the religious sects that control the demands of
the labor market. But there is really no occasion now to go further and anticipate
problems We cannot judge with the material now before Us. At any rate, the validity of a
statute is to be determined from its general purpose and its efficacy to accomplish the end
desired, not from its effects on a particular case. 70The essential basis for the exercise of
power, and not a mere incidental result arising from its exertion, is the criterion by which
the validity of a statute is to be measured. 71chanrobles virtual law library

II. We now pass on the second assignment of error, in support of which the Union argued
that the decision of the trial court ordering the Union to pay P500 for attorney's fees
directly contravenes Section 24 of Republic Act No. 875, for the instant action involves an
industrial dispute wherein the Union was a party, and said Union merely acted in the
exercise of its rights under the union shop provision of its existing collective bargaining
10
contract with the Company; that said order also contravenes Article 2208 of the Civil
Code; that, furthermore, Appellee was never actually dismissed by the defendant
Company and did not therefore suffer any damage at all . 72chanrobles virtual law library

In refuting appellant Union's arguments, Appellee claimed that in the instant case there
was really no industrial dispute involved in the attempt to compel Appellee to maintain its
membership in the union under pain of dismissal, and that the Union, by its act, inflicted
intentional harm on Appellee; that since Appellee was compelled to institute an action to
protect his right to work, appellant could legally be ordered to pay attorney's fees under
Articles 1704 and 2208 of the Civil Code. 73chanrobles virtual law library

The second paragraph of Section 24 of Republic Act No. 875 which is relied upon by
appellant provides that:

No suit, action or other proceedings shall be maintainable in any court against a labor
organization or any officer or member thereof for any act done by or on behalf of such
organization in furtherance of an industrial dispute to which it is a party, on the ground
only that such act induces some other person to break a contract of employment or that it
is in restraint of trade or interferes with the trade, business or employment of some other
person or with the right of some other person to dispose of his capital or labor. (Emphasis
supplied)

That there was a labor dispute in the instant case cannot be disputed for appellant sought
the discharge of respondent by virtue of the closed shop agreement and under Section 2
(j) of Republic Act No. 875 a question involving tenure of employment is included in the
term "labor dispute". 74The discharge or the act of seeking it is the labor dispute itself. It
being the labor dispute itself, that very same act of the Union in asking the employer to
dismiss Appellee cannot be "an act done ... in furtherance of an industrial dispute". The
mere fact that appellant is a labor union does not necessarily mean that all its acts are in
furtherance of an industrial dispute. 75Appellant Union, therefore, cannot invoke in its
favor Section 24 of Republic Act No. 875. This case is not intertwined with any unfair labor
practice case existing at the time when Appellee filed his complaint before the lower
court.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Neither does Article 2208 of the Civil Code, invoked by the Union, serve as its shield. The
article provides that attorney's fees and expenses of litigation may be awarded "when the
defendant's act or omission has compelled the plaintiff ... to incur expenses to protect his
interest"; and "in any other case where the court deems it just and equitable that
attorney's fees and expenses of litigation should be recovered". In the instant case, it
cannot be gainsaid that appellant Union's act in demanding Appellee's dismissal caused
Appellee to incur expenses to prevent his being dismissed from his job. Costs according to
Section 1, Rule 142, of the Rules of Court, shall be allowed as a matter of course to the
prevailing party.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is dismissed, and the decision, dated August 26, 1965, of
the Court of First Instance of Manila, in its Civil Case No. 58894, appealed from is
affirmed, with costs against appellant Union. It is so ordered.

Makalintal, C.J, Castro, Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio, Esguerra, Muñoz Palma
and Aquino, JJ., concur.

VICTORIANO VS ELIZALDE ROPE WORKERS' UNION

Topic: Right to self organization
Extent and Scope of Right

FACTS:
1. Benjamin Victoriano (hereinafter referred to as Appellee), a member of the religious sect known as the "Iglesia
ni Cristo", had been in the employ of the Elizalde Rope Factory, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as Company) since
1958. 

