Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 71 (2018) 58e66

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Studies in History and Philosophy of Science

The stage on which our ingenious play is performed: Kant’s

a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t

Article history: This paper focuses on Kant’s account of physical geography and his theory of the Earth. In spelling out the
Received 24 January 2017 epistemological foundations of Kant’s physical geography, the paper examines 1) their connection to the
Accepted 24 June 2018 mode of holding-to-be-true, mathematical construction and empirical certainty and 2) their implications
Available online 26 June 2018
for Kant’s view of cosmopolitan right. Moreover, by showing the role played by the mathematical model
of the Earth for the foundations of Kant’s Doctrine of Right, the exact relationship between the latter and
Keywords:
physical geography is highlighted. Finally, this paper shows how, in Kant’s view, the progress of physical
Kant
geography can be assured if and only if the free circulation of human beings is established and regulated
Earth sciences
Physical geography
by law. Therefore, examining the mutual relationship between the theory of Earth and the foundations of
Epistemology right opens new perspectives on the relationship between epistemology and practical philosophy within
Doctrine of right Kant’s system.
Ó 2018 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction: physical geography as Weltkenntnis knowledge. In 1775, in On the different races of man, Kant defined the
knowledge of the world (Weltkenntnis) provided by physical geog-
Recent studies on Kant’s physical geography, such as Stark raphy in terms of a cognition that embraces the relationship be-
(2011), Elden (2009, 2011), and Louden (2002), have emphasized tween human beings and the world as a whole (im Ganzen) (see Ak
its relevance within Kant’s system and suggested possible ways of 02:443).2 Weltkenntnis thus refers to the way in which human be-
reading it in terms of a “propaedeutic to practical reason” (see ings apply their knowledge to the physical world and to our planet
Elden, 2011, 3), especially in relation to Kant’s Anthropology from a in particular, in order to act within it. Physical geography, along with
pragmatic point of view (see Louden, 2015, 486).1 Physical geography anthropology, is a key discipline for the cultivation of citizens of the
was the topic on which Kant lectured for 40 years from 1756 to 1796 world (see Ak 02:443). This is due to the fact that physical geog-
(Elden, 2011; Kuehn, 2001). Contrary to other subjects that Kant raphy offers a description of the world that is not based merely on
taught, the course of physical geography was not based on a text- observation, but rather is meant to enable the application of the
book (Adickes, 1911). This indicates that Kant shaped this discipline laws of right on this planet and the realization of Kant’s ethicote-
in an original way and contributed to its dissemination until the end leology in the historical dimension. According to Kant, physical
of the 18th century. Two central notions of Kant’s account of geography leads to the awareness that “the world is the foundation
physical geography are those of: the world; and its pragmatic (Substrat) and stage on which our ingenious play is performed”
(Kant, 1910, Ak 09:158). One possible reading of Kant’s conception
of Weltkenntnis consists of highlighting its consequences for prac-
E-mail address: [email protected]. tical philosophy, e.g., for “impure ethics” (Louden, 2002) and for the
1
References to Kant’s texts follow the pagination of the Academy edition (Ak). pragmatic dimension, as examined by Elden (2011).
References to the Critique of the power of Judgement are abbreviated as CJ, whereas By contrast, I shall primarily focus on an epistemological anal-
those to the Critique of pure Reason use the standard abbreviation CPR, followed by ysis and explore the extent to which Kant’s conception of empirical
the A/B editions pagination. Translations are from the Cambridge Edition of the
Works of Immanuel Kant unless stated otherwise.
knowledge can lead to a deeper understanding of the role that the
2
It is worth emphasizing that in physical geography and in anthropology, the lectures on physical geography played within his system. To reach
idea of the World (Welt) is not to be understood as an idea of pure theoretical this goal, I shall examine the relation of this conception of knowl-
reason. It is rather to be taken from a pragmatic perspective, as an idea leading to edge to Kant’s philosophy of right and clarify why Kant defined the
the representation of the Earth as a Globus terraquaeus, as the territory in which
world as a Substratum in his lectures on physical geography. I shall
human beings freely interact and move, and therefore as an idea of practical reason.

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2018.06.006
0039-3681/Ó 2018 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
 S. De Bianchi / Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 71 (2018) 58e66 59

do so by analyzing the development of his epistemology both in his oceans’ water mass, enables the application of the laws of physics to
writings on natural science and logic (both in the Pre-Critical and the rotation of the planet and the prediction of the behavior of
more importantly in the Critical period), as well as in the Meta- celestial bodies. Kant, who is fascinated by the application of
physics of Morals. This move in turn offers a novel perspective in the mathematics and physics to fields that were previously interpreted
systematic study of Kant’s philosophy, but also the possibility to on the grounds of traditional and religious narratives, expresses the
reflect upon how the epistemology of physical geography relates to same attitude in two works from 1754 (Kant, 1754a, 1754b), which
the practical sphere, especially to cosmopolitan right (ius cosmo- suggests that the two writings are meant to complement one
politicum). Cosmopolitan right is defined by Kant as “the right of another. The first work describes the Earth’s motion and predicts its
offering to engage in commerce with any other based on the features on the basis of physical laws, whereas the second attempts
possible union of all nations” (Ak 06:352).3 As we shall see in the to reconstruct the Earth’s evolution. Therefore, The question,
next sections, one of the conditions of possibility for thinking of this whether the Earth is ageing, considered from a physical point of view
unity lies precisely in the mathematical representation of the Earth not only includes a theory of planetary formation, but also dis-
that is used in Kant’s physical geography. In what follows, I first cusses the interaction between human beings and the environment
examine Kant’s writings on natural science, with an emphasis on (see Kant, 1754b, Ak 01:197).
those discussing his theory of the Earth (Section 2), and those on However, unlike in Kant (1754a), The question, whether the Earth
physical geography (Section 3). Then I shall expound the episte- is ageing, considered from a physical point of view raises an important
mological aspects underlying physical geography which emerge in topic for the foundation of physical geography. Whereas there is no
the Critical period (Section 3.1) and the characterization of collec- problem in applying the laws of physics to determine the present
tive knowledge in physical geography (Section 3.2). Finally, in and the future behavior of planetary motion, the same cannot be
Section 4, I shall show which model and methods of physical ge- said for the history of the planet and its changes throughout history.
ography Kant used for the foundations of his doctrine of cosmo- There is a degree of uncertainty that is related to geological phe-
politan right in the Metaphysics of Morals, such as his use of a nomena and therefore not eliminable. Kant himself describes the
mathematical representation of the Earth in order to justify the different epochs of nature that dictated the cycle of the Earth’s
possession of land for all human beings. evolution in terms of an inner cycle subject to sudden changes. Not
all the factors determining such a change are immediately pre-
dictable (see Kant, 1754b, Ak 01:200e202).
