BACHRACH VS.

SEIFERT Held:

Facts: The usufructuary shall be entitled to receive all the natural,

industrial, and civil fruits of the property in usufruct. The
The deceased E. M. Bachrach, who left no forced heir except his
108,000 shares of stock are part of the property in usufruct. The
widow Mary McDonald Bachrach, in his last will and testament
54,000 shares of stock dividend are civil fruits of the original
made various legacies in cash and willed the remainder of his
investment. They represent profits, and the delivery of the
estate. The estate of E. M. Bachrach, as owner of 108,000 shares
certificate of stock covering said dividend is equivalent to the
of stock of the Atok-Big Wedge Mining Co., Inc., received from the
payment of said profits. Said shares may be sold independently
latter 54,000 shares representing 50 per cent stock dividend on
of the original shares, just as the offspring of a domestic animal
the said 108,000 shares. On June 10, 1948, Mary McDonald
may be sold independently of its mother. If the dividend be in
Bachrach, as usufructuary or life tenant of the estate, petitioned
fact a profit, although declared in stock, it should be held to be
the lower court to authorize the Peoples Bank and Trust
income. A dividend, whether in the form of cash or stock, is
Company, as administrator of the estate of E. M. Bachrach, to
income and, consequently, should go to the usufructuary, taking
transfer to her the said 54,000 shares of stock dividend by
into consideration that a stock dividend as well as a cash
indorsing and delivering to her the corresponding certificate of
dividend can be declared only out of profits of the corporation,
stock, claiming that said dividend, although paid out in the form
for if it were declared out of the capital it would be a serious
of stock, is fruit or income and therefore belonged to her as
violation of the law.
usufructuary or life tenant. Sophie Siefert and Elisa Elianoff, legal
heirs of the deceased, opposed said petition on the ground that
the stock dividend in question was not income but formed part of
Under the Massachusetts rule, a stock dividend is considered
the capital and therefore belonged not to the usufructuary but to
part of the capital and belongs to the remainderman; while under
the remainderman. While appellants admit that a cash dividend
the Pennsylvania rule, all earnings of a corporation, when
is an income, they contend that a stock dividend is not, but
declared as dividends in whatever form, made during the lifetime
merely represents an addition to the invested capital.
of the usufructuary, belong to the latter. The Pennsylvania rule is
more in accord with our statutory laws than the Massachusetts
rule.
Issue:

Whether or not a dividend is an income and whether it should go

to the usufructuary.
BACHRACH VS. TALISAY SILAY (P7,500) belonged to Cesar Ledesma because he had purchase it.
Cesar Ledesma claimed to be an owner by purchase in good faith.
Facts: On 22 December 1923, the Talisay-Silay Milling Co., Inc.,
At the trial all the parties agreed to recognize and respect the
was indebted to the PNB. To secure the payment of its debt, it
sale made in favor of Cesar Ledesma of the P7,500 part of the
succeeded in inducing its planters, among whom was Mariano
credit in question, for which reason the trial court dismissed the
Lacson Ledesma, to mortgage their land to the bank. And in
complaint and cross-complaint against Cesar Ledesma
order to compensate those planters for the risk they were
authorizing the central to deliver to him the sum of P7,500. And
running with their property under that mortgage, the aforesaid
upon conclusion of the hearing, the court held that the Bachrach
central, by a resolution passed on the same date, and amended
Motor Co., Inc., had a preferred right to receive the amount of
on 23 March 1928, undertook to credit the owners of the
P11,076.02 which was Mariano Lacson Ledesma’s bonus, and it
plantation thus mortgaged every year with a sum equal to 2% of
ordered the central to deliver said sum to Bachrach Motors. PNB
the debt secured according to the yearly balance, the payment of
appealed.
the bonus being made at once, or in part from time to time, as
soon as the central became free of its obligations to the bank, and Held: The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment appealed from,
of those contracted by virtue of the contract of supervision, and as it found no merit in the appeal; without express finding as to
had funds which might be so used, or as soon as it obtained from costs.
said bank authority to make such payment.
1. Civil Fruits under Article 355 of the Civil Code
Bachrach Motor Co., Inc. filed a complaint against the Talisay-
Article 355 of the Civil Code considers three things as civil fruits:
Silay Milling Co., Inc., for the delivery of the amount of P13,850
First, the rents of buildings; second, the proceeds from leases of
or promissory notes or other instruments of credit for that sum
lands; and, third, the income from perpetual or life annuities, or
payable on 30 June 1930, as bonus in favor of Mariano Lacson
other similar sources of revenue. According to the context of the
Ledesma. The complaint further prays that the sugar central be
law, the phrase “u otras analogas” refers only to rents or income,
ordered to render an accounting of the amounts it owes Mariano
for the adjectives “otras” and “analogas” agree with the noun
Lacson Ledesma by way of bonus, dividends, or otherwise, and to
“rentas,” as do also the other adjectives “perpetuas” and
pay Bachrach Motors a sum sufficient to satisfy the judgment
“vitalicias.” The “civil fruits” the Civil Code understands one of
mentioned in the complaint, and that the sale made by said
three and only three things, to wit: the rent of a building, the rent
Mariano Lacson Ledesma be declared null and void.
of land, and certain kinds of income.
The PNB filed a third party claim alleging a preferential right to
2. Bonus not a civil fruit; not an income of the land
receive any amount which Mariano Lacson Ledesma might be
entitled from Talisay-Silay Milling as bonus. Talisay-Silay The amount of the bonus, according to the resolution of the
answered the complaint that Mariano Lacson Ledesma’s credit central granting it, is not based upon the value, importance or
any other circumstance of the mortgaged property, but upon the
total value of the debt thereby secured, according to the annual
balance, which is something quite distinct from and independent
of the property referred to. As the bonus is not obtained from the
land, it is not civil fruits of that land. It is neither rent of
buildings, proceeds from lease of lands, or income under Article
355 of the Civil Code.
BERNERDO VS. BATACLAN Issue:

Facts: Whether or not there is good faith.

By a contract of sale executed from Pastor Samonte and others

ownership of a parcel of land of about 90 hectares. To secure
Held:
possession of the land from the vendors the said plaintiff, on July
20, 1929, instituted a civil case. The trial court found for the The judgment of the lower court is accordingly modified by
plaintiff in a decision which was affirmed by this Supreme Court eliminating therefrom the reservation made in favor of the
on appeal (G.R. No. 33017). When plaintiff entered upon the defendant-appellant to recover from the plaintiff the sum of
premises, however, he found the defendant herein, Catalino P2,212. In all the respects, the same is affirmed, without
Bataclan, who appears to have been authorized by former pronouncement regarding costs. So ordered
owners, as far back as 1922, to clear the land and make
improvements thereon. As Bataclan was not a party in the civil
case, plaintiff, on June 11, 1931, instituted against him a civil The sale at public auction having been asked by the plaintiff
case. In this case, plaintiff was declared owner but the defendant himself (p. 22, bill of exceptions) and the purchase price of
was held to be a possessor in good faith, entitled for P8,000 received by him from Toribio Teodoro, we find no reason
reimbursement in the total sum of P1,642, for work done and to justify a rapture of the situation thus created between them,
improvements made. the defendant-appellant not being entitled, after all, to recover
from the plaintiff the sum of P2,212
The defendant states that he is a possessor in good faith and that
the amount of P2,212 to which he is entitled has not yet been
paid to him. Therefore, he says, he has a right to retain the land
in accordance with the provisions of article 453 of the Civil Code.
In obedience to the decision of this court in G.R. No. 37319, the
plaintiff expressed his desire to require the defendant to pay for
the value of the land. The said defendant could have become
owner of both land and improvements and continued in
possession thereof. But he said he could not pay and the land was
sold at public auction to Toribio Teodoro. When he failed to pay
for the land, the defendant herein lost his right of retention.
IGNACIO VS HILARIO

Facts: The owner of the land, upon the other hand, has the option,
under article 361, either to pay for the building or to sell his land
This is a petition for certiorari arising from a case in the Court of
to the owner of the building. But he cannot, as respondents here
First Instance of Pangasinan between the herein respondents
did, refuse both to pay for the building and to sell the land and
Elias Hilario and his wife Dionisia Dres as plaintiffs, and the
compel the owner of the building to remove it from the land
herein petitioners Damian, Francisco and Luis, surnamed
where it is erected.
Ignacio, as defendants, concerning the ownership of a parcel of
land, partly rice-land and partly residential.

After the trial of the case, the lower court, presided over by Hon. He is entitled to such remotion only when, after having chosen to
Alfonso Felix, rendered judgment holding plaintiff Hilario, as the sell his land, the other party fails to pay for the same.
legal owners of the whole property but conceding to defendants,
Ignacio, the ownership of the houses and granaries built by them
on the residential portion with the rights of a possessor in good
faith, in accordance with article 361 of the Civil Code.

The plaintiff, Hilario, prayed for an order of execution alleging

that since they chose neither to pay defendants for the buildings
nor to sell to them the residential lot, said defendant, Ignacio,
should be ordered to remove the structure at their own expense
and to restore plaintiff in the possession of said lot.

Issue:

W/N Plaintiff, Hilario, can validly opt not to buy the house nor
sell the land, but instead order the removal of those structures
that Ignacio built in good faith.

Ruling:

No. The owner of the building erected in good faith on a land

owned by another, is entitled to retain the possession of the land
until he is paid the value of his building, under article 453.
DEPRA VS DUMLAO Article 448 of the Civil Code provides that the land owner has 2
options – to buy the building or to sell/rent his land. This is so
Facts:
because the rights of the owner of the land is older, and by the
Dumlao is the owner of a parcel of land in Iloilo, while Depra principle of accession, he also has a right to the accessories.
owns the lot adjoining his. Dumlao built his house on his own
The Court remanded the case to the RTC to determine the fair
land, but the kitchen encroached about 34 sq.m on Depra’s
price of the land, the expenses incurred by the BPS (Dumlao), the
property. Upon finding this, Depra’s mom ordered Dumlao to
increase in value of the land, and whether the value of the land is
move back from his encroachment, then subsequently filed an
considerably more than the value of the kitchen built on it. The
action for unlawful detainer against Dumlao.
RTC shall then give Depra 15 days to exercise such option.
The lower court found that Dumlao was a builder in good faith,
and ordered him to pay rent (PhP5.00/month) – forced lease
between the parties. Depra refused to accept the rentals so
Dumlao deposited this with the MTC. Neither party appealed
judgment so this became final and executory.

1 year later, though, Depra filed an complaint for Quieting of

Title. Dumlao contested this, stating that the suit is barred by res
judicata. But Depra averred that the lower court did not have
jurisdiction to rule on encumbrances of real property – only the
CFI has jurisdiction.