2. As such employee, he was a member of the Elizalde Rope Workers' Union (hereinafter referred to as Union)
which had with the Company a collective bargaining agreement containing a closed shop provision which reads
as follows: 

11
Membership in the Union shall be required as a condition of employment for all permanent employees workers
covered by this Agreement. 

3. The collective bargaining agreement expired on March 3, 1964 but was renewed the following day, March 4,
1964. 

4. Under Section 4(a), paragraph 4, of Republic Act No. 875, prior to its amendment by Republic Act No. 3350,
the employer was not precluded "from making an agreement with a labor organization to require as a condition of
employment membership therein, if such labor organization is the representative of the employees." On June 18,
1961, however, Republic Act No. 3350 was enacted, introducing an amendment to — paragraph (4) subsection
(a) of section 4 of Republic Act No. 875, as follows: ... "but such agreement shall not cover members of any
religious sects which prohibit affiliation of their members in any such labor organization". 

5. Being a member of a religious sect that prohibits the affiliation of its members with any labor organization,
Appellee presented his resignation to appellant Union in 1962, and when no action was taken thereon, he
reiterated his resignation on September 3, 1974. Thereupon, the Union wrote a formal letter to the Company
asking the latter to separate Appellee from the service in view of the fact that he was resigning from the Union as
a member. 

6. The management of the Company in turn notified Appellee and his counsel that unless the Appellee could
achieve a satisfactory arrangement with the Union, the Company would be constrained to dismiss him from the
service. This prompted Appellee to file an action for injunction, docketed as Civil Case No. 58894 in the Court of
First Instance of Manila to enjoin the Company and the Union from dismissing Appellee. 1 In its answer, the Union
invoked the "union security clause" of the collective bargaining agreement; assailed the constitutionality of
Republic Act No. 3350; and contended that the Court had no jurisdiction over the case, pursuant to Republic Act
No. 875, Sections 24 and 9 (d) and (e). 

CFI - Manila: enjoining the defendant Elizalde Rope Factory, Inc. from dismissing the plaintiff from his present
employment and sentencing the defendant Elizalde Rope Workers' Union to pay the plaintiff P500 for attorney's
fees and the costs of this action 

Appeal to this Court on purely questions of law. 

ISSUE/S:
WON RA 3350 introducing an amendment to paragraph (4) subsection (a) of section 4 of Republic Act No. 875,
as follows: ... "but such agreement shall not cover members of any religious sects which prohibit affiliation of their
members in any such labor organization" is unconstitutional

WON RA 3350 infringes on the fundamental right to form lawful associations when it "prohibits all the members of
a given religious sect from joining any labor union if such sect prohibits affiliations of their members thereto" 5 ;
and, consequently, deprives said members of their constitutional right to form or join lawful associations or
organizations guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, and thus becomes obnoxious to Article III, Section 1 (6) of the
1935 Constitution

RULING:

1. NO. R.A. No. 3350 is constitutional on all counts. It must be pointed out that the free exercise of religious
profession or belief is superior to contract rights. In case of conflict, the latter must, therefore, yield to the former.

2. No. What the exception provides, therefore, is that members of said religious sects cannot be compelled or
coerced to join labor unions even when said unions have closed shop agreements with the employers; that in
spite of any closed shop agreement, members of said religious sects cannot be refused employment or dismissed
from their jobs on the sole ground that they are not members of the collective bargaining union. 

If, notwithstanding their religious beliefs, the members of said religious sects prefer to sign up with the labor union,
they can do so. If in deference and fealty to their religious faith, they refuse to sign up, they can do so; the law
does not coerce them to join; neither does the law prohibit them from joining; and neither may the employer or
labor union compel them to join. Republic Act No. 3350, therefore, does not violate the constitutional provision on
freedom of association. 

DISPOSITIVE: Benjamin Victoriano Won (Plaintiff)

Appeal is dismissed.

DOCTRINE: The free exercise of religious profession or belief is superior to contract rights. In case of conflict, the
latter must yield to the former.

If in deference and fealty to their religious faith, they refuse to sign up, they can do so; the law does not coerce
them to join; neither does the law prohibit them from joining, and neither may the employer or labor union compel
them to join.

12