2. The theory of Earth in the Pre-Critical writings The uncertainty related to the evolution and history of the
planet is shown by the unpredictable character of phenomena, such
The widespread interpretation of Kant’s early writings on nat- as earthquakes.4 The uncertainty concerning earthquakes and most
ural science, including lectures on physical geography, is that they other subterranean phenomena is expressed in a simple remark:
were distant from the attitude of the Critical period, in which “We have another world beneath our feet with which we are at
transcendental philosophy is meant to ground natural science in a present but little acquainted” (Kant, 1756b, Ak 01:432). The simple
systematic way. This reading is plausible only if we consider each of fact that the inner structure of the planet we inhabit is unknown
Kant’s Pre-Critical works in isolation. Marcucci (2004) noticed that does not however limit completely the capacity of natural science
even if Kant’s early Pre-Critical works of natural science (1754e to explain and clarify phenomena, thereby positively influencing
1757) are not strongly based on philosophical assumptions, still human life. Indeed, according to Kant, when an earthquake occurs
they already contained most of the major topics of natural science at least the propagation of effects (shockwaves) is known according
that Kant would develop in the following 40 years. The present to the laws describing the behavior of wave propagation. Thus, in
paper does not discuss this interpretation in depth, but takes up an constructing his theory of earthquakes and tidal waves, Kant de-
important point underlined by it, namely that each work of the scribes the way in which the seismic waves propagate and, by
cluster of Kant’s mid-18th-century writings on natural science assuming the spheroidal shape of the planet, he is able to draw
should be read in connection with each other. If one assumes this some conclusions about their effects on the surface and the damage
perspective, then it is easy to notice that one of the main pre- that they can produce.5
occupations of the young Kant was the attempt to reconstruct a
theory of the Earth from a physical perspective, including a study of
its structure and its evolution within the solar system. 4
This view was reinforced in 1756 when Kant published On the cause of earth-
In 1754, Kant published Examination of the question whether the quakes in three essays, soon after the catastrophic earthquake in Lisbon of 1755.
rotation of the Earth on its axis [.] has undergone any change since its Many philosophers, at first astonished, later commented on this event, producing
origin and how one can be certain of this. Originally conceived as a several ethical works between them. However, Kant did not simply comment on
the earthquake from an ethical standpoint: “But at least we can say that they are
prize essay to be sent to the Academy of Sciences in Berlin, it was
not pleasing to the natural philosopher, for what hopes does he have for ascer-
rather published in ten issues in a local popular magazine of taining the laws according to which changes occur in the air when a subterranean
Königsberg, the Wöchentliche Königsbergische Frag-und Anzeigungs- atmosphere is interfering with their effects, and can one doubt that this must take
Nachrichten. Starting from Euler’s studies of the Earth as a spheroid, place frequently, for how else may we explain the fact that there is no regularity in
Kant proposed a subtle and precise argument in support of the the changes in the weather, because the causes of these changes are partly constant
and partly periodic?” (Kant, 1756a, Ak 01:426).
change of the Earth’s momentum in the calculations of its rotation. 5
Kant’s theory of the Earth assumes an original chaos which governed the
This essay introduces an important point that will also be present in natural processes in the planet. Then the progressive cooling down of the surface
Universal Natural History and Theory of the Heavens (1755). In Kant’s allowed for the orogeny and for the Earth to become inhabited. However, in
view, the use of a mathematical model, i.e., the Earth represented as agreement with De Mairan’s theory, Kant also believed that the interior of the Earth
was extremely warm and that it was responsible for the emission of heat. This
spheroid, together with the inclusion of physical effects, i.e., the
theory was in contrast with Buffon’s theory of the planet. The latter, similarly to
Leibniz, stressed the fact that the interior of the Earth was cold and governed by
processes of stratification and crystallization. Even if Kant rejected Buffon and
3
This characterization of cosmopolitan right has been an object of studies on Leibniz’s views of the interior of the planet, he still accepted Leibniz’s hypothesis
Kant and colonialism (Flikschuh and Ypi, 2014). A recent attempt at discussing concerning the structure of the upper level of the crust. He believed that there were
cosmopolitanism in geography is Harvey (2011). However, unlike the present cavities beneath the surface of the globe and that under the action of earthquakes
contribution, it does not account for the development of Kant’s epistemology to these cavities were falling down, thereby enabling the propagation of seismic
study such a connection. waves throughout large regions of the surface.
60 S. De Bianchi / Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 71 (2018) 58e66

In the mid-1750s Kant believes that the world cannot be thought mostly concerned with observation, and the method of studying
of as an ideal environment for human beings (see Kant, 1756b, Ak the atmosphere in its complexity. In the 18th century, meteorology
01:431). In his view, the final goals of human aspirations are located included all phenomena of the terrestrial atmosphere, such as
outside the realm of nature: natural laws do not contribute to the winds, rain and so forth, phenomena occurring under the crust
ethical completion of human beings, for instance of their duties and (earthquakes) or in the sea (tidal waves), and external objects
rights. However, any teleological reading of the history of the planet interacting with the atmosphere, such as meteorites. Meteorology
should be disregarded. For Kant, recognizing this fact is something also included the study of gases (pneumatics) and climatology
positive: it allows human beings to know their limits and develop (Frängsmyr, Heilbron, & Rider, 1990, 143ff.). One may wonder
new skills, and strengthens their existing abilities. The same atti- whether what Kant called ‘physical geography’ would be a part of
tude is also present in the New notes to explain the theory of winds what was called ‘meteorology’ in the 18th century. From our dis-
(Kant, 1756d), where Kant talks about the advantages that naviga- cussion, it will emerge that this was not the case. Kant established
tion obtains from the knowledge of the atmosphere and winds physical geography as autonomous, but at the same time claimed
(Kant, 1756d, Ak 01:501). Kant himself proposed a new explanation that it had to rely on the results obtained by meteorology and its
for the generation and characters of the western winds and sub-fields. On the one hand, physical geography has its proper
monsoon, but he also assumed that the empirical laws of winds domain and strongly relies on natural science and empirical ob-
would be the result of complex mechanisms that were yet to be servations; on the other hand, it reconstructs the idea of the world
discovered. In other words, only the development of a theory of the as a substratum, which is meaningful not only for our scientific
atmosphere would have been capable of explaining winds and activities, but also from a practical standpoint. As we shall see in the
other phenomena studied by meteorology. In the meantime, ac- next sections, Kant progressively included the practical standpoint
cording to Kant, it was possible to rely on well-known laws that in physical geography and so he gradually revised his account such
helped natural scientists to model atmospheric phenomena by that it would reflect the developments of his critical philosophy and
assuming, for instance, that the atmosphere responded to Ber- his theory of empirical knowledge.
noulli’s law of pressure for fluids and its description of moving
columns of air (see also D’Alembert, 1747; Euler, 1755a, 1755b, 3. Kant’s physical geography: an open question
1755c; see also; Darrigol, 2005; Darrigol & Frisch, 2008).