Issue:

1. Whether or not res judicata would apply to the case at bar?

2. Whether or not the land owner can be compelled to accept

rent payments by the court (with both LO and BPS being in good
faith)?

Held:

In the first issue, res judicata would not apply should the first
case be one for ejectment and the other for quieting of title.
TECHNOGAS PHILS VS CA A. When the petitioner purchased the lot, the wall was already
built. Even the respondent did not knew about the encroachment
Facts: Petitioner bought a lot together with the building and
until he has hired a surveyor.
improvements including the wall which encroached that of the
defendant. Upon learning of such encroachment, petitioner B. Where one derives title to the property from another, the act,
offered to buy the land but defendant refused. After 2 years, declaration, or omission of the latter, while holding the title, in
through an agreement, petitioner agreed to demolish the wall relation to the property, is evidence against the former. And
(but the case did not state what happened to this agreement, my possession in good faith does not lose this character except when
assumption is that it did not happen due to conflicts that arose the possessor is aware of this impropriety.
after)
C. The encroachment was very narrow which can be considered
Defendant dug a canal along the wall which caused a portion of it as a mere error. Remedy – the petitioner, despite being a
to collapse. Petitioner filed a supplemental complaint re the purchaser of the original builder, can compel the landowner to
action and a separate criminal action of malicious mischief either buy the property or sell the piece of land because:
(which the wife was convicted of). RTC decided for the
He was really unaware of the encroachment basing on the fact
petitioners and the CA reversed. Note that respondent wants to
presented by both sides.
have the wall demolished.
When the petitioner bought the land, he has stepped into the
Issues:
rights of the original owner (hence, the right to compel the LO to
A. Whether or not petitioner is a builder in bad faith because it is buy or sell is also transferred)
'presumed to know the metes and bounds of his property.'
Estoppel – Petitioner is not considered in estoppel only because
B. Whether or not amicable settlement was a proper remedy it has previously agreed to demolish a part of the wall. Rather, it
was to be negotiated by the parties concern. In the meantime,
C. Whether or not respondent can opt to demolish the structure
petitioner has to pay the rent for the property occupied by its
without exercising the option to sell the land to the petitioner
building only up to the date when respondent serves notice of
and the latter cannot do buy the same
their option. Case remanded back to the trial court for
Ruling: Petition was granted. determination of the value of the land and the number of days to
allot for the respondent to choose an option.
Good faith or Bad Faith – No such doctrinal statement that
supports that the knowledge of metes and bounds of a land due
to the Torrens system would amount to bad faith if there was
encroachment on the land of another.
BRIONES VS MACABAGDAD Thus, spouses Macabagdal cannot demand the removal of the
building unless he first exercises the option of appropriating
Facts:
such after payment to spouses Briones of the proper
Spouses Macabagdal purchased from Vergon a lot located in compensation.
Vergonville Subdivision. Sometime in 1984, spouses Briones,
after obtaining the necessary building permit from Vergon,
started constructing on the same parcel of land. After learning of
such, spouses Macabagdal demanded sposes Briones to demolish
the house and vacate the property. Spouses Briones refused.

Spouses Macabagdal thus filed a case for recovery of ownership

and possession of said parcel of land. The RTC and CA ruled in
favor of spouses Macabagdal, and ordered spouses Briones to
either vacate the property or to pay spouses Macabagdal the
prevailing price of the land.

Issue:

Are spouses Briones builders in good faith, thus, must not bear
the damage alone?

Held:

Yes. Since there was no evidence to show that spouses Briones

were builders in bad faith, they must be considered builders in
good faith. Thus, the landowner is given the option to
appropriate the building by paying compensation or to oblige the
builder to pay the price of the land. Moreover, the builder in good
faith is entitled to be reimbursed the necessary and useful
expenses they made of the subject land.
ORTIZ VS KAYANAN that this right to retain may be useful, to concede to the creditor
the right to secure reimbursement. the fruits of the property by
Facts:
utilizing its proceeds for the payment of the interest as well as
The lot in question was formerly subject of a homestead the principal of the debt while he remains in possession. This
application by Martin Dolorico II,Ortiz’s ward. Upon Martin’s right of retention is considered not a coercive measure to oblige
death, Ortiz continued cultivation & possession of said property the debtor to pay, depriving him temporarily of the enjoyment of
w/o filing any application to acquire title thereon. Martin’s heirs the fruits of his property, but as a means of obtaining
relinquished their rights over the property in favor of the compensation for the debt. The right of retention is
defendants. The latter filed their respective sales application, analogous to a contract of antichresis & it can be considered as
w/c Ortiz opposed. The Secretary of Agriculture dismissed such a means of extinguishing the obligation, inasmuch as the right to
opposition. On appeal, the CFI awarded a portion to defendants retain the thing lasts only for the period necessary to enable the
& the other portion to be subject of auction sale. And that should creditor to be reimbursed fr. the fruits for the necessary & useful
Ortiz not be declared a successful bidder thereof, the defendants expenses.
be ordered to reimburse Ortiz for the improvements he
introduced therein, Ortiz having the right to retain the property
until after he has been fully paid therefor.

Issue:

WON Ortiz is entitled to retain for his own exclusive benefit all
the fruits of the property?

Held:

NO. From the time of the filing of the action in court, possession
in good faith ceases & all the fruits that the possessor may
receive fr. that time must be delivered & paid to the owner or
lawful possessor. However, even after GF ceases, the possessor
in fact can still retain the property until he has been fully
reimbursed for all the necessary & useful expenses made by him.
This right of retention is accessory to a principal obligation.
Considering that the right of the possessor to receive the fruits
terminates when his good faith ceases, it is necessary, in order
GEMINIANO VS CA

Facts: Issues:

The lot in question was originally owned by the mother of the 1) Whether or not the respondents were builders in Good faith?
petitioner. Petitioner sold their unfinished bungalow to the
2) Whether Art 448 or 1678 should be applied?
respondents for P6,000, with a promise to sell the lot to the
latter. The property was later leased to the respondents for 7 Ruling:
years starting November 1978 for P40 a month as evidenced by
1) No, they were not builders in good faith. The respondents
their written lease contract. The respondents built their house
knew that their stay would end after the lease contract expires.
and introduced some improvements in the lot. In 1985
They can’t bank on the promise, which was not in writing, of the
petitioner’s mother refused receiving monthly rentals. It turned
petitioners that the latter will sell the land to them. According to
out that the lot in question was subject to litigation which
1403, an agreement for the sale of real property or an interest
resulted to its acquisition by Maria Lee which was sold to
therein is unenforceable, unless some note or memorandum
Salcedo, who further sold to Dionisio spouses. The property
thereof be produced. Other than the alleged promise by
eventually came back to the petitioner when the Dinisio spouses
petitioner, respondents had no other evidence to prove their
executed a Deed of Quitclaim over the said property in favor of
claim.
the petitioners. As such, the lot was registered in the latter’s
names. (petitioners never lost possession of the land because Lee 2) They are mere lessees in good faith; therefore Art 1678 may
and company never issued a writ of possession against them). apply if the lessor chooses to appropriate the improvements. But
since the petitioners refused to exercise that option, the private
In 1993, petitioners wrote a letter to respondents demanding
respondents can’t compel them to reimburse the one-half value
them to vacate the premises and when the latter refused,
of the house and improvements. Neither can they retain the
petitioners filed in court. Respondents claim that they should be
premises until reimbursement is made. The private respondents’
entitled to buy the land because of the promise of the petitioners
sole right then is to remove the improvements without causing
to sell them the land and because they were builders in Good
any more impairment upon the property leased than is necessary
faith. The courts now are deciding which one to use: Art. 448
regarding builders and land owners in good faith or Art. 1678
regarding lessee in good faith who can be reimbursed half of the
expenses of the improvements if the LO chooses to appropriate
them and that such lessee have the right to retain in the premises
until fully reimbursed.
PLEASANTVILLE DEVELOPMENT CORP VS CA the delivery of Lot 9 to Kee. The appellate court ruled that Kee
was a builder in good faith, as he was unaware of the "mix-up"
Facts:
when he began construction of the improvements on Lot 8.
Edith Robillo purchased from petitioner a parcel of land
Issues:
designated as Lot 9, Phase II and located at Taculing Road,
Pleasantville Subdivision, Bacolod City. In 1975, respondent (1) Was Kee a builder in good faith?
Eldred Jardinico bought the rights to the lot from Robillo. At that
(2) What is the liability, if any, of petitioner and its agent, C.T.
time, Lot 9 was vacant. Upon completing all payments, Jardinico
Torres Enterprises, Inc.? and
secured from the Register of Deeds of Bacolod City on December
19, 1978 Transfer Certificate of Title No. 106367 in his name. It (3) Is the award of attorney's fees proper?
was then that he discovered that improvements had been
Ruling:
introduced on Lot 9 by respondent Wilson Kee, who had... taken
possession thereof. It appears that on March 26, 1974, Kee 1. Petitioner fails to persuade this Court to abandon the findings
bought on installment Lot 8 of the same subdivision from C.T. and conclusions of the Court of Appeals that Kee was a builder in
Torres Enterprises, Inc. (CTTEI), the exclusive real estate agent good faith. The roots of the controversy can be traced directly to
of petitioner. the errors committed by CTTEI, when it pointed the wrong
property to Wilson Kee and his wife. It is highly improbable that
After discovering that Lot 9 was occupied by Kee, Jardinico
a purchaser of a lot would knowingly and willingly build his
confronted him. The parties tried to reach an amicable
residence on a lot owned by... another, deliberately exposing
settlement, but failed. On January 30, 1981, Jardinico's lawyer
himself and his family to the risk of being ejected from the land
wrote Kee, demanding that the latter remove all improvements
and losing all improvements thereon, not to mention the social
and vacate Lot 9. When Kee refused to vacate Lot 9, Jardinico
humiliation that would follow.
filed with the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 3, Bacolod
City (MTCC), a complaint for ejectment with damages against "Under the circumstances, Kee had acted in the manner of a
Kee. prudent man in ascertaining the identity of his property.
Kee, in turn, filed a third-party complaint against petitioner and Upon Kee's receipt of the map, his wife went to the subdivision
CTTEI. The MTCC held that the erroneous delivery of Lot 9 to Kee site accompanied by CTTEI's employee, Octaviano, who
was attributable to CTTEI. On appeal, the Regional Trial Court, authoritatively declared that the land she was pointing to was
Branch 48, Bacolod City (RTC) ruled that petitioner and CTTEI indeed Lot 8. Having full... faith and confidence in the reputation
were not at fault or were not negligent, there being no of CTTEI, and because of the company's positive identification of
preponderant evidence to show that they directly participated in the property, Kee saw no reason to suspect that there had been a
misdelivery. Good faith consists in the belief of the builder that 3. The MTCC awarded Jardinico attorney's fees and costs in the
the land he is building on is his and his ignorance of any defect or amount of P3,000.00 and P700.00, respectively, as prayed for in
flaw in his title. And as good faith is presumed, petitioner has the his complaint. The RTC deleted the award, consistent with its
burden of proving bad faith on the part of Kee. ruling that petitioner was without fault or negligence. The Court
of Appeals, however, reinstated the award of attorney's fees after
At the time he built improvements on Lot 8, Kee believed that
ruling that petitioner was liable for its agent's negligence.
said lot was what he bought from petitioner. He was not aware
that the lot delivered to him was not Lot 8. Thus, Kee's good faith. The award of attorney's fees lies within the discretion of the
Petitioner failed to prove otherwise. court and depends upon the circumstances of each case.[19] We
shall not interfere with the discretion of the Court of Appeals.
Jardinico was compelled to litigate for the protection of his...
2. The rule is that the principal is responsible for the acts of the interests and for the recovery of damages sustained as a result of
agent, done within the scope of his authority, and should bear the the negligence of petitioner's agent.
damage caused to third persons.[14] On the other hand, the
agent who exceeds his authority is personally liable for the...
damage.

