ARTICLE 106 – 109 After trial, the court rendered judgment ordering PBM and respondent-husband Alfredo

Ching to jointly and severally pay AIDC the principal amount of P50,300,000.00 with interests.
ARTICLE 121 – 125
Pending appeal of the judgment in Civil Case No. 42228, upon motion of AIDC, the lower
court issued a writ of execution pending appeal. Upon AIDC's putting up of an P8,000,000.00
G.R. No. 118305 February 12, 1998 bond, a writ of execution dated May 12, 1982 was issued. Thereafter, petitioner Abelardo
Magsajo, Sr., Deputy Sheriff of Rizal and appointed sheriff in Civil Case No. 42228, caused the
AYALA INVESTMENT & DEVELOPMENT CORP. and ABELARDO MAGSAJO, petitioners,  issuance and service upon respondents-spouses of a notice of sheriff sale dated May 20, 1982
vs. on three (3) of their conjugal properties. Petitioner Magsajo then scheduled the auction sale
COURT OF APPEALS and SPOUSES ALFREDO & ENCARNACION CHING, respondents. of the properties levied.

On June 9, 1982, private respondents filed a case of injunction against petitioners with the
then Court of First Instance of Rizal (Pasig), Branch XIII, to enjoin the auction sale alleging that
petitioners cannot enforce the judgment against the conjugal partnership levied on the
MARTINEZ, J.:
ground that, among others, the subject loan did not redound to the benefit of the said
conjugal partnership. 2 Upon application of private respondents, the lower court issued a
Under Article 161 of the Civil Code, what debts and obligations contracted by the husband temporary restraining order to prevent petitioner Magsajo from proceeding with the
alone are considered "for the benefit of the conjugal partnership" which are chargeable enforcement of the writ of execution and with the sale of the said properties at public
against the conjugal partnership? Is a surety agreement or an accommodation contract auction.
entered into by the husband in favor of his employer within the contemplation of the said
provision?
AIDC filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals,3 questioning the order of the
lower court enjoining the sale. Respondent Court of Appeals issued a Temporary Restraining
These are the issues which we will resolve in this petition for review. Order on June 25, 1982, enjoining the lower court 4 from enforcing its Order of June 14, 1982,
thus paving the way for the scheduled auction sale of respondents-spouses conjugal
The petitioner assails the decision dated April 14, 1994 of the respondent Court of Appeals in properties.
"Spouses Alfredo and Encarnacion Ching vs. Ayala Investment and Development Corporation,
et. al.," docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 29632, 1 upholding the decision of the Regional Trial Court On June 25, 1982, the auction sale took place. AIDC being the only bidder, was issued a
of Pasig, Branch 168, which ruled that the conjugal partnership of gains of respondents- Certificate of Sale by petitioner Magsajo, which was registered on July 2, 1982. Upon
spouses Alfredo and Encarnacion Ching is not liable for the payment of the debts secured by expiration of the redemption period, petitioner sheriff issued the final deed of sale on August
respondent-husband Alfredo Ching. 4, 1982 which was registered on August 9, 1983.

A chronology of the essential antecedent facts is necessary for a clear understanding of the In the meantime, the respondent court, on August 4, 1982, decided CA-G.R. SP No. 14404, in
case at bar. this manner:

Philippine Blooming Mills (hereinafter referred to as PBM) obtained a P50,300,000.00 loan WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari in this case is granted and the
from petitioner Ayala Investment and Development Corporation (hereinafter referred to as challenged order of the respondent Judge dated June 14, 1982 in Civil
AIDC). As added security for the credit line extended to PBM, respondent Alfredo Ching, Case No. 46309 is hereby set aside and nullified. The same petition
Executive Vice President of PBM, executed security agreements on December 10, 1980 and insofar as it seeks to enjoin the respondent Judge from proceeding with
on March 20, 1981 making himself jointly and severally answerable with PBM's indebtedness Civil Case No. 46309 is, however, denied. No pronouncement is here
to AIDC. made as to costs. . . . 5

PBM failed to pay the loan. Thus, on July 30, 1981, AIDC filed a case for sum of money against On September 3, 1983, AIDC filed a motion to dismiss the petition for injunction filed before
PBM and respondent-husband Alfredo Ching with the then Court of First Instance of Rizal Branch XIII of the CFI of Rizal (Pasig) on the ground that the same had become moot and
(Pasig), Branch VIII, entitled "Ayala Investment and Development Corporation vs. Philippine academic with the consummation of the sale. Respondents filed their opposition to the
Blooming Mills and Alfredo Ching," docketed as Civil Case No. 42228. motion arguing, among others, that where a third party who claim is ownership of the
property attached or levied upon, a different legal situation is presented; and that in this
case, two (2) of the real properties are actually in the name of Encarnacion Ching, a non- Specifically, the errors allegedly committed by the respondent court are as follows:
party to Civil Case No. 42228.
I. RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE
The lower court denied the motion to dismiss. Hence, trial on the merits proceeded. Private OBLIGATION INCURRED RESPONDENT HUSBAND DID
respondents presented several witnesses. On the other hand, petitioners did not present any NOT REDOUND TO THE BENEFIT OF THE CONJUGAL
evidence. PARTNERSHIP OF THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT.

On September 18, 1991, the trial court promulgated its decision declaring the sale on II. RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE
execution null and void. Petitioners appealed to the respondent court, which was docketed ACT OF RESPONDENT HUSBAND IN SECURING THE
as CA-G.R. CV No. 29632. SUBJECT LOAN IS NOT PART OF HIS INDUSTRY,
BUSINESS OR CAREER FROM WHICH HE SUPPORTS
On April 14, 1994, the respondent court promulgated the assailed decision, affirming the HIS FAMILY.
decision of the regional trial court. It held that:
Petitioners in their appeal point out that there is no need to prove that actual benefit
The loan procured from respondent-appellant AIDC was for the redounded to the benefit of the partnership; all that is necessary, they say, is that the
advancement and benefit of Philippine Blooming Mills and not for the transaction was entered into for the benefit of the conjugal partnership. Thus, petitioners
benefit of the conjugal partnership of petitioners-appellees. aver that:

x x x           x x x          x x x The wordings of Article 161 of the Civil Code is very clear: for the
partnership to be held liable, the husband must have contracted the debt
"for the benefit of the partnership, thus:
As to the applicable law, whether it is Article 161 of the New Civil Code or
Article 1211 of the Family Code-suffice it to say that the two provisions
are substantially the same. Nevertheless, We agree with the trial court Art. 161. The conjugal partnership shall be liable for:
that the Family Code is the applicable law on the matter . . . . . . .
1) all debts and obligations
Article 121 of the Family Code provides that "The conjugal partnership contracted by the husband for the
shall be liable for: . . . (2) All debts and obligations contracted during the benefit of the conjugal
marriage by the designated Administrator-Spouse for the benefit of the partnership . . . .
conjugal partnership of gains . . . ." The burden of proof that the debt was
contracted for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of gains, lies with There is a difference between the phrases: "redounded to the benefit of"
the creditor-party litigant claiming as such. In the case at bar, or "benefited from" (on the one hand) and "for the benefit of (on the
respondent-appellant AIDC failed to prove that the debt was contracted other). The former require that actual benefit must have been realized;
by appellee-husband, for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of gains. the latter requires only that the transaction should be one which
normally would produce benefit to the partnership, regardless of
The dispositive portion of the decision reads: whether or not actual benefit accrued.8

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered We do not agree with petitioners that there is a difference between the terms "redounded to
DISMISSING the appeal. The decision of the Regional Trial Court is the benefit of" or "benefited from" on the one hand; and "for the benefit of" on the other.
AFFIRMED in toto.6 They mean one and the same thing. Article 161 (1) of the Civil Code and Article 121 (2) of the
Family Code are similarly worded, i.e., both use the term "for the benefit of." On the other
hand, Article 122 of the Family Code provides that "The payment of personal debts by the
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the respondent court in a
husband or the wife before or during the marriage shall not be charged to the conjugal
Resolution dated November 28, 1994.7
partnership except insofar as they redounded to the benefit of the family." As can be seen,
the terms are used interchangeably.
Hence, this petition for review. Petitioner contends that the "respondent court erred in ruling
that the conjugal partnership of private respondents is not liable for the obligation by the
respondent-husband."
Petitioners further contend that the ruling of the respondent court runs counter to the When there is no showing that the execution of an indemnity agreement
pronouncement of this Court in the case of Cobb-Perez vs. Lantin,9 that the husband as head by the husband redounded to the benefit of his family, the undertaking is
of the family and as administrator of the conjugal partnership is presumed to have not a conjugal debt but an obligation personal to him. (Liberty Insurance)
contracted obligations for the benefit of the family or the conjugal partnership.
In the most categorical language, a conjugal partnership under Article 161
Contrary to the contention of the petitioners, the case of Cobb-Perez is not applicable in the of the new Civil Code is liable only for such "debts and obligations
case at bar. This Court has, on several instances, interpreted the term "for the benefit of the contracted by the husband for the benefit of the conjugal partnership."
conjugal partnership." There must be the requisite showing then of some advantage which
clearly accrued to the welfare of the spouses. Certainly, to make a
In the cases of Javier vs. Osmeña, 10 Abella de Diaz vs. Erlanger & Galinger, Inc., 11 Cobb-Perez conjugal partnership respond for a liability that should appertain to the
vs. Lantin 12and G-Tractors, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 13 cited by the petitioners, we held that: husband alone is to defeat and frustrate the avowed objective of the new
Civil Code to show the utmost concern for the solidarity and well-being of
the family as a unit. The husband, therefore, is denied the power to
The debts contracted by the husband during the marriage relation, for
assume unnecessary and unwarranted risks to the financial stability of
and in the exercise of the industry or profession by which he contributes
the conjugal partnership. (Luzon Surety, Inc.)
toward the support of his family, are not his personal and private debts,
and the products or income from the wife's own property, which, like
those of her husband's, are liable for the payment of the marriage From the foregoing jurisprudential rulings of this Court, we can derive the following
expenses, cannot be excepted from the payment of such debts. (Javier) conclusions:

The husband, as the manager of the partnership (Article 1412, Civil Code), (A) If the husband himself is the principal obligor in the contract, i.e., he directly received the
has a right to embark the partnership in an ordinary commercial money and services to be used in or for his own business or his own profession, that contract
enterprise for gain, and the fact that the wife may not approve of a falls within the term . . . . obligations for the benefit of the conjugal partnership." Here, no
venture does not make it a private and personal one of the husband. actual benefit may be proved. It is enough that the benefit to the family is apparent at the
(Abella de Diaz) time of the signing of the contract. From the very nature of the contract of loan or services,
the family stands to benefit from the loan facility or services to be rendered to the business
or profession of the husband. It is immaterial, if in the end, his business or profession fails or
Debts contracted by the husband for and in the exercise of the industry
does not succeed. Simply stated, where the husband contracts obligations on behalf of the
or profession by which he contributes to the support of the family,
family business, the law presumes, and rightly so, that such obligation will redound to the
cannot be deemed to be his exclusive and private debts. (Cobb-Perez).
benefit of the conjugal partnership.

. . . if he incurs an indebtedness in the legitimate pursuit of his career or

(B) On the other hand, if the money or services are given to another person or entity, and the
profession or suffers losses in a legitimate business, the conjugal
husband acted only as a surety or guarantor, that contract cannot, by itself, alone be
partnership must equally bear the indebtedness and the losses, unless he
categorized as falling within the context of "obligations for the benefit of the conjugal
deliberately acted to the prejudice of his family. (G-Tractors)
partnership." The contract of loan or services is clearly for the benefit of the principal debtor
and not for the surety or his family. No presumption can be inferred that, when a husband
However, in the cases of Ansaldo vs. Sheriff of Manila, Fidelity Insurance & Luzon Insurance enters into a contract of surety or accommodation agreement, it is "for the benefit of the
Co.,14 Liberty Insurance Corporation vs. Banuelos, 15 and Luzon Surety Inc. vs.  De conjugal partnership." Proof must be presented to establish benefit redounding to the
Garcia, 16 cited by the respondents, we ruled that: conjugal partnership.

The fruits of the paraphernal property which form part of the assets of Thus, the distinction between the Cobb-Perez case, and we add, that of the three other
the conjugal partnership, are subject to the payment of the debts and companion cases, on the one hand, and that of Ansaldo, Liberty Insurance and Luzon Surety,
expenses of the spouses, but not to the payment of the personal is that in the former, the husband contracted the obligation for his own business; while in the
obligations (guaranty agreements) of the husband, unless it be proved latter, the husband merely acted as a surety for the loan contracted by another for the
that such obligations were productive of some benefit to the family." latter's business.
(Ansaldo; parenthetical phrase ours.)
The evidence of petitioner indubitably show that co-respondent Alfredo Ching signed as
surety for the P50M loan contracted on behalf of PBM. petitioner should have adduced
evidence to prove that Alfredo Ching's acting as surety redounded to the benefit of the principal obligor himself. Thus, said transaction was found to be "one that would normally
conjugal partnership. The reason for this is as lucidly explained by the respondent court: produce . . . benefit for the partnership." In the later case of G-Tractors, Inc., the husband
was also the principal obligor — not merely the surety. This latter case, therefore, did not
The loan procured from respondent-appellant AIDC was for the create any precedent. It did not also supersede the Luzon Surety Company case, nor any of
advancement and benefit of Philippine Blooming Mills and not for the the previous accommodation contract cases, where this Court ruled that they were for the
benefit of the conjugal partnership of petitioners-appellees. Philippine benefit of third parties.
Blooming Mills has a personality distinct and separate from the family of
petitioners-appellees — this despite the fact that the members of the But it could be argued, as the petitioner suggests, that even in such kind of contract of
said family happened to be stockholders of said corporate entity. accommodation, a benefit for the family may also result, when the guarantee is in favor of
the husband's employer.
x x x           x x x          x x x
In the case at bar, petitioner claims that the benefits the respondent family would reasonably
. . . . The burden of proof that the debt was contracted for the benefit of anticipate were the following:
the conjugal partnership of gains, lies with the creditor-party litigant
claiming as such. In the case at bar, respondent-appellant AIDC failed to (a) The employment of co-respondent Alfredo Ching
prove that the debt was contracted by appellee-husband, for the benefit would be prolonged and he would be entitled to his
of the conjugal partnership of gains. What is apparent from the facts of monthly salary of P20,000.00 for an extended length
the case is that the judgment debt was contracted by or in the name of of time because of the loan he guaranteed;
the Corporation Philippine Blooming Mills and appellee-husband only
signed as surety thereof. The debt is clearly a corporate debt and (b) The shares of stock of the members of his family
respondent-appellant's right of recourse against appellee-husband as would appreciate if the PBM could be rehabilitated
surety is only to the extent of his corporate stockholdings. It does not through the loan obtained;
extend to the conjugal partnership of gains of the family of petitioners-
appellees. . . . . . .17
(c) His prestige in the corporation would be enhanced
and his career would be boosted should PBM survive
Petitioners contend that no actual benefit need accrue to the conjugal partnership. To because of the loan.
support this contention, they cite Justice J.B.L. Reyes' authoritative opinion in the Luzon
Surety Company case:
However, these are not the benefits contemplated by Article 161 of the Civil Code. The
benefits must be one directly resulting from the loan. It cannot merely be a by-product or a
I concur in the result, but would like to make of record that, in my spin-off of the loan itself.
opinion, the words "all debts and obligations contracted by the husband
for the benefit of the conjugal partnership" used in Article 161 of the Civil
In all our decisions involving accommodation contracts of the husband, 18 we underscored
Code of the Philippines in describing the charges and obligations for
the requirement that: "there must be the requisite showing . . . of some advantage which
which the conjugal partnership is liable do not require that actual profit
clearly accrued to the welfare of the spouses" or "benefits to his family" or "that such
or benefit must accrue to the conjugal partnership from the husband's
obligations are productive of some benefit to the family." Unfortunately, the petition did not
transaction; but it suffices that the transaction should be one that
present any proof to show: (a) Whether or not the corporate existence of PBM was
normally would produce such benefit for the partnership. This is the ratio
prolonged and for how many months or years; and/or (b) Whether or not the PBM was saved
behind our ruling in Javier vs. Osmeña, 34 Phil. 336, that obligations
by the loan and its shares of stock appreciated, if so, how much and how substantial was the
incurred by the husband in the practice of his profession are collectible
holdings of the Ching family.
from the conjugal partnership.

Such benefits (prospects of longer employment and probable increase in the value of stocks)
The aforequoted concurring opinion agreed with the majority decision that the conjugal
might have been already apparent or could be anticipated at the time the accommodation
partnership should not be made liable for the surety agreement which was clearly for the
agreement was entered into. But would those "benefits" qualify the transaction as one of the
benefit of a third party. Such opinion merely registered an exception to what may be
"obligations . . . for the benefit of the conjugal partnership"? Are indirect and remote
construed as a sweeping statement that in all cases actual profit or benefit must accrue to
probable benefits, the ones referred to in Article 161 of the Civil Code? The Court of Appeals
the conjugal partnership. The opinion merely made it clear that no actual benefits to the
family need be proved in some cases such as in the Javier case. There, the husband was the
in denying the motion for reconsideration, disposed of these questions in the following These are all in keeping with the spirit and intent of the other provisions of the Civil Code
manner: which prohibits any of the spouses to donate or convey gratuitously any part of the conjugal
property. 21 Thus, when co-respondent Alfredo Ching entered into a surety agreement he,
No matter how one looks at it, the debt/credit respondents-appellants is from then on, definitely put in peril the conjugal property (in this case, including the family
purely a corporate debt granted to PBM, with petitioner-appellee- home) and placed it in danger of being taken gratuitously as in cases of donation.
husband merely signing as surety. While such petitioner-appellee-
husband, as such surety, is solidarily liable with the principal debtor AIDC, In the second assignment of error, the petitioner advances the view that acting as surety is
such liability under the Civil Code provisions is specifically restricted by part of the business or profession of the respondent-husband.
Article 122 (par. 1) of the Family Code, so that debts for which the
husband is liable may not be charged against conjugal partnership This theory is new as it is novel.
properties. Article 122 of the Family Code is explicit — "The payment of
personal debts contracted by the husband or the wife before or during
The respondent court correctly observed that:
the marriage shall not be charged to the conjugal partnership except
insofar as they redounded to the benefit of the family.
Signing as a surety is certainly not an exercise of an industry or
profession, hence the cited cases of Cobb-Perez vs. Lantin; Abella de Diaz
Respondents-appellants insist that the corporate debt in question falls
vs. Erlanger & Galinger;  G-Tractors, Inc. vs. CAdo not apply in the instant
under the exception laid down in said Article 122 (par. one). We do not
case. Signing as a surety is not embarking in a business.22
agree. The loan procured from respondent-appellant AIDC was for the
sole advancement and benefit of Philippine Blooming Mills and not for
the benefit of the conjugal partnership of petitioners-appellees. We are likewise of the view that no matter how often an executive acted or was persuaded
to act, as a surety for his own employer, this should not be taken to mean that he had
thereby embarked in the business of suretyship or guaranty.
. . . appellee-husband derives salaries, dividends benefits from Philippine
Blooming Mills (the debtor corporation), only because said husband is an
employee of said PBM. These salaries and benefits, are not the "benefits" This is not to say, however, that we are unaware that executives are often asked to stand as
contemplated by Articles 121 and 122 of the Family Code. The "benefits" surety for their company's loan obligations. This is especially true if the corporate officials
contemplated by the exception in Article 122 (Family Code) is that benefit have sufficient property of their own; otherwise, their spouses' signatures are required in
derived directly from the use of the loan. In the case at bar, the loan is a order to bind the conjugal partnerships.
corporate loan extended to PBM and used by PBM itself, not by
petitioner-appellee-husband or his family. The alleged benefit, if any, The fact that on several occasions the lending institutions did not require the signature of the
continuously harped by respondents-appellants, are not only incidental wife and the husband signed alone does not mean that being a surety became part of his
but also speculative. 19 profession. Neither could he be presumed to have acted for the conjugal partnership.

We agree with the respondent court. Indeed, considering the odds involved in guaranteeing a Article 121, paragraph 3, of the Family Code is emphatic that the payment of personal debts
large amount (P50,000,000.00) of loan, the probable prolongation of employment in PBM contracted by the husband or the wife before or during the marriage shall not be charged to
and increase in value of its stocks, would be too small to qualify the transaction as one "for the conjugal partnership except to the extent that they redounded to the benefit of the
the benefit" of the surety's family. Verily, no one could say, with a degree of certainty, that family.
the said contract is even "productive of some benefits" to the conjugal partnership.
Here, the property in dispute also involves the family home. The loan is a corporate loan not
We likewise agree with the respondent court (and this view is not contested by the a personal one. Signing as a surety is certainly not an exercise of an industry or profession nor
petitioners) that the provisions of the Family Code is applicable in this case. These provisions an act of administration for the benefit of the family.
highlight the underlying concern of the law for the conservation of the conjugal partnership;
for the husband's duty to protect and safeguard, if not augment, not to dissipate it. On the basis of the facts, the rules, the law and equity, the assailed decision should be upheld
as we now uphold it. This is, of course, without prejudice to petitioner's right to enforce the
This is the underlying reason why the Family Code clarifies that the obligations entered into obligation in its favor against the PBM receiver in accordance with the rehabilitation program
by one of the spouses must be those that redounded to the benefit of the family and that the and payment schedule approved or to be approved by the Securities & Exchange
measure of the partnership's liability is to "the extent that the family is benefited."20 Commission.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review should be, as it is hereby, DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.
ARTICLE 116 – 117 Secondly, it has been held that a clam for moral damages is one not susceptible of pecuniary
estimation.1 In fact, Article 2217 of the Civil Code of the Philippines explicitly provides that
"(t)hough incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages may be recovered if they are
G.R. No. L-28589 January 8, 1973 the proximate result of the defendant's wrongful act or omission." Hence, "(n)o proof
pecuniary loss necessary" — pursuant to Article 2216 of the same Code — "in order that
RAFAEL ZULUETA, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees,  moral ... damages may be adjudicated." And "(t)he assessment of such damages ... is left to
vs. the discretion of the court" - said article adds - "according to the circumstances of each case."
PAN AMERICAN WORLD AIRWAYS, INC., defendant-appellant. Appellees' complaint is, therefore, within the original jurisdiction of courts of first instance,
which includes "all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is not capable of
Alfredo L. Benipayo for plaintiffs-appellee Rafael Zulueta and Carolina Zulueta. pecuniary estimation."2

Justo L. Albert for plaintiff-appellee Telly Albert Zulueta. Thirdly, in its answer to plaintiffs' original and amended complainants, defendant had set up
a counterclaim in the aggregate sum of P12,000, which is, also, within the original jurisdiction
of said courts, thereby curing the alleged defect if any, in plaintiffs' complaint.3
V.E. del Rosario and Associates and Salcedo, Del Rosario, Bito, Misa and Lozada for
defendant-appellant.
We need not consider the jurisdictional controversy as to the amount the
appellant sues to recover because the counterclaim interposed
RESOLUTION
establishes the jurisdiction of the District Court. Merchants' Heat & Light
Co. v. James B. Clow & Sons, 204 U.S. 286, 27 S. Ct. 285, 51 L. Ed. 488; O.
J. Lewis Mercantile Co. v. Klepner, 176 F. 343 (C.C.A. 2), certiorari denied
216 U.S. 620, 30 S Ct. 575, 54 L. Ed. 641. ... .4
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
... courts have said that "when the jurisdictional amount is in question,
Both parties in this case have moved for the reconsideration of the decision of this Court the tendering of a counterclaim in an amount which in itself, or added to
promulgated on February 29, 1972. Plaintiffs maintain that the decision appealed from the amount claimed in the petition, makes up a sum equal to the amount
should be affirmed in toto. The defendant, in turn, prays that the decision of this Court be necessary to the jurisdiction of this court, jurisdiction is established,
"set aside ... with or without a new trial, ... and that the complaint be dismissed, with costs; whatever may be the state of the plaintiff's complaint." American Sheet &
or, in the alternative, that the amount of the award embodied therein be considerably Tin Plate Co. v. Winzeler (D.C.) 227 F. 321, 324.5
reduced." .
Thus, in Ago v. Buslon,6 We held:
Subsequently to the filing of its motion for reconsideration, the defendant filed a "petition to
annul proceedings and/or to order the dismissal of plaintiffs-appellees' complaint" upon the ... . Then, too, petitioner's counterclaim for P37,000.00 was, also, within
ground that "appellees' complaint actually seeks the recovery of only P5,502.85 as actual the exclusive original jurisdiction of the latter courts, and there are ample
damages, because, for the purpose of determining the jurisdiction of the lower court, the precedents to the effect that "although the original claim involves less
unspecified sums representing items of alleged damages, may not be considered, under the than the jurisdictional amount, ... jurisdiction can be sustained if the
settled doctrines of this Honorable Court," and "the jurisdiction of courts of first instance counterclaim (of the compulsory type)" — such as the one set up by
when the complaint in the present case was filed on Sept. 30, 1965" was limited to cases "in petitioner herein, based upon the damages allegedly suffered by him in
which the demand, exclusive of interest, or the value of the property in controversy amounts consequence of the filing of said complaint — "exceeds the jurisdictional
to more than ten thousand pesos" and "the mere fact that the complaint also prays for amount." (Moore Federal Practice, 2nd ed. [1948], Vol. 3, p. 41; Ginsburg
unspecified moral damages and attorney's fees, does not bring the action within the vs. Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co. of California, 69 Fed. [2d] 97; Home Life Ins.
jurisdiction of the lower court." Co. vs. Sipp., 11 Fed. [2d]474; American Sheet & Tin Plate Co. vs. Winzeler
[D.C.], 227 Fed. 321, 324; Brix vs. People's Mutual Life Ins. Co., 41 P. 2d.
We find no merit in this contention. To begin with, it is not true that "the unspecified sums 537, 2 Cal. 2d. 446; Emery vs. Pacific Employees Ins. Co., 67 P. 2d. 1046, 8
representing items or other alleged damages, may not be considered" — for the purpose of Cal. 2d. 663).
determining the jurisdiction of the court — "under the settled doctrines of this Honorable
Court." In fact, not a single case has been cited in support of this allegation. Needless to say, having not only failed to question the jurisdiction of the trial court — either
in that court or in this Court, before the rendition of the latter's decision, and even
subsequently thereto, by filing the aforementioned motion for reconsideration and seeking Then, again, the passenger of a plane seldom knows how many toilets it has. As a general
the reliefs therein prayed for — but, also, urged both courts to exercise jurisdiction over the rule, his knowledge is limited to the toilets for the class — first class or tourist class — in
merits of the case, defendant is now estopped from impugning said jurisdiction.7 which he is. Then, too, it takes several minutes for the passengers of big aircrafts, like those
flying from the U.S. to the Philippines, to deplane. Besides, the speed with which a given
Before taking up the specific questions raised in defendant's motion for reconsideration, it passenger may do so depends, largely, upon the location of his seat in relation to the exit
should be noted that the same is mainly predicated upon the premise that plaintiffs' version door. He cannot go over the heads of those nearer than he thereto. Again, Mr. Zulueta may
is inherently incredible, and that this Court should accept the theory of the defense to the have stayed in the toilet terminal for some time, expecting one of the commodes therein to
effect that petitioner was off-loaded because of a bomb-scare allegedly arising from his delay be vacated soon enough, before deciding to go elsewhere to look for a place suitable to his
in boarding the aircraft and subsequent refusal to open his bags for inspection. We need not purpose. But he had to walk, first, from the plane to the terminal building and, then, after
repeat here the reasons given in Our decision for rejecting defendant's contention and not vainly waiting therein for a while, cover a distance of about 400 yards therefrom to the
disturbing the findings of fact of His Honor, the Trial Judge, who had the decided advantage beach, and seek there a place not visible by the people in the plane and in the terminal,
— denied to Us — of observing the behaviour of the witnesses in the course of the trial and inasmuch as the terrain at Wake Island is flat. What is more, he must have had to takeoff
found those of the plaintiffs worthy of credence, not the evidence for the defense. part, at least, of his clothing, because, without the facilities of a toilet, he had to wash himself
and, then, dry himself up before he could be properly attired and walk back the 400 yards
that separated him from the terminal building and/or the plane. Considering, in addition to
It may not be amiss however, to stress the fact that, in his written report, made in transit
the foregoing, the fact that he was not feeling well, at that time, We are not prepared to hold
from Wake to Manila — or immediately after the occurrence and before the legal
that it could not have taken him around an hour to perform the acts narrated by him.
implications or consequences thereof could have been the object of mature deliberation, so
that it could, in a way, be considered as part of the res gestae — Capt. Zentner stated that
Zulueta had been off-loaded "due to drinking" and "belligerent attitude," thereby belying the But, why — asks the defendant — did he not reveal the same before the plane took off? The
story of the defense about said alleged bomb-scare, and confirming the view that said agent record shows that, even before Mr. Zulueta had reached the ramp leading to the plane, Capt.
of the defendant had acted out of resentment because his ego had been hurt by Mr. Zentner was already demonstrating at him in an intemperate and arrogant tone and attitude
Zulueta's adamant refusal to be bullied by him. Indeed, had there been an iota of truth in ("What do you think you are?), thereby impelling Mr. Zulueta to answer back in the same
said story of the defense, Capt. Zentner would have caused every one of the passengers to be vein. As a consequence, there immediately ensued an altercation in the course of which each
frisked or searched and the luggage of all of them examined — as it is done now — before apparently tried to show that he could not be cowed by the other. Then came the order of
resuming the flight from Wake Island. His failure to do so merely makes the artificious nature Capt. Zentner to off-load all of the Zuluetas, including Mrs. Zulueta and the minor Miss
of defendant's version more manifest. Indeed, the fact that Mrs. Zulueta and Miss Zulueta Zulueta, as well as their luggage, their overcoats and other effects handcarried by them; but,
were on board the plane shows beyond doubt that Mr. Zulueta could not possibly have Mr. Zulueta requested that the ladies be allowed to continue the trip. Meanwhile, it had
intended to blow it up. taken time to locate his four (4) pieces of luggage. As a matter of fact, only three (3) of them
were found, and the fourth eventually remained in the plane. In short, the issue between
Capt. Zentner and Mr. Zulueta had been limited to determining whether the latter would
The defense tries to explain its failure to introduce any evidence to contradict the testimony
allow himself to be browbeaten by the former. In the heat of the altercation, nobody had
of Mr. Zulueta as to why he had gone to the beach and what he did there, alleging that, in
inquired about the cause of Mr. Zulueta's delay in returning to the plane, apart from the fact
the very nature of things, nobody else could have witnessed it. Moreover, the defense insists,
that it was rather embarrassing for him to explain, in the presence and within the hearing of
inter alia, that the testimony of Mr. Zulueta is inherently incredible because he had no idea
the passengers and the crew, then assembled around them, why he had gone to the beach
as to how many toilets the plane had; it could not have taken him an hour to relieve himself
and why it had taken him some time to answer there a call of nature, instead of doing so in
in the beach; there were eight (8) commodes at the terminal toilet for men ; if he felt the
the terminal building.
need of relieving himself, he would have seen to it that the soldiers did not beat him to the
terminal toilets; he did not tell anybody about the reason for going to the beach, until after
the plane had taken off from Wake. Defendant's motion for reconsideration assails: (1) the amount of damages awarded as
excessive; (2) the propriety of accepting as credible plaintiffs' theory; (3) plaintiffs' right to
recover either moral or exemplary damages; (4) plaintiffs' right to recover attorney's fees;
We find this pretense devoid of merit. Although Mr. Zulueta had to look for a secluded place
and (5) the non-enforcement of the compromise agreement between the defendant and
in the beach to relieve himself, beyond the view of others, defendant's airport manager,
plaintiff's wife, Mrs. Zulueta. Upon the other hand, plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration
whom Mr. Zulueta informed about it, soon after the departure of the plane, could have
contests the decision of this Court reducing the amount of damages awarded by the trial
forthwith checked the veracity of Mr. Zulueta's statement by asking him to indicate the
court to approximately one-half thereof, upon the ground, not only that, contrary to the
specific place where he had been in the beach and then proceeding thereto for purposes of
findings of this Court, in said decision, plaintiff had not contributed to the aggravation of his
verification.
altercation or incident with Capt. Zentner by reacting to his provocation with extreme
belligerency thereby allowing himself to be dragged down to the level on which said agent of
the defendant had placed himself, but, also, because the purchasing power of our local
currency is now much lower than when the trial court rendered its appealed decision, over It is urged by the defendant that exemplary damages are not recoverable in quasi-delicts,
five (5) years ago, on July 5, 1967, which is an undeniable and undisputed fact. Precisely, for pursuant to Article 2231 of our Civil Code, except when the defendant has acted with "gross
this reason, defendant's characterization as exorbitant of the aggregate award of over negligence," and that there is no specific finding that it had so acted. It is obvious, however,
P700,000 by way of damages, apart from attorney's fees in the sum of P75,000, is untenable. that in off-loading plaintiff at Wake Island, under the circumstances heretofore adverted to,
Indeed, said award is now barely equivalent to around 100,000 U. S. dollars. defendant's agents had acted with malice aforethought and evident bad faith. If "gross
negligence" warrants the award of exemplary damages, with more reason is its imposition
It further support of its contention, defendant cites the damages awarded in previous cases justified when the act performed is deliberate, malicious and tainted with bad faith. Thus,
to passengers of airlines,8 as well as in several criminal cases, and some cases for libel and in Lopez v. PANAM, 11 We held:
slander. None of these cases is, however, in point. Said cases against airlines referred to
passengers who were merely constrained to take a tourist class accommodation, despite the The rationale behind exemplary or corrective damages is, as the name
fact that they had first class tickets, and that although, in one of such cases, there was proof implies, to provide an example or correction for public good. Defendant
that the airline involved had acted as it did to give preference to a "white" passenger, this having breached its contracts in bad faith, the court, as stated earlier,
motive was not disclosed until the trial in court. In the case at bar, plaintiff Rafael Zulueta was may award exemplary damages in addition to moral damages (Articles
"off-loaded" at Wake Island, for having dared to retort to defendant's agent in a tone and 2229, 2232, New Civil Code.)
manner matching, if not befitting his intemperate language and arrogant attitude. As a
consequence, Capt. Zentner's attempt to humiliate Rafael Zulueta had boomeranged against Similarly, in NWA v. Cuenca, 12 this Court declared that an award for exemplary damages was
him (Zentner), in the presence of the other passengers and the crew. It was, also, in their justified by the fact that the airline's "agent had acted in a wanton, reckless and oppressive
presence that defendant's agent had referred to the plaintiffs as "monkeys," a racial insult manner" in compelling Cuenca, upon arrival at Okinawa, to transfer, over his objection, from
not made openly and publicly in the abovementioned previous cases against airlines. the first class, where he was accommodated from Manila to Okinawa, to the tourist class, in
his trip to Japan, "under threat of otherwise leaving him in Okinawa," despite the fact that he
In other words, Mr. Zulueta was off-loaded, not to protect the safety of the aircraft and its had paid in full the first class fare and was issued in Manila a first class ticket.
passengers, but to retaliate and  punish him for the embarrassment and loss of face thus
suffered by defendant's agent. This vindictive motive is made more manifest by the note Defendant cites Rotea v. Halili, 13 in support of the proposition that a principal is not liable for
delivered to Mr. Zulueta by defendant's airport manager at Wake Island, Mr. Sitton, stating exemplary damages owing to acts of his agent unless the former has participated in said acts
that the former's stay therein would be "for a minimum of one week," during which he would or ratified the same. Said case involved, however, the subsidiary civil liability of an employer
be charged $13.30 per day. This reference to a "minimum of one week" revealed the arising from criminal acts of his employee, and "exemplary damages ... may be imposed
intention to keep him there stranded that long, for no other plane, headed for Manila, was when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances." 14Accordingly,
expected within said period of time, although Mr. Zulueta managed to board, days later, a the Rotea case is not in point, for the case at bar involves a breach of contract, as well as
plane that brought him to Hawaii, whence he flew back to the Philippines, via Japan. a quasi-delict.