Now, is Kant’s approach concerning geophysical processes, such The doctrines of the theory of Earth and its history, as well as the
as earthquakes and winds, the same that he assumes in the physical theory of the atmosphere and winds, form part of Kant’s lectures on
geography? In Plan and announcement of a series of lectures on physical geography. It is of crucial importance to reconstruct Kant’s
physical geography (1757), Kant maintains that there are three ways view of physical geography in its epistemology and its foundations.
of looking at the Earth: However, the reconstruction of Kant’s doctrine of physical geog-
raphy is not a simple task, because its textual basis is disputed. This
a) The mathematical approach which portrays the Earth as an has been discussed by recent studies, such as Stark (2011), Elden
approximately spherical heavenly body. (2011), Reinhardt (2011), Louden (2014) and by older ones, such
b) The political approach which focuses on peoples, mutual ex- as Adickes (1911; 1925, 373 ff.).
change among communities, religions, governments and The problem in a nutshell is the following: Rink’s edition of
customs. Kant’s Physical Geography cannot be taken as representative of
c) Physical geography that expounds the natural characteristics of Kant’s doctrine since the first volume is based on lectures dated
the globe (seas, dry land, mountains, rivers, the atmosphere, from 1775 (see Ak 9:156e273) and the second (see Ak 9:273e436)
human beings, animals, plants, minerals, etc.); its method con- is based on prior lectures held between 1758 and 1759 (see Adickes,
sists in the comparison of observations, which typically resulted 1911; Louden, 2011, 192 footnote 5). It is also true that Kant
from the “curiosity of a traveler” (see Kant, 1757, Ak 02:03). commissioned the 1802 edition to Rink and therefore part of the
material is originally taken from Kant’s manuscripts and lecture
One can immediately notice that the activity of producing notes. Kant’s aim was also to avoid the publication of materials
mathematical models of the Earth (which is fundamental in Kant’s without his permission, as was the case in 1801 with the publica-
considerations on geophysics, see 1754a, 1756a, 1756b, 1756c, tion of Vollmer’s Kant’s physical geography (see Ak 12:372). We also
1756d) is not included among the methods of physical geography. have other sources that can be compared with Rink’s edition, such
Already in the mid-1750s Kant included the theory of winds in as Herder (1763e1764), Hesse (1770), Kaeheler (1774), Messina
physical geography, but excluded, at least in the Pre-Critical period, (1778), Dönhoff (1782), Dohna (1992) or the manuscript an-Hol-
phenomena such as earthquakes and the planetary evolution of the stein-Beck, which is believed to be the closest to Kant’s Diktattext.7
Earth.6 For the purpose of the present paper, which focuses on the epis-
What about phenomena such as meteorites, earthquakes and temology of physical geography, we should at least consider
tidal waves, that were unpredictable but terribly important for the whether Kant’s approach to physical geography changed from the
history and the development of the planet and of life therein? In the Pre-Critical to the Critical period both with respect to the devel-
1750s, they had no place in Kant’s physical geography, but belonged opment of Kant’s doctrine of empirical certainty and to the sys-
to a different level of understanding of the Earth through natural tematic role that physical geography assumes as a propaedeutic
laws. It is for this reason that in the 1750s Kant sharply distin- of philosophy. Let us start with the last point. Adickes (1911) had
guished between the method of physical geography, which was

7
Kant gave private lectures on physical geography during the Winter of 1772e
6
Rink’s 1802 edition contains a brief section on the epochs of the Earth (see Ak 1773 in the home of the Herzog Friedrich von Holstein-Beck before a mixed circle of
09:296ff.). Its inclusion in the field of physical geography in the Critical period also auditors. Stark (2011) finds it likely that Kant had a copy made of his own text to
depended on the fact that Kant changed his mind on natural history (Natur- present to Holstein-Beck; Kant added various marginalia and made some correc-
geschichte) in a less favorable direction (see Marcucci, 1986, and for a discussion of tions to personalize the copy. The literature agrees that this manuscript is the
earlier views of Marcucci, see; Düsing, 1984). Indeed, Kant weakened the epistemic closest copy of Kant’s Dictata, the texts that he prepared from 1757 to 1759 and
status of the ‘history of nature’ and gave theoretical preference to the ‘description of which served as the basis for his lectures, and which are now lost: see Louden
nature’ (Naturbeschreibung) (Sloan, 2006). (2012).
 S. De Bianchi / Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 71 (2018) 58e66 61

already shown that Rink’s 1802 edition of Physical Geography history become part of physical geography as knowledge of the
roughly follows upon the 1775 lectures in describing the possible world. This means that the method of physical geography cannot be
approaches to geography. These are: based on observation only, because it can rely on descriptions of-
fering historical certainty and on pragmatic knowledge or know-
1) Mathematical geography how that in turn is grounded in the mathematical modeling of
2) Moral geography the Earth. Mathematics, I claim, enters into play in a systematic way
3) Political geography in the physical geography and ensures that it is not based on
4) Mercantile/commercial geography observation only. Furthermore, from the epistemological perspec-
5) Theological geography tive, physical geography progressively includes explanatory ele-
ments and the transformation of opinion based on empirical
We immediately notice that in Rink’s 1802 edition there is a knowledge into higher levels of certainty, including holding-to-be-
difference with respect to the 1757 lecture examined in the previ- true, objective probability and so forth.9 Precisely in this progres-
ous section: mathematical geography is now part of physical ge- sive inclusion can one identify the architectonic function of the
ography, whereas before it was an alternative approach to the concept of physical geography as Weltkenntnis: physical geography
knowledge of the world, different from physical geography (Kant, has a regulative function to orient human activity on this planet.
1802, Ak 09:164e165). In Vorzügliche kleine Schriften und Aufsätze.
Nebst Betrachtungen über die Erde und den Menschen aus unge-
druckten Vorlesungen (1833), Starke, a pseudonym for Johann Adam 3.1. Physical geography: knowledge and methods
Bergk, reports the definition of physical geography used by Kant in
1791 during his lectures: Let us now analyze the epistemological underpinnings of
physical geography. My analysis focuses on published works, such
“The world can be treated as it is now or as it was (in the past);
as the Critique of the Power of Judgement, and on passages of stu-
the former is Cosmography whereas the latter is World history.
dents’ manuscripts of Kant’s lectures on logic and metaphysics that
Cosmography is either the description of the world as object of
can shed light on Kant’s lectures in physical geography.