CTTEI was acting within its authority as the sole real estate
representative of petitioner when it made the delivery to Kee. In
acting within its scope of authority, it was, however, negligent. It
is this negligence that is the basis of petitioner's liability, as
principal... of CTTEI, per Articles 1909 and 1910 of the Civil Code.

For such negligence, the petitioner should be held liable for

damages. Now, the extent and/or amount of damages to be
awarded is a factual issue which should be determined after
evidence is adduced.

However, there is no showing that such evidence was actually

presented in the trial court; hence no damages could now be
awarded.
FELICES VS IRIOLA Felices never lost his title or ownership over the land in question,
and there was no need either for him to repurchase the same.
Facts:

It appears that Felices was the grantee of a homestead, by virtue

of which he was issued OCT. A month after patent, he conveyed
in conditional sale to Iriola a portion of his homestead with an
express stipulation subject to Sec. 119 of Act 141 (PLA), that
after the lapse of 5 years or as soon as may be allowed by law,
the vendor or his successors would execute in vendee's favor a
deed of abso-lute sale over the land in question."# 2 years after
sale, Felices tried to recover the land, but the latter refused un-
less he was paid P2,000 as the value of improvements. Felices
deposited the received price in court and filed this action.

Issue:

Whether or not appellant may re-cover or be reimbursed the

value of his improvements on the land in question.

HELD:

While recognizing Felices' right to "redeem", Iriola insisted that

he must first be reimbursed. But investigation found that
improvements were made after the complaint had been filed;
some of the improvements were even introduced after a
commissioner had already been appoint-ed. "He who builds,
plants or sows in bad faith on the land of another, loses what is
built, planted, or sown without right to indemnity" (Art. 449,
New Civil Code).

The sale in question was executed by the parties within the 5-

year prohibitive period (Sec 118 of PLA), the same is absolutely
null and void and ineffective from its inception. Consequently,
SPOUSES NUQUID VS CA "Kasunduan" (Kasunduan) dated August 31, 1955, and as a
matter of fact, he had in his possession the original certificate of
Facts: The deceased spouses Victorino and Crisanta dela Rosa
title covering the property in the name of the deceased Victorino
(spouses dela Rosa) were registered owners of a parcel of land in
and Crisanta dela Rosa. The CFI of Bataan dismissed the
Orani, Bataan, and covered by OCT No. 3778. On or about May 4,
complaint filed by private respondents, but the Court of Appeals
1931, Victorino dela Rosa (widowed by then) sold one-half of the
reversed said decision and ordered the spouses Nuguid to
said property to Juliana Salazar for P95.00. This sale between
execute a deed of reconveyance in favor of herein respondents.
him and Salazar, though evidenced by a document, was not
registered. Nevertheless, Juliana Salazar constructed a house on Issue: Who is the rightful owner of the subject property?
the lot she purchased immediately after the sale. On March 10,
Ruling: The Supreme Court reinstated the decision of the CFI of
1964, petitioner spouses Diosdado Nuguid and Marqiueta
Bataan. The basis for the Court of Appeals' conclusion that
Venegas (spouses Nuguid) caused the registration of a document
petitioners were buyers in bad faith is ambiguous because said
entitled "Kasulatan ng Partihan at Bilihan" (Kasulatan) dated
court relied on the singular circumstance that the petitioners are
June 6, 1961. In this document, Marciana dela Rosa, together
from Orani, Bataan, and should have personally known that the
with the heirs of Victorino and Crisanta dela Rosa, sold to
private respondents were the persons in actual possession.
spouses Nuguid the entire area of the property for the sum of
However, at the time of the purchase, the spouses Nuguid dealt
P300.00. Subsequently, OCT No. 3778 was cancelled by the
with Pedro Guevarra and Pascuala Tolentino, the latter being the
Register of Deeds of Bataan, and TCT No. T-12782 was issued in
actual occupants. The respondents Guevarras, children of the
the spouses Nuguid’s names.
said Pedro and Pascuala Guevarra, came into the picture only
Private respondents claimed that the presented by spouses after their parents died. As for the respondent heirs of Victorino
Nuguid was forged. They also allegedly discovered the forged dela Rosa, their being in actual possession of any portion of the
deed as well as the certificate of title in the name of the property was, likewise, simply presumed or taken for granted by
petitioners much later, that is, on February 28, 1978, when the Court of Appeals.
respondents Amorita Guevarra and Teresita Guevarra thought of
The private respondents cannot also honestly claim that they
having the title of their grandmother Juliana Salazar, registered.
became aware of the spouses Nuguid’s title only in 1978, because
On the other hand, spouse Nuguid assert that in the latter part of
ever since the latter bought the property in 1961, the spouse
1960, Nicolas dela Rosa, uncle of respondent Marciana dela Rosa
Nuguid have occupied the same openly, publicly, and
and grandfather of the other heirs-signatories, offered to sell the
continuously in the concept of owners, even building their house
subject land to them. Apparently, Nicolas dela Rosa claimed that
thereon. For seventeen years they were in peaceful possession,
he had already purchased the shares of the heirs over the subject
with the respondents Guevarras occupying less than one-half of
property as evidenced by a private document entitled
the same property.
PECSON VS CA Whether or not Art. 448 and 546 applies in the case at bar

Facts: Held:

Pedro Pecson was the owner of a commercial lot on which he YES

built a 4-door-2-storey apartment building. He failed to pay
> With regard to Art. 448, the provision on indemnity may be
realty taxes amounting to P12k so the lot was sold at public
applied in analogy. Whoever is the owner of the land may
auction to Mamerto Nepomuceno who later on sold it to the Sps.
appropriate whatever has been built, planted or sown after
Nuguid.
paying indemnity. However, it does not apply when the owner of
Pecson challenged the validity of the auction before the RTC but the land is also the builder of the works on his own land who
was dismissed but the RTC held that the apartment bldg was not later on loses ownership by sale or donation.
subject of the litigation. On appeal, the CA appealed in toto the
> Art. 546 refers to the necessary and useful expenses which
decision of the RTC that the apartment bldg was not included in
shall be refunded to the possessor in good faith with right of
the auction sale. After an entry of judgment was made, the Sps.
retention. However, it does not state how to determine the value
Nuguid filed a motion with the RTC for a motion for delivery of
of the useful improvement. The respondents [court and private
possession of the lot and the apartment bldg citing Art. 546 of
respondents alike] espouses as sufficient reimbursement the
the CC. The RTC issued an order declaring that the owner of the
cost of construction in 1965, however, this is contrary to
lot and apartment bldg were the Sps. Nuguid and to pay the
previous rulings which declares that the value to the reimbursed
construction cost of the apartment before a writ of possession
should be the present market value of said improvements so as
would be issued and to pay rent to the spouses. Pecson moved
not to unjustly enrich either of the parties. [the trial court erred
for reconsideration but the Trial court did not act on it, instead it
in ordering Pecson to pay rent since the Sps. Nuguid has yet to
issued a writ of possession. The CA affirmed in part the decision
pay the indemnity therefore Pecson has the right to retain the
declaring the cost of construction can be offset from the amount
improvements and the income thereof. The case was remanded
of rents to be collected and that since Sps. Nuguid opted to
to the trial court for determination of the current market value of
appropriate the improvement, Pecson is entitled to be
the apartment bldg and ordered the Sps to pay Pecson otherwise
reimbursed the cost of construction at the time it was built in
it shall be restored to Pecson until payment of indemnity.
1965 which is at P53k and the right the retain the improvement
until full indemnity is paid.

Thus the case at bar.