Neither may criminal cases, nor the cases for libel and slander cited in the defendant's Neither may the case of Palisoc v. Brillantes, 15 invoked by the defendant, be equated with
motion for reconsideration, be equated with the present case. Indeed, in ordinary criminal the case at bar. The Palisoc case dealt with the liability of school officials for damages arising
cases, the award for damages is, in actual practice, of purely academic value, for the convicts from the death of a student (Palisoc) due to fist blows given by another student (Daffon), in
generally belong to the poorest class of society. There is, moreover, a fundamental difference the course of a quarrel between them, while in a laboratory room of the Manila Technical
between said cases and the one at bar. The Zuluetas had a contract of carriage with the Institute. In an action for damages, the head thereof and the teacher in charge of said
defendant, as a common carrier, pursuant to which the latter was bound, for a substantial laboratory were held jointly and severally liable with the student who caused said death, for
monetary considerationpaid by the former, not merely to transport them to Manila, but, also, failure of the school to provide "adequate supervision over the activities of the students in
to do so with "extraordinary diligence" or "utmost diligence."9 The responsibility of the the school premises," to protect them "from harm, whether at the hands of fellow students
common carrier, under said contract, as regards the passenger's safety, is of such a nature, or other parties." Such liability was predicated upon Article 2180 of our Civil Code, the
affecting as it does public interest, that it "cannot be dispensed with" or even "lessened by pertinent part of which reads:
stipulation, by the posting of notices, by statements on tickets, or otherwise." 10 In the
present case, the defendant did not only fail to comply with its obligation to transport Mr.
ART. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not
Zulueta to Manila, but, also, acted in a manner calculated to humiliate him, to chastise him,
only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for
to make him suffer, to cause to him the greatest possible inconvenience, by leaving him in a
whom one is responsible.
desolate island, in the expectation that he would be stranded there for a "minimum of one
week" and, in addition thereto, charged therefor $13.30 a day.
xxx xxx xxx
 Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be Island, the absolute refusal of defendant's manager in Manila to take any step whatsoever to
liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, so alleviate Mr. Zulueta's predicament at Wake and have him brought to Manila — which, under
long as they remain in their custody. their contract of carriage, was defendant's obligation to discharge with "extra-ordinary" or
"utmost" diligence — and, the "racial" factor that had, likewise, tainted the decision of
xxx xxx xxx defendant's agent, Capt. Zentner, to off-load him at Wake Island.

Obviously, the amount of damages warded in the Palisoc case is not and cannot serve as the As regards the evidence necessary to justify the sum of P75,000 awarded as attorney's fees in
measure of the damages recoverable in the present case, the latter having been this case, suffice it to say that the quantity and quality of the services rendered by plaintiffs'
caused directly and intentionally by an employee or agent of the defendant, whereas the counsel appearing on record, apart from the nature of the case and the amount involved
student who killed the young Palisoc was in no wise an agent of the school. Moreover, upon therein, as well as his prestige as one of the most distinguished members of the legal
her arrival in the Philippines, Mrs. Zulueta reported her husband's predicament to profession in the Philippines, of which judicial cognizance may be taken, amply justify said
defendant's local manager and asked him to forthwith have him (Mr. Zulueta) brought to award, which is a little over 10% of the damages (P700,000) collectible by plaintiffs herein.
Manila, which defendant's aforementioned manager refused to do, thereby impliedly Indeed, the attorney's fees in this case is proportionally much less than that adjudged
ratifying the off-loading of Mr. Zulueta at Wake Island. in Lopez v. PANAM 16 in which the judgment rendered for attorney's fees (P50,000) was
almost 20% of the damages (P275,000) recovered by the plaintiffs therein.
It is next urged that, under the contract of carriage with the defendant, Mr. Zulueta was
bound to be present at the time scheduled for the departure of defendant's plane and that The defense assails the last part of the decision sought to be reconsidered, in which —
he had, consequently, violated said contract when he did not show up at such time. This relying upon Article 172 of our Civil Code, which provides that "(t)he wife cannot bind the
argument might have had some weight had defendant's plane taken off beforeMr. Zulueta conjugal partnership without the husband's consent, except in cases provided by law," and it
had shown up. But the fact is that he was ready, willing and able to board the plane about is not claimed that this is one of such cases — We denied a motion, filed by Mrs. Zulueta, for
two hours before it actually took off, and that he was deliberately and maliciously off-loaded the dismissal of this case, insofar as she is concerned - she having settled all her differences
on account of his altercation with Capt. Zentner. It should, also, be noted that, although Mr. with the defendant, which appears to have paid her the sum of P50,000 therefor - "without
Zulueta was delayed some 20 to 30 minutes, the arrival or departure of planes is often prejudice to this sum being deducted from the award made in said decision." Defendant now
delayed for much longer periods of time. Followed to its logical conclusion, the argument alleges that this is tantamount to holding that said compromise agreement is both effective
adduced by the defense suggests that airlines should be held liable for damages due to the and ineffective.
inconvenience and anxiety, aside from actual damages, suffered by many passengers either
in their haste to arrive at the airport on scheduled time just to find that their plane will not This, of course, is not true. The payment is effective, insofar as it is deductible from the
take off until later, or by reason of the late arrival of the aircraft at its destination. award, and, because it is due (or part of the amount due) from the defendant, with or
without its compromise agreement with Mrs. Zulueta. What is ineffective is the
PANAM impugns the award of attorney's fees upon the ground that no penalty should be compromise agreement, insofar as the conjugal partnership is concerned. Mrs. Zulueta's
imposed upon the right to litigate; that, by law, it may be awarded only in exceptional cases; motion was for the dismissal of the case insofar as she was concerned, and the defense cited
that the claim for attorney's fees has not been proven; and that said defendant was justified in support thereof Article 113 of said Code, pursuant to which "(t)he husband must be joined
in resisting plaintiff's claim "because it was patently exorbitant." in all suits by or against the wife except: ... (2) If they have in fact been separated for at least
one year." This provision, We held, however, refers to suits in which the wife is the principal
or real party in interest, not to the case at bar, "in which the husband is the main party in
Nothing, however, can be farther from the truth. Indeed apart from plaintiff's claim for actual
interest, both as the person principally aggrieved and as administrator of the conjugal
damages, the amount of which is not contested, plaintiffs did not ask any specific sum by way
partnership ... he having acted in this capacity in entering into the contract of carriage with
of exemplary and moral damages, as well as attorney's fees, and left the amount thereof to
PANAM and paid the amount due to the latter, under the contract, with funds of the conjugal
the "sound discretion" of the lower court. This, precisely, is the reason why PANAM, now,
partnership," to which the amounts recoverable for breach of said contract, accordingly,
alleges — without justification that the lower court had no jurisdiction over the subject
belong. The damages suffered by Mrs. Zulueta were mainly an in accident of the humiliation
matter of the present case.
to which her husband had been subjected. The Court ordered that said sum of P50,00 paid by
PANAM to Mrs. Zulueta be deducted from the aggregate award in favor of the plaintiffs
Moreover, Article 2208 of our Civil Code expressly authorizes the award of attorney's fees herein for the simple reason that upon liquidation of the conjugal partnership, as provided by
"when exemplary damages are awarded," — as they are in this case —as well as "in any law, said amount would have to be reckoned with, either as part of her share in the
other case where the court deems it just and equitable that attorney's fees ... be recovered," partnership, or as part of the support which might have been or may be due to her as wife of
and We so deem it just and equitable in the present case, considering the "exceptional" Rafael Zulueta. It would surely be inane to sentence the defendant to pay the P700,000 due
circumstances obtaining therein, particularly the bad faith with which defendant's agent had to the plaintiffs and to direct Mrs. Zulueta to return said P50,000 to the defendant.
acted, the place where and the conditions under which Rafael Zulueta was left at Wake
In this connection, it is noteworthy that, for obvious reasons of public policy, she is not Considering that the damages in question have arisen from, inter alia, a breach of plaintiffs'
allowed by law to waive her share in the conjugal partnership, before the dissolution contract of carriage with the defendant, for which plaintiffs paid their fare with funds
thereof. 17 She cannot even acquire any property by gratuitous title, without the husband's presumably belonging to the conjugal partnership, We hold that said damages fall under
consent, except from her ascendants, descendants, parents-in-law, and collateral relatives paragraph (1) of said Article 153, the right thereto having been "acquired by onerous title
within the fourth degree. 18 during the marriage ... ." This conclusion is bolstered up by Article 148 of our Civil Code,
according to which:
It is true that the law favors and encourages the settlement of litigations by compromise
agreement between the contending parties, but, it certainly does not favor a settlement ART. 148. The following shall be the exclusive property of each spouse:
with one of the spouses, both of whom are plaintiffs or defendants in a common cause, such
as the defense of the rights of the conjugal partnership, when the effect, even if indirect, of (1) That which is brought to the marriage as his or her own;
the compromise is to jeopardize "the solidarity of the family" — which the 
law 19 seeks to protect — by creating an additional cause for the misunderstanding that had
(2) That which each acquires, during the marriage, by lucrative title;
arisen between such spouses during the litigation, and thus rendering more difficult a
reconciliation between them.
(3) That which is acquired by right of redemption or by exchange with
other property belonging to only one of the spouses;
It is urged that there is no proof as to the purpose of the trip of the plaintiffs, that neither is
there any evidence that the money used to pay the plane tickets came from the conjugal
funds and that the award to Mrs. Zulueta was for her personal suffering or injuries. There (4) That which is purchased with exclusive money of the wife or of the
was, however, no individual or specific award in favor of Mrs. Zulueta or any of the plaintiffs. husband.
The award was made in their favor collectively. Again, in the absence of said proof, the
presumption is that the purpose of the trip was for the common benefit of the plaintiffs and The damages involved in the case at bar do not come under any of these provisions or of the
that the money had come from the conjugal funds, for, unless there is proof to the contrary, other provisions forming part of Chapter 3, Title VI, of Book I of the Civil Code, which chapter
it is presumed "(t)hat things have happened according to the ordinary course of nature and is entitled "Paraphernal Property." What is more, if "(t)hat which is acquired by right of
the ordinary habits of life." 20 In fact Manresa maintains 21 that they are deemed conjugal, redemption or by exchange with other property belonging to only one of the spouses," and
when the source of the money used therefor is not established, even if the purchase had "(t)hat which is purchased with exclusive money of the wife or of the husband," 24 belong
been made by the wife. 22 And this is the rule obtaining in the Philippines. Even property exclusively to such wife or husband, it follows necessarily that that which is acquired with
registered, under the Torrens system, in the name of one of the spouses, or in that of the money of the conjugal partnership belongs thereto or forms part thereof. The rulings
wife only, if acquired during the marriage, is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, in Maramba v. Lozano 25 and Perez v. Lantin, 26 cited in defendant's motion for
unless there is competent proof to the contrary. 23 reconsideration, are, in effect, adverse thereto. In both cases, it was merely held that the
presumption under Article 160 of our Civil Code — to the effect that all property of the
PANAM maintains that the damages involved in the case at bar are not among those forming marriage belong to the conjugal partnership — does not apply unless it is shown that it was
part of the conjugal partnership pursuant to Article 153 of the Civil Code, reading: acquired during marriage. In the present case, the contract of carriage was concededly
entered into, and the damages claimed by the plaintiffs were incurred, during marriage.
Hence, the rights accruing from said contract, including those resulting from breach thereof
ART. 153. The following are conjugal partnership property:
by the defendant, are presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership of Mr. and Mrs.
Zulueta. The fact that such breach of contract was coupled, also, with a quasi-delict
(1) That which is acquired by onerous title during the marriage at the constitutes an aggravating circumstance and can not possibly have the effect of depriving the
expense of the common fund, whether the acquisition be for the conjugal partnership of such property rights.
partnership, or for only one of the spouses;
Defendant insists that the use of conjugal funds to redeem property does not make the
(2) That which is obtained by the industry, or work, or as salary of the property redeemed conjugal if the right of redemption pertained to the wife. In the absence,
spouses, or of either of them; however, of proof that such right of redemption pertains to the wife — and there is no proof
that the contract of carriage with PANAM or the money paid therefor belongs to Mrs. Zulueta
(3) The fruits, rents or interests received or due during the marriage, — the property involved, or the rights arising therefrom, must be presumed, therefore, to
coming from the common property or from the exclusive property of form part of the conjugal partnership.
each spouse.
It is true that in Lilius v. Manila Railroad Co., 27 it was held that the "patrimonial and moral Again, Colin y Capitant, as well as the Lilius case, refer to damages recovered
damages" awarded to a young and beautiful woman by reason of a scar — in consequence of for physical injuries suffered by the wife. In the case at bar, the party mainly injured,
an injury resulting from an automobile accident — which disfigured her face and fractured although not physically, is the husband.
her left leg, as well as caused a permanent deformity, are her paraphernal property.
Defendant cites, also, in support of its contention the following passage from Colin y Accordingly, the other Philippine cases 33 and those from Louisiana — whose civil law is based
Capitant: upon the French Civil Code — cited by the defendant, which similarly refer to moral damages
due to physical injuries suffered by the wife, are, likewise, inapplicable to the case at bar.
No esta resuelta expresamente en la legislacion española la cuestion de si
las indemnizaciones debidas por accidentes del trabaho tienen la We find, therefore, no plausible reason to disturb the views expressed in Our decision
consideracion de gananciales, o son bienes particulares de los conyuges. promulgated on February 29, 1972.

Inclinan a la solucion de que estas indemnizaciones deben ser WHEREFORE, the motions for reconsideration above-referred to should be, as they are
consideradas como gananciales, el hecho de que la sociedad pierde la hereby denied.
capacidad de trabajocon el accidente, que a ella le pertenece, puesto que
de la sociedad son losfrutos de ese trabajo; en cambio, la consideracion
Makalintal, Zaldivar, Fernando, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra, JJ., concur.
de que igual manera que losbienes que sustituyen a los que cada conyuge
lleva al matrimonio como propiostienen el caracter de propios, hace
pensar que las indemnizaciones que vengana suplir la capacidad de Castro and Teehankee, JJ., took no part.
trabajo aportada por cada conyuge a la sociedad, debenser juridicamente
reputadas como bienes propios del conyuge que haya sufrido elaccidente. Barredo, J., voted to modify the judgment by reducing the amount of the awarded damages
Asi se llega a la misma solucion aportada por la jurisprudencia and individualizing the same, and now reserves the filing of a separate concurring and
francesca. 28 dissenting opinion in support of his vote.

This opinion is, however, undecisive, to say the least. It should be noted that Colin y Capitant
were commenting on the French Civil Code; that their comment referred to indemnities due
in consequence of "accidentes del trabajo "resulting in  physical injuries sustained by one of
the spouses (which Mrs. Zulueta has not suffered); and that said commentators admit that
the question whether or not said damages are paraphernal property or belong to the
conjugal partnership is not settled under the Spanish law. 29 Besides, the French law and
jurisprudence — to which the comments of Planiol and Ripert, likewise, refer —
are inapposite to the question under consideration, because they differ basically from the
Spanish law in the treatment of the property relations between husband and wife. Indeed,
our Civil Code, like the Spanish Civil Code, favors the system of conjugal partnership of gains.
Accordingly, the former provides that, "(i)n the absence of marriage settlements, or when the
same are void, the system of relative community or conjugal partnership of gains ... shall
govern the property relations between" the spouses. 30Hence, "(a)ll property of the marriage
is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains
exclusively to the husband or to the wife." 31

No similar rules are found in the French Civil Code. What is more, under the provisions
thereof, the conjugal partnership exists only when so stipulated in the "capitulaciones
matrimoniales" or by way of exception. In the language of Manresa —

Prescindimos de los preceptos de los Condigos de Francia, Italia, Holanda,

Portugal, Alemania y Suiza, porsue solo excepcionalmente, o cuando asi
se pacta en las capitulaciones, admiten el sistema de gananciales. 32
ARTICLE 118 lot and the bungalow erected thereon, as well as the beneficial and equitable title thereto,
were acquired by their parents during the existence of the first marriage under their lease
and conditional sale agreement with Philamlife of September 2, 1955.
G.R. No. 100728 June 18, 1992

On December 28, 1989, the court a quo rendered judgment 3 with the following dispositions:
WILHELMINA JOVELLANOS, MERCY JOVELLANOS-MARTINEZ and JOSE HERMILO
JOVELLANOS, petitioners, 
vs. WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as
THE COURT OF APPEALS, and ANNETTE H. JOVELLANOS, for and in her behalf, and in follows
representation of her two minor daughters as natural guardian, ANA MARIA and MA.
JENNETTE, both surnamed JOVELLANOS, respondents. 1. Ordering the liquidation of the partnership of the second marriage and
directing the reimbursement of the amount advanced by the partnership
of the first marriage as well (as) by the late Daniel Jovellanos and the
defendants spouses Gil and Mercia * J. Martinez in the acquisition of the
lot and bungalow described in the Lease and Conditional Sale Agreement
REGALADO, J.: (Exhs. D and 1);

This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse and set aside the 2. After such liquidation and reimbursement, declaring the plaintiff
decision 1 promulgated by respondent court on June 26, 1991 in CA-G.R. CV No. 27556 Annette Jovellanos as pro-indiviso owner of 1/2 of the property described
affirming with some modifications the earlier decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon in TCT No. 212268 (sic) and the bungalow erected therein;
City, Branch 85, which, inter alia, awarded one-half (1/2) of the property subject of Civil Case
No. Q-52058 therein to private respondent Annette H. Jovellanos and one-sixth (1/6) each of
the other half of said property to the three private respondents. all as  pro indiviso owners of 3. Declaring the plaintiff Annette Jovellanos, as well as the minors Anna
their aforesaid respective portions. Marie and Ma. Jeannette (sic) both surnamed Jovellanos and the herein
defendants, as owners pro indiviso of 1/6 each of the other half of said
property;
As found by respondent court, 2 on September 2, 1955, Daniel Jovellanos and Philippine
American Life Insurance Company (Philamlife) entered into a contract denominated as a
lease and conditional sale agreement over Lot 8, Block 3 of the latter's Quezon City 4. Declaring the defendants spouses Gil and Mercia Martinez as exclusive
Community Development Project, including a bungalow thereon, located at and known as owners of the two-storey house erected on the property at the back of
No. 55 South Maya Drive, Philamlife Homes, Quezon City. At that time, Daniel Jovellanos was the said bungalow, with all the rights vested in them as builders in good
married to Leonor Dizon, with whom he had three children, the petitioners herein. Leonor faith under Article 448 of the New Civil Code;
Dizon died on January 2, 1959. On May 30, 1967, Daniel married private respondent Annette
H. Jovellanos with whom he begot two children, her herein co-respondents. 5. Ordering the parties to make a partition among themselves by proper
instruments of conveyances, subject to the confirmation of this Court,
On December 18, 1971, petitioner Mercy Jovellanos married Gil Martinez and, at the behest and if they are unable to agree upon the partition, ordering that the
of Daniel Jovellanos, they built a house on the back portion of the premises. On January 8, partition should be made by not more than three (3) competent and
1975, with the lease amounts having been paid, Philamlife executed to Daniel Jovellanos a disinterested persons as commissioners who shall make the partition in
deed of absolute sale and, on the next day, the latter donated to herein petitioners all his accordance with Sec. 5, Rule 69 of the Revised Rules of Court;
rights, title and interests over the lot and bungalow thereon. On September 8, 1985, Daniel
Jovellanos died and his death spawned the present controversy, resulting in the filing by 6. Ordering the defendant(s) to pay plaintiffs, jointly and severally, the
private respondents of Civil Case No. Q-52058 in the court below. sum of P5,000.00 as attorney's fees, plus costs.

Private respondent Annette H. Jovellanos claimed in the lower court that the aforestated SO ORDERED. 4
property was acquired by her deceased husband while their marriage was still subsisting, by
virtue of the deed of absolute sale dated January 8, 1975 executed by Philamlife in favor of Respondent Court of Appeals, in its challenged decision, held that the lease and conditional
her husband, Daniel Jovellanos. who was issued Transfer Certificate of Title No. 212286 of sale agreement executed by and between Daniel Jovellanos and Philamlife is a lease contract
the Register of Deeds of Quezon City and which forms part of the conjugal partnership of the and, in support of its conclusion, reproduced as its own the following findings of the trial
second marriage. Petitioners, on the other hand, contend that the property, specifically the court:
 It is therefore incumbent upon the vendee to comply with all his It is petitioners' position that the Family Code should not be applied in determining the
obligations, i.e., the payment of the stipulated rentals and adherence to successional rights of the party litigants to the estate of Daniel Jovellanos. for to do so would
the limitations set forth in the contract before the legal title over the be to impair their vested property rights over the property in litigation which they have
property is conveyed to the lessee-vendee. This, in effect. is a pactum acquired long before the Family Code took effect. 7
reservati dominii which is common in sales on installment plan of real
estate whereby ownership is retained by the vendor and payment of the To arrive at the applicable law, it would accordingly be best to look into the nature of the
agreed price being a condition precedent before full ownership could be contract entered into by the contracting parties. As appositely observed by respondent court,
transferred (Wells vs. Samonte, 38768-R, March 23, 1973; Perez vs. the so-called lease agreement is, therefore, very much in issue. Preliminarily, we do not lose
Erlanger and Galinger Inc., CA 54 OG 6088). The dominion or full sight of the basic rule that a contract which is not contrary to law, morals, good customs,
ownership of the subject property was only transferred to Daniel public order or public policy has the force of law between the contracting parties and should
Jovellanos upon full payment of the stipulated price giving rise to the be complied with in good faith. 8 Its provisions are binding not only upon them but also upon
execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale on January 8, 1975 (Exh. 2) when their heirs and assigns. 9
the marriage between the plaintiff and Daniel Jovellanos was already in
existence.
The contract entered into by the late Daniel Jovellanos and Philamlife is specifically
denominated as a "Lease and Conditional Sale Agreement" over the property involved with a
The contention of the defendants that the jus in re aliena or right in the lease period of twenty years at a monthly rental of P288.87, by virtue of which the former, as
property of another person (Gabuya vs. Cruz, 38 SCRA 98) or beneficial lessee-vendee, had only the right of possession over the property. 10 In a lease agreement,
use and enjoyment of the property or the equitable title has long been the lessor transfers merely the temporary use and enjoyment of the thing leased. 11 In fact,
vested in the vendee-lessee Daniel Jovellanos upon execution of Exh. "1" Daniel Jovellanos bound himself therein, among other things, to use the property solely as a
is true, But the instant case should be differentiated from the cited cases residence, take care thereof like a good father of a family, permit inspection thereof by
of Pugeda v. Trias, et al., 4 SCRA 849; and Alvarez vs. Espiritu, G.R. L- representatives of Philamlife in regard to the use and preservation of the property. 12
18833, August 14, 1965, which cannot be applied herein even by analogy.
In Pugeda. the subject property refers solely to friar lands and is
It is specifically provided, however, that "(i)f, at the expiration of the lease period herein
governed by Act 1120 wherein the certificate of sale is considered a
agreed upon, the LESSEE-VENDEE shall have fully faithfully complied with all his obligations
conveyance of ownership subject only to the resolutory condition that
herein stipulated, the LESSOR-VENDOR shall immediately sell, transfer and convey to the
the sale may be rescinded if the agreed price has not been paid in full; in
LESSEE-VENDEE the property which is the subject matter of this agreement; . . . 13
the case at bar, however, payment of the stipulated price is a condition
precedent before ownership could be transferred to the vendee. 5
The conditional sale agreement in said contract is, therefore, also in the nature of a contract
to sell, as contrdistinguished from a contract of sale. In a contract to sell or a conditional sale,
With the modification that private respondents should also reimburse to petitioners their
ownership is not transferred upon delivery of the property but upon full payment of the
proportionate shares on the proven hospitalization and burial expenses of the late Daniel
purchase price. 14Generally, ownership is transferred upon delivery, but even if delivered,
Jovellanos, respondent Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court. applying
the ownership may still be with the seller until full payment of the price is made, if there is
Article 118 of the Family Code which provides:
stipulation to this effect. The stipulation is usually known as a pactum reservati dominii, or
contractual reservation of title, and is common in sales on the installment
Art. 118. Property bought on installment paid partly from exclusive funds plan. 15 Compliance with the stipulated payments is a suspensive condition. 16 the failure of
of either or both spouses and partly from conjugal funds belongs to the which prevents the obligation of the vendor to convey title from acquiring binding force. 17
buyer or buyers if full ownership was vested before the marriage and to
the conjugal partnership if such ownership was vested during the
Hornbook lore from civilists clearly lays down the distinctions between a contract of sale in
marriage. In either case, any amount advanced by the partnership or by
which the title passes to the buyer upon delivery of the thing sold, and a contract to sell
either or both spouses shall be reimbursed by the owner or owners upon
where, by agreement, the ownership is reserved in the seller and is not to pass until full
liquidation of the partnership.
payment of the purchase price: In the former, non-payment of the price is a negative
resolutory condition; in the latter, full payment is a positive suspensive condition. In the
Petitioners now seek this review, invoking their assignment of errors raised before the former, the vendor loses and cannot recover the ownership of the thing sold until and unless
respondent court and which may be capsulized into two contentions, namely, that (1) the the contract of sale is rescinded or set aside; in the latter, the title remains in the vendor if
lower court erred in holding that the lot and bungalow covered by the lease and conditional the vendee does not comply with the condition precedent of making full payment as
sale agreement (Exhibit 1) is conjugal property of the second marriage of the late Daniel specified in the contract.
Jovellanos: and (2) the lower court erred in holding that the provisions of the Family Code are
applicable in resolving the rights of the parties herein. 6
Accordingly, viewed either as a lease contract or a contract to sell, or as a contractual The right of Daniel Jovellanos to the property under the contract with Philamlife was merely
amalgam with facets of both, what was vested by the aforestated contract in petitioners' an inchoate and expectant right which would ripen into a vested right only upon his
predecessor in interest was merely the beneficial title to the property in question. His acquisition of ownership which, as aforestated, was contingent upon his full payment of the
monthly payments were made in the concept of rentals, but with the agreement that if he rentals and compliance with all his contractual obligations thereunder. A vested right as an
faithfully complied with all the stipulations in the contract the same would in effect be immediate fixed right of present and future enjoyment. It is to be distinguished from a right
considered as amortization payments to be applied to the predetermined price of the said that is expectant or contingent. 20 It is a right which is fixed, unalterable, absolute, complete
property. He consequently acquired ownership thereof only upon full payment of the said and unconditional to the exercise of which no obstacle exists, 21 and which is perfect in itself
amount hence, although he had been in possession of the premises since September 2, 1955, and not dependent upon a contingency. 22 Thus, for a property right to be vested, there
it was only on January 8, 1975 that Philamlife executed the deed of absolute sale thereof in must be a transition from the potential or contingent to the actual, and the proprietary
his favor. interest must have attached to a thing; it must have become fixed or established and is no
longer open to doubt or controversy. 23
The conditions of the aforesaid agreement also bear notice, considering the stipulations
therein that Daniel Jovellanos, as lessee-vendee, shall not — The trial court which was upheld by respondent court, correctly ruled that the cases cited by
petitioners are inapplicable to the case at bar since said cases involved friar lands which are
xxx xxx xxx governed by a special law, Act 1120, which was specifically enacted for the purpose. In the
sale of friar lands, upon execution of the contract to sell, a certificate of sale is delivered to
the vendee and such act is considered as a conveyance of ownership, subject only to the
(b) Sublease said property to a third party;
resolutory condition that the sale may be rescinded if the agreed price shall not be paid in
full. In the instant case, no certificate of sale was delivered and full payment of the rentals
(c) Engage in business or practice any profession within the property; was a condition precedent before ownership could be transferred to the vendee. 24

xxx xxx xxx We have earlier underscored that the deed of absolute sale was executed in 1975 by
Philamlife, pursuant to the basic contract between the parties, only after full payment of the
(f) Make any alteration or improvement on the property without the prior rentals. Upon the execution of said deed of absolute sale, full ownership was vested in Daniel
written consent of the LESSOR-VENDOR; Jovellanos. Since. as early as 1967, he was already married to Annette H. Jovellanos, this
property necessarily belonged to his conjugal partnership with his said second wife.
(g) Cut down, damage, or remove any tree or shrub, or remove or quarry
any stone, rock or earth within the property, without the prior written As found by the trial court, the parties stipulated during the pre-trial conference in the case
consent of the LESSOR-VENDOR; below that the rentals/installments under the lease and conditional sale agreement were
paid as follows (a) from September 2, 1955 to January 2, 1959, by conjugal funds of the first
(h) Assign to another his right, title and interest under and by virtue of marriage; (b) from January 3, 1959 to May 29, 1967, by capital of Daniel Jovellanos; (c) from
this Agreement, without the prior written consent and approval of the May 30, 1967 to 1971, by conjugal funds of the second marriage; and (d) from 1972 to
LESSOR-VENDOR. 18 January 8, 1975, by conjugal funds of the spouses Gil and Mercy Jovellanos
Martinez. 25 Both courts, therefore, ordered that reimbursements should be made in line
with the pertinent provision of Article 118 of the Family Code that "any amount advanced by
The above restrictions further bolster the conclusion that Daniel Jovellanos did not enjoy the the partnership or by either or both spouses shall be reimbursed by the owner or owners
full attributes of ownership until the execution of the deed of sale in his favor. The law upon liquidation of the partnership."
recognizes in the owner the right to enjoy and dispose of a thing, without other limitations
than those established by law, 19and, under the contract, Daniel Jovellanos evidently did not
possess or enjoy such rights of ownership. ACCORDINGLY, finding no reversible error in the judgment of respondent court, the same is
hereby AFFIRMED.

We find no legal impediment to the application in this case of the rule of retroactivity
provided in the Family Code to the effect that —

Art. 256. This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not
prejudice or impair vested or acquired nights in accordance with the Civil
Code or other laws.
ARTICLE 121 – 125 However, pursuant to a Special Power of Attorney7 signed by Onesiforo in favor of Victor,
dated March 10, 1989, the latter was able to redeem, on the same date, Lot 896-B-9-B from
the SSS for the sum of P111,110.09. On June 19, 1989, a Certificate of Redemption 8 was
G.R. No. 158040             April 14, 2008 issued by the SSS.

SPOUSES ONESIFORO and ROSARIO ALINAS, petitioner,  Onesiforo's signature also appears in an Absolute Deed of Sale9 likewise dated March 10,
vs. 1989, selling Lot 896-B-9-B to respondent spouses. The records also show a notarized
SPOUSES VICTOR and ELENA ALINAS, respondents. document dated March 10, 1989 and captioned Agreement10 whereby petitioner Onesiforo
acknowledged that his brother Victor used his own money to redeem Lot 896-B-9-B from the
DECISION SSS and, thus, Victor became the owner of said lot. In the same Agreeement, petitioner
Onesiforo waived whatever rights, claims, and interests he or his heirs, successors and
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.: assigns have or may have over the subject property. On March 15, 1993, by virtue of said
documents, TCT No. 1739411 covering Lot 896-B-9-B was issued in the name of respondent
spouses.
This resolves the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
praying that the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated September 25, 2002, and the CA
Resolution2 dated March 31, 2003, denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration, be On June 25, 1993, petitioners filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Ozamis City a
reversed and set aside. complaint for recovery of possession and ownership of their conjugal properties with
damages against respondent spouses.
The factual antecedents of the case are as follows.
After trial, the RTC rendered its Decision dated November 13, 1995, finding that:
Spouses Onesiforo and Rosario Alinas (petitioners) separated sometime in 1982, with Rosario
moving to Pagadian City and Onesiforo moving to Manila. They left behind two lots identified 1. Plaintiffs have not proven that they entrusted defendant spouses with the care
as Lot 896-B-9-A with a bodega standing on it and Lot 896-B-9-B with petitioners' house. and administration of their properties. It was Valeria Alinas, their mother, whom
These two lots are the subject of the present petition. plaintiff Onesiforo requested/directed to "take care of everything and sell
everything" and Teresita Nuñez, his elder sister, to whom he left a "verbal"
authority to administer his properties.
Petitioner Onesiforo Alinas (Onesiforo) and respondent Victor Alinas (Victor) are brothers.
Petitioners allege that they entrusted their properties to Victor and Elena Alinas (respondent
spouses) with the agreement that any income from rentals of the properties should be 2. Plaintiffs have not proven their allegation that defendant spouses agreed to pay
remitted to the Social Security System (SSS) and to the Rural Bank of Oroquieta City (RBO), as rent of P1,500.00 a month for the occupancy of plaintiffs' house, which rent was to
such rentals were believed sufficient to pay off petitioners' loans with said institutions. Lot be remitted to the SSS and Rural Bank of Oroquieta to pay off plaintiffs' loan and to
896-B-9-A with the bodega was mortgaged as security for the loan obtained from the RBO, keep for plaintiffs the rest of the rent after the loans would have been paid in full.
while Lot 896-B-9-B with the house was mortgaged to the SSS. Onesiforo alleges that he left
blank papers with his signature on them to facilitate the administration of said properties. 3. Plaintiff Onesiforo's allegation that defendants concocted deeds of conveyances
(Exh. "M", "N" & "O") with the use of his signatures in blank is not worthy of
Sometime in 1993, petitioners discovered that their two lots were already titled in the name credence. Why his family would conspire to rob him at a time when life had struck
of respondent spouses. him with a cruel blow in the form of a failed marriage that sent him plummeting to
the depths of despair is not explained and likewise defies comprehension. That his
signatures appear exactly on the spot where they ought to be in Exhs. "M", "N" &
Records show that after Lot 896-B-9-A was extra-judicially foreclosed, Transfer Certificate of
"O" belies his pretension that he affixed them on blank paper only for the purpose
Title (TCT) No. T-118533 covering said property was issued in the name of mortgagee RBO on
of facilitating his sister Terry's acts of administration.
November 13, 1987. On May 2, 1988, the duly authorized representative of RBO executed a
Deed of Installment Sale of Bank's Acquired Assets 4conveying Lot 896-B-9-A to respondent
spouses. RBO's TCT over Lot 896-B-9-A was then cancelled and on February 22, 1989, TCT No. This Court, therefore, does not find that defendant spouses had schemed to obtain
T-126645 covering said lot was issued in the name of respondent spouses. title to plaintiffs' properties or enriched themselves at the expense of plaintiffs.12

Lot 896-B-9-B was also foreclosed by the SSS and on November 17, 1986, the Ex-Oficio City with the following dispositive portion:
Sheriff of Ozamis City issued a Certificate of Sale6 over said property in favor of the SSS.
 WHEREFORE, this Court renders judgment: 3. ordering [petitioners] Rosario Alinas to reimburse [respondents] the
redemption amount of P55,550.00 with interest of 12% per annum from
1. declaring [respondents] Victor Jr. and Elena Alinas owners of Lot 896-B- the time of redemption until fully paid.
9-A with the building (bodega) standing thereon and affirming the validity
of their acquisition thereof from the Rural Bank of Oroquieta, Inc.; 4. ordering the [respondents] to convey and transfer one half portion of
Lot 896-B-9-B unto Rosario Alinas, which comprises her share on the
2. declaring [petitioners] Onesiforo and Rosario Alinas owners of Lot 896- property simultaneous to the tender of the above redemption price, both
B-9-B with the house standing thereon, plaintiff Onesiforo's sale thereof to be accomplished within sixty (60) days from finality of this judgment.
to defendants spouses without the consent of his wife being null and void
and defendant spouses' redemption thereof from the SSS not having 5. in the event of failure of [respondents] to execute the acts as specified
conferred its ownership to them; above, [petitioner] Rosario Alinas may proceed against them under
Section 10, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
3. ordering [petitioners] to reimburse [respondents] Victor Jr. and Elena
Alinas the redemption sum of P111,100.09, paid by them to the SSS 6. on the other hand, failure of [petitioner] Rosario Alinas to reimburse
(without interest as it shall be compensated with the rental value of the the redemption price within sixty (60) days from the finality of this
house they occupy) within sixty days from the finality of this judgment; decision will render the conveyance and sale of her share by her husband
to [respondents], of full force and effect.
4. ordering [respondents] to vacate the subject house within thirty days
from receiving the reimbursement mentioned in No. 3 above; and No costs.