our senses or as the complex of objects with which we could
First, let us examine the conundrum according to which, for
come together, but over all possible celestial bodies it is only the
Kant, physical geography as knowledge-of-the-world would not be
Earth that we need from our perspective and that we could
a historical narrative, but a mere study of space (Hartshorne, 1958)
change. The description of the Earth (geography) is the knowl-
realized through the description of our planet and its parts (e.g.,
edge that concerns what can be found now on Earth and can be
topography, chorography, orography, hydrography).10 However,
treated either as natural or political description” (Bergk & Kant,
Kant included the history of the Earth and its epochs in his lectures
1833, p. 262).8
on physical geography in the Critical period. How can the history of
our planet be a part of physical geography, given that for Kant
Therefore, in the 1790s, Kant offered a definition of worldly history implies a temporal narrative rather than a pure description?
knowledge (Weltkenntnis) as the combined experience of nature This question can be resolved by considering Kant’s epistemology
and of human beings acting upon it. This meaning is also present in and his definition of certainty given to geography in both his
Rink’s edition of Physical Geography, where the knowledge of the published and unpublished writings.
world consists in considering “how to apply one’s knowledge and We can choose two basic questions to investigate Kant’s doc-
make use of it in a manner appropriate to one’s understanding and trine of explanation and probability in order to show how it as-
present situation, or to provide practical use for one’s knowledge” sumes more and more importance for physical geography in the
(Kant, 1802, Ak 09:157). Differently from the Pre-Critical period, Critical period:
however, Kant further clarifies the cosmographic point of view,
according to which the knowledge of the world is a pragmatic 1. Are there explanations in physical geography?
knowledge of the Earth and of human beings as a whole (see Kant, 2. Which kind of certainty, and therefore knowledge, can physical
1802, Ak 09:157). The cosmographic standpoint is the only one that geography offer?
allows the systematic knowledge of the world as the sum total
(Inbegriff, complexus) of objects of experience, and as a Substrat on The first question can be answered by considering that empir-
which human beings act, as introduced in Section 1. Thus, in the ical knowledge is for Kant associated to the mode of holding-to-
Critical period, physical geography offers the possibility of sys- be-true (Fürwahrhalten).11 We have seen how taking account of
tematically knowing the world, understood as the sum total of our
experiences and as the stage on which we perform. Furthermore,
9
physical geography contributes to the understanding of connec- In the CPR these levels of certainty are discussed in the Doctrine of Method (see
tions among phenomena, is systematic and guides pragmatic CPR A820/B848-A831/859). In particular, Kant describes how one can pass from
opinion to belief, and from holding to be true to knowing (see CPR A822/B850). I
knowledge of the world (see Kant, 1802, Ak 09:158).
also discuss this aspect in section 3.1.
To this pragmatic view of Weltkenntnis, Kant added important 10
For a discussion of historical narratives and geographical description in Kant’s
elements that clearly emerge in the 1790s: both geography and physical geography, see Marcuzzi (2011).
11
Kant defines this mode as follows: “Taking something to be true is an occur-
rence in our understanding that may rest on objective grounds, but that also re-
quires subjective causes in the mind of him who judges. If it is valid for everyone
8
Translation is mine. The original reads: “Die Welt kann betrachtet werden, wie merely as long as he has reason, then its ground is objectively sufficient, and in that
sie jetzt ist oder wie sie gewesen ist; jenes ist Kosmographie, dieses Geschichte der case taking something to be true is called conviction. If it has its ground only in the
Welt. Die Kosmographie ist entweder Beschreibung der Welt als Gegenstand uns- particular constitution of the subject, then it is called persuasion. Persuasion is a
erer Sinne oder der Inbegriff der Gegenstände, mit denen wir in Gemeinschaft mere semblance, since the ground of the judgment, which lies solely in the subject,
kommen können, aber unter allen übrigen Weltkörpern ist dies nur die Erde, is held to be objective. Hence such a judgment also has only private validity, and
welche wir allem nach unseren Absichten brauchen und verändern können. Die this taking something to be true cannot be communicated. [.] The touchstone of
Erdbeschreibung (Geographie) ist Kenntnib desjenigen, was jetzt auf der Erde whether taking something to be true is conviction or mere persuasion is therefore,
angetroffen wird, und kann entweder als Natur - oder als politische Beschreibung externally, the possibility of communicating it and finding it to be valid for the
betrachtet werden”. reason of every human being to take it to be true” (CPR A820/B848).
62 S. De Bianchi / Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 71 (2018) 58e66

uncertainty is crucial in Kant’s natural writings since the Pre- specific kind of empirical certainty which he calls historical cer-
Critical writings and, from the epistemological perspective, it tainty (Kant, Vienna Logic, Ak 24:891).15
becomes an even more pressing question in the third Critique. In the Jäsche Logic empirical certainty is original (originarie
In the Critical period, indeed, Kant describes the explanation empirica) to the extent that one becomes certain of something from
offered by physical geography as an approximation to certainty on one’s own experience, and derived (derivative empirica) insofar as
the ground of his doctrine of holding-to-be-true.12 The latter is one becomes certain through someone else’s experience (see Kant,
associated with probable cognition in Kant’s lectures on logic, as 1910, Ak 09:71). The latter is called historical certainty and does
follows: not rest on our own experience, but on testimony.16 This implies a
social dimension of knowledge and the possibility to communicate
“To the doctrine concerning the certainty of our cognition per-
it through language (see also Kant, Refl. 5645, Ak 18:291). In other
tains also the doctrine of the cognition of the probable, which is
words, the knowledge of the world provided by physical geography
to be regarded as an approximation to certainty. By probability
assumes the existence of an exchange (commercium) among human
is to be understood a holding-to-be-true based on insufficient
beings and a reciprocal interaction (Wechselwirkung) that is also
grounds which have, however, a greater relation to the sufficient
fundamental for the foundation of the Doctrine of Right (see Sec-
grounds than do the grounds of the opposite. By this explana-
tion 4).17 The character of this collective knowledge is based on the
tion we distinguish probability (probabilitas) from mere plausi-
doctrine of holding-to-be-true, as described in the Blomberg Logic:
bility (verisimilitude), a holding-to-be-true based on insufficient
grounds insofar as these are greater than the grounds of the “We have two methods for grounds of holding-to-be-true. The
opposite” (Kant, Jäsche Logic, Ak 9:81). agreement of other men with our opinions, and the testing of our
thought according to other men’s sentiments, is really a most
outstanding logical test of our understanding by the under-
With probability, then, the ground of holding-to-be-true is
standing of others. Man needs this communication of his cog-
objectively valid, while with mere plausibility it is only subjectively
nitions very much in order to be able to pass judgment on them
valid.13 Probability is an approximation to certainty, because with it
rightly. Men have a natural inclination to communicate to others
there must always exist a standard in accordance with which one
the judgments that their understanding has made, and merely
can estimate it. This standard is certainty (see Kant, Jäsche Logic, Ak
from this arises the writing of books, whose cause has otherwise
09:82). I shall come back to this question about explanation in the
been set down to vanity, to ambition, by other critics of the hu-
following section, but for now it is worth noticing that for Kant
man race, who would happily interpret everything most unfa-
explanations in physical geography are either approximately
vorably. Men who separate themselves from all human society
certain or probable.