Issue:
MERCADO VS CA declared that the Bulaong and Mercado Groups had executed the
sub-letting agreements with full awareness that they were
Facts: The private respondents Bulaong Group, had for many
thereby violating Ordinance No. 14; they were thus in pari
years been individual lessees of stalls in the public market of
delicto, and hence had no cause of action one against the other
Baliuag, Bulacan; from 1956 to 1972. The market was destroyed
and no right to recover whatever had been given or demand
by fire on February 17, 1956; the members of the Bulaong Group
performance of anything undertaken. The judgment therefore
constructed new stalls therein at their expense; and they
decreed (1) the annulment of the leases between the
thereafter paid rentals thereon to the Municipality of Baliuag. In
Municipality and the individuals comprising the Mercado Group
1972, the members of the group sub-leased their individual stalls
(the defendants who had taken over the original leases of the
to other persons, referred to as the Mercado Group. After the
Bulaong Group); and (2) the payment to the individual members
Mercado Group had been in possession of the market stalls for
of the Bulaong Group (the plaintiffs) of the stated, adjudicated
some months, as sub-lessees of the Bulaong Group, the municipal
value of the stalls, with interest IF — The members of the
officials of Baliuag cancelled the long standing leases of the
Mercado Group are now before this Court on an appeal by
Bulaong Group and declared the persons comprising the
certiorari, this time timely taken, assailing the above rulings of
Mercado Group as the rightful lessees of the stalls in question, in
the Court of Appeals. Their appeal must fail for lack of merit. No
substitution of the former.
error can be ascribed to the judgment of the Court of Appeals
The members of the Bulaong Group sued. They filed several which is hereby affirmed in toto.
individual complaints with the Court of First Instance seeking
Held: It was held that “to be deemed a builder in good faith, it is
recovery of their stalls from the Mercado Group as well as
essential that a person assert title to the land on which he builds;
damages. 1 Their theory was anchored on their claimed
i.e., that he be a possessor in concept of owner, and that he be
ownership of the stalls constructed by them at their own
unaware ‘that there exists in his title or mode of acquisition any
expense, and their resulting right, as such owners, to sub-lease
flaw which invalidates it.’
the stalls, and necessarily, to recover them from any person
withholding possession thereof from them. On October 24,1975, Lessees cannot be considered builders in good faith (taken from
respondent Judge rendered a summary judgment in all the cases. Haystacks, by Berne Guerrero)
3 It rejected the claim of the Municipality of Baliuag that it had
The members of the Bulaong group were admittedly lessees of
automatically acquired ownership of the new stalls constructed
space in the public market; they therefore could not, and in truth
after the old stalls had been razed by fire, declaring the members
never did make the claim, that they were owners of any part of
of the Bulaong Group to be builders in good faith, entitled to
the land occupied by the market so that in respect of any new
retain possession of the stalls respectively put up by them until
structure put up by them thereon, they could be deemed builders
and unless indemnified for the value thereof. The decision also
in good faith (in accordance with Article 526 of the Civil Code).
To be deemed a builder in good faith, it is essential that a person
assert title to the land on which he builds; i.e., that he be a
possessor in concept of owner, and that he be unaware “that
there exists in his title or mode of acquisition any flaw which
invalidates it. It is such a builder in good faith who is given the
right to retain the thing, even as against the real owner, until he
has been reimbursed in full not only for the necessary expenses
but also for useful expenses. On the other hand, unlike the
builder in good faith, a lessee who “makes in good faith useful
improvements which are suitable to the use for which the lease
is intended, without altering the form or substance of the
property leased,” can only claim payment of “one-half of the
value of the improvements” or, “should the lessor refuse to
reimburse said amount, remove the improvements, even though
the principal thing may suffer damage thereby.”
REPUBLIC VS CA through the effects of the currents of the two rivers. The lands in
question total almost 4 hectares of land, which are highly
Facts:
doubtful to have been caused by accretion. The lone witness
The respondents (Tancinco’s) were registered owners of a parcel testified that she observed an increase in the area in 1939, but
of land in Bulacan, bordering on the Maycauayan and Bocaue the lots in question were not included in the survey of their
Rivers. They filed an application for the registration of three lots adjacent property conducted in 1940. They were also not
adjacent to their fishpond, but because of the recommendation of included in the Cadastral Survey of the entire Municipality of
the Commissioner, they only pushed for the registration of two. Maycauayan between the years 1958-1960. If the overseer was
The RTC and CA granted the petition despite the opposition of indeed telling the truth, the accretion was sudden, not gradual.
the Bureau of Lands. When the respondents transferred their dikes towards the river
beds, the dikes were meant for reclamation purposes and not to
The respondents based their claim on accretions to their
protect their property from the destructive force of the waters of
fishponds. They presented a lone witness (their overseer). The
the river. The lots in question were portions of the bed of the
Bureau of Lands argue that the lands in dispute are not
Meycauayan River and are therefore classified as public
accretions. They assert that what actually happened was that the
property.
respondents simply transferred their dikes simply further down
the river bed of the Meycauayan River. Thus, if there was any Registration denied, decisions appealed are reversed. Note: The
accretion to speak of, it was man-made. lands sought were not even dry land. The entire area was under
one to two meters of water.
Respondents counter that the their evidence shows that
accretion happened without human intervention and that the
transfer of the dikes occurred only after.

Issue:

Whether accretion took place

Ruling: No

Alluvion must be the exclusive work of nature. There is not

evidence that the addition to said property was made gradually
GRANDE VS CA portion, of which the alluvial deposits are not included, and are
thus, subject to acquisition by prescription. Since the Calalungs
Facts:
proved that they have been in possession of the land since 1934
The Grandes are owners of a parcel of land in Isabela, by via two credible witnesses, as opposed to the Grande’s single
inheritance from their deceased mother, Patricia Angui, who witness who claims that the Calalungs only entered the land in
likewise, inherited it from her parents. In the early 1930’s, the 1948, the Calalungs have been held to have acquired the land
Grandes decided to have their land surveyed for registration created by the alluvial deposits by prescription. This is because
purposes. The land was described to have Cagayan River as the the possession took place in 1934, when the law to be followed
northeastern boundary, as stated in the title. was Act 190, and not the New Civil Code, which only took effect
in 1950.
By 1958, a gradual accretion took place due to the action of the
current of the river, and an alluvial deposit of almost 20,000
sq.m. was added to the registered area. The Grandes filed an
action for quieting of title against the Calalungs, stating that they
were in peaceful and continuous possession of the land created
by the alluvial deposit until 1948, when the Calalungs allegedly
trespassed into their property. The Calalungs, however, stated
that they were the rightful owners since prior to 1933.

The CFI found for the Grandes and ordered the Calalungs to
vacate the premises and pay for damages. Upon appeal to the CA,
however, the decision was reversed.

Issue:

Whether or not the alluvium deposited land automatically

belongs to the riparian owners?

Held:

Art. 457 dictates that alluvium deposits on land belong to the

owners of the adjacent land. However, this does not ipso jure
become theirs merely believing that said land have become
imprescriptible. The land of the Grandes only specifies a specific
CUREG VS IAC petitioner’s land, being an accretion left by the change of course
or the northward movement of the Cagayan River does not
Facts:
automatically become registered land just because the lot which
On November 5, 1982, private respondents Domingo Apostol et receives such accretion is covered by a Torrens title. As such, it
al. filed a complaint for quieting of title against petitioners must also be placed under the operation of the Torrens system.
Leonida Cureg et al. The complaint alleged that private
respondents, except Apostol, are the legal and/or the forced
heirs of the late Domingo Gerardo, and his predecessors-in-
interest have been in actual, open, peaceful and continuous
possession, under a bona fide claim of ownership of a parcel of
land (referred to as their “motherland”). Subsequently, the heirs
verbally sold the“motherland” to Apostol. The “motherland”
showed signs of accretion caused by the movement of the
Cagayan River. When private respondents were about to
cultivate their “motherland” together with its accretion, they
were prevented by the petitioners. Petitioners alleged that the
“motherland” claimed by the private respondents is non-existent,
that the “subject land” is an accretion to their registered land,
and that petitioners have been in possession and cultivation of
the “accretion” for many years now.

Issue:

Whether or not the petitioners have the better right of accretion.

Held:

Yes. The petitioners are entitled to the accretion. The “subject

land” is an alluvial deposit left by the northward movement of
the Cagayan River and pursuant to Article457 of the New Civil
Code: “To the owners of land adjoining the banks of river belong
the accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the
current of the waters.” However, the increase in the area of the
MENESES VS CA confederating with District Land Officer Darum and Land
Inspector Almendral, obtained free patents and OCTs to the land.
Facts:
Issue: WON
On March 1, 1977, Darum, then the District Land Officer of Los
Bañ os, Laguna, issued to Pablito Meneses 2 Free Patent and 2 1. The lands in question were not accretion lands but lands of the
OCT covering lots located in Los Bañ os, Laguna. Pablito acquired public domain
said property from Bautista through a Deed of Waiver and
2. Conspiracy to commit fraud, deceit and bad faith attended the
Transfer of Rights executed in 1975 in consideration of Bautista’s
issuance of the free patent and titles to Pablito Meneses; and
“love and affection” for and “some monetary obligations” in favor
of Meneses. After the execution of said document, Meneses took Held: WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision CA is
possession of the land, introduced improvements thereon, AFFIRMED
declared the land as his own for tax purposes and paid the
While the lots occupied by Villamor and Lanuzo may not be the
corresponding realty taxes. In turn, Bautista acquired the land
very same lots petitioners are claiming here, the two cases refer
from his aunt. He had been occupying the land since 1956.
to the same accretion lands northwest of the original land owned
On the other hand, the Quisumbing family traces ownership of by the Quisumbings.
their land as far back as 1919 when their matriarch was issued
The submersion in water of a portion of the land in question is
an OCT covering a lot, with the Laguna de Bay as its
due to the rains “falling directly on or flowing into Laguna de Bay
northwestern boundary. The same parcel of land was registered
from different sources.” Since the inundation of a portion of the
on 1973 under a TCT in the names of her heirs, all surnamed
land is not due to “flux and reflux of tides” it cannot be
Quisumbing. The Quisumbings applied for registration and
considered a foreshore land. The land sought to be registered not
confirmation of title over an additional area which had gradually
being part of the bed or basin of Laguna de Bay, nor a foreshore
accrued to their property by the natural action of the waters of
land as claimed by the Director of Lands, it is not a public land
Laguna de Bay. The CFI of Biñ an confirmed the Quisumbings’
and therefore capable of registration as private property
title thereto.
provided that the applicant proves that he has a registerable
In 1979, the Quisumbings filed a case before the CFI of Calamba title.
against Lorenzo and Pablito Meneses, Darum and Almendral for
Additionally, the provision of the law on waters will govern in
nullification of the free patents and titles issued to Pablito
determining the natural bed or basin of the lake. And
Meneses. They alleged that Lorenzo Menesis, then the Mayor of
accordingly, to Art. 84 of the Law of Waters of August 3, 1866:
Los Bañ os, using his brother Pablito as a “tool and dummy,”
illegally occupied their “private accretion land” and
Accretions deposited gradually upon land contiguous to creeks,
streams, rivers and lakes by accessions or sediments from the
waters thereof, belong to the owners of such lands.

As pointed out by the lower court, no act of appropriation is

necessary in order to acquire ownership of the alluvial formation
as the law does not require the same.