5. reinstating TCT No. T-7248 in the name of [petitioners] and cancelling SO ORDERED.14
TCT No. T-17394 in the name of [respondents].
Petitioners moved for reconsideration but the CA denied said motion per herein assailed
No costs. Resolution dated March 31, 2003.

SO ORDERED.13 Hence, the present petition on the following grounds:

Only respondent spouses appealed to the CA assailing the RTC's ruling that they acquired Lot The Honorable Court of Appeals abuse [sic] its discretion in disregarding the
896-B-9-B from the SSS by mere redemption and not by purchase. They likewise question the testimony of the Register of Deeds, Atty. Nerio Nuñez, who swore that the
reimbursement by petitioners of the redemption price without interest. signatures appearing on various TCTs were not his own;

On September 25, 2002, the CA promulgated herein assailed Decision, the dispositive portion The Honorable Court of Appeals manifestly abuse [sic] its discretion in declaring the
of which reads: respondents to be the owners of Lot 896-B-9-A with the building (bodega) standing
thereon when they merely redeemed the property and are therefore mere trustees
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing disquisitions, the first paragraph of the of the real owners of the property;
dispositive portion of the assailed decision is AFFIRMED and the rest MODIFIED as
follows: It was pure speculation and conjecture and surmise for the Honorable Court of
Appeals to impose an obligation to reimburse upon petitioners without ordering
1. declaring [respondents] Victor Jr. and Elena Alinas owners of Lot 896-B- respondents to account for the rentals of the properties from the time they
9-A with the building (bodega) standing thereon and affirming the validity occupied the same up to the present time and thereafter credit one against the
of their acquisition thereof from the Rural Bank of Oroquieta, Inc.; other whichever is higher.15

2. declaring Onesiforo's sale of Lot 896-B-9-B together with the house The first issue raised by petitioners deserves scant consideration. By assailing the authenticity
standing thereon to [respondents] in so far as Rosario Alinas, his wife's of the Registrar of Deeds' signature on the certificates of title, they are, in effect, questioning
share of one half thereof is concerned, of no force and effect; the validity of the certificates.
Section 48 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 provides, thus: record which shows that ownership over the lot had duly passed on to the RBO, as shown by
TCT No. T-11853 registered in its name; and subsequently, RBO sold the lot with its
Sec. 48. Certificate not subject to collateral attack. - A certificate of title shall not be improvements to respondent spouses. Needless to stress, the sale was made after the
subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled except in a redemption period had lapsed. The trial court, therefore, correctly held that respondent
direct proceeding in accordance with law. spouses acquired their title over the lot from RBO and definitely not from petitioners.

Pursuant to said provision, the Court ruled in De Pedro v. Romasan Development However, with regard to Lot 896-B-9-B (with house), the Court finds it patently erroneous for
Corporation16 that: the CA to have applied the principle of equity in sustaining the validity of the sale of
Onesiforo’s one-half share in the subject property to respondent spouses.
It has been held that a certificate of title, once registered, should not thereafter be
impugned, altered, changed, modified, enlarged or diminished except in a direct Although petitioners were married before the enactment of the Family Code on August 3,
proceeding permitted by law. x x x 1988, the sale in question occurred in 1989. Thus, their property relations are governed by
Chapter IV on Conjugal Partnership of Gains of the Family Code.
The action of the petitioners against the respondents, based on the material
allegations of the complaint, is one for recovery of possession of the subject The CA ruling completely deviated from the clear dictate of Article 124 of the Family Code
property and damages. However, such action is not a direct, but a collateral which provides:
attack of TCT No. 236044.17 (Emphasis supplied)
Art. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property
As in De Pedro, the complaint filed by herein petitioners with the RTC is also one for recovery shall belong to both spouses jointly. x x x
of possession and ownership. Verily, the present case is merely a collateral attack on TCT No.
T-17394, which is not allowed by law and jurisprudence. In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in
the administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole
With regard to the second issue, petitioners’ claim that it was the CA which declared powers of administration. These powers do not include the powers of disposition
respondent spouses owners of Lot 896-B-9-A (with bodega) is misleading. It was the RTC or encumbrance which must have the authority of the court or the written consent
which ruled that respondent spouses are the owners of Lot 896-B-9-A and, therefore, since of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent the disposition or
only the respondent spouses appealed to the CA, the issue of ownership over Lot 896-B-9-A encumbrance shall be void. x x x (Underscoring and emphasis supplied)
is not raised before the appellate court. Necessarily, the CA merely reiterated in the
dispositive portion of its decision the RTC's ruling on respondent spouses' ownership of Lot In Homeowners Savings & Loan Bank v. Dailo,19 the Court categorically stated thus:
896-B-9-A.
In Guiang v. Court of Appeals, it was held that the sale of a conjugal property
It is a basic principle that no modification of judgment or affirmative relief can be granted to requires the consent of both the husband and wife. In applying Article 124 of the
a party who did not appeal.18 Hence, not having appealed from the RTC Decision, petitioners Family Code, this Court declared that the absence of the consent of one renders
can no longer seek the reversal or modification of the trial court's ruling that respondent the entire sale null and void, including the portion of the conjugal property
spouses had acquired ownership of Lot 896-B-9-A by virtue of the sale of the lot to them by pertaining to the husband who contracted the sale. x x x
RBO.
xxxx
Furthermore, the CA did not commit any reversible error in affirming the trial court's factual
findings as the records are indeed bereft of proof to support the petitioners’ allegations that x x x By express provision of Article 124 of the Family Code, in the absence of
they left the care and administration of their properties to respondent spouses; and that (court) authority or written consent of the other spouse, any disposition or
there is an agreement between petitioners and respondent spouses regarding remittance to encumbrance of the conjugal property shall be void. 20
the SSS and the RBO of rental income from their properties. Thus, respondent spouses may
not be held responsible for the non-payment of the loan with RBO and the eventual
Thus, pursuant to Article 124 of the Family Code and jurisprudence, the sale of petitioners'
foreclosure of petitioners' Lot 896-B-9-A.
conjugal property made by petitioner Onesiforo alone is void in its entirety.

Petitioners do not assail the validity of the foreclosure of said lot but argues that respondent
It is true that in a number of cases, this Court abstained from applying the literal import of a
spouses merely redeemed the property from RBO. This is, however, belied by evidence on
particular provision of law if doing so would lead to unjust, unfair and absurd results.21
In the present case, the Court does not see how applying Article 124 of the Family Code Thus, herein petitioners should reimburse respondent spouses the redemption price plus
would lead to injustice or absurdity. It should be noted that respondent spouses were well interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of filing of the complaint, and after the
aware that Lot 896-B-9-B is a conjugal property of petitioners. They also knew that the judgment becomes final and executory, the amount due shall earn 12% interest per
disposition being made by Onesiforo is without the consent of his wife, as they knew that annum until the obligation is satisfied.
petitioners had separated, and, the sale documents do not bear the signature of petitioner
Rosario. The fact that Onesiforo had to execute two documents, namely: the Absolute Deed Petitioners pray that said redemption price and interest be offset or compensated against the
of Sale dated March 10, 1989 and a notarized Agreement likewise dated March 10, 1989, rentals for the house and bodega.
reveals that they had full knowledge of the severe infirmities of the sale. As held in Heirs of
Aguilar-Reyes v. Spouses Mijares,22 "a purchaser cannot close his eyes to facts which should
The records show that the testimonial evidence for rentals was only with regard to the
put a reasonable man on his guard and still claim he acted in good faith." 23 Such being the
bodega.25 However, the Court has affirmed the ruling of the RTC that Lot 896-B-9-A with the
case, no injustice is being foisted on respondent spouses as they risked transacting with
bodega had been validly purchased by respondent spouses from the RBO and a TCT over said
Onesiforo alone despite their knowledge that the subject property is a conjugal property.
property was issued in the name of respondent spouses on February 22, 1989. Testimonial
evidence shows that the bodega was leased out by respondent spouses only beginning
Verily, the sale of Lot 896-B-9-B to respondent spouses is entirely null and void. January of 1990 when ownership had been transferred to them. 26 Hence, any rentals earned
from the lease of said bodega rightfully belongs to respondent spouses and cannot be offset
However, in consonance with the salutary principle of non-enrichment at another’s expense, against petitioners' obligation to respondent spouses.
the Court agrees with the CA that petitioners should reimburse respondent spouses the
redemption price paid for Lot 896-B-9-B in the amount of P111,110.09 with legal interest As to rentals for Lot 896-B-9-B and the house thereon, respondent Victor testified that they
from the time of filing of the complaint. never agreed to rent the house and when they finally took over the same, it was practically
inhabitable and so they even incurred expenses to repair the house. 27 There is absolutely no
In Heirs of Aguilar-Reyes, the husband's sale of conjugal property without the consent of the proof of the rental value for the house, considering the condition it was in; as well as for the
wife was annulled but the spouses were ordered to refund the purchase price to the buyers, lot respondent spouses are occupying.
it was ruled that an interest of 12% per annumon the purchase price to be refunded is not
proper. The Court elucidated as follows: Respondent spouses, having knowledge of the flaw in their mode of acquisition, are deemed
to be possessors in bad faith under Article 526 28 of the Civil Code. However, they have a right
The trial court, however, erred in imposing 12% interest per annum on the amount to be refunded for necessary expenses on the property as provided under Article 54629 of the
due the respondents. In Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, it was held same Code. Unfortunately, there is no credible proof to support respondent spouses'
that interest on obligations not constituting a loan or forbearance of money is six allegation that they spent more than P400,000.00 to repair and make the house habitable.
percent (6%) annually. If the purchase price could be established with certainty at
the time of the filing of the complaint, the six percent (6%) interest should be Set-off or compensation is governed by Article 1279 of the Civil Code which provides, thus:
computed from the date the complaint was filed until finality of the decision. In Lui
vs. Loy,  involving a suit for reconveyance and annulment of title filed by the first
Article 1279. In order that compensation may be proper, it is necessary:
buyer against the seller and the second buyer, the Court, ruling in favor of the first
buyer and annulling the second sale, ordered the seller to refund to the second
buyer (who was not a purchaser in good faith) the purchase price of the lots. It was 1. That each one of the obligors be bound principally, and that he be at the time a
held therein that the 6% interest should be computed from the date of the filing of principal creditor of the other;
the complaint by the first buyer. After the judgment becomes final and executory
until the obligation is satisfied, the amount due shall earn interest at 12% per year, 2. That both debts consist in a sum of money, or if the things due are consumable,
the interim period being deemed equivalent to a forbearance of credit. they be of the same kind, and also of the same quality if the latter has been stated;

Accordingly, the amount of P110,000.00 due the respondent spouses which could 3. That the two debts be due;
be determined with certainty at the time of the filing of the complaint shall earn
6% interest per annum from June 4, 1986 until the finality of this decision. If the 4. That they be liquidated and demandable;
adjudged principal and the interest (or any part thereof) remain unpaid
thereafter, the interest rate shall be twelve percent (12%) per annum computed
from the time the judgment becomes final and executory until it is fully 5. That over neither of them there be any retention or controversy, commenced by
satisfied.24 third persons and communicated in due time to the debtor.
Therefore, under paragraph 4 of the foregoing provision, compensation or set-off is allowed
only if the debts of both parties against each other is already liquidated and demandable. To
liquidate means "to make the amount of indebtedness or an obligation clear and settled in
the form of money."30 In the present case, no definite amounts for rentals nor for expenses
for repairs on subject house has been determined. Thus, in the absence of evidence upon
which to base the amount of rentals, no compensation or set-off can take place between
petitioners and respondent spouses.

While the courts are empowered to set an amount as reasonable compensation to the
owners for the use of their property, this Court cannot set such amount based on mere
surmises and conjecture

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated
September 25, 2002 is MODIFIED to read as follows:

1. declaring respondent spouses Victor Jr. and Elena Alinas owners of Lot 896-B-9-A with the
building (bodega) standing thereon and affirming the validity of their acquisition thereof from
the Rural Bank of Oroquieta, Inc.;

2. declaring Onesiforo's sale of Lot 896-B-9-B together with the house standing thereon to
respondent spouses null and void ab initio;

3. ordering petitioners to jointly and severally reimburse respondent spouses the redemption
amount of P111,110.09 with interest at 6% per annum from the date of filing of the
complaint, until finality of this decision. After this decision becomes final, interest at the
rate of 12% per annum on the principal and interest (or any part thereof) shall be imposed
until full payment;

4. ordering the respondent spouses to convey and transfer Lot 896-B-9-B to petitioners and
vacate said premises within fifteen (15) days from finality of this Decision; and

5. in the event of failure of respondent spouses to execute the acts as specified above,
petitioners may proceed against them under Section 10, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.
ARTICLE 121 – 125 On July 5, 1991 while Mary Ann was outside the house and the four children were in school,
Pedro together with armed members of the Civilian Armed Forces Geographical Unit (CAFGU)
and acting in connivance with petitioners6 began transferring all their belongings from the
G.R. No. 160708               October 16, 2009 house to an apartment.

PATROCINIA RAVINA AND WILFREDO RAVINA, Petitioners,  When Mary Ann and her daughter Ingrid Villa Abrille came home, they were stopped from
vs. entering it. They waited outside the gate until evening under the rain. They sought help from
MARY ANN P. VILLA ABRILLE, for herself and in behalf of INGRID D'LYN P. VILLA ABRILLE, the Talomo Police Station, but police authorities refused to intervene, saying that it was a
INGREMARK D'WIGHT VILLA ABRILLE, INGRESOLL DIELS VILLA ABRILLE AND INGRELYN family matter. Mary Ann alleged that the incident caused stress, tension and anxiety to her
DYAN VILLA ABRILLE,Respondents. children, so much so that one flunked at school. Thus, respondents Mary Ann and her
children filed a complaint for Annulment of Sale, Specific Performance, Damages and
DECISION Attorney’s Fees with Preliminary Mandatory Injunction 7 against Pedro and herein petitioners
(the Ravinas) in the RTC of Davao City.
QUISUMBING, Acting C.J.:
During the trial, Pedro declared that the house was built with his own money. Petitioner
For review are the Decision1 dated February 21, 2002 and the Resolution2 dated October 7, Patrocinia Ravina testified that they bought the house and lot from Pedro, and that her
2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 54560. The appellate court modified the husband, petitioner Wilfredo Ravina, examined the titles when they bought the property.
Decision3 dated September 26, 1995 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Davao City, Branch
15. On September 26, 1995, the trial court ruled in favor of herein respondent Mary Ann P. Villa
Abrille as follows:
Simply stated, the facts as found by the Court of Appeals4 are as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered as follows:
Respondent Mary Ann Pasaol Villa Abrille and Pedro Villa Abrille are husband and wife. They
have four children, who are also parties to the instant case and are represented by their 1. The sale of lot 8 covered by TCT No. 26471 by defendant Pedro Abrille appearing
mother, Mary Ann. in the Deed of Sale marked as Exh. "E" is void as to one half or 277.5 square meters
representing the share of plaintiff Mary Villa Abrille.
In 1982, the spouses acquired a 555-square meter parcel of land denominated as Lot 7,
located at Kamuning Street, Juna Subdivision, Matina, Davao City, and covered by Transfer 2. That sale of Lot 7 covered by TCT No. [88674] by defendant Pedro Villa Abrille in
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-88674 in their names. Said lot is adjacent to a parcel of land the Deed of Sale (Exh. "A") is valid as to one half or 277.5 square meters of the 555
which Pedro acquired when he was still single and which is registered solely in his name square meters as one half belongs to defendant Pedro Abrille but it is void as to the
under TCT No. T-26471. other half or 277.5 square meters as it belongs to plaintiff Mary Abrille who did not
sell her share nor give her consent to the sale.
Through their joint efforts and the proceeds of a loan from the Development Bank of the
Philippines (DBP), the spouses built a house on Lot 7 and Pedro’s lot. The house was finished 3. That sale of the house mentioned in the Deed of Sale (Exh. "A") is valid as far as
in the early 1980’s but the spouses continuously made improvements, including a poultry the one half of the house representing the share of defendant Pedro Abrille is
house and an annex. concerned but void as to the other half which is the share of plaintiff Mary Abrille
because she did not give her consent/sign the said sale.
In 1991, Pedro got a mistress and began to neglect his family. Mary Ann was forced to sell or
mortgage their movables to support the family and the studies of her children. By himself, 4. The defendants shall jointly pay the plaintiffs.
Pedro offered to sell the house and the two lots to herein petitioners, Patrocinia and
Wilfredo Ravina. Mary Ann objected and notified the petitioners of her objections, but Pedro 4. A. Seventeen Thousand Pesos (₱17,000.00) representing the value of the
nonetheless sold the house and the two lots without Mary Ann’s consent, as evidenced by a movables and belonging[s] that were lost when unknown men unceremoniously
Deed of Sale5 dated June 21, 1991. It appears on the said deed that Mary Ann did not sign on and without their knowledge and consent removed their movables from their
top of her name. house and brought them to an apartment.
 4. B. One Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱ 100,000.00) to plaintiff Mary Abrille as moral b) Fifty Thousand Pesos (₱50,000.00) as moral damages to each of the
damages. four children, namely: Ingrid Villa Abrille, Ingremark Villa Abrille, Ingresoll
Villa Abrille and Ingrelyn Villa Abrille.
4. C. Fifty Thousand Pesos (₱50,000.00) to each of the four children as moral
damages, namely: c) Ten Thousand (₱10,000.00) as exemplary damages by way of example
and correction for the public good.
a) Ingrid Villa Abrille – Fifty Thousand Pesos (₱50,000.00), b) Ingremark Villa Abrille
– Fifty Thousand Pesos (₱50,000.00), c) Ingresoll Villa Abrille – Fifty Thousand Pesos SO ORDERED.9
(₱50,000.00) and d) Ingrelyn Villa Abrille – Fifty Thousand Pesos (₱50,000.00).
Their Motion for Reconsideration having been denied, petitioners filed this petition.
5. Ten Thousand Pesos (₱10,000.00) as exemplary damages by way of example and Petitioners argue that:
correction for the public good.
I.
6. The costs of suit.8
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT DECLARED x x x THE SALE OF LOT COVERED BY TCT
On appeal, the Court of Appeals modified the decision, thus: NO. 88674 IN FAVOR OF SPOUSES RAVINA, TOGETHER WITH THE HOUSE THEREON, AS NULL
AND VOID SINCE IT IS CLEARLY CONTRARY TO LAW AND EVIDENCE.
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is hereby MODIFIED as follows:
II.
1. The sale of lot covered by TCT No. 26471 in favor of defendants spouses Wilfredo
and Patrocinia Ravina is declared valid. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT PETITIONERS PATROCIN[I]A RAVINA
AND WILFREDO RAVINA ARE NOT INNOCENT PURCHASERS FOR VALUE, THE SAME BEING
2. The sale of lot covered by TCT No. 88674 in favor of said defendants spouses CONTRARY TO LAW AND EVIDENCE.
Ravina, together with the house thereon, is declared null and void.
III.
3. Defendant Pedro Abrille is ordered to return the value of the consideration for
the lot covered by TCT No. 88674 and the house thereon to co-defendants spouses THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT PETITIONERS PATROCIN[I]A RAVINA
Ravina. AND WILFREDO RAVINA ARE LIABLE FOR DAMAGES, THE SAME BEING CONTRARY TO LAW
AND EVIDENCE.10
4. Defendants spouses Ravina [a]re ordered to reconvey the lot and house covered
by TCT No. 88674 in favor of spouses Pedro and Mary Villa Abrille and to deliver In essence, petitioners assail the appellate court’s declaration that the sale to them by Pedro
possession to them. of the lot covered by TCT No. T-88674 is null and void. However, in addressing this issue, it is
imperative to determine: (1) whether the subject property covered by TCT No. T-88674 is an
5. Plaintiffs are given the option to exercise their rights under Article [450] of the exclusive property of Pedro or conjugal property, and (2) whether its sale by Pedro was valid
New Civil Code with respect to the improvements introduced by defendant spouses considering the absence of Mary Ann’s consent.
Ravina.
Petitioners assert that the subject lot covered by TCT No. T-88674 was the exclusive property
6. Defendants Pedro Villa Abrille and spouses Ravina are ordered to pay jointly and of Pedro having been acquired by him through barter or exchange. 11 They allege that the
severally the plaintiffs as follows: subject lot was acquired by Pedro with the proceeds of the sale of one of his exclusive
properties. Allegedly, Pedro and his sister Carmelita initially agreed to exchange their
exclusive lots covered by TCT No. T-26479 and TCT No. T-26472, respectively. Later, however,
a) One Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱100,000.00) to plaintiff Mary Villa
Pedro sold the lot covered by TCT No. T-26472 to one Francisca Teh Ting and purchased the
Abrille as moral damages.
property of Carmelita using the proceeds of the sale. A new title, TCT No. T-88674, was
issued thereafter. Thus, petitioners insist that the subject lot remains to be an exclusive
property of Pedro as it was acquired or purchased through the exclusive funds or money of
the latter.
We are not persuaded. Article 160 of the New Civil Code provides, "All property of the Here, respondent Mary Ann timely filed the action for annulment of sale within five (5) years
marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it from the date of sale and execution of the deed. However, her action to annul the sale
pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife." pertains only to the conjugal house and lot and does not include the lot covered by TCT No.
T-26471, a property exclusively belonging to Pedro and which he can dispose of freely
There is no issue with regard to the lot covered by TCT No. T-26471, which was an exclusive without Mary Ann’s consent.
property of Pedro, having been acquired by him before his marriage to Mary Ann. However,
the lot covered by TCT No. T-88674 was acquired in 1982 during the marriage of Pedro and On the second assignment of error, petitioners contend that they are buyers in good
Mary Ann. No evidence was adduced to show that the subject property was acquired through faith.14 Accordingly, they need not inquire whether the lot was purchased by money
exchange or barter. The presumption of the conjugal nature of the property subsists in the exclusively belonging to Pedro or of the common fund of the spouses and may rely on the
absence of clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence to overcome said presumption or to certificates of title.
prove that the subject property is exclusively owned by Pedro. 12 Petitioners’ bare assertion
would not suffice to overcome the presumption that TCT No. T-88674, acquired during the The contention is bereft of merit. As correctly held by the Court of Appeals, a purchaser in
marriage of Pedro and Mary Ann, is conjugal. Likewise, the house built thereon is conjugal good faith is one who buys the property of another without notice that some other person
property, having been constructed through the joint efforts of the spouses, who had even has a right to, or interest in, such property and pays a full and fair price for the same at the
obtained a loan from DBP to construct the house.1avvphi1 time of such purchase, or before he has notice of the claim or interest of some other person
in the property.15 To establish his status as a buyer for value in good faith, a person dealing
Significantly, a sale or encumbrance of conjugal property concluded after the effectivity of with land registered in the name of and occupied by the seller need only show that he relied
the Family Code on August 3, 1988, is governed by Article 124 of the same Code that now on the face of the seller’s certificate of title. But for a person dealing with land registered in
treats such a disposition to be void if done (a) without the consent of both the husband and the name of and occupied by the seller whose capacity to sell is restricted, such as by Articles
the wife, or (b) in case of one spouse’s inability, the authority of the court. Article 124 of the 166 and 173 of the Civil Code or Article 124 of the Family Code, he must show that he
Family Code, the governing law at the time the assailed sale was contracted, is explicit: inquired into the latter’s capacity to sell in order to establish himself as a buyer for value in
good faith.161avvphi1
ART. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property shall
belong to both spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husband’s decision shall prevail, In the present case, the property is registered in the name of Pedro and his wife, Mary Ann.
subject to recourse to the court by the wife for proper remedy which must be availed of Petitioners cannot deny knowledge that during the time of the sale in 1991, Pedro was
within five years from the date of the contract implementing such decision. married to Mary Ann. However, Mary Ann’s conformity did not appear in the deed. Even
assuming that petitioners believed in good faith that the subject property is the exclusive
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the property of Pedro, they were apprised by Mary Ann’s lawyer of her objection to the sale and
administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of yet they still proceeded to purchase the property without Mary Ann’s written consent.
administration. These powers do not include the powers of disposition or encumbrance Moreover, the respondents were the ones in actual, visible and public possession of the
which must have the authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the property at the time the transaction was being made. Thus, at the time of sale, petitioners
absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. knew that Mary Ann has a right to or interest in the subject properties and yet they failed to
However, the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the obtain her conformity to the deed of sale. Hence, petitioners cannot now invoke the
consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon protection accorded to purchasers in good faith.
the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is
withdrawn by either or both offerors. (Emphasis supplied.) Now, if a voidable contract is annulled, the restoration of what has been given is proper. The
relationship between the parties in any contract even if subsequently annulled must always
The particular provision in the New Civil Code giving the wife ten (10) years to annul the be characterized and punctuated by good faith and fair dealing.17 Hence, in consonance with
alienation or encumbrance was not carried over to the Family Code. It is thus clear that justice and equity and the salutary principle of non-enrichment at another’s expense, we
alienation or encumbrance of the conjugal partnership property by the husband without the sustain the appellate court’s order directing Pedro to return to petitioner spouses the value
consent of the wife is null and void. of the consideration for the lot covered by TCT No. T-88674 and the house thereon.

Hence, just like the rule in absolute community of property, if the husband, without However, this court rules that petitioners cannot claim reimbursements for improvements
knowledge and consent of the wife, sells conjugal property, such sale is void. If the sale was they introduced after their good faith had ceased. As correctly found by the Court of Appeals,
with the knowledge but without the approval of the wife, thereby resulting in a petitioner Patrocinia Ravina made improvements and renovations on the house and lot at the
disagreement, such sale is annullable at the instance of the wife who is given five (5) years time when the complaint against them was filed. Ravina continued introducing
from the date the contract implementing the decision of the husband to institute the case.13 improvements during the pendency of the action.18
Thus, Article 449 of the New Civil Code is applicable. It provides that, "(h)e who builds, plants
or sows in bad faith on the land of another, loses what is built, planted or sown without right
to indemnity."19

On the last issue, petitioners claim that the decision awarding damages to respondents is not
supported by the evidence on record.20

The claim is erroneous to say the least. The manner by which respondent and her children
were removed from the family home deserves our condemnation. On July 5, 1991, while
respondent was out and her children were in school, Pedro Villa Abrille acting in connivance
with the petitioners21 surreptitiously transferred all their personal belongings to another
place. The respondents then were not allowed to enter their rightful home or family abode
despite their impassioned pleas.

Firmly established in our civil law is the doctrine that: "Every person must, in the exercise of
his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and
observe honesty and good faith."22 When a right is exercised in a manner that does not
conform with such norms and results in damages to another, a legal wrong is thereby
committed for which the wrong doer must be held responsible. Similarly, any person who
willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs
or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damages caused.23 It is patent in this case
that petitioners’ alleged acts fall short of these established civil law standards.

WHEREFORE, we deny the instant petition for lack of merit. The Decision dated February 21,
2002 and the Resolution dated October 7, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
54560 are AFFIRMED.

Costs against petitioners. SO ORDERED.

ARTICLE 121 – 125 Claiming that she had no knowledge of the mortgage constituted on the subject property,
which was conjugal in nature, respondent instituted with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 29,
San Pablo City, Civil Case No. SP-2222 (97) for Nullity of Real Estate Mortgage and Certificate
G.R. No. 153802. March 11, 2005 of Sale, Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership, Deed of Sale, Reconveyance with Prayer for
Preliminary Injunction and Damages against petitioner. In the latter’s Answer with
HOMEOWNERS SAVINGS & LOAN BANK, Petitioner,  Counterclaim, petitioner prayed for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the
vs. property in question was the exclusive property of the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr.
MIGUELA C. DAILO, Respondents.
After trial on the merits, the trial court rendered a Decision on October 18, 1997. The
DECISION dispositive portion thereof reads as follows:

TINGA, J.: WHEREFORE, the plaintiff having proved by the preponderance of evidence the allegations of
the Complaint, the Court finds for the plaintiff and hereby orders:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, assailing
the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 59986 rendered on June 3, 2002, ON THE FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION:
which affirmed with modification the October 18, 1997 Decision2  of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 29, San Pablo City, Laguna in Civil Case No. SP-4748 (97). 1. The declaration of the following documents as null and void:

The following factual antecedents are undisputed. (a) The Deed of Real Estate Mortgage dated December 1, 1993 executed before Notary Public
Romulo Urrea and his notarial register entered as Doc. No. 212; Page No. 44, Book No. XXI,
Respondent Miguela C. Dailo and Marcelino Dailo, Jr. were married on August 8, 1967. During Series of 1993.
their marriage, the spouses purchased a house and lot situated at Barangay San Francisco,
San Pablo City from a certain Sandra Dalida. The subject property was declared for tax (b) The Certificate of Sale executed by Notary Public Reynaldo Alcantara on April 20, 1995.
assessment purposes under Assessment of Real Property No. 94-051-2802. The Deed of
Absolute Sale, however, was executed only in favor of the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. as vendee
thereof to the exclusion of his wife.3 (c) The Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership executed by the defendant

On December 1, 1993, Marcelino Dailo, Jr. executed a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) in (c) The Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership executed by the defendant over the
favor of one Lilibeth Gesmundo, authorizing the latter to obtain a loan from petitioner residential lot located at Brgy. San Francisco, San Pablo City, covered by ARP No. 95-091-1236
Homeowners Savings and Loan Bank to be secured by the spouses Dailo’s house and lot in entered as Doc. No. 406; Page No. 83, Book No. III, Series of 1996 of Notary Public Octavio M.
San Pablo City. Pursuant to the SPA, Gesmundo obtained a loan in the amount of Zayas.
₱300,000.00 from petitioner. As security therefor, Gesmundo executed on the same day a
Real Estate Mortgage constituted on the subject property in favor of petitioner. The (d) The assessment of real property No. 95-051-1236.
abovementioned transactions, including the execution of the SPA in favor of Gesmundo, took
place without the knowledge and consent of respondent.4 2. The defendant is ordered to reconvey the property subject of this complaint to the
plaintiff.
Upon maturity, the loan remained outstanding. As a result, petitioner instituted extrajudicial
foreclosure proceedings on the mortgaged property. After the extrajudicial sale thereof, a ON THE SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
Certificate of Sale was issued in favor of petitioner as the highest bidder. After the lapse of
one year without the property being redeemed, petitioner, through its vice-president,
1. The defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of ₱40,000.00 representing the value of the car
consolidated the ownership thereof by executing on June 6, 1996 an Affidavit of
which was burned.
Consolidation of Ownership and a Deed of Absolute Sale.5

ON BOTH CAUSES OF ACTION

In the meantime, Marcelino Dailo, Jr. died on December 20, 1995. In one of her visits to the
subject property, respondent learned that petitioner had already employed a certain Roldan
Brion to clean its premises and that her car, a Ford sedan, was razed because Brion allowed a 1. The defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of ₱25,000.00 as attorney’s fees;
boy to play with fire within the premises.
2. The defendant to pay plaintiff ₱25,000.00 as moral damages; ART. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property shall
belong to both spouses jointly. . . .
3. The defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of ₱10,000.00 as exemplary damages;
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the
4. To pay the cost of the suit. administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of
administration. These powers do not include the powers of disposition or encumbrance
which must have the authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the
The counterclaim is dismissed.
absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. . . .

SO ORDERED.6
Petitioner argues that although Article 124 of the Family Code requires the consent of the
other spouse to the mortgage of conjugal properties, the framers of the law could not have
Upon elevation of the case to the Court of Appeals, the appellate court affirmed the trial intended to curtail the right of a spouse from exercising full ownership over the portion of
court’s finding that the subject property was conjugal in nature, in the absence of clear and the conjugal property pertaining to him under the concept of co-ownership. 12 Thus,
convincing evidence to rebut the presumption that the subject property acquired during the petitioner would have this Court uphold the validity of the mortgage to the extent of the late
marriage of spouses Dailo belongs to their conjugal partnership.7 The appellate court Marcelino Dailo, Jr.’s share in the conjugal partnership.
declared as void the mortgage on the subject property because it was constituted without
the knowledge and consent of respondent, in accordance with Article 124 of the Family
In Guiang v. Court of Appeals,13 it was held that the sale of a conjugal property requires the
Code. Thus, it upheld the trial court’s order to reconvey the subject property to
consent of both the husband and wife.14 In applying Article 124 of the Family Code, this Court
respondent.8 With respect to the damage to respondent’s car, the appellate court found
declared that the absence of the consent of one renders the entire sale null and void,
petitioner to be liable therefor because it is responsible for the consequences of the acts or
including the portion of the conjugal property pertaining to the husband who contracted the
omissions of the person it hired to accomplish the assigned task.9 All told, the appellate court
sale. The same principle in Guiang squarely applies to the instant case. As shall be discussed
affirmed the trial court’s Decision, but deleted the award for damages and attorney’s fees for
next, there is no legal basis to construe Article 493 of the Civil Code as an exception to Article
lack of basis.10
124 of the Family Code.

Hence, this petition, raising the following issues for this Court’s consideration:
Respondent and the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. were married on August 8, 1967. In the absence
of a marriage settlement, the system of relative community or conjugal partnership of gains
1. WHETHER OR NOT THE MORTGAGE CONSTITUTED BY THE LATE MARCELINO DAILO, JR. ON governed the property relations between respondent and her late husband.15 With the
THE SUBJECT PROPERTY AS CO-OWNER THEREOF IS VALID AS TO HIS UNDIVIDED SHARE. effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988, Chapter 4 on Conjugal Partnership of
Gains in the Family Code was made applicable to conjugal partnership of gains already
2. WHETHER OR NOT THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP IS LIABLE FOR THE PAYMENT OF THE established before its effectivity unless vested rights have already been acquired under the
LOAN OBTAINED BY THE LATE MARCELINO DAILO, JR. THE SAME HAVING REDOUNDED TO Civil Code or other laws.16
THE BENEFIT OF THE FAMILY.11
The rules on co-ownership do not even apply to the property relations of respondent and the
First, petitioner takes issue with the legal provision applicable to the factual milieu of this late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. even in a suppletory manner. The regime of conjugal partnership of
case. It contends that Article 124 of the Family Code should be construed in relation to Article gains is a special type of partnership, where the husband and wife place in a common fund
493 of the Civil Code, which states: the proceeds, products, fruits and income from their separate properties and those acquired
by either or both spouses through their efforts or by chance. 17 Unlike the absolute
ART. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and community of property wherein the rules on co-ownership apply in a suppletory
benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even manner,18 the conjugal partnership shall be governed by the rules on contract of partnership
substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the in all that is not in conflict with what is expressly determined in the chapter (on conjugal
effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to partnership of gains) or by the spouses in their marriage settlements.19 Thus, the property
the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co- relations of respondent and her late husband shall be governed, foremost, by Chapter 4
ownership. on Conjugal Partnership of Gains of the Family Code and, suppletorily, by the rules on
partnership under the Civil Code. In case of conflict, the former prevails because the Civil
Code provisions on partnership apply only when the Family Code is silent on the matter.
Article 124 of the Family Code provides in part:
The basic and established fact is that during his lifetime, without the knowledge and consent further evidence by the adverse party in order to enable it to properly meet the issue raised
of his wife, Marcelino Dailo, Jr. constituted a real estate mortgage on the subject property, in the new theory.26
which formed part of their conjugal partnership. By express provision of Article 124 of the
Family Code, in the absence of (court) authority or written consent of the other spouse, any WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Costs against petitioner.
disposition or encumbrance of the conjugal property shall be void.
SO ORDERED.
The aforequoted provision does not qualify with respect to the share of the spouse who
makes the disposition or encumbrance in the same manner that the rule on co-ownership
under Article 493 of the Civil Code does. Where the law does not distinguish, courts should
not distinguish.20 Thus, both the trial court and the appellate court are correct in declaring
the nullity of the real estate mortgage on the subject property for lack of respondent’s
consent.