necessarily find, in the end, when they begin to investigate their
As to the second question, we notice that in the 1770s Kant
condition and the causes of their misanthropy, that they do not
claims that physical geography offers not only belief or opinion but
also knowledge:
“In speculative philosophical cognition one can indeed hold 15
“Sciences are historical sciences or sciences of reason. It is not good that the
opinions, but not believe. In mathematical cognition one can author understands by science only a cognition of reason. For a system can be given
neither hold opinions nor believe, but only know. In empirical or for historical things, too, namely, by my setting up an idea, in accordance with
historical cognition, all three. In practical cognition, only belief” which the manifold in history is to be ordered [.]. The idea could be this. Human
actions derive from human nature, in order to fulfill completely its determination if
(Kant, Refl. 2450. 1764e68? 1769e70? (1772e75?) V, 43, at x157, I take as my idea how human nature has developed in various ages, and how it has
Ak 16:374). gradually gotten closer to its determination, i.e., to the completion of all the pur-
poses that are prescribed for humanity on earth, then I bring a system to mind, in
accordance with which I can order history. Certainty is either 1. empirical certainty.
This is because physical geography as worldly knowledge can be This rests either on one’s own experience or that of others, when I hold the thing to
based on experiments and speculations which lead to opinions be certain on account of their testimony. It is also called historical certainty. It is just
(e.g., the composition of high strata of the atmosphere), but it is also as good empirically as my own experience, however. For often I must not trust my
observations as much as those of some other man, of whom I know that he is an
based on mathematical cognition (e.g., the Earth represented as a
attentive man, and that I am probably overlooking something in the matter. The
spheroid, the atmosphere modelled as a fluid and so forth) and certainty is all the stronger. For there are some things that I do not attend to as
therefore implies knowledge (Wissen). Finally, as we shall see in the much as another man does” (Kant, The Vienna Logic, Ak 24:891).
16
next sections, in the context of physical geography, cognition can In The Vienna Logic (Ak 24:899) it is reported that certainty can be grounded in
also assume the connotation of belief, because it is genuinely based the testimony of other people, as history and geography are grounded therein. For
Kant’s notion of testimony and its relevance for a theory of knowledge, see also
on the trust that one has in the words of experts and explorers.
Gelfert (2006). Also Scholz (2000) can be very helpful in understanding the
Furthermore, in the early 1770s, physical geography is character- epistemic limits of testimony in Kant’s view.
ized beyond doubt by empirical certainty (Kant, Refl. 2454. (1769e 17
In The Blomberg Logic (Ak 24:245e246) we find the following passage: “Just
70? 1771e75? V, 44, opposite x162), Ak 16:375) and is classified as because the whole of men’s commercium would be removed if no one asserted the
historical cognition.14 In the 1780s, in particular in the Vienna Logic, truth, since then no one would trust anyone else; because a lie is something
harmful, too, and asserting the truth is the most certain path for avoiding disdain.
Kant deepens his conception of historical knowledge with respect E.g., geography, physics, history, and other sciences always presuppose the expe-
to his notion of a system and attributes to physical geography a riences of others. In common life one must not believe the common man in regard
to such cognitions as do not affect the interest of all men, but are rather indifferent.
For in such cases it is all the same to him whether something is thus or otherwise,
since he does not have insight into the importance of the cognition. The learned
12
See footnote 12. man, however, has far more credibility in this kind of cognition, for to him even the
13
In the CPR Kant distinguished between an external (communication and slightest matters in all cognition will be important[;] he will also be more inclined,
agreement of judgments) and an internal source of certainty (truth) for the mode of from love of honor, to assert everything precisely as he has experienced it, since
holding-to-be-true (see CPR A820/B848-A821/B849). In the Jäsche Logic, it emerges otherwise he would lose his credit”. This passage should be compared with the
that Kant is clearly looking for an additional source of objective validity (certainty) Metaphysics of Morals (Ak 06:352) where Kant offers the juridical definition of
for this mode that is able to lead to knowing (compare CPR A822/B850). commercium among human beings in the ius cosmopoliticum. From the comparison
14
In Kant’s view, to hold an opinion is different from but not opposed to knowing. of these passages it emerges that historical certainty can be objectively valid on
Believing is rather opposed to knowing, in the same way that only historical pragmatic grounds. Its objective validity is grounded on the objectivity of right and
cognition is opposed to rational cognition, see Kant, 1910, Ak 16:374. not on pure theoretical grounds.
 S. De Bianchi / Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 71 (2018) 58e66 63

themselves have enough means to distinguish the true from the concept of freedom, which sufficiently proves its reality through
false. The freedom to communicate one’s thoughts, judgments, the causality of reason with regard to certain effects in the sen-
[and] cognitions is certainly the only most certain means to test sible world possible by means of it, and which are irrefutably
one’s cognitions properly, however, and to verify them. And he postulated in the moral law (Ak 05:475, CJ, pp. 338e339)”.18
who takes away this freedom is to be regarded as the worst
enemy of the extension of human cognition, indeed, of men
However, this passage also suggests consequences for the
themselves” (Kant, Blomberg Logic, Ak 24:150e151).
interpretation of the structure and exposition of physical geogra-
phy. Indeed, since every fact is grounded in theoretical proofs, that
To fully specify the importance of the collective dimension of the Earth is a terrestrial globe is itself a fact grounded in theoretical
knowledge which characterizes Kant’s physical geography, I shall proofs. This fact depends on our capacity to give a mathematical
now consider other published works, such as the Critique of the representation of the planet. It is for this reason that in both Kant’s
Power of Judgment. In particular, the second edition gives us an lectures and in Rink’s edition of Physical Geography, the exposition
important hint concerning Kant’s mature view of geography: always starts with the mathematical representation of the Earth.
But this representation is not only related to physical geography
“For although we can have faith in that which we can learn only
and geophysics, it is also fundamental in characterizing the foun-
from the experience of others by means of testimony, it is not on
dations of Kant’s doctrine of right, as well as the methods followed
that account intrinsically a matter of faith; for in the case of one
in the act of division of land according to quantity, i.e., in consti-
of those witnesses it was still real experience and fact, or pre-
tuting property rights (see Section 4).
supposed to be such. Further, it must be possible by means of this
route (of historical faith) to arrive at knowledge; and the objects
of history and geography, like everything else that it is at least 3.2. Kant’s epistemology of Earth Science: the collective dimension
possible for us to know given the constitution of our cognitive
faculties, belong not among matters of faith but among facts. What is the moral that we can draw from the analysis of Kant’s
Only objects of pure reason can be matters of faith in any case, works? Let us first note that the epistemological questions behind
but not as objects of mere pure speculative reason; for then they these texts have been left implicit by the literature. If we look at the
could not even safely be counted among the matters, i.e., objects, debates on the current epistemology and scientific methodology of
of possible cognition for us” (Ak 5:469, CJ p. 333). the Earth sciences, we note that the literature is replete with dis-
cussions of the kind of explanation which pertains to Earth science.