2. As found by the CA, petitioners conspired in the approval and

grant of the free patents heirs Quisumbing. Such fraud was
confirmed by this Court in Meneses v. People, which held the
petitioners therein liable for violation of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act in the issuance of the same free patents
and titles. In due course, the Sandiganbayan rendered a decision
finding the defendants guilty as charged. The judgment of
conviction was affirmed.
HEIRS OF EMILIANO VS IAC Talisay and Bulacan Rivers which run their course on the eastern
and western boundaries, respectively, of petitioners' own tract of
Facts: On October 3, 1946, Sinforoso Pascual filed an application
land.
for foreshore lease covering a tract of foreshore land in Sibocon,
Balanga, Bataan, having an area of approximately seventeen (17) Issue: Whether or not the petitioners can rightfully claim the
hectares. This application was denied on January 15, 1953. So land under the principle of accretion
was his motion for reconsideration. Subsequently, petitioners'
Held: The petitioner’s claim is misplaced. The principle of
predecessor-in-interest, also now deceased, Emiliano Navarro,
accretion is only applicable to owners whose estates are adjacent
filed a fishpond application with the Bureau of Fisheries covering
to rivers as stated in Article 457 of the Civil Code. The disputed
twenty five (25) hectares of foreshore land also in Sibocon,
land is an accretion not on a river bank but on a sea bank, or on
Balanga, Bataan. Initially the application was denied, eventually
what used to be the foreshore of Manila Bay which adjoined
however the grant was given. Pascual claimed that this land is an
petitioners' own tract of land on the northern side. As such, the
accretion to his property, The Talisay River as well as the
applicable law is not Article 457 of to Civil Code but Article 4 of
Bulacan River flow downstream and meet at the Manila Bay
the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866. The disputed property is an
thereby depositing sand and silt on Pascual's property resulting
accretion on a sea bank, Manila Bay being an inlet or an arm of
in an accretion thereon. Sinforoso Pascual claimed the accretion
the sea; as such, the disputed property is, under Article 4 of the
as the riparian owner. On March 25, 1960, the Director of Lands,
Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, part of the public domain. As
represented by the Assistant Solicitor General, filed an
part of the public domain, the herein disputed land is intended
opposition thereto stating that neither Pascual nor his
for public uses, and "so long as the land in litigation belongs to
predecessors-in-interest possessed sufficient title to the subject
the national domain and is reserved for public uses, it is not
property, the same being a portion of the public domain and,
capable of being appropriated by any private person, except
therefore, it belongs to the Republic of the Philippines. On
through express authorization granted in due form by a
November 10, 1975, the courta quorendered judgment finding
competent authority."Only the executive and possibly the
the subject property to be foreshore land and, being a part of the
legislative departments have the right and the power to make the
public domain, it cannot be the subject of land registration
declaration that the lands so gained by action of the sea is no
proceedings. On appeal, the respondent court reversed the
longer necessary for purposes of public utility or for the cause of
findings of the courta quoand granted the petition for
establishment of special industries or for coast guard services.
registration of the subject property but excluding certain areas. A
Petitioners utterly fail to show that either the executive or
motion for reconsideration was filed by in the CA but the same
legislative department has already declared the disputed land as
was denied. Anchoring their claim of ownership on Article 457 of
qualified, under Article 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866,
the Civil Code, petitioners vigorously argue that the disputed 14-
hectare land is an accretion caused by the joint action of the
to be the property of petitioners as owners of the estates
adjacent thereto.
BAES VS CA the affected Lot 2958-B through the Deed of Exchange of Real
Property dated June 20, 1970. This was a fair exchange because
Facts:
the two lots were of the same area and value and the agreement
In 1962, the Government dug up a canal on a private estate in was freely entered into by the parties.
order to streamline the Tripa de Gallina creek (in other words,
there was a mand-made change of river course). Said private
estate was acquired by petitioner Baes, and was subdivided in to
three lots. It was lot 2958-C which was totally occupied by the
canal so the Government in exchange granted him a lot near but
not contiguous to C. The old river bed was filled up by soil from
Lot C. Petitioner now claims ownership over the old river bed on
the basis of Article 461 which says that abandoned river beds
belong to the riparian owners whose land is occupied by the new
course of water.

Issue:

Whether or not Article 461 applies

Ruling:

YES!

If the riparian owner is entitled to compensation for the damage

to or loss of his property due to natural causes, there is all the
more reason to compensate him when the change in the course
of the river is effected through artificial means. The loss to the
petitioners of the land covered by the canal was the result of a
deliberate act on the part of the government when it sought to
improve the flow of the Tripa de Gallina creek. It was therefore
obligated to compensate the Baeses for their loss.

We find, however, that the petitioners have already been so

compensated. Felix Baes was given Lot 3271-A in exchange for
BINALAY VS MANALO hand, insist that they own it. They occupy the other edges of the
lot along the river bank (i.e. the fertile portions on which they
Facts:
plant tobacco and other agricultural products) and also cultivate
Manalo acquired 2 lots which were originally owned by Judge the western strip during the summer.
Taccad from 2 different people (the latter’s daughter and from an
Manalo filed 2 cases for forcible entry which were both
earlier purchaser). These lots were later consolidated into Lot
dismissed. Later on, he filed a complaint for quieting of title,
307, a total of 10.45 hectares. The lot was beside the Cagayan
possession, and damages against petitioner. The trial court and
River, which, due to flooding, would place a portion of the land
the CA ruled in favor of Manalo, saying that Lot 821 and Lot 307
underwater during the rainy season (September to December).
cannot be considered separate and distinct from each other.
On sunny days, however, the land would be dried up for the
They reasoned that when the land dries up for the most part of
entire dry season (January to August). When a survey of the land
the year, the two are connected. [Note: The CA applied the ruling
was conducted on a rainy month, a portion of the land that
in Gov’t of the Phil Islands vs. Colegio de San Jose, which was
Manalo bought was then underwater and was thus left
actually inappropriate because the subject matter in this case
unsurveyed and excluded from Lot 307.
was a lake so that the definition of a “bed” was different.
The big picture is this: Cagayan River running from south to
Issue: Whether or not Manalo owns Lot 821 by way of accretion
north, forks at a certain point to form two braches (western and
eastern) and then unites at the other end, further north, to form a Ruling: No. The disputed property is not an accretion. It is the
narrower strip of land. The eastern branch of the river cuts action of the heavy rains that cause the highest ordinary level of
through Lot 307, and is flooded during the rainy season. The waters of the Cagayan River during the rainy season. The
unsurveyed portion, on the other hand, is the bed of the eastern depressed portion is a river bed and is thus considered property
branch. Note that the fork exists only during the rainy season of public domain.
while the “island”/elongated strip of land formed in the middle
The SC observed the following:
of the forks becomes dry and perfect for cultivation when the
Cagayan river is at its ordinary depth. The strip of land in the a) The pictures identified by Manalo during his direct
middle of the fork totaled 22.7 hectares and was labeled Lot 821- examination depict the depressed portion as a river bed. The
822. Lot 821 is directly opposite Lot 307 and is separated by the dried up portion had dike-like slopes (around 8m) on both sides
eastern branch of the river’s fork. connecting it to Lot 307 and Lot 821 that are vertical and very
prominent.
Manalo claims that Lot 821 belongs to him by way of accretion to
the submerged portion of the land to which it is adjacent. b) The eastern bed already existed even before Manalo bought
Petitioners (Binalay, et al) who possess the Lot 821, on the other the land. It was called “Rio Muerte de Cagayan.”
c) Manalo could not have acquire ownership of the land because
article 420 of the civil code states that rivers are property of
public dominion. The word “river” includes the running waters,
the bed, and the banks. [The seller never actually owned that
part of the land since it was public property]

d) The submerged area (22.72 ha) is twice the area of the land he
actually bought. It is difficult to suppose that such a sizable area
could have been brought about by accretion.

More importantly, the requisites of accretion in article 457 were

not satisfied. These are: 1) that the deposition of the soil or
sediment be gradual and imperceptible; 2) that it be the result of
the action of the waters of the river (or sea); and 3) the land
where the accretion takes place is adjacent to the banks of the
rivers (or the sea coast). The accretion should’ve been attached
to Lot 307 for Manalo to acquire its ownership. BUT, the claimed
accretion lies on the bank of the river; not adjacent to Lot 307
but directly opposite it – across the river. Aside from that, the
dike-like slopes which were very steep may only be formed by a
sudden and forceful action like flooding. The steep slopes could
not have been formed by the river in a slow and gradual manner.
SIARI VALLEY ESTATES VS LUCASAN defendant driving some of plaintiff's cattle into defendant's
ranch. When a Red Cross Committee member, requested Roemer
Facts: The Siari Valley Estate Inc., a duly organized agricultural
to contribute to the fund, Roemer offered to give at least 30 head
corporation, started raising livestock on its 950-hectare ranch, in
of cattle provided the committee would make arrangements with
1921,with 7 native cattle. In 1923 it acquired 30 native cattle and
Lucasan to permit him to get plaintiff's cattle inside defendant's
two Indian bulls. It also introduced native stock into its herd thru
toril. A certain Fiscal Ubay was sought by the Red Cross who
anative black bull. Male offspring of this bull were castrated.
negotiated with Lucasan and the latter agreed. Roemer and his
Prior to the Japanese occupation, the fence enclosing plaintiff's
men were able to round up 78 head of cattle during the first day
pasture was well kept. However in 1943 a portion thereof was
of the drive, but said cattle were turned loose thenext morning
destroyed, with the result that some cattle strayed into the
by defendant and his wife. During the Japanese occupation, the
adjoining unfenced range of defendant Lucasan.
company's officers being American had to flee to the interior for
Siari Valley: personal safety. As a resultthe management and supervision of
the ranch was practically abandoned.
Several men in the employ of Lucasan, taking advantage of the
situation willfully and deliberately rounded up and drove Lucasan admitted that some cattle of the Siari Valley Estate did
manyanimals from the Siari pasture towards Lucasan's grazing enter his ranch. However, thru the good offices of Fiscal Ubay
land . During the war a farmer saw the men of defendant thecompany rounded up and drove away from his ranch 98 head
drivingcattle (30 head) from the Siari Valley Estate to his ranch. of cattle in November 1946 In May 1947 plaintiff's herdsmen
1944: Defendant informed plaintiff that some of the latter's cattle took away 5 more head of cattle. He affirmed that as of December
were mixed with his cows. With due permission they (he 1951 he had 400 head on his ranch all belonging to him, after
andplaintiff's men) were allowed to catch eight (8) head of the deducting 200 head which he haddisposed of. December 1948:
Siari Valley Estate cattle in the toril of defendant. Lucasan also Siari Valley Estate Inc filed an action to recover about 200 head
informed this witness that there were still about 200 head of the of cattle that were driven, or wandered,from its pasture lands
company's cattle , in his ranch mixed with his herd. October, into the adjoining ranch of defendant Filemon Lucasan,
1946: In one of Lucasans afternoon visits to Roemers family Sindangan, Zamboanga.
(President of Siari Valley), he informed Roemer that Siari Valley
Issues:
had at least 250 head of cattle in his pasture land; President of
Siari Valley and Lucasan came to an agreement permittingthe 1. Whether plaintiff's cattle were commingled with defendant's?
former to round up and drive plaintiff's cattle. However, on the (YES)
date set for the drive Lucasan's wife protested , and thereafter
2. Whether the commixtion was made in bad faith? (YES)
defendant refused to admit that there were 250head of Siari
Valley Estate cattle in his ranch. Roemer also saw two sons of 3. If he acted in bad faith, what is the result?
Ratio: must have also beendriven away on subsequent or prior
occasions, applying, by analogy, the principle that one who stole
1.The evidence of record sufficiently shows that hundreds of
a part of the stolenmoney must have taken also the larger sum
cattle belonging to plaintiff have been driven, into or wandered
lost by the offended party.
intodefendant's land. Defendant himself admitted such
commixtion although, he says, plaintiff had already retrieved its 2. YES, Lucasan acted in bad faith. His cowboys -and even his
animals. Lucasan started raising his own cattle in 1939 with 53 sons Rafael and Vicente- rounded up and drove plaintiff's cattle
head of cattle he received as his share from his partners R. into his pasture He knew he had plaintiff's cattle, but refused to
Macias and TeckLee. return them despite demands by plaintiff; he even threatened
plaintiff's men whenthe latter tried to retrieve its animals He
A 30% increase per year should give him around 417 head of
harassed them with false prosecutions for their attempts to get
cattle in 1951. Yet in 1951 he had 400 head, after disposing of
back the company's animals; He wouldn't allow plaintiff' s
230head according to his evidence, or "less than 800" (which
cowboys to get into his pasture to identify its flock; he rebranded
means 700 at least) according to his answer. [400+230 = 630
several Siari Valley cattle with his own brand; He sold cattle
OR400+700(+) = 1100(+)] Must be 417 in 1951, why 1100???
without registering the sales; After some cattle impounded were
Where did he get the excess of 200 or 700? According to Dr.
entrusted to his custody as trustee, he disposed of not less than 5
Pacifico Geronimo, defendant sold 200 head in Ozamis City;
head of cattle among those he received as such trustee; He
andthere is evidence that he marketed cattle in Sindangan,
disposed of much more cattle than he had a right to.
Dipolog and other parts of Zamboanga. On the other hand the
Report of the Siari Valley for September 1941 to September 1945 3. Filemon had been actuated by bad faith in retaining in his
showed that the company had or shouldhave 1768 head of ranch, to multiply and increased there for his own benefit, the
cattle , 249 of which was slaughtered or died, leaving a total of cattle belonging to the Siari Valley Estate and under the Civil
1513 head . Thereafter it sold 593 head;therefore it should have Code "if the commingling of two things is made in bad faith, the
925 head. Actually it could count only 102 head. Therefore it lost one responsible for it will lose his share x x x". (Art. 382; See Art.
823 head. [1768-249 =1513; 1513-593= 925; 925-102=823] 473 New Civil Code.)US jurisprudence "Where the goods are so
Where is the 823???? It is not far-fetched to conclude -as the mingled that they cannot thereafter properly be identified or
lower court concluded- that these were part of the 700 which divided, all the inconvenience or loss resulting from the
was disposed of byLucasan, and a part is the remaining flock in confusion is thrown on the party who occasioned it; and,
his possession. No actual evidence exists that all these missing generally, it is for him to distinguish his own property or lose it,
animals (323) were taken by defendant or his men; but in view it being held, in this connection, that the rule of confusion of
of the proof that hismen on two occasions drove away more than goods is merely a rule of evidence." "Where one fraudulently,
30 head of cattle, it is not erroneous to believe that the others willfully, or wrongly intermingles his goods with those of
another, so that there is no evidence todistinguish the goods of
the one from those of the other, the wrongdoer forfeits all his
interest in the mixture to the other part. Inother words, he
cannot recover for his own proportion, or for any part of the
intermixture, but the entire property vests in him whoseright is
invaded." Thus where one wilfully places his brand on another's
cattle, intermingling them with his own and on account of the
change or destruction of the identity of the goods he is unable to
distinguish and separate his own goods from the others, he will
be held toforteit his own."