Second, petitioner imposes the liability for the payment of the principal obligation obtained
by the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. on the conjugal partnership to the extent that it redounded to
the benefit of the family.21

Under Article 121 of the Family Code, "[T]he conjugal partnership shall be liable for: . . . (3)
Debts and obligations contracted by either spouse without the consent of the other to the
extent that the family may have been benefited; . . . ." For the subject property to be held
liable, the obligation contracted by the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. must have redounded to the
benefit of the conjugal partnership. There must be the requisite showing then of some
advantage which clearly accrued to the welfare of the spouses. Certainly, to make a conjugal
partnership respond for a liability that should appertain to the husband alone is to defeat and
frustrate the avowed objective of the new Civil Code to show the utmost concern for the
solidarity and well-being of the family as a unit.22

The burden of proof that the debt was contracted for the benefit of the conjugal partnership
of gains lies with the creditor-party litigant claiming as such. 23 Ei incumbit probatio qui dicit,
non qui negat (he who asserts, not he who denies, must prove). 24 Petitioner’s sweeping
conclusion that the loan obtained by the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. to finance the construction
of housing units without a doubt redounded to the benefit of his family, without adducing
adequate proof, does not persuade this Court. Other than petitioner’s bare allegation, there
is nothing from the records of the case to compel a finding that, indeed, the loan obtained by
the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. redounded to the benefit of the family. Consequently, the
conjugal partnership cannot be held liable for the payment of the principal obligation.

In addition, a perusal of the records of the case reveals that during the trial, petitioner
vigorously asserted that the subject property was the exclusive property of the late
Marcelino Dailo, Jr. Nowhere in the answer filed with the trial court was it alleged that the
proceeds of the loan redounded to the benefit of the family. Even on appeal, petitioner never
claimed that the family benefited from the proceeds of the loan. When a party adopts a
certain theory in the court below, he will not be permitted to change his theory on appeal,
for to permit him to do so would not only be unfair to the other party but it would also be
offensive to the basic rules of fair play, justice and due process. 25 A party may change his legal
theory on appeal only when the factual bases thereof would not require presentation of any
ARTICLE 129 Further, except for the personal and real properties already foreclosed by the RCBC, all the
remaining properties, namely:
G.R. No 176556               July 4, 2012
1. coffee mill in Balongagan, Las Nieves, Agusan del Norte;
BRIGIDO B. QUIAO, Petitioner, 
vs. 2. coffee mill in Durian, Las Nieves, Agusan del Norte;
RITA C. QUIAO, KITCHIE C. QUIAO, LOTIS C. QUIAO, PETCHIE C. QUIAO, represented by their
mother RITA QUIAO, Respondents. 3. corn mill in Casiklan, Las Nieves, Agusan del Norte;

DECISION 4. coffee mill in Esperanza, Agusan del Sur;

REYES, J.: 5. a parcel of land with an area of 1,200 square meters located in Tungao, Butuan
City;
The family is the basic and the most important institution of society. It is in the family where
children are born and molded either to become useful citizens of the country or 6. a parcel of agricultural land with an area of 5 hectares located in Manila de
troublemakers in the community. Thus, we are saddened when parents have to separate and Bugabos, Butuan City;
fight over properties, without regard to the message they send to their children.
Notwithstanding this, we must not shirk from our obligation to rule on this case involving 7. a parcel of land with an area of 84 square meters located in Tungao, Butuan City;
legal separation escalating to questions on dissolution and partition of properties.
8. Bashier Bon Factory located in Tungao, Butuan City;
The Case
shall be divided equally between herein [respondents] and [petitioner] subject to the
This case comes before us via Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of respective legitimes of the children and the payment of the unpaid conjugal liabilities of
Court. The petitioner seeks that we vacate and set aside the Order 2 dated January 8, 2007 of [₱]45,740.00.
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 1, Butuan City. In lieu of the said order, we are asked
to issue a Resolution defining the net profits subject of the forfeiture as a result of the decree
[Petitioner’s] share, however, of the net profits earned by the conjugal partnership is
of legal separation in accordance with the provision of Article 102(4) of the Family Code, or
forfeited in favor of the common children.
alternatively, in accordance with the provisions of Article 176 of the Civil Code.

He is further ordered to reimburse [respondents] the sum of [₱]19,000.00 as attorney's fees

Antecedent Facts
and litigation expenses of [₱]5,000.00[.]

On October 26, 2000, herein respondent Rita C. Quiao (Rita) filed a complaint for legal
SO ORDERED.5 
separation against herein petitioner Brigido B. Quiao (Brigido). 3 Subsequently, the RTC
rendered a Decision4 dated October 10, 2005, the dispositive portion of which provides:
Neither party filed a motion for reconsideration and appeal within the period provided for
under Section 17(a) and (b) of the Rule on Legal Separation.6 
WHEREFORE, viewed from the foregoing considerations, judgment is hereby rendered
declaring the legal separation of plaintiff Rita C. Quiao and defendant-respondent Brigido B.
Quiao pursuant to Article 55. On December 12, 2005, the respondents filed a motion for execution7 which the trial court
granted in its Order dated December 16, 2005, the dispositive portion of which reads:
As such, the herein parties shall be entitled to live separately from each other, but the
marriage bond shall not be severed. "Wherefore, finding the motion to be well taken, the same is hereby granted. Let a writ of
execution be issued for the immediate enforcement of the Judgment.
Except for Letecia C. Quiao who is of legal age, the three minor children, namely, Kitchie,
Lotis and Petchie, all surnamed Quiao shall remain under the custody of the plaintiff who is SO ORDERED."8 
the innocent spouse.
Subsequently, on February 10, 2006, the RTC issued a Writ of Execution9 which reads as Not satisfied with the trial court's Order, the petitioner filed a Motion for
follows: Reconsideration17 on September 8, 2006. Consequently, the RTC issued another Order 18 dated
November 8, 2006, holding that although the Decision dated October 10, 2005 has become
NOW THEREFORE, that of the goods and chattels of the [petitioner] BRIGIDO B. QUIAO you final and executory, it may still consider the Motion for Clarification because the petitioner
cause to be made the sums stated in the afore-quoted DECISION [sic], together with your simply wanted to clarify the meaning of "net profit earned."19 Furthermore, the same Order
lawful fees in the service of this Writ, all in the Philippine Currency. held:

But if sufficient personal property cannot be found whereof to satisfy this execution and your ALL TOLD, the Court Order dated August 31, 2006 is hereby ordered set aside. NET PROFIT
lawful fees, then we command you that of the lands and buildings of the said [petitioner], EARNED, which is subject of forfeiture in favor of [the] parties' common children, is ordered
you make the said sums in the manner required by law. You are enjoined to strictly observed to be computed in accordance [with] par. 4 of Article 102 of the Family Code.20 
Section 9, Rule 39, Rule [sic] of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
On November 21, 2006, the respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration, 21 praying for the
You are hereby ordered to make a return of the said proceedings immediately after the correction and reversal of the Order dated November 8, 2006. Thereafter, on January 8,
judgment has been satisfied in part or in full in consonance with Section 14, Rule 39 of the 2007,22 the trial court had changed its ruling again and granted the respondents' Motion for
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended.10  Reconsideration whereby the Order dated November 8, 2006 was set aside to reinstate the
Order dated August 31, 2006.
On July 6, 2006, the writ was partially executed with the petitioner paying the respondents
the amount of ₱46,870.00, representing the following payments: Not satisfied with the trial court's Order, the petitioner filed on February 27, 2007 this instant
Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, raising the following:
(a) ₱22,870.00 – as petitioner's share of the payment of the conjugal share;
Issues
(b) ₱19,000.00 – as attorney's fees; and
I
11 
(c) ₱5,000.00 – as litigation expenses.
IS THE DISSOLUTION AND THE CONSEQUENT LIQUIDATION OF THE COMMON PROPERTIES OF
THE HUSBAND AND WIFE BY VIRTUE OF THE DECREE OF LEGAL SEPARATION GOVERNED BY
On July 7, 2006, or after more than nine months from the promulgation of the Decision, the
ARTICLE 125 (SIC) OF THE FAMILY CODE?
petitioner filed before the RTC a Motion for Clarification,12 asking the RTC to define the term
"Net Profits Earned."
II
13 
To resolve the petitioner's Motion for Clarification, the RTC issued an Order dated August
31, 2006, which held that the phrase "NET PROFIT EARNED" denotes "the remainder of the WHAT IS THE MEANING OF THE NET PROFITS EARNED BY THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP FOR
properties of the parties after deducting the separate properties of each [of the] spouse and PURPOSES OF EFFECTING THE FORFEITURE AUTHORIZED UNDER ARTICLE 63 OF THE FAMILY
the debts."14 The Order further held that after determining the remainder of the properties, it CODE?
shall be forfeited in favor of the common children because the offending spouse does not
have any right to any share of the net profits earned, pursuant to Articles 63, No. (2) and 43, III
No. (2) of the Family Code.15 The dispositive portion of the Order states:
WHAT LAW GOVERNS THE PROPERTY RELATIONS BETWEEN THE HUSBAND AND WIFE WHO
WHEREFORE, there is no blatant disparity when the sheriff intends to forfeit all the remaining GOT MARRIED IN 1977? CAN THE FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES BE GIVEN RETROACTIVE
properties after deducting the payments of the debts for only separate properties of the EFFECT FOR PURPOSES OF DETERMINING THE NET PROFITS SUBJECT OF FORFEITURE AS A
defendant-respondent shall be delivered to him which he has none. RESULT OF THE DECREE OF LEGAL SEPARATION WITHOUT IMPAIRING VESTED RIGHTS
ALREADY ACQUIRED UNDER THE CIVIL CODE?
The Sheriff is herein directed to proceed with the execution of the Decision.
IV
16 
IT IS SO ORDERED.
WHAT PROPERTIES SHALL BE INCLUDED IN THE FORFEITURE OF THE SHARE OF THE GUILTY after 67 days had lapsed, the trial court issued an order granting the respondent's motion for
SPOUSE IN THE NET CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP AS A RESULT OF THE ISSUANCE OF THE DECREE execution; and on February 10, 2006, or after 123 days had lapsed, the trial court issued a
OF LEGAL SEPARATION?23  writ of execution. Finally, when the writ had already been partially executed, the petitioner,
on July 7, 2006 or after 270 days had lapsed, filed his Motion for Clarification on the
Our Ruling definition of the "net profits earned." From the foregoing, the petitioner had clearly slept on
his right to question the RTC’s Decision dated October 10, 2005. For 270 days, the petitioner
never raised a single issue until the decision had already been partially executed. Thus at the
While the petitioner has raised a number of issues on the applicability of certain laws, we are
time the petitioner filed his motion for clarification, the trial court’s decision has become final
well-aware that the respondents have called our attention to the fact that the Decision dated
and executory. A judgment becomes final and executory when the reglementary period to
October 10, 2005 has attained finality when the Motion for Clarification was filed. 24 Thus, we
appeal lapses and no appeal is perfected within such period. Consequently, no court, not
are constrained to resolve first the issue of the finality of the Decision dated October 10,
even this Court, can arrogate unto itself appellate jurisdiction to review a case or modify a
2005 and subsequently discuss the matters that we can clarify.
judgment that became final.28 

The Decision dated October 10, 2005 has become final and executory at the time the
The petitioner argues that the decision he is questioning is a void judgment. Being such, the
Motion for Clarification was filed on July 7, 2006.
petitioner's thesis is that it can still be disturbed even after 270 days had lapsed from the
issuance of the decision to the filing of the motion for clarification. He said that "a void
Section 3, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court provides: judgment is no judgment at all. It never attains finality and cannot be a source of any right
nor any obligation."29 But what precisely is a void judgment in our jurisdiction? When does a
Section 3. Period of ordinary appeal. - The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from judgment becomes void?
notice of the judgment or final order appealed from. Where a record on appeal is required,
the appellant shall file a notice of appeal and a record on appeal within thirty (30) days from "A judgment is null and void when the court which rendered it had no power to grant the
notice of the judgment or final order. relief or no jurisdiction over the subject matter or over the parties or both."30 In other words,
a court, which does not have the power to decide a case or that has no jurisdiction over the
The period of appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new trial or reconsideration. subject matter or the parties, will issue a void judgment or a coram non judice.31 
No motion for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration shall be
allowed. The questioned judgment does not fall within the purview of a void judgment. For sure, the
trial court has jurisdiction over a case involving legal separation. Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8369
In Neypes v. Court of Appeals,25 we clarified that to standardize the appeal periods provided confers upon an RTC, designated as the Family Court of a city, the exclusive original
in the Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases, we held that "it jurisdiction to hear and decide, among others, complaints or petitions relating to marital
would be practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal status and property relations of the husband and wife or those living together. 32 The Rule on
in the RTC, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion Legal Separation33 provides that "the petition [for legal separation] shall be filed in the Family
for reconsideration."26  Court of the province or city where the petitioner or the respondent has been residing for at
least six months prior to the date of filing or in the case of a non-resident respondent, where
In Neypes, we explained that the "fresh period rule" shall also apply to Rule 40 governing he may be found in the Philippines, at the election of the petitioner." 34 In the instant case,
appeals from the Municipal Trial Courts to the RTCs; Rule 42 on petitions for review from the herein respondent Rita is found to reside in Tungao, Butuan City for more than six months
RTCs to the Court of Appeals (CA); Rule 43 on appeals from quasi-judicial agencies to the CA prior to the date of filing of the petition; thus, the RTC, clearly has jurisdiction over the
and Rule 45 governing appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court. We also said, "The new respondent's petition below. Furthermore, the RTC also acquired jurisdiction over the
rule aims to regiment or make the appeal period uniform, to be counted from receipt of the persons of both parties, considering that summons and a copy of the complaint with its
order denying the motion for new trial, motion for reconsideration (whether full or partial) or annexes were served upon the herein petitioner on December 14, 2000 and that the herein
any final order or resolution."27 In other words, a party litigant may file his notice of appeal petitioner filed his Answer to the Complaint on January 9, 2001.35 Thus, without doubt, the
within a fresh 15-day period from his receipt of the trial court's decision or final order RTC, which has rendered the questioned judgment, has jurisdiction over the complaint and
denying his motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration. Failure to avail of the fresh the persons of the parties.
15-day period from the denial of the motion for reconsideration makes the decision or final
order in question final and executory. From the aforecited facts, the questioned October 10, 2005 judgment of the trial court is
clearly not void ab initio, since it was rendered within the ambit of the court's jurisdiction.
In the case at bar, the trial court rendered its Decision on October 10, 2005. The petitioner Being such, the same cannot anymore be disturbed, even if the modification is meant to
neither filed a motion for reconsideration nor a notice of appeal. On December 16, 2005, or correct what may be considered an erroneous conclusion of fact or law. 36 In fact, we have
ruled that for "[as] long as the public respondent acted with jurisdiction, any error committed
by him or it in the exercise thereof will amount to nothing more than an error of judgment (l) The holding that the conjugal partnership shall be liable to matters included
which may be reviewed or corrected only by appeal." 37 Granting without admitting that the under Article 121 of the Family Code and the conjugal liabilities totaling
RTC's judgment dated October 10, 2005 was erroneous, the petitioner's remedy should be an ₱503,862.10 shall be charged to the income generated by these properties;49 
appeal filed within the reglementary period. Unfortunately, the petitioner failed to do this.
He has already lost the chance to question the trial court's decision, which has become (m) The fact that the trial court had no way of knowing whether the petitioner had
immutable and unalterable. What we can only do is to clarify the very question raised below separate properties which can satisfy his share for the support of the family;50 
and nothing more.
(n) The holding that the applicable law in this case is Article 129(7);51 
For our convenience, the following matters cannot anymore be disturbed since the October
10, 2005 judgment has already become immutable and unalterable, to wit:
(o) The ruling that the remaining properties not subject to any encumbrance shall
therefore be divided equally between the petitioner and the respondent without
(a) The finding that the petitioner is the offending spouse since he cohabited with a prejudice to the children's legitime;52 
woman who is not his wife;38 
(p) The holding that the petitioner's share of the net profits earned by the conjugal
(b) The trial court's grant of the petition for legal separation of respondent Rita;39  partnership is forfeited in favor of the common children;53 and

(c) The dissolution and liquidation of the conjugal partnership;40  (q) The order to the petitioner to reimburse the respondents the sum of
₱19,000.00 as attorney's fees and litigation expenses of ₱5,000.00.54 
(d) The forfeiture of the petitioner's right to any share of the net profits earned by
the conjugal partnership;41  After discussing lengthily the immutability of the Decision dated October 10, 2005, we will
discuss the following issues for the enlightenment of the parties and the public at large.
(e) The award to the innocent spouse of the minor children's custody;42 
Article 129 of the Family Code applies to the present case since the parties' property
(f) The disqualification of the offending spouse from inheriting from the innocent relation is governed by the system of relative community or conjugal partnership of gains.
spouse by intestate succession;43 
The petitioner claims that the court a quo is wrong when it applied Article 129 of the Family
(g) The revocation of provisions in favor of the offending spouse made in the will of Code, instead of Article 102. He confusingly argues that Article 102 applies because there is
the innocent spouse;44  no other provision under the Family Code which defines net profits earned subject of
forfeiture as a result of legal separation.
(h) The holding that the property relation of the parties is conjugal partnership of
gains and pursuant to Article 116 of the Family Code, all properties acquired during Offhand, the trial court's Decision dated October 10, 2005 held that Article 129(7) of the
the marriage, whether acquired by one or both spouses, is presumed to be Family Code applies in this case. We agree with the trial court's holding.
conjugal unless the contrary is proved;45 
First, let us determine what governs the couple's property relation. From the record, we can
(i) The finding that the spouses acquired their real and personal properties while deduce that the petitioner and the respondent tied the marital knot on January 6, 1977.
they were living together;46  Since at the time of the exchange of marital vows, the operative law was the Civil Code of the
Philippines (R.A. No. 386) and since they did not agree on a marriage settlement, the
(j) The list of properties which Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC) property relations between the petitioner and the respondent is the system of relative
foreclosed;47  community or conjugal partnership of gains.55 Article 119 of the Civil Code provides:

(k) The list of the remaining properties of the couple which must be dissolved and Art. 119. The future spouses may in the marriage settlements agree upon absolute or relative
liquidated and the fact that respondent Rita was the one who took charge of the community of property, or upon complete separation of property, or upon any other regime.
administration of these properties;48  In the absence of marriage settlements, or when the same are void, the system of relative
community or conjugal partnership of gains as established in this Code, shall govern the
property relations between husband and wife.
Thus, from the foregoing facts and law, it is clear that what governs the property relations of To be vested, a right must have become a title—legal or equitable—to the present or future
the petitioner and of the respondent is conjugal partnership of gains. And under this property enjoyment of property.62 (Citations omitted)
relation, "the husband and the wife place in a common fund the fruits of their separate
property and the income from their work or industry." 56 The husband and wife also own in In our en banc Resolution dated October 18, 2005 for ABAKADA Guro Party List Officer
common all the property of the conjugal partnership of gains.57  Samson S. Alcantara, et al. v. The Hon. Executive Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita ,63 we also
explained:
Second, since at the time of the dissolution of the petitioner and the respondent's marriage
the operative law is already the Family Code, the same applies in the instant case and the The concept of "vested right" is a consequence of the constitutional guaranty of due
applicable law in so far as the liquidation of the conjugal partnership assets and liabilities is process that expresses a present fixed interest which in right reason and natural justice is
concerned is Article 129 of the Family Code in relation to Article 63(2) of the Family Code. protected against arbitrary state action; it includes not only legal or equitable title to the
The latter provision is applicable because according to Article 256 of the Family Code "[t]his enforcement of a demand but also exemptions from new obligations created after the right
Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or has become vested. Rights are considered vested when the right to enjoyment is a present
acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other law."58  interest, absolute, unconditional, and perfect or fixed and irrefutable. 64 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
Now, the petitioner asks: Was his vested right over half of the common properties of the
conjugal partnership violated when the trial court forfeited them in favor of his children From the foregoing, it is clear that while one may not be deprived of his "vested right," he
pursuant to Articles 63(2) and 129 of the Family Code? may lose the same if there is due process and such deprivation is founded in law and
jurisprudence.
We respond in the negative.
In the present case, the petitioner was accorded his right to due process. First, he was well-
Indeed, the petitioner claims that his vested rights have been impaired, arguing: "As earlier aware that the respondent prayed in her complaint that all of the conjugal properties be
adverted to, the petitioner acquired vested rights over half of the conjugal properties, the awarded to her.65 In fact, in his Answer, the petitioner prayed that the trial court divide the
same being owned in common by the spouses. If the provisions of the Family Code are to be community assets between the petitioner and the respondent as circumstances and evidence
given retroactive application to the point of authorizing the forfeiture of the petitioner's warrant after the accounting and inventory of all the community properties of the
share in the net remainder of the conjugal partnership properties, the same impairs his rights parties.66 Second, when the Decision dated October 10, 2005 was promulgated, the petitioner
acquired prior to the effectivity of the Family Code."59 In other words, the petitioner is saying never questioned the trial court's ruling forfeiting what the trial court termed as "net profits,"
that since the property relations between the spouses is governed by the regime of Conjugal pursuant to Article 129(7) of the Family Code. 67 Thus, the petitioner cannot claim being
Partnership of Gains under the Civil Code, the petitioner acquired vested rights over half of deprived of his right to due process.
the properties of the Conjugal Partnership of Gains, pursuant to Article 143 of the Civil Code,
which provides: "All property of the conjugal partnership of gains is owned in common by the Furthermore, we take note that the alleged deprivation of the petitioner's "vested right" is
husband and wife."60 Thus, since he is one of the owners of the properties covered by the one founded, not only in the provisions of the Family Code, but in Article 176 of the Civil
conjugal partnership of gains, he has a vested right over half of the said properties, even after Code. This provision is like Articles 63 and 129 of the Family Code on the forfeiture of the
the promulgation of the Family Code; and he insisted that no provision under the Family guilty spouse's share in the conjugal partnership profits. The said provision says:
Code may deprive him of this vested right by virtue of Article 256 of the Family Code which
prohibits retroactive application of the Family Code when it will prejudice a person's vested
Art. 176. In case of legal separation, the guilty spouse shall forfeit his or her share of the
right.
conjugal partnership profits, which shall be awarded to the children of both, and the children
of the guilty spouse had by a prior marriage. However, if the conjugal partnership property
However, the petitioner's claim of vested right is not one which is written on stone. In Go, Jr. came mostly or entirely from the work or industry, or from the wages and salaries, or from
v. Court of Appeals,61 we define and explained "vested right" in the following manner: the fruits of the separate property of the guilty spouse, this forfeiture shall not apply.

A vested right is one whose existence, effectivity and extent do not depend upon events In case there are no children, the innocent spouse shall be entitled to all the net profits.
foreign to the will of the holder, or to the exercise of which no obstacle exists, and which is
immediate and perfect in itself and not dependent upon a contingency. The term "vested
From the foregoing, the petitioner's claim of a vested right has no basis considering that even
right" expresses the concept of present fixed interest which, in right reason and natural
under Article 176 of the Civil Code, his share of the conjugal partnership profits may be
justice, should be protected against arbitrary State action, or an innately just and imperative
forfeited if he is the guilty party in a legal separation case. Thus, after trial and after the
right which enlightened free society, sensitive to inherent and irrefragable individual rights,
cannot deny.
petitioner was given the chance to present his evidence, the petitioner's vested right claim earlier discussed, Article 129 of the Family Code applies as to the property relations of the
may in fact be set aside under the Civil Code since the trial court found him the guilty party. parties. In other words, the computation and the succession of events will follow the
provisions under Article 129 of the said Code. Moreover, as to the definition of "net profits,"
More, in Abalos v. Dr. Macatangay, Jr.,68 we reiterated our long-standing ruling that: we cannot but refer to Article 102(4) of the Family Code, since it expressly provides that for
purposes of computing the net profits subject to forfeiture under Article 43, No. (2) and
Article 63, No. (2), Article 102(4) applies. In this provision, net profits "shall be the increase in
[P]rior to the liquidation of the conjugal partnership, the interest of each spouse in the
value between the market value of the community property at the time of the celebration of
conjugal assets is inchoate, a mere expectancy, which constitutes neither a legal nor an
the marriage and the market value at the time of its dissolution." 72 Thus, without any iota of
equitable estate, and does not ripen into title until it appears that there are assets in the
doubt, Article 102(4) applies to both the dissolution of the absolute community regime under
community as a result of the liquidation and settlement. The interest of each spouse is
Article 102 of the Family Code, and to the dissolution of the conjugal partnership regime
limited to the net remainder or "remanente liquido" (haber ganancial) resulting from the
under Article 129 of the Family Code. Where lies the difference? As earlier shown, the
liquidation of the affairs of the partnership after its dissolution. Thus, the right of the
difference lies in the processes used under the dissolution of the absolute community regime
husband or wife to one-half of the conjugal assets does not vest until the dissolution and
under Article 102 of the Family Code, and in the processes used under the dissolution of the
liquidation of the conjugal partnership, or after dissolution of the marriage, when it is finally
conjugal partnership regime under Article 129 of the Family Code.
determined that, after settlement of conjugal obligations, there are net assets left which can
be divided between the spouses or their respective heirs.69 (Citations omitted)
Let us now discuss the difference in the processes between the absolute community regime
and the conjugal partnership regime.
Finally, as earlier discussed, the trial court has already decided in its Decision dated October
10, 2005 that the applicable law in this case is Article 129(7) of the Family Code. 70 The
petitioner did not file a motion for reconsideration nor a notice of appeal. Thus, the On Absolute Community Regime:
petitioner is now precluded from questioning the trial court's decision since it has become
final and executory. The doctrine of immutability and unalterability of a final judgment When a couple enters into a regime of absolute community, the husband and the wife
prevents us from disturbing the Decision dated October 10, 2005 because final and executory becomes joint owners of all the properties of the marriage. Whatever property each spouse
decisions can no longer be reviewed nor reversed by this Court.71  brings into the marriage, and those acquired during the marriage (except those excluded
under Article 92 of the Family Code) form the common mass of the couple's properties. And
From the above discussions, Article 129 of the Family Code clearly applies to the present case when the couple's marriage or community is dissolved, that common mass is divided
since the parties' property relation is governed by the system of relative community or between the spouses, or their respective heirs, equally or in the proportion the parties have
conjugal partnership of gains and since the trial court's Decision has attained finality and established, irrespective of the value each one may have originally owned.73 
immutability.
Under Article 102 of the Family Code, upon dissolution of marriage, an inventory is prepared,
The net profits of the conjugal partnership of gains are all the fruits of the separate listing separately all the properties of the absolute community and the exclusive properties of
properties of the spouses and the products of their labor and industry. each; then the debts and obligations of the absolute community are paid out of the absolute
community's assets and if the community's properties are insufficient, the separate
properties of each of the couple will be solidarily liable for the unpaid balance. Whatever is
The petitioner inquires from us the meaning of "net profits" earned by the conjugal
left of the separate properties will be delivered to each of them. The net remainder of the
partnership for purposes of effecting the forfeiture authorized under Article 63 of the Family
absolute community is its net assets, which shall be divided between the husband and the
Code. He insists that since there is no other provision under the Family Code, which defines
wife; and for purposes of computing the net profits subject to forfeiture, said profits shall be
"net profits" earned subject of forfeiture as a result of legal separation, then Article 102 of
the increase in value between the market value of the community property at the time of the
the Family Code applies.
celebration of the marriage and the market value at the time of its dissolution.74 

What does Article 102 of the Family Code say? Is the computation of "net profits" earned in
Applying Article 102 of the Family Code, the "net profits" requires that we first find the
the conjugal partnership of gains the same with the computation of "net profits" earned in
market value of the properties at the time of the community's dissolution. From the totality
the absolute community?
of the market value of all the properties, we subtract the debts and obligations of the
absolute community and this result to the net assets or net remainder of the properties of
Now, we clarify. the absolute community, from which we deduct the market value of the properties at the
time of marriage, which then results to the net profits.75 
First and foremost, we must distinguish between the applicable law as to the property
relations between the parties and the applicable law as to the definition of "net profits." As
Granting without admitting that Article 102 applies to the instant case, let us see what will Considering that the couple's marriage has been dissolved under the Family Code, Article 129
happen if we apply Article 102: of the same Code applies in the liquidation of the couple's properties in the event that the
conjugal partnership of gains is dissolved, to wit:
(a) According to the trial court's finding of facts, both husband and wife have no
separate properties, thus, the remaining properties in the list above are all part of Art. 129. Upon the dissolution of the conjugal partnership regime, the following procedure
the absolute community. And its market value at the time of the dissolution of the shall apply:
absolute community constitutes the "market value at dissolution."
(1) An inventory shall be prepared, listing separately all the properties of the
(b) Thus, when the petitioner and the respondent finally were legally separated, all conjugal partnership and the exclusive properties of each spouse.
the properties which remained will be liable for the debts and obligations of the
community. Such debts and obligations will be subtracted from the "market value (2) Amounts advanced by the conjugal partnership in payment of personal debts
at dissolution." and obligations of either spouse shall be credited to the conjugal partnership as an
asset thereof.
(c) What remains after the debts and obligations have been paid from the total
assets of the absolute community constitutes the net remainder or net asset. And (3) Each spouse shall be reimbursed for the use of his or her exclusive funds in the
from such net asset/remainder of the petitioner and respondent's remaining acquisition of property or for the value of his or her exclusive property, the
properties, the market value at the time of marriage will be subtracted and the ownership of which has been vested by law in the conjugal partnership.
resulting totality constitutes the "net profits."
(4) The debts and obligations of the conjugal partnership shall be paid out of the
(d) Since both husband and wife have no separate properties, and nothing would conjugal assets. In case of insufficiency of said assets, the spouses shall be solidarily
be returned to each of them, what will be divided equally between them is simply liable for the unpaid balance with their separate properties, in accordance with the
the "net profits." However, in the Decision dated October 10, 2005, the trial court provisions of paragraph (2) of Article 121.
forfeited the half-share of the petitioner in favor of his children. Thus, if we use
Article 102 in the instant case (which should not be the case), nothing is left to the
(5) Whatever remains of the exclusive properties of the spouses shall thereafter be
petitioner since both parties entered into their marriage without bringing with
delivered to each of them.
them any property.

(6) Unless the owner had been indemnified from whatever source, the loss or
On Conjugal Partnership Regime:
deterioration of movables used for the benefit of the family, belonging to either
spouse, even due to fortuitous event, shall be paid to said spouse from the conjugal
Before we go into our disquisition on the Conjugal Partnership Regime, we make it clear that funds, if any.
Article 102(4) of the Family Code applies in the instant case for purposes only of defining
"net profit." As earlier explained, the definition of "net profits" in Article 102(4) of the Family
(7) The net remainder of the conjugal partnership properties shall constitute the
Code applies to both the absolute community regime and conjugal partnership regime as
profits, which shall be divided equally between husband and wife, unless a different
provided for under Article 63, No. (2) of the Family Code, relative to the provisions on Legal
proportion or division was agreed upon in the marriage settlements or unless there
Separation.
has been a voluntary waiver or forfeiture of such share as provided in this Code.

Now, when a couple enters into a regime of conjugal partnership of gains under Article 142
(8) The presumptive legitimes of the common children shall be delivered upon the
of the Civil Code, "the husband and the wife place in common fund the fruits of their
partition in accordance with Article 51.
separate property and income from their work or industry, and divide equally, upon the
dissolution of the marriage or of the partnership, the net gains or benefits obtained
indiscriminately by either spouse during the marriage."76 From the foregoing provision, each (9) In the partition of the properties, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is
of the couple has his and her own property and debts. The law does not intend to effect a situated shall, unless otherwise agreed upon by the parties, be adjudicated to the
mixture or merger of those debts or properties between the spouses. Rather, it establishes a spouse with whom the majority of the common children choose to remain.
complete separation of capitals.77  Children below the age of seven years are deemed to have chosen the mother,
unless the court has decided otherwise. In case there is no such majority, the court
shall decide, taking into consideration the best interests of said children.
In the normal course of events, the following are the steps in the liquidation of the properties their respective heirs.86 However, since the trial court found the petitioner the
of the spouses: guilty party, his share from the net profits of the conjugal partnership is forfeited in
favor of the common children, pursuant to Article 63(2) of the Family Code. Again,
(a) An inventory of all the actual properties shall be made, separately listing the lest we be confused, like in the absolute community regime, nothing will be
couple's conjugal properties and their separate properties.78 In the instant case, the returned to the guilty party in the conjugal partnership regime, because there is no
trial court found that the couple has no separate properties when they separate property which may be accounted for in the guilty party's favor.
married.79 Rather, the trial court identified the following conjugal properties, to wit:
In the discussions above, we have seen that in both instances, the petitioner is not entitled to
1. coffee mill in Balongagan, Las Nieves, Agusan del Norte; any property at all. Thus, we cannot but uphold the Decision dated October 10, 2005 of the
trial court. However, we must clarify, as we already did above, the Order dated January 8,
2007.
2. coffee mill in Durian, Las Nieves, Agusan del Norte;

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated October 10, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 1 of
3. corn mill in Casiklan, Las Nieves, Agusan del Norte;
Butuan City is AFFIRMED. Acting on the Motion for Clarification dated July 7, 2006 in the
Regional Trial Court, the Order dated January 8, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court is hereby
4. coffee mill in Esperanza, Agusan del Sur; CLARIFIED in accordance with the above discussions.