In particular, the notion of explanatory narratives played an
In the second edition of the third Critique, Kant added this important role as a possible candidate to characterize the meth-
reference to geography. Thus, in 1791 Kant explicitly claims that the odology of geography and the typical explanation in Earth science.
objects of geography can be known in conformity with the consti- But this is an old problem that was already present in the early
tution of our cognitive faculties. That our faculties are constituted in history of geography.
a certain way and not in another one is a factum (Thatsache). In Kant’s view, the order of explanation should be reversed. One
Furthermore, knowledge of the object of geography, i.e., the Earth as must first identify the conditions of possibility for the trust implied
terrestrial globe (Erdglobe), can also make use of testimony, but it is by physical geography; only then can one proceed to the analysis of
not grounded in it. The specific form and constitution of our its epistemological underpinnings. Consider the following exam-
planet also constitute a factum for the pragmatic knowledge of ples. Even if I have never been to Alaska, I have information about
physical geography. Experience can enrich the determination of the its climate; even if I have never been to Beijing, I know where it is.
world as object of geography, but this process must be founded in Thus, from a Kantian perspective, the community of geographers,
Kant’s doctrine of theoretical proof, because “every matter of fact is explorers and other experts that communicate this kind of
grounded in theoretical proofs” (CJ Ak 05:469). Kant explicitly ap- knowledge must be trusted,19 but on grounds that constitute a
peals to his doctrine of holding-to-be-true as the epistemological matter of fact, e.g., the constitution of our faculties, the fact that we
ground of belief for pragmatic cognition: share language and the occupation of soil on the same planet. These
“They [i.e., proofs, author’s note] must ultimately ground all underpinnings pertain, in Kant’s view, not only to the epistemo-
holding-to-be-true on a factum (Thatsache), if it [i.e., holding-to- logical but also to the ontological level. Indeed, for him, the scien-
be-true, author’s note] is not to be fully groundless; and the tific methodology of physical geography makes ontological
only difference among proofs is thus whether the holding-to-be- assumptions prior to investigating the explanatory capacity of the
true of the consequence drawn from this fact can be grounded on models employed therein.20
it as knowledge, for theoretical cognition, or mere belief for
practical cognition. All facts belong either to the concept of nature
19
which proves its reality in the objects of the senses that are given Otherwise there would have been no geographical knowledge, because in the
18th century it was simply impossible to have a direct experience of all topics
(or can possibly be given) prior to all concepts of nature, or to the
covered by physical geography.
20
However, there are various ways to model explanation in the earth sciences.
This has led to debate concerning how the earth sciences present themselves as
18
I modified Guyer’s translation in this passage, because the term Fürwahrhalten both natural-historical and as nomological (Laudan, 1987). A more recent account
is to be translated with “holding-to-be-true” and Glauben with “belief” rather than characterizes explanation in earth science as narration through historical de-
faith. The original German text reads: “Auf Thatsache mub sie alles Fürwahrhalten scriptions (Kleinhans, Buskes, & de Regt, 2005). In contrast to physics and chem-
zuvörderst gründen, wenn es nicht völlig grundlos sein soll; und es kann also nur istry, but in analogy with biology, an important part of theories of earth science
der einzige Unterschied im Beweisen Statt finden, ob auf diese Thatsache ein Für- consists of descriptions of contingent states of nature (Beatty, 1995) or distributions
wahrhalten der daraus gezogenen Folgerung als Wissen für das theoretische, oder (Waters, 1998). Thus, in order to be genuinely explanatory, narratives in earth
blob als Glauben für das praktische Erkenntnib könne gegründet werden. Alle science do not need to be reduced to physical causal-law explanations. It is argued
Thatsachen gehören entweder zum Naturbegriff, der seine Realität an den vor allen that the practice of earth science shows how a domain can be ontologically
Naturbegriffen gegebenen (oder zu geben möglichen) Gegenständen der Sinne dependent on another deeper domain (i.e., the physical), while at the same time
beweiset; oder zum Freiheitsbegriffe, der seine Realität durch die Causalität der being explanatorily autonomous (Kleinhans et al., 2005). Physical processes of plate
Vernunft in Ansehung gewisser durch sie möglichen Wirkungen in der Sinnenwelt, tectonics and glaciation, for instance, are captured as contingent regularities with
die sie im moralischen Gesetze unwiderleglich postulirt, hinreichend darthut”. only local reductions to physics and chemistry.
64 S. De Bianchi / Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 71 (2018) 58e66

Could we define Kant’s view of physical geography as a field epistemological change in the status of explanation in the Earth
mainly engaged with the descriptions of our planet and appealing sciences in the 1790s, that is the result of Kant’s mature doctrine of
mainly to narrative explanations? Consider what Kant wrote in empirical certainty and probability. This change was influenced by
1754: the advances in empirical science that Kant witnessed throughout
the 1780s. In particular, in the Critical period, Kant thought that
“If one considers the durability encountered in the really large-
empirical certainty could be attributed to models of the Earth.
scale phenomena of creation, which approaches infinity, then
However, we also know that, in Kant’s system, mathematical con-
one is led to conclude that the passage of five or six thousand
struction leads to apodictic certainty. Thus, physical geography can
years in the time span allotted to the Earth is perhaps not even
contain apodictic certainty in its judgements based on the mathe-
what a year is in relation to the life of a human being” (Kant,
matical model of the Earth as a spheroid; therefore, it leads to
1754b, Ak 01:195).
objective knowledge, or at least is able to approximate it. Precisely
this part of physical geography, i.e., that of the mathematical rep-
Also in the essay On the rotation of the Earth on its Axis, Kant resentation of the globe, plays a central role in the Metaphysics of
refused to use history in Earth science: “I shall not seek to obtain Morals.
elucidation by means of history” (Kant, 1754a, Ak 01:185e186), for
the reason that the history of the human race is not comparable 4. From physical geography to cosmopolitan right
with geological periods.21 However, the laws of physics are reliable
knowledge. Therefore, the dependence of meteorological phe- In the Pre-Critical period, Kant connected in a non-systematic
nomena (whose description can be included in physical geography) way his studies on physical geography and geophysics to prag-
on physical and chemical laws is unavoidable, in Kant’s view, when matic and practical considerations. In his discussion of earthquakes,
approximating certainty in physical geography.22 For instance in his for instance, Kant suggested the possibility of obtaining indirect
1794 essay Something on the influence of the Moon on the weather advantages from unfortunate events, namely gaining more and
the importance of chemistry for the study of the atmosphere is more awareness of our status as contingent beings (see Kant, 1756b,
clearly stated (Ak 08:323e324). In order to explain atmospheric Ak 01:460e461).24 He endorsed a view that was widespread in the
phenomena and different climates at different latitudes, in the 1750s, namely that natural disasters foster humility and astonish-
1790s Kant began to appeal to chemistry and to a more funda- ment, pity and fear, but that these effects are not merely negative:
mental level of these emergent phenomena. For instance, he sought the disclosure of the power of nature leads us to the sublime.