(Naulit tong case na to)

SANTOS VS BERNABE No, both Tiongson and Santos must divide the cavans and palay
proportionately.
Facts:

Santos deposited 778 cavans and 38 kilos of palay in the

warehouse of Bernabe. At the same time, Tiongson also
deposited 1,026 cavans and 9 kilos of palay. The share of
The cavans belonging to Santos, having been mixed with those
Tiongson and Santos were mixed together and cannot be
belonging to Tiongson, the following rule prescribed is Article
separated.
381 of the Civil Code: “If, by will of one of their owners, two
Later on and for some unknown reason, Tiongson files a case things of identical or dissimilar nature are mixed, or if the
against Bernabe to recover the 1,026 cavans and 9 kilos of palay mixture occurs accidentally, if in the latter case, the things
deposited in Bernabe’s warehouse. So Tiongson files for a cannot be separated without injury, each owner shall acquire a
petition for a writ of attachment and the Court granted it. right in the mixture proportionate to the part belonging to him,
Bernabe’s properties were attached, including only 924 cavans of according to the value of the things mixed or comingled.”
rice and 31 ½ kilos of palay. These were sold at a public auction
The number of kilos in a cavan not having been determined, the
and the proceeds were delivered to Tiongson.
Court took the proportion only of the 924 cavans of palay which
Santos tried to intervene in the attachment of the palay but then were attached andsold, therby giving Santos, who deposited 778
the sheriff had already proceeded with the attachment, so Santos cavans, 398.49 and Tiongson, who deposited 1,026 cavans,
files a complaint. He says that Tiongson cannot claim the 924 525.51, or the value thereof at the rate of 3Php per cavan.
cavans of palay; he says that by asking for the attachment of the
properties, Tiongson is claiming that the cavans of rice all
belonged to Bernabe and not to him.

Issue:

Whether or not Tiongson can claim the 924 cavans of rice as his
own.

Held:
OLVIGA VS CA the plaintiff is not in possession of the property. However, if a
person claiming to be owner of the property is in actual
Facts:
possession of the property,in this case the Glors, then their right
Eutequio Pureza and his father cultivated a forest land in 1950. to seek reconveyance does not prescribe. In Faja vs CA, it was
The same land was surveyed in 1954 by the Bureau of Lands in held that the owner who is in actual possession of the property
the name of Eutequio Pureza and has since been known as Lot may wait until his possession is disturbed or his title is attacked
13,Pls-84. However, Godofredo Olviga protested and claimed before taking steps to vindicate his right.
that 1/2 hectare of the surveyed land belonged to him and not to
Pureza. In 1960, Pureza filed a homestead application over Lot
13. Since his application had not been acted upon, he transferred
his rights in said land to Cornelio Glor. Unfortunately, the said
transfer was also not acted upon by the Director of Lands for
undisclosed reasons.In 1967, Jose Olviga obtained a registered
title for Lot 13 in a cadastral proceeding in fraud of Pureza and
Cornelio Glor. He also failed to disclose that the land in dispute
was currently in possession of the Glors. Angelita Glor, wife of
Cornelia Glor, testified that she did not receive any notice about
the said proceedings. Glor then filed an action for reconveyance
over Lot 13.

Issue:

Whether or not the action for reconveyance has already

prescribed

Held:

No, the cause of action should be considered to have accrued not

from the date of registration of the title of Olviga over Lot 13 in
1967, but on 1988 when the Glors gained knowledge of the said
proceedings. The rule that an action for reconveyance of a parcel
of land based on implied or constructive trust prescribes in 10
years cannot be applied in this case because it only applies when
PINGOL VS CA of the lot was transferred to the Donasco upon its actual (upon
Donasco’s possession and construction of the house) and
Facts:
constructive delivery (upon execution of the contract). The
In 1969, Pingol, the owner of a lot (Lot No. 3223) in Caloocan delivery of the lot divested Pingol of his ownership and he cannot
City, executed a DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE OF ONE-HALF OF AN recover the title unless the contract is resolved or rescinded
UNDIVIDED PORTION OF [his] PARCEL OF LAND in favor of under Art. 1592 of NCC. It states that the vendee may pay even
Donasco (private respondent), payable in 6 years. after the expiration of the period stipulated as long as no demand
for rescission has been made upon him either judicially or by
In 1984, Donasco died and was only able to pay P8,369 plus
notarial act. Pingol neither did so. Hence, Donasco has equitable
P2,000 downpayment, leaving a balance of P10,161. The heirs of
title over the property.
Donasco remained in possession of such lot and offered to settle
the balance with Pingol. However, Pingol refused to accept the (2) Although the complaint filed by the Donascos was an action
offer and demanded a larger amount. Thus, the heirs of Donasco for specific performance, it was actually an action to quiet title. A
filed an action for specific performance (with Prayer for Writ of cloud has been cast on the title, since despite the fact that the
Prelim. Injunction, because Pingol were encroaching upon title had been transferred to them by the execution of the deed of
Donasco’s lot). Pingol averred that the sale and transfer of title sale and the delivery of the object of the contract, Pingol
was conditional upon the full payment of Donasco (contract to adamantly refused to accept the payment by Donascos and
sell, not contract of sale). With Donasco’s breach of the contract insisted that they no longer had the obligation to transfer the
in 1976 and death in 1984, the sale was deemed cancelled, and title.
the heirs’ continuous occupancy was only being tolerated by
Donasco, who had made partial payments and improvements
Pingol.
upon the property, is entitled to bring suit to clear his title
Issues: against Pingol who refused to transfer title to him. It is not
necessary that Donasco should have an absolute title, an
(1) Whether or not Pingol can refuse to transfer title to Donasco
equitable title being sufficient to clothe him with personality to
(2) Whether or not Donasco has the right to quiet title bring an action to quiet title.

Ruling: Prescription cannot also be invoked against the Donascos

because an action to quiet title to property in ONE’s POSSESSION
(1) No. The contract between Pingol and Donasco is a contract of is imprescriptible.
sale and not a contract to sell. The acts of the parties,
contemporaneous and subsequent to the contract, clearly show
that the parties intended an absolute deed of sale; the ownership
TITONG VS CA Private resps, on the other hand, denied claim of Titong’s, saying
that the area and boundaries of disputed land remained
Facts:
unaltered during the series of conveyances prior to its coming
A 20,592 square meter parcel of land located at Barrio Titiong, into his hands. Accdg to him, Titong first declared land for
Masbate is the subject property being disputed in this case. The taxation purposes which showed that the land had an area of 5.5
property is being claimed by 2 contestants, however legal title hectares and was bounded on the north by the B. River; on the
over the property can only be given to one of them. The case east by property under ownership by Zaragoza, and on the west
originated from an action for quieting of title filed by petitioner by property owned by De la Cruz. He also alleges that Titong sold
Mario Titong. The RTC of Masbate decided in favor of private property to Verano. The latter reacquired the property pursuant
respondents, Vicente Laurio and Angeles Laurio as the true and to mutual agreement to repurchase the same.
lawful owners of the disputed land. The CA affirmed the decision
However, the property remained in Titong’s hands only for 4
of the RTC. Titong asserts that he is the owner of an unregistered
days because he sold it to Espinosa. It then became a part of the
parcel of land with an area of 3.2800 hectares and declared for
estate of Espinosa’s wife, late Segundina Espinosa. Later on, her
taxation purposes. He claims that on three separate occasions,
heirs executed an “Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate with
private resps, with their hired laborers, forcibly entered a
Simultaneous Sale” whereby the 5.5 hectares was sold to Laurio
portion of the land containing an approximate area of 2 hectares
for 5,000 pesos. In all these conveyances, the area and
and began plowing the same under pretext of ownership. On the
boundaries of the property remained exactly the same as those
other hand, private resps denied the claim and said that the
appearing in the name of Titong’s.
subject land formed part of the 5.5 hectare agricultural land
which they had purchased from their predecessor-in-interest, The court found out that 2 surveys were made of the property.
Pablo Espinosa. First survey was made by Titong, while the second was the
relocation survey ordered by the lower court. Because of which,
Titong identified Espinosa as the his adjoining owner asserting
certain discrepancies surfaced. Contrary to Titong’s allegation, he
that no controversy had sprouted between them for 20 years
was actually claiming 5.9789 hectares, the total areas of lot nos
until the latter sold lot 3749 to V. Laurio. The boundary between
3918, 3918-A and 3606. The lot 3479 pertaining to Espinosa’s
the land sold to Espinosa and what remained of Titong’s
was left with only an area of 4.1841 hectares instead of the 5.5
property was the old Bugsayon river. When Titong employed
hectares sold by Titong to him.
Lerit as his tenant, he instructed the latter to change the course
of the old river and direct the flow of water to the lowland at the Apprised of the discrepancy, private resps filed a protest before
southern portion of Titong’s property, thus converting the old Bureau of Lands against 1st survey, and filing a case for
river into a Riceland. alteration of boundaries before the MTC, proceedings of which
were suspended because of instant case. Private resps. Avers that
Titong is one of the four heirs of his mother, Leonida Zaragoza. In Laurio’s alleged acts of physical intrusion into his purported
the Extrajudicial Settlement with Sale of Estate of late Zaragoza, property. The grounds mentioned are for action for forcible
the heirs adjudicated unto themselves the 3.6 hectares property entry and not quieting title.
of the deceased. The property was bounded by the north by
In addition, the case was considered to be a boundary dispute.
Verano, on the east by Bernardo Titong, on the south by the
The RTC and CA correctly held that when Titong sold the 5.5
Bugsayon River and on the west by Benigno Titong.
hectare land to Espinosa, his rights and possession ceased and
The boundaries were likewise altered so that it was bounded on were transferred to Laurio upon its sale to the latter. Thus, it is
the north by Verano, on the east by B. Titong, on the south by now a contract of sale wherein it is a contract transferring
Espinosa and on the west by Adolfo Titong. Laurio also denied dominion and other real rights in the thing sold. Titong also
that Titong diverted course of the B. river after he had cannot rely on the claim of prescription as ordinary acquisitive
repurchased the land from Verano because land was prescription requires possession in good faith and with just title
immediately sold to Espinosa thereafter. for the time fixed by law.

Issue:

Whether or not Titong is the rightful owner of the subject

property

Ruling:

NO. The remedy for quieting of title may be availed of under the
circumstances mentioned in Art 476 of the NCC wherein it says
that action to quiet title may be made as a remedial or preventive
measure. Under 476, a claimant must show that there is an
instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding which
casts a cloud, doubt, question or shadow upon owner’s title to or
interest in real property. The ground for filing a complaint for
quieting title must be “instrument, record, claim, encumbrance
or proceeding.”

In the case at bar, Titong failed to allege that there was an

instrument, claim etc be clouded over his property. Through his
allegations, what Titong imagined as clouds cast on his title were
SPOUSES PORTIC VS CRISTOBAL Whether or not there was a contract of sale in this case.

Facts: Ruling:

In 1968, spouses Ricardo and FermaPortic acquired a parcel of NO.

land with a 3 door apartment from spouses Alcantara even
What transpired between the parties was a contract to sell. The
though they’re aware that the land was mortgaged to the SSS.
provision of the contract characterizes the agreement between
Portic defaulted in paying SSS. The Portics then executed a
the parties as a contract to sell, not a contract of sale. Ownership
contract with Anastacia Cristobal and the latter agreed to buy the
is retained by the vendors, the Portics; it will not be passed to the
said property for P200k. Cristobal’s down payment was P45k
vendee, the Cristobals, until the full payment of the purchase
and she also agreed to pay SSS.
price. Such payment is a positive suspensive condition, and
Thereafter, a transfer Certificate of Title was executed in favor of failure to comply with it is not a breach of obligation; it is merely
Cristobal. However, on May 20, 1996, petitioners demanded an event that prevents the effectivity of the obligation of the
from respondent the alleged unpaid balance of P55, 000.00, but vendor to convey the title. In short, until the full price is paid, the
the latter refused to pay. This prompted the petitioners to file vendor retains ownership. Also, the mere issuance of the
this instant civil case against respondent to remove the cloud on Certificate of Title in favor of Cristobal did not vest ownership in
the title. Petitioners claimed that they sold the subject property her. Neither did it validate the alleged absolute purchase of the
to respondent on the condition that respondent shall pay the lot. Registration does not vest, but merely serves as evidence of
balance on or before May 22, 1985; that in case of failure to pay, title.
the sale shall be considered void and petitioners shall reimburse
respondent of the amounts already paid; that respondent failed
to fully pay the purchase price within the period; that on account
of this failure, the sale of the subject property by petitioners to
respondent is void.

Respondent on her part claimed that her title over the subject
property is already indefeasible; that the true agreement of the
parties is that embodied in the Deed of Absolute Sale with
Assumption of Mortgage; that respondent had fully paid the
purchase price; that respondent is the true owner of the subject
property; that petitioners claim is already barred by laches.

Issue:
RUMARATE VS HERNANDEZ 1. The plaintiff has legal or equitable title to or interest in the
subject property.
Facts:
2. The deed, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding casts on cloud on
Spouses Rumarate filed an action for re-conveyance of real
his title even if it appears to be valid or legally efficient but was
property and quieting of title against the Heirs of Spouses
really invalid.
Hernandez. Rumarate averred that Santiago Guerrero orally
bequeathed his rights over a lot to him in 1929. Thereafter, took
possession of the land, built a house and planted on it. A
quitclaim was also executed by Santiago in their favor in 1960.In
1970, Rumarate discovered that Spouses Hernandez were able to
obtain a title over the disputed lot but he did not file a case
immediately. The respondent Heirs of Hernandez claimed that
Santiago sold the lot to them in 1964 but were not able to take
possession of the land.

Issue:

Whether or not Rumarate is entitled for the re-conveyance and

quieting of title of the disputed land.

Held:

Yes. Rumarate is entitled for the re-conveyance and quieting of

title of the disputed land. This is because, Rumarates open,
continuous, exclusive, notorious possession and occupation of
the disputed land for more than 30 years vested them the title
over the lot.The action for quieting of title is aimed to determine
the respective rights of the parties and to prevent future
disturbances thereon. It is merely a confirmation proceeding and
is imprescriptible.The requisites for an action for quieting of title
are satisfied in this case;
PARDELL VS BARTOLOME No. The Court ruled that the spouses are not liable to pay rent.
Their occupation of the said property was a mere exercise of
Facts:
their right to use the same as a co-owner. One of the limitations
Petitioner Vicenta Ortiz y Felin de Pardell and respondent on a co-owner’s right of use is that he must use it in such a way
Matilde Ortiz y Felin Bartolome were the existing heirs of the late so as not to injure the interest of the other co-owners. In the case
Miguel Ortiz and Calixta Felin. On1888, Matilde and co- at bar, the other party failed to provide proof that by the
defendant Gaspar de Bartolome y Escribano took it upon occupation of the spouses Bartolome, they prevented Vicenta
themselves without an judicial authorization or even extra from utilizing the same.
judicial agreement the administration of the properties of the
(Naulit tong case na to)
late Calixta and Miguel.

These properties included a house in Escolta Street, Vigan, Ilocos

Sur; a house in Washington Street, Vigan, Ilocos Sur; a lot in
Magallanes Street, Vigan, Ilocos Sur; parcels of rice land in San
Julian and Sta. Lucia; and parcels of land in Candon, Ilocos
Sur.Vicenta filed an action in court asking that the judgement be
rendered in restoring and returning to them one half of the total
value of thefruits and rents, plus losses and damages from the
aforementioned properties.

However, respondent Matilde asserted that she never refused to

give the plaintiff her share of the said properties. Vicenta also
argued that Matilde and her husband, Gaspar are obliged to pay
rent to the former for their occupation of the upper story of the
house in Escolta Street.

Issue:

Whether or not Matilde and Gaspar are obliged to pay rent for
their occupation of the said property