5. a parcel of land with an area of 1,200 square meters located in Tungao, SO ORDERED.
Butuan City;

6. a parcel of agricultural land with an area of 5 hectares located in

Manila de Bugabos, Butuan City;

7. a parcel of land with an area of 84 square meters located in Tungao,

Butuan City;

8. Bashier Bon Factory located in Tungao, Butuan City.80 

(b) Ordinarily, the benefit received by a spouse from the conjugal partnership
during the marriage is returned in equal amount to the assets of the conjugal
partnership;81 and if the community is enriched at the expense of the separate
properties of either spouse, a restitution of the value of such properties to their
respective owners shall be made.82 

(c) Subsequently, the couple's conjugal partnership shall pay the debts of the
conjugal partnership; while the debts and obligation of each of the spouses shall be
paid from their respective separate properties. But if the conjugal partnership is
not sufficient to pay all its debts and obligations, the spouses with their separate
properties shall be solidarily liable.83 

(d) Now, what remains of the separate or exclusive properties of the husband and
of the wife shall be returned to each of them. 84 In the instant case, since it was
already established by the trial court that the spouses have no separate
properties,85 there is nothing to return to any of them. The listed properties above
are considered part of the conjugal partnership. Thus, ordinarily, what remains in
the above-listed properties should be divided equally between the spouses and/or
ARTICLE 135 building located at M. H. del Pilar, Manila purchased for P285,000, an amount borrowed from
the Manufacturer's Bank and Trust Company.
G.R. No. L-19565           January 30, 1968
The spouses are indebted to the Philippine National Bank and the Development Bank of the
Philippines for loans obtained, to secure which they mortgaged the Philippine Texboard
ESTRELLA DE LA CRUZ, plaintiff-appellee,  Factory, the Silay hacienda, their conjugal house, and all their parcels of land located in
vs. Bacolod City.
SEVERINO DE LA CRUZ, defendant-appellant.

The essential issues of fact may be gleaned from the nine errors the defendant imputes to
Estacion and Paltriguera for plaintiff-appellee.  the court a quo, namely,
Manuel O. Soriano and Pio G. Villoso for defendant-appellant.

1. In finding that the only visit, from May 15, 1955 to the rendition of the decision,
CASTRO, J.: made by the defendant to the conjugal abode to see his wife was on June 15, 1955;

The plaintiff Estrella de la Cruz filed a complaint on July 22, 1958 with the Court of First 2. In finding that the letter exh. 3 was written by one Nenita Hernandez and that
Instance of Negros Occidental, alleging in essence that her husband, the defendant Severino she and the defendant are living as husband and wife;
de la Cruz, had not only abandoned her but as well was mismanaging their conjugal
partnership properties, and praying for (1) separation of property, (2) monthly support of
P2,500 during the pendency of the action, and (3) payment of P20,000 as attorney's fees, and 3. In finding that since 1951 the relations between the plaintiff and the defendant
costs. were far from cordial, and that it was from 1948 that the former has been receiving
an allowance from the latter;
The court a quo forthwith issued an order allowing the plaintiff the amount prayed for as
alimony  pendente lite, which however, upon defendant's motion, was reduced to P2,000. 4. In finding that the defendant has abandoned the plaintiff;

On June 1, 1961 the trial court rendered judgment ordering separation and division of the 5. In finding that the defendant since 1956 has not discussed with his wife the
conjugal assets, and directing the defendant to pay to the plaintiff the sum of P20,000 as business activities of the partnership, and that this silence constituted "abuse of
attorney's fees, with legal interest from the date of the original complaint, that is, from July administration of the conjugal partnerships";
22, 1958, until fully paid, plus costs. From this judgment the defendant appealed to the Court
of Appeals, which certified the case to us, "it appearing that the total value of the conjugal 6. In declaring that the defendant mortgaged the conjugal assets without the
assets is over P500,000". knowledge of the plaintiff and thru false pretences to which the latter was prey;

The basic facts are not controverted. The plaintiff and the defendant were married in Bacolod 7. In allowing the plaintiff, on the one hand, to testify on facts not actually known
City on February 1, 1938. Six children were born to them, namely, Zenia (1939), Ronnie by her, and, on the other hand, in not allowing the defendant to establish his
(1942), Victoria (1944), Jessie 1945), Bella (1946), and Felipe (1948). During their coverture special defenses;
they acquired seven parcels of land of the Bacolod Cadastre, all assessed at P45,429, and
three parcels of the Silay Cadastre, all assessed at P43,580. All these parcels are registered in 8. In ordering separation of the conjugal partnership properties; and
their names. The hacienda in Silay yielded for the year 1957 a net profit of P3,390.49.
9. In sentencing the defendant to pay to the plaintiff attorney's fees in the amount
They are also engaged in varied business ventures with fixed assets valued as of December of P20,000, with interest at the legal rate.1äwphï1.ñët
31, 1956 at P496,006.92, from which they obtained for that year a net profit of P75,655.78.
The net gain of the Philippine Texboard Factory, the principal business of the spouses, was
Two issues of law as well emerge, requiring resolution petition: (1) Did the separation of the
P90,454.48 for the year 1957. As of December 31, 1959, the total assets of the various
defendant from the plaintiff constitute abandonment in law that would justify a separation of
enterprises of the conjugal partnership were valued at P1,021,407.68, not including those of
the conjugal partnership properties? (2) Was the defendant's failure and/or refusal to inform
the Top Service Inc., of which firm the defendant has been the president since its
the plaintiff of the state of their business enterprises such an abuse of his powers of
organization in 1959 in Manila with a paid-up capital of P50,000, P10,000 of which was
administration of the conjugal partnership as to warrant a division of the matrimonial assets?
contributed by him. This corporation was the Beverly Hills Subdivision in Antipolo, Rizal, the
Golden Acres Subdivision and the Green Valley Subdivision in Las Piñas, Rizal, and a lot and
The plaintiff's evidence may be summarized briefly. The defendant started living in Manila in that during the entire period of their estrangement, he was giving her around P500 a month
1955, although he occasionally returned to Bacolod City, sleeping in his office at the for support. In point of fact, his wife and children continued to draw allowances from his
Philippine Texboard Factory in Mandalagan, instead of in the conjugal home at 2nd Street, office of a total ranging from P1,200 to P1,500 a month. He financed the education of their
Bacolod City. Since 1955 the defendant had not slept in the conjugal dwelling, although in the children, two of whom were studying in Manila at the time of the trial and were not living
said year he paid short visits during which they engaged in brief conversations. After 1955 up with the plaintiff. While in Bacolod City, he never failed to visit his family, particularly the
to the time of the trial, the defendant had never visited the conjugal abode, and when he was children. His wife was always in bad need of money because she played mahjong, an
in Bacolod, she was denied communication with him. He has abandoned her and their accusation which she did not traverse, explaining that she played mahjong to entertain
children, to live in Manila with his concubine, Nenita Hernandez. In 1949 she began to herself and forget the infidelities of her husband.
suspect the existence of illicit relations between her husband and Nenita. This suspicion was
confirmed in 1951 when she found an unsigned note in a pocket of one of her husband's polo Marcos V. Ganaban, the manager of the Philippine Texboard Factory, corroborated the
shirt which was written by Nenita and in which she asked "Bering" to meet her near the testimony of the defendant on the matter of the support the latter gave to his family, by
church. She confronted her husband who forthwith tore the note even as he admitted his declaring in court that since the start of his employment in 1950 as assistant general
amorous liaison with Nenita. He then allayed her fears by vowing to forsake his mistress. manager, the plaintiff has been drawing an allowance of P1,000 to P1,500 monthly, which
Subsequently, in November 1951, she found in the iron safe of her husband a letter, exh. C, amount was given personally by the defendant or, in his absence, by the witness himself.
also written by Nenita. In this letter the sender (who signed as "D") apologized for her
conduct, and expressed the hope that the addressee ("Darling") could join her in Baguio as
The defendant denied that he ever maintained a mistress in Manila. He came to know Nenita
she was alone in the Patria Inn and lonely in "a place for honeymooners". Immediately after
Hernandez when she was barely 12 years old, but had lost track of her thereafter. His
her husband departed for Manila the following morning, the plaintiff enplaned for Baguio,
constant presence in Manila was required by the pressing demands of an expanding
where she learned that Nenita had actually stayed at the Patria Inn, but had already left for
business. He denied having destroyed the alleged note which the plaintiff claimed to have
Manila before her arrival. Later she met her husband in the house of a relative in Manila from
come from Nenita, nor having seen, previous to the trial, the letter exh. C. The allegation of
whence they proceeded to the Avenue Hotel where she again confronted him about Nenita.
his wife that he had a concubine is based on mere suspicion. He had always been faithful to
He denied having further relations with this woman.
his wife, and not for a single instance had he been caught or surprised by her with another
woman.
Celia Bañez, testifying for the plaintiff, declared that she was employed as a cook in the home
of the spouses from May 15, 1955 to August 15, 1958, and that during the entire period of
On the matter of the alleged abuse by the defendant of his powers of administration of the
her employment she saw the defendant in the place only once. This declaration is
conjugal partnership, the plaintiff declared that the defendant refused and failed to inform
contradicted, however, by the plaintiff herself who testified that in 1955 the defendant "used
her of the progress of their various business concerns. Although she did not allege, much less
to have a short visit there," which statement implies more than one visit.
prove, that her husband had dissipated the conjugal properties, she averred nevertheless
that her husband might squander and dispose of the conjugal assets in favor of his
The defendant, for his part, denied having abandoned his wife and children, but admitted concubine. Hence, the urgency of separation of property.
that in 1957, or a year before the filing of the action, he started to live separately from his
wife. When he transferred his living quarters to his office in Mandalagan, Bacolod City, his
The defendant's answer to the charge of mismanagement is that he has applied his industry,
intention was not, as it never has been, to abandon his wife and children, but only to teach
channeled his ingenuity, and devoted his time, to the management, maintenance and
her a lesson as she was quarrelsome and extremely jealous of every  woman. He decided to
expansion of their business concerns, even as his wife threw money away at
live apart from his wife temporarily because at home he could not concentrate on his work as
the  mahjong tables. Tangible proof of his endeavors is that from a single cargo truck which
she always quarreled with him, while in Mandalagan he could pass the nights in peace. Since
he himself drove at the time of their marriage, he had built up one business after another,
1953 he stayed in Manila for some duration of time to manage their expanding business and
the Speedway Trucking Service, the Negros Shipping Service, the Bacolod Press, the
look for market outlets for their texboard products. Even the plaintiff admitted in both her
Philippine Texboard Factory, and miscellaneous other business enterprises worth over a
original and amended complaints that "sometime in 1953, because of the expanding business
million pesos; that all that the spouses now own have been acquired through his diligence,
of the herein parties, the defendant established an office in the City of Manila, wherein some
intelligence and industry; that he has steadily expanded the income and assets of said
of the goods, effects and merchandise manufactured or produced in the business enterprises
business enterprises from year to year, contrary to the allegations of the complainant, as
of the parties were sold or disposed of". From the time he started living separately in
proved by his balance sheet and profit and loss statements for the year 1958 and 1959
Mandalagan up to the filing of the complaint, the plaintiff herself furnished him food and
(exhibits 1 and 2); and that out of the income of their enterprises he had purchased
took care of his laundry. This latter declaration was not rebutted by the plaintiff.
additional equipment and machineries and has partially paid their indebtedness to the
Philippine National Bank and the Development Bank of the Philippines.
The defendant, with vehemence, denied that he has abandoned his wife and family, averring
that he has never failed, even for a single month, to give them financial support, as witnessed
by the plaintiff's admission in her original and amended complaints as well as in open court
It will be noted that the plaintiff does not ask for legal separation. The evidence presented by with intention to forsake her entirely, never to return to her, and never to resume his marital
her to prove concubinage on the part of the defendant, while pertinent and material in the duties towards her, or to claim his marital rights; such neglect as either leaves the wife
determination of the merits of a petition for legal separation, must in this case be regarded destitute of the common necessaries of life, or would leave her destitute but for the charity
merely as an attempt to bolster her claim that the defendant had abandoned her, which of others." 4 The word "abandonment", when referring to the act of one consort of leaving
abandonment, if it constitutes abandonment in law, would justify separation of the conjugal the other, is "the act of the husband or the wife who leaves his or her consort wilfully, and
assets under the applicable provisions of article 178 of the new Civil Code which read: "The with an intention of causing per perpetual separation."  5 Giving to the word "abandoned", as
separation in fact between husband and wife without judicial approval, shall not affect the used in article 178, the meaning drawn from the definitions above reproduced, it seems
conjugal partnership, except that . . . if the husband has abandoned the wife without just rather clear that to constitute abandonment of the wife by the husband, there must be
cause for at least one year, she may petition the court for a receivership, or administration by absolute cessation of marital relations and duties and rights, with the intention of perpetual
her of the conjugal partnership property, or separation of property". In addition to separation.
abandonment as a ground, the plaintiff also invokes article 167 of the new Civil Code in
support of her prayer for division of the matrimonial assets. This article provides that "In case Coming back to the case at bar, we believe that the defendant did not intend to leave his
of abuse of powers of administration of the conjugal partnership property by the husband, wife and children permanently. The record conclusively shows that he continued to give
the courts, on the petition of the wife, may provide for a receivership, or administration by support to his family despite his absence from the conjugal home. This fact is admitted by the
the wife, or separation of property". It behooves us, therefore, to inquire, in the case at bar, complainant, although she minimized the amount of support given, saying that it was only
whether there has been abandonment, in the legal sense, by the defendant of the plaintiff, P500 monthly. There is good reason to believe, however, that she and the children received
and/or whether the defendant has abused his powers of administration of the conjugal more than this amount, as the defendant's claim that his wife and children continued to draw
partnership property, so as to justify the plaintiff's plea for separation of property. from his office more than P500 monthly was substantially corroborated by Marcos Ganaban,
whose declarations were not rebutted by the plaintiff. And then there is at all no showing
We have made a searching scrutiny of the record, and it is our considered view that the that the plaintiff and the children were living in want. On the contrary, the plaintiff admitted,
defendant is not guilty of abandonment of his wife, nor of such abuse of his powers of albeit reluctantly, that she frequently played mahjong, from which we can infer that she had
administration of the conjugal partnership, as to warrant division of the conjugal assets. money; to spare.

The extraordinary remedies afforded to the wife by article 178 when she has been The fact that the defendant never ceased to give support to his wife and children negatives
abandoned by the husband for at least one year are the same as those granted to her by any intent on his part not to return to the conjugal abode and resume his marital duties and
article 167 in case of abuse of the powers of administration by the husband. To entitle her to rights. In  People v. Schelske, 6 it was held that where a husband, after leaving his wife,
any of these remedies, under article 178, there must be real abandonment, and not mere continued to make small contributions at intervals to her support and that of their minor
separation. 1 The abandonment must not only be physical estrangement but also amount to child, he was not guilty of their "abandonment", which is an act of separation with intent that
financial and moral desertion. it shall be perpetual, since contributing to their support negatived such intent. In re Hoss'
Estate, supra, it was ruled that a father did not abandon his family where the evidence
Although an all-embracing definition of the term "abandonment " is yet to be spelled out in disclosed that he almost always did give his wife part of his earnings during the period of
explicit words, we nevertheless can determine its meaning from the context of the Law as their separation and that he gradually paid some old rental and grocery bills.
well as from its ordinary usage. The concept of abandonment in article 178 may be
established in relation to the alternative remedies granted to the wife when she has been With respect to the allegation that the defendant maintained a concubine, we believe,
abandoned by the husband, namely, receivership, administration by her, or separation of contrary to the findings of the court a quo, that the evidence on record fails to preponderate
property, all of which are designed to protect the conjugal assets from waste and dissipation in favor of the plaintiff's thesis. The proof that Nenita Hernandez was the concubine of the
rendered imminent by the husband's continued absence from the conjugal abode, and to defendant and that they were living as husband and wife in Manila, is altogether too
assure the wife of a ready and steady source of support. Therefore, physical separation alone indefinite. Aside from the uncorroborated statement of the plaintiff that she knew that
is not the full meaning of the term "abandonment", if the husband, despite his voluntary Nenita Hernandez was her husband's concubine, without demonstrating by credible evidence
departure from the society of his spouse, neither neglects the management of the conjugal the existence of illicit relations between Nenita and the defendant, the only evidence on
partnership nor ceases to give support to his wife. record offered to link the defendant to his alleged mistress is exh. C. The plaintiff however
failed to connect authorship of the said letter with Nenita, on the face whereof the sender
The word "abandon", in its ordinary sense, means to forsake entirely; to forsake or renounce merely signed as "D" and the addressee was one unidentified "Darling". The plaintiff's
utterly. 2 The dictionaries trace this word to the root idea of "putting under a bar". The testimony on cross-examination, hereunder quoted, underscores such failure:
emphasis is on the finality and the publicity with which some thing or body is thus put in the
control of another, and hence the meaning of giving up absolutely, with intent never again to Q. You personally never received any letter from Nenita?
resume or claim one's rights or interests. 3 When referring to desertion of a wife by a
husband, the word has been defined as "the act of a husband in voluntarily leaving his wife
 A. No. 167 and 178 are not to be construed as condonation of the husband's act but are designed to
protect the conjugal partnership from waste and shield the wife from want. Therefore, a
Q. Neither have you received on any time until today from 1949 from Nenita? denial of the wife's prayer does not imply a condonation of the husband's act but merely
points up the insufficiency or absence of a cause of action.
A. No.
Courts must need exercise judicial restraint and reasoned hesitance in ordering a separation
of conjugal properties because the basic policy of the law is homiletic, to promote healthy
Q. Neither have you written to her any letter yourself until now?
family life and to preserve the union of the spouses, in person, in spirit and in property.

A. Why should I write a letter to her.

Consistent with its policy of discouraging a regime of separation as not in harmony
with the unity of the family and the mutual affection and help expected of the
Q. In that case, Mrs. De la Cruz, you are not familiar with the handwriting of Nenita. spouses, the Civil Code (both old and new) requires that separation of property
Is that right? shall not prevail unless expressly stipulated in marriage settlements before the
union is solemnized or by formal judicial decree during the existence of the
A. I can say that Nenita writes very well. marriage (Article 190, new Civil Code, Article 1432, old Civil Code): and in the latter
case, it may only be ordered by the court for causes specified in Article 191 of the
Q. I am not asking you whether she writes very well or not but, my question is this: new Civil Code. 8
In view of the fact that you have never received a letter from Nenita, you have ot
sent any letter to her, you are not familiar with her handwriting? Furthermore, a judgment ordering the division of conjugal assets where there has been no
real abandonment, the separation not being wanton and absolute, may altogether slam shut
A. Yes. the door for possible reconciliation. The estranged spouses may drift irreversibly further
apart; the already broken family solidarity may be irretrievably shattered; and any flickering
hope for a new life together may be completely and finally extinguished.
Q. You have not seen her writing anybody?

The monthly alimony in the sum of P2,000 which was allowed to the wife in 1958, long
A. Yes. before the devaluation of the Philippine peso in 1962, should be increased to P3,000.

Anent the allegation that the defendant had mismanaged the conjugal partnership property, On the matter of attorney's fees, it is our view that because the defendant, by leaving the
the record presents a different picture. There is absolutely no evidence to show that he has conjugal abode, has given cause for the plaintiff to seek redress in the courts, and ask
squandered the conjugal assets. Upon the contrary, he proved that through his industry and for adequate support, an award of attorney's fees to the plaintiff must be made. Ample
zeal, the conjugal assets at the time of the trial had increased to a value of over a million authority for such award is found in paragraphs 6 and 11 of article 2208 of the new Civil Code
pesos. which empower courts to grant counsel's fees "in actions for legal support" and in cases
"where the court deems it just and equitable that attorney's fees . . . should be recovered."
The lower court likewise erred in holding that mere refusal or failure of the husband as However, an award of P10,000, in our opinion, is, under the environmental circumstances,
administrator of the conjugal partnership to inform the wife of the progress of the family sufficient.
businesses constitutes abuse of administration. For "abuse" to exist, it is not enough that the
husband perform an act or acts prejudicial to the wife. Nor is it sufficient that he commits This Court would be remiss if it did not, firstly, remind the plaintiff and the defendant that
acts injurious to the partnership, for these may be the result of mere inefficient or negligent the law enjoins husband and wife to live together, and, secondly, exhort them to avail of —
administration. Abuse connotes willful and utter disregard of the interests of the partnership, mutually, earnestly and steadfastly — all opportunities for reconciliation to the end that their
evidenced by a repetition of deliberate acts and/or omissions prejudicial to the latter. 7 marital differences may be happily resolved, and conjugal harmony may return and, on the
basis of mutual respect and understanding, endure.
If there is only physical separation between the spouses (and nothing more), engendered by
the husband's leaving the conjugal abode, but the husband continues to manage the conjugal ACCORDINGLY, the judgment a quo, insofar as it decrees separation of the conjugal
properties with the same zeal, industry, and efficiency as he did prior to the separation, and properties, is reversed and set aside. Conformably to our observations, however, the
religiously gives support to his wife and children, as in the case at bar, we are not disposed to defendant is ordered to pay to the plaintiff, in the concept of support, the amount of P3,000
grant the wife's petition for separation of property. This decision may appear to condone the per month, until he shall have rejoined her in the conjugal home, which amount may, in the
husband's separation from his wife; however, the remedies granted to the wife by articles meantime, be reduced or increased in the discretion of the court a quo as circumstances
warrant. The award of attorney's fees to the plaintiff is reduced to P10,000, without interest.
No pronouncement as to costs.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez, Angeles
and Fernando, JJ., concur.
ARTICLE 137 The balance of such deposit, which presently stands at ₱1,318,043.36, shall be withdrawn
and divided equally by the parties;
G.R. NO. 155409              June 8, 2007
b. The store that is now being occupied by the plaintiff shall be allotted to her while the
bodega shall be for the defendant. The defendant shall be paid the sum of ₱50,000.00 as his
VIRGILIO MAQUILAN, petitioner,  share in the stocks of the store in full settlement thereof.
vs.
DITA MAQUILAN, respondent.
The plaintiff shall be allowed to occupy the bodega until the time the owner of the lot on
which it stands shall construct a building thereon;
DECISION

c. The motorcycles shall be divided between them such that the Kawasaki shall be owned by
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.: the plaintiff while the Honda Dream shall be for the defendant;

Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court d. The passenger jeep shall be for the plaintiff who shall pay the defendant the sum of
assailing the Decision1dated August 30, 2002 promulgated by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA- ₱75,000.00 as his share thereon and in full settlement thereof;
G.R. SP No. 69689, which affirmed the Judgment on Compromise Agreement dated January
2, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 3, Nabunturan, Compostela Valley, and the
RTC Orders dated January 21, 2002 and February 7, 2002 (ORDERS) in Civil Case No. 656. e. The house and lot shall be to the common child.

The facts of the case, as found by the CA, are as follows: 2. This settlement is only partial, i.e., without prejudice to the litigation of other conjugal
properties that have not been mentioned;
Herein petitioner and herein private respondent are spouses who once had a blissful married
life and out of which were blessed to have a son. However, their once sugar coated romance xxxx
turned bitter when petitioner discovered that private respondent was having illicit sexual
affair with her paramour, which thus, prompted the petitioner to file a case of adultery The said Compromise Agreement was given judicial imprimatur by the respondent judge in
against private respondent and the latter’s paramour. Consequently, both the private the assailed Judgment On Compromise Agreement, which was erroneously dated January 2,
respondent and her paramour were convicted of the crime charged and were sentenced to 2002.2
suffer an imprisonment ranging from one (1) year, eight (8) months, minimum of prision
correccional as minimum penalty, to three (3) years, six (6) months and twenty one (21) days, However, petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion dated January 15, 2002, praying for the
medium of prision correccional as maximum penalty. repudiation of the Compromise Agreement and the reconsideration of the Judgment on
Compromise Agreement by the respondent judge on the grounds that his previous lawyer did
Thereafter, private respondent, through counsel, filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of not intelligently and judiciously apprise him of the consequential effects of the Compromise
Marriage, Dissolution and Liquidation of Conjugal Partnership of Gains and Damages on June Agreement.
15, 2001 with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 3 of Nabunturan, Compostela Valley, docketed
as Civil Case No. 656, imputing psychological incapacity on the part of the petitioner. The respondent Judge in the assailed Order dated January 21, 2002, denied the
aforementioned Omnibus Motion.
During the pre-trial of the said case, petitioner and private respondent entered into a
COMPROMISE AGREEMENT in the following terms, to wit: Displeased, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the aforesaid Order, but the
same was denied in the assailed Order dated February 7, 2002.3 (Emphasis supplied)
1. In partial settlement of the conjugal partnership of gains, the parties agree to the
following: The petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with the CA under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court claiming that the RTC committed grave error and abuse of discretion
a. ₱500,000.00 of the money deposited in the bank jointly in the name of the spouses shall amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction (1) in upholding the validity of the Compromise
be withdrawn and deposited in favor and in trust of their common child, Neil Maquilan, with Agreement dated January 11, 2002; (2) when it held in its Order dated February 7, 2002 that
the deposit in the joint account of the parties. the Compromise Agreement was made within the cooling-off period; (3) when it denied
petitioner’s Motion to Repudiate Compromise Agreement and to Reconsider Its Judgment on
Compromise Agreement; and (4) when it conducted the proceedings without the appearance II
and participation of the Office of the Solicitor General and/or the Provincial Prosecutor.4
WHETHER OR NOT A COMPROMISE AGREEMENT ENTERED INTO BY SPOUSES, ONE OF
On August 30, 2002, the CA dismissed the Petition for lack of merit. The CA held that the WHOM WAS CONVICTED OF ADULTERY, GIVING THE CONVICTED SPOUSE A SHARE IN THE
conviction of the respondent of the crime of adultery does not ipso facto disqualify her from CONJUGAL PROPERTY, VALID AND LEGAL;
sharing in the conjugal property, especially considering that she had only been sentenced
with the penalty of prision correccional, a penalty that does not carry the accessory penalty III
of civil interdiction which deprives the person of the rights to manage her property and to
dispose of such property inter vivos; that Articles 43 and 63 of the Family Code, which pertain
WHETHER OR NOT A JUDGMENT FOR ANNULMENT AND LEGAL SEPARATION IS A PRE-
to the effects of a nullified marriage and the effects of legal separation, respectively, do not
REQUISITE BEFORE A SPOUSE CONVICTED OF EITHER CONCUBINAGE OR ADULTERY, BE
apply, considering, too, that the Petition for the Declaration of the Nullity of Marriage filed by
DISQUALIFIED AND PROHIBITED FROM SHARING IN THE CONJUGAL PROPERTY;
the respondent invoking Article 36 of the Family Code has yet to be decided, and, hence, it is
premature to apply Articles 43 and 63 of the Family Code; that, although adultery is a ground
for legal separation, nonetheless, Article 63 finds no application in the instant case since no IV
petition to that effect was filed by the petitioner against the respondent; that the spouses
voluntarily separated their property through their Compromise Agreement with court WHETHER OR NOT THE DISQUALIFICATION OF A CONVICTED SPOUSE OF ADULTERY FROM
approval under Article 134 of the Family Code; that the Compromise Agreement, which SHARING IN A CONJUGAL PROPERTY, CONSTITUTES CIVIL INTERDICTION.5
embodies the voluntary separation of property, is valid and binding in all respects because it
had been voluntarily entered into by the parties; that, furthermore, even if it were true that The petitioner argues that the Compromise Agreement should not have been given judicial
the petitioner was not duly informed by his previous counsel about the legal effects of the imprimatur since it is against law and public policy; that the proceedings where it was
Compromise Agreement, this point is untenable since the mistake or negligence of the approved is null and void, there being no appearance and participation of the Solicitor
lawyer binds his client, unless such mistake or negligence amounts to gross negligence or General or the Provincial Prosecutor; that it was timely repudiated; and that the respondent,
deprivation of due process on the part of his client; that these exceptions are not present in having been convicted of adultery, is therefore disqualified from sharing in the conjugal
the instant case; that the Compromise Agreement was plainly worded and written in simple property.
language, which a person of ordinary intelligence can discern the consequences thereof,
hence, petitioner’s claim that his consent was vitiated is highly incredible; that the
Compromise Agreement was made during the existence of the marriage of the parties since The Petition must fail.
it was submitted during the pendency of the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage;
that the application of Article 2035 of the Civil Code is misplaced; that the cooling-off period The essential question is whether the partial voluntary separation of property made by the
under Article 58 of the Family Code has no bearing on the validity of the Compromise spouses pending the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage is valid.
Agreement; that the Compromise Agreement is not contrary to law, morals, good customs,
public order, and public policy; that this agreement may not be later disowned simply First. The petitioner contends that the Compromise Agreement is void because it circumvents
because of a change of mind; that the presence of the Solicitor General or his deputy is not the law that prohibits the guilty spouse, who was convicted of either adultery or
indispensable to the execution and validity of the Compromise Agreement, since the purpose concubinage, from sharing in the conjugal property. Since the respondent was convicted of
of his presence is to curtail any collusion between the parties and to see to it that evidence is adultery, the petitioner argues that her share should be forfeited in favor of the common
not fabricated, and, with this in mind, nothing in the Compromise Agreement touches on the child under Articles 43(2)6 and 637 of the Family Code.
very merits of the case of declaration of nullity of marriage for the court to be wary of any
possible collusion; and, finally, that the Compromise Agreement is merely an agreement
To the petitioner, it is the clear intention of the law to disqualify the spouse convicted of
between the parties to separate their conjugal properties partially without prejudice to the
adultery from sharing in the conjugal property; and because the Compromise Agreement is
outcome of the pending case of declaration of nullity of marriage.
void, it never became final and executory.

Hence, herein Petition, purely on questions of law, raising the following issues:
Moreover, the petitioner cites Article 20358 of the Civil Code and argues that since adultery is
a ground for legal separation, the Compromise Agreement is therefore void.
I.
These arguments are specious. The foregoing provisions of the law are inapplicable to the
WHETHER OF NOT A SPOUSE CONVICTED OF EITHER CONCUBINAGE OR ADULTERY, CAN STILL instant case.
SHARE IN THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP;
Article 43 of the Family Code refers to Article 42, to wit: take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that the evidence is not
fabricated or suppressed. (Emphasis supplied)
Article 42. The subsequent marriage referred to in the preceding Article9 shall be
automatically terminated by the recording of the affidavit of reappearance of the absent Section 3(e) of Rule 9 of the 1997 Rules of Court provides:
spouse, unless there is a judgment annulling the previous marriage or declaring it void ab
initio. SEC. 3. Default; declaration of.- x x x x

A sworn statement of the fact and circumstances of reappearance shall be recorded in the xxxx
civil registry of the residence of the parties to the subsequent marriage at the instance of any
interested person, with due notice to the spouses of the subsequent marriage and without
(e) Where no defaults allowed.— If the defending party in action for annulment or
prejudice to the fact of reappearance being judicially determined in case such fact is
declaration of nullity of marriage or for legal separation fails to answer, the court shall order
disputed.
the prosecuting attorney to investigate whether or not a collusion between the parties exists
if there is no collusion, to intervene for the State in order to see to it that the evidence
where a subsequent marriage is terminated because of the reappearance of an absent submitted is not fabricated. (Emphasis supplied
spouse; while Article 63 applies to the effects of a decree of legal separation. The present
case involves a proceeding where the nullity of the marriage is sought to be declared under
Truly, the purpose of the active participation of the Public Prosecutor or the Solicitor General
the ground of psychological capacity.
is to ensure that the interest of the State is represented and protected in proceedings for
annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages by preventing collusion between the
Article 2035 of the Civil Code is also clearly inapplicable. The Compromise Agreement parties, or the fabrication or suppression of evidence.10 While the appearances of the
partially divided the properties of the conjugal partnership of gains between the parties and Solicitor General and/or the Public Prosecutor are mandatory, the failure of the RTC to
does not deal with the validity of a marriage or legal separation. It is not among those that require their appearance does not per se nullify the Compromise Agreement. This Court fully
are expressly prohibited by Article 2035. concurs with the findings of the CA:

Moreover, the contention that the Compromise Agreement is tantamount to a circumvention x x x. It bears emphasizing that the intendment of the law in requiring the presence of the
of the law prohibiting the guilty spouse from sharing in the conjugal properties is misplaced. Solicitor General and/or State prosecutor in all proceedings of legal separation and
Existing law and jurisprudence do not impose such disqualification. annulment or declaration of nullity of marriage is to curtail or prevent any possibility of
collusion between the parties and to see to it that their evidence respecting the case is not
Under Article 143 of the Family Code, separation of property may be effected voluntarily or fabricated. In the instant case, there is no exigency for the presence of the Solicitor General
for sufficient cause, subject to judicial approval. The questioned Compromise Agreement and/or the State prosecutor because as already stated, nothing in the subject compromise
which was judicially approved is exactly such a separation of property allowed under the law. agreement touched into the very merits of the case of declaration of nullity of marriage for
This conclusion holds true even if the proceedings for the declaration of nullity of marriage the court to be wary of any possible collusion between the parties. At the risk of being
was still pending. However, the Court must stress that this voluntary separation of property is repetiti[ve], the compromise agreement pertains merely to an agreement between the
subject to the rights of all creditors of the conjugal partnership of gains and other persons petitioner and the private respondent to separate their conjugal properties partially without
with pecuniary interest pursuant to Article 136 of the Family Code. prejudice to the outcome of the pending case of declaration of nullity of marriage.11

Second. Petitioner’s claim that since the proceedings before the RTC were void in the Third. The conviction of adultery does not carry the accessory of civil interdiction. Article 34
absence of the participation of the provincial prosecutor or solicitor, the voluntary separation of the Revised Penal Code provides for the consequences of civil interdiction:
made during the pendency of the case is also void. The proceedings pertaining to the
Compromise Agreement involved the conjugal properties of the spouses. The settlement had Art. 34. Civil Interdiction. – Civil interdiction shall deprive the offender during the time of his
no relation to the questions surrounding the validity of their marriage. Nor did the settlement sentence of the rights of parental authority, or guardianship, either as to the person or
amount to a collusion between the parties. property of any ward, of marital authority, of the right to manage his property and of the
right to dispose of such property by any act or any conveyance inter vivos.
Article 48 of the Family Code states:
Under Article 333 of the same Code, the penalty for adultery is prision correccional in its
Art. 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, the Court medium and maximum periods. Article 333 should be read with Article 43 of the same Code.
shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State to The latter provides:
Art. 43. Prision correccional – Its accessory penalties. – The penalty of prision correccional
shall carry with it that of suspension from public office, from the right to follow a profession
or calling, and that of perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage, if the
duration of said imprisonment shall exceed eighteen months. The offender shall suffer the
disqualification provided in this article although pardoned as to the principal penalty, unless
the same shall have been expressly remitted in the pardon.

It is clear, therefore, and as correctly held by the CA, that the crime of adultery does not carry
the accessory penalty of civil interdiction which deprives the person of the rights to manage
her property and to dispose of such property inter vivos.

Fourth. Neither could it be said that the petitioner was not intelligently and judiciously
informed of the consequential effects of the compromise agreement, and that, on this basis,
he may repudiate the Compromise Agreement. The argument of the petitioner that he was
not duly informed by his previous counsel about the legal effects of the voluntary settlement
is not convincing. Mistake or vitiation of consent, as now claimed by the petitioner as his
basis for repudiating the settlement, could hardly be said to be evident. In Salonga v. Court of
Appeals,12 this Court held:

[I]t is well-settled that the negligence of counsel binds the client. This is based on the rule
that any act performed by a lawyer within the scope of his general or implied authority is
regarded as an act of his client. Consequently, the mistake or negligence of petitioners'
counsel may result in the rendition of an unfavorable judgment against them.

Exceptions to the foregoing have been recognized by the Court in cases where reckless or
gross negligence of counsel deprives the client of due process of law, or when its application
"results in the outright deprivation of one's property through a technicality." x x x x13

None of these exceptions has been sufficiently shown in the present case.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION that the subject Compromise Agreement is VALID without prejudice to the
rights of all creditors and other persons with pecuniary interest in the properties of the
conjugal partnership of gains.