explanations in the oscillation of the ether and the action of In the 1790s, Kant aimed to show that the awareness of ourselves
fundamental forces (e.g., magnetism, electricity and so forth). Such as necessary contingent beings on the Earth is one premise for the
forces could have explained emergent atmospheric phenomena. In realization of moral ends.25 To indicate the role played by the
turn, it could have contributed to a new science meant to link the foundations of physical geography within this picture, I shall now
metaphysical principles of natural science and empirical physics show how Kant in the 1790s emphasized the role played by the
(the unpublished project known as the Transition from the meta- mathematical representation of our planet in the Metaphysics of
physical Foundations of Natural Science to Physics; see Ak 21, 22). Morals (1797). In particular, the most important consequences of
In Section 2, however, we have seen that in the Pre-Critical period such a move throw new light on Kant’s doctrine of cosmopolitanism.
Kant made some epistemological assumptions that remain present For Kant, there is a substantial reason for presuming a direct
in his Critical work. In particular, he maintained that when theo- connection between the mathematical model of our planet and his
rizing about the Earth scientific explanation must take into account a doctrine of right. As will be shown in Section 4.2 below, the
necessary aspect of uncertainty, e.g., we do not know and cannot
directly experience the interior of the planet. This makes us view
regularities as contingent necessary facts,23 leaving open the possi- 24
“We demand that the Earth’s surface should be so constituted that one might
bility of employing models taken from other fields, e.g., biology or wish to live on it forever. In addition, we imagine that we would better regulate
chemistry, in order to make terrestrial phenomena intelligible and to everything to our advantage, if fate had asked for our vote on this matter. Thus we
wish to have e.g. the rain in our power so that we could distribute it over the whole
approximate certainty. Finally, in Kant’s view, in order to predict and
year in accordance with our convenience [.]. But we forget the wells, which we
explain phenomena, any science of the Earth must be based on an cannot do without and which would not be maintained under this system. Equally
idealization: our planet must be represented as a spheroid. we do not know the use which is brought to us by the same causes that frighten us
These foundational aspects of Kant’s theory of the Earth in the case of earthquakes, and yet we should like to see the latter abolished” (Kant,
remained throughout his career. However, there is an 1756b, Ak 01:455). Kant’s statement “Whatever damage earthquakes may ever have
caused for man, they can easily replace with interest” (Kant, 1756b, Ak 01:458) fully
manifests his view in the 1750s.
25
In the 1795 essay Toward perpetual peace (Ak 8:362e364), Kant develops his
21
This paper does not discuss Kant’s reflections on the concept of race; for a reflections on teleology within the framework of his political theory. The cases
discussion that nicely fits to my reading of Kant’s view of physical geography in discussed are taken from earth sciences and descriptions of phenomena included in
connection with the CJ and his late works on moral philosophy and ethics, see the physical geography. According to Kleingeld, Kant’s assumption of a teleological
Huneman (2005). model of history is also justified from a theoretical perspective, because without
22
However, accounting for a transition to explain and classify this dependence this theoretical ground the practical (moral) belief of the moral agent might be
remained a desideratum in Kant’s system. We have only a draft of it in the pages of disconnected from phenomena in the empirical world (Kleingeld, 2006, xxii). It is
the Opus postumum, where Kant talks about a science of “Transition” (Opus post- worth noticing a subtle point here (a point that also leads to the rejection of May’s
umum, Ak 21, 22). This shift towards filling the gap between the metaphysical (1970) criticism of Kant’s geography and that explains why Kant did not explicitly
foundations of natural science and physics is also due to the increasing relevance use teleology in his physical geography): to assume nature as teleologically driven
that Kant attributed to chemistry for natural science (see Friedman, 1992). only leads to belief and not to holding-to-be-true; which is to say that empirical
23
Contingent necessary facts happen according to a rule, and we can obtain in- certainty is not reached by representing nature teleologically. Therefore, from the
formation about them, but we are unable to justify in an absolute, necessary way, perspective of pragmatic knowledge of the world, one can portray nature either as a
their existence. This view depends on Kant’s doctrine of empirical certainty, as can sum total of phenomena or as a teleologically oriented whole that includes freedom
be seen by considering the following passage: “All empirical certainty is bound up and the realization of moral ends. In this way the foundations of geography, history
with consciousness of the contingency of the truth; for experience very well and other sciences is guaranteed by the epistemology of empirical certainty, but at
teaches that something is constituted in one way or another or that something has the same time the possibility of thinking teleologically about nature leaves open the
happened, but never teaches that it could not have been constituted or happened possibility of belief and hope for the moral agent acting in this world (see also
otherwise” (Kant, Refl. 5645, Ak 18:290). Marcucci, 1997).
 S. De Bianchi / Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 71 (2018) 58e66 65

collective dimension of knowledge in physical geography and the “This rational idea of a peaceful, even if not friendly, thor-
trust of the public in the explorers and experts in this field were not oughgoing community of all nations on the earth that can come
based on mere observation but stood in need of an a priori into relations affecting one another is not a philanthropic
grounding. Indeed, whereas the mathematical representation of (ethical) principle, but a principle having to do with rights.
the planet has apodictic certainty, for most other notions discussed Nature has enclosed them all together within determinate limits
in physical geography Kant faced the problem of grounding trust in (by the spherical shape of the place we live in, a globus terra-
testimony and of justifying the condition of possibility of collective queus). And since possession of the land, on which an inhabitant
knowledge. of the earth can live, can be thought only as possession of a part
In other words, there was no a priori ground to guarantee that of a determinate whole, and so as possession of that to which
the pragmatic knowledge of the world would remain collective and each of them originally has a right, it follows that all nations
reliable in its results. This suggested that geography could not claim stand originally in a community of land [.] they stand in a
even empirical certainty. However, in the mid-1790s, the possibility community of possible physical interaction (commercium).”
to test and verify the knowledge of physical geography found an a (Kant, 1797, Ak 06:352)
priori foundation not only in Kant’s claim that the constitution of
our faculties is a fact, but also in the practical dimension of the
Now, in Rink’s edition of Physical Geography as well as in the Pre-
sphere of right.
Critical manuscripts of his lectures, Kant also talked about
Let us examine, then, the relevant concepts of Kant’s doctrine of
“mercantile geography”, namely about the exchange of materials
right. First, in order to be effective, the idea of right must rely on the
and commodities deriving from the exploration and exploitation of
law of a reciprocal coercion (Zwang) in necessary agreement with
lands. Traces of the foundation of mercantile geography can also be
the freedom of everyone:
found in Kant’s account of cosmopolitan right. Indeed, in Kant’s
“Under the principle of universal freedom is as it were the
view the collective use of land and its regulations are to be ascribed
construction of that concept, that is, the presentation of it in pure
to a mercantile society that can be said to be cosmopolitan only if it
intuition a priori, by analogy with representing the possibility of
is capable of securing peace:
bodies moving freely under the law of the equality of action and
reaction” (Kant, 1797, Ak 6:232e233). “It can be said that establishing universal and lasting peace
Since the opening of the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant draws an constitutes not merely a part of the doctrine of right but rather
analogy between mathematics and the idea of right (right line e the entire final end of the doctrine of right within the limits of
rectum) (Kant, 1797, Ak 06:233). He continues by clarifying the reason alone; for the condition of peace is the only condition in
condition of possibility for property right (xx11e17) and the defi- which what is mine and what is yours are secured under laws
nition of land (understood as all habitable ground), according to for a multitude of human beings living in proximity to one
which “just as in a theoretical sense accidents cannot exist apart another and therefore under a constitution.” (Kant, 1797, Ak
from a substance, so in a practical sense no one can have what is 6:355)
movable on a piece of land as his own unless he is assumed to be
already in rightful possession of the land” (Kant, 1797, Ak 06:261).
Thus, in Kant’s view, cosmopolitan right and peace constitute
At this point, the mathematical representation of the Earth
the a priori condition of possibility for thinking of the pragmatic
comes into play in a fundamental manner:
knowledge of the world (Weltkenntnis). Only if the cosmopolitan
“All human beings are originally (i.e., prior to any act of choice right is guaranteed together with the free circulation of human
that establishes a right) in a possession of land that is in con- beings is physical geography as practical cognition conceivable,
formity with right, that is, they have a right to be wherever because the condition for attaining empirical certainty by means of
nature or chance has placed them. This kind of possession is a trust is thereby guaranteed de facto. Nevertheless, without the
possession in common because the spherical surface of the mathematical representation of the Earth as globus terraquaeus
earth unites all the places on its surface” (Kant, 1797, Ak 06:262). there would not be a quantitative foundation of the doctrine of
right, i.e., of the property right.
This aspect is clarified by considering that worldly knowledge in
It is therefore in the sections devoted to the property right that
geography implies belief in the validity of testimony. The collec-
Kant starts using the mathematical representation of the Earth of
tively shared knowledge of the world is not possible if there are
physical geography, in order to justify the possession of land for all
effective boundaries that interfere with the exchange of informa-
human beings. Furthermore, this original possession of land is
tion among people and that make it harder to communicate with
something that inevitably implies a collective dimension of the use
each other and to share common strategies and techniques to act in
of land according to a practical concept of original possession in
the world to modify it. In this sense, Kant’s pragmatic representa-
common (communio possessionis originaria) (see Kant, 1797, Ak
tion of our globe as offered by physical geography is necessary for
06:265). Moreover, Kant explicitly connects the possession of land
and mutually linked to cosmopolitan right and its foundations, as a
to the will to use it (communio fundi originaria (Kant, 1797, Ak
means of ensuring knowledge of the world and the cultivation of its
06:267)): all men are originally in common possession of the land
citizens.
of the entire Earth and each has by nature the will to use it (lex
iusti).26 Now, the characterization of this use also includes the
scientific research and the use of the planet’s resources. However, 5. Concluding remarks and perspectives
the limits to our will and to our possession of the land are given
precisely by the mathematical representation of the Earth of In this paper, I have offered some reason to believe that for Kant,
physical geography and this clearly emerges in the section devoted the mathematical representation of the planet is conditioned by the
to the cosmopolitan right (das Weltbürgerrecht): foundations of the doctrine of right, which allow dividing and/or
fixing a quantity of land to be distributed (Kant, 1797, Ak 06:261e
262). As noticed, however, the mathematical model of the Earth is
susceptible to different uses depending on the context, i.e., in the
26
For a discussion of this aspect, see Edwards (2011). 1754 physical theory of the Earth or in physical geography. This can
66 S. De Bianchi / Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 71 (2018) 58e66

be explained by the fact that for Kant a mathematical model per se any change since its origin and how one can be certain of this, which [question]
was set by the Royal Academy of Sciences in Berlin as the prize question for the
does not directly imply a practical use, but the way in which a
current year [2012]. In E. Watkins (Ed.), Kant: Natural science (pp. 156-164).
model is used determines its link to a practical dimension. I have Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
also shown that Kant’s doctrine of right represents a condition for Kant, I. (1754b). The question, whether the Earth is ageing, considered from a
the trust needed for sharing knowledge in physical geography and physical point of view [2012]. In E. Watkins (Ed.), Kant: Natural science (pp. 165-
181). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
that the mathematical representation of the planet is needed to Kant, I. (1756a). On the causes of earthquakes on the occasion of the calamity that
represent the unity of nations in the doctrine of rights. Thus, by befell the western countries of Europe towards the end of last year [2012]. In
analyzing this mutual interaction between the doctrine of right and E. Watkins (Ed.), Kant: Natural science (pp. 327-336). Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press
physical geography, this paper sheds light on Kant’s idea of the Kant, I. (1756b). History and natural description of the most noteworthy occur-
world as “a Substrat of our ingenious play”. The latter can be por- rences of the earthquake that struck a large part of the Earth at the end of the
trayed as the notion of a virtual space through which one can think year 1755 [2012]. In E. Watkins (Ed.), Kant: Natural science (pp. 337-364).
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
of a community (Gemeinschaft) and of an exchange of information Kant, I. (1756c). Continued observations on the earthquakes that have been expe-
among human beings, as well as of the inclusion of the crucial aim rienced for some time [2012]. In E. Watkins (Ed.), Kant: Natural science (pp. 365-
of modifying the environment to realize our moral destination on 373). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
Kant, I. (1756d). New notes to explain the theory of winds, in which at the same
the Earth. time he invites attendance at his lectures [2012]. In E. Watkins (Ed.), Kant:
Natural science (pp. 374-385). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
Acknowledgement Kant, I. (1757). Plan and announcement of a series of lectures on physical geography
with an appendix containing a brief consideration of the question: Whether the
West winds in our regions are moist because they travel over a great sea [2012].
I am very thankful to Katharina Kraus for providing insightful In E. Watkins (Ed.), Kant: Natural science (pp. 386-395). Cambridge: Cambridge
comments at various stages of this manuscript. This research had University Press
made been possible thanks to the Ramón y Cajal programme (RYC- Kant, I. (1797). The metaphysics of morals [1991]. In H. Reiss, & H. B. Nisbet (Eds.),
Kant: Political writings. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
2015-17289). Kant, I. (1802). Physical geography [2012]. In T. Rink (Ed.), Kant: Natural science (pp.
434-679). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Watkins, E. (ed.)
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