Held:
GATCHALIAN VS COLLECTOR Held:
Facts: Yes, the plaintiffs formed a partnership
On December 15, 1934, the plaintiffs, all 15 of them, each The Supreme Court held that according to the stipulated facts the
contributed in order to buy a sweepstakes ticket worth Php 2.00. plaintiffs organized a partnership of a civil nature because each
That immediately thereafter but prior to December 16, 1934, of them put up money to buy a sweepstakes ticket for the sole
plaintiffs purchased, in the ordinary course of business, from one purpose of dividing equally the prize which they may win, as
of the duly authorized agents of the National Charity they did in fact in the amount of P50,000. The partnership was
Sweepstakes Office one ticket bearing No. 178637 for the sum of not only formed, but upon the organization thereof and the
two pesos (P2) and that the said ticket was registered in the winning of the prize, Jose Gatchalian personally appeared in the
name of Jose Gatchalian and Company. office of the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes, in his capacity as co-
partner, as such collected the prize, the office issued the check
The above-mentioned ticket bearing No. 178637 won one of the
for P50,000 in favor of Jose Gatchalian and company, and the said
third prizes in the amount of P50,000 and that the corresponding
partner in the same capacity, collected the said check.
check covering the above-mentioned prize of P50,000 was
drawn by the National Charity Sweepstakes Office in favor of Jose Having organized and constituted a partnership of a civil nature,
Gatchalian & Company against the Philippine National Bank, the said entity is the one bound to pay the income tax which the
which check was cashed during the latter part of December, defendant collected under the aforesaid section 10 (a) of Act No.
1934 by Jose Gatchalian & Company. Thereafter, Jose Gatchalian 2833, as amended by section 2 of Act No. 3761.
was required by income tax examiner Alfredo David to file the
corresponding income tax return covering the prize won by Jose
Gatchalian & Company and that on December 29, 1934.
The defendant made an assessment against Jose Gatchalian &
Company requesting the payment of the sum of P1,499.94 to the
deputy provincial treasurer of Pulilan, Bulacan. Tthe plaintiffs
requested exemption from the payment of the income tax but it
was rejected. The plaintiffs paid in protest the tax assessment
given to them.
Issue:
Whether the plaintiffs formed a partnership, thus not exempted
from paying income tax
PUNSALAN VS BOOM LIAT on account of this price, a bill of sale having been signed by
Ahamad, Maharaja Butu and three Moros more. The balance of
Facts:
this price was paid later. When Cheong Tong, Lim Chiat, and the
The twenty two (22) men found, from the Cawit-Cawit shores in Moros, arrived at the house of Maharaja Butu, they found that the
the Province of Zamboanga, a large fish having large quantity of amber they had purchased from Tamsi and his companions was
ambergris, which was placed in three sacks and taken to the no longer there. A complaint was filed by the plaintiffs, who
house of Mahajara Butu, where they left if in the care Ahamad. among those are twenty-one of the twenty-two Moros who had
Then the contents of the two full sacks were placed in three caught the whale, and Ahamad is the one of the defendants.
trunks. All of these twenty-two persons made an agreement that
Issue:
they were to be the sole owners of this ambergris and that none
of them could sell it without the consent of the rest. As to the half Whether or not an action for recovery may be filed by a co-
sack of amber they agreed that some of them should take it to owner against a co-owner with respect to the thing they held in
Zamboanga to sell for the purpose of ascertaining the market common.
price of the ambergris, in order that they might dispose of the
Held:
rest accordingly. Subsequently, they offered to sell for the sum
ofP12,000 to the Chinamen, Cheong Tong and Lim Chiat, the rest YES. The action for recovery which each co-owner has, derived
of the amber contained in the two sacks which had been left in from the right of ownership inherent in the co-ownership, may
the house of Maharaja Butu, for safekeeping. It appears that be exercised not only against strangers but against the co-
there were other people in Zamboanga who knew of the owners themselves, when the latter perform, with respect to the
existence of this ambergris in the house of Maharaja Butu. thing held in common, acts for their exclusive benefit, or of
exclusive ownership, or which are prejudicial to, and in violation
Mr. Henry E. Teck, proposed to the master of the revenue cutter
of, the right of the community
Mindoro to go to Cawit-Cawit to seize some supposedly
contraband opium. After transmitting this information to the
Collector of Customs, he, the master of the Mindoro immediately
proceeded to Cawit-Cawit. Upon arrival, the master searched and
seized the three trunks. Then Ahamad and other Moros asked
permission of the master to accompany him on the voyage to
Zamboanga, to which the master consented. When already on
board and during the voyage, the master became convinced that
the contents of the three trunks were not opium. During the
voyage, Mr. Teck offered to purchase the amber contained in the
three trunks. With a promise of protection, Ahamad decided to
sell the amber for P7,500 and received P2,500 as part payment
TWIN TOWERS CONDOMINIUM CORP VS CA Deed to deal with delinquent members. R assail the validity of
House Rule 26.3 alleging that it is ultra vires so it claims it can
Facts:
validly deduct the value of the services withheld from the
Twin Towers Condominium Corp. (P) is a non-stock corporation assessments and dues since it was barred from using the
organized for the sole purpose of holding title to and managing Condominium facilities for which the assessments and dues were
the common areas of Twin Towers Condominium. ALS being collected.
Management & Development Corp. (R) is a registered owner of
Issue:
Unit 4-A wherein its pres. Litonjua occupies therein. P collects
from all its members quarterly assessments and dues as Whether P House Rule 26.3 is Ultra Vires.
authorized by its Master Deed and its By-Laws. R failed to pay
Ruling:
assessments and dues starting 1986 up to the 1st quarter of
1988. P claimed against both ALS and Litonjua P118,923.20 as No. The Master Deed empowers P to enforce the provisions of
unpaid assessments and dues. R claims that it is the corp. & not the Master Deed in accordance with P’s By-Laws and expressly
Litonuja who is liable and claims damages against P’s act of authorizes P to exercise all powers granted to the management
preventing usage of facilities. The SEC Hearing Officer ordered P body by the Condominium Act, Articles of Incorp. & By-Laws, the
to pay Litonjua moral and exemplary damages for maliciously Master Deed, and the Corporation Code under the Sec. 9 (a) (1) &
including Litonjua’s name in the list of delinquent unit owners (3) of the Condomium Act. P’s By-Laws expressly authorize P’s
and for impleading him as R but ordered the latter to pay the Board of Directors to promulgate rules and regulations on the
assessments and dues to P. The SEC en banc nullified the award use and enjoyment of the common areas. P would be unable to
of damages and attorney’s fees to Litonjua on the ground that the carry out its main purpose of maintaining the Condominium
SEC had no jurisdiction over Litonjua. common areas and facilities if members refuse to pay their dues
and yet continue to use these areas and facilities. To impose a
The SEC en banc held that there is no intracorporate relationship
temporary ban on the use of the common areas and facilities
between P and Litonjua who is not the registered owner of the
until the assessments and dues in arrears are paid is a
Unit & not a member of P and P can’t raise corp. veil doctrine.
reasonable measure that P may undertake to compel the prompt
Specifically, Rule 26.3 of P’s house rules expressly authorize
payment of assessments and dues.
denial of the use of condominium facilities to delinquent
members. P justifies such by invoking Section 36, paragraph 11
of the Corporation Code which grants every corporation the
power "to exercise such powers as may be essential or necessary
to carry out its purpose or purposes as stated in its Articles of
Incorporation." P claims that there is here implied the power to
enact such measures as may be necessary to carry out the
provisions of the Articles of Incorporation, By-Laws and Master
RESUENA VS CA owners to bring an action in ejectment, may successfully be
invoked by the respondent because, in a sense, a co-owner is the
Facts:
owner and possessor of the whole, and that the suit for ejectment
Juanito Borromeo, Sr. (respondent), is the co-owner and is deemed to be instituted for the benefit of all co-owners The
overseer of certain parcels of land located in Talisay, Cebu and Court of Appeals affirmed the Decision of the RTC.
owns six-eighths (6/8) of Lot No. 2587 while the late spouses
Issue:
Bascon own two-eights (2/8) thereof. Lot No. 2592 is owned in
common by respondent and the heirs of one Nicolas Maneja. Whether or not respondent is estopped in filing this ejectment
However, the proportion of their undivided shares was not case against petitioners.
determined a quo. Initially, petitioners Tining Resuena, Alejandra
Ruling:
Garay, Lorna Resuena, Eleuterio Resuena, and Unisima Resuena
resided in the upper portion of Lot No. 2587, allegedly under the The petition cannot prosper. Article 487 of the Civil Code, which
acquiescence of the Spouses Bascon and their heir, Andres provides simply that [a]ny one of the co-owners may bring an
Bascon. While petitioner Eutiquia Rosario occupied a portion of action in ejectment, is a categorical and an unqualified authority
Lot No. 2592, allegedly with the permission of the heirs of in favor of respondent to evict petitioners from the portions of
Nicolas Maneja, one of the original co-owners of Lot No. 2587. Lot. No. 2587.
Respondent claims that all petitioners have occupied portions of
the subject property by virtue of his own liberality. This provision is a departure from Palarca v. Baguisi, which held
that an action for ejectment must be brought by all the co-
Respondent developed portions of Lots Nos. 2587 and 2592 owners. Thus, a co-owner may bring an action to exercise and
occupied by him into a resort. In his desire to expand and extend protect the rights of all. When the action is brought by one co-
the facilities of the resort that he established on the subject owner for the benefit of all, a favorable decision will benefit
properties, respondent demanded that petitioners vacate the them; but an adverse decision cannot prejudice their rights.
property. Petitioners, however, refused to vacate their homes.
Respondent filed a Complaint for ejectment with the MTC against Respondents action for ejectment against petitioners is deemed
the petitioners. The MTC ruled that respondent did not have a to be instituted for the benefit of all co-owners of the property
preferential right of possession over the portions occupied by since petitioners were not able to prove that they are authorized
petitioners, since Lots Nos. 2587 and 2592 were not yet to occupy the same.
partitioned nor the disputed portions assigned to respondent as Petitioners lack of authority to occupy the properties, coupled
his determinate share. Thus, the MTC held that respondent had with respondent’s right under Article 487, clearly settles
no right to evict petitioners therefrom. respondent’s prerogative to eject petitioners from Lot No. 2587.
On appeal, the RTC reversed the Decision of the MTC. It held that Time and again, this Court has ruled that persons who occupy
Article 487 of the Civil Code, which allows any one of the co- the land of another at the latter’s tolerance or permission,
without any contract between them, are necessarily bound by an
implied promise that they will vacate the same upon demand,
failing in which a summary action for ejectment is the proper
remedy against them.
Thus, in order that the petition may acquire any whiff of merit,
petitioners are obliged to establish a legal basis for their
continued occupancy of the properties. The mere tolerance of
one of the co-owners, assuming that there was such, does not
suffice to establish such right. Tolerance in itself does not bear
any legal fruit, and it can easily be supplanted by a sudden
change of heart on the part of the owner. Petitioners have not
adduced any convincing evidence that they have somehow
become successors-in-interest of the Spouses Bascon, or any of
the owners of Lot No. 2587
The lower courts have made a common factual finding that
petitioners are occupying portions of Lots No. 2587 and 2592 by
mere tolerance. Thus, petitioners have no right to get reimbursed
for the expenses they incurred in erecting their houses thereon.
ACABAL VS ACABAL the fair market value of a land as of the time of its sale, it cannot
be concluded that the price at which it was sold was inadequate.
Facts:
Inadequacy of price must be proven because mere speculation or
Alejandro Acabal and Felicidad Balasbas executed a Deed of conjecture has no place in our judicial system.
Absolute Sale over a parcel of land in favor of their son,
Even, however, on the assumption that the price of P10,000.00
respondent Villaner Acabal (Villaner). Villaner was then married
was below the fair market value of the property in 1990, mere
to Justiniana Lipajan. When he became a widower, he executed a
inadequacy of the price per se will not rule out the transaction as
deed conveying the same parcel of land in favor of petitioner
one of sale. For the price must be grossly inadequate or shocking
Leonardo Acabal (Leonardo).
to the conscience such that the mind revolts at it and such that a
However, Villaner later claims that the document he signed was a reasonable man would neither directly nor indirectly be likely to
document captioned ―Lease Contract,‖ wherein he leased for the consent to it.
property for 3 years to Leonardo. Villaner filed a complaint with
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) against Leonardo and Ramon
Nicolas to whom Leonardo in turn conveyed the property for
annulment of the deeds of sale.
The RTC ruled in favor of Acabal and dismissed the complaint.
The Court of Appeals (CA) however reversed the decision of RTC
and held that the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Villaner in
favor of Leonardo was simulated and fictitious.

Issue:
Whether or not the deed executed by respondent Villaner in
favor of petitioner Leonardo is a Deed of Absolute Sale.

Held:
It bears noting, however, that Villaner failed to present evidence
on the fair market value of the property as of April 19, 1990, the
date of execution of the disputed deed. Absent any evidence of