SO ORDERED.
ARTICLE 147 – 148 (3) The petitioner and the respondent are directed to start proceedings on the
liquidation of their common properties as defined by Article 147 of the Family Code,
and to comply with the provisions of Articles 50, 51, and 52 of the same code,
G.R. No. 122749 July 31, 1996 within thirty (30) days from notice of this decision.

ANTONIO A. S. VALDEZ, petitioner,  Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Local Civil Registrar of Mandaluyong,
vs. Metro Manila, for proper recording in the registry of marriages.2 (Emphasis ours.)
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 102, QUEZON CITY, and CONSUELO M. GOMEZ-
VALDEZ, respondents.
Consuelo Gomez sought a clarification of that portion of the decision directing compliance
with Articles 50, 51 and 52 of the Family Code. She asserted that the Family Code contained
  no provisions on the procedure for the liquidation of common property in "unions without
marriage." Parenthetically, during the hearing of the motion, the children filed a joint
VITUG, J.:p affidavit expressing their desire to remain with their father, Antonio Valdez, herein
petitioner.
The petition for new bewails, purely on the question of law, an alleged error committed by
the Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No. Q-92-12539. Petitioner avers that the court a In an order, dated 05 May 1995, the trial court made the following clarification:
quo has failed to apply the correct law that should govern the disposition of a family dwelling
in a situation where a marriage is declared void ab initio because of psychological incapacity Consequently, considering that Article 147 of the Family Code explicitly provides
on the part of either or both parties in the contract. that the property acquired by both parties during their union, in the absence of
proof to the contrary, are presumed to have been obtained through the joint
The pertinent facts giving rise to this incident are, by large, not in dispute. efforts of the parties and will be owned by them in equal shares, plaintiff and
defendant will own their "family home" and all their properties for that matter in
Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez were married on 05 January 1971. Begotten during the equal shares.
marriage were five children. In a petition, dated 22 June 1992, Valdez sought the declaration
of nullity of the marriage pursuant to Article 36 of the Family code (docketed Civil Case No. In the liquidation and partition of properties owned in common by the plaintiff and
Q-92-12539, Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 102). After the hearing the parties defendant, the provisions on ownership found in the Civil Code shall
following the joinder of issues, the trial court, 1 in its decision of 29 July 1994, granted the apply.3 (Emphasis supplied.)
petition, viz:
In addressing specifically the issue regarding the disposition of the family dwelling, the trial
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows: court said:

(1) The marriage of petitioner Antonio Valdez and respondent Consuelo Gomez- Considering that this Court has already declared the marriage between petitioner
Valdez is hereby declared null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code on the and respondent as null and void ab initio, pursuant to Art. 147, the property regime
ground of their mutual psychological incapacity to comply with their essential of petitioner and respondent shall be governed by the rules on ownership.
marital obligations;
The provisions of Articles 102 and 129 of the Family Code finds no application since
(2) The three older children, Carlos Enrique III, Antonio Quintin and Angela Rosario Article 102 refers to the procedure for the liquidation of the conjugal partnership
shall choose which parent they would want to stay with. property  and Article 129 refers to the procedure for the liquidation of the absolute
community of property.4
Stella Eloisa and Joaquin Pedro shall be placed in the custody of their mother,
herein respondent Consuelo Gomez-Valdes. Petitioner moved for a reconsideration of the order. The motion was denied on 30 October
1995.
The petitioner and respondent shall have visitation rights over the children who are
in the custody of the other. In his recourse to this Court, petitioner submits that Articles 50, 51 and 52 of the Family Code
should be held controlling: he argues that:
 I When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the
party in bad faith in the ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common
Article 147 of the Family Code does not apply to cases where the parties are children. In case of default of or waiver by any or all of the common children or
psychologically incapacitated. their descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the innocent party. In all
cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon the termination of the cohabitation.
II
This particular kind of co-ownership applies when a man and a woman, suffering no illegal
impediment to marry each other, so exclusively live together as husband and wife under a
Articles 50, 51 and 52 in relation to Articles 102 and 129 of the Family Code govern
void marriage or without the benefit of marriage. The term "capacitated" in the provision (in
the disposition of the family dwelling in cases where a marriage is declared void ab
the first paragraph of the law) refers to the legal capacity of a party to contract marriage, i.e.,
initio, including a marriage declared void by reason of the psychological incapacity
any "male or female of the age of eighteen years or upwards not under any of the
of the spouses.
impediments mentioned in Articles 37 and 38"7 of the Code.

III
Under this property regime, property acquired by both spouses through their work and
industry shall be governed by the rules on equal co-ownership. Any property acquired during
Assuming arguendo that Article 147 applies to marriages declared void ab initio on the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. A party
the ground of the psychological incapacity of a spouse, the same may be read who did not participate in the acquisition of the property shall be considered as having
consistently with Article 129. contributed thereto jointly if said party's "efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of
the family household."8 Unlike the conjugal partnership of gains, the fruits of the couple's
IV separate property are not included in the co-ownership.

It is necessary to determine the parent with whom majority of the children wish to Article 147 of the Family Code, in the substance and to the above extent, has clarified Article
stay.5 144 of the Civil Code; in addition, the law now expressly provides that —

The trial court correctly applied the law. In a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, (a) Neither party can dispose or encumber by act intervivos his or her share in co-ownership
the property relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed by the property, without consent of the other, during the period of cohabitation; and
provisions of Article 147 or Article 148, such as the case may be, of the Family Code. Article
147 is a remake of Article 144 of the Civil Code as interpreted and so applied in previous (b) In the case of a void marriage, any party in bad faith shall forfeit his or her share in the co-
cases;6 it provides: ownership in favor of their common children; in default thereof or waiver by any or all of the
common children, each vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving descendants, or
Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live still in default thereof, to the innocent party. The forfeiture shall take place upon the
exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or termination of the cohabitation9 or declaration of nullity of the marriage. 10
under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal
shares and the property acquired by both of them through their work or industry When the common-law spouses suffer from a legal impediment to marry or when they do
shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership. not live exclusively with each other (as husband and wife), only the property acquired by
both of them through their actual joint contribution of money, property or industry shall be
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived owned in common and in proportion to their respective contributions. Such contributions
together shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or and corresponding shares, however, are  prima facie presumed to be equal. The share of any
industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who is married to another shall accrue to the absolute community or conjugal
party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other party of any property partnership, as the case may be, if so existing under a valid marriage. If the party who has
shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof in the acted in bad faith is not validly married to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the
former's efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the manner already heretofore expressed. 11
household.
In deciding to take further cognizance of the issue on the settlement of the parties' common
Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the property, the trial court acted neither imprudently nor precipitately; a court which has
property acquired during cohabitation and owned in common, without the consent jurisdiction to declare the marriage a nullity must be deemed likewise clothed in authority to
of the other, until after the termination of their cohabitation. resolve incidental and consequential matters. Nor did it commit a reversible error in ruling
that petitioner and private respondent own the "family home" and all their common 6 See Margaret Maxey vs Court of Appeals, 129 SCRA 187; Aznar, et al.vs. Garcia, et
property in equal shares, as well as in concluding that, in the liquidation and partition of the al., 102 Phil. 1055.
property owned in common by them, the provisions on co-ownership under the Civil Code,
not Articles 50, 51 and 52, in relation to Articles 102 and 129, 12 of the Family Code, should 7 Art. 5. Any male or female of the age of eighteen years or upwards not under any
aptly prevail. The rules set up to govern the liquidation of either the absolute community or of the impediments mentioned in Articles 37 and 38, may contract marriage.
the conjugal partnership of gains, the property regimes recognized for valid and voidable
marriages (in the latter case until the contract is annulled), are irrelevant to the liquidation of
Art. 37. Marriages between the following are Incestuous and void from the
the co-ownership that exists between common-law spouses. The first paragraph of Articles
beginning, whether the relationship between the parties be legitimate or
50 of the Family Code, applying paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and 95) of Article 43, 13 relates only, by
illegitimate:
its explicit terms, to voidable marriages and, exceptionally, to void  marriages under Article
40 14 of the Code, i.e., the declaration of nullity of a subsequent marriage contracted by a
spouse of a prior void marriage before the latter is judicially declared void. The latter is a (1) Between ascendants and descendants of any degree; and
special rule that somehow recognizes the philosophy and an old doctrine that void marriages
are inexistent from the very beginning and no judicial decree is necessary to establish their (2) Between brothers and sisters, whether of the full-or half-
nullity. In now requiring for purposes of remarriage, the declaration of nullity by final blood.
judgment of the previously contracted void marriage, the present law aims to do away with
any continuing uncertainty on the status of the second marriage. It is not then illogical for the Art. 38. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning for
provisions of Article 43, in relation to Articles 41 15 and 42, 16 of the Family Code, on the reasons of public policy:
effects of the termination of a subsequent marriage contracted during the subsistence of a
previous marriage to be made applicable  pro hac vice. In all other cases, it is not to be
assumed that the law has also meant to have coincident property relations, on the one hand, (1) Between collateral blood relatives; whether legitimate or
between spouses in valid and voidable marriages (before annulment) and, on the other, illegitimate, up to the fourth civil degree;
between common-law spouses or spouses of void marriages, leaving to ordain, on the latter
case, the ordinary rules on co-ownership subject to the provisions of the Family Code on the (2) Between step-parents and stepchildren;
"family home," i.e., the provisions found in Title V, Chapter 2, of the Family Code, remain in
force and effect regardless of the property regime of the spouses. (3) Between parents-in-law and children-in-law;

WHEREFORE, the questioned orders, dated 05 May 1995 and 30 October 1995, of the trial (4) Between adopting parent and the adopted child;
court are AFFIRMED. No costs.
(5) Between the surviving spouse of the adopting parent and
Padilla, Kapunan and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur. the adopted child;

Bellosillo, J., is on leave. (6) Between the surviving spouse of the adopted child and the
adopter;
Footnotes
(7) Between an adopted child and a legitimate child of the
1 Hon. Perlita Tria Tirona, presiding. adopter;

2 Rollo,  p. 22. (8) Between adopted children of the same adopter; and

3 Rollo, p. 42. (9) Between parties where one, with the intention to marry the
other, killed that other person's spouse or his or her own
4 Rollo, pp. 38-39. spouse.

5 Rollo, pp. 24-25. 8 Article 147, Family Code.

 9 Article 147, Family Code. (1) An inventory shall be prepared; listing separately all the
properties of the absolute community and the exclusive
10 Articles 43, 50 and 51, Family Code. properties of each spouse.

11 Article 148, Family Code. (2) The debts and obligations of the absolute community shall
be paid out of its assets. In case of insufficiency of the said
assets, the spouses shall be solidarily liable for the unpaid
12 Art. 50. The effects provided for in paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and (5) of
balance with their separate properties in accordance with the
Article 43 and in Article 44 shall also apply in proper cases to marriages
provisions of the second paragraph of Article 94.
which are declared void ab initio or annulled by final judgment under
Articles 40 and 45.
(3) Whatever remains of the exclusive properties of the spouses
shall be thereafter be delivered to each of them.
The final judgment in such cases shall provide for the liquidation,
partition and distribution of the propitious of the spouses, the custody
and support of the common children. and the delivery of their (4) The net remainder of the properties of the absolute
presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had been adjudicated in the community shall constitute its net assets, which shall be divided
previous judicial proceedings. equally between husband and wife, unless a different
proportion or division was agreed upon in the marriage
settlements, or unless there has been a voluntary waiver of
All creditors of the spouses as well as of the absolute community or the
such shares provided in this Code. For purposes of computing
conjugal partnership shall be notified of the proceedings for liquidation.
the net profits subject to forfeiture in accordance with Articles
43, No. (2) and 63, No. (2), the said profits shall be the increase
In the partition, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is situated, in value between the market value of the community property
shall be adjudicated in accordance with the provisions of Articles 102 and at the time of the celebration of the marriage and the market
129. value at the time of its dissolution.

Art 51. In said partition, the value of the presumptive legitimes of all (5) The Presumptive legitimes of the common children shall be
common children, computed as of the date of the final judgment of the delivered upon partition, in accordance with Article 51.
trial court, shall be delivered In cash, property or sound securities, unless
the parties, by mutual agreement judicially approved, had already
(6) Unless otherwise agreed upon the parties, in the partition of
provided for such matters.
the properties, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is
situated shall be adjudicated the the spouse with whom the
The children of their guardian, or the trustee of their property, may ask for the majority of the common children choose to remain. Children
enforcement of the judgment. below the age of seven years are deemed to have chosen the
mother, unless the court has decided otherwise. In case there is
The delivery of the presumptive legitimes herein prescribed shall in no way no such majority, the court shall decide, taking into
prejudice the ultimate successional rights of the children accruing upon the death consideration the best interests of the said children.
of either or both of the parents; but the value of the properties already received
under the decree of annulment or absolute nullity shall be considered as advances Art. 129. Upon the dissolution of the conjugal partnership regime, the following
on their legitime. procedure shall apply:

Art. 52. The judgment of annulment or of absolute nullity of the marriage, the (1) An inventory shall be prepared, listing separately all the
partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses, and the delivery of the properties of the conjugal partnership and the exclusive
children's presumptive legitimes shall be recorded in the appropriate civil registry properties of each spouse.
and registries of property; otherwise, the same shall not affect the third persons.

Art. 102. Upon dissolution of the absolute community regime, the following
procedure shall apply:
 (2) Amounts advanced by the conjugal partnership in payment (2) The absolute community of property or the conjugal partnership, as the case
of personal debts and obligations of either spouse shall be may be, shall be dissolved and liquidated, but if either spouse contracted said
credited to the conjugal partnership as an asset thereof. marriage in bad faith, his or her share of the net profits of the community property
or conjugal partnership property shall be forfeited in favor of the common children
(3) Each spouse shall be reimbursed for the use of his or her or, if there are none, the children of the guilty spouse by a previous marriage or, in
exclusive funds in the acquisition of property or for the value of default of children, the incorrect spouse.
his or her exclusive property, the ownership of which has been
vested by law in the conjugal partnership. (3) Donations by reasons of marriage shall remain valid, except that if the
donee contracted the marriage in bad faith, such donations made to said
(4) The debts and obligations of the conjugal partnership shall donee are revoked by operation of law;
be paid out of the conjugal assets. In the case of insufficiency of
the said assets, the spouses shall be solidarily liable for the (4) The innocent spouse my revoke the designation of the other spouse
unpaid balance with their separate properties , in accordance who acted as a beneficiary in any insurance policy, even if such
with the provisions of paragraph (2) of Article 121.(5) Whatever designation be stipulated as irrevocable; and
remains of the exclusive properties of the spouses shall
thereafter be delivered to each of them. (5) The spouse who contracted the subsequent marriage in bad faith shall
be disqualified in inherit from the innocent spouse by testate and
(6) Unless the owner has been indemnified from whatever source, the intestate succession.
loss or deterioration of movables used for the benefit of the family,
belonging to either spouse, even due to fortuitous event, shall be paid to 14 Art. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes
said spouse from the conjugal funds, if any. of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous
marriage void.
(7) The net remainder of the conjugal partnership properties shall
constitute the profits, which shall be divided equally between husband 15 Art 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a
and wife, unless a different proportion or division was agreed upon in the previous marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the
marriage settlements or unless there has been a voluntary waiver or subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years
forfeiture of such share as provided in this Code. and the spouse present had a well-rounded belief that the absent spouse was
already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death under the
(8) The presumptive legitimes of the common children shall be delivered circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence
upon partition in accordance with Article 51. of only two years shall be sufficient.

(9) In the partition of the properties, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding
which it is situated shall, unless otherwise agreed upon by the parties, be paragraph, the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in
adjudicated to the spouse with whom the majority of the common this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without
children choose to remain. Children below the age of seven years are prejudice to the effect or reappearance of the absent spouse.
deemed to have chosen the mother, unless the court has decided
otherwise. In case there is no such majority, the court shall decide, taking 16 Art. 42. The subsequent marriage referred to in the preceding Article shall be
into consideration the best interests of the said children. automatically terminated by the recording of the affidavit of reappearance of the
absent spouse, unless there is judgment annulling the previous marriage or
13 Art 43. The termination of the subsequent marriage referred to in the preceding declaring it void ab initio.
Article shall produce the following effects:
A sworn statement of the fact and circumstances of reappearance shall be
(1) The children of subsequent marriage concieved prior to its termination shall be recorded in the civil registry of the residence of the parties to the subsequent
considered legitimate, and their custody and support in case of dispute shall be marriage at the instance of any interested person, with the due notice to the
decided by the court in a proper proceeding; spouses of the subsequent marriage and without prejudice to the fact of
reappearance being judicially determined in such case such fact is disputed.
ARTICLE 147 – 148   Valuation of Valuation of petitioner
respondent
(Record, p. 111) 
G.R. NO. 159521 December 16, 2005] (Record, p. 110) 
1. Acropolis property None P 6,000,000
FRANCISCO L. GONZALES, Petitioner, v. ERMINDA F. GONZALES, Respondents.
2. Baguio City property P 10,000,000 10,000,000
DECISION
3. Nasugbu, Batangas 5,000,000 5,000,000
property
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
18,000,000 23,000,000
4. Corinthian house and
This Petition for Review on Certiorari seeks the reversal of the Decision dated April 2, 2003 lot
2,500,000 2,000,000
and Resolution dated August 8, 2003, both issued by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
66041, entitled, "Erminda F. Gonzales, plaintiff-appellee v. Francisco L. Gonzales, defendant- 5. Sagitarius condominium
30,000,000 24,000,000
appellant."
6. Office
10,000,000 15,000,000
In March 1977, Francisco Gonzales, petitioner, and Erminda Gonzales, respondent, started
living as husband and wife. After two (2) years, or on February 4, 1979, they got married. 7. Greenmeadows lot
7,000,000 10,000,000
From this union, four (4) children were born, namely: Carlo Manuel, Maria Andres, Maria
Angelica and Marco Manuel. 8. White Plains
12,000,000  None

On October 29, 1992, respondent filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 143, 9. Corinthian lot
Makati City, for annulment of marriage with prayer for support pendente lite, docketed as Personal Property (Vehicles)
Civil Case No. 32-31111. The complaint alleges that petitioner is psychologically incapacitated 1. Galant '83 model None P 120,000
to comply with the obligations of marriage. He beats her for no justifiable reason, humiliates
and embarrasses her, and denies her love, sexual comfort and loyalty. During the time they 2. Toyota Corona '79 -  80,000
lived together, they acquired properties. She managed their pizza business and worked hard model
for its development. She prays for the declaration of the nullity of their marriage and for the -  150,000
dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains. 3. Coaster '77 model
-  500,000
4. Pajero '89 model
In his answer to the complaint, petitioner averred that it is respondent who is psychologically
incapacitated. He denied that she was the one who managed the pizza business and claimed -  180,000
that he exclusively owns the properties "existing during their marriage."  5. Corolla '92 model
350,000
6. L-300 '90 model
In her reply, respondent alleged that "she controlled the entire generation of Fiesta Pizza
representing 80% of the total management of the same and that all income from said 220,000
business are conjugal in nature." 7. Mercedes Sedan '79
model
100,000
The public prosecutor, in compliance with the directive of the trial court, and pursuant 8. Pick-up '89 model
Section 48 of the Family Code, 1 certified that no collusion exists between the parties in asking 300,000
for the declaration of the nullity of their marriage and that he would appear for the state to
9. Mercedes wagon '80
see to it that the evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.  200,000
model

Each party submitted a list of the properties with their valuation, acquired during their union, - 
10. Nissan Sentra '89
thus: model

11. 8 Tamaraws
Evidence adduced during the trial show that petitioner used to beat respondent without 4. Nasugbu property - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 5,000,000
justifiable reasons, humiliating and embarrassing her in the presence of people and even in
front of their children. He has been afflicted with satyriasis, a personality disorder 5. Greenmeadows property - - - - - 12,500,000
characterized by excessive and promiscuous sex hunger manifested by his indiscriminate
womanizing. The trial court found that: 6. Sagitarius condominium - - - - - - 2,250,000 

"The evidence adduced by plaintiff was overwhelming to prove that the defendant by his P 47,750,000
infliction of injuries on the plaintiff, his wife, and excessive and promiscuous hunger for sex, a
personality disorder called satyriasis, was, at the time of the celebration of marriage, 2) Personal:
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage although
such incapacity became manifest only after its solemnization. The defendant's evidence, on
1. Pajero '89 model - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - P 500,000
the other hand, on the psychological incapacity of plaintiff did not have any evidentiary
weight, the same being doubtful, unreliable, unclear and unconvincing."
2. L-300 '90 model - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 350,000

On February 12, 1997, the trial court rendered its Decision, the dispositive portion of which
3. Nissan Sentra '89 model - - - - - 200,000
reads:

P 1,050,000
"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is rendered:
B. 1) Defendant's share of real properties:
1) Declaring the marriage contracted by and between FRANCISCO L. GONZALEZ and
ERMINDA F. FLORENTINO solemnized by Rev. Fr. Alberto Ampil, S.J. on February 4, 1979, at 1. Corinthian house and lot - - - - P 20,500,000
the Manila Hilton Chapel, Nuestra de Guia Parish, Ermita, Manila, NULL and VOID ab
initio with all legal effects as provided for under applicable laws;
2. Office - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 27,000,000

2) Awarding the custody of minors Maria Andrea and Marco Manuel to the plaintiff, and
P 47,500,000
Carlo Manuel and Maria Angela with rights of visitation given to both parties under an
arrangement mutually acceptable to both of them;
2) Personal:

3) Ordering the parties to deliver the children's legitimes pursuant to Article 50, in relation to
1. Galant '83 model - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - P 120,000
Article 51 of the Family Code;

2. Toyota Corona '79 model - - - - 80,000

4) Ordering the defendant to give monthly support to Maria Andrea and Marco Manuel in
the amount of Forty Thousand (P40,000.00) Pesos within five (5) days of each corresponding
3. Coaster '77 model - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 150,000
month delivered at the residence of the plaintiff staring January 1997 and thereafter;

4. Corolla '92 model - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 180,000 

5) Ordering the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains and dividing the conjugal
properties between the plaintiff and the defendant as follows:
5. Mercedes Sedan '79 model - - - 220,000

A. 1) Plaintiff's share of real properties:

6. Pick-up '89 model - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 100,000

1. Corinthian lot - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - P 12,000,000

7. Mercedes wagon '80 model' 300,000 

2. Acropolis property - - - - - - - - - - - - - 6,000,000

P 1,150,000 

3. Baguio property - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 10,000,000

8. Four (4) Tamaraws - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
6) Ordering the plaintiff to pay the defendant in cash the amount of P2,196,125. Article 147 creates a presumption that properties acquired during the cohabitation of the
parties have been acquired through their joint efforts, work or industry and shall be owned
7) Ordering the defendant who has actual possession of the conjugal properties to deliver to plaintiff her by them in equal shares. It further provides that a party who did not participate in the
share of the real and personal properties, including four (4) Tamaraws, above-described, and execute the acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in
necessary documents valid in law conveying the title and ownership of said properties in favor of the the acquisition thereof if the former's efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the
plaintiff." family and of the household. 

Not satisfied with the manner their properties were divided, petitioner appealed to the Court While it is true that all the properties were bought from the proceeds of the pizza business,
of Appeals. He did not contest that part of the decision which declared his marriage to petitioner himself testified that respondent was not a plain housewife and that she helped
respondent void ab initio. him in managing the business. In his handwritten letter to her dated September 6, 1989, he
admitted that "You ve helped me for what we are now and I won't let it be destroyed."
In its Decision dated April 2, 2003, the Appellate Court affirmed the assailed Decision of the
trial court. It appeared that before they started living together, petitioner offered respondent to be his
partner in his pizza business and to take over its operations. Respondent started managing
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied in an Order dated July 23, the business in 1976. Her job was to: (1) take care of the daily operations of the business; (2)
1997.  manage the personnel; and (3) meet people during inspection and supervision of outlets. She
reported for work everyday, even on Saturdays and Sundays, without receiving any salary or
Hence, the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari . allowance.

The sole issue for our resolution is whether the court of Appeals erred in ruling that the In Petitions for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the general rule is
properties should be divided equally between the parties.  that only questions of law may be raised by the parties and passed upon by this
Court.2 Factual findings of the Appellate Court are generally binding on, especially this Court,
when in complete accord with the findings of the trial court, 3 as in this case. This is because it
Let it be stressed that petitioner does not challenge the Appellate Court's Decision declaring
is not our function to analyze or weigh the evidence all over again.4
his marriage with respondent void. Consequently, their property relation shall be governed
by the provisions of Article 147 of the Family Code quoted as follows:
WHEREFOR, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of
the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. CV No. 66041, are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
"ART. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live
exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a
void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the SO ORDERED.
property acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall be governed by the
rules on co-ownership.  The petitioner wanted that the White Plains and Greenmeadows lots be classified as non-
conjugal assets. The RTC agreed with respect to the While Plains property because it was
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be purchased by petitioner before he started living with respondent. However, the RTC
presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned disagreed with respect to the Greenmeadows lot and declared that it is conjugal property
by them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the because although it was purchased before they started living together, the payment of the
acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in purchase price was completed only after their marriage. 
the acquisition thereof if the former's efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the
family and of the household."  In dividing the properties between the parties, the RTC took the average of the petitioner's
and respondent's valuation of a specific property. Thus, the RTC fixed the valuation of each
These provisions enumerate the two instances when the property relations between spouses property as follows:
shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership. These are: (1) when a man and woman
capacitated to marry each other live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without 1. Acropolis property - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  P 6,000,000
the benefit of marriage; and (2) when a man and woman live together under a void marriage.
Under this property regime of co-ownership, properties acquired by both parties during their 2. Baguio City property - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  10,000,000
union, in the absence of proof to the contrary, are presumed to have been obtained through
the joint efforts of the parties and will be owned by them in equal shares.
 Plaintiff will get the following:
3. Nasugbu, Batangas property - - - - - - -  5,000,000
1. Pajero '89 model - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  P 500,000
4. Corinthian house and lot - - - - - - - - - - - - -  20,500,000
2. L-300 '90 model - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  350,000
5. Sagitarius condominium - - - - - - - - - - - - -  2,250,000
3. Nissan Sentra '89 model - - - - - - - - -  200,000 
6. Office - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  27,000,000   P 1,050,000 

7. Greenmeadows lot - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  12,500,000 Defendant will get the following:

8. Corinthian lot - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  12,000,000  1. Galant '83 model P 120,000

  P 95,250,000
2. Toyota Corona '79 model 80,000
The valuation of the conjugal real properties as fixed by the Court was P95,250,000,
excluding the White Plains property. Each spouse will get one-half of these properties, 3. Coaster '77 model 150,000
or P47,625,000.
4. Corolla '92 model 180,000
Defendant will get the following:
5. Mercedes Sedan '79 model 220,000
1. Corinthian house and lot - - - - - - - - - - - - -  P 20,500,000
6. Pick-up '89 model 100,000
2. Office - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 27,000,000 
- - - - - - -  7. Mercedes wagon '80 model  300,000 
  P 47,500,000
  P 1,150,000

Plaintiff will get the following:

1. Corinthian lot - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  P 12,000,000

6,000,000
2. Acropolis property - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
10,000,000
3. Baguio property - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
5,000,000
4. Nasugbu property - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
12,500,000
5. Greenmeadows - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
2,250,000 
6. Sagitarius condominium - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
  P 47,750,000 

With respect to the personal properties - vehicles - their total value was fixed at P2,200,000
by defendant. The husband or the wife will get said vehicles with total value of P1,100,000.
ARTICLE 147 – 148 where she met petitioner who introduced herself as the wife of the deceased. To bolster her
action for collection of sum of money, respondent contended that the marriage of petitioner
and the deceased is void ab initio because the same was solemnized without the required
G.R. No. 132529. February 2, 2001 marriage license. In support thereof, respondent presented: 1) the marriage certificate of the
deceased and the petitioner which bears no marriage license number; 5and 2) a certification
SUSAN NICDAO CARIÑO, petitioner,  dated March 9, 1994, from the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, which reads –
vs.
SUSAN YEE CARIÑO, respondent. This is to certify that this Office has no record of marriage license of the spouses SANTIAGO
CARINO (sic) and SUSAN NICDAO, who are married in this municipality on June 20, 1969.
DECISION Hence, we cannot issue as requested a true copy or transcription of Marriage License number
from the records of this archives.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This certification is issued upon the request of Mrs. Susan Yee Cariño for whatever legal
The issue for resolution in the case at bar hinges on the validity of the two marriages purpose it may serve.  6
contracted by the deceased SPO4 Santiago S. Cariño, whose “death benefits” is now the
subject of the controversy between the two Susans whom he married. 1âwphi1.nêt On August 28, 1995, the trial court ruled in favor of respondent, Susan Yee, holding as
follows:
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to set aside the decision 1 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51263, which affirmed in toto the decision 2 of the WHEREFORE, the defendant is hereby ordered to pay the plaintiff the sum of P73,000.00, half
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 87, in Civil Case No. Q-93-18632. of the amount which was paid to her in the form of death benefits arising from the death of
SPO4 Santiago S. Cariño, plus attorney’s fees in the amount of P5,000.00, and costs of suit.
During the lifetime of the late SPO4 Santiago S. Cariño, he contracted two marriages, the first
was on June 20, 1969, with petitioner Susan Nicdao Cariño (hereafter referred to as Susan IT IS SO ORDERED.  7
Nicdao), with whom he had two offsprings, namely, Sahlee and Sandee Cariño; and the
second was on November 10, 1992, with respondent Susan Yee Cariño (hereafter referred to On appeal by petitioner to the Court of Appeals, the latter affirmed in toto the decision of the
as Susan Yee), with whom he had no children in their almost ten year cohabitation starting trial court. Hence, the instant petition, contending that:
way back in 1982.

I.
In 1988, SPO4 Santiago S. Cariño became ill and bedridden due to diabetes complicated by
pulmonary tuberculosis. He passed away on November 23, 1992, under the care of Susan
Yee, who spent for his medical and burial expenses. Both petitioner and respondent filed THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE
claims for monetary benefits and financial assistance pertaining to the deceased from various FINDINGS OF THE LOWER COURT THAT VDA. DE CONSUEGRA VS. GSIS IS
government agencies. Petitioner Susan Nicdao was able to collect a total of P146,000.00 from APPLICABLE TO THE CASE AT BAR.
“MBAI, PCCUI, Commutation, NAPOLCOM, [and] Pag-ibig,” 3 while respondent Susan Yee
received a total of P21,000.00 from “GSIS Life, Burial (GSIS) and burial (SSS).” 4 II.

On December 14, 1993, respondent Susan Yee filed the instant case for collection of sum of THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN APPLYING EQUITY IN THE
money against petitioner Susan Nicdao praying, inter alia, that petitioner be ordered to INSTANT CASE INSTEAD OF THE CLEAR AND UNEQUIVOCAL MANDATE OF THE
return to her at least one-half of the one hundred forty-six thousand pesos (P146,000.00) FAMILY CODE.
collectively denominated as “death benefits” which she (petitioner) received from “MBAI,
PCCUI, Commutation, NAPOLCOM, [and] Pag-ibig.” Despite service of summons, petitioner III.
failed to file her answer, prompting the trial court to declare her in default.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING THE CASE
Respondent Susan Yee admitted that her marriage to the deceased took place during the OF VDA. DE CONSUEGRA VS GSIS TO HAVE BEEN MODIFIED, AMENDED AND EVEN
subsistence of, and without first obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity of, the marriage ABANDONED BY THE ENACTMENT OF THE FAMILY CODE. 8
between petitioner and the deceased. She, however, claimed that she had no knowledge of
the previous marriage and that she became aware of it only at the funeral of the deceased,
Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be one of the marriages exempt from the marriage license requirement, is undoubtedly void ab
invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such initio.
previous marriage void. Meaning, where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought
to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law, It does not follow from the foregoing disquisition, however, that since the marriage of
for said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity, is a final judgment declaring the petitioner and the deceased is declared void ab initio, the “death benefits” under scrutiny
previous marriage void. 9 However, for purposes other than remarriage, no judicial action is would now be awarded to respondent Susan Yee. To reiterate, under Article 40 of the Family
necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not Code, for purposes of remarriage, there must first be a prior judicial declaration of the nullity
limited to the determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of of a previous marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a second marriage,
estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass otherwise, the second marriage would also be void.
upon the validity of marriage even after the death of the parties thereto, and even in a suit
not directly instituted to question the validity of said marriage, so long as it is essential to the
Accordingly, the declaration in the instant case of nullity of the previous marriage of the
determination of the case. 10 In such instances, evidence must be adduced, testimonial or
deceased and petitioner Susan Nicdao does not validate the second marriage of the deceased
documentary, to prove the existence of grounds rendering such a previous marriage an
with respondent Susan Yee. The fact remains that their marriage was solemnized without
absolute nullity. These need not be limited solely to an earlier final judgment of a court
first obtaining a judicial decree declaring the marriage of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the
declaring such previous marriage void. 11
deceased void. Hence, the marriage of respondent Susan Yee and the deceased is, likewise,
void ab initio.
It is clear therefore that the Court is clothed with sufficient authority to pass upon the validity
of the two marriages in this case, as the same is essential to the determination of who is
One of the effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage is the separation of the property of
rightfully entitled to the subject “death benefits” of the deceased.
the spouses according to the applicable property regime. 16 Considering that the two
marriages are void ab initio, the applicable property regime would not be absolute
Under the Civil Code, which was the law in force when the marriage of petitioner Susan community or conjugal partnership of property, but rather, be governed by the provisions of
Nicdao and the deceased was solemnized in 1969, a valid marriage license is a requisite of Articles 147 and 148 of the Family Code on “Property Regime of Unions Without Marriage.”
marriage, 12 and the absence thereof, subject to certain exceptions, 13 renders the marriage
void ab initio. 14
Under Article 148 of the Family Code, which refers to the property regime of bigamous
marriages, adulterous relationships, relationships in a state of concubine, relationships where
In the case at bar, there is no question that the marriage of petitioner and the deceased does both man and woman are married to other persons, multiple alliances of the same married
not fall within the marriages exempt from the license requirement. A marriage license, man, 17 -
therefore, was indispensable to the validity of their marriage. This notwithstanding, the
records reveal that the marriage contract of petitioner and the deceased bears no marriage
“... [O]nly the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint
license number and, as certified by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, their
contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion
office has no record of such marriage license. In Republic v. Court of Appeals, 15 the Court held
to their respective contributions ...”
that such a certification is adequate to prove the non-issuance of a marriage license. Absent
any circumstance of suspicion, as in the present case, the certification issued by the local civil
registrar enjoys probative value, he being the officer charged under the law to keep a record In this property regime, the properties acquired by the parties through their actual joint
of all data relative to the issuance of a marriage license. contribution shall belong to the co-ownership. Wages and salaries earned by each party
belong to him or her exclusively. Then too, contributions in the form of care of the home,
children and household, or spiritual or moral inspiration, are excluded in this regime. 18
Such being the case, the presumed validity of the marriage of petitioner and the deceased
has been sufficiently overcome. It then became the burden of petitioner to prove that their
marriage is valid and that they secured the required marriage license. Although she was Considering that the marriage of respondent Susan Yee and the deceased is a bigamous
declared in default before the trial court, petitioner could have squarely met the issue and marriage, having been solemnized during the subsistence of a previous marriage then
explained the absence of a marriage license in her pleadings before the Court of Appeals and presumed to be valid (between petitioner and the deceased), the application of Article 148 is
this Court. But petitioner conveniently avoided the issue and chose to refrain from pursuing therefore in order.
an argument that will put her case in jeopardy. Hence, the presumed validity of their
marriage cannot stand. The disputed P146,000.00 from MBAI [AFP Mutual Benefit Association, Inc.], NAPOLCOM,
Commutation, Pag-ibig, and PCCUI, are clearly renumerations, incentives and benefits from
It is beyond cavil, therefore, that the marriage between petitioner Susan Nicdao and the governmental agencies earned by the deceased as a police officer. Unless respondent Susan
deceased, having been solemnized without the necessary marriage license, and not being Yee presents proof to the contrary, it could not be said that she contributed money, property
or industry in the acquisition of these monetary benefits. Hence, they are not owned in share in his estate upon his death should she survive him. Consequently, whether as conjugal
common by respondent and the deceased, but belong to the deceased alone and respondent partner in a still subsisting marriage or as such putative heir she has an interest in the
has no right whatsoever to claim the same. By intestate succession, the said “death benefits” husband’s share in the property here in dispute....” And with respect to the right of the second
of the deceased shall pass to his legal heirs. And, respondent, not being the legal wife of the wife, this Court observed that although the second marriage can be presumed to be void ab
deceased is not one of them. initio as it was celebrated while the first marriage was still subsisting, still there is need for
judicial declaration of such nullity. And inasmuch as the conjugal partnership formed by the
As to the property regime of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased, Article 147 of the second marriage was dissolved before judicial declaration of its nullity, “[t]he only just and
Family Code governs. This article applies to unions of parties who are legally capacitated and equitable solution in this case would be to recognize the right of the second wife to her share
not barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless void of one-half in the property acquired by her and her husband, and consider the other half as
for other reasons, like the absence of a marriage license. Article 147 of the Family Code reads pertaining to the conjugal partnership of the first marriage.”   21
-
It should be stressed, however, that the aforecited decision is premised on the rule which
Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively requires a prior and separate judicial declaration of nullity of marriage. This is the reason why
with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void in the said case, the Court determined the rights of the parties in accordance with their
marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property existing property regime.
acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-
ownership. In Domingo v. Court of Appeals, 22 however, the Court, construing Article 40 of the Family
Code, clarified that a prior and separate declaration of nullity of a marriage is an all important
In the absence
presumed of proof
to have beento the contrary,
obtained properties
by their acquired
joint efforts, workwhile they lived
or industry, andtogether
shall beshall
ownedbe condition precedent only for purposes of remarriage. That is, if a party who is previously
by them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the married wishes to contract a second marriage, he or she has to obtain first a judicial decree
acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in
the acquisition thereof if the former’s efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the declaring the first marriage void, before he or she could contract said second marriage,
family and of the household.
otherwise the second marriage would be void. The same rule applies even if the first
xxx marriage is patently void because the parties are not free to determine for themselves the
validity or invalidity or their marriage. However, for purposes other than to remarry, like for
When
faith inonly
theone of the parties
co-ownership to abevoid
shall marriage
forfeited in is in good
favor faith,common
of their the sharechildren.
of the party in bad
In case of filing a case for collection of sum of money anchored on a marriage claimed to be valid, no
default of or waiver by any or all of the common children or their descendants, each vacant prior and separate judicial declaration of nullity is necessary. All that a party has to do is to
share shall belong to the respective surviving descendants. In the absence of descendants,
such share shall belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon present evidence, testimonial or documentary, that would prove that the marriage from
termination of the cohabitation.
which his or her rights flow is in fact valid. Thereupon, the court, if material to the
determination of the issues before it, will rule on the status of the marriage involved and
In contrast to Article 148, under the foregoing article, wages and salaries earned by either proceed to determine the rights of the parties in accordance with the applicable laws and
party during the cohabitation shall be owned by the parties in equal shares and will be jurisprudence. Thus, in Niñal v. Bayadog, 23 the Court explained:
divided equally between them, even if only one party earned the wages and the other did
not contribute thereto. 19 Conformably, even if the disputed “death benefits” were earned by
the deceased alone as a government employee, Article 147 creates a co-ownership in respect [T]he court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to
thereto, entitling the petitioner to share one-half thereof. As there is no allegation of bad question the same so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. This is without
faith in the present case, both parties of the first marriage are presumed to be in good faith. prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case. When such need arises, a final judgment of
Thus, one-half of the subject “death benefits” under scrutiny shall go to the petitioner as her declaration of nullity is necessary even if the purpose is other than to remarry. The clause “on
share in the property regime, and the other half pertaining to the deceased shall pass by, the basis of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void” in Article 40 of the
intestate succession, to his legal heirs, namely, his children with Susan Nicdao. Family Code connoted that such final judgment need not be obtained only for purpose of
remarriage.
In affirming the decision of the trial court, the Court of Appeals relied on the case of Vda. de
Consuegra v. Government Service Insurance System,  20 where the Court awarded one-half of WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, and the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
the retirement benefits of the deceased to the first wife and the other half, to the second No. 51263 which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City ordering
wife, holding that: petitioner to pay respondent the sum of P73,000.00 plus attorney’s fees in the amount of
P5,000.00, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The complaint in Civil Case No. Q-93-18632, is hereby
DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs.1âwphi1.nêt
“... [S]ince the defendant’s first marriage has not been dissolved or declared void the conjugal
partnership established by that marriage has not ceased. Nor has the first wife lost or
relinquished her status as putative heir of her husband under the new Civil Code, entitled to SO ORDERED.
 The main issue is — Can plaintiff validly claim the partition and/or payment of co-
ARTICLE 147 – 148 ownership share, accounting and damages, considering that plaintiff and defendant
are admittedly both married to their respective spouses under still valid and
subsisting marriages, even assuming as claimed by plaintiff, that they lived together
G.R. No. 136803               June 16, 2000 as husband and wife without benefit of marriage? In other words, can the parties
be considered as co-owners of the properties, under the law, considering the
EUSTAQUIO MALLILIN, JR., petitioner,  present status of the parties as both married and incapable of marrying each other,
vs. even assuming that they lived together as husband and wife (?)
MA. ELVIRA CASTILLO, respondent.
B.
MENDOZA, J.:
As a collateral issue, can the plaintiff be considered as an unregistered co-owner of
This is a petition for review of the amended decision1 of the Court of Appeals dated May 7, the real properties under the Transfer Certificates of Title duly registered solely in
1998 in CA G.R. CV No. 48443 granting respondent's motion for reconsideration of its the name of defendant Ma. Elvira Castillo? This issue is also true as far as the motor
decision dated November 7, 1996, and of the resolution dated December 21, 1998 denying vehicles in question are concerned which are also registered in the name of
petitioner's motion for reconsideration. defendant.6

The factual and procedural antecedents are as follows: On the first point, respondent contended that even if she and petitioner actually cohabited,
petitioner could not validly claim a part of the subject real and personal properties because
On February 24, 1993, petitioner Eustaquio Mallilin, Jr. filed a complaint2 for "Partition and/or Art. 144 of the Civil Code, which provides that the rules on co-ownership shall govern the
Payment of Co-Ownership Share, Accounting and Damages" against respondent Ma. Elvira properties acquired by a man and a woman living together as husband and wife but not
Castillo. The complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 93-656 at the Regional Trial Court in married, or under a marriage which is void ab initio, applies only if the parties are not in any
Makati City, alleged that petitioner and respondent, both married and with children, but way incapacitated to contract marriage.7 In the parties' case, their union suffered the legal
separated from their respective spouses, cohabited after a brief courtship sometime in 1979 impediment of a prior subsisting marriage. Thus, the question of fact being raised by
while their respective marriages still subsisted. During their union, they set up the petitioner, i.e., whether they lived together as husband and wife, was irrelevant as no co-
Superfreight Customs Brokerage Corporation, with petitioner as president and chairman of ownership could exist between them.
the board of directors, and respondent as vice-president and treasurer. The business
flourished and petitioner and respondent acquired real and personal properties which were As to the second issue, respondent maintained that petitioner cannot be considered an
registered solely in respondent's name. In 1992, due to irreconcilable differences, the couple unregistered co-owner of the subject properties on the ground that, since titles to the land
separated. Petitioner demanded from respondent his share in the subject properties, but are solely in her name, to grant petitioner's prayer would be to allow a collateral attack on
respondent refused alleging that said properties had been registered solely in her name. the validity of such titles.

In her Amended Answer,3 respondent admitted that she engaged in the customs brokerage Petitioner opposed respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment.8 He contended that the
business with petitioner but alleged that the Superfreight Customs Brokerage Corporation case presented genuine factual issues and that Art. 144 of the Civil Code had been repealed
was organized with other individuals and duly registered with the Securities and Exchange by the Family Code which now allows, under Art. 148, a limited co-ownership even though a
Commission in 1987. She denied that she and petitioner lived as husband and wife because man and a woman living together are not capacitated to marry each other. Petitioner also
the fact was that they were still legally married to their respective spouses. She claimed to be asserted that an implied trust was constituted when he and respondent agreed to register
the exclusive owner of all real personal properties involved in petitioner's action for partition the properties solely in the latter's name although the same were acquired out of the profits
on the ground that they were acquired entirely out of her own money and registered solely made from their brokerage business. Petitioner invoked the following provisions of the Civil
in her name. Code:

On November 25, 1994, respondent filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, 4 in accordance Art. 1452. If two or more persons agree to purchase property and by common
with Rule 34 of the Rules of Court.5 She contended that summary judgment was proper, consent the legal title is taken in the name of one of them for the benefit of all, a
because the issues raised in the pleadings were sham and not genuine, to wit: trust is created by force of law in favor of the others in proportion to the interest of
each.
A.
 Art. 1453. When the property is conveyed to a person in reliance upon his declared 4. TCT No. 37047 (Annex D) = — do —
intention to hold it for, or transfer it to another grantor, there is an implied trust in
favor of the person whose benefit is contemplated. 5. TCT No. 37048 (Annex E) = — do —

On January 30, 1995, the trial court rendered its decision 9 granting respondent's motion for 6. TCT No. 30368 (Annex F) = Steelhaus Realty & Dev. Corp.
summary judgment. It ruled that an examination of the pleadings shows that the issues
involved were purely legal. The trial court also sustained respondent's contention that
7. TCT No. 30369 (Annex G) = — do —
petitioner's action for partition amounted to a collateral attack on the validity of the
certificates of title covering the subject properties. It held that even if the parties really had
cohabited, the action for partition could not be allowed because an action for partition 8. TCT No. 30371 (Annex F) = — do —
among co-owners ceases to be so and becomes one for title if the defendant, as in the
present case, alleges exclusive ownership of the properties in question. For these reasons, 9. TCT No. (92323) 67881 (Annex I) = Eloisa Castillo
the trial court dismissed Civil Case No. 93-656.
In this action, plaintiff-appellant seeks to be declared as 1/2 co-owner of the real properties
On appeals, the Court of Appeals on November 7, 1996, ordered the case remanded to the covered by the above listed titles and eventually for their partition [par. (a), Prayer; p. 4
court of origin for trial on the merits. It cited the decision in Roque v.  Intermediate Appellate Records]. Notably, in order to achieve such prayer for a joint co-ownership declaration, it is
Court 10 to the effect that an action for partition is at once an action for declaration of co- unavoidable that the individual titles involved be altered, changed, cancelled or modified to
ownership and for segregation and conveyance of a determinate portion of the properties include therein the name of the appellee as a registered 1/2 co-owner. Yet, no cause of
involved. If the defendant asserts exclusive title over the property, the action for partition action or even a prayer is contained filed. Manifestly, absent any cause or prayer for the
should not be dismissed. Rather, the court should resolve the case and if the plaintiff is alteration, cancellation, modification or changing of the titles involved, the desired
unable to sustain his claimed status as a co-owner, the court should dismiss the action, not declaration of co-ownership and eventual partition will utterly be an indirect or collateral
because the wrong remedy was availed of, but because no basis exists for requiring the attack on the subject titled in this suit.
defendant to submit to partition. Resolving the issue whether petitioner's action for partition
was a collateral attack on the validity of the certificates of title, the Court of Appeals held that It is here that We fell into error,  such that,  if not rectified will surely lead to a procedural
since petitioner sought to compel respondent to execute documents necessary to effect lapse and a possible injustice.  Well settled is the rules that a certificate of title cannot be
transfer of what he claimed was his share, petitioner was not actually attacking the validity of altered, modified or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law.
the titles but in fact, recognized their validity. Finally, the appellate court upheld petitioner's
position that Art. 144 of the Civil Code had been repealed by Art. 148 of the Family Code.
In this jurisdiction, the remedy of the landowner whose property has been wrongfully or
erroneously registered in another name is, after one year from the date of the decree, not to
Respondent moved for reconsideration of the decision of Court of Appeals. On May 7, 1998, set aside the decree, but respecting it as incontrovertible and no longer open to review, to
nearly two years after its first decision, the Court of Appeals granted respondent's motion bring an action for reconveyance or, if the property had passed into the hands of an innocent
and reconsidered its prior decision. In its decision now challenged in the present petition, it purchaser for value, for damages. Verily,  plaintiff-appellant should have first pursued such
held — remedy or any other relief directly attacking the subject titles before instituting the present
partition suit. Apropos, the case at bench appears to have been prematurely filed.
Prefatorily, and to better clarify the controversy on whether this suit is a collateral attack on
the titles in issue, it must be underscored that plaintiff-appellant alleged in his complaint that Lastly, to grant the partition prayed for by the appellant will in effect rule and decide against
all the nine (9) titles are registered in the name of defendant-appellee, Ma. Elvira T. Castillo, the properties registered in the names of Steelhouse Realty and Development Corporation
except one which appears in the name of Eloisa Castillo (see par. 9, Complaint). However, a and Eloisa Castillo, who are not parties in the case. To allow this to happen will surely result
verification of the annexes of such initiatory pleading shows some discrepancies, to wit: to injustice and denial of due process of law. . . . 11

1. TCT No. 149046 (Annex A) = Elvira T. Castillo, single Petitioner moved for reconsideration but his motion was denied by the Court of Appeals in its
resolution dated December 21, 1998. Hence this petition.
2. TCT No. 168208 (Annex B) = — do —
Petitioner contends that: (1) the Court of Appeals, in its first decision of November 7, 1996,
3. TCT No. 37046 (Annex C) = — do — was correct in applying the Roque ruling and in rejecting respondent's claim that she was the
sole owner of the subject properties and that the partition suit was a collateral attack on the
titles; (2) the Court of Appeals correctly rules in its first decision that Art. 148 of the Family
Code governs the co-ownership between the parties, hence, the complaint for partition is incapacitated or are without impediment to marry each other, 15 or in which the marriage is
proper; (3) with respect to the properties registered in the name of Steelhouse Realty, void ab initio, provided it is not bigamous. Art. 144, therefore, does not cover parties living in
respondent admitted ownership thereof and, at the very least, these properties could simply an adulterous relationship. However, Art. 148 of the Family Code now provides for a limited
be excluded and the partition limited to the remaining real and personal properties; and (4) co-ownership in cases where the parties in union are incapacitated to marry each other. It
the Court of Appeals erred in not holding that under the Civil Code, there is an implied trust states:
in his favor. 12
In cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding article, 16 only the
The issue in this case is really whether summary judgment, in accordance with Rule 35 of the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of
Rules of Court, is proper. We rule in the negative. money, property or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to
their respective contributions. In the absence of proof to the contrary, their
First. Rule 35, §3 of the Rules of Court provides that summary judgment is proper only when, contributions and corresponding shares are presumed to be equal. The same rule
based on the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, and after summary hearing, it is and presumption shall apply to joint deposits of money and evidences of credits.
shown that except as to the amount of damages, there is no veritable issue regarding any
material fact in the action and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the co-
law. 1 Conversely, where the pleadings tender a genuine issue, i.e., an issue of fact the ownership shall accrue to the absolute community or conjugal partnership existing
resolution of which calls for the presentation of evidence, as distinguished from an issue in such valid marriage. If the party who acted in bad faith is not validly married to
which is sham, fictitious, contrived, set-up in bad faith, or patently unsubstantial, summary another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the manner provided in the last
judgment is not proper. 14 paragraph of the preceding article.

In the present case, we are convinced that genuine issues exist. Petitioner anchors his claim The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both parties are in bad
of co-ownership on two factual grounds: first, that said properties were acquired by him and faith.
respondent during their union from 1979 to 1992 from profits derived from their brokerage
business; and second, that said properties were registered solely in respondent's name only It was error for the trial court to rule that, because the parties in this case were not
because they agreed to that arrangement, thereby giving rise to an implied trust in capacitated to marry each other at the time that they were alleged to have been living
accordance with Art. 1452 and Art. 1453 of the Civil Code. These allegations are denied by together, they could not have owned properties in common. The Family Code, in addition to
respondent. She denies that she and petitioner lived together as husband and wife. She also providing that a co-ownership exists between a man and a woman who live together as
claims that the properties in question were acquired solely by her with her own money and husband and wife without the benefit of marriage, likewise provides that, if the parties are
resources. With such conflicting positions, the only way to ascertain the truth is obviously incapacitated to marry each other, properties acquired by them through their joint
through the presentation of evidence by the parties. contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned by them in common in
proportion to their contributions which, in the absence of proof to the contrary, is presumed
The trial court ruled that it is immaterial whether the parties actually lived together as to be equal. There is thus co-ownership eventhough the couple are not capacitated to marry
husband and wife because Art. 144 of the Civil Code can not be made to apply to them as each other.
they were both incapacitated to marry each other. Hence, it was impossible for a co-
ownership to exist between them. In this case, there may be a co-ownership between the parties herein. Consequently,
whether petitioner and respondent cohabited and whether the properties involved in the
We disagree. case are part of the alleged co-ownership are genuine and material. All but one of the
properties involved were alleged to have been acquired after the Family Code took effect on
Art. 144 of the Civil Code provides: August 3, 1988. With respect to the property acquired before the Family Code took effect if it
is shown that it was really acquired under the regime of the Civil Code, then it should be
excluded.
When a man and a woman live together as husband and wife, but they are not
married, or their marriage is void from the beginning, the property acquired by
either or both of them through their work or industry or their wages and salaries Petitioner also alleged in paragraph 7 of his complaint that:
shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
Due to the effective management, hardwork and enterprise of plaintiff assisted by
This provision of the Civil Code, applies only to cases in which a man and a woman live defendant, their customs brokerage business grew and out of the profits therefrom,
together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage provided they are not the parties acquired real and personal properties which were, upon agreement of
 the parties, listed and registered in defendant's name with plaintiff as the he would deliver to the others their shares after the debts of the original owner had been
unregistered co-owner of all said properties. 17 paid, this Court ruled that notwithstanding the registration of the land in the name of only
one of the heirs, the other heirs can claim their shares in "such action, judicial or
On the basis of this, he contends that an implied trust existed pursuant to Art. 1452 of the extrajudicial, as may be necessary to partition the estate of the testator." 22
Civil Code which provides that "(I)f two or more persons agree to purchase property and by
common consent the legal title is taken in the name of one of them for the benefit of all, a Third. The Court of Appeals also reversed its first decision on the ground that to order
trust is created by force of law in favor of the others in proportion to the interest of each." partition will, in effect, rule and decide against Steelhouse Realty Development Corporation
We do not think this is correct. The legal relation of the parties is already specifically covered and Eloisa Castillo, both strangers to the present case, as to the properties registered in their
by Art. 148 of the Family Code under which all the properties acquired by the parties out of names. This reasoning, however, ignores the fact that the majority of the properties involved
their actual joint contributions of money, property or industry shall constitute a co- in the present case are registered in respondent's name, over which petitioner claims rights
ownership. Co-ownership is a form of trust and every co-owner is a trustee for the as a co-owner. Besides, other than the real properties, petitioner also seeks partition of a
other. 18 The provisions of Art. 1452 and Art. 1453 of the Civil Code, then are no longer substantial amount of personal properties consisting of motor vehicles and several pieces of
material since a trust relation already inheres in a co-ownership which is governed under jewelry. By dismissing petitioner's complaint for partition on grounds of due process and
Title III, Book II of the Civil Code. equity, the appellate court unwittingly denied petitioner his right to prove ownership over
the claimed real and personal properties. The dismissal of petitioner's complaint is unjustified
Second. The trial court likewise dismissed petitioner's action on the ground that the same since both ends may be amply served by simply excluding from the action for partition the
amounted to a collateral attack on the certificates of title involved. As already noted, at first, properties registered in the name of Steelhouse Realty and Eloisa Castillo.
the Court of Appeals ruled that petitioner's action does not challenge the validity of
respondent's titles. However, on reconsideration, it reversed itself and affirmed the trial WHEREFORE, the amended decision of the Court of Appeals, dated May 7, 1998, is REVERSED
court. It noted that petitioner's complaint failed to include a prayer for the alteration, and the case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 59, Makati City for further
cancellation, modification, or changing of the titles involved. Absent such prayer, the proceedings on the merits.
appellate court ruled that a declaration of co-ownership and eventual partition would involve
an indirect or collateral attack on the titles. We disagree. SO ORDERED.

A torrens title, as a rule, is conclusive and indefeasible. Proceeding from this, P.D. No.
1529, 19 §48 provides that a certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack and can
not be altered, modified, or canceled except in a direct proceeding. When is an action an
attack on a title? It is when the object of the action or proceeding is to nullify the title, and
thus challenge the judgment pursuant to which the title was decreed. The attack is direct
when the object of an action or proceeding is to annul or set aside such judgment, or enjoin
its enforcement. On the other hand, the attack is indirect or collateral when, in an action to
obtain a different relief, an attack on the judgment is nevertheless made as an incident
thereof. 20

In his complaint for partition, consistent with our ruling in Roque regarding the nature of an
action for partition, petitioner seeks first, a declaration that he is a co-owner of the subject
properties; and second, the conveyance of his lawful shares. He does not attack respondent's
titles. Petitioner alleges no fraud, mistake, or any other irregularity that would justify a
review of the registration decree in respondent's favor. His theory is that although the
subject properties were registered solely in respondent's name, but since by agreement
between them as well as under the Family Code, he is co-owner of these properties and as
such is entitled to the conveyance of his shares. On the premise that he is a co-owner, he can
validly seek the partition of the properties in co-ownership and the conveyance to him of his
share.

Thus, in Guevara v. Guevara, 21 in which a parcel of land bequeathed in a last will and
testament was registered in the name of only one of the heirs, with the understanding that
ARTICLE 147 – 148 (ART.89) commodities, or the value thereof in the amount of ₱768,750.00. The case was docketed as
Civil Case No. 90-3251. On January 8, 1992, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of
MIWCC and against Eduardo. The fallo of the decision reads:
G.R. No. 151967             February 16, 2005

Accordingly, the Court renders judgment in favor of the plaintiff Master Iron Works And
JOSEFINA C. FRANCISCO, petitioner,  Construction Corporation against the defendant [Eduardo] Francisco ordering the latter as
vs. follows:
MASTER IRON WORKS & CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION and ROBERTO V. ALEJO, Sheriff IV,
Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 142, respondents.
1. To replace to plaintiff 7,500 bags at 50 kilos/bag of Portland cement or, in the
alternative, to pay the plaintiff the amount of ₱768,750.00;
DECISION

2. In either case, to pay liquidated damages by way of interest at 12% per annum
CALLEJO, SR., J.: from June 21, 1990 until fully paid;

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in 3. To pay ₱50,000.00 as actual damages; and
CA-G.R. No. CV No. 59045, which reversed and set aside the Decision 2 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Parañaque, Metro Manila, Branch 260, in Civil Case No. 94-2260 and the
Resolution of the CA denying the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the said decision. 4. To pay attorney’s fees of ₱153,750.00 and litigation expenses of ₱20,000.00.

Josefina Castillo was only 24 years old when she and Eduardo G. Francisco were married on SO ORDERED.10 
January 15, 1983.3 Eduardo was then employed as the vice president in a private corporation.
A little more than a year and seven months thereafter, or on August 31, 1984, the Imus Rural The decision in Civil Case No. 90-3251 became final and executory and, on June 7, 1994, the
Bank, Inc. (Imus Bank) executed a deed of absolute sale for ₱320,000.00 in favor of Josefina court issued a writ of execution.11 On June 14, 1994, Sheriff Roberto Alejo sold at a public
Castillo Francisco, married to Eduardo Francisco, covering two parcels of residential land with auction one stainless, owner-type jeep for ₱10,000.00 to MIWCC. 12 Sheriff Alejo issued a
a house thereon located at St. Martin de Porres Street, San Antonio Valley I, Sucat, Notice of Levy on Execution/Attachment over the lots covered by TCT No. 87976 (60550) and
Parañaque, Metro Manila. One of the lots was covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) 87977 (60551) for the recovery of the balance of the amount due under the decision of the
No. 36519, with an area of 342 square meters, while the other lot, with an area of 360 square trial court in Civil Case No. 90-3251.13 On June 24, 1994, the sale of the property at a public
meters, was covered by TCT No. 36518.4 The purchase price of the property was paid to the auction was set to August 5, 1994.14 
Bank via Check No. 002334 in the amount of ₱320,000.00 drawn and issued by the
Commercial Bank of Manila, for which the Imus Bank issued Official Receipt No. 121408 on On July 3, 1994, Josefina executed an Affidavit of Third Party Claim15 over the two parcels of
August 31, 1984.5 On the basis of the said deed of sale, TCT Nos. 36518 and 36519 were land in which she claimed that they were her paraphernal property, and that her husband
cancelled and, on September 4, 1984, the Register of Deeds issued TCT Nos. 87976 (60550) Eduardo had no proprietary right or interest over them as evidenced by his affidavit of
and 87977 (60551) in the name of "Josefina Castillo Francisco married to Eduardo G. waiver, a copy of which she attached to her affidavit. She, likewise, requested Sheriff Alejo to
Francisco."6  cause the cancellation of the notice of levy on execution/attachment earlier issued by him.

On February 15, 1985, the Register of Deeds made of record Entry No. 85-18003 at the dorsal On July 7, 1994, Josefina filed the said Affidavit of Third Party Claim in the trial court and
portion of the said titles. This referred to an Affidavit of Waiver executed by Eduardo where served a copy thereof to the sheriff. MIWCC then submitted an indemnity bond 16 in the
he declared that before his marriage to Josefina, the latter purchased two parcels of land, amount of ₱1,361,500.00 issued by the Prudential Guarantee and Assurance, Inc. The sale at
including the house constructed thereon, with her own savings, and that he was waiving public auction proceeded. MIWCC made a bid for the property for the price of
whatever claims he had over the property.7 On January 13, 1986, Josefina mortgaged the said ₱1,350,000.00.17 
property to Leonila Cando for a loan of ₱157,000.00.8 It appears that Eduardo affixed his
marital conformity to the deed.9 
On July 28, 1994, Josefina filed a Complaint against MIWCC and Sheriff Alejo in the RTC of
Parañaque for damages with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction or temporary
On June 11, 1990, Eduardo, who was then the General Manager and President of Reach Out restraining order, docketed as Civil Case No. 94-2260. She alleged then that she was the sole
Trading International, bought 7,500 bags of cement worth ₱768,750.00 from Master Iron owner of the property levied on execution by Sheriff Alejo in Civil Case No. 90-3251; hence,
Works & Construction Corporation (MIWCC) but failed to pay for the same. On November 27, the levy on execution of the property was null and void. She reiterated that her husband, the
1990, MIWCC filed a complaint against him in the RTC of Makati City for the return of the said defendant in Civil Case No. 90-3251, had no right or proprietary interest over the said
property as evidenced by his affidavit of waiver annotated at the dorsal portion of the said Before she could commence presenting her evidence, Josefina filed a petition to annul her
title. Josefina prayed that the court issue a temporary restraining order/writ of preliminary marriage to Eduardo in the RTC of Parañaque, Metro Manila, on the ground that when they
injunction to enjoin MIWCC from causing the sale of the said property at public auction. were married on January 15, 1983, Eduardo was already married to one Carmelita Carpio.
Considering that no temporary restraining order had as yet been issued by the trial court, the The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 95-0169.
sheriff sold the subject property at public auction to MIWCC for ₱1,350,000.00 on August 5,
1994.18 However, upon the failure of MIWCC to remit the sheriff’s commission on the sale, Josefina and Carmelita testified in Civil Case No. 95-0169. Josefina declared that during her
the latter did not execute a sheriff’s certificate of sale over the property. The RTC of marriage to Eduardo, she acquired the property covered by TCT Nos. 87976 (60550) and
Parañaque, thereafter, issued a temporary restraining order19 on August 16, 1994. 87977 (60551), through the help of her sisters and brother, and that Eduardo had no
participation whatsoever in the said acquisition. She added that Eduardo had five children,
When Josefina learned of the said sale at public auction, she filed an amended complaint namely, Mary Jane, Dianne, Mary Grace Jo, Mark Joseph and Mary Cecille, all surnamed
impleading MIWCC, with the following prayer: Francisco.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most respectfully prayed to this Honorable Court On September 9, 1996, the RTC of Parañaque rendered judgment21 in Civil Case No. 95-0169,
that, after hearing, judgment be rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants declaring the marriage between Josefina and Eduardo as null and void for being bigamous.
and the same be in the following tenor:
In the meantime, Josefina testified in Civil Case No. 94-2260, declaring, inter alia, that she
1. Ordering the defendants, jointly and severally, to pay the plaintiff the following was able to purchase the property from the Bank when she was still single with her mother’s
amounts: financial assistance; she was then engaged in recruitment when Eduardo executed an
affidavit of waiver; she learned that he was previously married when they already had two
A. The sum of ₱50,000.00 representing as actual damages; children; nevertheless, she continued cohabiting with him and had three more children by
him; and because of Eduardo’s first marriage, she decided to have him execute the affidavit
of waiver.
B. The sum of ₱200,000.00 representing as moral damages;

Eduardo testified that when his wife bought the property in 1984, he was in Davao City and
C. The sum of ₱50,000.00 or such amount which this Honorable Court
had no knowledge of the said purchases; he came to know of the purchase only when
deems just as exemplary damages;
Josefina informed him a week after his arrival from Davao; 22 Josefina’s sister, Lolita Castillo,
told him that she would collect from him the money his wife borrowed from her and their
D. The sum of ₱60,000.00 as and for attorney’s fees. mother to buy the property;23 when he told Lolita that he had no money, she said that she
would no longer collect from him, on the condition that he would have no participation over
2. Declaring the levying and sale at public auction of the plaintiff’s properties null the property,24 which angered Eduardo;25 when Josefina purchased the property, he had a
and void; gross monthly income of ₱10,000.00 and gave ₱5,000.00 to Josefina for the support of his
family;26 Josefina decided that he execute the affidavit of waiver because her mother and
3. To issue writ of preliminary injunction and makes it permanent; sister gave the property to her.27 

4. Order the cancellation of whatever entries appearing at the titles as a result of On December 20, 1997, the trial court rendered judgment finding the levy on the subject
the enforcement of the writ of execution issued in Civil Case No. 90-3251. property and the sale thereof at public auction to be null and void. The fallo of the decision
reads:

Plaintiff further prays for such other reliefs as may be just under the premises.20 
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, THIS COURT finds the Levying and sale at public
auction of the plaintiff’s properties null and void.
In its answer to the complaint, MIWCC cited Article 116 of the Family Code of the Philippines
and averred that the property was the conjugal property of Josefina and her husband
Eduardo, who purchased the same on August 31, 1984 after their marriage on January 14, The court orders the defendants to, jointly and severally, pay plaintiff the following amounts:
1983. MIWCC asserted that Eduardo executed the affidavit of waiver to evade the
satisfaction of the decision in Civil Case No. 90-3251 and to place the property beyond the a. The sum of ₱50,000.00 as actual damages;
reach of creditors; hence, the said affidavit was null and void.
b. The sum of ₱50,000.00 representing as moral damages;
 c. The sum of ₱50,000.00 as exemplary damages; Josefina, now the petitioner, filed the present petition for review, alleging that:

d. The sum of ₱60,000.00 as and for attorney’s fees. A. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT THERE EXISTS A CONJUGAL
PARTNERSHIP BETWEEN PETITIONER AND EDUARDO FRANCISCO;
The court orders the cancellation of whatever entries appearing at the Titles as a result of the
enforcement of the writ of execution issued in Civil Case No. 90-3251. B. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THE SUBJECT
PROPERTIES WERE NOT PARAPHERNAL PROPERTIES OF PETITIONER;
SO ORDERED.28 
C. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DISTURBING THE FINDINGS OF FACTS AND
The trial court held that the property levied by Sheriff Alejo was the sole and exclusive CONCLUSION BY THE TRIAL COURT IN ITS DECISION OF DECEMBER 20, 1997, THE SAME
property of Josefina, applying Articles 144, 160, 175 and 485 of the New Civil Code. The trial BEING IN ACCORDANCE WITH LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE.31 
court also held that MIWCC failed to prove that Eduardo Francisco contributed to the
acquisition of the property. The threshold issues for resolution are as follows: (a) whether or not the subject property is
the conjugal property of Josefina Castillo and Eduardo Francisco; and (b) whether or not the
MIWCC appealed the decision to the CA in which it alleged that: subject properties may be held to answer for the personal obligations of Eduardo.

I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE REAL ESTATE PROPERTIES SUBJECT OF THE We shall deal with the issues simultaneously as they are closely related.
AUCTION SALE ARE PARAPHERNAL PROPERTIES OWNED BY PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE JOSEFINA
FRANCISCO; The petitioner asserts that inasmuch as her marriage to Eduardo is void ab initio, there is no
occasion that would give rise to a regime of conjugal partnership of gains. The petitioner
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING THE RECEPTION OF REBUTTAL EVIDENCE WITH adds that to rule otherwise would render moot and irrelevant the provisions on the regime of
REGARD TO THE ANNULMENT OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE’S MARRIAGE WITH EDUARDO special co-ownership under Articles 147 and 148 of the Family Code of the Philippines, in
FRANCISCO; relation to Article 144 of the New Civil Code.

III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE LEVY ON EXECUTION OF PLAINTIFF- The petitioner avers that since Article 148 of the Family Code governs their property
APPELLEE’S PROPERTIES SUBJECT OF THE PRESENT CONTROVERSY IS NULL AND VOID; relationship, the respondents must adduce evidence to show that Eduardo actually
contributed to the acquisition of the subject properties. The petitioner asserts that she
purchased the property before her marriage to Eduardo with her own money without any
IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ORDERING DEFENDANT-APPELLANT TO PAY DAMAGES TO
contribution from him; hence, the subject property is her paraphernal
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE FOR ALLEGED IMPROPER LEVY ON EXECUTION.29 
property.l^vvphi1.net Consequently, such property is not liable for the debts of Eduardo to
private respondent MIWCC.
The CA rendered judgment setting aside and reversing the decision of the RTC on September
20, 2001. The fallo of the decision reads:
The respondents, on the other hand, contend that the appellate court was correct in ruling
that the properties are conjugal in nature because there is nothing in the records to support
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision, dated 20 December 1997, of the Regional the petitioner’s uncorroborated claim that the funds she used to purchase the subject
Trial Court of Parañaque, Branch 260, is hereby REVERSED and SETASIDE and a new one properties were her personal funds or came from her mother and sister. The respondents
entered dismissing Civil Case No. 94-0126. point out that if, as claimed by the petitioner, the subject properties were, indeed, not
conjugal in nature, then, there was no need for her to obtain marital (Eduardo’s) consent
SO ORDERED.30  when she mortgaged the properties to two different parties sometime in the first quarter of
1986, or after Eduardo executed the affidavit of waiver.
The CA ruled that the property was presumed to be the conjugal property of Eduardo and
Josefina, and that the latter failed to rebut such presumption. It also held that the affidavit of We note that the only questions raised in this case are questions of facts. Under Rule 45 of
waiver executed by Eduardo was contrary to Article 146 of the New Civil Code and, as such, the Rules of Court, only questions of law may be raised in and resolved by the Court. The
had no force and effect. Josefina filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision, which Court may, however, determine and resolve questions of facts in cases where the findings of
was, likewise, denied by the CA. facts of the trial court and those of the CA are inconsistent, where highly meritorious
circumstances are present, and where it is necessary to give substantial justice to the parties.
In the present action, the findings of facts and the conclusions of the trial court and those of Since the subject property was acquired during the subsistence of the marriage of Eduardo
the CA are opposite. There is thus an imperative need for the Court to delve into and resolve and Carmelita, under normal circumstances, the same should be presumed to be conjugal
the factual issues, in tandem with the questions of law raised by the parties. property.34 Article 105 of the Family Code of the Philippines provides that the Code shall
apply to conjugal partnership established before the code took effect, without prejudice to
The petition has no merit. vested rights already acquired under the New Civil Code or other laws.35 Thus, even if Eduardo
and Carmelita were married before the effectivity of the Family Code of the Philippines, the
property still cannot be considered conjugal property because there can only be but one valid
The petitioner failed to prove that she acquired the property with her personal funds before
existing marriage at any given time.36 Article 148 of the Family Code also debilitates against
her cohabitation with Eduardo and that she is the sole owner of the property. The evidence
the petitioner’s claim since, according to the said article, a co-ownership may ensue in case
on record shows that the Imus Bank executed a deed of absolute sale over the property to
of cohabitation where, for instance, one party has a pre-existing valid marriage provided that
the petitioner on August 31, 1984 and titles over the property were, thereafter, issued to the
the parents prove their actual joint contribution of money, property or industry and only to
latter as vendee on September 4, 1984 after her marriage to Eduardo on January 15,
the extent of their proportionate interest thereon.37 
1983.1ªvvphi1.nét

We agree with the findings of the appellate court that the petitioner failed to adduce
We agree with the petitioner that Article 144 of the New Civil Code does not apply in the
preponderance of evidence that she contributed money, property or industry in the
present case. This Court in Tumlos v. Fernandez32 held that Article 144 of the New Civil Code
acquisition of the subject property and, hence, is not a co-owner of the property:
applies only to a relationship between a man and a woman who are not incapacitated to
marry each other, or to one in which the marriage of the parties is void from the very
beginning. It does not apply to a cohabitation that is adulterous or amounts to concubinage, First of all, other than plaintiff-appellee’s bare testimony, there is nothing in the record to
for it would be absurd to create a co-ownership where there exists a prior conjugal support her claim that the funds she used to purchase the subject properties came from her
partnership or absolute community between the man and his lawful wife. In this case, the mother and sister. She did not, for instance, present the testimonies of her mother and sister
petitioner admitted that when she and Eduardo cohabited, the latter was incapacitated to who could have corroborated her claim. Furthermore, in her Affidavit of Third-Party Claim
marry her. (Exh. "C"), she stated that the subject properties "are my own paraphernal properties,
including the improvements thereon, as such are the fruits of my own exclusive efforts …,"
clearly implying that she used her own money and contradicting her later claim that the
Article 148 of the Family Code of the Philippines, on which the petitioner anchors her claims,
funds were provided by her mother and sister. She also stated in her affidavit that she
provides as follows:
acquired the subject properties before her marriage to Eduardo Francisco on 15 January
1983, a claim later belied by the presentation of the Deed of Absolute Sale clearly indicating
Art. 148. In cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding Article, only the properties that she bought the properties from Imus Rural Bank on 31 August 1984, or one year and
acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or seven months after her marriage (Exh. "D"). In the face of all these contradictions, plaintiff-
industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. appellee’s uncorroborated testimony that she acquired the subject properties with funds
In the absence of proof to the contrary, their contributions and corresponding shares are provided by her mother and sister should not have been given any weight by the lower court.
presumed to be equal. The same rule and presumption shall apply to joint deposits of money
and evidences of credit.
It is to be noted that plaintiff-appellee got married at the age of 23. At that age, it is doubtful
if she had enough funds of her own to purchase the subject properties as she claimed in her
If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the co-ownership shall Affidavit of Third Party Claim. Confronted with this reality, she later claimed that the funds
accrue to the absolute community or conjugal partnership existing in such valid marriage. If were provided by her mother and sister, clearly an afterthought in a desperate effort to
the party who acted in bad faith is not validly married to another, his or her share shall be shield the subject properties from appellant Master Iron as judgment creditor.38 
forfeited in the manner provided in the last paragraph of the preceding Article.
Aside from her bare claims, the petitioner offered nothing to prove her allegation that she
The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall, likewise, apply even if both parties are in bad faith. borrowed the amount of ₱320,000.00 from her mother and her sister, which she paid to the
Imus Bank on August 31, 1984 to purchase the subject property. The petitioner even failed to
Indeed, the Family Code has filled the hiatus in Article 144 of the New Civil Code by expressly divulge the name of her mother and the sources of her income, if any, and that of her sister.
regulating in Article 148 the property relations of couples living in a state of adultery or When she testified in Civil Case No. 95-0169, the petitioner declared that she borrowed part
concubinage. Under Article 256 of the Family Code, the law can be applied retroactively if it of the purchase price of the property from her brother, 39 but failed to divulge the latter’s
does not prejudice vested or acquired rights. The petitioner failed to prove that she had any name, let alone reveal how much money she borrowed and when. The petitioner even failed
vested right over the property in question.33  to adduce any evidence to prove that her mother and sister had ₱320,000.00 in 1984, which,
considering the times, was then quite a substantial amount. Moreover, the petitioner’s third-
party-claim affidavit stating that the properties "are the fruits of my own exclusive effort
before I married Eduardo Francisco" belies her testimony in the trial court and in Civil Case
No. 95-0169.1awphi1.nét

We note that, as gleaned from the receipt issued by the Imus Bank, the payment for the
subject property was drawn via Check No. 002334 and issued by the Commercial Bank of
Manila in the amount of ₱320,000.00.40 The petitioner failed to testify against whose account
the check was drawn and issued, and whether the said account was owned by her and/or
Eduardo Francisco or her mother, sister or brother. She even failed to testify whether the
check was a manager’s check and, if so, whose money was used to purchase the same.

We also agree with the findings of the CA that the affidavit of waiver executed by Eduardo on
February 15, 1985, stating that the property is owned by the petitioner, is barren of probative
weight. We are convinced that he executed the said affidavit in anticipation of claims by third
parties against him and hold the property liable for the said claims. First, the petitioner failed
to prove that she had any savings before her cohabitation with Eduardo. Second, despite
Eduardo’s affidavit of waiver, he nevertheless affixed his marital conformity to the real estate
mortgage executed by the petitioner over the property in favor of Leonila on January 13,
1986.41 Third, the petitioner testified that she borrowed the funds for the purchase of the
property from her mother and sister.42 Fourth, the petitioner testified that Eduardo executed
the affidavit of waiver because she discovered that he had a first marriage.43 Lastly, Eduardo
belied the petitioner’s testimony when he testified that he executed the affidavit of waiver
because his mother-in-law and sister-in-law had given the property to the petitioner.44 

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision of
the Court of Appeals reversing the decision of the Regional Trial Court is AFFIRMED. No
pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
ARTICLE 147 – 148 AND PROPERTY SETTLEMENT" dated November 12, 1975, whereby they agreed to live
separately and to dissolve and liquidate their conjugal partnership of property.

On January 12, 1976, ATTY. LUNA obtained a divorce decree of his marriage with EUGENIA
G.R. No. 171914               July 23, 2014 from the Civil and Commercial Chamber of the First Circumscription of the Court of First
Instance of Sto. Domingo, Dominican Republic. Also in Sto.Domingo, Dominican Republic, on
SOLEDAD L. LAVADIA, Petitioner,  the same date, ATTY. LUNA contracted another marriage, this time with SOLEDAD.
vs. Thereafter, ATTY. LUNA and SOLEDAD returned to the Philippines and lived together as
HEIRS OF JUAN LUCES LUNA, represented by GREGORIO Z. LUNA and EUGENIA ZABALLERO- husband and wife until 1987.
LUNA,Respondents.
Sometime in 1977, ATTY. LUNA organized a new law firm named: Luna, Puruganan, Sison and
DECISION Ongkiko (LUPSICON) where ATTY. LUNA was the managing partner.

BERSAMIN, J.: On February 14, 1978, LUPSICON through ATTY. LUNA purchased from Tandang Sora
Development Corporation the 6th Floor of Kalaw-Ledesma Condominium
Divorce between Filipinos is void and ineffectual under the nationality rule adopted by Project(condominium unit) at Gamboa St., Makati City, consisting of 517.52 square meters,
Philippine law. Hence, any settlement of property between the parties of the first marriage for ₱1,449,056.00, to be paid on installment basis for 36months starting on April 15, 1978.
involving Filipinos submitted as an incident of a divorce obtained in a foreign country lacks Said condominium unit was to be usedas law office of LUPSICON. After full payment, the
competent judicial approval, and cannot be enforceable against the assets of the husband Deed of Absolute Sale over the condominium unit was executed on July 15, 1983, and CCT
who contracts a subsequent marriage. No. 4779 was issued on August 10, 1983, which was registered bearing the following names:

The Case "JUAN LUCES LUNA, married to Soledad L. Luna (46/100); MARIO E. ONGKIKO, married to
Sonia P.G. Ongkiko (25/100); GREGORIO R. PURUGANAN, married to Paz A. Puruganan
(17/100); and TERESITA CRUZ SISON, married to Antonio J.M. Sison (12/100) x x x"
The petitioner, the second wife of the late Atty. Juan Luces Luna, appeals the adverse
Subsequently, 8/100 share of ATTY. LUNA and 17/100 share of Atty. Gregorio R. Puruganan in
decision promulgated on November 11, 2005,1 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed
the condominium unit was sold to Atty. Mario E. Ongkiko, for which a new CCT No. 21761
with modification the decision rendered on August 27, 2001 by the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
was issued on February 7, 1992 in the following names:
Branch 138, in Makati City.2 The CA thereby denied her right in the 25/100 pro indiviso share
of the husband in a condominium unit, and in the law books of the husband acquired during
the second marriage. "JUAN LUCES LUNA, married to Soledad L. Luna (38/100); MARIO E. ONGKIKO, married to
Sonia P.G. Ongkiko (50/100); TERESITA CRUZ SISON, married to Antonio J.M. Sison (12/100) x
x x"
Antecedents

Sometime in 1992, LUPSICON was dissolved and the condominium unit was partitioned by
The antecedent facts were summarized by the CA as follows:
the partners but the same was still registered in common under CCT No. 21716. The parties
stipulated that the interest of ATTY. LUNA over the condominium unit would be 25/100
ATTY. LUNA, a practicing lawyer, was at first a name partner in the prestigious law firm Sycip, share. ATTY. LUNA thereafter established and headed another law firm with Atty. Renato G.
Salazar, Luna, Manalo, Hernandez & Feliciano Law Offices at that time when he was living Dela Cruzand used a portion of the office condominium unit as their office. The said law firm
with his first wife, herein intervenor-appellant Eugenia Zaballero-Luna (EUGENIA), whom he lasted until the death of ATTY. JUAN on July 12, 1997.
initially married ina civil ceremony conducted by the Justice of the Peace of Parañaque, Rizal
on September 10, 1947 and later solemnized in a church ceremony at the Pro-Cathedral in
After the death of ATTY. JUAN, his share in the condominium unit including the lawbooks,
San Miguel, Bulacan on September 12, 1948. In ATTY. LUNA’s marriage to EUGENIA, they
office furniture and equipment found therein were taken over by Gregorio Z. Luna, ATTY.
begot seven (7) children, namely: Regina Maria L. Nadal, Juan Luis Luna, Araceli Victoria L.
LUNA’s son of the first marriage. Gregorio Z. Luna thenleased out the 25/100 portion of the
Arellano, Ana Maria L. Tabunda, Gregorio Macario Luna, Carolina Linda L. Tapia, and Cesar
condominium unit belonging to his father to Atty. Renato G. De la Cruz who established his
Antonio Luna. After almost two (2) decades of marriage, ATTY. LUNA and EUGENIA eventually
own law firm named Renato G. De la Cruz & Associates.
agreed to live apart from each other in February 1966 and agreed to separation of property,
to which end, they entered into a written agreement entitled "AGREEMENT FOR SEPARATION
The 25/100 pro-indiviso share of ATTY. Luna in the condominium unit as well as the law Both parties appealed to the CA.6
books, office furniture and equipment became the subject of the complaint filed by SOLEDAD
against the heirs of ATTY. JUAN with the RTC of Makati City, Branch 138, on September 10, On her part, the petitioner assigned the following errors to the RTC, namely:
1999, docketed as Civil Case No. 99-1644. The complaint alleged that the subject properties
were acquired during the existence of the marriage between ATTY. LUNA and SOLEDAD
I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE CONDOMINIUM UNIT WAS
through their joint efforts that since they had no children, SOLEDAD became co-owner of the
ACQUIRED THRU THE SOLE INDUSTRY OF ATTY. JUAN LUCES LUNA;
said properties upon the death of ATTY. LUNA to the extent of ¾ pro-indiviso share consisting
of her ½ share in the said properties plus her ½ share in the net estate of ATTY. LUNA which
was bequeathed to her in the latter’s last will and testament; and thatthe heirs of ATTY. II. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT PLAINTIFFAPPELLANT DID NOT
LUNA through Gregorio Z. Luna excluded SOLEDAD from her share in the subject properties. CONTRIBUTE MONEY FOR THE ACQUISITION OF THE CONDOMINIUM UNIT;
The complaint prayed that SOLEDAD be declared the owner of the ¾ portion of the subject
properties;that the same be partitioned; that an accounting of the rentals on the III. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO PORTIONS OF THE
condominium unit pertaining to the share of SOLEDAD be conducted; that a receiver be TESTIMONY OF GREGORIO LUNA, WHO HAS NO ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE
appointed to preserve ad administer the subject properties;and that the heirs of ATTY. LUNA ACQUISITION OF THE UNIT, BUT IGNORED OTHER PORTIONS OF HIS TESTIMONY
be ordered to pay attorney’s feesand costs of the suit to SOLEDAD.3 FAVORABLE TO THE PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT;

Ruling of the RTC IV. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING SIGNIFICANCE TO THE FACT THAT
THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP BETWEEN LUNA AND INTERVENOR-APPELLANT WAS
On August 27, 2001, the RTC rendered its decision after trial upon the aforementioned ALREADY DISSOLVED AND LIQUIDATED PRIOR TO THE UNION OF PLAINTIFF-
facts,4 disposing thusly: APPELLANT AND LUNA;

WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered as follows: V. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING UNDUE SIGNIFICANCE TO THE ABSENCE OF
THE DISPOSITION OF THE CONDOMINIUM UNIT IN THE HOLOGRAPHIC WILL OF THE
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT;
(a) The 24/100 pro-indiviso share in the condominium unit located at the SIXTH
FLOOR of the KALAW LEDESMA CONDOMINIUM PROJECT covered by Condominium
Certificate of Title No. 21761 consisting of FIVE HUNDRED SEVENTEEN (517/100) VI. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING UNDUE SIGNIFICANCE TO THE FACTTHAT
SQUARE METERS is adjudged to have been acquired by Juan Lucas Luna through his THE NAME OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT DID NOT APPEAR IN THE DEED OF ABSOLUTE
sole industry; SALE EXECUTED BY TANDANG SORA DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION OVER THE
CONDOMINIUM UNIT;
(b) Plaintiff has no right as owner or under any other concept over the
condominium unit, hence the entry in Condominium Certificate of Title No. 21761 VII. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT NEITHER ARTICLE 148 OF THE
of the Registry of Deeds of Makati with respect to the civil status of Juan Luces FAMILYCODE NOR ARTICLE 144 OF THE CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES ARE
Luna should be changed from "JUAN LUCES LUNA married to Soledad L. Luna" to APPLICABLE;
"JUAN LUCES LUNA married to Eugenia Zaballero Luna";
VIII. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE CAUSE OF ACTION OF
(c) Plaintiff is declared to be the owner of the books Corpus Juris, Fletcher on THE INTERVENOR-APPELLANT HAS BEEN BARRED BY PESCRIPTION AND LACHES;
Corporation, American Jurisprudence and Federal Supreme Court Reports found in and
the condominium unit and defendants are ordered to deliver them to the plaintiff
as soon as appropriate arrangements have been madefor transport and storage. IX. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT EXPUNGING/DISMISSING THE INTERVENTION
FOR FAILURE OF INTERVENOR-APPELLANT TO PAY FILING FEE.7
No pronouncement as to costs.
In contrast, the respondents attributedthe following errors to the trial court, to wit:
SO ORDERED.5
I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT CERTAIN FOREIGN LAW BOOKS IN
Decision of the CA THE LAW OFFICE OF ATTY. LUNA WERE BOUGHT WITH THE USE OF PLAINTIFF’S
MONEY;
 II. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PLAINTIFF PROVED BY Issues
PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE (HER CLAIM OVER) THE SPECIFIED FOREIGN LAW
BOOKS FOUND IN ATTY. LUNA’S LAW OFFICE; and In this appeal, the petitioner avers in her petition for review on certiorarithat:

III. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT, ASSUMING PLAINTIFF PAID A. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the Agreement for
FOR THE SAID FOREIGN LAW BOOKS, THE RIGHT TO RECOVER THEM HAD Separation and Property Settlement executed by Luna and Respondent Eugenia
PRESCRIBED AND BARRED BY LACHES AND ESTOPPEL.8 was unenforceable; hence, their conjugal partnership was not dissolved and
liquidated;
On November 11, 2005, the CA promulgated its assailed modified decision, 9 holding and
ruling: B. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in not recognizing the Dominican Republic
court’s approval of the Agreement;
EUGENIA, the first wife, was the legitimate wife of ATTY. LUNA until the latter’s death on July
12, 1997. The absolute divorce decree obtained by ATTY. LUNA inthe Dominican Republic did C. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ruling that Petitioner failed to adduce
not terminate his prior marriage with EUGENIA because foreign divorce between Filipino sufficient proof of actual contribution to the acquisition of purchase of the
citizens is not recognized in our jurisdiction. x x x10 subjectcondominium unit; and

xxxx D. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ruling that Petitioner was not entitled
to the subject law books.14
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed August 27, 2001 Decision of the RTC of
MakatiCity, Branch 138, is hereby MODIFIEDas follows: The decisive question to be resolved is who among the contending parties should be entitled
to the 25/100 pro indivisoshare in the condominium unit; and to the law books (i.e., Corpus
(a) The 25/100 pro-indiviso share in the condominium unit at the SIXTH FLOOR of Juris, Fletcher on Corporation, American Jurisprudence and Federal Supreme Court Reports).
the KALAW LEDESMA CONDOMINIUM PROJECT covered by Condominium
Certificate of Title No. 21761 consisting of FIVE HUNDRED SEVENTEEN (517/100) The resolution of the decisive question requires the Court to ascertain the law that should
(sic) SQUARE METERS is hereby adjudged to defendants-appellants, the heirs of determine, firstly, whether the divorce between Atty. Luna and Eugenia Zaballero-Luna
Juan Luces Luna and Eugenia Zaballero-Luna (first marriage), having been acquired (Eugenia) had validly dissolved the first marriage; and, secondly, whether the second
from the sole funds and sole industry of Juan Luces Luna while marriage of Juan marriage entered into by the late Atty. Luna and the petitioner entitled the latter to any
Luces Luna and Eugenia Zaballero-Luna (first marriage) was still subsisting and rights in property. Ruling of the Court
valid;
We affirm the modified decision of the CA.
(b) Plaintiff-appellant Soledad Lavadia has no right as owner or under any other
concept over the condominium unit, hence the entry in Condominium Certificate of
1. Atty. Luna’s first marriage with Eugenia
Title No. 21761 of the Registry of Deeds ofMakati with respect to the civil status of
subsisted up to the time of his death
Juan Luces Luna should be changed from "JUAN LUCES LUNA married to Soledad L.
Luna" to "JUAN LUCES LUNA married to Eugenia Zaballero Luna";
The first marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia, both Filipinos, was solemnized in the
Philippines on September 10, 1947. The law in force at the time of the solemnization was the
(c) Defendants-appellants, the heirs of Juan Luces Luna and Eugenia Zaballero-
Spanish Civil Code, which adopted the nationality rule. The Civil Codecontinued to follow the
Luna(first marriage) are hereby declared to be the owner of the books Corpus Juris,
nationality rule, to the effect that Philippine laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the
Fletcher on Corporation, American Jurisprudence and Federal Supreme Court
status, condition and legal capacity of persons were binding upon citizens of the Philippines,
Reports found in the condominium unit.
although living abroad.15 Pursuant to the nationality rule, Philippine laws governed thiscase
by virtue of bothAtty. Luna and Eugenio having remained Filipinos until the death of Atty.
No pronouncement as to costs. Luna on July 12, 1997 terminated their marriage.

SO ORDERED.11 From the time of the celebration ofthe first marriage on September 10, 1947 until the
present, absolute divorce between Filipino spouses has not been recognized in the
On March 13, 2006,12 the CA denied the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. 13 Philippines. The non-recognition of absolute divorce between Filipinos has remained even
under the Family Code,16 even if either or both of the spouses are residing abroad.17 Indeed, Article 142. By means of the conjugal partnership of gains the husband and wife place in a
the only two types of defective marital unions under our laws have beenthe void and the common fund the fruits of their separate property and the income from their work or
voidable marriages. As such, the remedies against such defective marriages have been industry, and divide equally, upon the dissolution of the marriage or of the partnership, the
limited to the declaration of nullity ofthe marriage and the annulment of the marriage. net gains or benefits obtained indiscriminately by either spouse during the marriage.

It is true that on January 12, 1976, the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Sto. Domingo in the The conjugal partnership of gains subsists until terminated for any of various causes of
Dominican Republic issued the Divorce Decree dissolving the first marriage of Atty. Luna and termination enumerated in Article 175 of the Civil Code, viz:
Eugenia.18 Conformably with the nationality rule, however, the divorce, even if voluntarily
obtained abroad, did not dissolve the marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia, which Article 175. The conjugal partnership of gains terminates:
subsisted up to the time of his death on July 12, 1997. This finding conforms to the
Constitution, which characterizes marriage as an inviolable social institution,19 and regards it
(1) Upon the death of either spouse;
as a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman for the establishment
of a conjugal and family life.20 The non-recognition of absolute divorce in the Philippines is a
manifestation of the respect for the sanctity of the marital union especially among Filipino (2) When there is a decree of legal separation;
citizens. It affirms that the extinguishment of a valid marriage must be grounded only upon
the death of either spouse, or upon a ground expressly provided bylaw. For as long as this (3) When the marriage is annulled;
public policy on marriage between Filipinos exists, no divorce decree dissolving the marriage
between them can ever be given legal or judicial recognition and enforcement in this (4) In case of judicial separation of property under Article 191.
jurisdiction.

The mere execution of the Agreement by Atty. Luna and Eugenia did not per sedissolve and
2. The Agreement for Separation and Property Settlement liquidate their conjugal partnership of gains. The approval of the Agreement by a competent
was void for lack of court approval court was still required under Article 190 and Article 191 of the Civil Code, as follows:

The petitioner insists that the Agreement for Separation and Property Settlement Article 190. In the absence of an express declaration in the marriage settlements, the
(Agreement) that the late Atty. Luna and Eugenia had entered into and executed in separation of property between spouses during the marriage shall not take place save in
connection with the divorce proceedings before the CFI of Sto. Domingo in the Dominican virtue of a judicial order. (1432a)
Republic to dissolve and liquidate their conjugal partnership was enforceable against
Eugenia. Hence, the CA committed reversible error in decreeing otherwise.
Article 191. The husband or the wife may ask for the separation of property, and it shall be
decreed when the spouse of the petitioner has been sentenced to a penalty which carries
The insistence of the petitioner was unwarranted. with it civil interdiction, or has been declared absent, or when legal separation has been
granted.
Considering that Atty. Luna and Eugenia had not entered into any marriage settlement prior
to their marriage on September 10, 1947, the system of relative community or conjugal xxxx
partnership of gains governed their property relations. This is because the Spanish Civil Code,
the law then in force at the time of their marriage, did not specify the property regime of the
spouses in the event that they had not entered into any marriage settlement before or at the The husband and the wife may agree upon the dissolution of the conjugal partnership during
time of the marriage. Article 119 of the Civil Codeclearly so provides, to wit: the marriage, subject to judicial approval. All the creditors of the husband and of the wife, as
well as of the conjugal partnership shall be notified of any petition for judicialapproval or the
voluntary dissolution of the conjugal partnership, so that any such creditors may appear
Article 119. The future spouses may in the marriage settlements agree upon absolute or atthe hearing to safeguard his interests. Upon approval of the petition for dissolution of the
relative community of property, or upon complete separation of property, or upon any other conjugal partnership, the court shall take such measures as may protect the creditors and
regime. In the absence of marriage settlements, or when the same are void, the system of other third persons.
relative community or conjugal partnership of gains as established in this Code, shall govern
the property relations between husband and wife.
After dissolution of the conjugal partnership, the provisions of articles 214 and 215 shall
apply. The provisions of this Code concerning the effect of partition stated in articles 498 to
Article 142 of the Civil Codehas defined a conjugal partnership of gains thusly: 501 shall be applicable. (1433a)
But was not the approval of the Agreement by the CFI of Sto. Domingo in the Dominican of them through their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the
Republic sufficient in dissolving and liquidating the conjugal partnership of gains between the rules on co-ownership.(n)
late Atty. Luna and Eugenia?
In such a situation, whoever alleges co-ownership carried the burden of proof to confirm
The query is answered in the negative. There is no question that the approval took place only such fact.1âwphi1 To establish co-ownership, therefore, it became imperative for the
as an incident ofthe action for divorce instituted by Atty. Luna and Eugenia, for, indeed, the petitioner to offer proof of her actual contributions in the acquisition of property. Her mere
justifications for their execution of the Agreement were identical to the grounds raised in the allegation of co-ownership, without sufficient and competent evidence, would warrant no
action for divorce.21 With the divorce not being itself valid and enforceable under Philippine relief in her favor. As the Court explained in Saguid v. Court of Appeals:25
law for being contrary to Philippine public policy and public law, the approval of the
Agreement was not also legally valid and enforceable under Philippine law. Consequently, In the cases of Agapay v. Palang, and Tumlos v. Fernandez, which involved the issue of co-
the conjugal partnership of gains of Atty. Luna and Eugenia subsisted in the lifetime of their ownership ofproperties acquired by the parties to a bigamous marriage and an adulterous
marriage. relationship, respectively, we ruled that proof of actual contribution in the acquisition of the
property is essential. The claim of co-ownership of the petitioners therein who were parties
3. Atty. Luna’s marriage with Soledad, being bigamous, to the bigamous and adulterousunion is without basis because they failed to substantiate
was void; properties acquired during their marriage their allegation that they contributed money in the purchase of the disputed properties. Also
were governed by the rules on co-ownership in Adriano v. Court of Appeals, we ruled that the fact that the controverted property was
titled in the name of the parties to an adulterous relationship is not sufficient proof of
What law governed the property relations of the second marriage between Atty. Luna and coownership absent evidence of actual contribution in the acquisition of the property.
Soledad?
As in other civil cases, the burden of proof rests upon the party who, as determined by the
The CA expressly declared that Atty. Luna’s subsequent marriage to Soledad on January 12, pleadings or the nature of the case, asserts an affirmative issue. Contentions must be proved
1976 was void for being bigamous,22 on the ground that the marriage between Atty. Luna and by competent evidence and reliance must be had on the strength of the party’s own
Eugenia had not been dissolved by the Divorce Decree rendered by the CFI of Sto. Domingo evidence and not upon the weakness of the opponent’s defense. This applies with more vigor
in the Dominican Republic but had subsisted until the death of Atty. Luna on July 12, 1997. where, as in the instant case, the plaintiff was allowed to present evidence ex
parte.1âwphi1 The plaintiff is not automatically entitled to the relief prayed for. The law gives
the defendantsome measure of protection as the plaintiff must still prove the allegations in
The Court concurs with the CA.
the complaint. Favorable relief can be granted only after the court isconvinced that the facts
proven by the plaintiff warrant such relief. Indeed, the party alleging a fact has the burden of
In the Philippines, marriages that are bigamous, polygamous, or incestuous are void. Article proving it and a mereallegation is not evidence.26
71 of the Civil Codeclearly states:
The petitioner asserts herein that she sufficiently proved her actual contributions in the
Article 71. All marriages performed outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in purchase of the condominium unit in the aggregate amount of at least ₱306,572.00,
force in the country where they were performed, and valid there as such, shall also be valid consisting in direct contributions of ₱159,072.00, and in repaying the loans Atty. Luna had
in this country, except bigamous, polygamous, or incestuous marriages as determined by obtained from Premex Financing and Banco Filipino totaling ₱146,825.30; 27 and that such
Philippine law. aggregate contributions of ₱306,572.00 corresponded to almost the entire share of Atty.
Luna in the purchase of the condominium unit amounting to ₱362,264.00 of the unit’s
Bigamy is an illegal marriage committed by contracting a second or subsequent marriage purchase price of ₱1,449,056.00.28 The petitioner further asserts that the lawbooks were paid
before the first marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been for solely out of her personal funds, proof of which Atty. Luna had even sent her a "thank
declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper you" note;29 that she had the financial capacity to make the contributions and purchases; and
proceedings.23 A bigamous marriage is considered void ab initio.24 that Atty. Luna could not acquire the properties on his own due to the meagerness of the
income derived from his law practice.
Due to the second marriage between Atty. Luna and the petitioner being void ab initioby
virtue of its being bigamous, the properties acquired during the bigamous marriage were Did the petitioner discharge her burden of proof on the co-ownership?
governed by the rules on co-ownership, conformably with Article 144 of the Civil Code, viz:
In resolving the question, the CA entirely debunked the petitioner’s assertions on her actual
Article 144. When a man and a woman live together as husband and wife, but they are not contributions through the following findings and conclusions, namely:
married, ortheir marriage is void from the beginning, the property acquired by eitheror both
SOLEDAD was not able to prove by preponderance of evidence that her own independent "The Deed of Absolute Sale, Exhibit "9", covering the condominium unit was in the name of
funds were used to buy the law office condominium and the law books subject matter in Atty. Luna, together with his partners in the law firm. The name of the plaintiff does not
contentionin this case – proof that was required for Article 144 of the New Civil Code and appear as vendee or as the spouse of Atty. Luna. The same was acquired for the use of the
Article 148 of the Family Code to apply – as to cases where properties were acquired by a Law firm of Atty. Luna. The loans from Allied Banking Corporation and Far East Bank and
man and a woman living together as husband and wife but not married, or under a marriage Trust Company were loans of Atty. Luna and his partners and plaintiff does not have evidence
which was void ab initio. Under Article 144 of the New Civil Code, the rules on co-ownership to show that she paid for them fully or partially. x x x"
would govern. But this was not readily applicable to many situations and thus it created a
void at first because it applied only if the parties were not in any way incapacitated or were The fact that CCT No. 4779 and subsequently, CCT No. 21761 were in the name of "JUAN
without impediment to marry each other (for it would be absurd to create a co-ownership LUCES LUNA, married to Soledad L. Luna" was no proof that SOLEDAD was a co-owner of the
where there still exists a prior conjugal partnership or absolute community between the man condominium unit. Acquisition of title and registration thereof are two different acts. It is
and his lawful wife). This void was filled upon adoption of the Family Code. Article 148 well settled that registration does not confer title but merely confirms one already existing.
provided that: only the property acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint The phrase "married to" preceding "Soledad L. Luna" is merely descriptive of the civil status
contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned in common and in proportion to of ATTY. LUNA.
their respective contributions. Such contributions and corresponding shares were prima
faciepresumed to be equal. However, for this presumption to arise, proof of actual
SOLEDAD, the second wife, was not even a lawyer. So it is but logical that SOLEDAD had no
contribution was required. The same rule and presumption was to apply to joint deposits of
participation in the law firm or in the purchase of books for the law firm. SOLEDAD failed to
money and evidence of credit. If one of the parties was validly married to another, his or her
prove that she had anything to contribute and that she actually purchased or paid for the law
share in the co-ownership accrued to the absolute community or conjugal partnership
office amortization and for the law books. It is more logical to presume that it was ATTY.
existing in such valid marriage. If the party who acted in bad faith was not validly married to
LUNA who bought the law office space and the law books from his earnings from his practice
another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the manner provided in the last paragraph of
of law rather than embarrassingly beg or ask from SOLEDAD money for use of the law firm
the Article 147. The rules on forfeiture applied even if both parties were in bad faith. Co-
that he headed.30
ownership was the exception while conjugal partnership of gains was the strict rule whereby
marriage was an inviolable social institution and divorce decrees are not recognized in the
Philippines, as was held by the Supreme Court in the case of Tenchavez vs. Escaño, G.R. No. L- The Court upholds the foregoing findings and conclusions by the CA both because they were
19671, November 29, 1965, 15 SCRA 355, thus: substantiated by the records and because we have not been shown any reason to revisit and
undo them. Indeed, the petitioner, as the party claiming the co-ownership, did not discharge
her burden of proof. Her mere allegations on her contributions, not being evidence, 31 did not
xxxx
serve the purpose. In contrast, given the subsistence of the first marriage between Atty. Luna
and Eugenia, the presumption that Atty. Luna acquired the properties out of his own
As to the 25/100pro-indivisoshare of ATTY. LUNA in the condominium unit, SOLEDAD failed personal funds and effort remained. It should then be justly concluded that the properties in
to prove that she made an actual contribution to purchase the said property. She failed to litislegally pertained to their conjugal partnership of gains as of the time of his death.
establish that the four (4) checks that she presented were indeed used for the acquisition of Consequently, the sole ownership of the 25/100 pro indivisoshare of Atty. Luna in the
the share of ATTY. LUNA in the condominium unit. This was aptly explained in the Decision of condominium unit, and of the lawbooks pertained to the respondents as the lawful heirs of
the trial court, viz.: Atty. Luna.

"x x x The first check, Exhibit "M" for ₱55,000.00 payable to Atty. Teresita Cruz Sison was WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on November 11, 2005; and
issued on January 27, 1977, which was thirteen (13) months before the Memorandum of ORDERS the petitioner to pay the costs of suit.
Agreement, Exhibit "7" was signed. Another check issued on April 29, 1978 in the amount of
₱97,588.89, Exhibit "P" was payable to Banco Filipino. According to the plaintiff, thiswas in
SO ORDERED.
payment of the loan of Atty. Luna. The third check which was for ₱49,236.00 payable to
PREMEX was dated May 19, 1979, also for payment of the loan of Atty. Luna. The fourth
check, Exhibit "M", for ₱4,072.00 was dated December 17, 1980. None of the foregoing prove
that the amounts delivered by plaintiff to the payees were for the acquisition of the subject
condominium unit. The connection was simply not established. x x x"

SOLEDAD’s claim that she made a cash contribution of ₱100,000.00 is unsubstantiated.

Clearly, there is no basis for SOLEDAD’s claim of co-ownership over the 25/100 portion of the
condominium unit and the trial court correctly found that the same was acquired through the
sole industry of ATTY. LUNA, thus: