PUBLIC CORPORATION CASES

IV. Concepts of Local Autonomy [Sec. 2], Decentralization [Sec. 3], Devolution and Deconcentration

G.R. No. 80391 February 28, 1989

SULTAN ALIMBUSAR P. LIMBONA, petitioner,

vs.
CONTE MANGELIN, SALIC ALI, SALINDATO ALI, PILIMPINAS CONDING, ACMAD TOMAWIS, GERRY
TOMAWIS, JESUS ORTIZ, ANTONIO DELA FUENTE, DIEGO PALOMARES, JR., RAUL DAGALANGIT, and
BIMBO SINSUAT, respondents.

Ambrosio Padilla, Mempin & Reyes Law Offices for petitioner petitioner.

Makabangkit B. Lanto for respondents

SARMIENTO, J.:

The acts of the Sangguniang Pampook of Region XII are assailed in this petition. The antecedent facts are as follows:

1. On September 24, 1986, petitioner Sultan Alimbusar Limbona was appointed as a member of
the Sangguniang Pampook, Regional Autonomous Government, Region XII, representing Lanao
del Sur.

2. On March 12, 1987 petitioner was elected Speaker of the Regional Legislative Assembly or
Batasang Pampook of Central Mindanao (Assembly for brevity).

3. Said Assembly is composed of eighteen (18) members. Two of said members, respondents
Acmad Tomawis and Pakil Dagalangit, filed on March 23, 1987 with the Commission on Elections
their respective certificates of candidacy in the May 11, 1987 congressional elections for the district
of Lanao del Sur but they later withdrew from the aforesaid election and thereafter resumed again
their positions as members of the Assembly.

4. On October 21, 1987 Congressman Datu Guimid Matalam, Chairman of the Committee on
Muslim Affairs of the House of Representatives, invited Mr. Xavier Razul, Pampook Speaker of
Region XI, Zamboanga City and the petitioner in his capacity as Speaker of the Assembly, Region
XII, in a letter which reads:

The Committee on Muslim Affairs well undertake consultations and dialogues

with local government officials, civic, religious organizations and traditional
leaders on the recent and present political developments and other issues
affecting Regions IX and XII.

The result of the conference, consultations and dialogues would hopefully chart
the autonomous governments of the two regions as envisioned and may prod the
President to constitute immediately the Regional Consultative Commission as
mandated by the Commission.

You are requested to invite some members of the Pampook Assembly of your
respective assembly on November 1 to 15, 1987, with venue at the Congress of
the Philippines. Your presence, unstinted support and cooperation is (sic)
indispensable.

5. Consistent with the said invitation, petitioner sent a telegram to Acting Secretary Johnny
Alimbuyao of the Assembly to wire all Assemblymen that there shall be no session in November as
"our presence in the house committee hearing of Congress take (sic) precedence over any pending
business in batasang pampook ... ."
6. In compliance with the aforesaid instruction of the petitioner, Acting Secretary Alimbuyao sent to
the members of the Assembly the following telegram:

TRANSMITTING FOR YOUR INFORMATION AND GUIDANCE TELEGRAM

RECEIVED FROM SPEAKER LIMBONA QUOTE CONGRESSMAN JIMMY
MATALAM CHAIRMAN OF THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON MUSLIM AFFAIRS
REQUESTED ME TO ASSIST SAID COMMITTEE IN THE DISCUSSION OF
THE PROPOSED AUTONOMY ORGANIC NOV. 1ST TO 15. HENCE WERE
ALL ASSEMBLYMEN THAT THERE SHALL BE NO SESSION IN NOVEMBER
AS OUR PRESENCE IN THE HOUSE COMMITTEE HEARING OF CONGRESS
TAKE PRECEDENCE OVER ANY PENDING BUSINESS IN BATASANG
PAMPOOK OF MATALAM FOLLOWS UNQUOTE REGARDS.

7. On November 2, 1987, the Assembly held session in defiance of petitioner's advice, with the
following assemblymen present:

1. Sali, Salic

2. Conding, Pilipinas (sic)

3. Dagalangit, Rakil

4. Dela Fuente, Antonio

5. Mangelen, Conte

6. Ortiz, Jesus

7. Palomares, Diego

8. Sinsuat, Bimbo

9. Tomawis, Acmad

10. Tomawis, Jerry

After declaring the presence of a quorum, the Speaker Pro-Tempore was authorized to preside in
the session. On Motion to declare the seat of the Speaker vacant, all Assemblymen in attendance
voted in the affirmative, hence, the chair declared said seat of the Speaker vacant. 8. On
November 5, 1987, the session of the Assembly resumed with the following Assemblymen present:

1. Mangelen Conte-Presiding Officer

2. Ali Salic

3. Ali Salindatu

4. Aratuc, Malik

5. Cajelo, Rene

6. Conding, Pilipinas (sic)

7. Dagalangit, Rakil
 8. Dela Fuente, Antonio

9. Ortiz, Jesus

10 Palomares, Diego

11. Quijano, Jesus

12. Sinsuat, Bimbo

13. Tomawis, Acmad

14. Tomawis, Jerry

An excerpt from the debates and proceeding of said session reads:

HON. DAGALANGIT: Mr. Speaker, Honorable Members of the House, with the presence of our
colleagues who have come to attend the session today, I move to call the names of the new
comers in order for them to cast their votes on the previous motion to declare the position of the
Speaker vacant. But before doing so, I move also that the designation of the Speaker Pro
Tempore as the Presiding Officer and Mr. Johnny Evangelists as Acting Secretary in the session
last November 2, 1987 be reconfirmed in today's session.

HON. SALIC ALI: I second the motions.

PRESIDING OFFICER: Any comment or objections on the two motions presented? Me chair hears
none and the said motions are approved. ...

Twelve (12) members voted in favor of the motion to declare the seat of the Speaker vacant; one
1
abstained and none voted against.

Accordingly, the petitioner prays for judgment as follows:

WHEREFORE, petitioner respectfully prays that-

(a) This Petition be given due course;

(b) Pending hearing, a restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction be issued enjoining
respondents from proceeding with their session to be held on November 5, 1987, and on any day
thereafter;

(c) After hearing, judgment be rendered declaring the proceedings held by respondents of their
session on November 2, 1987 as null and void;

(d) Holding the election of petitioner as Speaker of said Legislative Assembly or Batasan Pampook,
Region XII held on March 12, 1987 valid and subsisting, and

(e) Making the injunction permanent.

2
Petitioner likewise prays for such other relief as may be just and equitable.

Pending further proceedings, this Court, on January 19, 1988, received a resolution filed by the Sangguniang
Pampook, "EXPECTING ALIMBUSAR P. LIMBONA FROM MEMBERSHIP OF THE SANGGUNIANG PAMPOOK
3
AUTONOMOUS REGION XII," on the grounds, among other things, that the petitioner "had caused to be prepared
and signed by him paying [sic] the salaries and emoluments of Odin Abdula, who was considered resigned after filing
his Certificate of Candidacy for Congressmen for the First District of Maguindanao in the last May 11, elections. . .
and nothing in the record of the Assembly will show that any request for reinstatement by Abdula was ever made . .
4
." and that "such action of Mr. Lim bona in paying Abdula his salaries and emoluments without authority from the
5
Assembly . . . constituted a usurpation of the power of the Assembly," that the petitioner "had recently caused
withdrawal of so much amount of cash from the Assembly resulting to the non-payment of the salaries and
6
emoluments of some Assembly [sic]," and that he had "filed a case before the Supreme Court against some
7
members of the Assembly on question which should have been resolved within the confines of the Assembly," for
8
which the respondents now submit that the petition had become "moot and academic".

The first question, evidently, is whether or not the expulsion of the petitioner (pending litigation) has made the case
moot and academic.

We do not agree that the case has been rendered moot and academic by reason simply of the expulsion resolution
so issued. For, if the petitioner's expulsion was done purposely to make this petition moot and academic, and to
preempt the Court, it will not make it academic.

On the ground of the immutable principle of due process alone, we hold that the expulsion in question is of no force
and effect. In the first place, there is no showing that the Sanggunian had conducted an investigation, and whether or
not the petitioner had been heard in his defense, assuming that there was an investigation, or otherwise given the
opportunity to do so. On the other hand, what appears in the records is an admission by the Assembly (at least, the
respondents) that "since November, 1987 up to this writing, the petitioner has not set foot at the Sangguniang
9
Pampook." "To be sure, the private respondents aver that "[t]he Assemblymen, in a conciliatory gesture, wanted him
10 11
to come to Cotabato City," but that was "so that their differences could be threshed out and settled." Certainly,
that avowed wanting or desire to thresh out and settle, no matter how conciliatory it may be cannot be a substitute for
the notice and hearing contemplated by law.

While we have held that due process, as the term is known in administrative law, does not absolutely require notice
12
and that a party need only be given the opportunity to be heard, it does not appear herein that the petitioner had, to
begin with, been made aware that he had in fact stood charged of graft and corruption before his collegues. It cannot
be said therefore that he was accorded any opportunity to rebut their accusations. As it stands, then, the charges now
levelled amount to mere accusations that cannot warrant expulsion.

In the second place, (the resolution) appears strongly to be a bare act of vendetta by the other Assemblymen against
the petitioner arising from what the former perceive to be abduracy on the part of the latter. Indeed, it (the resolution)
speaks of "a case [having been filed] [by the petitioner] before the Supreme Court . . . on question which should have
been resolved within the confines of the Assemblyman act which some members claimed unnecessarily and unduly
13
assails their integrity and character as representative of the people" an act that cannot possibly justify expulsion.
14
Access to judicial remedies is guaranteed by the Constitution, and, unless the recourse amounts to malicious
prosecution, no one may be punished for seeking redress in the courts.

We therefore order reinstatement, with the caution that should the past acts of the petitioner indeed warrant his
removal, the Assembly is enjoined, should it still be so minded, to commence proper proceedings therefor in line with
the most elementary requirements of due process. And while it is within the discretion of the members of the
Sanggunian to punish their erring colleagues, their acts are nonetheless subject to the moderating band of this Court
in the event that such discretion is exercised with grave abuse.

It is, to be sure, said that precisely because the Sangguniang Pampook(s) are "autonomous," the courts may not
rightfully intervene in their affairs, much less strike down their acts. We come, therefore, to the second issue: Are the
so-called autonomous governments of Mindanao, as they are now constituted, subject to the jurisdiction of the
national courts? In other words, what is the extent of self-government given to the two autonomous governments of
Region IX and XII?

The autonomous governments of Mindanao were organized in Regions IX and XII by Presidential Decree No.
15 16
1618 promulgated on July 25, 1979. Among other things, the Decree established "internal autonomy" in the two
regions "[w]ithin the framework of the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines
17
and its Constitution," with legislative and executive machinery to exercise the powers and
18
responsibilities specified therein.
It requires the autonomous regional governments to "undertake all internal administrative matters for the respective
19
regions," except to "act on matters which are within the jurisdiction and competence of the National
20
Government," "which include, but are not limited to, the following:

(1) National defense and security;

(2) Foreign relations;

(3) Foreign trade;

(4) Currency, monetary affairs, foreign exchange, banking and quasi-banking, and external
borrowing,

(5) Disposition, exploration, development, exploitation or utilization of all natural resources;

(6) Air and sea transport

(7) Postal matters and telecommunications;

(8) Customs and quarantine;

(9) Immigration and deportation;

(10) Citizenship and naturalization;

(11) National economic, social and educational planning; and

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(12) General auditing.

In relation to the central government, it provides that "[t]he President shall have the power of general supervision and
22
control over the Autonomous Regions ..."

Now, autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of power. There is decentralization of

administration when the central government delegates administrative powers to political subdivisions in order to
broaden the base of government power and in the process to make local governments "more responsive and
23
accountable," "and ensure their fullest development as self-reliant communities and make them more effective
24
partners in the pursuit of national development and social progress." At the same time, it relieves the central
government of the burden of managing local affairs and enables it to concentrate on national concerns. The President
25
exercises "general supervision" over them, but only to "ensure that local affairs are administered according to
26 27
law." He has no control over their acts in the sense that he can substitute their judgments with his own.

Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an abdication of political power in the favor of local
governments units declare to be autonomous . In that case, the autonomous government is free to chart its own
destiny and shape its future with minimum intervention from central authorities. According to a constitutional author,
decentralization of power amounts to "self-immolation," since in that event, the autonomous government becomes
28
accountable not to the central authorities but to its constituency.

But the question of whether or not the grant of autonomy Muslim Mindanao under the 1987 Constitution involves,
truly, an effort to decentralize power rather than mere administration is a question foreign to this petition, since what
is involved herein is a local government unit constituted prior to the ratification of the present Constitution. Hence, the
Court will not resolve that controversy now, in this case, since no controversy in fact exists. We will resolve it at the
proper time and in the proper case.

Under the 1987 Constitution, local government units enjoy autonomy in these two senses, thus:
 Section 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the Philippines are the
provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays. Here shall be autonomous regions in Muslim
29
Mindanao ,and the Cordilleras as hereinafter provided.

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Sec. 2. The territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy local autonomy.

xxx xxx xxx

See. 15. Mere shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordilleras
consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical areas sharing common and
distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures, and other relevant
characteristics within the framework of this Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as
31
territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines.

An autonomous government that enjoys autonomy of the latter category [CONST. (1987), art. X, sec. 15.] is subject
alone to the decree of the organic act creating it and accepted principles on the effects and limits of "autonomy." On
the other hand, an autonomous government of the former class is, as we noted, under the supervision of the national
32
government acting through the President (and the Department of Local Government). If the Sangguniang Pampook
(of Region XII), then, is autonomous in the latter sense, its acts are, debatably beyond the domain of this Court in
perhaps the same way that the internal acts, say, of the Congress of the Philippines are beyond our jurisdiction. But if
it is autonomous in the former category only, it comes unarguably under our jurisdiction. An examination of the very
Presidential Decree creating the autonomous governments of Mindanao persuades us that they were never meant to
exercise autonomy in the second sense, that is, in which the central government commits an act of self-immolation.
Presidential Decree No. 1618, in the first place, mandates that "[t]he President shall have the power of general
33
supervision and control over Autonomous Regions." In the second place, the Sangguniang Pampook, their
legislative arm, is made to discharge chiefly administrative services, thus:

SEC. 7. Powers of the Sangguniang Pampook. The Sangguniang Pampook shall exercise local
legislative powers over regional affairs within the framework of national development plans, policies
and goals, in the following areas:

(1) Organization of regional administrative system;

(2) Economic, social and cultural development of the Autonomous Region;

(3) Agricultural, commercial and industrial programs for the Autonomous Region;

(4) Infrastructure development for the Autonomous Region;

(5) Urban and rural planning for the Autonomous Region;

(6) Taxation and other revenue-raising measures as provided for in this Decree;

(7) Maintenance, operation and administration of schools established by the Autonomous Region;

(8) Establishment, operation and maintenance of health, welfare and other social services,
programs and facilities;

(9) Preservation and development of customs, traditions, languages and culture indigenous to the
Autonomous Region; and

(10) Such other matters as may be authorized by law,including the enactment of such measures as
may be necessary for the promotion of the general welfare of the people in the Autonomous
Region.
 The President shall exercise such powers as may be necessary to assure that enactment and acts
of the Sangguniang Pampook and the Lupong Tagapagpaganap ng Pook are in compliance with
this Decree, national legislation, policies, plans and programs.

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The Sangguniang Pampook shall maintain liaison with the Batasang Pambansa.

Hence, we assume jurisdiction. And if we can make an inquiry in the validity of the expulsion in question, with more
reason can we review the petitioner's removal as Speaker.

Briefly, the petitioner assails the legality of his ouster as Speaker on the grounds that: (1) the Sanggunian, in
convening on November 2 and 5, 1987 (for the sole purpose of declaring the office of the Speaker vacant), did so in
violation of the Rules of the Sangguniang Pampook since the Assembly was then on recess; and (2) assuming that it
was valid, his ouster was ineffective nevertheless for lack of quorum.

Upon the facts presented, we hold that the November 2 and 5, 1987 sessions were invalid. It is true that under
Section 31 of the Region XII Sanggunian Rules, "[s]essions shall not be suspended or adjourned except by direction
35
of the Sangguniang Pampook," but it provides likewise that "the Speaker may, on [sic] his discretion, declare a
36
recess of "short intervals." Of course, there is disagreement between the protagonists as to whether or not the
recess called by the petitioner effective November 1 through 15, 1987 is the "recess of short intervals" referred to; the
petitioner says that it is while the respondents insist that, to all intents and purposes, it was an adjournment and that
"recess" as used by their Rules only refers to "a recess when arguments get heated up so that protagonists in a
37
debate can talk things out informally and obviate dissenssion [sic] and disunity. The Court agrees with the
respondents on this regard, since clearly, the Rules speak of "short intervals." Secondly, the Court likewise agrees
that the Speaker could not have validly called a recess since the Assembly had yet to convene on November 1, the
38
date session opens under the same Rules. Hence, there can be no recess to speak of that could possibly interrupt
any session. But while this opinion is in accord with the respondents' own, we still invalidate the twin sessions in
question, since at the time the petitioner called the "recess," it was not a settled matter whether or not he could. do
so. In the second place, the invitation tendered by the Committee on Muslim Affairs of the House of Representatives
provided a plausible reason for the intermission sought. Thirdly, assuming that a valid recess could not be called, it
does not appear that the respondents called his attention to this mistake. What appears is that instead, they opened
the sessions themselves behind his back in an apparent act of mutiny. Under the circumstances, we find equity on his
side. For this reason, we uphold the "recess" called on the ground of good faith.

It does not appear to us, moreover, that the petitioner had resorted to the aforesaid "recess" in order to forestall the
Assembly from bringing about his ouster. This is not apparent from the pleadings before us. We are convinced that
the invitation was what precipitated it.

In holding that the "recess" in question is valid, we are not to be taken as establishing a precedent, since, as we said,
a recess can not be validly declared without a session having been first opened. In upholding the petitioner herein,
we are not giving him a carte blanche to order recesses in the future in violation of the Rules, or otherwise to prevent
the lawful meetings thereof.

Neither are we, by this disposition, discouraging the Sanggunian from reorganizing itself pursuant to its lawful
prerogatives. Certainly, it can do so at the proper time. In the event that be petitioner should initiate obstructive
39
moves, the Court is certain that it is armed with enough coercive remedies to thwart them.

In view hereof, we find no need in dwelling on the issue of quorum.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The Sangguniang Pampook, Region XII, is
ENJOINED to (1) REINSTATE the petitioner as Member, Sangguniang Pampook, Region XII; and (2) REINSTATE
him as Speaker thereof. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 92299 April 19, 1991

REYNALDO R. SAN JUAN, petitioner,

vs.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT and CECILIA
ALMAJOSE, respondents.

Legal Services Division for petitioner.

Sumulong, Sumulong, Paras & Abano Law Offices for private respondent.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

In this petition for certiorari pursuant to Section 7, Article IX (A) of the present Constitution, the petitioner Governor of
the Province of Rizal, prays for the nullification of Resolution No. 89-868 of the Civil Service Commission (CSC)
dated November 21, 1989 and its Resolution No. 90-150 dated February 9, 1990.

The dispositive portion of the questioned Resolution reads:

WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Commission resolved to dismiss, as it hereby dismisses
the appeal of Governor Reynaldo San Juan of Rizal. Accordingly, the approved appointment of Ms. Cecilia
Almajose as Provincial Budget Officer of Rizal, is upheld. (Rollo, p. 32)

The subsequent Resolution No. 90-150 reiterates CSC's position upholding the private respondent's appointment by
denying the petitioner's motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.

The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:

On March 22, 1988, the position of Provincial Budget Officer (PBO) for the province of Rizal was left vacant by its
former holder, a certain Henedima del Rosario.

In a letter dated April 18, 1988, the petitioner informed Director Reynaldo Abella of the Department of Budget and
Management (DBM) Region IV that Ms. Dalisay Santos assumed office as Acting PBO since March 22, 1988
pursuant to a Memorandum issued by the petitioner who further requested Director Abella to endorse the
appointment of the said Ms. Dalisay Santos to the contested position of PBO of Rizal. Ms. Dalisay Santos was then
Municipal Budget Officer of Taytay, Rizal before she discharged the functions of acting PBO.

In a Memorandum dated July 26, 1988 addressed to the DBM Secretary, then Director Abella of Region IV
recommended the appointment of the private respondent as PBO of Rizal on the basis of a comparative study of all
Municipal Budget Officers of the said province which included three nominees of the petitioner. According to Abella,
the private respondent was the most qualified since she was the only Certified Public Accountant among the
contenders.

On August 1, 1988, DBM Undersecretary Nazario S. Cabuquit, Jr. signed the appointment papers of the private
respondent as PBO of Rizal upon the aforestated recommendation of Abella.

In a letter dated August 3, 1988 addressed to Secretary Carague, the petitioner reiterated his request for the
appointment of Dalisay Santos to the contested position unaware of the earlier appointment made by Undersecretary
Cabuquit.

On August 31, 1988, DBM Regional Director Agripino G. Galvez wrote the petitioner that Dalisay Santos and his
other recommendees did not meet the minimum requirements under Local Budget Circular No. 31 for the position of
a local budget officer. Director Galvez whether or not through oversight further required the petitioner to submit at
least three other qualified nominees who are qualified for the position of PBO of Rizal for evaluation and processing.

On November 2, 1988, the petitioner after having been informed of the private respondent's appointment wrote
Secretary Carague protesting against the said appointment on the grounds that Cabuquit as DBM Undersecretary is
not legally authorized to appoint the PBO; that the private respondent lacks the required three years work experience
as provided in Local Budget Circular No. 31; and that under Executive Order No. 112, it is the Provincial Governor,
not the Regional Director or a Congressman, who has the power to recommend nominees for the position of PBO.

On January 9, 1989 respondent DBM, through its Director of the Bureau of Legal & Legislative Affairs (BLLA) Virgilio
A. Afurung, issued a Memorandum ruling that the petitioner's letter-protest is not meritorious considering that public
respondent DBM validly exercised its prerogative in filling-up the contested position since none of the petitioner's
nominees met the prescribed requirements.

On January 27, 1989, the petitioner moved for a reconsideration of the BLLA ruling.

On February 28, 1989, the DBM Secretary denied the petitioner's motion for reconsideration.

On March 27, 1989, the petitioner wrote public respondent CSC protesting against the appointment of the private
respondent and reiterating his position regarding the matter.

Subsequently, public respondent CSC issued the questioned resolutions which prompted the petitioner to submit
before us the following assignment of errors:

A. THE CSC ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE APPOINTMENT BY DBM ASSISTANT SECRETARY

CABUQUIT OF CECILIA ALMAJOSE AS PBO OF RIZAL.

B. THE CSC ERRED IN HOLDING THAT CECILIA ALMA JOSE POSSESSES ALL THE REQUIRED
QUALIFICATIONS.

C. THE CSC ERRED IN DECLARING THAT PETITIONER'S NOMINEES ARE NOT QUALIFIED TO THE
SUBJECT POSITION.

D. THE CSC AND THE DBM GRAVELY ABUSED THEIR DISCRETION IN NOT ALLOWING PETITIONER
TO SUBMIT NEW NOMINEES WHO COULD MEET THE REQUIRED QUALIFICATION (Petition, pp. 7-
8, Rollo, pp. 15-16)

All the assigned errors relate to the issue of whether or not the private respondent is lawfully entitled to discharge the
functions of PBO of Rizal pursuant to the appointment made by public respondent DBM's Undersecretary upon the
recommendation of then Director Abella of DBM Region IV.

The petitioner's arguments rest on his contention that he has the sole right and privilege to recommend the nominees
to the position of PBO and that the appointee should come only from his nominees. In support thereof, he invokes
Section 1 of Executive Order No. 112 which provides that:

Sec. 1. All budget officers of provinces, cities and municipalities shall be appointed henceforth by the
Minister of Budget and Management upon recommendation of the local chief executive concerned, subject
to civil service law, rules and regulations, and they shall be placed under the administrative control and
technical supervision of the Ministry of Budget and Management.

The petitioner maintains that the appointment of the private respondent to the contested position was made in
derogation of the provision so that both the public respondents committed grave abuse of discretion in upholding
Almajose's appointment.

There is no question that under Section 1 of Executive Order No. 112 the petitioner's power to recommend is subject
to the qualifications prescribed by existing laws for the position of PBO. Consequently, in the event that the
recommendations made by the petitioner fall short of the required standards, the appointing authority, the Minister
(now Secretary) of public respondent DBM is expected to reject the same.

In the event that the Governor recommends an unqualified person, is the Department Head free to appoint anyone he
fancies ? This is the issue before us.
Before the promulgation of Executive Order No. 112 on December 24, 1986, Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, otherwise
known as the Local Government Code vested upon the Governor, subject to civil service rules and regulations, the
power to appoint the PBO (Sec. 216, subparagraph (1), BP 337). The Code further enumerated the qualifications for
the position of PBO. Thus, Section 216, subparagraph (2) of the same code states that:

(2) No person shall be appointed provincial budget officer unless he is a citizen of the Philippines, of good
moral character, a holder of a degree preferably in law, commerce, public administration or any related
course from a recognized college or university, a first grade civil service eligibility or its equivalent, and has
acquired at least five years experience in budgeting or in any related field.

The petitioner contends that since the appointing authority with respect to the Provincial Budget Officer of Rizal was
vested in him before, then, the real intent behind Executive Order No. 112 in empowering him to recommend
nominees to the position of Provincial Budget Officer is to make his recommendation part and parcel of the
appointment process. He states that the phrase "upon recommendation of the local chief executive concerned" must
be given mandatory application in consonance with the state policy of local autonomy as guaranteed by the 1987
Constitution under Art. II, Sec. 25 and Art. X, Sec. 2 thereof. He further argues that his power to recommend cannot
validly be defeated by a mere administrative issuance of public respondent DBM reserving to itself the right to fill-up
any existing vacancy in case the petitioner's nominees do not meet the qualification requirements as embodied in
public respondent DBM's Local Budget Circular No. 31 dated February 9, 1988.

The questioned ruling is justified by the public respondent CSC as follows:

As required by said E.O. No. 112, the DBM Secretary may choose from among the recommendees of the
Provincial Governor who are thus qualified and eligible for appointment to the position of the PBO of Rizal.
Notwithstanding, the recommendation of the local chief executive is merely directory and not a
condition sine qua non to the exercise by the Secretary of DBM of his appointing prerogative. To rule
otherwise would in effect give the law or E.O. No. 112 a different interpretation or construction not intended
therein, taking into consideration that said officer has been nationalized and is directly under the control and
supervision of the DBM Secretary or through his duly authorized representative. It cannot be gainsaid that
said national officer has a similar role in the local government unit, only on another area or concern, to that
of a Commission on Audit resident auditor. Hence, to preserve and maintain the independence of said
officer from the local government unit, he must be primarily the choice of the national appointing official, and
the exercise thereof must not be unduly hampered or interfered with, provided the appointee finally selected
meets the requirements for the position in accordance with prescribed Civil Service Law, Rules and
Regulations. In other words, the appointing official is not restricted or circumscribed to the list submitted or
recommended by the local chief executive in the final selection of an appointee for the position. He may
consider other nominees for the position vis a vis the nominees of the local chief executive. (CSC Resolution
No. 89-868, p. 2; Rollo, p. 31)

The issue before the Court is not limited to the validity of the appointment of one Provincial Budget Officer. The tug of
war between the Secretary of Budget and Management and the Governor of the premier province of Rizal over a
seemingly innocuous position involves the application of a most important constitutional policy and principle, that of
local autonomy. We have to obey the clear mandate on local autonomy. Where a law is capable of two
interpretations, one in favor of centralized power in Malacañang and the other beneficial to local autonomy, the scales
must be weighed in favor of autonomy.

The exercise by local governments of meaningful power has been a national goal since the turn of the century. And
yet, inspite of constitutional provisions and, as in this case, legislation mandating greater autonomy for local officials,
national officers cannot seem to let go of centralized powers. They deny or water down what little grants of autonomy
have so far been given to municipal corporations.

President McKinley's Instructions dated April 7, 1900 to the Second Philippine Commission ordered the new
Government "to devote their attention in the first instance to the establishment of municipal governments in which
natives of the Islands, both in the cities and rural communities, shall be afforded the opportunity to manage their own
local officers to the fullest extent of which they are capable and subject to the least degree of supervision and control
which a careful study of their capacities and observation of the workings of native control show to be consistent with
the maintenance of law, order and loyalty.
In this initial organic act for the Philippines, the Commission which combined both executive and legislative powers
was directed to give top priority to making local autonomy effective.

The 1935 Constitution had no specific article on local autonomy. However, in distinguishing between presidential
control and supervision as follows:

The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, or offices, exercise general
supervision over all local governments as may be provided by law, and take care that the laws be faithfully
executed. (Sec. 11, Article VII, 1935 Constitution)

the Constitution clearly limited the executive power over local governments to "general supervision . . . as may be
provided by law." The President controls the executive departments. He has no such power over local governments.
He has only supervision and that supervision is both general and circumscribed by statute.

In Tecson v. Salas, 34 SCRA 275, 282 (1970), this Court stated:

. . . Hebron v. Reyes, (104 Phil. 175 [1958]) with the then Justice, now Chief Justice, Concepcion as
the ponente, clarified matters. As was pointed out, the presidential competence is not even supervision in
general, but general supervision as may be provided by law. He could not thus go beyond the applicable
statutory provisions, which bind and fetter his discretion on the matter. Moreover, as had been earlier ruled
in an opinion penned by Justice Padilla in Mondano V. Silvosa, (97 Phil. 143 [1955]) referred to by the
present Chief Justice in his opinion in the Hebron case, supervision goes no further than "overseeing or the
power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect
to fulfill them the former may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform their
duties." (Ibid, pp. 147-148) Control, on the other hand, "means the power of an officer to alter or modify or
nullify or set aside what a subordinate had done in the performance of their duties and to substitute the
judgment of the former for that of the latter." It would follow then, according to the present Chief Justice, to
go back to the Hebron opinion, that the President had to abide by the then provisions of the Revised
Administrative Code on suspension and removal of municipal officials, there being no power of control that
he could rightfully exercise, the law clearly specifying the procedure by which such disciplinary action would
be taken.

Pursuant to this principle under the 1935 Constitution, legislation implementing local autonomy was enacted. In 1959,
Republic Act No. 2264, "An Act Amending the Law Governing Local Governments by Increasing Their Autonomy and
Reorganizing Local Governments" was passed. It was followed in 1967 when Republic Act No. 5185, the
Decentralization Law was enacted, giving "further autonomous powers to local governments governments."

The provisions of the 1973 Constitution moved the country further, at least insofar as legal provisions are concerned,
towards greater autonomy. It provided under Article II as a basic principle of government:

Sec. 10. The State shall guarantee and promote the autonomy of local government units, especially the
barangay to ensure their fullest development as self-reliant communities.

An entire article on Local Government was incorporated into the Constitution. It called for a local government code
defining more responsive and accountable local government structures. Any creation, merger, abolition, or substantial
boundary alteration cannot be done except in accordance with the local government code and upon approval by a
plebiscite. The power to create sources of revenue and to levy taxes was specifically settled upon local governments.

The exercise of greater local autonomy is even more marked in the present Constitution.

Article II, Section 25 on State Policies provides:

Sec. 25. The State shall ensure the autonomy of local governments

The 14 sections in Article X on Local Government not only reiterate earlier doctrines but give in greater detail the
provisions making local autonomy more meaningful. Thus, Sections 2 and 3 of Article X provide:
 Sec. 2. The territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy local autonomy.

Sec. 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall provide for a more responsive and
accountable local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization with effective
mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum, allocate among the different local government units their
powers, responsibilities, and resources, and provide for the qualifications, election, appointment and
removal, term, salaries, powers and functions and duties of local officials, and all other matters relating to
the organization and operation of the local units.

When the Civil Service Commission interpreted the recommending power of the Provincial Governor as purely
directory, it went against the letter and spirit of the constitutional provisions on local autonomy. If the DBM Secretary
jealously hoards the entirety of budgetary powers and ignores the right of local governments to develop self-reliance
and resoluteness in the handling of their own funds, the goal of meaningful local autonomy is frustrated and set back.

The right given by Local Budget Circular No. 31 which states:

Sec. 6.0 — The DBM reserves the right to fill up any existing vacancy where none of the nominees of the
local chief executive meet the prescribed requirements.

is ultra vires and is, accordingly, set aside. The DBM may appoint only from the list of qualified recommendees
nominated by the Governor. If none is qualified, he must return the list of nominees to the Governor explaining why
no one meets the legal requirements and ask for new recommendees who have the necessary eligibilities and
qualifications.

The PBO is expected to synchronize his work with DBM. More important, however, is the proper administration of
fiscal affairs at the local level. Provincial and municipal budgets are prepared at the local level and after completion
are forwarded to the national officials for review. They are prepared by the local officials who must work within the
constraints of those budgets. They are not formulated in the inner sanctums of an all-knowing DBM and unilaterally
imposed on local governments whether or not they are relevant to local needs and resources. It is for this reason that
there should be a genuine interplay, a balancing of viewpoints, and a harmonization of proposals from both the local
and national officials. It is for this reason that the nomination and appointment process involves a sharing of power
between the two levels of government.

It may not be amiss to give by way of analogy the procedure followed in the appointments of Justices and
Judges.1âwphi1 Under Article VIII of the Constitution, nominations for judicial positions are made by the Judicial and
Bar Council. The President makes the appointments from the list of nominees submitted to her by the Council. She
cannot apply the DBM procedure, reject all the Council nominees, and appoint another person whom she feels is
better qualified. There can be no reservation of the right to fill up a position with a person of the appointing power's
personal choice.

The public respondent's grave abuse of discretion is aggravated by the fact that Director Galvez required the
Provincial Governor to submit at least three other names of nominees better qualified than his earlier
recommendation. It was a meaningless exercise. The appointment of the private respondent was formalized before
the Governor was extended the courtesy of being informed that his nominee had been rejected. The complete
disregard of the local government's prerogative and the smug belief that the DBM has absolute wisdom, authority,
and discretion are manifest.

In his classic work "Philippine Political Law" Dean Vicente G. Sinco stated that the value of local governments as
institutions of democracy is measured by the degree of autonomy that they enjoy. Citing Tocqueville, he stated that
"local assemblies of citizens constitute the strength of free nations. . . . A people may establish a system of free
government but without the spirit of municipal institutions, it cannot have the spirit of liberty." (Sinco, Philippine
Political Law, Eleventh Edition, pp. 705-706).

Our national officials should not only comply with the constitutional provisions on local autonomy but should also
appreciate the spirit of liberty upon which these provisions are based.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The questioned resolutions of the Civil Service Commission are
SET ASIDE. The appointment of respondent Cecilia Almajose is nullified. The Department of Budget and
Management is ordered to appoint the Provincial Budget Officer of Rizal from among qualified nominees submitted by
the Provincial Governor.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. Nos. 120865-71 December 7, 1995

LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS; HON. JUDGE HERCULANO TECH, PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 70, REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT OF BINANGONAN RIZAL; FLEET DEVELOPMENT, INC. and CARLITO ARROYO; THE MUNICIPALITY
OF BINANGONAN and/or MAYOR ISIDRO B. PACIS, respondents.

LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS; HON. JUDGE AURELIO C. TRAMPE, PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 163, REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT OF PASIG; MANILA MARINE LIFE BUSINESS RESOURCES, INC. represented by, MR. TOBIAS
REYNALD M. TIANGCO; MUNICIPALITY OF TAGUIG, METRO MANILA and/or MAYOR RICARDO D. PAPA,
JR., respondents.

LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS; HON. JUDGE ALEJANDRO A. MARQUEZ, PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 79,
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MORONG, RIZAL; GREENFIELD VENTURES INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION and R. J. ORION DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION; MUNICIPALITY OF JALA-JALA and/or
MAYOR WALFREDO M. DE LA VEGA, respondents.

LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS; HON. JUDGE MANUEL S. PADOLINA, PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 162, REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT OF PASIG, METRO MANILA; IRMA FISHING & TRADING CORP.; ARTM FISHING CORP.; BDR
CORPORATION, MIRT CORPORATION and TRIM CORPORATION; MUNICIPALITY OF BINANGONAN and/or
MAYOR ISIDRO B. PACIS, respondents.

LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS; HON. JUDGE ARTURO A. MARAVE, PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 78, REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT OF MORONG, RIZAL; BLUE LAGOON FISHING CORP. and ALCRIS CHICKEN GROWERS, INC.;
MUNICIPALITY OF JALA-JALA and/or MAYOR WALFREDO M. DE LA VEGA, respondents.

LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS; HON. JUDGE ARTURO A. MARAVE, PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 78, REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT OF MORONG, RIZAL; AGP FISH VENTURES, INC., represented by its PRESIDENT ALFONSO
PUYAT; MUNICIPALITY OF JALA-JALA and/or MAYOR WALFREDO M. DE LA VEGA, respondents.

LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS; HON. JUDGE EUGENIO S. LABITORIA, PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 161, REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT OF PASIG, METRO MANILA; SEA MAR TRADING CO. INC.; EASTERN LAGOON FISHING
CORP.; MINAMAR FISHING CORP.; MUNICIPALITY OF BINANGONAN and/or MAYOR ISIDRO B.
PACIS, respondents.

HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.:

It is difficult for a man, scavenging on the garbage dump created by affluence and profligate consumption and
extravagance of the rich or fishing in the murky waters of the Pasig River and the Laguna Lake or making a clearing
in the forest so that he can produce food for his family, to understand why protecting birds, fish, and trees is more
important than protecting him and keeping his family alive.

How do we strike a balance between environmental protection, on the one hand, and the individual personal interests
of people, on the other?

Towards environmental protection and ecology, navigational safety, and sustainable development, Republic Act No.
4850 created the "Laguna Lake Development Authority." This Government Agency is supposed to carry out and
effectuate the aforesaid declared policy, so as to accelerate the development and balanced growth of the Laguna
Lake area and the surrounding provinces, cities and towns, in the act clearly named, within the context of the national
and regional plans and policies for social and economic development.

Presidential Decree No. 813 of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos amended certain sections of Republic Act No.
4850 because of the concern for the rapid expansion of Metropolitan Manila, the suburbs and the lakeshore towns of
Laguna de Bay, combined with current and prospective uses of the lake for municipal-industrial water supply,
irrigation, fisheries, and the like. Concern on the part of the Government and the general public over: — the
environment impact of development on the water quality and ecology of the lake and its related river systems; the
inflow of polluted water from the Pasig River, industrial, domestic and agricultural wastes from developed areas
around the lake; the increasing urbanization which induced the deterioration of the lake, since water quality studies
have shown that the lake will deteriorate further if steps are not taken to check the same; and the floods in
Metropolitan Manila area and the lakeshore towns which will influence the hydraulic system of Laguna de Bay, since
any scheme of controlling the floods will necessarily involve the lake and its river systems, — likewise gave impetus
to the creation of the Authority.

Section 1 of Republic Act No. 4850 was amended to read as follows:

Sec. 1. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby declared to be the national policy to promote, and
accelerate the development and balanced growth of the Laguna Lake area and the surrounding
provinces, cities and towns hereinafter referred to as the region, within the context of the national
and regional plans and policies for social and economic development and to carry out the
development of the Laguna Lake region with due regard and adequate provisions for environmental
management and control, preservation of the quality of human life and ecological systems, and the
1
prevention of undue ecological disturbances, deterioration and pollution.

Special powers of the Authority, pertinent to the issues in this case, include:

Sec. 3. Section 4 of the same Act is hereby further amended by adding thereto seven new
paragraphs to be known as paragraphs (j), (k), (l), (m), (n), (o), and (p) which shall read as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

(j) The provisions of existing laws to the contrary notwithstanding, to engage in

fish production and other aqua-culture projects in Laguna de Bay and other
bodies of water within its jurisdiction and in pursuance thereof to conduct studies
and make experiments, whenever necessary, with the collaboration and
assistance of the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources, with the end in
view of improving present techniques and practices. Provided, that until modified,
altered or amended by the procedure provided in the following sub-paragraph,
the present laws, rules and permits or authorizations remain in force;

(k) For the purpose of effectively regulating and monitoring activities in Laguna
de Bay, the Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to issue new permit for the
use of the lake waters for any projects or activities in or affecting the said lake
including navigation, construction, and operation of fishpens, fish enclosures, fish
corrals and the like, and to impose necessary safeguards for lake quality control
and management and to collect necessary fees for said activities and
projects: Provided, That the fees collected for fisheries may be shared between
the Authority and other government agencies and political sub-divisions in such
proportion as may be determined by the President of the Philippines upon
 recommendation of the Authority's Board: Provided, further, That the Authority's
Board may determine new areas of fishery development or activities which it may
place under the supervision of the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources
taking into account the overall development plans and programs for Laguna de
Bay and related bodies of water: Provided, finally, That the Authority shall subject
to the approval of the President of the Philippines promulgate such rules and
regulations which shall govern fisheries development activities in Laguna de Bay
which shall take into consideration among others the following: socio-economic
amelioration of bonafide resident fishermen whether individually or collectively in
the form of cooperatives, lakeshore town development, a master plan for fishpen
construction and operation, communal fishing ground for lake shore town
residents, and preference to lake shore town residents in hiring laborer for fishery
projects;

(l) To require the cities and municipalities embraced within the region to pass
appropriate zoning ordinances and other regulatory measures necessary to carry
out the objectives of the Authority and enforce the same with the assistance of
the Authority;

(m) The provisions of existing laws to the contrary notwithstanding, to exercise

water rights over public waters within the Laguna de Bay region whenever
necessary to carry out the Authority's projects;

(n) To act in coordination with existing governmental agencies in establishing

water quality standards for industrial, agricultural and municipal waste discharges
into the lake and to cooperate with said existing agencies of the government of
the Philippines in enforcing such standards, or to separately pursue enforcement
and penalty actions as provided for in Section 4 (d) and Section 39-A of this
Act: Provided, That in case of conflict on the appropriate water quality standard
2
to be enforced such conflict shall be resolved thru the NEDA Board.

To more effectively perform the role of the Authority under Republic Act No. 4850, as though Presidential Decree No.
813 were not thought to be completely effective, the Chief Executive, feeling that the land and waters of the Laguna
Lake Region are limited natural resources requiring judicious management to their optimal utilization to insure
renewability and to preserve the ecological balance, the competing options for the use of such resources and
conflicting jurisdictions over such uses having created undue constraints on the institutional capabilities of the
Authority in the light of the limited powers vested in it by its charter, Executive Order No. 927 further defined and
enlarged the functions and powers of the Authority and named and enumerated the towns, cities and provinces
encompassed by the term "Laguna de Bay Region".

Also, pertinent to the issues in this case are the following provisions of Executive Order No. 927 which include in
particular the sharing of fees:

Sec 2. Water Rights Over Laguna de Bay and Other Bodies of Water within the Lake Region: To
effectively regulate and monitor activities in the Laguna de Bay region, the Authority shall have
exclusive jurisdiction to issue permit for the use of all surface water for any projects or activities in
or affecting the said region including navigation, construction, and operation of fishpens, fish
enclosures, fish corrals and the like.

For the purpose of this Executive Order, the term "Laguna de Bay Region" shall refer to the
Provinces of Rizal and Laguna; the Cities of San Pablo, Pasay, Caloocan, Quezon, Manila and
Tagaytay; the towns of Tanauan, Sto. Tomas and Malvar in Batangas Province; the towns of Silang
and Carmona in Cavite Province; the town of Lucban in Quezon Province; and the towns of
Marikina, Pasig, Taguig, Muntinlupa, and Pateros in Metro Manila.

Sec 3. Collection of Fees. The Authority is hereby empowered to collect fees for the use of the lake
water and its tributaries for all beneficial purposes including but not limited to fisheries, recreation,
municipal, industrial, agricultural, navigation, irrigation, and waste disposal purpose; Provided, that
the rates of the fees to be collected, and the sharing with other government agencies and political
 subdivisions, if necessary, shall be subject to the approval of the President of the Philippines upon
recommendation of the Authority's Board, except fishpen fee, which will be shared in the following
manner; 20 percent of the fee shall go to the lakeshore local governments, 5 percent shall go to the
Project Development Fund which shall be administered by a Council and the remaining 75 percent
shall constitute the share of LLDA. However, after the implementation within the three-year period
of the Laguna Lake Fishery Zoning and Management Plan, the sharing will be modified as
follows: 35 percent of the fishpen fee goes to the lakeshore local governments, 5 percent goes to
the Project Development Fund and the remaining 60 percent shall be retained by LLDA; Provided,
however, that the share of LLDA shall form part of its corporate funds and shall not be remitted to
the National Treasury as an exception to the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1234.
(Emphasis supplied)

It is important to note that Section 29 of Presidential Decree No. 813 defined the term "Laguna Lake" in this manner:

Sec 41. Definition of Terms.

(11) Laguna Lake or Lake. Whenever Laguna Lake or lake is used in this Act, the same shall refer
to Laguna de Bay which is that area covered by the lake water when it is at the average annual
maximum lake level of elevation 12.50 meters, as referred to a datum 10.00 meters below mean
lower low water (M.L.L.W). Lands located at and below such elevation are public lands which form
part of the bed of said lake.

Then came Republic Act No. 7160, the Local Government Code of 1991. The municipalities in the Laguna Lake
Region interpreted the provisions of this law to mean that the newly passed law gave municipal governments the
exclusive jurisdiction to issue fishing privileges within their municipal waters because R.A. 7160 provides:

Sec. 149. Fishery Rentals, Fees and Charges.

(a) Municipalities shall have the exclusive authority to grant fishery privileges in the municipal
waters and impose rental fees or charges therefor in accordance with the provisions of this Section.

(b) The Sangguniang Bayan may:

(1) Grant fishing privileges to erect fish corrals, oyster, mussel or other aquatic
beds or bangus fry areas, within a definite zone of the municipal waters, as
determined by it; . . . .

(2) Grant privilege to gather, take or catch bangus fry, prawn fry or kawag-
kawag or fry of other species and fish from the municipal waters by nets, traps or
other fishing gears to marginal fishermen free from any rental fee, charges or any
other imposition whatsoever.

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 447. Power, Duties, Functions and Compensation. . . . .

xxx xxx xxx

(XI) Subject to the provisions of Book II of this Code, grant exclusive privileges of
constructing fish corrals or fishpens, or the taking or catching of bangus fry,
prawn fry or kawag-kawag or fry of any species or fish within the municipal
waters.

xxx xxx xxx

Municipal governments thereupon assumed the authority to issue fishing privileges and fishpen permits. Big fishpen
operators took advantage of the occasion to establish fishpens and fishcages to the consternation of the Authority.
Unregulated fishpens and fishcages, as of July, 1995, occupied almost one-third of the entire lake water surface area,
increasing the occupation drastically from 7,000 hectares in 1990 to almost 21,000 hectares in 1995. The Mayor's
permit to construct fishpens and fishcages were all undertaken in violation of the policies adopted by the Authority on
fishpen zoning and the Laguna Lake carrying capacity.

To be sure, the implementation by the lakeshore municipalities of separate independent policies in the operation of
fishpens and fishcages within their claimed territorial municipal waters in the lake and their indiscriminate grant of
fishpen permits have already saturated the lake area with fishpens, thereby aggravating the current environmental
problems and ecological stress of Laguna Lake.

In view of the foregoing circumstances, the Authority served notice to the general public that:

In compliance with the instructions of His Excellency PRESIDENT FIDEL V. RAMOS given on June
23, 1993 at Pila, Laguna pursuant to Republic Act 4850 as amended by Presidential Decree 813
and Executive Order 927 series of 1983 and in line with the policies and programs of the
Presidential Task Force on Illegal Fishpens and Illegal Fishing, the general public is hereby notified
that:

1. All fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures in the Laguna de Bay Region, which
were not registered or to which no application for registration and/or permit has been filed with
Laguna Lake Development Authority as of March 31, 1993 are hereby declared outrightly as illegal.

2. All fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures so declared as illegal shall be subject to
demolition which shall be undertaken by the Presidential Task Force for Illegal Fishpen and Illegal
Fishing.

3. Owners of fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures declared as illegal shall, without
prejudice to demolition of their structures be criminally charged in accordance with Section 39-A of
Republic Act 4850 as amended by P.D. 813 for violation of the same laws. Violations of these laws
carries a penalty of imprisonment of not exceeding 3 years or a fine not exceeding Five Thousand
Pesos or both at the discretion of the court.

All operators of fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures declared as illegal in
accordance with the foregoing Notice shall have one (1) month on or before 27 October 1993 to
show cause before the LLDA why their said fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures
should not be demolished/dismantled.

One month, thereafter, the Authority sent notices to the concerned owners of the illegally constructed fishpens,
fishcages and other aqua-culture structures advising them to dismantle their respective structures within 10 days from
receipt thereof, otherwise, demolition shall be effected.

Reacting thereto, the affected fishpen owners filed injunction cases against the Authority before various regional trial
courts, to wit: (a) Civil Case No. 759-B, for Prohibition, Injunction and Damages, Regional Trial Court, Branch 70,
Binangonan, Rizal, filed by Fleet Development, Inc. and Carlito Arroyo; (b) Civil Case No. 64049, for Injunction,
Regional Trial Court, Branch 162, Pasig, filed by IRMA Fishing and Trading Corp., ARTM Fishing Corp., BDR Corp.,
MIRT Corp. and TRIM Corp.; (c) Civil Case No. 566, for Declaratory Relief and Injunction, Regional Trial Court,
Branch 163, Pasig, filed by Manila Marine Life Business Resources, Inc. and Tobias Reynaldo M. Tianco; (d) Civil
Case No. 556-M, for Prohibition, Injunction and Damages, Regional Trial Court, Branch 78, Morong, Rizal, filed by
AGP Fishing Ventures, Inc.; (e) Civil Case No. 522-M, for Prohibition, Injunction and Damages, Regional Trial Court,
Branch 78, Morong, Rizal, filed by Blue Lagoon and Alcris Chicken Growers, Inc.; (f) Civil Case No. 554-,
for Certiorari and Prohibition, Regional Trial Court, Branch 79, Morong, Rizal, filed by Greenfields Ventures Industrial
Corp. and R.J. Orion Development Corp.; and (g) Civil Case No. 64124, for Injunction, Regional Trial Court, Branch
15, Pasig, filed by SEA-MAR Trading Co., Inc. and Eastern Lagoon Fishing Corp. and Minamar Fishing Corporation.

The Authority filed motions to dismiss the cases against it on jurisdictional grounds. The motions to dismiss were
invariably denied. Meanwhile, temporary restraining order/writs of preliminary mandatory injunction were issued in
Civil Cases Nos. 64124, 759 and 566 enjoining the Authority from demolishing the fishpens and similar structures in
question.
Hence, the herein petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction, G.R. Nos. 120865-71, were filed by the Authority
with this court. Impleaded as parties-respondents are concerned regional trial courts and respective private parties,
and the municipalities and/or respective Mayors of Binangonan, Taguig and Jala-jala, who issued permits for the
construction and operation of fishpens in Laguna de Bay. The Authority sought the following reliefs, viz.:

(A) Nullification of the temporary restraining order/writs of preliminary injunction issued in Civil
Cases Nos. 64125, 759 and 566;

(B) Permanent prohibition against the regional trial courts from exercising jurisdiction over cases
involving the Authority which is a co-equal body;

(C) Judicial pronouncement that R.A. 7610 (Local Government Code of 1991) did not repeal, alter
or modify the provisions of R.A. 4850, as amended, empowering the Authority to issue permits for
fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures in Laguna de Bay and that, the Authority the
government agency vested with exclusive authority to issue said permits.

By this Court's resolution of May 2, 1994, the Authority's consolidated petitions were referred to the Court of Appeals.

In a Decision, dated June 29, 1995, the Court of Appeals dismissed the Authority's consolidated petitions, the Court
of Appeals holding that: (A) LLDA is not among those quasi-judicial agencies of government whose decision or order
are appealable only to the Court of Appeals; (B) the LLDA charter does vest LLDA with quasi-judicial functions insofar
as fishpens are concerned; (C) the provisions of the LLDA charter insofar as fishing privileges in Laguna de Bay are
concerned had been repealed by the Local Government Code of 1991; (D) in view of the aforesaid repeal, the power
to grant permits devolved to and is now vested with their respective local government units concerned.

Not satisfied with the Court of Appeals decision, the Authority has returned to this Court charging the following errors:

1. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS PROBABLY COMMITTED AN ERROR WHEN IT

RULED THAT THE LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY IS NOT A QUASI-JUDICIAL
AGENCY.

2. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR WHEN IT RULED

THAT R.A. 4850 AS AMENDED BY P.D. 813 AND E.O. 927 SERIES OF 1983 HAS BEEN
REPEALED BY REPUBLIC ACT 7160. THE SAID RULING IS CONTRARY TO ESTABLISHED
PRINCIPLES AND JURISPRUDENCE OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION.

3. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR WHEN IT RULED

THAT THE POWER TO ISSUE FISHPEN PERMITS IN LAGUNA DE BAY HAS BEEN DEVOLVED
TO CONCERNED (LAKESHORE) LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS.

We take a simplistic view of the controversy. Actually, the main and only issue posed is: Which agency of the
Government — the Laguna Lake Development Authority or the towns and municipalities comprising the region —
should exercise jurisdiction over the Laguna Lake and its environs insofar as the issuance of permits for fishery
privileges is concerned?

Section 4 (k) of the charter of the Laguna Lake Development Authority, Republic Act No. 4850, the provisions of
Presidential Decree No. 813, and Section 2 of Executive Order No. 927, cited above, specifically provide that the
Laguna Lake Development Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to issue permits for the use of all surface water
for any projects or activities in or affecting the said region, including navigation, construction, and operation of
fishpens, fish enclosures, fish corrals and the like. On the other hand, Republic Act No. 7160, the Local Government
Code of 1991, has granted to the municipalities the exclusive authority to grant fishery privileges in municipal waters.
The Sangguniang Bayan may grant fishery privileges to erect fish corrals, oyster, mussels or other aquatic beds or
bangus fry area within a definite zone of the municipal waters.

We hold that the provisions of Republic Act No. 7160 do not necessarily repeal the aforementioned laws creating the
Laguna Lake Development Authority and granting the latter water rights authority over Laguna de Bay and the lake
region.
The Local Government Code of 1991 does not contain any express provision which categorically expressly repeal the
charter of the Authority. It has to be conceded that there was no intent on the part of the legislature to repeal Republic
Act No. 4850 and its amendments. The repeal of laws should be made clear and expressed.

It has to be conceded that the charter of the Laguna Lake Development Authority constitutes a special law. Republic
Act No. 7160, the Local Government Code of 1991, is a general law. It is basic in statutory construction that the
enactment of a later legislation which is a general law cannot be construed to have repealed a special law. It is a well-
settled rule in this jurisdiction that "a special statute, provided for a particular case or class of cases, is not repealed
by a subsequent statute, general in its terms, provisions and application, unless the intent to repeal or alter is
3
manifest, although the terms of the general law are broad enough to include the cases embraced in the special law."

Where there is a conflict between a general law and a special statute, the special statute should prevail since it
evinces the legislative intent more clearly than the general statute. The special law is to be taken as an exception to
the general law in the absence of special circumstances forcing a contrary conclusion. This is because implied
repeals are not favored and as much as possible, effect must be given to all enactments of the legislature. A special
4
law cannot be repealed, amended or altered by a subsequent general law by mere implication.

Thus, it has to be concluded that the charter of the Authority should prevail over the Local Government Code of 1991.

Considering the reasons behind the establishment of the Authority, which are environmental protection, navigational
safety, and sustainable development, there is every indication that the legislative intent is for the Authority to proceed
with its mission.

We are on all fours with the manifestation of petitioner Laguna Lake Development Authority that "Laguna de Bay, like
any other single body of water has its own unique natural ecosystem. The 900 km² lake surface water, the eight (8)
major river tributaries and several other smaller rivers that drain into the lake, the 2,920 km² basin or watershed
transcending the boundaries of Laguna and Rizal provinces, greater portion of Metro Manila, parts of Cavite,
Batangas, and Quezon provinces, constitute one integrated delicate natural ecosystem that needs to be protected
with uniform set of policies; if we are to be serious in our aims of attaining sustainable development. This is an
exhaustible natural resource — a very limited one — which requires judicious management and optimal utilization to
ensure renewability and preserve its ecological integrity and balance."

"Managing the lake resources would mean the implementation of a national policy geared towards the protection,
conservation, balanced growth and sustainable development of the region with due regard to the inter-generational
use of its resources by the inhabitants in this part of the earth. The authors of Republic Act 4850 have foreseen this
need when they passed this LLDA law — the special law designed to govern the management of our Laguna de Bay
lake resources."

"Laguna de Bay therefore cannot be subjected to fragmented concepts of management policies where lakeshore
local government units exercise exclusive dominion over specific portions of the lake water. The garbage thrown or
sewage discharged into the lake, abstraction of water therefrom or construction of fishpens by enclosing its certain
area, affect not only that specific portion but the entire 900 km² of lake water. The implementation of a cohesive and
integrated lake water resource management policy, therefore, is necessary to conserve, protect and sustainably
5
develop Laguna de Bay."

The power of the local government units to issue fishing privileges was clearly granted for revenue purposes. This is
evident from the fact that Section 149 of the New Local Government Code empowering local governments to issue
fishing permits is embodied in Chapter 2, Book II, of Republic Act No. 7160 under the heading, "Specific Provisions
On The Taxing And Other Revenue Raising Power Of Local Government Units."

On the other hand, the power of the Authority to grant permits for fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture
structures is for the purpose of effectively regulating and monitoring activities in the Laguna de Bay region (Section 2,
6
Executive Order No. 927) and for lake quality control and management. It does partake of the nature of police power
which is the most pervasive, the least limitable and the most demanding of all State powers including the power of
taxation. Accordingly, the charter of the Authority which embodies a valid exercise of police power should prevail over
the Local Government Code of 1991 on matters affecting Laguna de Bay.

There should be no quarrel over permit fees for fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures in the Laguna
de Bay area. Section 3 of Executive Order No. 927 provides for the proper sharing of fees collected.
In respect to the question as to whether the Authority is a quasi-judicial agency or not, it is our holding that,
considering the provisions of Section 4 of Republic Act No. 4850 and Section 4 of Executive Order No. 927, series of
1983, and the ruling of this Court in Laguna Lake Development Authority vs. Court of Appeals, 231 SCRA 304, 306,
which we quote:

xxx xxx xxx

As a general rule, the adjudication of pollution cases generally pertains to the Pollution Adjudication
Board (PAB), except in cases where the special law provides for another forum. It must be
recognized in this regard that the LLDA, as a specialized administrative agency, is specifically
mandated under Republic Act No. 4850 and its amendatory laws to carry out and make effective
the declared national policy of promoting and accelerating the development and balanced growth of
the Laguna Lake area and the surrounding provinces of Rizal and Laguna and the cities of San
Pablo, Manila, Pasay, Quezon and Caloocan with due regard and adequate provisions for
environmental management and control, preservation of the quality of human life and ecological
systems, and the prevention of undue ecological disturbances, deterioration and pollution. Under
such a broad grant of power and authority, the LLDA, by virtue of its special charter, obviously has
the responsibility to protect the inhabitants of the Laguna Lake region from the deleterious effects
of pollutants emanating from the discharge of wastes from the surrounding areas. In carrying out
the aforementioned declared policy, the LLDA is mandated, among others, to pass upon and
approve or disapprove all plans, programs, and projects proposed by local government
offices/agencies within the region, public corporations, and private persons or enterprises where
such plans, programs and/or projects are related to those of the LLDA for the development of the
region.

xxx xxx xxx

. . . . While it is a fundamental rule that an administrative agency has only such powers as are
expressly granted to it by law, it is likewise a settled rule that an administrative agency has also
such powers as are necessarily implied in the exercise of its express powers. In the exercise,
therefore, of its express powers under its charter, as a regulatory and quasi-judicial body with
respect to pollution cases in the Laguna Lake region, the authority of the LLDA to issue a "cease
and desist order" is, perforce, implied. Otherwise, it may well be reduced to a "toothless" paper
agency.

there is no question that the Authority has express powers as a regulatory and quasi-judicial body in respect
to pollution cases with authority to issue a "cease and desist order" and on matters affecting the construction
of illegal fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures in Laguna de Bay. The Authority's pretense,
however, that it is co-equal to the Regional Trial Courts such that all actions against it may only be instituted
before the Court of Appeals cannot be sustained. On actions necessitating the resolution of legal questions
affecting the powers of the Authority as provided for in its charter, the Regional Trial Courts have jurisdiction.

In view of the foregoing, this Court holds that Section 149 of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local
Government Code of 1991, has not repealed the provisions of the charter of the Laguna Lake Development Authority,
Republic Act No. 4850, as amended. Thus, the Authority has the exclusive jurisdiction to issue permits for the
enjoyment of fishery privileges in Laguna de Bay to the exclusion of municipalities situated therein and the authority
to exercise such powers as are by its charter vested on it.

Removal from the Authority of the aforesaid licensing authority will render nugatory its avowed purpose of protecting
and developing the Laguna Lake Region. Otherwise stated, the abrogation of this power would render useless its
reason for being and will in effect denigrate, if not abolish, the Laguna Lake Development Authority. This, the Local
Government Code of 1991 had never intended to do.

WHEREFORE, the petitions for prohibition, certiorari and injunction are hereby granted, insofar as they relate to the
authority of the Laguna Lake Development Authority to grant fishing privileges within the Laguna Lake Region.

The restraining orders and/or writs of injunction issued by Judge Arturo Marave, RTC, Branch 78, Morong, Rizal;
Judge Herculano Tech, RTC, Branch 70, Binangonan, Rizal; and Judge Aurelio Trampe, RTC, Branch 163, Pasig,
Metro Manila, are hereby declared null and void and ordered set aside for having been issued with grave abuse of
discretion.

The Municipal Mayors of the Laguna Lake Region are hereby prohibited from issuing permits to construct and
operate fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures within the Laguna Lake Region, their previous
issuances being declared null and void. Thus, the fishing permits issued by Mayors Isidro B. Pacis, Municipality of
Binangonan; Ricardo D. Papa, Municipality of Taguig; and Walfredo M. de la Vega, Municipality of Jala-jala,
specifically, are likewise declared null and void and ordered cancelled.

The fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures put up by operators by virtue of permits issued by
Municipal Mayors within the Laguna Lake Region, specifically, permits issued to Fleet Development, Inc. and Carlito
Arroyo; Manila Marine Life Business Resources, Inc., represented by, Mr. Tobias Reynald M. Tiangco; Greenfield
Ventures Industrial Development Corporation and R.J. Orion Development Corporation; IRMA Fishing And Trading
Corporation, ARTM Fishing Corporation, BDR Corporation, Mirt Corporation and Trim Corporation; Blue Lagoon
Fishing Corporation and ALCRIS Chicken Growers, Inc.; AGP Fish Ventures, Inc., represented by its President
Alfonso Puyat; SEA MAR Trading Co., Inc., Eastern Lagoon Fishing Corporation, and MINAMAR Fishing
Corporation, are hereby declared illegal structures subject to demolition by the Laguna Lake Development Authority.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., Bellosillo and Kapunan, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

PADILLA, J., concurring:

I fully concur with the decision written by Mr. Justice R. Hermosisima, Jr.. I would only like to stress what the decision
already states, i.e., that the local government units in the Laguna Lake area are not precluded from imposing permits
on fishery operations for revenue raising purposes of such local government units. In other words, while the exclusive
jurisdiction to determine whether or not projects or activities in the lake area should be allowed, as well as their
regulation, is with the Laguna Lake Development Authority, once the Authority grants a permit, the permittee may still
be subjected to an additional local permit or license for revenue purposes of the local government units concerned.
This approach would clearly harmonize the special law, Rep. Act No. 4850, as amended, with Rep. Act No. 7160, the
Local Government Code. It will also enable small towns and municipalities in the lake area, like Jala-Jala, to rise to
some level of economic viability.

Separate Opinions

PADILLA, J., concurring:

I fully concur with the decision written by Mr. Justice R. Hermosisima, Jr.. I would only like to stress what the decision
already states, i.e., that the local government units in the Laguna Lake area are not precluded from imposing permits
on fishery operations for revenue raising purposes of such local government units. In other words, while the exclusive
jurisdiction to determine whether or not projects or activities in the lake area should be allowed, as well as their
regulation, is with the Laguna Lake Development Authority, once the Authority grants a permit, the permittee may still
be subjected to an additional local permit or license for revenue purposes of the local government units concerned.
This approach would clearly harmonize the special law, Rep. Act No. 4850, as amended, with Rep. Act No. 7160, the
Local Government Code. It will also enable small towns and municipalities in the lake area, like Jala-Jala, to rise to
some level of economic viability.
V. Creation, Conversion, Division, Merger, Substantial Change of Boundary of LGUs and Abolition [Sec. 6]

G.R. No. 176951 April 12, 2011

LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (LCP), represented by LCP National President Jerry P. Treñas; City
of Calbayog, represented by Mayor Mel Senen S. Sarmiento; and Jerry P. Treñas, in his personal capacity as
Taxpayer, Petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; Municipality of Baybay, Province of Leyte; Municipality of Bogo, Province of
Cebu; Municipality of Catbalogan, Province of Western Samar; Municipality of Tandag, Province of Surigao
del Sur; Municipality of Borongan, Province of Eastern Samar; and Municipality of Tayabas, Province of
Quezon, Respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

G.R. No. 177499

LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (LCP), represented by LCP National President Jerry P. Treñas; City
of Calbayog, represented by Mayor Mel Senen S. Sarmiento; and Jerry P. Treñas, in his personal capacity as
Taxpayer, Petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; Municipality of Lamitan, Province of Basilan; Municipality of Tabuk, Province
of Kalinga; Municipality of Bayugan, Province of Agusan del Sur; Municipality of Batac, Province of Ilocos
Norte; Municipality of Mati, Province of Davao Oriental; and Municipality of Guihulngan, Province of Negros
Oriental, Respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

G.R. No. 178056

LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (LCP), represented by LCP National President Jerry P. Treñas; City
of Calbayog, represented by Mayor Mel Senen S. Sarmiento; and Jerry P. Treñas, in his personal capacity as
Taxpayer, Petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; Municipality of Cabadbaran, Province of Agusan del Norte; Municipality of
Carcar, Province of Cebu; Municipality of El Salvador, Province of Misamis Oriental; Municipality of Naga,
Cebu; and Department of Budget and Management, Respondents.

RESOLUTION

BERSAMIN, J.:

We consider and resolve the Ad Cautelam Motion for Reconsideration filed by the petitioners vis-à-vis the Resolution
promulgated on February 15, 2011.

To recall, the Resolution promulgated on February 15, 2011 granted the Motion for Reconsideration of the
respondents presented against the Resolution dated August 24, 2010, reversed the Resolution dated August 24,
2010, and declared the 16 Cityhood Laws — Republic Acts Nos. 9389, 9390, 9391, 9392, 9393, 9394, 9398, 9404,
9405, 9407, 9408, 9409, 9434, 9435, 9436, and 9491 — constitutional.

Now, the petitioners anchor their Ad Cautelam Motion for Reconsideration upon the primordial ground that the Court
could no longer modify, alter, or amend its judgment declaring the Cityhood Laws unconstitutional due to such
judgment having long become final and executory. They submit that the Cityhood Laws violated Section 6 and
Section 10 of Article X of the Constitution, as well as the Equal Protection Clause.
The petitioners specifically ascribe to the Court the following errors in its promulgation of the assailed February 15,
2011 Resolution, to wit:

I. THE HONORABLE COURT HAS NO JURISDICTION TO PROMULGATE THE RESOLUTION OF 15

FEBRUARY 2011 BECAUSE THERE IS NO LONGER ANY ACTUAL CASE OR CONTROVERSY TO
SETTLE.

II. THE RESOLUTION CONTRAVENES THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE AND RELEVANT
SUPREME COURT ISSUANCES.

III. THE RESOLUTION UNDERMINES THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM IN ITS DISREGARD OF THE
PRINCIPLES OF RES JUDICATA AND THE DOCTRINE OF IMMUTABILITY OF FINAL JUDGMENTS.

IV. THE RESOLUTION ERRONEOUSLY RULED THAT THE SIXTEEN (16) CITYHOOD BILLS DO NOT
VIOLATE ARTICLE X, SECTIONS 6 AND 10 OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION.

V. THE SIXTEEN (16) CITYHOOD LAWS VIOLATE THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE OF THE
CONSTITUTION AND THE RIGHT OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS TO A JUST SHARE IN THE NATIONAL
TAXES.

Ruling

Upon thorough consideration, we deny the Ad Cautelam Motion for Reconsideration for its lack of merit.

I.
Procedural Issues

With respect to the first, second, and third assignments of errors, supra, it appears that the petitioners assail the
jurisdiction of the Court in promulgating the February 15, 2011 Resolution, claiming that the decision herein had long
become final and executory. They state that the Court thereby violated rules of procedure, and the principles of res
judicata and immutability of final judgments.

The petitioners posit that the controversy on the Cityhood Laws ended with the April 28, 2009 Resolution denying the
respondents’ second motion for reconsideration vis-à-vis the November 18, 2008 Decision for being a prohibited
pleading, and in view of the issuance of the entry of judgment on May 21, 2009.

The Court disagrees with the petitioners.

In the April 28, 2009 Resolution, the Court ruled:

By a vote of 6-6, the Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of 31 March 2009 is DENIED for lack of merit. The
motion is denied since there is no majority that voted to overturn the Resolution of 31 March 2009.

The Second Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision of 18 November 2008 is DENIED for being a prohibited
pleading, and the Motion for Leave to Admit Attached Petition in Intervention dated 20 April 2009 and the Petition in
Intervention dated 20 April 2009 filed by counsel for Ludivina T. Mas, et al. are also DENIED in view of the denial of
the second motion for reconsideration. No further pleadings shall be entertained. Let entry of judgment be made in
due course.

Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. wrote a Dissenting Opinion, joined by Justices Consuelo Ynares-Santiago, Renato
C. Corona, Minita Chico-Nazario, Teresita Leonardo-De Castro, and Lucas P. Bersamin. Chief Justice Reynato S.
1
Puno and Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura took no part. Justice Leonardo A. Quisumbing is on leave.

Within 15 days from receipt of the April 28, 2009 Resolution, the respondents filed a Motion To Amend Resolution Of
April 28, 2009 By Declaring Instead That Respondents’ "Motion for Reconsideration Of the Resolution Of March 31,
2009" And "Motion For Leave To File, And To Admit Attached ‘Second Motion For Reconsideration Of The Decision
Dated November 18, 2008’ Remain Unresolved And To Conduct Further Proceedings Thereon, arguing therein that a
determination of the issue of constitutionality of the 16 Cityhood Laws upon a motion for reconsideration by an
equally divided vote was not binding on the Court as a valid precedent, citing the separate opinion of then Chief
2
Justice Reynato S. Puno in Lambino v. Commission on Elections.

Thus, in its June 2, 2009 Resolution, the Court issued the following clarification of the April 28, 2009 Resolution, viz:

As a rule, a second motion for reconsideration is a prohibited pleading pursuant to Section 2, Rule 52 of the Rules of
Civil Procedure which provides that: "No second motion for reconsideration of a judgment or final resolution by the
same party shall be entertained." Thus, a decision becomes final and executory after 15 days from receipt of the
denial of the first motion for reconsideration.

However, when a motion for leave to file and admit a second motion for reconsideration is granted by the Court, the
Court therefore allows the filing of the second motion for reconsideration. In such a case, the second motion for
reconsideration is no longer a prohibited pleading.

In the present case, the Court voted on the second motion for reconsideration filed by respondent cities. In effect, the
Court allowed the filing of the second motion for reconsideration. Thus, the second motion for reconsideration was no
longer a prohibited pleading. However, for lack of the required number of votes to overturn the 18 November 2008
Decision and 31 March 2009 Resolution, the Court denied the second motion for reconsideration in its 28 April 2009
3
Resolution.

As the result of the aforecited clarification, the Court resolved to expunge from the records several pleadings and
documents, including respondents’ Motion To Amend Resolution Of April 28, 2009 etc.

The respondents thus filed their Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of June 2, 2009, asseverating that their
Motion To Amend Resolution Of April 28, 2009 etc. was not another motion for reconsideration of the November 18,
2008 Decision, because it assailed the April 28, 2009 Resolution with respect to the tie-vote on the respondents’
Second Motion For Reconsideration. They pointed out that the Motion To Amend Resolution Of April 28, 2009 etc.
was filed on May 14, 2009, which was within the 15-day period from their receipt of the April 28, 2009 Resolution;
thus, the entry of judgment had been prematurely made. They reiterated their arguments with respect to a tie-vote
upon an issue of constitutionality.

4
In the September 29, 2009 Resolution, the Court required the petitioners to comment on the Motion for
Reconsideration of the Resolution of June 2, 2009 within 10 days from receipt.

As directed, the petitioners filed their Comment Ad Cautelam With Motion to Expunge.

The respondents filed their Motion for Leave to File and to Admit Attached "Reply to Petitioners’ ‘Comment Ad
Cautelam With Motion to Expunge’", together with the Reply.

On November 17, 2009, the Court resolved to note the petitioners’ Comment Ad Cautelam With Motion to Expunge,
to grant the respondents’ Motion for Leave to File and Admit Reply to Petitioners’ Comment Ad Cautelam with Motion
to Expunge, and to note the respondents’ Reply to Petitioners’ Comment Ad Cautelam with Motion to Expunge.

On December 21, 2009, the Court, resolving the Motion To Amend Resolution Of April 28, 2009 etc. and voting anew
on the Second Motion For Reconsideration in order to reach a concurrence of a majority, promulgated its Decision
5
granting the motion and declaring the Cityhood Laws as constitutional, disposing thus:

WHEREFORE, respondent LGUs’ Motion for Reconsideration dated June 2, 2009, their "Motion to Amend the
Resolution of April 28, 2009 by Declaring Instead that Respondents’ ‘Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of
March 31, 2009’ and ‘Motion for Leave to File and to Admit Attached Second Motion for Reconsideration of the
Decision Dated November 18, 2008’ Remain Unresolved and to Conduct Further Proceedings," dated May 14, 2009,
and their second Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision dated November 18, 2008 are GRANTED. The June 2,
2009, the March 31, 2009, and April 31, 2009 Resolutions are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The entry of judgment
made on May 21, 2009 must accordingly be RECALLED.
The instant consolidated petitions and petitions-in-intervention are DISMISSED. The cityhood laws, namely Republic
Act Nos. 9389, 9390, 9391, 9392, 9393, 9394, 9398, 9404, 9405, 9407, 9408, 9409, 9434, 9435, 9436, and 9491 are
declared VALID and CONSTITUTIONAL.

SO ORDERED.

On January 5, 2010, the petitioners filed an Ad Cautelam Motion for Reconsideration against the December 21, 2009
6 7
Decision. On the same date, the petitioners also filed a Motion to Annul Decision of 21 December 2009.

8
On January 12, 2010, the Court directed the respondents to comment on the motions of the petitioners.

On February 4, 2010, petitioner-intervenors City of Santiago, City of Legazpi, and City of Iriga filed their separate
9
Manifestations with Supplemental Ad Cautelam Motions for Reconsideration. Similar manifestations with
supplemental motions for reconsideration were filed by other petitioner-intervenors, specifically: City of Cadiz on
10 11 12
February 15, 2010; City of Batangas on February 17, 2010; and City of Oroquieta on February 24, 2010. The
13
Court required the adverse parties to comment on the motions. As directed, the respondents complied.

14
On August 24, 2010, the Court issued its Resolution reinstating the November 18, 2008 Decision.

On September 14, 2010, the respondents timely filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the "Resolution" Dated August
15
24, 2010. They followed this by filing on September 20, 2010 a Motion to Set "Motion for Reconsideration of the
16
‘Resolution’ dated August 24, 2010" for Hearing. On November 19, 2010, the petitioners sent in their Opposition [To
17 18
the "Motion for Reconsideration of ‘Resolution’ dated August 24, 2010"]. On November 30, 2010, the Court noted,
among others, the petitioners’ Opposition.

19
On January 18, 2011, the Court denied the respondents’ Motion to Set "Motion for Reconsideration of the
‘Resolution’ dated August 24, 2010" for Hearing.

Thereafter, on February 15, 2011, the Court issued the Resolution being now challenged.

It can be gleaned from the foregoing that, as the June 2, 2009 Resolution clarified, the respondents’ Second Motion
For Reconsideration was not a prohibited pleading in view of the Court’s voting and acting on it having the effect of
allowing the Second Motion For Reconsideration; and that when the respondents filed their Motion for
Reconsideration of the Resolution of June 2, 2009 questioning the expunging of their Motion To Amend Resolution Of
April 28, 2009 etc. (which had been filed within the 15-day period from receipt of the April 28, 2009 Resolution), the
Court opted to act on the Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of June 2, 2009 by directing the adverse
parties through its September 29, 2009 Resolution to comment. The same permitting effect occurred when the Court,
by its November 17, 2009 Resolution, granted the respondents’ Motion for Leave to File and Admit Reply to
Petitioners’ Comment Ad Cautelam with Motion to Expunge, and noted the attached Reply.

Moreover, by issuing the Resolutions dated September 29, 2009 and November 17, 2009, the Court: (a) rendered
ineffective the tie-vote under the Resolution of April 28, 2009 and the ensuing denial of the Motion for
Reconsideration of the Resolution of March 31, 2009 for lack of a majority to overturn; (b), re-opened the Decision of
November 18, 2008 for a second look under reconsideration; and (c) lifted the directive that no further pleadings
would be entertained. The Court in fact entertained and acted on the respondents’ Motion for Reconsideration of the
Resolution of June 2, 2009. Thereafter, the Court proceeded to deliberate anew on the respondents’ Second Motion
for Reconsideration and ended up with the promulgation of the December 21, 2009 Decision (declaring the Cityhood
Laws valid and constitutional).

It is also inaccurate for the petitioners to insist that the December 21, 2009 Decision overturned the November 18,
2008 Decision on the basis of the mere Reflections of the Members of the Court. To be sure, the Reflections were the
legal opinions of the Members and formed part of the deliberations of the Court. The reference in the December 21,
2009 Decision to the Reflections pointed out that there was still a pending incident after the April 28, 2009 Resolution
20 21
that had been timely filed within 15 days from its receipt, pursuant to Section 10, Rule 51, in relation to Section 1,
22
Rule 52, of the Rules of Court. Again, the Court did act and deliberate upon this pending incident, leading to the
issuance of the December 21, 2009 Decision (declaring the Cityhood Laws free from constitutional infirmity). It was
thereafter that the Court rendered its August 24, 2010 Resolution (reinstating the November 18, 2008 Decision), to
correct which the respondents’ Motion for Reconsideration of the "Resolution" Dated August 24, 2010 was filed. And,
finally, the Court issued its February 15, 2011 Resolution, reversing and setting aside the August 24, 2010
Resolution.

It is worth repeating that the actions taken herein were made by the Court en banc strictly in accordance with the
Rules of Court and its internal procedures. There has been no irregularity attending or tainting the proceedings.

It also relevant to state that the Court has frequently disencumbered itself under extraordinary circumstances from the
23
shackles of technicality in order to render just and equitable relief.

On whether the principle of immutability of judgments and bar by res judicata apply herein, suffice it to state that the
succession of the events recounted herein indicates that the controversy about the 16 Cityhood Laws has not yet
been resolved with finality. As such, the operation of the principle of immutability of judgments did not yet come into
play. For the same reason is an adherence to the doctrine of res judicata not yet warranted, especially considering
that the precedential ruling for this case needed to be revisited and set with certainty and finality.

II.
Substantive Issues

The petitioners reiterate their position that the Cityhood Laws violate Section 6 and Section 10 of Article X of the
Constitution, the Equal Protection Clause, and the right of local governments to a just share in the national taxes.

The Court differs.

Congress clearly intended that the local government units covered by the Cityhood Laws be exempted from the
coverage of R.A. No. 9009. The apprehensions of the then Senate President with respect to the considerable
disparity between the income requirement of ₱20 million under the Local Government Code (LGC) prior to its
amendment, and the ₱100 million under the amendment introduced by R.A. No. 9009 were definitively articulated in
his interpellation of Senator Pimentel during the deliberations on Senate Bill No. 2157. The then Senate President
was cognizant of the fact that there were municipalities that then had pending conversion bills

24
during the 11th Congress prior to the adoption of Senate Bill No. 2157 as R.A. No. 9009, including the municipalities
covered by the Cityhood Laws. It is worthy of mention that the pertinent deliberations on Senate Bill No. 2157
occurred on October 5, 2000 while the 11th Congress was in session, and the conversion bills were then pending in
the Senate. Thus, the responses of Senator Pimentel made it obvious that R.A. No. 9009 would not apply to the
conversion bills then pending deliberation in the Senate during the 11th Congress.

R.A. No. 9009 took effect on June 30, 2001, when the 12th Congress was incipient. By reason of the clear legislative
intent to exempt the municipalities covered by the conversion bills pending during the 11th

Congress, the House of Representatives adopted Joint Resolution No. 29, entitled Joint Resolution to Exempt Certain
Municipalities Embodied in Bills Filed in Congress before June 30, 2001 from the coverage of Republic Act No. 9009.
However, the Senate failed to act on Joint Resolution No. 29. Even so, the House of Representatives readopted Joint
Resolution No. 29 as

25
Joint Resolution No. 1 during the 12th Congress, and forwarded Joint Resolution No. 1 to the Senate for approval.
Again, the Senate failed to approve Joint Resolution No. 1.

At this juncture, it is worthwhile to consider the manifestation of Senator Pimentel with respect to Joint Resolution No.
1, to wit:

MANIFESTATION OF SENATOR PIMENTEL

House Joint Resolution No. 1 seeks to exempt certain municipalities seeking conversion into cities from the
requirement that they must have at least P100 million in income of locally generated revenue, exclusive of the internal
revenue share that they received from the central government as required under Republic Act No. 9009.
The procedure followed by the House is questionable, to say the least. The House wants the Senate to do away with
the income requirement of P100 million so that, en masse, the municipalities they want exempted could now file bills
specifically converting them into cities. The reason they want the Senate to do it first is that Cong. Dodo Macias, chair
of the House Committee on Local Governments, I am told, will not entertain any bill for the conversion of
municipalities into cities unless the issue of income requirement is first hurdled. The House leadership therefore
wants to shift the burden of exempting certain municipalities from the income requirement to the Senate rather than
do it itself.

That is most unusual because, in effect, the House wants the Senate to pass a blanket resolution that would qualify
the municipalities concerned for conversion into cities on the matter of income alone. Then, at a later date, the House
would pass specific bills converting the municipalities into cities. However, income is not only the requirement for
municipalities to become cities. There are also the requirements on population and land area.

In effect, the House wants the Senate to tackle the qualification of the municipalities they want converted into cities
piecemeal and separately, first is the income under the joint resolution, then the other requirements when the bills are
file to convert specific municipalities into cities. To repeat, this is a most unusual manner of creating cities.

My respectful suggestion is for the Senate to request the House to do what they want to do regarding the applications
of certain municipalities to become cities pursuant to the requirements of the Local Government Code. If the House
wants to exempt certain municipalities from the requirements of the Local Government Code to become cities, by all
means, let them do their thing. Specifically, they should act on specific bills to create cities and cite the reasons why
the municipalities concerned are qualified to become cities. Only after the House shall have completed what they are
expected to do under the law would it be proper for the Senate to act on specific bills creating cities.

In other words, the House should be requested to finish everything that needs to be done in the matter of converting
municipalities into cities and not do it piecemeal as they are now trying to do under the joint resolution.

In my long years in the Senate, this is the first time that a resort to this subterfuge is being undertaken to favor the
creation of certain cities. I am not saying that they are not qualified. All I am saying is, if the House wants to pass and
create cities out of certain municipalities, by all means let them do that. But they should do it following the
requirements of the Local Government Code and, if they want to make certain exceptions, they can also do that too.
But they should not use the Senate as a ploy to get things done which they themselves should do.

Incidentally, I have recommended this mode of action verbally to some leaders of the House. Had they followed the
recommendation, for all I know, the municipalities they had envisioned to be covered by House Joint Resolution No. 1
would, by now – if not all, at least some – have been converted into cities. House Joint Resolution No. 1, the House,
in effect, caused the delay in the approval in the applications for cityhood of the municipalities concerned.

Lastly, I do not have an amendment to House Joint Resolution No. 1. What I am suggesting is for the Senate to
request the House to follow the procedure outlined in the Local Government Code which has been respected all
through the years. By doing so, we uphold the rule of law and minimize the possibilities of power play in the approval
26
of bills converting municipalities into cities.

Thereafter, the conversion bills of the respondents were individually filed in the House of Representatives, and were
27
all unanimously and favorably voted upon by the Members of the House of Representatives. The bills, when
28
forwarded to the Senate, were likewise unanimously approved by the Senate. The acts of both Chambers of
Congress show that the exemption clauses ultimately incorporated in the Cityhood Laws are but the express
articulations of the clear legislative intent to exempt the respondents, without exception, from the coverage of R.A.
No. 9009. Thereby, R.A. No. 9009, and, by necessity, the LGC, were amended, not by repeal but by way of the
express exemptions being embodied in the exemption clauses.

The petitioners further contend that the new income requirement of ₱100 million from locally generated sources is not
arbitrary because it is not difficult to comply with; that there are several municipalities that have already complied with
the requirement and have, in fact, been converted into cities, such as Sta. Rosa in Laguna (R.A. No 9264), Navotas
(R.A. No. 9387) and San Juan (R.A. No. 9388) in Metro Manila, Dasmariñas in Cavite (R.A. No. 9723), and Biñan in
Laguna (R.A. No. 9740); and that several other municipalities have supposedly reached the income of ₱100 million
from locally generated sources, such as Bauan in Batangas, Mabalacat in Pampanga, and Bacoor in Cavite.

The contention of the petitioners does not persuade.

As indicated in the Resolution of February 15, 2011, fifty-nine (59) existing cities had failed as of 2006 to post an
average annual income of ₱100 million based on the figures contained in the certification dated December 5, 2008 by
the Bureau of Local Government. The large number of existing cities, virtually 50% of them, still unable to comply with
the ₱100 million threshold income five years after R.A. No. 9009 took effect renders it fallacious and probably
unwarranted for the petitioners to claim that the ₱100 million income requirement is not difficult to comply with.

In this regard, the deliberations on Senate Bill No. 2157 may prove enlightening, thus:

Senator Osmeña III. And could the gentleman help clarify why a municipality would want to be converted into a city?

Senator Pimentel. There is only one reason, Mr. President, and it is not hidden. It is the fact that once converted into
a city, the municipality will have roughly more than three times the share that it would be receiving over the internal
revenue allotment than it would have if it were to remain a municipality. So more or less three times or more.

Senator Osmeña III. Is it the additional funding that they will be able to enjoy from a larger share from the internal
revenue allocations?

Senator Pimentel. Yes, Mr. President.

Senator Osmeña III. Now, could the gentleman clarify, Mr. President, why in the original Republic Act No. 7160,
known as the Local Government Code of 1991, such a wide gap was made between a municipality—what a
municipality would earn—and a city? Because essentially, to a person’s mind, even with this new requirement, if
approved by Congress, if a municipality is earning P100 million and has a population of more than 150,000
inhabitants but has less than 100 square kilometers, it would not qualify as a city.

Senator Pimentel. Yes.

Senator Osmeña III. Now would that not be quite arbitrary on the part of the municipality?

Senator Pimentel. In fact, Mr. President, the House version restores the "or". So, this is a matter that we can very well
take up as a policy issue. The chair of the committee does not say that we should, as we know, not listen to
arguments for the restoration of the word "or" in the population or territorial requirement.

Senator Osmeña III. Mr. President, my point is that, I agree with the gentleman’s "and", but perhaps we should bring
down the area. There are certainly very crowded places in this country that are less than 10,000 hectares—100
square kilometers is 10,000 hectares. There might only be 9,000 hectares or 8,000 hectares. And it would be unfair if
these municipalities already earning P100,000,000 in locally generated funds and have a population of over 150,000
would not be qualified because of the simple fact that the physical area does not cover 10,000 hectares.

Senator Pimentel. Mr. President, in fact, in Metro Manila there are any number of municipalities. San Juan is a
specific example which, if we apply the present requirements, would not qualify: 100 square kilometers and a
population of not less than 150,000.

But my reply to that, Mr. President, is that they do not have to become a city?

Senator Osmeña III. Because of the income.

Senator Pimentel. But they are already earning a lot, as the gentleman said. Otherwise, the danger here, if we
become lax in the requirements, is the metropolis-located local governments would have more priority in terms of
funding because they would have more qualifications to become a city compared to far-flung areas in Mindanao or in
the Cordilleras, or whatever.

Therefore, I think we should not probably ease up on the requirements. Maybe we can restore the word "or" so that if
they do not have the 100 square kilometers of territory, then if they qualify in terms of population and income, that
would be all right, Mr. President.
Senator Osmeña III. Mr. President, I will not belabor the point at this time. I know that the distinguished gentleman is
considering several amendments to the Local Government Code. Perhaps this is something that could be further
refined at a later time, with his permission.

So I would like to thank the gentleman for his graciousness in answering our questions.

29
Senator Pimentel. I also thank the gentleman, Mr. President.

The Court takes note of the fact that the municipalities cited by the petitioners as having generated the threshold
income of ₱100 million from local sources, including those already converted into cities, are either in Metro Manila or
in provinces close to Metro Manila. In comparison, the municipalities covered by the Cityhood Laws are spread out in
the different provinces of the Philippines, including the Cordillera and Mindanao regions, and are considerably very
distant from Metro Manila. This reality underscores the danger the enactment of R.A. No. 9009 sought to prevent, i.e.,
that "the metropolis-located local governments would have more priority in terms of funding because they would have
more qualifications to become a city compared to the far-flung areas in Mindanao or in the Cordilleras, or whatever,"
actually resulting from the abrupt increase in the income requirement. Verily, this result is antithetical to what the
Constitution and LGC have nobly envisioned in favor of countryside development and national growth. Besides, this
result should be arrested early, to avoid the unwanted divisive effect on the entire country due to the local
government units closer to the National Capital Region being afforded easier access to the bigger share in the
national coffers than other local government units.

There should also be no question that the local government units covered by the Cityhood Laws belong to a class of
their own. They have proven themselves viable and capable to become component cities of their respective
provinces. They are and have been centers of trade and commerce, points of convergence of transportation, rich
havens of agricultural, mineral, and other natural resources, and flourishing tourism spots. In his speech delivered on
30
the floor of the Senate to sponsor House Joint Resolution No. 1, Senator Lim recognized such unique traits, viz:

It must be noted that except for Tandag and Lamitan, which are both second-class municipalities in terms of income,
all the rest are categorized by the Department of Finance as first-class municipalities with gross income of at least
P70 million as per Commission of Audit Report for 2005. Moreover, Tandag and Lamitan, together with Borongan,
Catbalogan, and Tabuk, are all provincial capitals.

The more recent income figures of the 12 municipalities, which would have increased further by this time, indicate
their readiness to take on the responsibilities of cityhood.

Moreover, the municipalities under consideration are leading localities in their respective provinces. Borongan,
Catbalogan, Tandag, Batac and Tabuk are ranked number one in terms of income among all the municipalities in
their respective provinces; Baybay and Bayugan are number two; Bogo and Lamitan are number three; Carcar,
number four; and Tayabas, number seven. Not only are they pacesetters in their respective provinces, they are also
among the frontrunners in their regions – Baybay, Bayugan and Tabuk are number two income-earners in Regions
VIII, XIII, and CAR, respectively; Catbalogan and Batac are number three in Regions VIII and I, respectively; Bogo,
number five in Region VII; Borongan and Carcar are both number six in Regions VIII and VII, respectively. This
simply shows that these municipalities are viable.

Petitioner League of Cities argues that there exists no issue with respect to the cityhood of its member cities,
considering that they became cities in full compliance with the criteria for conversion at the time of their creation.

The Court considers the argument too sweeping. What we pointed out was that the previous income requirement of
₱20 million was definitely not insufficient to provide the essential government facilities, services, and special functions
vis-à-vis the population of a component city. We also stressed that the increased income requirement of ₱100 million
was not the only conclusive indicator for any municipality to survive and remain viable as a component city. These
observations were unerringly reflected in the respective incomes of the fifty-nine (59) members of the League of
Cities that have still failed, remarkably enough, to be compliant with the new requirement of the ₱100 million
threshold income five years after R.A. No. 9009 became law.

Undoubtedly, the imposition of the income requirement of ₱100 million from local sources under R.A. No. 9009 was
arbitrary. When the sponsor of the law chose the specific figure of ₱100 million, no research or empirical data
buttressed the figure. Nor was there proof that the proposal took into account the after-effects that were likely to arise.
As already mentioned, even the danger the passage of R.A. No. 9009 sought to prevent might soon become a reality.
While the Constitution mandates that the creation of local government units must comply with the criteria laid down in
the LGC, it cannot be justified to insist that the Constitution must have to yield to every amendment to the LGC
despite such amendment imminently producing effects contrary to the original thrusts of the LGC to promote
autonomy, decentralization, countryside development, and the concomitant national growth.

Moreover, if we were now to adopt the stringent interpretation of the Constitution the petitioners are espousing, we
may have to apply the same restrictive yardstick against the recently converted cities cited by the petitioners, and find
two of them whose conversion laws have also to be struck down for being unconstitutional. The two laws are R.A. No.
31 32
9387 and R.A. No. 9388, respectively converting the municipalities of San Juan and Navotas into highly urbanized
cities. A cursory reading of the laws indicates that there is no indication of compliance with the requirements imposed
by the LGC, for, although the two local government units concerned presumably complied with the income
requirement of ₱50 million under Section 452 of the LGC and the income requirement of ₱100 million under the
amended Section 450 of the LGC, they obviously did not meet the requirements set forth under Section 453 of the
LGC, to wit:

Section 453. Duty to Declare Highly Urbanized Status.—It shall be the duty of the President to declare a city as highly
urbanized within thirty (30) days after it shall have met the minimum requirements prescribed in the immediately
preceding Section, upon proper application therefor and ratification in a plebiscite by the qualified voters therein.

Indeed, R.A. No. 9387 and R.A. No. 9388 evidently show that the President had not classified San Juan and Navotas
as highly urbanized cities upon proper application and ratification in a plebiscite by the qualified voters therein. A
further perusal of R.A. No. 9387 reveals that San Juan did not qualify as a highly urbanized city because it had a
population of only 125,558, contravening the required minimum population of 200,000 under Section 452 of the LGC.
Such non-qualification as a component city was conceded even by Senator Pimentel during the deliberations on
Senate Bill No. 2157.

The petitioners’ contention that the Cityhood Laws violated their right to a just share in the national taxes is not
acceptable.

In this regard, it suffices to state that the share of local government units is a matter of percentage under Section 285
of the LGC, not a specific amount. Specifically, the share of the cities is 23%, determined on the basis of population
(50%), land area (25%), and equal sharing (25%). This share is also dependent on the number of existing cities, such
that when the number of cities increases, then more will divide and share the allocation for cities. However, we have
to note that the allocation by the National Government is not a constant, and can either increase or decrease. With
every newly converted city becoming entitled to share the allocation for cities, the percentage of internal revenue
allotment (IRA) entitlement of each city will decrease, although the actual amount received may be more than that
received in the preceding year. That is a necessary consequence of Section 285 and Section 286 of the LGC.

As elaborated here and in the assailed February 15, 2011 Resolution, the Cityhood Laws were not violative of the
Constitution and the LGC. The respondents are thus also entitled to their just share in the IRA allocation for cities.
They have demonstrated their viability as component cities of their respective provinces and are developing
continuously, albeit slowly, because they had previously to share the IRA with about 1,500 municipalities. With their
conversion into component cities, they will have to share with only around 120 cities.

Local government units do not subsist only on locally generated income, but also depend on the IRA to support their
development. They can spur their own developments and thereby realize their great potential of encouraging trade
and commerce in the far-flung regions of the country. Yet their potential will effectively be stunted if those already
earning more will still receive a bigger share from the national coffers, and if commercial activity will be more or less
concentrated only in and near Metro Manila.

III.
Conclusion

We should not ever lose sight of the fact that the 16 cities covered by the Cityhood Laws not only had conversion bills
pending during the 11th Congress, but have also complied with the requirements of the LGC prescribed prior to its
amendment by R.A. No. 9009. Congress undeniably gave these cities all the considerations that justice and fair play
demanded. Hence, this Court should do no less by stamping its imprimatur to the clear and unmistakable legislative
intent and by duly recognizing the certain collective wisdom of Congress.
WHEREFORE, the Ad Cautelam Motion for Reconsideration (of the Decision dated 15 February 2011) is denied with
finality.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 183591 October 14, 2008

THE PROVINCE OF NORTH COTABATO, duly represented by GOVERNOR JESUS SACDALAN and/or VICE-
GOVERNOR EMMANUEL PIÑOL, for and in his own behalf, petitioners,
vs.
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES PEACE PANEL ON ANCESTRAL DOMAIN
(GRP), represented by SEC. RODOLFO GARCIA, ATTY. LEAH ARMAMENTO, ATTY. SEDFREY CANDELARIA,
MARK RYAN SULLIVAN and/or GEN. HERMOGENES ESPERON, JR., the latter in his capacity as the present
and duly-appointed Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process (OPAPP) or the so-called Office of the
Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process, respondents.

x--------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 183752 October 14, 2008

CITY GOVERNMENT OF ZAMBOANGA, as represented by HON. CELSO L. LOBREGAT, City Mayor of

Zamboanga, and in his personal capacity as resident of the City of Zamboanga, Rep. MA. ISABELLE G.
CLIMACO, District 1, and Rep. ERICO BASILIO A. FABIAN, District 2, City of Zamboanga, petitioners,
vs.
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES PEACE NEGOTIATING PANEL (GRP), as
represented by RODOLFO C. GARCIA, LEAH ARMAMENTO, SEDFREY CANDELARIA, MARK RYAN
SULLIVAN and HERMOGENES ESPERON, in his capacity as the Presidential Adviser on Peace
Process, respondents.

x--------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 183893 October 14, 2008

THE CITY OF ILIGAN, duly represented by CITY MAYOR LAWRENCE LLUCH CRUZ, petitioner,
vs.
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES PEACE PANEL ON ANCESTRAL DOMAIN
(GRP), represented by SEC. RODOLFO GARCIA, ATTY. LEAH ARMAMENTO, ATTY. SEDFREY CANDELARIA,
MARK RYAN SULLIVAN; GEN. HERMOGENES ESPERON, JR., in his capacity as the present and duly
appointed Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process; and/or SEC. EDUARDO ERMITA, in his capacity as
Executive Secretary. respondents.

x--------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 183951 October 14, 2008

THE PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT OF ZAMBOANGA DEL NORTE, as represented by HON. ROLANDO E.

YEBES, in his capacity as Provincial Governor, HON. FRANCIS H. OLVIS, in his capacity as Vice-Governor
and Presiding Officer of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, HON. CECILIA JALOSJOS CARREON,
st rd
Congresswoman, 1 Congressional District, HON. CESAR G. JALOSJOS, Congressman, 3 Congressional
District, and Members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Zamboanga del Norte, namely,
HON. SETH FREDERICK P. JALOSJOS, HON. FERNANDO R. CABIGON, JR., HON. ULDARICO M. MEJORADA
II, HON. EDIONAR M. ZAMORAS, HON. EDGAR J. BAGUIO, HON. CEDRIC L. ADRIATICO, HON. FELIXBERTO
C. BOLANDO, HON. JOSEPH BRENDO C. AJERO, HON. NORBIDEIRI B. EDDING, HON. ANECITO S.
DARUNDAY, HON. ANGELICA J. CARREON and HON. LUZVIMINDA E. TORRINO, petitioners,
vs.
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES PEACE NEGOTIATING PANEL [GRP], as
represented by HON. RODOLFO C. GARCIA and HON. HERMOGENES ESPERON, in his capacity as the
Presidential Adviser of Peace Process, respondents.
x--------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 183962 October 14, 2008

ERNESTO M. MACEDA, JEJOMAR C. BINAY, and AQUILINO L. PIMENTEL III, petitioners,

vs.
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES PEACE NEGOTIATING PANEL, represented by
its Chairman RODOLFO C. GARCIA, and the MORO ISLAMIC LIBERATION FRONT PEACE NEGOTIATING
PANEL, represented by its Chairman MOHAGHER IQBAL, respondents.

x--------------------------------------------x

FRANKLIN M. DRILON and ADEL ABBAS TAMANO, petitioners-in-intervention.

x--------------------------------------------x

SEN. MANUEL A. ROXAS, petitioners-in-intervention.

x--------------------------------------------x

MUNICIPALITY OF LINAMON duly represented by its Municipal Mayor NOEL N. DEANO, petitioners-in-
intervention,

x--------------------------------------------x

THE CITY OF ISABELA, BASILAN PROVINCE, represented by MAYOR CHERRYLYN P. SANTOS-

AKBAR, petitioners-in-intervention.

x--------------------------------------------x

THE PROVINCE OF SULTAN KUDARAT, rep. by HON. SUHARTO T. MANGUDADATU, in his capacity as
Provincial Governor and a resident of the Province of Sultan Kudarat, petitioner-in-intervention.

x-------------------------------------------x

RUY ELIAS LOPEZ, for and in his own behalf and on behalf of Indigenous Peoples in Mindanao Not
Belonging to the MILF, petitioner-in-intervention.

x--------------------------------------------x

CARLO B. GOMEZ, GERARDO S. DILIG, NESARIO G. AWAT, JOSELITO C. ALISUAG and RICHALEX G.
JAGMIS, as citizens and residents of Palawan, petitioners-in-intervention.

x--------------------------------------------x

MARINO RIDAO and KISIN BUXANI, petitioners-in-intervention.

x--------------------------------------------x

MUSLIM LEGAL ASSISTANCE FOUNDATION, INC (MUSLAF), respondent-in-intervention.

x--------------------------------------------x

MUSLIM MULTI-SECTORAL MOVEMENT FOR PEACE & DEVELOPMENT (MMMPD), respondent-in-intervention.

x--------------------------------------------x

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Subject of these consolidated cases is the extent of the powers of the President in pursuing the peace
process. While the facts surrounding this controversy center on the armed conflict in Mindanao between the
government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), the legal issue involved has a bearing on all areas in the
country where there has been a long-standing armed conflict. Yet again, the Court is tasked to perform a delicate
balancing act. It must uncompromisingly delineate the bounds within which the President may lawfully exercise her
discretion, but it must do so in strict adherence to the Constitution, lest its ruling unduly restricts the freedom of action
vested by that same Constitution in the Chief Executive precisely to enable her to pursue the peace process
effectively.

I. FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE PETITIONS

On August 5, 2008, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the MILF, through the
Chairpersons of their respective peace negotiating panels, were scheduled to sign a Memorandum of Agreement on
the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) Aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 in Kuala Lumpur,
Malaysia.

The MILF is a rebel group which was established in March 1984 when, under the leadership of the late Salamat
Hashim, it splintered from the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) then headed by Nur Misuari, on the ground,
among others, of what Salamat perceived to be the manipulation of the MNLF away from an Islamic basis towards
1
Marxist-Maoist orientations.

The signing of the MOA-AD between the GRP and the MILF was not to materialize, however, for upon motion of
petitioners, specifically those who filed their cases before the scheduled signing of the MOA-AD, this Court issued a
Temporary Restraining Order enjoining the GRP from signing the same.

The MOA-AD was preceded by a long process of negotiation and the concluding of several prior agreements
between the two parties beginning in 1996, when the GRP-MILF peace negotiations began. On July 18, 1997, the
GRP and MILF Peace Panels signed the Agreement on General Cessation of Hostilities. The following year, they
signed the General Framework of Agreement of Intent on August 27, 1998.

The Solicitor General, who represents respondents, summarizes the MOA-AD by stating that the same contained,
among others, the commitment of the parties to pursue peace negotiations, protect and respect human rights,
negotiate with sincerity in the resolution and pacific settlement of the conflict, and refrain from the use of threat or
2
force to attain undue advantage while the peace negotiations on the substantive agenda are on-going.

Early on, however, it was evident that there was not going to be any smooth sailing in the GRP-MILF peace process.
Towards the end of 1999 up to early 2000, the MILF attacked a number of municipalities in Central Mindanao and, in
3
March 2000, it took control of the town hall of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte. In response, then President Joseph
Estrada declared and carried out an "all-out-war" against the MILF.

When President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo assumed office, the military offensive against the MILF was suspended
and the government sought a resumption of the peace talks. The MILF, according to a leading MILF member, initially
responded with deep reservation, but when President Arroyo asked the Government of Malaysia through Prime
Minister Mahathir Mohammad to help convince the MILF to return to the negotiating table, the MILF convened its
4
Central Committee to seriously discuss the matter and, eventually, decided to meet with the GRP.

The parties met in Kuala Lumpur on March 24, 2001, with the talks being facilitated by the Malaysian government, the
parties signing on the same date the Agreement on the General Framework for the Resumption of Peace Talks
5
Between the GRP and the MILF. The MILF thereafter suspended all its military actions.

Formal peace talks between the parties were held in Tripoli, Libya from June 20-22, 2001, the outcome of which
was the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace (Tripoli Agreement 2001) containing the basic principles and agenda
on the following aspects of the negotiation: Security Aspect, Rehabilitation Aspect, and Ancestral Domain Aspect.
With regard to the Ancestral Domain Aspect, the parties in Tripoli Agreement 2001 simply agreed "that the same be
discussed further by the Parties in their next meeting."

A second round of peace talks was held in Cyberjaya, Malaysia on August 5-7, 2001 which ended with the signing of
the Implementing Guidelines on the Security Aspect of the Tripoli Agreement 2001 leading to a ceasefire status
between the parties. This was followed by the Implementing Guidelines on the Humanitarian Rehabilitation and
Development Aspects of the Tripoli Agreement 2001, which was signed on May 7, 2002 at Putrajaya, Malaysia.
Nonetheless, there were many incidence of violence between government forces and the MILF from 2002 to 2003.

Meanwhile, then MILF Chairman Salamat Hashim passed away on July 13, 2003 and he was replaced by Al Haj
Murad, who was then the chief peace negotiator of the MILF. Murad's position as chief peace negotiator was taken
6
over by Mohagher Iqbal.

In 2005, several exploratory talks were held between the parties in Kuala Lumpur, eventually leading to the crafting of
the draft MOA-AD in its final form, which, as mentioned, was set to be signed last August 5, 2008.

II. STATEMENT OF THE PROCEEDINGS

Before the Court is what is perhaps the most contentious "consensus" ever embodied in an instrument - the MOA-AD
which is assailed principally by the present petitions bearing docket numbers 183591, 183752, 183893, 183951 and
183962.

7
Commonly impleaded as respondents are the GRP Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain and the Presidential Adviser
on the Peace Process (PAPP) Hermogenes Esperon, Jr.

8
On July 23, 2008, the Province of North Cotabato and Vice-Governor Emmanuel Piñol filed a petition, docketed
as G.R. No. 183591, for Mandamus and Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction and
9
Temporary Restraining Order. Invoking the right to information on matters of public concern, petitioners seek to
compel respondents to disclose and furnish them the complete and official copies of the MOA-AD including its
attachments, and to prohibit the slated signing of the MOA-AD, pending the disclosure of the contents of the MOA-AD
and the holding of a public consultation thereon. Supplementarily, petitioners pray that the MOA-AD be declared
10
unconstitutional.

This initial petition was followed by another one, docketed as G.R. No. 183752, also for Mandamus and
11 12
Prohibition filed by the City of Zamboanga, Mayor Celso Lobregat, Rep. Ma. Isabelle Climaco and Rep. Erico
Basilio Fabian who likewise pray for similar injunctive reliefs. Petitioners herein moreover pray that the City of
Zamboanga be excluded from the Bangsamoro Homeland and/or Bangsamoro Juridical Entity and, in the alternative,
that the MOA-AD be declared null and void.

By Resolution of August 4, 2008, the Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order commanding and directing public
13
respondents and their agents to cease and desist from formally signing the MOA-AD. The Court also required the
14
Solicitor General to submit to the Court and petitioners the official copy of the final draft of the MOA-AD, to which
15
she complied.

16
Meanwhile, the City of Iligan filed a petition for Injunction and/or Declaratory Relief, docketed as G.R. No. 183893,
praying that respondents be enjoined from signing the MOA-AD or, if the same had already been signed, from
implementing the same, and that the MOA-AD be declared unconstitutional. Petitioners herein additionally implead
Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita as respondent.

17
The Province of Zamboanga del Norte, Governor Rolando Yebes, Vice-Governor Francis Olvis, Rep. Cecilia
18
Jalosjos-Carreon, Rep. Cesar Jalosjos, and the members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Zamboanga del
19
Norte filed on August 15, 2008 a petition for Certiorari, Mandamus and Prohibition, docketed as G.R. No. 183951.
They pray, inter alia, that the MOA-AD be declared null and void and without operative effect, and that respondents
be enjoined from executing the MOA-AD.

On August 19, 2008, Ernesto Maceda, Jejomar Binay, and Aquilino Pimentel III filed a petition for
20
Prohibition, docketed as G.R. No. 183962, praying for a judgment prohibiting and permanently enjoining
respondents from formally signing and executing the MOA-AD and or any other agreement derived therefrom or
similar thereto, and nullifying the MOA-AD for being unconstitutional and illegal. Petitioners herein additionally
implead as respondent the MILF Peace Negotiating Panel represented by its Chairman Mohagher Iqbal.

Various parties moved to intervene and were granted leave of court to file their petitions-/comments-in-intervention.
Petitioners-in-Intervention include Senator Manuel A. Roxas, former Senate President Franklin Drilon and Atty. Adel
21 22
Tamano, the City of Isabela and Mayor Cherrylyn Santos-Akbar, the Province of Sultan Kudarat and Gov. Suharto
23
Mangudadatu, the Municipality of Linamon in Lanao del Norte, Ruy Elias Lopez of Davao City and of the Bagobo
tribe, Sangguniang Panlungsod member Marino Ridao and businessman Kisin Buxani, both of Cotabato City; and
lawyers Carlo Gomez, Gerardo Dilig, Nesario Awat, Joselito Alisuag, Richalex Jagmis, all of Palawan City. The
Muslim Legal Assistance Foundation, Inc. (Muslaf) and the Muslim Multi-Sectoral Movement for Peace and
Development (MMMPD) filed their respective Comments-in-Intervention.

By subsequent Resolutions, the Court ordered the consolidation of the petitions. Respondents filed Comments on the
petitions, while some of petitioners submitted their respective Replies.

Respondents, by Manifestation and Motion of August 19, 2008, stated that the Executive Department shall thoroughly
review the MOA-AD and pursue further negotiations to address the issues hurled against it, and thus moved to
dismiss the cases. In the succeeding exchange of pleadings, respondents' motion was met with vigorous opposition
from petitioners.

The cases were heard on oral argument on August 15, 22 and 29, 2008 that tackled the following principal issues:

1. Whether the petitions have become moot and academic

(i) insofar as the mandamus aspect is concerned, in view of the disclosure of official copies of the
final draft of the Memorandum of Agreement (MOA); and

(ii) insofar as the prohibition aspect involving the Local Government Units is concerned, if it is
considered that consultation has become fait accompli with the finalization of the draft;

2. Whether the constitutionality and the legality of the MOA is ripe for adjudication;

3. Whether respondent Government of the Republic of the Philippines Peace Panel committed grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it negotiated and initiated the MOA vis-à-vis
ISSUES Nos. 4 and 5;

4. Whether there is a violation of the people's right to information on matters of public concern (1987
Constitution, Article III, Sec. 7) under a state policy of full disclosure of all its transactions involving public
interest (1987 Constitution, Article II, Sec. 28) including public consultation under Republic Act No. 7160
(LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991)[;]

If it is in the affirmative, whether prohibition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is an
appropriate remedy;

5. Whether by signing the MOA, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines would be BINDING itself

a) to create and recognize the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) as a separate state, or a juridical,
territorial or political subdivision not recognized by law;

b) to revise or amend the Constitution and existing laws to conform to the MOA;

c) to concede to or recognize the claim of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front for ancestral domain in
violation of Republic Act No. 8371 (THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT OF 1997),
particularly Section 3(g) & Chapter VII (DELINEATION, RECOGNITION OF ANCESTRAL
DOMAINS)[;]
 If in the affirmative, whether the Executive Branch has the authority to so bind the Government of the
Republic of the Philippines;

6. Whether the inclusion/exclusion of the Province of North Cotabato, Cities of Zamboanga, Iligan and
Isabela, and the Municipality of Linamon, Lanao del Norte in/from the areas covered by the projected
Bangsamoro Homeland is a justiciable question; and

7. Whether desistance from signing the MOA derogates any prior valid commitments of the Government of
24
the Republic of the Philippines.

The Court, thereafter, ordered the parties to submit their respective Memoranda. Most of the parties submitted their
memoranda on time.

III. OVERVIEW OF THE MOA-AD

As a necessary backdrop to the consideration of the objections raised in the subject five petitions and six petitions-in-
intervention against the MOA-AD, as well as the two comments-in-intervention in favor of the MOA-AD, the Court
takes an overview of the MOA.

The MOA-AD identifies the Parties to it as the GRP and the MILF.

Under the heading "Terms of Reference" (TOR), the MOA-AD includes not only four earlier agreements between the
GRP and MILF, but also two agreements between the GRP and the MNLF: the 1976 Tripoli Agreement, and the Final
Peace Agreement on the Implementation of the 1976 Tripoli Agreement, signed on September 2, 1996 during the
administration of President Fidel Ramos.

The MOA-AD also identifies as TOR two local statutes - the organic act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim
25 26
Mindanao (ARMM) and the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA), and several international law instruments - the
ILO Convention No. 169 Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries in relation to the UN
Declaration on the Rights of the Indigenous Peoples, and the UN Charter, among others.

The MOA-AD includes as a final TOR the generic category of "compact rights entrenchment emanating from the
regime of dar-ul-mua'hada (or territory under compact) and dar-ul-sulh (or territory under peace agreement) that
partakes the nature of a treaty device."

During the height of the Muslim Empire, early Muslim jurists tended to see the world through a simple dichotomy:
there was the dar-ul-Islam (the Abode of Islam) and dar-ul-harb (the Abode of War). The first referred to those lands
where Islamic laws held sway, while the second denoted those lands where Muslims were persecuted or where
27
Muslim laws were outlawed or ineffective. This way of viewing the world, however, became more complex through
the centuries as the Islamic world became part of the international community of nations.

As Muslim States entered into treaties with their neighbors, even with distant States and inter-governmental
organizations, the classical division of the world into dar-ul-Islam and dar-ul-harb eventually lost its meaning. New
terms were drawn up to describe novel ways of perceiving non-Muslim territories. For instance, areas like dar-ul-
mua'hada (land of compact) and dar-ul-sulh (land of treaty) referred to countries which, though under a secular
regime, maintained peaceful and cooperative relations with Muslim States, having been bound to each other by treaty
or agreement. Dar-ul-aman (land of order), on the other hand, referred to countries which, though not bound by treaty
28
with Muslim States, maintained freedom of religion for Muslims.

It thus appears that the "compact rights entrenchment" emanating from the regime of dar-ul-mua'hada and dar-ul-
sulh simply refers to all other agreements between the MILF and the Philippine government - the Philippines being
the land of compact and peace agreement - that partake of the nature of a treaty device, "treaty" being broadly
defined as "any solemn agreement in writing that sets out understandings, obligations, and benefits for both parties
29
which provides for a framework that elaborates the principles declared in the [MOA-AD]."

The MOA-AD states that the Parties "HAVE AGREED AND ACKNOWLEDGED AS FOLLOWS," and starts with its
main body.
The main body of the MOA-AD is divided into four strands, namely, Concepts and Principles, Territory,
Resources, and Governance.

A. CONCEPTS AND PRINCIPLES

This strand begins with the statement that it is "the birthright of all Moros and all Indigenous peoples of Mindanao to
identify themselves and be accepted as ‘Bangsamoros.'" It defines "Bangsamoro people" as the natives or original
inhabitants of Mindanao and its adjacent islands including Palawan and the Sulu archipelago at the time of conquest
30
or colonization, and their descendants whether mixed or of full blood, including their spouses.

Thus, the concept of "Bangsamoro," as defined in this strand of the MOA-AD, includes not only "Moros" as
31
traditionally understood even by Muslims, but all indigenous peoples of Mindanao and its adjacent islands. The
MOA-AD adds that the freedom of choice of indigenous peoples shall be respected. What this freedom of choice
consists in has not been specifically defined.

The MOA-AD proceeds to refer to the "Bangsamoro homeland," the ownership of which is vested exclusively in the
32
Bangsamoro people by virtue of their prior rights of occupation. Both parties to the MOA-AD acknowledge
33
that ancestral domain does not form part of the public domain.

The Bangsamoro people are acknowledged as having the right to self-governance, which right is said to be rooted on
ancestral territoriality exercised originally under the suzerain authority of their sultanates and the Pat a Pangampong
ku Ranaw. The sultanates were described as states or "karajaan/kadatuan" resembling a body politic endowed with
34
all the elements of a nation-state in the modern sense.

The MOA-AD thus grounds the right to self-governance of the Bangsamoro people on the past suzerain authority of
the sultanates. As gathered, the territory defined as the Bangsamoro homeland was ruled by several sultanates and,
specifically in the case of the Maranao, by the Pat a Pangampong ku Ranaw, a confederation of independent
35
principalities (pangampong) each ruled by datus and sultans, none of whom was supreme over the others.

The MOA-AD goes on to describe the Bangsamoro people as "the ‘First Nation' with defined territory and with a
system of government having entered into treaties of amity and commerce with foreign nations."

The term "First Nation" is of Canadian origin referring to the indigenous peoples of that territory, particularly those
known as Indians. In Canada, each of these indigenous peoples is equally entitled to be called "First Nation," hence,
36
all of them are usually described collectively by the plural "First Nations." To that extent, the MOA-AD, by identifying
the Bangsamoro people as "the First Nation" - suggesting its exclusive entitlement to that designation - departs from
the Canadian usage of the term.

The MOA-AD then mentions for the first time the "Bangsamoro Juridical Entity" (BJE) to which it grants the
37
authority and jurisdiction over the Ancestral Domain and Ancestral Lands of the Bangsamoro.

B. TERRITORY

The territory of the Bangsamoro homeland is described as the land mass as well as the maritime, terrestrial, fluvial
and alluvial domains, including the aerial domain and the atmospheric space above it, embracing the Mindanao-Sulu-
38
Palawan geographic region.

More specifically, the core of the BJE is defined as the present geographic area of the ARMM - thus constituting the
following areas: Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Basilan, and Marawi City. Significantly, this core
39
also includes certain municipalities of Lanao del Norte that voted for inclusion in the ARMM in the 2001 plebiscite.

Outside of this core, the BJE is to cover other provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays, which are grouped into
two categories, Category A and Category B. Each of these areas is to be subjected to a plebiscite to be held on
different dates, years apart from each other. Thus, Category A areas are to be subjected to a plebiscite not later than
40
twelve (12) months following the signing of the MOA-AD. Category B areas, also called "Special Intervention
Areas," on the other hand, are to be subjected to a plebiscite twenty-five (25) years from the signing of a separate
41
agreement - the Comprehensive Compact.
The Parties to the MOA-AD stipulate that the BJE shall have jurisdiction over all natural resources within its
42
"internal waters," defined as extending fifteen (15) kilometers from the coastline of the BJE area; that the BJE shall
also have "territorial waters," which shall stretch beyond the BJE internal waters up to the baselines of the Republic of
the Philippines (RP) south east and south west of mainland Mindanao; and that within these territorial waters, the
BJE and the "Central Government" (used interchangeably with RP) shall exercise joint jurisdiction, authority and
43
management over all natural resources. Notably, the jurisdiction over the internal waters is not similarly described
as "joint."

The MOA-AD further provides for the sharing of minerals on the territorial waters between the Central Government
44
and the BJE, in favor of the latter, through production sharing and economic cooperation agreement. The activities
which the Parties are allowed to conduct on the territorial waters are enumerated, among which are the exploration
and utilization of natural resources, regulation of shipping and fishing activities, and the enforcement of police and
45
safety measures. There is no similar provision on the sharing of minerals and allowed activities with respect to
the internal waters of the BJE.

C. RESOURCES

The MOA-AD states that the BJE is free to enter into any economic cooperation and trade relations with foreign
countries and shall have the option to establish trade missions in those countries. Such relationships and
understandings, however, are not to include aggression against the GRP. The BJE may also enter into environmental
46
cooperation agreements.

The external defense of the BJE is to remain the duty and obligation of the Central Government. The Central
Government is also bound to "take necessary steps to ensure the BJE's participation in international meetings and
events" like those of the ASEAN and the specialized agencies of the UN. The BJE is to be entitled to participate in
Philippine official missions and delegations for the negotiation of border agreements or protocols for environmental
protection and equitable sharing of incomes and revenues involving the bodies of water adjacent to or between the
47
islands forming part of the ancestral domain.

With regard to the right of exploring for, producing, and obtaining all potential sources of energy, petroleum, fossil
fuel, mineral oil and natural gas, the jurisdiction and control thereon is to be vested in the BJE "as the party having
control within its territorial jurisdiction." This right carries the proviso that, "in times of national emergency, when
public interest so requires," the Central Government may, for a fixed period and under reasonable terms as may be
48
agreed upon by both Parties, assume or direct the operation of such resources.

The sharing between the Central Government and the BJE of total production pertaining to natural resources is to be
49
75:25 in favor of the BJE.

The MOA-AD provides that legitimate grievances of the Bangsamoro people arising from any unjust dispossession of
their territorial and proprietary rights, customary land tenures, or their marginalization shall be acknowledged.
50
Whenever restoration is no longer possible, reparation is to be in such form as mutually determined by the Parties.

The BJE may modify or cancel the forest concessions, timber licenses, contracts or agreements, mining
concessions, Mineral Production and Sharing Agreements (MPSA), Industrial Forest Management Agreements
(IFMA), and other land tenure instruments granted by the Philippine Government, including those issued by the
51
present ARMM.

D. GOVERNANCE

The MOA-AD binds the Parties to invite a multinational third-party to observe and monitor the implementation of
the Comprehensive Compact. This compact is to embody the "details for the effective enforcement" and "the
mechanisms and modalities for the actual implementation" of the MOA-AD. The MOA-AD explicitly provides that the
participation of the third party shall not in any way affect the status of the relationship between the Central
52
Government and the BJE.

The "associative" relationship

between the Central Government
and the BJE
The MOA-AD describes the relationship of the Central Government and the BJE as "associative," characterized by
shared authority and responsibility. And it states that the structure of governance is to be based on executive,
legislative, judicial, and administrative institutions with defined powers and functions in the Comprehensive Compact.

The MOA-AD provides that its provisions requiring "amendments to the existing legal framework" shall take effect
upon signing of the Comprehensive Compact and upon effecting the aforesaid amendments, with due regard to
the non-derogation of prior agreements and within the stipulated timeframe to be contained in the Comprehensive
Compact. As will be discussed later, much of the present controversy hangs on the legality of this provision.

The BJE is granted the power to build, develop and maintain its own institutions inclusive of civil service, electoral,
financial and banking, education, legislation, legal, economic, police and internal security force, judicial system and
correctional institutions, the details of which shall be discussed in the negotiation of the comprehensive compact.

As stated early on, the MOA-AD was set to be signed on August 5, 2008 by Rodolfo Garcia and Mohagher Iqbal,
Chairpersons of the Peace Negotiating Panels of the GRP and the MILF, respectively. Notably, the penultimate
paragraph of the MOA-AD identifies the signatories as "the representatives of the Parties," meaning the GRP and
53
MILF themselves, and not merely of the negotiating panels. In addition, the signature page of the MOA-AD states
that it is "WITNESSED BY" Datuk Othman Bin Abd Razak, Special Adviser to the Prime Minister of Malaysia,
"ENDORSED BY" Ambassador Sayed Elmasry, Adviser to Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) Secretary
General and Special Envoy for Peace Process in Southern Philippines, and SIGNED "IN THE PRESENCE OF" Dr.
Albert G. Romulo, Secretary of Foreign Affairs of RP and Dato' Seri Utama Dr. Rais Bin Yatim, Minister of Foreign
Affairs, Malaysia, all of whom were scheduled to sign the Agreement last August 5, 2008.

Annexed to the MOA-AD are two documents containing the respective lists cum maps of the provinces,
municipalities, and barangays under Categories A and B earlier mentioned in the discussion on the strand on
TERRITORY.

IV. PROCEDURAL ISSUES

A. RIPENESS

54
The power of judicial review is limited to actual cases or controversies. Courts decline to issue advisory opinions or
55
to resolve hypothetical or feigned problems, or mere academic questions. The limitation of the power of judicial
review to actual cases and controversies defines the role assigned to the judiciary in a tripartite allocation of power, to
56
assure that the courts will not intrude into areas committed to the other branches of government.

An actual case or controversy involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims, susceptible of
judicial resolution as distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute. There must be a contrariety
57
of legal rights that can be interpreted and enforced on the basis of existing law and jurisprudence. The Court can
decide the constitutionality of an act or treaty only when a proper case between opposing parties is submitted for
58
judicial determination.

Related to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the requirement of ripeness. A question is ripe for
59
adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. For a
case to be considered ripe for adjudication, it is a prerequisite that something had then been accomplished or
60
performed by either branch before a court may come into the picture, and the petitioner must allege the existence of
61
an immediate or threatened injury to itself as a result of the challenged action. He must show that he has sustained
62
or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of the act complained of.

The Solicitor General argues that there is no justiciable controversy that is ripe for judicial review in the present
petitions, reasoning that

The unsigned MOA-AD is simply a list of consensus points subject to further negotiations and legislative
enactments as well as constitutional processes aimed at attaining a final peaceful agreement. Simply put,
the MOA-AD remains to be a proposal that does not automatically create legally demandable rights and
obligations until the list of operative acts required have been duly complied with. x x x

xxxx
 In the cases at bar, it is respectfully submitted that this Honorable Court has no authority to pass upon
issues based on hypothetical or feigned constitutional problems or interests with no concrete bases.
Considering the preliminary character of the MOA-AD, there are no concrete acts that could possibly violate
petitioners' and intervenors' rights since the acts complained of are mere contemplated steps toward the
formulation of a final peace agreement. Plainly, petitioners and intervenors' perceived injury, if at all, is
merely imaginary and illusory apart from being unfounded and based on mere conjectures. (Underscoring
supplied)

63
The Solicitor General cites the following provisions of the MOA-AD:

TERRITORY

xxxx

2. Toward this end, the Parties enter into the following stipulations:

xxxx

d. Without derogating from the requirements of prior agreements, the Government stipulates to conduct and
deliver, using all possible legal measures, within twelve (12) months following the signing of the MOA-AD, a
plebiscite covering the areas as enumerated in the list and depicted in the map as Category A attached
herein (the "Annex"). The Annex constitutes an integral part of this framework agreement. Toward this end,
the Parties shall endeavor to complete the negotiations and resolve all outstanding issues on the
Comprehensive Compact within fifteen (15) months from the signing of the MOA-AD.

xxxx

GOVERNANCE

xxxx

7. The Parties agree that mechanisms and modalities for the actual implementation of this MOA-AD shall be
spelt out in the Comprehensive Compact to mutually take such steps to enable it to occur effectively.

Any provisions of the MOA-AD requiring amendments to the existing legal framework shall come into
force upon the signing of a Comprehensive Compact and upon effecting the necessary changes to the legal
framework with due regard to non-derogation of prior agreements and within the stipulated timeframe to be
64
contained in the Comprehensive Compact. (Underscoring supplied)

The Solicitor General's arguments fail to persuade.

Concrete acts under the MOA-AD are not necessary to render the present controversy ripe. In Pimentel, Jr. v.
65
Aguirre, this Court held:

x x x [B]y the mere enactment of the questioned law or the approval of the challenged action, the dispute is
said to have ripened into a judicial controversy even without any other overt act. Indeed, even a singular
violation of the Constitution and/or the law is enough to awaken judicial duty.

xxxx

By the same token, when an act of the President, who in our constitutional scheme is a coequal of
Congress, is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution and the laws x x x settling the dispute
66
becomes the duty and the responsibility of the courts.

67
In Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe, the United States Supreme Court held that the challenge to the
constitutionality of the school's policy allowing student-led prayers and speeches before games was ripe for
adjudication, even if no public prayer had yet been led under the policy, because the policy was being challenged as
68
unconstitutional on its face.

That the law or act in question is not yet effective does not negate ripeness. For example, in New York v. United
69
States, decided in 1992, the United States Supreme Court held that the action by the State of New York challenging
the provisions of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act was ripe for adjudication even if the questioned
provision was not to take effect until January 1, 1996, because the parties agreed that New York had to take
70
immediate action to avoid the provision's consequences.

71
The present petitions pray for Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus. Certiorari and Prohibition are remedies
granted by law when any tribunal, board or officer has acted, in the case of certiorari, or is proceeding, in the case of
prohibition, without or in excess of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
72
jurisdiction. Mandamus is a remedy granted by law when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person
unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office,
trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use or enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is
73
entitled. Certiorari, Mandamus and Prohibition are appropriate remedies to raise constitutional issues and to review
74
and/or prohibit/nullify, when proper, acts of legislative and executive officials.

The authority of the GRP Negotiating Panel is defined by Executive Order No. 3 (E.O. No. 3), issued on February 28,
75
2001. The said executive order requires that "[t]he government's policy framework for peace, including the
systematic approach and the administrative structure for carrying out the comprehensive peace process x x x be
76
governed by this Executive Order."

The present petitions allege that respondents GRP Panel and PAPP Esperon drafted the terms of the MOA-AD
without consulting the local government units or communities affected, nor informing them of the proceedings. As will
be discussed in greater detail later, such omission, by itself, constitutes a departure by respondents from their
mandate under E.O. No. 3.

Furthermore, the petitions allege that the provisions of the MOA-AD violate the Constitution. The MOA-AD provides
that "any provisions of the MOA-AD requiring amendments to the existing legal framework shall come into force upon
the signing of a Comprehensive Compact and upon effecting the necessary changes to the legal framework,"
implying an amendment of the Constitution to accommodate the MOA-AD. This stipulation, in effect, guaranteed to
the MILF the amendment of the Constitution. Such act constitutes another violation of its authority. Again, these
points will be discussed in more detail later.

As the petitions allege acts or omissions on the part of respondent that exceed their authority, by violating their
duties under E.O. No. 3 and the provisions of the Constitution and statutes, the petitions make a prima facie case for
Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus, and an actual case or controversy ripe for adjudication exists. When an act of
a branch of government is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right
77
but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute.

B. LOCUS STANDI

For a party to have locus standi, one must allege "such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to
assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely
78
depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions."

Because constitutional cases are often public actions in which the relief sought is likely to affect other persons, a
79
preliminary question frequently arises as to this interest in the constitutional question raised.

When suing as a citizen, the person complaining must allege that he has been or is about to be denied some right or
privilege to which he is lawfully entitled or that he is about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of
80
the statute or act complained of. When the issue concerns a public right, it is sufficient that the petitioner is a citizen
81
and has an interest in the execution of the laws.

For a taxpayer, one is allowed to sue where there is an assertion that public funds are illegally disbursed or deflected
to an illegal purpose, or that there is a wastage of public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or
82 83
unconstitutional law. The Court retains discretion whether or not to allow a taxpayer's suit.
In the case of a legislator or member of Congress, an act of the Executive that injures the institution of Congress
causes a derivative but nonetheless substantial injury that can be questioned by legislators. A member of the House
of Representatives has standing to maintain inviolate the prerogatives, powers and privileges vested by the
84
Constitution in his office.

85
An organization may be granted standing to assert the rights of its members, but the mere invocation by
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines or any member of the legal profession of the duty to preserve the rule of law
86
does not suffice to clothe it with standing.

As regards a local government unit (LGU), it can seek relief in order to protect or vindicate an interest of its own, and
87
of the other LGUs.

Intervenors, meanwhile, may be given legal standing upon showing of facts that satisfy the requirements of the law
88
authorizing intervention, such as a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties.

In any case, the Court has discretion to relax the procedural technicality on locus standi, given the liberal attitude it
89
has exercised, highlighted in the case of David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, where technicalities of procedure were
brushed aside, the constitutional issues raised being of paramount public interest or of transcendental importance
90
deserving the attention of the Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents. The Court's
forbearing stance on locus standi on issues involving constitutional issues has for its purpose the protection of
fundamental rights.

In not a few cases, the Court, in keeping with its duty under the Constitution to determine whether the other branches
of government have kept themselves within the limits of the Constitution and the laws and have not abused the
91
discretion given them, has brushed aside technical rules of procedure.

In the petitions at bar, petitioners Province of North Cotabato (G.R. No. 183591) Province of Zamboanga del
Norte (G.R. No. 183951), City of Iligan (G.R. No. 183893) and City of Zamboanga (G.R. No. 183752) and
petitioners-in-intervention Province of Sultan Kudarat, City of Isabela and Municipality of Linamon have locus
standi in view of the direct and substantial injury that they, as LGUs, would suffer as their territories, whether in whole
or in part, are to be included in the intended domain of the BJE. These petitioners allege that they did not vote for
their inclusion in the ARMM which would be expanded to form the BJE territory. Petitioners' legal standing is thus
beyond doubt.

In G.R. No. 183962, petitioners Ernesto Maceda, Jejomar Binay and Aquilino Pimentel III would have no standing
as citizens and taxpayers for their failure to specify that they would be denied some right or privilege or there would
be wastage of public funds. The fact that they are a former Senator, an incumbent mayor of Makati City, and a
resident of Cagayan de Oro, respectively, is of no consequence. Considering their invocation of the transcendental
importance of the issues at hand, however, the Court grants them standing.

Intervenors Franklin Drilon and Adel Tamano, in alleging their standing as taxpayers, assert that government funds
would be expended for the conduct of an illegal and unconstitutional plebiscite to delineate the BJE territory. On that
score alone, they can be given legal standing. Their allegation that the issues involved in these petitions are of
"undeniable transcendental importance" clothes them with added basis for their personality to intervene in these
petitions.

With regard to Senator Manuel Roxas, his standing is premised on his being a member of the Senate and a citizen
to enforce compliance by respondents of the public's constitutional right to be informed of the MOA-AD, as well as on
a genuine legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success or failure of either of the parties. He thus
possesses the requisite standing as an intervenor.

rd
With respect to Intervenors Ruy Elias Lopez, as a former congressman of the 3 district of Davao City, a taxpayer
and a member of the Bagobo tribe; Carlo B. Gomez, et al., as members of the IBP Palawan chapter, citizens and
taxpayers; Marino Ridao, as taxpayer, resident and member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cotabato City;
and Kisin Buxani, as taxpayer, they failed to allege any proper legal interest in the present petitions. Just the same,
the Court exercises its discretion to relax the procedural technicality on locus standi given the paramount public
interest in the issues at hand.
Intervening respondents Muslim Multi-Sectoral Movement for Peace and Development, an advocacy group for
justice and the attainment of peace and prosperity in Muslim Mindanao; and Muslim Legal Assistance Foundation
Inc., a non-government organization of Muslim lawyers, allege that they stand to be benefited or prejudiced, as the
case may be, in the resolution of the petitions concerning the MOA-AD, and prays for the denial of the petitions on
the grounds therein stated. Such legal interest suffices to clothe them with standing.

B. MOOTNESS

Respondents insist that the present petitions have been rendered moot with the satisfaction of all the reliefs prayed
for by petitioners and the subsequent pronouncement of the Executive Secretary that "[n]o matter what the Supreme
92
Court ultimately decides[,] the government will not sign the MOA."

In lending credence to this policy decision, the Solicitor General points out that the President had already disbanded
93
the GRP Peace Panel.

94
In David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, this Court held that the "moot and academic" principle not being a magical formula
that automatically dissuades courts in resolving a case, it will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if it finds
95
that (a) there is a grave violation of the Constitution; (b) the situation is of exceptional character and paramount
96
public interest is involved; (c) the constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide
97 98
the bench, the bar, and the public; and (d) the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.

Another exclusionary circumstance that may be considered is where there is a voluntary cessation of the activity
complained of by the defendant or doer. Thus, once a suit is filed and the doer voluntarily ceases the challenged
conduct, it does not automatically deprive the tribunal of power to hear and determine the case and does not render
the case moot especially when the plaintiff seeks damages or prays for injunctive relief against the possible
99
recurrence of the violation.

The present petitions fall squarely into these exceptions to thus thrust them into the domain of judicial review. The
grounds cited above in David are just as applicable in the present cases as they were, not only in David, but also
100 101
in Province of Batangas v. Romulo and Manalo v. Calderon where the Court similarly decided them on the
merits, supervening events that would ordinarily have rendered the same moot notwithstanding.

Petitions not mooted

Contrary then to the asseverations of respondents, the non-signing of the MOA-AD and the eventual dissolution of
the GRP Peace Panel did not moot the present petitions. It bears emphasis that the signing of the MOA-AD did not
push through due to the Court's issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order.

Contrary too to respondents' position, the MOA-AD cannot be considered a mere "list of consensus points,"
especially given its nomenclature, the need to have it signed or initialed by all the parties concerned on August 5,
2008, and the far-reaching Constitutional implications of these "consensus points," foremost of which is the
creation of the BJE.

In fact, as what will, in the main, be discussed, there is a commitment on the part of respondents to amend and
effect necessary changes to the existing legal framework for certain provisions of the MOA-AD to take effect.
Consequently, the present petitions are not confined to the terms and provisions of the MOA-AD, but to other on-
going and future negotiations and agreements necessary for its realization. The petitions have not, therefore, been
102
rendered moot and academic simply by the public disclosure of the MOA-AD, the manifestation that it will not be
signed as well as the disbanding of the GRP Panel not withstanding.

Petitions are imbued with paramount public interest

There is no gainsaying that the petitions are imbued with paramount public interest, involving a significant part of the
country's territory and the wide-ranging political modifications of affected LGUs. The assertion that the MOA-AD is
subject to further legal enactments including possible Constitutional amendments more than ever provides
impetus for the Court to formulate controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, the public and, in this
case, the government and its negotiating entity.
 103
Respondents cite Suplico v. NEDA, et al. where the Court did not "pontificat[e] on issues which no longer
legitimately constitute an actual case or controversy [as this] will do more harm than good to the nation as a whole."

The present petitions must be differentiated from Suplico. Primarily, in Suplico, what was assailed and eventually
cancelled was a stand-alone government procurement contract for a national broadband network involving a one-time
contractual relation between two parties-the government and a private foreign corporation. As the issues therein
involved specific government procurement policies and standard principles on contracts, the majority opinion
in Suplico found nothing exceptional therein, the factual circumstances being peculiar only to the transactions and
parties involved in the controversy.

The MOA-AD is part of a series of agreements

In the present controversy, the MOA-AD is a significant part of a series of agreements necessary to carry out the
Tripoli Agreement 2001. The MOA-AD which dwells on the Ancestral Domain Aspect of said Tripoli Agreement is the
third such component to be undertaken following the implementation of the Security Aspect in August 2001 and
the Humanitarian, Rehabilitation and Development Aspect in May 2002.

Accordingly, even if the Executive Secretary, in his Memorandum of August 28, 2008 to the Solicitor General, has
stated that "no matter what the Supreme Court ultimately decides[,] the government will not sign the MOA[-
AD]," mootness will not set in in light of the terms of the Tripoli Agreement 2001.

Need to formulate principles-guidelines

Surely, the present MOA-AD can be renegotiated or another one will be drawn up to carry out the Ancestral
Domain Aspect of the Tripoli Agreement 2001, in another or in any form, which could contain similar or
significantly drastic provisions. While the Court notes the word of the Executive Secretary that the government "is
committed to securing an agreement that is both constitutional and equitable because that is the only way that long-
lasting peace can be assured," it is minded to render a decision on the merits in the present petitions to formulate
controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, the public and, most especially, the government in
negotiating with the MILF regarding Ancestral Domain.

Respondents invite the Court's attention to the separate opinion of then Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban
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in Sanlakas v. Reyes in which he stated that the doctrine of "capable of repetition yet evading review" can override
mootness, "provided the party raising it in a proper case has been and/or continue to be prejudiced or damaged as a
direct result of their issuance." They contend that the Court must have jurisdiction over the subject matter for the
doctrine to be invoked.

The present petitions all contain prayers for Prohibition over which this Court exercises original jurisdiction. While
G.R. No. 183893 (City of Iligan v. GRP) is a petition for Injunction and Declaratory Relief, the Court will treat it as one
105
for Prohibition as it has far reaching implications and raises questions that need to be resolved. At all events, the
Court has jurisdiction over most if not the rest of the petitions.

Indeed, the present petitions afford a proper venue for the Court to again apply the doctrine immediately referred to
106
as what it had done in a number of landmark cases. There is a reasonable expectation that petitioners, particularly
the Provinces of North Cotabato, Zamboanga del Norte and Sultan Kudarat, the Cities of Zamboanga, Iligan and
Isabela, and the Municipality of Linamon, will again be subjected to the same problem in the future as respondents'
actions are capable of repetition, in another or any form.

It is with respect to the prayers for Mandamus that the petitions have become moot, respondents having, by
Compliance of August 7, 2008, provided this Court and petitioners with official copies of the final draft of the MOA-AD
and its annexes. Too, intervenors have been furnished, or have procured for themselves, copies of the MOA-AD.

V. SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES

As culled from the Petitions and Petitions-in-Intervention, there are basically two SUBSTANTIVE issues to be
resolved, one relating to the manner in which the MOA-AD was negotiated and finalized, the other relating to its
provisions, viz:
1. Did respondents violate constitutional and statutory provisions on public consultation and the right to information
when they negotiated and later initialed the MOA-AD?

2. Do the contents of the MOA-AD violate the Constitution and the laws?

ON THE FIRST SUBSTANTIVE ISSUE

Petitioners invoke their constitutional right to information on matters of public concern, as provided in Section 7,
Article III on the Bill of Rights:

Sec. 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to
official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well
as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject
107
to such limitations as may be provided by law.

108
As early as 1948, in Subido v. Ozaeta, the Court has recognized the statutory right to examine and inspect public
records, a right which was eventually accorded constitutional status.

The right of access to public documents, as enshrined in both the 1973 Constitution and the 1987 Constitution, has
109
been recognized as a self-executory constitutional right.

110
In the 1976 case of Baldoza v. Hon. Judge Dimaano, the Court ruled that access to public records is predicated on
the right of the people to acquire information on matters of public concern since, undoubtedly, in a democracy, the
pubic has a legitimate interest in matters of social and political significance.

x x x The incorporation of this right in the Constitution is a recognition of the fundamental role of free exchange of
information in a democracy. There can be no realistic perception by the public of the nation's problems, nor a
meaningful democratic decision-making if they are denied access to information of general interest. Information is
needed to enable the members of society to cope with the exigencies of the times. As has been aptly observed:
"Maintaining the flow of such information depends on protection for both its acquisition and its dissemination since, if
111
either process is interrupted, the flow inevitably ceases." x x x

In the same way that free discussion enables members of society to cope with the exigencies of their time, access to
information of general interest aids the people in democratic decision-making by giving them a better perspective of
112
the vital issues confronting the nation so that they may be able to criticize and participate in the affairs of the
government in a responsible, reasonable and effective manner. It is by ensuring an unfettered and uninhibited
exchange of ideas among a well-informed public that a government remains responsive to the changes desired by
113
the people.

The MOA-AD is a matter of public concern

114
That the subject of the information sought in the present cases is a matter of public concern faces no serious
115
challenge. In fact, respondents admit that the MOA-AD is indeed of public concern. In previous cases, the Court
116
found that the regularity of real estate transactions entered in the Register of Deeds, the need for adequate notice
117 118
to the public of the various laws, the civil service eligibility of a public employee, the proper management of
119
GSIS funds allegedly used to grant loans to public officials, the recovery of the Marcoses' alleged ill-gotten
120 121
wealth, and the identity of party-list nominees, among others, are matters of public concern. Undoubtedly, the
MOA-AD subject of the present cases is of public concern, involving as it does the sovereignty and territorial
integrity of the State, which directly affects the lives of the public at large.

Matters of public concern covered by the right to information include steps and negotiations leading to the
consummation of the contract. In not distinguishing as to the executory nature or commercial character of
agreements, the Court has categorically ruled:

x x x [T]he right to information "contemplates inclusion of negotiations leading to the consummation of

the transaction." Certainly, a consummated contract is not a requirement for the exercise of the right to
information. Otherwise, the people can never exercise the right if no contract is consummated, and if one is
consummated, it may be too late for the public to expose its defects.
 Requiring a consummated contract will keep the public in the dark until the contract, which may be grossly
disadvantageous to the government or even illegal, becomes fait accompli. This negates the State policy of
full transparency on matters of public concern, a situation which the framers of the Constitution could not
have intended. Such a requirement will prevent the citizenry from participating in the public discussion of
any proposed contract, effectively truncating a basic right enshrined in the Bill of Rights. We can allow
neither an emasculation of a constitutional right, nor a retreat by the State of its avowed "policy of full
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disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest." (Emphasis and italics in the original)

123
Intended as a "splendid symmetry" to the right to information under the Bill of Rights is the policy of public
disclosure under Section 28, Article II of the Constitution reading:

Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full
124
public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest.

The policy of full public disclosure enunciated in above-quoted Section 28 complements the right of access to
information on matters of public concern found in the Bill of Rights. The right to information guarantees the right of the
people to demand information, while Section 28 recognizes the duty of officialdom to give information even if nobody
125
demands.

The policy of public disclosure establishes a concrete ethical principle for the conduct of public affairs in a genuinely
open democracy, with the people's right to know as the centerpiece. It is a mandate of the State to be accountable by
126
following such policy. These provisions are vital to the exercise of the freedom of expression and essential to hold
127
public officials at all times accountable to the people.

Whether Section 28 is self-executory, the records of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission so disclose:

MR. SUAREZ. And since this is not self-executory, this policy will not be enunciated or will not be in force
and effect until after Congress shall have provided it.

MR. OPLE. I expect it to influence the climate of public ethics immediately but, of course, the implementing
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law will have to be enacted by Congress, Mr. Presiding Officer.

The following discourse, after Commissioner Hilario Davide, Jr., sought clarification on the issue, is enlightening.

MR. DAVIDE. I would like to get some clarifications on this. Mr. Presiding Officer, did I get the Gentleman
correctly as having said that this is not a self-executing provision? It would require a legislation by Congress
to implement?

MR. OPLE. Yes. Originally, it was going to be self-executing, but I accepted an amendment from
Commissioner Regalado, so that the safeguards on national interest are modified by the clause "as may be
provided by law"

MR. DAVIDE. But as worded, does it not mean that this will immediately take effect and Congress may
provide for reasonable safeguards on the sole ground national interest?

MR. OPLE. Yes. I think so, Mr. Presiding Officer, I said earlier that it should immediately influence the
climate of the conduct of public affairs but, of course, Congress here may no longer pass a law revoking
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it, or if this is approved, revoking this principle, which is inconsistent with this policy. (Emphasis supplied)

Indubitably, the effectivity of the policy of public disclosure need not await the passing of a statute. As
Congress cannot revoke this principle, it is merely directed to provide for "reasonable safeguards." The complete and
effective exercise of the right to information necessitates that its complementary provision on public disclosure derive
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the same self-executory nature. Since both provisions go hand-in-hand, it is absurd to say that the broader right to
information on matters of public concern is already enforceable while the correlative duty of the State to disclose its
transactions involving public interest is not enforceable until there is an enabling law. Respondents cannot thus point
to the absence of an implementing legislation as an excuse in not effecting such policy.
An essential element of these freedoms is to keep open a continuing dialogue or process of communication between
the government and the people. It is in the interest of the State that the channels for free political discussion be
131
maintained to the end that the government may perceive and be responsive to the people's will. Envisioned to
be corollary to the twin rights to information and disclosure is the design for feedback mechanisms.

MS. ROSARIO BRAID. Yes. And lastly, Mr. Presiding Officer, will the people be able to participate? Will
the government provide feedback mechanisms so that the people can participate and can react
where the existing media facilities are not able to provide full feedback mechanisms to the
government? I suppose this will be part of the government implementing operational mechanisms.

MR. OPLE. Yes. I think through their elected representatives and that is how these courses take place.
There is a message and a feedback, both ways.

xxxx

MS. ROSARIO BRAID. Mr. Presiding Officer, may I just make one last sentence?

I think when we talk about the feedback network, we are not talking about public officials but also
network of private business o[r] community-based organizations that will be reacting. As a matter of
fact, we will put more credence or credibility on the private network of volunteers and voluntary community-
based organizations. So I do not think we are afraid that there will be another OMA in the
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making. (Emphasis supplied)

The imperative of a public consultation, as a species of the right to information, is evident in the "marching orders" to
respondents. The mechanics for the duty to disclose information and to conduct public consultation regarding the
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peace agenda and process is manifestly provided by E.O. No. 3. The preambulatory clause of E.O. No. 3 declares
that there is a need to further enhance the contribution of civil society to the comprehensive peace process by
institutionalizing the people's participation.

One of the three underlying principles of the comprehensive peace process is that it "should be community-based,
reflecting the sentiments, values and principles important to all Filipinos" and "shall be defined not by the government
134
alone, nor by the different contending groups only, but by all Filipinos as one community." Included as a
component of the comprehensive peace process is consensus-building and empowerment for peace, which includes
"continuing consultations on both national and local levels to build consensus for a peace agenda and process, and
135
the mobilization and facilitation of people's participation in the peace process."

Clearly, E.O. No. 3 contemplates not just the conduct of a plebiscite to effectuate "continuing" consultations,
136
contrary to respondents' position that plebiscite is "more than sufficient consultation."

Further, E.O. No. 3 enumerates the functions and responsibilities of the PAPP, one of which is to "[c]onduct regular
dialogues with the National Peace Forum (NPF) and other peace partners to seek relevant information, comments,
recommendations as well as to render appropriate and timely reports on the progress of the comprehensive peace
137
process." E.O. No. 3 mandates the establishment of the NPF to be "the principal forum for the PAPP to consult
with and seek advi[c]e from the peace advocates, peace partners and concerned sectors of society on both national
and local levels, on the implementation of the comprehensive peace process, as well as for government[-]civil society
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dialogue and consensus-building on peace agenda and initiatives."

In fine, E.O. No. 3 establishes petitioners' right to be consulted on the peace agenda, as a corollary to the
constitutional right to information and disclosure.

PAPP Esperon committed grave abuse of discretion

The PAPP committed grave abuse of discretion when he failed to carry out the pertinent consultation. The furtive
process by which the MOA-AD was designed and crafted runs contrary to and in excess of the legal authority,
and amounts to a whimsical, capricious, oppressive, arbitrary and despotic exercise thereof.
The Court may not, of course, require the PAPP to conduct the consultation in a particular way or manner. It may,
however, require him to comply with the law and discharge the functions within the authority granted by the
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President.

Petitioners are not claiming a seat at the negotiating table, contrary to respondents' retort in justifying the denial of
petitioners' right to be consulted. Respondents' stance manifests the manner by which they treat the salient
provisions of E.O. No. 3 on people's participation. Such disregard of the express mandate of the President is not
140
much different from superficial conduct toward token provisos that border on classic lip service. It illustrates a gross
evasion of positive duty and a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined.

As for respondents' invocation of the doctrine of executive privilege, it is not tenable under the premises. The
argument defies sound reason when contrasted with E.O. No. 3's explicit provisions on continuing consultation and
dialogue on both national and local levels. The executive order even recognizes the exercise of the public's
right even before the GRP makes its official recommendations or before the government proffers its definite
141
propositions. It bear emphasis that E.O. No. 3 seeks to elicit relevant advice, information, comments and
recommendations from the people through dialogue.

AT ALL EVENTS, respondents effectively waived the defense of executive privilege in view of their unqualified
disclosure of the official copies of the final draft of the MOA-AD. By unconditionally complying with the Court's August
4, 2008 Resolution, without a prayer for the document's disclosure in camera, or without a manifestation that it was
complying therewith ex abundante ad cautelam.

Petitioners' assertion that the Local Government Code (LGC) of 1991 declares it a State policy to "require all national
agencies and offices to conduct periodic consultations with appropriate local government units, non-governmental
and people's organizations, and other concerned sectors of the community before any project or program is
142
implemented in their respective jurisdictions" is well-taken. The LGC chapter on intergovernmental relations puts
flesh into this avowed policy:

Prior Consultations Required. - No project or program shall be implemented by government

authorities unless the consultations mentioned in Sections 2 (c) and 26 hereof are complied with, and prior
approval of the sanggunian concerned is obtained: Provided, That occupants in areas where such projects
are to be implemented shall not be evicted unless appropriate relocation sites have been provided, in
143
accordance with the provisions of the Constitution. (Italics and underscoring supplied)

144
In Lina, Jr. v. Hon. Paño, the Court held that the above-stated policy and above-quoted provision of the LGU apply
only to national programs or projects which are to be implemented in a particular local community. Among the
programs and projects covered are those that are critical to the environment and human ecology including those that
may call for the eviction of a particular group of people residing in the locality where these will be
145
implemented. The MOA-AD is one peculiar program that unequivocally and unilaterally vests ownership of
146
a vast territory to the Bangsamoro people, which could pervasively and drastically result to the diaspora
or displacement of a great number of inhabitants from their total environment.

With respect to the indigenous cultural communities/indigenous peoples (ICCs/IPs), whose interests are represented
herein by petitioner Lopez and are adversely affected by the MOA-AD, the ICCs/IPs have, under the IPRA, the right
147
to participate fully at all levels of decision-making in matters which may affect their rights, lives and destinies. The
MOA-AD, an instrument recognizing ancestral domain, failed to justify its non-compliance with the clear-cut
148
mechanisms ordained in said Act, which entails, among other things, the observance of the free and prior informed
consent of the ICCs/IPs.

Notably, the IPRA does not grant the Executive Department or any government agency the power to delineate and
recognize an ancestral domain claim by mere agreement or compromise. The recognition of the ancestral domain is
the raison d'etre of the MOA-AD, without which all other stipulations or "consensus points" necessarily must fail. In
proceeding to make a sweeping declaration on ancestral domain, without complying with the IPRA, which is cited as
one of the TOR of the MOA-AD, respondents clearly transcended the boundaries of their authority. As it seems,
even the heart of the MOA-AD is still subject to necessary changes to the legal framework. While paragraph 7 on
Governance suspends the effectivity of all provisions requiring changes to the legal framework, such clause is itself
invalid, as will be discussed in the following section.
Indeed, ours is an open society, with all the acts of the government subject to public scrutiny and available always to
public cognizance. This has to be so if the country is to remain democratic, with sovereignty residing in the people
149
and all government authority emanating from them.

ON THE SECOND SUBSTANTIVE ISSUE

With regard to the provisions of the MOA-AD, there can be no question that they cannot all be accommodated under
the present Constitution and laws. Respondents have admitted as much in the oral arguments before this Court, and
the MOA-AD itself recognizes the need to amend the existing legal framework to render effective at least some of its
provisions. Respondents, nonetheless, counter that the MOA-AD is free of any legal infirmity because any provisions
therein which are inconsistent with the present legal framework will not be effective until the necessary changes to
that framework are made. The validity of this argument will be considered later. For now, the Court shall pass upon
how

The MOA-AD is inconsistent with the Constitution and laws as presently worded.

In general, the objections against the MOA-AD center on the extent of the powers conceded therein to the BJE.
Petitioners assert that the powers granted to the BJE exceed those granted to any local government under present
laws, and even go beyond those of the present ARMM. Before assessing some of the specific powers that would
have been vested in the BJE, however, it would be useful to turn first to a general idea that serves as a unifying link
to the different provisions of the MOA-AD, namely, the international law concept of association. Significantly, the
MOA-AD explicitly alludes to this concept, indicating that the Parties actually framed its provisions with it in mind.

Association is referred to in paragraph 3 on TERRITORY, paragraph 11 on RESOURCES, and paragraph 4 on

GOVERNANCE. It is in the last mentioned provision, however, that the MOA-AD most clearly uses it to describe
the envisioned relationship between the BJE and the Central Government.

4. The relationship between the Central Government and the Bangsamoro juridical entity shall
be associative characterized by shared authority and responsibility with a structure of governance
based on executive, legislative, judicial and administrative institutions with defined powers and functions in
the comprehensive compact. A period of transition shall be established in a comprehensive peace compact
specifying the relationship between the Central Government and the BJE. (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)

The nature of the "associative" relationship may have been intended to be defined more precisely in the still to be
forged Comprehensive Compact. Nonetheless, given that there is a concept of "association" in international law, and
the MOA-AD - by its inclusion of international law instruments in its TOR- placed itself in an international legal
context, that concept of association may be brought to bear in understanding the use of the term "associative" in the
MOA-AD.

Keitner and Reisman state that

[a]n association is formed when two states of unequal power voluntarily establish durable links. In the basic
model, one state, the associate, delegates certain responsibilities to the other, the principal, while
maintaining its international status as a state. Free associations represent a middle ground between
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integration and independence. x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

For purposes of illustration, the Republic of the Marshall Islands and the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM),
151
formerly part of the U.S.-administered Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, are associated states of the U.S.
pursuant to a Compact of Free Association. The currency in these countries is the U.S. dollar, indicating their very
close ties with the U.S., yet they issue their own travel documents, which is a mark of their statehood. Their
international legal status as states was confirmed by the UN Security Council and by their admission to UN
membership.

According to their compacts of free association, the Marshall Islands and the FSM generally have the capacity to
conduct foreign affairs in their own name and right, such capacity extending to matters such as the law of the sea,
marine resources, trade, banking, postal, civil aviation, and cultural relations. The U.S. government, when conducting
its foreign affairs, is obligated to consult with the governments of the Marshall Islands or the FSM on matters which it
(U.S. government) regards as relating to or affecting either government.

In the event of attacks or threats against the Marshall Islands or the FSM, the U.S. government has the authority and
obligation to defend them as if they were part of U.S. territory. The U.S. government, moreover, has the option of
establishing and using military areas and facilities within these associated states and has the right to bar the military
personnel of any third country from having access to these territories for military purposes.

It bears noting that in U.S. constitutional and international practice, free association is understood as an international
association between sovereigns. The Compact of Free Association is a treaty which is subordinate to the associated
nation's national constitution, and each party may terminate the association consistent with the right of independence.
It has been said that, with the admission of the U.S.-associated states to the UN in 1990, the UN recognized that the
152
American model of free association is actually based on an underlying status of independence.

In international practice, the "associated state" arrangement has usually been used as a transitional device of
former colonies on their way to full independence. Examples of states that have passed through the status of
associated states as a transitional phase are Antigua, St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla, Dominica, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and
153
Grenada. All have since become independent states.

Back to the MOA-AD, it contains many provisions which are consistent with the international legal concept
of association, specifically the following: the BJE's capacity to enter into economic and trade relations with foreign
countries, the commitment of the Central Government to ensure the BJE's participation in meetings and events in the
ASEAN and the specialized UN agencies, and the continuing responsibility of the Central Government over external
defense. Moreover, the BJE's right to participate in Philippine official missions bearing on negotiation of border
agreements, environmental protection, and sharing of revenues pertaining to the bodies of water adjacent to or
between the islands forming part of the ancestral domain, resembles the right of the governments of FSM and the
Marshall Islands to be consulted by the U.S. government on any foreign affairs matter affecting them.

These provisions of the MOA indicate, among other things, that the Parties aimed to vest in the BJE the status of
an associated state or, at any rate, a status closely approximating it.

The concept of association is not recognized under the present Constitution

No province, city, or municipality, not even the ARMM, is recognized under our laws as having an "associative"
relationship with the national government. Indeed, the concept implies powers that go beyond anything ever granted
by the Constitution to any local or regional government. It also implies the recognition of the associated entity as a
state. The Constitution, however, does not contemplate any state in this jurisdiction other than the Philippine State,
much less does it provide for a transitory status that aims to prepare any part of Philippine territory for independence.

Even the mere concept animating many of the MOA-AD's provisions, therefore, already requires for its validity the
amendment of constitutional provisions, specifically the following provisions of Article X:

SECTION 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the Philippines are the provinces,
cities, municipalities, and barangays. There shall be autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the
Cordilleras as hereinafter provided.

SECTION 15. There shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordilleras
consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical areas sharing common and distinctive
historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures, and other relevant characteristics within the
framework of this Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the
Republic of the Philippines.

The BJE is a far more powerful

entity than the autonomous region
recognized in the Constitution

It is not merely an expanded version of the ARMM, the status of its relationship with the national government being
fundamentally different from that of the ARMM. Indeed, BJE is a state in all but name as it meets the criteria of a
 154
state laid down in the Montevideo Convention, namely, a permanent population, a defined territory,
a government, and a capacity to enter into relations with other states.

Even assuming arguendo that the MOA-AD would not necessarily sever any portion of Philippine territory, the spirit
animating it - which has betrayed itself by its use of the concept of association - runs counter to the national
sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic.

The defining concept underlying the relationship between the national government and the BJE being itself
contrary to the present Constitution, it is not surprising that many of the specific provisions of the MOA-AD
on the formation and powers of the BJE are in conflict with the Constitution and the laws.

Article X, Section 18 of the Constitution provides that "[t]he creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when
approved by a majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose, provided
that only provinces, cities, and geographic areas voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be included in the
autonomous region." (Emphasis supplied)

As reflected above, the BJE is more of a state than an autonomous region. But even assuming that it is covered by
the term "autonomous region" in the constitutional provision just quoted, the MOA-AD would still be in conflict with it.
Under paragraph 2(c) on TERRITORY in relation to 2(d) and 2(e), the present geographic area of the ARMM and, in
addition, the municipalities of Lanao del Norte which voted for inclusion in the ARMM during the 2001 plebiscite -
Baloi, Munai, Nunungan, Pantar, Tagoloan and Tangkal - are automatically part of the BJE without need of another
plebiscite, in contrast to the areas under Categories A and B mentioned earlier in the overview. That the present
components of the ARMM and the above-mentioned municipalities voted for inclusion therein in 2001, however,
does not render another plebiscite unnecessary under the Constitution, precisely because what these areas voted for
then was their inclusion in the ARMM, not the BJE.

The MOA-AD, moreover, would not

comply with Article X, Section 20 of
the Constitution

since that provision defines the powers of autonomous regions as follows:

SECTION 20. Within its territorial jurisdiction and subject to the provisions of this Constitution and national
laws, the organic act of autonomous regions shall provide for legislative powers over:

(1) Administrative organization;

(2) Creation of sources of revenues;

(3) Ancestral domain and natural resources;

(4) Personal, family, and property relations;

(5) Regional urban and rural planning development;

(6) Economic, social, and tourism development;

(7) Educational policies;

(8) Preservation and development of the cultural heritage; and

(9) Such other matters as may be authorized by law for the promotion of the general welfare of the people of
the region. (Underscoring supplied)

Again on the premise that the BJE may be regarded as an autonomous region, the MOA-AD would require an
amendment that would expand the above-quoted provision. The mere passage of new legislation pursuant to sub-
paragraph No. 9 of said constitutional provision would not suffice, since any new law that might vest in the BJE the
powers found in the MOA-AD must, itself, comply with other provisions of the Constitution. It would not do, for
instance, to merely pass legislation vesting the BJE with treaty-making power in order to accommodate paragraph 4
of the strand on RESOURCES which states: "The BJE is free to enter into any economic cooperation and trade
relations with foreign countries: provided, however, that such relationships and understandings do not include
aggression against the Government of the Republic of the Philippines x x x." Under our constitutional system, it is
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only the President who has that power. Pimentel v. Executive Secretary instructs:

In our system of government, the President, being the head of state, is regarded as the sole organ and
authority in external relations and is the country's sole representative with foreign nations. As the
chief architect of foreign policy, the President acts as the country's mouthpiece with respect to international
affairs. Hence, the President is vested with the authority to deal with foreign states and governments,
extend or withhold recognition, maintain diplomatic relations, enter into treaties, and otherwise
transact the business of foreign relations. In the realm of treaty-making, the President has the sole
authority to negotiate with other states. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Article II, Section 22 of the Constitution must also be amended if the scheme envisioned in the MOA-AD is to
be effected. That constitutional provision states: "The State recognizes and promotes the rights of indigenous
cultural communities within the framework of national unity and development." (Underscoring
supplied) An associative arrangement does not uphold national unity. While there may be a semblance of unity
because of the associative ties between the BJE and the national government, the act of placing a portion of
Philippine territory in a status which, in international practice, has generally been a preparation for independence, is
certainly not conducive to national unity.

Besides being irreconcilable with the Constitution, the MOA-AD is also inconsistent with prevailing statutory law,
156 157
among which are R.A. No. 9054 or the Organic Act of the ARMM, and the IPRA.

Article X, Section 3 of the Organic Act of the ARMM is a bar to the adoption of the definition of "Bangsamoro
people" used in the MOA-AD. Paragraph 1 on Concepts and Principles states:

1. It is the birthright of all Moros and all Indigenous peoples of Mindanao to identify themselves and be
accepted as "Bangsamoros". The Bangsamoro people refers to those who are natives or original
inhabitants of Mindanao and its adjacent islands including Palawan and the Sulu archipelago at the time
of conquest or colonization of its descendants whether mixed or of full blood. Spouses and their
descendants are classified as Bangsamoro. The freedom of choice of the Indigenous people shall be
respected. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

This use of the term Bangsamoro sharply contrasts with that found in the Article X, Section 3 of the Organic Act,
which, rather than lumping together the identities of the Bangsamoro and other indigenous peoples living in
Mindanao, clearly distinguishes between Bangsamoro people and Tribal peoples, as follows:

"As used in this Organic Act, the phrase "indigenous cultural community" refers to Filipino citizens residing
in the autonomous region who are:

(a) Tribal peoples. These are citizens whose social, cultural and economic conditions distinguish them from
other sectors of the national community; and

(b) Bangsa Moro people. These are citizens who are believers in Islam and who have retained some or
all of their own social, economic, cultural, and political institutions."

Respecting the IPRA, it lays down the prevailing procedure for the delineation and recognition of ancestral domains.
The MOA-AD's manner of delineating the ancestral domain of the Bangsamoro people is a clear departure from that
procedure. By paragraph 1 of Territory, the Parties simply agree that, subject to the delimitations in the agreed
Schedules, "[t]he Bangsamoro homeland and historic territory refer to the land mass as well as the maritime,
terrestrial, fluvial and alluvial domains, and the aerial domain, the atmospheric space above it, embracing the
Mindanao-Sulu-Palawan geographic region."
Chapter VIII of the IPRA, on the other hand, lays down a detailed procedure, as illustrated in the following provisions
thereof:

SECTION 52. Delineation Process. - The identification and delineation of ancestral domains shall be done in
accordance with the following procedures:

xxxx

b) Petition for Delineation. - The process of delineating a specific perimeter may be initiated by the NCIP
with the consent of the ICC/IP concerned, or through a Petition for Delineation filed with the NCIP, by a
majority of the members of the ICCs/IPs;

c) Delineation Proper. - The official delineation of ancestral domain boundaries including census of all
community members therein, shall be immediately undertaken by the Ancestral Domains Office upon filing
of the application by the ICCs/IPs concerned. Delineation will be done in coordination with the community
concerned and shall at all times include genuine involvement and participation by the members of the
communities concerned;

d) Proof Required. - Proof of Ancestral Domain Claims shall include the testimony of elders or community
under oath, and other documents directly or indirectly attesting to the possession or occupation of the area
since time immemorial by such ICCs/IPs in the concept of owners which shall be any one (1) of the following
authentic documents:

1) Written accounts of the ICCs/IPs customs and traditions;

2) Written accounts of the ICCs/IPs political structure and institution;

3) Pictures showing long term occupation such as those of old improvements, burial grounds,
sacred places and old villages;

4) Historical accounts, including pacts and agreements concerning boundaries entered into by the
ICCs/IPs concerned with other ICCs/IPs;

5) Survey plans and sketch maps;

6) Anthropological data;

7) Genealogical surveys;

8) Pictures and descriptive histories of traditional communal forests and hunting grounds;

9) Pictures and descriptive histories of traditional landmarks such as mountains, rivers, creeks,
ridges, hills, terraces and the like; and

10) Write-ups of names and places derived from the native dialect of the community.

e) Preparation of Maps. - On the basis of such investigation and the findings of fact based thereon, the
Ancestral Domains Office of the NCIP shall prepare a perimeter map, complete with technical descriptions,
and a description of the natural features and landmarks embraced therein;

f) Report of Investigation and Other Documents. - A complete copy of the preliminary census and a report of
investigation, shall be prepared by the Ancestral Domains Office of the NCIP;

g) Notice and Publication. - A copy of each document, including a translation in the native language of the
ICCs/IPs concerned shall be posted in a prominent place therein for at least fifteen (15) days. A copy of the
document shall also be posted at the local, provincial and regional offices of the NCIP, and shall be
 published in a newspaper of general circulation once a week for two (2) consecutive weeks to allow other
claimants to file opposition thereto within fifteen (15) days from date of such publication: Provided, That in
areas where no such newspaper exists, broadcasting in a radio station will be a valid substitute: Provided,
further, That mere posting shall be deemed sufficient if both newspaper and radio station are not available;

h) Endorsement to NCIP. - Within fifteen (15) days from publication, and of the inspection process, the
Ancestral Domains Office shall prepare a report to the NCIP endorsing a favorable action upon a claim that
is deemed to have sufficient proof. However, if the proof is deemed insufficient, the Ancestral Domains
Office shall require the submission of additional evidence: Provided, That the Ancestral Domains Office shall
reject any claim that is deemed patently false or fraudulent after inspection and verification: Provided,
further, That in case of rejection, the Ancestral Domains Office shall give the applicant due notice, copy
furnished all concerned, containing the grounds for denial. The denial shall be appealable to the NCIP:
Provided, furthermore, That in cases where there are conflicting claims among ICCs/IPs on the boundaries
of ancestral domain claims, the Ancestral Domains Office shall cause the contending parties to meet and
assist them in coming up with a preliminary resolution of the conflict, without prejudice to its full adjudication
according to the section below.

xxxx

To remove all doubts about the irreconcilability of the MOA-AD with the present legal system, a discussion of not only
the Constitution and domestic statutes, but also of international law is in order, for

Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution states that the Philippines "adopts the generally accepted principles
of international law as part of the law of the land."

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Applying this provision of the Constitution, the Court, in Mejoff v. Director of Prisons, held that the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights is part of the law of the land on account of which it ordered the release on bail of a
detained alien of Russian descent whose deportation order had not been executed even after two years. Similarly,
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the Court in Agustin v. Edu applied the aforesaid constitutional provision to the 1968 Vienna Convention on Road
Signs and Signals.

International law has long recognized the right to self-determination of "peoples," understood not merely as the entire
population of a State but also a portion thereof. In considering the question of whether the people of Quebec had a
right to unilaterally secede from Canada, the Canadian Supreme Court in REFERENCE RE SECESSION OF
160
QUEBEC had occasion to acknowledge that "the right of a people to self-determination is now so widely
recognized in international conventions that the principle has acquired a status beyond ‘convention' and is considered
a general principle of international law."

161
Among the conventions referred to are the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International
162
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights which state, in Article 1 of both covenants, that all peoples, by
virtue of the right of self-determination, "freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social,
and cultural development."

The people's right to self-determination should not, however, be understood as extending to a unilateral right of
secession. A distinction should be made between the right of internal and external self-determination. REFERENCE
RE SECESSION OF QUEBEC is again instructive:

"(ii) Scope of the Right to Self-determination

126. The recognized sources of international law establish that the right to self-determination of a people
is normally fulfilled through internal self-determination - a people's pursuit of its political, economic,
social and cultural development within the framework of an existing state. A right to external self-
determination (which in this case potentially takes the form of the assertion of a right to unilateral
secession) arises in only the most extreme of cases and, even then, under carefully defined
circumstances. x x x

External self-determination can be defined as in the following statement from the Declaration on
Friendly Relations, supra, as
 The establishment of a sovereign and independent State, the free association or integration with an
independent State or the emergence into any other political status freely determined by
a people constitute modes of implementing the right of self-determination by that people. (Emphasis added)

127. The international law principle of self-determination has evolved within a framework of respect
for the territorial integrity of existing states. The various international documents that support the
existence of a people's right to self-determination also contain parallel statements supportive of the
conclusion that the exercise of such a right must be sufficiently limited to prevent threats to an existing
state's territorial integrity or the stability of relations between sovereign states.

x x x x (Emphasis, italics and underscoring supplied)

The Canadian Court went on to discuss the exceptional cases in which the right to external self-determination can
arise, namely, where a people is under colonial rule, is subject to foreign domination or exploitation outside a colonial
context, and - less definitely but asserted by a number of commentators - is blocked from the meaningful exercise of
its right to internal self-determination. The Court ultimately held that the population of Quebec had no right to
secession, as the same is not under colonial rule or foreign domination, nor is it being deprived of the freedom to
make political choices and pursue economic, social and cultural development, citing that Quebec is equitably
represented in legislative, executive and judicial institutions within Canada, even occupying prominent positions
therein.

The exceptional nature of the right of secession is further exemplified in the REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL
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COMMITTEE OF JURISTS ON THE LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE AALAND ISLANDS QUESTION. There, Sweden
presented to the Council of the League of Nations the question of whether the inhabitants of the Aaland Islands
should be authorized to determine by plebiscite if the archipelago should remain under Finnish sovereignty or be
incorporated in the kingdom of Sweden. The Council, before resolving the question, appointed an International
Committee composed of three jurists to submit an opinion on the preliminary issue of whether the dispute should,
based on international law, be entirely left to the domestic jurisdiction of Finland. The Committee stated the rule as
follows:

x x x [I]n the absence of express provisions in international treaties, the right of disposing of national
territory is essentially an attribute of the sovereignty of every State. Positive International Law does
not recognize the right of national groups, as such, to separate themselves from the State of which
they form part by the simple expression of a wish, any more than it recognizes the right of other States
to claim such a separation. Generally speaking, the grant or refusal of the right to a portion of its
population of determining its own political fate by plebiscite or by some other method, is,
exclusively, an attribute of the sovereignty of every State which is definitively constituted. A dispute
between two States concerning such a question, under normal conditions therefore, bears upon a question
which International Law leaves entirely to the domestic jurisdiction of one of the States concerned. Any other
solution would amount to an infringement of sovereign rights of a State and would involve the risk of creating
difficulties and a lack of stability which would not only be contrary to the very idea embodied in term "State,"
but would also endanger the interests of the international community. If this right is not possessed by a large
or small section of a nation, neither can it be held by the State to which the national group wishes to be
attached, nor by any other State. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The Committee held that the dispute concerning the Aaland Islands did not refer to a question which is left by
international law to the domestic jurisdiction of Finland, thereby applying the exception rather than the rule elucidated
above. Its ground for departing from the general rule, however, was a very narrow one, namely, the Aaland Islands
agitation originated at a time when Finland was undergoing drastic political transformation. The internal situation of
Finland was, according to the Committee, so abnormal that, for a considerable time, the conditions required for the
formation of a sovereign State did not exist. In the midst of revolution, anarchy, and civil war, the legitimacy of the
Finnish national government was disputed by a large section of the people, and it had, in fact, been chased from the
capital and forcibly prevented from carrying out its duties. The armed camps and the police were divided into two
opposing forces. In light of these circumstances, Finland was not, during the relevant time period, a "definitively
constituted" sovereign state. The Committee, therefore, found that Finland did not possess the right to withhold from
a portion of its population the option to separate itself - a right which sovereign nations generally have with respect to
their own populations.

Turning now to the more specific category of indigenous peoples, this term has been used, in scholarship as well as
international, regional, and state practices, to refer to groups with distinct cultures, histories, and connections to land
(spiritual and otherwise) that have been forcibly incorporated into a larger governing society. These groups are
regarded as "indigenous" since they are the living descendants of pre-invasion inhabitants of lands now dominated by
others. Otherwise stated, indigenous peoples, nations, or communities are culturally distinctive groups that find
164
themselves engulfed by settler societies born of the forces of empire and conquest. Examples of groups who have
been regarded as indigenous peoples are the Maori of New Zealand and the aboriginal peoples of Canada.

As with the broader category of "peoples," indigenous peoples situated within states do not have a general right to
165
independence or secession from those states under international law, but they do have rights amounting to what
was discussed above as the right to internal self-determination.

In a historic development last September 13, 2007, the UN General Assembly adopted the United Nations
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UN DRIP) through General Assembly Resolution 61/295. The
vote was 143 to 4, the Philippines being included among those in favor, and the four voting against being Australia,
Canada, New Zealand, and the U.S. The Declaration clearly recognized the right of indigenous peoples to self-
determination, encompassing the right to autonomy or self-government, to wit:

Article 3

Indigenous peoples have the right to self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their
political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.

Article 4

Indigenous peoples, in exercising their right to self-determination, have the right to autonomy or self-
government in matters relating to their internal and local affairs, as well as ways and means for
financing their autonomous functions.

Article 5

Indigenous peoples have the right to maintain and strengthen their distinct political, legal, economic, social
and cultural institutions, while retaining their right to participate fully, if they so choose, in the political,
economic, social and cultural life of the State.

Self-government, as used in international legal discourse pertaining to indigenous peoples, has been understood as
166
equivalent to "internal self-determination." The extent of self-determination provided for in the UN DRIP is more
particularly defined in its subsequent articles, some of which are quoted hereunder:

Article 8

1. Indigenous peoples and individuals have the right not to be subjected to forced assimilation or destruction
of their culture.

2. States shall provide effective mechanisms for prevention of, and redress for:

(a) Any action which has the aim or effect of depriving them of their integrity as distinct peoples, or
of their cultural values or ethnic identities;

(b) Any action which has the aim or effect of dispossessing them of their lands, territories or
resources;

(c) Any form of forced population transfer which has the aim or effect of violating or undermining
any of their rights;

(d) Any form of forced assimilation or integration;

(e) Any form of propaganda designed to promote or incite racial or ethnic discrimination directed
against them.

Article 21

1. Indigenous peoples have the right, without discrimination, to the improvement of their economic and
social conditions, including, inter alia, in the areas of education, employment, vocational training and
retraining, housing, sanitation, health and social security.

2. States shall take effective measures and, where appropriate, special measures to ensure continuing
improvement of their economic and social conditions. Particular attention shall be paid to the rights and
special needs of indigenous elders, women, youth, children and persons with disabilities.

Article 26

1. Indigenous peoples have the right to the lands, territories and resources which they have
traditionally owned, occupied or otherwise used or acquired.

2. Indigenous peoples have the right to own, use, develop and control the lands, territories and resources
that they possess by reason of traditional ownership or other traditional occupation or use, as well as those
which they have otherwise acquired.

3. States shall give legal recognition and protection to these lands, territories and resources. Such
recognition shall be conducted with due respect to the customs, traditions and land tenure systems of the
indigenous peoples concerned.

Article 30

1. Military activities shall not take place in the lands or territories of indigenous peoples, unless justified by a
relevant public interest or otherwise freely agreed with or requested by the indigenous peoples concerned.

2. States shall undertake effective consultations with the indigenous peoples concerned, through appropriate
procedures and in particular through their representative institutions, prior to using their lands or territories
for military activities.

Article 32

1. Indigenous peoples have the right to determine and develop priorities and strategies for the development
or use of their lands or territories and other resources.

2. States shall consult and cooperate in good faith with the indigenous peoples concerned through their own
representative institutions in order to obtain their free and informed consent prior to the approval of any
project affecting their lands or territories and other resources, particularly in connection with the
development, utilization or exploitation of mineral, water or other resources.

3. States shall provide effective mechanisms for just and fair redress for any such activities, and appropriate
measures shall be taken to mitigate adverse environmental, economic, social, cultural or spiritual impact.

Article 37

1. Indigenous peoples have the right to the recognition, observance and enforcement of treaties,
agreements and other constructive arrangements concluded with States or their successors and to have
States honour and respect such treaties, agreements and other constructive arrangements.

2. Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as diminishing or eliminating the rights of indigenous
peoples contained in treaties, agreements and other constructive arrangements.
 Article 38

States in consultation and cooperation with indigenous peoples, shall take the appropriate measures,
including legislative measures, to achieve the ends of this Declaration.

Assuming that the UN DRIP, like the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, must now be regarded as embodying
customary international law - a question which the Court need not definitively resolve here - the obligations
enumerated therein do not strictly require the Republic to grant the Bangsamoro people, through the instrumentality
of the BJE, the particular rights and powers provided for in the MOA-AD. Even the more specific provisions of the UN
DRIP are general in scope, allowing for flexibility in its application by the different States.

There is, for instance, no requirement in the UN DRIP that States now guarantee indigenous peoples their own police
and internal security force. Indeed, Article 8 presupposes that it is the State which will provide protection for
indigenous peoples against acts like the forced dispossession of their lands - a function that is normally performed by
police officers. If the protection of a right so essential to indigenous people's identity is acknowledged to be the
responsibility of the State, then surely the protection of rights less significant to them as such peoples would also be
the duty of States. Nor is there in the UN DRIP an acknowledgement of the right of indigenous peoples to the aerial
domain and atmospheric space. What it upholds, in Article 26 thereof, is the right of indigenous peoples to the lands,
territories and resources which they have traditionally owned, occupied or otherwise used or acquired.

Moreover, the UN DRIP, while upholding the right of indigenous peoples to autonomy, does not obligate States to
grant indigenous peoples the near-independent status of an associated state. All the rights recognized in that
document are qualified in Article 46 as follows:

1. Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as implying for any State, people, group or person any
right to engage in any activity or to perform any act contrary to the Charter of the United Nations
or construed as authorizing or encouraging any action which would dismember or impair, totally or
in part, the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent States.

Even if the UN DRIP were considered as part of the law of the land pursuant to Article II, Section 2 of the
Constitution, it would not suffice to uphold the validity of the MOA-AD so as to render its compliance with other laws
unnecessary.

It is, therefore, clear that the MOA-AD contains numerous provisions that cannot be reconciled with the
Constitution and the laws as presently worded. Respondents proffer, however, that the signing of the MOA-AD
alone would not have entailed any violation of law or grave abuse of discretion on their part, precisely because it
stipulates that the provisions thereof inconsistent with the laws shall not take effect until these laws are amended.
They cite paragraph 7 of the MOA-AD strand on GOVERNANCE quoted earlier, but which is reproduced below for
convenience:

7. The Parties agree that the mechanisms and modalities for the actual implementation of this MOA-AD shall
be spelt out in the Comprehensive Compact to mutually take such steps to enable it to occur effectively.

Any provisions of the MOA-AD requiring amendments to the existing legal framework shall come into force
upon signing of a Comprehensive Compact and upon effecting the necessary changes to the legal
framework with due regard to non derogation of prior agreements and within the stipulated timeframe to be
contained in the Comprehensive Compact.

Indeed, the foregoing stipulation keeps many controversial provisions of the MOA-AD from coming into force until the
necessary changes to the legal framework are effected. While the word "Constitution" is not mentioned in the
provision now under consideration or anywhere else in the MOA-AD, the term "legal framework" is certainly
broad enough to include the Constitution.

Notwithstanding the suspensive clause, however, respondents, by their mere act of incorporating in the MOA-AD the
provisions thereof regarding the associative relationship between the BJE and the Central Government, have already
violated the Memorandum of Instructions From The President dated March 1, 2001, which states that the
"negotiations shall be conducted in accordance with x x x the principles of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of
the Republic of the Philippines." (Emphasis supplied) Establishing an associative relationship between the BJE and
the Central Government is, for the reasons already discussed, a preparation for independence, or worse, an implicit
acknowledgment of an independent status already prevailing.

Even apart from the above-mentioned Memorandum, however, the MOA-AD is defective because the suspensive
clause is invalid, as discussed below.

The authority of the GRP Peace Negotiating Panel to negotiate with the MILF is founded on E.O. No. 3, Section 5(c),
which states that there shall be established Government Peace Negotiating Panels for negotiations with different
rebel groups to be "appointed by the President as her official emissaries to conduct negotiations, dialogues, and face-
to-face discussions with rebel groups." These negotiating panels are to report to the President, through the PAPP on
the conduct and progress of the negotiations.

It bears noting that the GRP Peace Panel, in exploring lasting solutions to the Moro Problem through its negotiations
with the MILF, was not restricted by E.O. No. 3 only to those options available under the laws as they presently stand.
One of the components of a comprehensive peace process, which E.O. No. 3 collectively refers to as the "Paths to
Peace," is the pursuit of social, economic, and political reforms which may require new legislation or even
167
constitutional amendments. Sec. 4(a) of E.O. No. 3, which reiterates Section 3(a), of E.O. No. 125, states:

SECTION 4. The Six Paths to Peace. - The components of the comprehensive peace process comprise the
processes known as the "Paths to Peace". These component processes are interrelated and not mutually
exclusive, and must therefore be pursued simultaneously in a coordinated and integrated fashion. They shall
include, but may not be limited to, the following:

a. PURSUIT OF SOCIAL, ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL REFORMS. This component involves the vigorous
implementation of various policies, reforms, programs and projects aimed at addressing the root
causes of internal armed conflicts and social unrest. This may require administrative action, new
legislation or even constitutional amendments.

x x x x (Emphasis supplied)

The MOA-AD, therefore, may reasonably be perceived as an attempt of respondents to address, pursuant to this
provision of E.O. No. 3, the root causes of the armed conflict in Mindanao. The E.O. authorized them to "think outside
the box," so to speak. Hence, they negotiated and were set on signing the MOA-AD that included various social,
economic, and political reforms which cannot, however, all be accommodated within the present legal framework, and
which thus would require new legislation and constitutional amendments.

The inquiry on the legality of the "suspensive clause," however, cannot stop here, because it must be asked whether
the President herself may exercise the power delegated to the GRP Peace Panel under E.O. No. 3, Sec. 4(a).

The President cannot delegate a power that she herself does not possess. May the President, in the course of peace
negotiations, agree to pursue reforms that would require new legislation and constitutional amendments, or should
the reforms be restricted only to those solutions which the present laws allow? The answer to this question requires a
discussion of the extent of the President's power to conduct peace negotiations.

That the authority of the President to conduct peace negotiations with rebel groups is not explicitly mentioned in the
168
Constitution does not mean that she has no such authority. In Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary, in issue was the
authority of the President to declare a state of rebellion - an authority which is not expressly provided for in the
Constitution. The Court held thus:

"In her ponencia in Marcos v. Manglapus, Justice Cortes put her thesis into jurisprudence. There, the Court,
by a slim 8-7 margin, upheld the President's power to forbid the return of her exiled predecessor. The
rationale for the majority's ruling rested on the President's

. . . unstated residual powers which are implied from the grant of executive power and which
are necessary for her to comply with her duties under the Constitution. The powers of the
President are not limited to what are expressly enumerated in the article on the Executive
Department and in scattered provisions of the Constitution. This is so, notwithstanding the
avowed intent of the members of the Constitutional Commission of 1986 to limit the powers of the
 President as a reaction to the abuses under the regime of Mr. Marcos, for the result was a limitation
of specific powers of the President, particularly those relating to the commander-in-chief clause, but
not a diminution of the general grant of executive power.

Thus, the President's authority to declare a state of rebellion springs in the main from her powers as
chief executive and, at the same time, draws strength from her Commander-in-Chief powers. x x x
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Similarly, the President's power to conduct peace negotiations is implicitly included in her powers as Chief Executive
and Commander-in-Chief. As Chief Executive, the President has the general responsibility to promote public peace,
and as Commander-in-Chief, she has the more specific duty to prevent and suppress rebellion and lawless
169
violence.

As the experience of nations which have similarly gone through internal armed conflict will show, however, peace is
rarely attained by simply pursuing a military solution. Oftentimes, changes as far-reaching as a fundamental
reconfiguration of the nation's constitutional structure is required. The observations of Dr. Kirsti Samuels are
enlightening, to wit:

x x x [T]he fact remains that a successful political and governance transition must form the core of any post-
conflict peace-building mission. As we have observed in Liberia and Haiti over the last ten years, conflict
cessation without modification of the political environment, even where state-building is undertaken through
technical electoral assistance and institution- or capacity-building, is unlikely to succeed. On average, more
than 50 percent of states emerging from conflict return to conflict. Moreover, a substantial proportion of
transitions have resulted in weak or limited democracies.

The design of a constitution and its constitution-making process can play an important role in the political
and governance transition. Constitution-making after conflict is an opportunity to create a common vision of
the future of a state and a road map on how to get there. The constitution can be partly a peace agreement
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and partly a framework setting up the rules by which the new democracy will operate.

In the same vein, Professor Christine Bell, in her article on the nature and legal status of peace agreements,
observed that the typical way that peace agreements establish or confirm mechanisms for demilitarization and
demobilization is by linking them to new constitutional structures addressing governance, elections, and legal and
171
human rights institutions.

In the Philippine experience, the link between peace agreements and constitution-making has been recognized by no
172
less than the framers of the Constitution. Behind the provisions of the Constitution on autonomous regions is the
framers' intention to implement a particular peace agreement, namely, the Tripoli Agreement of 1976 between the
GRP and the MNLF, signed by then Undersecretary of National Defense Carmelo Z. Barbero and then MNLF
Chairman Nur Misuari.

MR. ROMULO. There are other speakers; so, although I have some more questions, I will reserve my right
to ask them if they are not covered by the other speakers. I have only two questions.

I heard one of the Commissioners say that local autonomy already exists in the Muslim region; it is
working very well; it has, in fact, diminished a great deal of the problems. So, my question is: since that
already exists, why do we have to go into something new?

MR. OPLE. May I answer that on behalf of Chairman Nolledo. Commissioner Yusup Abubakar is right
that certain definite steps have been taken to implement the provisions of the Tripoli Agreement with
respect to an autonomous region in Mindanao. This is a good first step, but there is no question that
this is merely a partial response to the Tripoli Agreement itself and to the fuller standard of regional
173
autonomy contemplated in that agreement, and now by state policy. (Emphasis supplied)

The constitutional provisions on autonomy and the statutes enacted pursuant to them have, to the credit of their
drafters, been partly successful. Nonetheless, the Filipino people are still faced with the reality of an on-going conflict
between the Government and the MILF. If the President is to be expected to find means for bringing this conflict to an
end and to achieve lasting peace in Mindanao, then she must be given the leeway to explore, in the course of peace
negotiations, solutions that may require changes to the Constitution for their implementation. Being uniquely vested
with the power to conduct peace negotiations with rebel groups, the President is in a singular position to know the
precise nature of their grievances which, if resolved, may bring an end to hostilities.

The President may not, of course, unilaterally implement the solutions that she considers viable, but she may not be
prevented from submitting them as recommendations to Congress, which could then, if it is minded, act upon them
pursuant to the legal procedures for constitutional amendment and revision. In particular, Congress would have the
option, pursuant to Article XVII, Sections 1 and 3 of the Constitution, to propose the recommended amendments or
revision to the people, call a constitutional convention, or submit to the electorate the question of calling such a
convention.

While the President does not possess constituent powers - as those powers may be exercised only by Congress, a
Constitutional Convention, or the people through initiative and referendum - she may submit proposals for
constitutional change to Congress in a manner that does not involve the arrogation of constituent powers.

174
In Sanidad v. COMELEC, in issue was the legality of then President Marcos' act of directly submitting proposals for
constitutional amendments to a referendum, bypassing the interim National Assembly which was the body vested by
the 1973 Constitution with the power to propose such amendments. President Marcos, it will be recalled, never
convened the interim National Assembly. The majority upheld the President's act, holding that "the urges of absolute
necessity" compelled the President as the agent of the people to act as he did, there being no interim National
Assembly to propose constitutional amendments. Against this ruling, Justices Teehankee and Muñoz Palma
vigorously dissented. The Court's concern at present, however, is not with regard to the point on which it was then
divided in that controversial case, but on that which was not disputed by either side.

175
Justice Teehankee's dissent, in particular, bears noting. While he disagreed that the President may directly submit
proposed constitutional amendments to a referendum, implicit in his opinion is a recognition that he would have
upheld the President's action along with the majority had the President convened the interim National Assembly and
coursed his proposals through it. Thus Justice Teehankee opined:

"Since the Constitution provides for the organization of the essential departments of government, defines
and delimits the powers of each and prescribes the manner of the exercise of such powers, and the
constituent power has not been granted to but has been withheld from the President or Prime Minister, it
follows that the President's questioned decrees proposing and submitting constitutional amendments directly
to the people (without the intervention of the interim National Assembly in whom the power is
176
expressly vested) are devoid of constitutional and legal basis." (Emphasis supplied)

From the foregoing discussion, the principle may be inferred that the President - in the course of conducting peace
negotiations - may validly consider implementing even those policies that require changes to the Constitution, but she
may not unilaterally implement them without the intervention of Congress, or act in any way as if the assent of
that body were assumed as a certainty.

Since, under the present Constitution, the people also have the power to directly propose amendments through
initiative and referendum, the President may also submit her recommendations to the people, not as a formal
proposal to be voted on in a plebiscite similar to what President Marcos did in Sanidad, but for their independent
consideration of whether these recommendations merit being formally proposed through initiative.

These recommendations, however, may amount to nothing more than the President's suggestions to the people, for
any further involvement in the process of initiative by the Chief Executive may vitiate its character as a genuine
"people's initiative." The only initiative recognized by the Constitution is that which truly proceeds from the people. As
177
the Court stated in Lambino v. COMELEC:

"The Lambino Group claims that their initiative is the ‘people's voice.' However, the Lambino Group
unabashedly states in ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02, in the verification of their petition with the COMELEC,
that ‘ULAP maintains its unqualified support to the agenda of Her Excellency President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo for constitutional reforms.' The Lambino Group thus admits that their ‘people's' initiative is an
‘unqualified support to the agenda' of the incumbent President to change the Constitution. This forewarns
the Court to be wary of incantations of ‘people's voice' or ‘sovereign will' in the present initiative."
 178
It will be observed that the President has authority, as stated in her oath of office, only to preserve and defend the
Constitution. Such presidential power does not, however, extend to allowing her to change the Constitution, but
simply to recommend proposed amendments or revision. As long as she limits herself to recommending these
changes and submits to the proper procedure for constitutional amendments and revision, her mere recommendation
need not be construed as an unconstitutional act.

The foregoing discussion focused on the President's authority to propose constitutional amendments, since her
authority to propose new legislation is not in controversy. It has been an accepted practice for Presidents in this
jurisdiction to propose new legislation. One of the more prominent instances the practice is usually done is in the
yearly State of the Nation Address of the President to Congress. Moreover, the annual general appropriations bill has
always been based on the budget prepared by the President, which - for all intents and purposes - is a proposal for
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new legislation coming from the President.

The "suspensive clause" in the MOA-AD viewed in light of the above-discussed standards

Given the limited nature of the President's authority to propose constitutional amendments, she cannot guarantee to
any third party that the required amendments will eventually be put in place, nor even be submitted to a plebiscite.
The most she could do is submit these proposals as recommendations either to Congress or the people, in whom
constituent powers are vested.

Paragraph 7 on Governance of the MOA-AD states, however, that all provisions thereof which cannot be reconciled
with the present Constitution and laws "shall come into force upon signing of a Comprehensive Compact and upon
effecting the necessary changes to the legal framework." This stipulation does not bear the marks of a suspensive
condition - defined in civil law as a future and uncertain event - but of a term. It is not a question of whether the
necessary changes to the legal framework will be effected, but when. That there is no uncertainty being
contemplated is plain from what follows, for the paragraph goes on to state that the contemplated changes shall be
"with due regard to non derogation of prior agreements and within the stipulated timeframe to be contained in the
Comprehensive Compact."

Pursuant to this stipulation, therefore, it is mandatory for the GRP to effect the changes to the legal framework
contemplated in the MOA-AD - which changes would include constitutional amendments, as discussed earlier. It
bears noting that,

By the time these changes are put in place, the MOA-AD itself would be counted among the "prior
agreements" from which there could be no derogation.

What remains for discussion in the Comprehensive Compact would merely be the implementing details for these
"consensus points" and, notably, the deadline for effecting the contemplated changes to the legal framework.

Plainly, stipulation-paragraph 7 on GOVERNANCE is inconsistent with the limits of the President's authority to
propose constitutional amendments, it being a virtual guarantee that the Constitution and the laws of the Republic
of the Philippines will certainly be adjusted to conform to all the "consensus points" found in the MOA-AD. Hence, it
must be struck down as unconstitutional.

A comparison between the "suspensive clause" of the MOA-AD with a similar provision appearing in the 1996 final
peace agreement between the MNLF and the GRP is most instructive.

As a backdrop, the parties to the 1996 Agreement stipulated that it would be implemented in two phases. Phase
I covered a three-year transitional period involving the putting up of new administrative structures through Executive
Order, such as the Special Zone of Peace and Development (SZOPAD) and the Southern Philippines Council for
Peace and Development (SPCPD), while Phase II covered the establishment of the new regional autonomous
government through amendment or repeal of R.A. No. 6734, which was then the Organic Act of the ARMM.

The stipulations on Phase II consisted of specific agreements on the structure of the expanded autonomous region
envisioned by the parties. To that extent, they are similar to the provisions of the MOA-AD. There is, however, a
crucial difference between the two agreements. While the MOA-AD virtually guarantees that the "necessary
changes to the legal framework" will be put in place, the GRP-MNLF final peace agreement states thus:
"Accordingly, these provisions [on Phase II] shall be recommended by the GRP to Congress for incorporation in the
amendatory or repealing law."

Concerns have been raised that the MOA-AD would have given rise to a binding international law obligation on the
part of the Philippines to change its Constitution in conformity thereto, on the ground that it may be considered either
as a binding agreement under international law, or a unilateral declaration of the Philippine government to the
international community that it would grant to the Bangsamoro people all the concessions therein stated. Neither
ground finds sufficient support in international law, however.

The MOA-AD, as earlier mentioned in the overview thereof, would have included foreign dignitaries as signatories. In
addition, representatives of other nations were invited to witness its signing in Kuala Lumpur. These circumstances
readily lead one to surmise that the MOA-AD would have had the status of a binding international agreement had it
been signed. An examination of the prevailing principles in international law, however, leads to the contrary
conclusion.

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The Decision on Challenge to Jurisdiction: Lomé Accord Amnesty (the Lomé Accord case) of the Special Court of
Sierra Leone is enlightening. The Lomé Accord was a peace agreement signed on July 7, 1999 between the
Government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), a rebel group with which the Sierra Leone
Government had been in armed conflict for around eight years at the time of signing. There were non-contracting
signatories to the agreement, among which were the Government of the Togolese Republic, the Economic
Community of West African States, and the UN.

On January 16, 2002, after a successful negotiation between the UN Secretary-General and the Sierra Leone
Government, another agreement was entered into by the UN and that Government whereby the Special Court of
Sierra Leone was established. The sole purpose of the Special Court, an international court, was to try persons who
bore the greatest responsibility for serious violations of international humanitarian law and Sierra Leonean law
committed in the territory of Sierra Leone since November 30, 1996.

Among the stipulations of the Lomé Accord was a provision for the full pardon of the members of the RUF with
respect to anything done by them in pursuit of their objectives as members of that organization since the conflict
began.

In the Lomé Accord case, the Defence argued that the Accord created an internationally binding obligation not to
prosecute the beneficiaries of the amnesty provided therein, citing, among other things, the participation of foreign
dignitaries and international organizations in the finalization of that agreement. The Special Court, however, rejected
this argument, ruling that the Lome Accord is not a treaty and that it can only create binding obligations and rights
between the parties in municipal law, not in international law. Hence, the Special Court held, it is ineffective in
depriving an international court like it of jurisdiction.

"37. In regard to the nature of a negotiated settlement of an internal armed conflict it is easy to assume
and to argue with some degree of plausibility, as Defence counsel for the defendants seem to have
done, that the mere fact that in addition to the parties to the conflict, the document formalizing the
settlement is signed by foreign heads of state or their representatives and representatives of
international organizations, means the agreement of the parties is internationalized so as to create
obligations in international law.

xxxx

40. Almost every conflict resolution will involve the parties to the conflict and the mediator or facilitator of the
settlement, or persons or bodies under whose auspices the settlement took place but who are not at all
parties to the conflict, are not contracting parties and who do not claim any obligation from the contracting
parties or incur any obligation from the settlement.

41. In this case, the parties to the conflict are the lawful authority of the State and the RUF which has
no status of statehood and is to all intents and purposes a faction within the state. The non-
contracting signatories of the Lomé Agreement were moral guarantors of the principle that, in the
terms of Article XXXIV of the Agreement, "this peace agreement is implemented with integrity and in
good faith by both parties". The moral guarantors assumed no legal obligation. It is recalled that the
 UN by its representative appended, presumably for avoidance of doubt, an understanding of the extent of
the agreement to be implemented as not including certain international crimes.

42. An international agreement in the nature of a treaty must create rights and obligations regulated by
international law so that a breach of its terms will be a breach determined under international law which will
also provide principle means of enforcement. The Lomé Agreement created neither rights nor
obligations capable of being regulated by international law. An agreement such as the Lomé
Agreement which brings to an end an internal armed conflict no doubt creates a factual situation of
restoration of peace that the international community acting through the Security Council may take
note of. That, however, will not convert it to an international agreement which creates an obligation
enforceable in international, as distinguished from municipal, law. A breach of the terms of such a
peace agreement resulting in resumption of internal armed conflict or creating a threat to peace in the
determination of the Security Council may indicate a reversal of the factual situation of peace to be visited
with possible legal consequences arising from the new situation of conflict created. Such consequences
such as action by the Security Council pursuant to Chapter VII arise from the situation and not from the
agreement, nor from the obligation imposed by it. Such action cannot be regarded as a remedy for the
breach. A peace agreement which settles an internal armed conflict cannot be ascribed the same
status as one which settles an international armed conflict which, essentially, must be between two
or more warring States. The Lomé Agreement cannot be characterised as an international
instrument. x x x" (Emphasis, italics and underscoring supplied)

Similarly, that the MOA-AD would have been signed by representatives of States and international organizations not
parties to the Agreement would not have sufficed to vest in it a binding character under international law.

In another vein, concern has been raised that the MOA-AD would amount to a unilateral declaration of the Philippine
State, binding under international law, that it would comply with all the stipulations stated therein, with the result that it
would have to amend its Constitution accordingly regardless of the true will of the people. Cited as authority for this
181
view is Australia v. France, also known as the Nuclear Tests Case, decided by the International Court of Justice
(ICJ).

In the Nuclear Tests Case, Australia challenged before the ICJ the legality of France's nuclear tests in the South
Pacific. France refused to appear in the case, but public statements from its President, and similar statements from
other French officials including its Minister of Defence, that its 1974 series of atmospheric tests would be its last,
182
persuaded the ICJ to dismiss the case. Those statements, the ICJ held, amounted to a legal undertaking
addressed to the international community, which required no acceptance from other States for it to become effective.

Essential to the ICJ ruling is its finding that the French government intended to be bound to the international
community in issuing its public statements, viz:

43. It is well recognized that declarations made by way of unilateral acts, concerning legal or factual
situations, may have the effect of creating legal obligations. Declarations of this kind may be, and often are,
very specific. When it is the intention of the State making the declaration that it should become bound
according to its terms, that intention confers on the declaration the character of a legal undertaking,
the State being thenceforth legally required to follow a course of conduct consistent with the
declaration. An undertaking of this kind, if given publicly, and with an intent to be bound, even though not
made within the context of international negotiations, is binding. In these circumstances, nothing in the
nature of a quid pro quo nor any subsequent acceptance of the declaration, nor even any reply or reaction
from other States, is required for the declaration to take effect, since such a requirement would be
inconsistent with the strictly unilateral nature of the juridical act by which the pronouncement by the State
was made.

44. Of course, not all unilateral acts imply obligation; but a State may choose to take up a certain
position in relation to a particular matter with the intention of being bound-the intention is to be
ascertained by interpretation of the act. When States make statements by which their freedom of action
is to be limited, a restrictive interpretation is called for.

xxxx
 51. In announcing that the 1974 series of atmospheric tests would be the last, the French
Government conveyed to the world at large, including the Applicant, its intention effectively to
terminate these tests. It was bound to assume that other States might take note of these statements
and rely on their being effective. The validity of these statements and their legal consequences must
be considered within the general framework of the security of international intercourse, and the
confidence and trust which are so essential in the relations among States. It is from the actual substance
of these statements, and from the circumstances attending their making, that the legal implications
of the unilateral act must be deduced. The objects of these statements are clear and they were
addressed to the international community as a whole, and the Court holds that they constitute an
undertaking possessing legal effect. The Court considers *270 that the President of the Republic, in
deciding upon the effective cessation of atmospheric tests, gave an undertaking to the international
community to which his words were addressed. x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

As gathered from the above-quoted ruling of the ICJ, public statements of a state representative may be construed as
a unilateral declaration only when the following conditions are present: the statements were clearly addressed to the
international community, the state intended to be bound to that community by its statements, and that not to give
legal effect to those statements would be detrimental to the security of international intercourse. Plainly, unilateral
declarations arise only in peculiar circumstances.

The limited applicability of the Nuclear Tests Case ruling was recognized in a later case decided by the ICJ
183
entitled Burkina Faso v. Mali, also known as the Case Concerning the Frontier Dispute. The public declaration
subject of that case was a statement made by the President of Mali, in an interview by a foreign press agency, that
Mali would abide by the decision to be issued by a commission of the Organization of African Unity on a frontier
dispute then pending between Mali and Burkina Faso.

Unlike in the Nuclear Tests Case, the ICJ held that the statement of Mali's President was not a unilateral act with
legal implications. It clarified that its ruling in the Nuclear Tests case rested on the peculiar circumstances
surrounding the French declaration subject thereof, to wit:

40. In order to assess the intentions of the author of a unilateral act, account must be taken of all the factual
circumstances in which the act occurred. For example, in the Nuclear Tests cases, the Court took the
view that since the applicant States were not the only ones concerned at the possible continuance of
atmospheric testing by the French Government, that Government's unilateral declarations had
‘conveyed to the world at large, including the Applicant, its intention effectively to terminate these
tests‘ (I.C.J. Reports 1974, p. 269, para. 51; p. 474, para. 53). In the particular circumstances of those
cases, the French Government could not express an intention to be bound otherwise than by
unilateral declarations. It is difficult to see how it could have accepted the terms of a negotiated
solution with each of the applicants without thereby jeopardizing its contention that its conduct was
lawful. The circumstances of the present case are radically different. Here, there was nothing to
hinder the Parties from manifesting an intention to accept the binding character of the conclusions
of the Organization of African Unity Mediation Commission by the normal method: a formal
agreement on the basis of reciprocity. Since no agreement of this kind was concluded between the
Parties, the Chamber finds that there are no grounds to interpret the declaration made by Mali's head of
State on 11 April 1975 as a unilateral act with legal implications in regard to the present case. (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied)

Assessing the MOA-AD in light of the above criteria, it would not have amounted to a unilateral declaration on the
part of the Philippine State to the international community. The Philippine panel did not draft the same with the clear
intention of being bound thereby to the international community as a whole or to any State, but only to the MILF.
While there were States and international organizations involved, one way or another, in the negotiation and
projected signing of the MOA-AD, they participated merely as witnesses or, in the case of Malaysia, as facilitator. As
held in the Lomé Accord case, the mere fact that in addition to the parties to the conflict, the peace settlement is
signed by representatives of states and international organizations does not mean that the agreement is
internationalized so as to create obligations in international law.

Since the commitments in the MOA-AD were not addressed to States, not to give legal effect to such commitments
would not be detrimental to the security of international intercourse - to the trust and confidence essential in the
relations among States.
In one important respect, the circumstances surrounding the MOA-AD are closer to that of Burkina Faso wherein, as
already discussed, the Mali President's statement was not held to be a binding unilateral declaration by the ICJ. As in
that case, there was also nothing to hinder the Philippine panel, had it really been its intention to be bound to other
States, to manifest that intention by formal agreement. Here, that formal agreement would have come about by the
inclusion in the MOA-AD of a clear commitment to be legally bound to the international community, not just the MILF,
and by an equally clear indication that the signatures of the participating states-representatives would constitute an
acceptance of that commitment. Entering into such a formal agreement would not have resulted in a loss of face for
the Philippine government before the international community, which was one of the difficulties that prevented the
French Government from entering into a formal agreement with other countries. That the Philippine panel did not
enter into such a formal agreement suggests that it had no intention to be bound to the international community. On
that ground, the MOA-AD may not be considered a unilateral declaration under international law.

The MOA-AD not being a document that can bind the Philippines under international law notwithstanding,
respondents' almost consummated act of guaranteeing amendments to the legal framework is, by itself,
sufficient to constitute grave abuse of discretion. The grave abuse lies not in the fact that they considered, as a
solution to the Moro Problem, the creation of a state within a state, but in their brazen willingness to guarantee that
Congress and the sovereign Filipino people would give their imprimatur to their solution. Upholding such an
act would amount to authorizing a usurpation of the constituent powers vested only in Congress, a Constitutional
Convention, or the people themselves through the process of initiative, for the only way that the Executive can ensure
the outcome of the amendment process is through an undue influence or interference with that process.

The sovereign people may, if it so desired, go to the extent of giving up a portion of its own territory to the Moros for
the sake of peace, for it can change the Constitution in any it wants, so long as the change is not inconsistent with
184
what, in international law, is known as Jus Cogens. Respondents, however, may not preempt it in that decision.

SUMMARY

The petitions are ripe for adjudication. The failure of respondents to consult the local government units or
communities affected constitutes a departure by respondents from their mandate under E.O. No. 3. Moreover,
respondents exceeded their authority by the mere act of guaranteeing amendments to the Constitution. Any alleged
violation of the Constitution by any branch of government is a proper matter for judicial review.

As the petitions involve constitutional issues which are of paramount public interest or of transcendental importance,
the Court grants the petitioners, petitioners-in-intervention and intervening respondents the requisite locus standi in
keeping with the liberal stance adopted in David v. Macapagal-Arroyo.

Contrary to the assertion of respondents that the non-signing of the MOA-AD and the eventual dissolution of the GRP
Peace Panel mooted the present petitions, the Court finds that the present petitions provide an exception to the "moot
and academic" principle in view of (a) the grave violation of the Constitution involved; (b) the exceptional character of
the situation and paramount public interest; (c) the need to formulate controlling principles to guide the bench, the
bar, and the public; and (d) the fact that the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.

The MOA-AD is a significant part of a series of agreements necessary to carry out the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement
on Peace signed by the government and the MILF back in June 2001. Hence, the present MOA-AD can be
renegotiated or another one drawn up that could contain similar or significantly dissimilar provisions compared to the
original.

The Court, however, finds that the prayers for mandamus have been rendered moot in view of the respondents'
action in providing the Court and the petitioners with the official copy of the final draft of the MOA-AD and its annexes.

The people's right to information on matters of public concern under Sec. 7, Article III of the Constitution is in splendid
symmetry with the state policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest under Sec. 28,
Article II of the Constitution. The right to information guarantees the right of the people to demand information, while
Section 28 recognizes the duty of officialdom to give information even if nobody demands. The complete and
effective exercise of the right to information necessitates that its complementary provision on public disclosure derive
the same self-executory nature, subject only to reasonable safeguards or limitations as may be provided by law.
The contents of the MOA-AD is a matter of paramount public concern involving public interest in the highest order. In
declaring that the right to information contemplates steps and negotiations leading to the consummation of the
contract, jurisprudence finds no distinction as to the executory nature or commercial character of the agreement.

An essential element of these twin freedoms is to keep a continuing dialogue or process of communication between
the government and the people. Corollary to these twin rights is the design for feedback mechanisms. The right to
public consultation was envisioned to be a species of these public rights.

At least three pertinent laws animate these constitutional imperatives and justify the exercise of the people's right to
be consulted on relevant matters relating to the peace agenda.

One, E.O. No. 3 itself is replete with mechanics for continuing consultations on both national and local levels and for
a principal forum for consensus-building. In fact, it is the duty of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process to
conduct regular dialogues to seek relevant information, comments, advice, and recommendations from peace
partners and concerned sectors of society.

Two, Republic Act No. 7160 or the Local Government Code of 1991 requires all national offices to conduct
consultations before any project or program critical to the environment and human ecology including those that may
call for the eviction of a particular group of people residing in such locality, is implemented therein. The MOA-AD is
one peculiar program that unequivocally and unilaterally vests ownership of a vast territory to the Bangsamoro
people, which could pervasively and drastically result to the diaspora or displacement of a great number of
inhabitants from their total environment.

Three, Republic Act No. 8371 or the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 provides for clear-cut procedure for the
recognition and delineation of ancestral domain, which entails, among other things, the observance of the free and
prior informed consent of the Indigenous Cultural Communities/Indigenous Peoples. Notably, the statute does not
grant the Executive Department or any government agency the power to delineate and recognize an ancestral
domain claim by mere agreement or compromise.

The invocation of the doctrine of executive privilege as a defense to the general right to information or the specific
right to consultation is untenable. The various explicit legal provisions fly in the face of executive secrecy. In any
event, respondents effectively waived such defense after it unconditionally disclosed the official copies of the final
draft of the MOA-AD, for judicial compliance and public scrutiny.

In sum, the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process committed grave abuse of discretion when he failed to carry
out the pertinent consultation process, as mandated by E.O. No. 3, Republic Act No. 7160, and Republic Act No.
8371. The furtive process by which the MOA-AD was designed and crafted runs contrary to and in excess of the legal
authority, and amounts to a whimsical, capricious, oppressive, arbitrary and despotic exercise thereof. It illustrates a
gross evasion of positive duty and a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined.

The MOA-AD cannot be reconciled with the present Constitution and laws. Not only its specific provisions but the
very concept underlying them, namely, the associative relationship envisioned between the GRP and the
BJE, are unconstitutional, for the concept presupposes that the associated entity is a state and implies that the
same is on its way to independence.

While there is a clause in the MOA-AD stating that the provisions thereof inconsistent with the present legal
framework will not be effective until that framework is amended, the same does not cure its defect. The inclusion of
provisions in the MOA-AD establishing an associative relationship between the BJE and the Central Government is,
itself, a violation of the Memorandum of Instructions From The President dated March 1, 2001, addressed to the
government peace panel. Moreover, as the clause is worded, it virtually guarantees that the necessary amendments
to the Constitution and the laws will eventually be put in place. Neither the GRP Peace Panel nor the President
herself is authorized to make such a guarantee. Upholding such an act would amount to authorizing a usurpation of
the constituent powers vested only in Congress, a Constitutional Convention, or the people themselves through the
process of initiative, for the only way that the Executive can ensure the outcome of the amendment process is
through an undue influence or interference with that process.

While the MOA-AD would not amount to an international agreement or unilateral declaration binding on the
Philippines under international law, respondents' act of guaranteeing amendments is, by itself, already a
constitutional violation that renders the MOA-AD fatally defective.
WHEREFORE, respondents' motion to dismiss is DENIED. The main and intervening petitions are GIVEN DUE
COURSE and hereby GRANTED.

The Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain Aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of
2001 is declared contrary to law and the Constitution.

SO ORDERED.

ii) Specific Requirements

5. Province [Sec. 459-461]

G.R. No. 180050 April 12, 2011

RODOLFO G. NAVARRO, VICTOR F. BERNAL, and RENE O. MEDINA, Petitioners,

vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA, representing the President of the Philippines; Senate of the
Philippines, represented by the SENATE PRESIDENT; House of Representatives, represented by the HOUSE
SPEAKER; GOVERNOR ROBERT ACE S. BARBERS, representing the mother province of Surigao del Norte;
GOVERNOR GERALDINE ECLEO VILLAROMAN, representing the new Province of Dinagat
Islands, Respondents,

CONGRESSMAN FRANCISCO T. MATUGAS, HON. SOL T. MATUGAS, HON. ARTURO CARLOS A. EGAY, JR.,
HON. SIMEON VICENTE G. CASTRENCE, HON. MAMERTO D. GALANIDA, HON. MARGARITO M. LONGOS,
and HON. CESAR M. BAGUNDOL, Intervenors.

RESOLUTION

NACHURA, J.:

For consideration of the Court is the Urgent Motion to Recall Entry of Judgment dated October 20, 2010 filed by
1
Movant-Intervenors dated and filed on October 29, 2010, praying that the Court (a) recall the entry of judgment, and
(b) resolve their motion for reconsideration of the July 20, 2010 Resolution.

To provide a clear perspective of the instant motion, we present hereunder a brief background of the relevant
antecedents—

On October 2, 2006, the President of the Republic approved into law Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9355 (An Act Creating
2
the Province of Dinagat Islands). On December 3, 2006, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) conducted the
3
mandatory plebiscite for the ratification of the creation of the province under the Local Government Code (LGC). The
4
plebiscite yielded 69,943 affirmative votes and 63,502 negative votes. With the approval of the people from both the
mother province of Surigao del

Norte and the Province of Dinagat Islands (Dinagat), the President appointed the interim set of provincial officials who
took their oath of office on January 26, 2007. Later, during the May 14, 2007 synchronized elections, the Dinagatnons
5
elected their new set of provincial officials who assumed office on July 1, 2007.

On November 10, 2006, petitioners Rodolfo G. Navarro, Victor F. Bernal and Rene O. Medina, former political
leaders of Surigao del Norte, filed before this Court a petition for certiorari and prohibition (G.R. No. 175158)
6
challenging the constitutionality of R.A. No. 9355. The Court dismissed the petition on technical grounds. Their
7
motion for reconsideration was also denied.

Undaunted, petitioners, as taxpayers and residents of the Province of Surigao del Norte, filed another petition for
8
certiorari seeking to nullify R.A. No. 9355 for being unconstitutional. They alleged that the creation of Dinagat as a
new province, if uncorrected, would perpetuate an illegal act of Congress, and would unjustly deprive the people of
Surigao del Norte of a large chunk of the provincial territory, Internal Revenue Allocation (IRA), and rich resources
from the area. They pointed out that when the law was passed, Dinagat had a land area of 802.12 square kilometers
only and a population of only 106,951, failing to comply with Section 10, Article X of the Constitution and of Section
461 of the LGC, on both counts, viz.—

Constitution, Article X – Local Government

Section 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary
substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to
the approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.

LGC, Title IV, Chapter I

Section 461. Requisites for Creation. – (a) A province may be created if it has an average annual income, as certified
by the Department of Finance, of not less than Twenty million pesos (₱20,000,000.00) based on 1991 constant prices
and either of the following requisites:

(i) a continuous territory of at least two thousand (2,000) square kilometers, as certified by the Lands
Management Bureau; or

(ii) a population of not less than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) inhabitants as certified by the National
Statistics Office:

Provided, That, the creation thereof shall not reduce the land area, population, and income of the original
unit or units at the time of said creation to less than the minimum requirements prescribed herein.

(b) The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands or is separated by a chartered
city or cities which do not contribute to the income of the province.

(c) The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund, exclusive of special
funds, trust funds, transfers, and non-recurring income. (Emphasis supplied.)

9 10
On February 10, 2010, the Court rendered its Decision granting the petition. The Decision declared R.A. No. 9355
unconstitutional for failure to comply with the requirements on population and land area in the creation of a province
under the LGC. Consequently, it declared the proclamation of Dinagat and the election of its officials as null and void.
The Decision likewise declared as null and void the provision on Article 9(2) of the Rules and Regulations
Implementing the LGC (LGC-IRR), stating that, "[t]he land area requirement shall not apply where the proposed
province is composed of one (1) or more islands" for being beyond the ambit of Article 461 of the LGC, inasmuch as
11
such exemption is not expressly provided in the law.

The Republic, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, and Dinagat filed their respective motions for
12 13 14
reconsideration of the Decision. In its Resolution dated May 12, 2010, the Court denied the said motions.

Unperturbed, the Republic and Dinagat both filed their respective motions for leave of court to admit their second
motions for reconsideration, accompanied by their second motions for reconsideration. These motions were
15
eventually "noted without action" by this Court in its June 29, 2010 Resolution.

Meanwhile, the movants-intervenors filed on June 18, 2010 a Motion for Leave to Intervene and to File and to Admit
Intervenors’ Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated May 12, 2010. They alleged that the COMELEC
issued Resolution No. 8790, relevant to this case, which provides—

RESOLUTION NO. 8790

WHEREAS, Dinagat Islands, consisting of seven (7) municipalities, were previously components of the First
Legislative District of the Province of Surigao del Norte. In December 2006 pursuant to Republic Act No. 9355, the
Province of Dinagat Island[s] was created and its creation was ratified on 02 December 2006 in the Plebiscite for this
purpose;
WHEREAS, as a province, Dinagat Islands was, for purposes of the May 10, 2010 National and Local Elections,
allocated one (1) seat for Governor, one (1) seat for Vice Governor, one (1) for congressional seat, and ten (10)
Sangguniang Panlalawigan seats pursuant to Resolution No. 8670 dated 16 September 2009;

WHEREAS, the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 180050 entitled "Rodolfo Navarro, et al., vs. Executive Secretary
Eduardo Ermita, as representative of the President of the Philippines, et al." rendered a Decision, dated 10 February
2010, declaring Republic Act No. 9355 unconstitutional for failure to comply with the criteria for the creation of a
province prescribed in Sec. 461 of the Local Government Code in relation to Sec. 10, Art. X, of the 1987 Constitution;

WHEREAS, respondents intend to file Motion[s] for Reconsideration on the above decision of the Supreme Court;

WHEREAS, the electoral data relative to the: (1) position for Member, House of Representatives representing the
lone congressional district of Dinagat Islands, (2) names of the candidates for the aforementioned position, (3)
position for Governor, Dinagat Islands, (4) names of the candidates for the said position, (5) position of the Vice
Governor, (6) the names of the candidates for the said position, (7) positions for the ten (10) Sangguniang
Panlalawigan Members and, [8] all the names of the candidates for Sangguniang Panlalawigan Members, have
already been configured into the system and can no longer be revised within the remaining period before the
elections on May 10, 2010.

NOW, THEREFORE, with the current system configuration, and depending on whether the Decision of the Supreme
Court in Navarro vs. Ermita is reconsidered or not, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to declare
that:

a. If the Decision is reversed, there will be no problem since the current system configuration is in line with
the reconsidered Decision, meaning that the Province of Dinagat Islands and the Province of Surigao del
Norte remain as two (2) separate provinces;

b. If the Decision becomes final and executory before the election, the Province of Dinagat Islands will revert
to its previous status as part of the First Legislative District, Surigao del Norte.

But because of the current system configuration, the ballots for the Province of Dinagat Islands will, for the
positions of Member, House of Representatives, Governor, Vice Governor and Members, Sangguniang
Panlalawigan, bear only the names of the candidates for the said positions.

Conversely, the ballots for the First Legislative District of Surigao del Norte, will, for the position of Governor,
Vice Governor, Member, House of Representatives, First District of Surigao del Norte and Members,
Sangguniang Panlalawigan, show only candidates for the said position. Likewise, the whole Province of
Surigao del Norte, will, for the position of Governor and Vice Governor, bear only the names of the
candidates for the said position[s].

Consequently, the voters of the Province of Dinagat Islands will not be able to vote for the candidates of
Members, Sangguniang Panlalawigan, and Member, House [of] Representatives, First Legislative District,
Surigao del Norte, and candidates for Governor and Vice Governor for Surigao del Norte. Meanwhile, voters
of the First Legislative District of Surigao del Norte, will not be able to vote for Members, Sangguniang
Panlalawigan and Member, House of Representatives, Dinagat Islands. Also, the voters of the whole
Province of Surigao del Norte, will not be able to vote for the Governor and Vice Governor, Dinagat Islands.
Given this situation, the Commission will postpone the elections for Governor, Vice Governor, Member,
House of Representatives, First Legislative District, Surigao del Norte, and Members, Sangguniang
Panlalawigan, First Legislative District, Surigao del Norte, because the election will result in [a] failure to
elect, since, in actuality, there are no candidates for Governor, Vice Governor, Members, Sangguniang
Panlalawigan, First Legislative District, and Member, House of Representatives, First Legislative District
(with Dinagat Islands) of Surigao del Norte.

c. If the Decision becomes final and executory after the election, the Province of Dinagat Islands will revert
to its previous status as part of the First Legislative District of Surigao del Norte. The result of the election
will have to be nullified for the same reasons given in Item "b" above. A special election for Governor, Vice
Governor, Member, House of Representatives, First Legislative District of Surigao del Norte, and Members,
Sangguniang Panlalawigan, First District, Surigao del Norte (with Dinagat Islands) will have to be conducted.
 xxxx

SO ORDERED.

They further alleged that, because they are the duly elected officials of Surigao del Norte whose positions will be
affected by the nullification of the election results in the event that the May 12, 2010 Resolution is not reversed, they
have a legal interest in the instant case and would be directly affected by the declaration of nullity of R.A. No. 9355.
Simply put, movants-intervenors’ election to their respective offices would necessarily be annulled since Dinagat
Islands will revert to its previous status as part of the First Legislative District of Surigao del Norte and a special
election will have to be conducted for governor, vice governor, and House of Representatives member and
Sangguniang Panlalawigan member for the First Legislative District of Surigao del Norte. Moreover, as residents of
Surigao del Norte and as public servants representing the interests of their constituents, they have a clear and strong
interest in the outcome of this case inasmuch as the reversion of Dinagat as part of the First Legislative District of
Surigao del Norte will affect the latter province such that: (1) the whole administrative set-up of the province will have
to be restructured; (2) the services of many employees will have to be terminated; (3) contracts will have to be
invalidated; and (4) projects and other developments will have to be discontinued. In addition, they claim that their
rights cannot be adequately pursued and protected in any other proceeding since their rights would be foreclosed if
the May 12, 2010 Resolution would attain finality.

In their motion for reconsideration of the May 12, 2010 Resolution, movants-intervenors raised three (3) main
arguments to challenge the above Resolution, namely: (1) that the passage of R.A. No. 9355 operates as an act of
Congress amending Section 461 of the LGC; (2) that the exemption from territorial contiguity, when the intended
province consists of two or more islands, includes the exemption from the application of the minimum land area
requirement; and (3) that the Operative Fact Doctrine is applicable in the instant case.

16
In the Resolution dated July 20, 2010, the Court denied the Motion for Leave to Intervene and to File and to Admit
Intervenors’ Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated May 12, 2010 on the ground that the allowance or
disallowance of a motion to intervene is addressed to the sound discretion of the Court, and that the appropriate time
to file the said motion was before and not after the resolution of this case.

On September 7, 2010, movants-intervenors filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the July 20, 2010 Resolution, citing
17
several rulings of the Court, allowing intervention as an exception to Section 2, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court that it
should be filed at any time before the rendition of judgment. They alleged that, prior to the May 10, 2010 elections,
their legal interest in this case was not yet existent. They averred that prior to the May 10, 2010 elections, they were
unaware of the proceedings in this case. Even for the sake of argument that they had notice of the pendency of the
case, they pointed out that prior to the said elections, Sol T. Matugas was a simple resident of Surigao del Norte,
Arturo Carlos A. Egay, Jr. was a member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Second District of Surigao del
Norte, and Mamerto D. Galanida was the Municipal Mayor of Socorro, Surigao del Norte, and that, pursuant to
COMELEC Resolution No. 8790, it was only after they were elected as Governor of Surigao del Norte, Vice Governor
of Surigao del Norte and Sangguniang Panlalawigan Member of the First District of Surigao del Norte, respectively,
that they became possessed with legal interest in this controversy.

On October 5, 2010, the Court issued an order for Entry of Judgment, stating that the decision in this case had
become final and executory on May 18, 2010. Hence, the above motion.

At the outset, it must be clarified that this Resolution delves solely on the instant Urgent Motion to Recall Entry of
Judgment of movants-intervenors, not on the second motions for reconsideration of the original parties, and neither
on Dinagat’s Urgent Omnibus Motion, which our

esteemed colleague, Mr. Justice Arturo D. Brion considers as Dinagat’s third motion for reconsideration. Inasmuch as
the motions for leave to admit their respective motions for reconsideration of the May 12, 2010 Resolution and the
aforesaid motions for reconsideration were already noted without action by the Court, there is no reason to treat
Dinagat’s Urgent Omnibus Motion differently. In relation to this, the Urgent Motion to Recall Entry of Judgment of
movants-intervenors could not be considered as a second motion for reconsideration to warrant the application of
18
Section 3, Rule 15 of the Internal Rules of the Supreme Court. It should be noted that this motion prays for the
recall of the entry of judgment and for the resolution of their motion for reconsideration of the July 20, 2010
Resolution which remained unresolved. The denial of their motion for leave to intervene and to admit motion for
reconsideration of the May 12, 2010 Resolution did not rule on the merits of the motion for reconsideration of the May
12, 2010 Resolution, but only on the timeliness of the intended intervention. Their motion for reconsideration of this
denial elaborated on movants-intervenors’ interest in this case which existed only after judgment had been rendered.
As such, their motion for intervention and their motion for reconsideration of the May 12, 2010 Resolution merely
stand as an initial reconsideration of the said resolution.

With due deference to Mr. Justice Brion, there appears nothing in the records to support the claim that this was a ploy
of respondents’ legal tactician to reopen the case despite an entry of judgment. To be sure, it is actually COMELEC
Resolution No. 8790 that set this controversy into motion anew. To reiterate, the pertinent portion of the Resolution
reads:

c. If the Decision becomes final and executory after the election, the Province of Dinagat Islands will revert to its
previous status as part of the First Legislative District of Surigao del Norte. The result of the election will have to be
nullified for the same reasons given in Item "b" above. A special election for Governor, Vice Governor, Member,
House of Representatives, First Legislative District of Surigao del Norte, and Members, Sangguniang Panlalawigan,
First District, Surigao del Norte (with Dinagat Islands) will have to be conducted. (Emphasis supplied.)

Indeed, COMELEC Resolution No. 8790 spawned the peculiar circumstance of proper party interest for movants-
intervenors only with the specter of the decision in the main case becoming final and executory. More importantly, if
the intervention be not entertained, the movants-intervenors would be left with no other remedy as regards to the
impending nullification of their election to their respective positions. Thus, to the Court’s mind, there is an imperative
to grant the Urgent Motion to Recall Entry of Judgment by movants-intervenors.

It should be remembered that this case was initiated upon the filing of the petition for certiorari way back on October
30, 2007. At that time, movants-intervenors had nothing at stake in the outcome of this case. While it may be argued
that their interest in this case should have commenced upon the issuance of COMELEC Resolution No. 8790, it is
obvious that their interest in this case then was more imaginary than real. This is because COMELEC Resolution No.
8790 provides that should the decision in this case attain finality prior to the May 10, 2010 elections, the election of
the local government officials stated therein would only have to be postponed. Given such a scenario, movants-
intervenors would not have suffered any injury or adverse effect with respect to the reversion of Dinagat as part of
Surigao del Norte since they would simply have remained candidates for the respective positions they have vied for
and to which they have been elected.

For a party to have locus standi, one must allege "such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to
assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely
depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions." Because constitutional cases are often public actions in
which the relief sought is likely to affect other persons, a preliminary question frequently arises as to this interest in
19
the constitutional question raised.

It cannot be denied that movants-intervenors will suffer direct injury in the event their Urgent Motion to Recall Entry of
Judgment dated October 29, 2010 is denied and their Motion for Leave to Intervene and to File and to Admit
Intervenors’ Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated May 12, 2010 is denied with finality. Indeed, they
have sufficiently shown that they have a personal and substantial interest in the case, such that if the May 12, 2010
Resolution be not reconsidered, their election to their respective positions during the May 10, 2010 polls and its
concomitant effects would all be nullified and be put to naught. Given their unique circumstances, movants-
intervenors should not be left without any remedy before this Court simply because their interest in this case became
manifest only after the case had already been decided. The consequences of such a decision would definitely work to
their disadvantage, nay, to their utmost prejudice, without even them being parties to the dispute. Such decision
would also violate their right to due process, a right that cries out for protection. Thus, it is imperative that the
movants-intervenors be heard on the merits of their cause. We are not only a court of law, but also of justice and
equity, such that our position and the dire repercussions of this controversy should be weighed on the scales of
justice, rather than dismissed on account of mootness.

The "moot and academic" principle is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the courts from resolving
a case. Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if: (1) there is a grave violation of the Constitution;
(2) there is an exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is involved; (3) the
constitutional issue raised requires formation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and
20
(4) the case is capable of repetition yet evading review. The second exception attends this case.

21
This Court had taken a liberal attitude in the case of David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, where technicalities of procedure
on locus standi were brushed aside, because the constitutional issues raised were of paramount public interest or of
transcendental importance deserving the attention of the Court. Along parallel lines, the motion for intervention should
be given due course since movants-intervenors have shown their substantial legal interest in the outcome of this
case, even much more than petitioners themselves, and because of the novelty, gravity, and weight of the issues
involved.

Undeniably, the motion for intervention and the motion for reconsideration of the May 12, 2010 Resolution of
movants-intervenors is akin to the right to appeal the judgment of a case, which, though merely a statutory right that
must comply with the requirements of the rules, is an essential part of our judicial system, such that courts should
proceed with caution not to deprive a party of the right to question the judgment and its effects, and ensure that every
party-litigant, including those who would be directly affected, would have the amplest opportunity for the proper and
22
just disposition of their cause, freed from the constraints of technicalities.

Verily, the Court had, on several occasions, sanctioned the recall entries of judgment in light of attendant
23
extraordinary circumstances. The power to suspend or even disregard rules of procedure can be so pervasive and
24
compelling as to alter even that which this Court itself had already declared final. In this case, the compelling
concern is not only to afford the movants-intervenors the right to be heard since they would be adversely affected by
the judgment in this case despite not being original parties thereto, but also to arrive at the correct interpretation of
the provisions of the LGC with respect to the creation of local government units. In this manner, the thrust of the
Constitution with respect to local autonomy and of the LGC with respect to decentralization and the attainment of
national goals, as hereafter elucidated, will effectively be realized.

On the merits of the motion for intervention, after taking a long and intent look, the Court finds that the first and
second arguments raised by movants-intervenors deserve affirmative consideration.

It must be borne in mind that the central policy considerations in the creation of local government units are economic
viability, efficient administration, and capability to deliver basic services to their constituents. The criteria prescribed
by the LGC, i.e., income, population and land area, are all designed to accomplish these results. In this light,
Congress, in its collective wisdom, has debated on the relative weight of each of these three criteria, placing
emphasis on which of them should enjoy preferential consideration.

Without doubt, the primordial criterion in the creation of local government units, particularly of a province, is economic
viability. This is the clear intent of the framers of the LGC. In this connection, the following excerpts from
congressional debates are quoted hereunder—

HON. ALFELOR. Income is mandatory. We can even have this doubled because we thought…

CHAIRMAN CUENCO. In other words, the primordial consideration here is the economic viability of the new local
government unit, the new province?

xxxx

HON. LAGUDA. The reason why we are willing to increase the income, double than the House version, because we
also believe that economic viability is really a minimum. Land area and population are functions really of the viability
of the area, because you have an income level which would be the trigger point for economic development,
population will naturally increase because there will be an immigration. However, if you disallow the particular area
from being converted into a province because of the population problems in the beginning, it will never be able to
reach the point where it could become a province simply because it will never have the economic take off for it to
trigger off that economic development.

Now, we’re saying that maybe Fourteen Million Pesos is a floor area where it could pay for overhead and provide a
minimum of basic services to the population. Over and above that, the provincial officials should be able to trigger off
economic development which will attract immigration, which will attract new investments from the private sector. This
is now the concern of the local officials. But if we are going to tie the hands of the proponents, simply by telling them,
"Sorry, you are now at 150 thousand or 200 thousand," you will never be able to become a province because nobody
wants to go to your place. Why? Because you never have any reason for economic viability.

xxxx
CHAIRMAN PIMENTEL. Okay, what about land area?

HON. LUMAUIG. 1,500 square kilometers

HON. ANGARA. Walang problema ‘yon, in fact that’s not very critical, ‘yong land area because…

CHAIRMAN PIMENTEL. Okay, ya, our, the Senate version is 3.5, 3,500 square meters, ah, square kilometers.

HON. LAGUDA. Ne, Ne. A province is constituted for the purpose of administrative efficiency and delivery of basic
services.

CHAIRMAN PIMENTEL. Right.

HON. LAGUDA. Actually, when you come down to it, when government was instituted, there is only one central
government and then everybody falls under that. But it was later on subdivided into provinces for purposes of
administrative efficiency.

CHAIRMAN PIMENTEL. Okay.

HON. LAGUDA. Now, what we’re seeing now is that the administrative efficiency is no longer there precisely because
the land areas that we are giving to our governors is so wide that no one man can possibly administer all of the
complex machineries that are needed.

Secondly, when you say "delivery of basic services," as pointed out by Cong. Alfelor, there are sections of the
province which have never been visited by public officials, precisely because they don’t have the time nor the energy
anymore to do that because it’s so wide. Now, by compressing the land area and by reducing the population
requirement, we are, in effect, trying to follow the basic policy of why we are creating provinces, which is to deliver
basic services and to make it more efficient in administration.

CHAIRMAN PIMENTEL. Yeah, that’s correct, but on the assumption that the province is able to do it without being a
burden to the national government. That’s the assumption.

HON. LAGUDA. That’s why we’re going into the minimum income level. As we said, if we go on a minimum income
25
level, then we say, "this is the trigger point at which this administration can take place."

Also worthy of note are the requisites in the creation of a barangay, a municipality, a city, and a province as provided
both in the LGC and the LGC-IRR, viz.—

For a Barangay:

LGC: SEC. 386. Requisites for Creation. – (a) A barangay may be created out of a contiguous territory which has a
population of at least two thousand (2,000) inhabitants as certified by the National Statistics Office except in cities
and municipalities within Metro Manila and other metropolitan political subdivisions or in highly urbanized cities where
such territory shall have a certified population of at least five thousand (5,000) inhabitants: Provided, That the
creation thereof shall not reduce the population of the original barangay or barangays to less than the minimum
requirement prescribed herein.

To enhance the delivery of basic services in the indigenous cultural communities, barangays may be created
in such communities by an Act of Congress, notwithstanding the above requirement.

(b) The territorial jurisdiction of the new barangay shall be properly identified by metes and bounds or by
more or less permanent natural boundaries. The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or
more islands.

(c) The governor or city mayor may prepare a consolidation plan for barangays, based on the criteria
prescribed in this Section, within his territorial jurisdiction. The plan shall be submitted to the sangguniang
 panlalawigan or sangguniang panlungsod concerned for appropriate action. In the case of municipalities
within the Metropolitan Manila area and other metropolitan political subdivisions, the barangay consolidation
plan can be prepared and approved by the sangguniang bayan concerned.

LGC-IRR: ARTICLE 14. Barangays. – (a) Creation of barangays by the sangguniang panlalawigan shall require prior
recommendation of the sangguniang bayan.

(b) New barangays in the municipalities within MMA shall be created only by Act of Congress, subject to the
limitations and requirements prescribed in this Article.

(c) Notwithstanding the population requirement, a barangay may be created in the indigenous cultural
communities by Act of Congress upon recommendation of the LGU or LGUs where the cultural community is
located.

(d) A barangay shall not be created unless the following requisites are present:

(1) Population – which shall not be less than two thousand (2,000) inhabitants, except in
municipalities and cities within MMA and other metropolitan political subdivisions as may be
created by law, or in highly-urbanized cities where such territory shall have a population of at least
five thousand (5,000) inhabitants, as certified by the NSO. The creation of a barangay shall not
reduce the population of the original barangay or barangays to less than the prescribed minimum/

(2) Land Area – which must be contiguous, unless comprised by two (2) or more islands. The
territorial jurisdiction of a barangay sought to be created shall be properly identified by metes and
bounds or by more or less permanent natural boundaries.

Municipality:

LGC: SEC. 442. Requisites for Creation. – (a) A municipality may be created if it has an average annual income, as
certified by the provincial treasurer, or at least Two million five hundred thousand pesos (P2,500,000.00) for the last
two (2) consecutive years based on the 1991 constant prices; a population of at least twenty-five thousand (25,000)
inhabitants as certified by the National Statistics Office; and a contiguous territory of at least fifty (50) square
kilometers as certified by the Lands

Management Bureau: Provided, That the creation thereof shall not reduce the land area, population or
income of the original municipality or municipalities at the time of said creation to less than the minimum
requirements prescribed herein.

(b) The territorial jurisdiction of a newly-created municipality shall be properly identified by metes and
bounds. The requirement on land area shall not apply where the municipality proposed to be created is
composed of one (1) or more islands. The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more
islands.

(c) The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund of the municipality
concerned, exclusive of special funds, transfers and non-recurring income.

(d) Municipalities existing as of the date of effectivity of this Code shall continue to exist and operate as
such. Existing municipal districts organized pursuant to presidential issuances or executive orders and which
have their respective set of elective municipal officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of this Code
shall henceforth be considered regular municipalities.

LGC-IRR: ARTICLE 13. Municipalities. – (a) Requisites for Creation – A municipality shall not be created unless the
following requisites are present:

(i) Income – An average annual income of not less than Two Million Five Hundred Thousand Pesos
(₱2,500,000.00), for the immediately preceding two (2) consecutive years based on 1991 constant prices, as
 certified by the provincial treasurer. The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the
general fund, exclusive of special funds, special accounts, transfers, and nonrecurring income;

(ii) Population – which shall not be less than twenty five thousand (25,000) inhabitants, as certified by NSO;
and

(iii) Land area – which must be contiguous with an area of at least fifty (50) square kilometers, as certified by
LMB. The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands. The requirement on land
area shall not apply where the proposed municipality is composed of one (1) or more islands. The territorial
jurisdiction of a municipality sought to be created shall be properly identified by metes and bounds.

The creation of a new municipality shall not reduce the land area, population, and income of the original
LGU or LGUs at the time of said creation to less than the prescribed minimum requirements. All expenses
incidental to the creation shall be borne by the petitioners.

City:

LGC: SEC. 450. Requisites for Creation. – (a) A municipality or a cluster of barangays may be converted into a
component city if it has an average annual income, as certified by the Department of Finance, of at least Twenty
million pesos (₱20,000,000.00) for the last two (2) consecutive years based on 1991 constant prices, and if it has
either of the following requisities:

(i) a contiguous territory of at least one hundred (100) square kilometers, as certified by the Lands
Management Bureau; or,

(ii) a population of not less than one hundred fifty thousand (150,000) inhabitants, as certified by
the National Statistics Office: Provided, That, the creation thereof shall not reduce the land area,
population, and income of the original unit or units at the time of said creation to less than the
minimum requirements prescribed herein.

(b) The territorial jurisdiction of a newly-created city shall be properly identified by metes and bounds. The
requirement on land area shall not apply where the city proposed to be created is composed of one (1) or
more islands. The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands.

(c) The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund, exclusive of special
funds, transfers, and non-recurring income.

LGC-IRR: ARTICLE 11. Cities. – (a) Requisites for creation – A city shall not be created unless the following
requisites on income and either population or land area are present:

(1) Income – An average annual income of not less than Twenty Million Pesos (₱20,000,000.00), for the
immediately preceding two (2) consecutive years based on 1991 constant prices, as certified by DOF. The
average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund, exclusive of special funds,
special accounts, transfers, and nonrecurring income; and

(2) Population or land area – Population which shall not be less than one hundred fifty thousand (150,000)
inhabitants, as certified by the NSO; or land area which must be contiguous with an area of at least one
hundred (100) square kilometers, as certified by LMB. The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises
two (2) or more islands or is separated by a chartered city or cities which do not contribute to the income of
the province. The land area requirement shall not apply where the proposed city is composed of one (1) or
more islands. The territorial jurisdiction of a city sought to be created shall be properly identified by metes
and bounds.

The creation of a new city shall not reduce the land area, population, and income of the original LGU or LGUs at the
time of said creation to less than the prescribed minimum requirements. All expenses incidental to the creation shall
be borne by the petitioners.
Provinces:

LGC: SEC. 461. Requisites for Creation. – (a) A province may be created if it has an average annual income, as
certified by the Department of Finance, of not less than Twenty million pesos (₱20,000,000.00) based on 1991 prices
and either of the following requisites:

(i) a contiguous territory of at least two thousand (2,000) square kilometers, as certified by the
Lands Management Bureau; or,

(ii) a population of not less than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) inhabitants as certified by the
National Statistics Office:

Provided, That the creation thereof shall not reduce the land area, population, and income of the original unit
or units at the time of said creation to less than the minimum requirements prescribed herein.

(b) The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands or is separated by a chartered
city or cities which do not contribute to the income of the province.

(c) The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund, exclusive of special
funds, trust funds, transfers, and non-recurring income.

LGC-IRR: ARTICLE 9. Provinces. – (a) Requisites for creation – A province shall not be created unless the following
requisites on income and either population or land area are present:

(1) Income – An average annual income of not less than Twenty Million pesos (₱20,000,000.00) for the
immediately preceding two (2) consecutive years based on 1991 constant prices, as certified by DOF. The
average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund, exclusive of special funds,
special accounts, transfers, and non-recurring income; and

(2) Population or land area – Population which shall not be less than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000)
inhabitants, as certified by NSO; or land area which must be contiguous with an area of at least two
thousand (2,000) square kilometers, as certified by LMB. The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises
two (2) or more islands or is separated by a chartered city or cities which do not contribute to the income of
the province. The land area requirement shall not apply where the proposed province is composed of one
(1) or more islands. The territorial jurisdiction of a province sought to be created shall be properly identified
by metes and bounds.

The creation of a new province shall not reduce the land area, population, and income of the original LGU or LGUs at
the time of said creation to less than the prescribed minimum requirements. All expenses incidental to the creation
shall be borne by the petitioners. (Emphasis supplied.)

It bears scrupulous notice that from the above cited provisions, with respect to the creation of barangays, land area is
not a requisite indicator of viability. However, with respect to the creation of municipalities, component cities, and
provinces, the three (3) indicators of viability and projected capacity to provide services, i.e., income, population, and
land area, are provided for.

But it must be pointed out that when the local government unit to be created consists of one (1) or more islands, it is
exempt from the land area requirement as expressly provided in Section 442 and Section 450 of the LGC if the local
government unit to be created is a municipality or a component city, respectively. This exemption is absent in the
enumeration of the requisites for the creation of a province under Section 461 of the LGC, although it is expressly
stated under Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR.

There appears neither rhyme nor reason why this exemption should apply to cities and municipalities, but not to
provinces. In fact, considering the physical configuration of the Philippine archipelago, there is a greater likelihood
that islands or group of islands would form part of the land area of a newly-created province than in most cities or
municipalities. It is, therefore, logical to infer that the genuine legislative policy decision was expressed in Section 442
(for municipalities) and Section 450 (for component cities) of the LGC, but was inadvertently omitted in Section 461
(for provinces). Thus, when the exemption was expressly provided in Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR, the inclusion was
intended to correct the congressional oversight in Section 461 of the LGC – and to reflect the true legislative intent. It
would, then, be in order for the Court to uphold the validity of Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR.

This interpretation finds merit when we consider the basic policy considerations underpinning the principle of local
autonomy.

Section 2 of the LGC, of which paragraph (a) is pertinent to this case, provides—

Sec. 2. Declaration of Policy. – (a) It is hereby declared the policy of the State that the territorial and political
subdivisions of the State shall enjoy genuine and meaningful local autonomy to enable them to attain their fullest
development as self-reliant communities and make them more effective partners in the attainment of national goals.
Toward this end, the State shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted
through a system of decentralization whereby local government units shall be given more powers, authority,
responsibilities, and resources. The process of decentralization shall proceed from the national government to the
local government units.

26
This declaration of policy is echoed in Article 3(a) of the LGC-IRR and in the Whereas clauses of Administrative
27
Order No. 270, which read—

WHEREAS, Section 25, Article II of the Constitution mandates that the State shall ensure the autonomy of local
governments;

WHEREAS, pursuant to this declared policy, Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government
Code of 1991, affirms, among others, that the territorial and political subdivisions of the State shall enjoy genuine and
meaningful local autonomy to enable them to attain their fullest development as self-reliant communities and make
them more effective partners in the attainment of national goals;

WHEREAS, Section 533 of the Local Government Code of 1991 requires the President to convene an Oversight
Committee for the purpose of formulating and issuing the appropriate rules and regulations necessary for the efficient
and effective implementation of all the provisions of the said Code; and

WHEREAS, the Oversight Committee, after due deliberations and consultations with all the concerned sectors of
society and consideration of the operative principles of local autonomy as provided in the Local Government Code of
1991, has completed the formulation of the implementing rules and regulations; x x x

Consistent with the declared policy to provide local government units genuine and meaningful local autonomy,
contiguity and minimum land area requirements for prospective local government units should be liberally construed
in order to achieve the desired results. The strict interpretation adopted by the February 10, 2010 Decision could
prove to be counter-productive, if not outright absurd, awkward, and impractical. Picture an intended province that
consists of several municipalities and component cities which, in themselves, also consist of islands. The component
cities and municipalities which consist of islands are exempt from the minimum land area requirement, pursuant to
Sections 450 and 442, respectively, of the LGC. Yet, the province would be made to comply with the minimum land
area criterion of 2,000 square kilometers, even if it consists of several islands. This would mean that Congress has
opted to assign a distinctive preference to create a province with contiguous land area over one composed of islands
— and negate the greater imperative of development of self-reliant communities, rural progress, and the delivery of
basic services to the constituency. This preferential option would prove more difficult and burdensome if the 2,000-
square-kilometer territory of a province is scattered because the islands are separated by bodies of water, as
compared to one with a contiguous land mass.

Moreover, such a very restrictive construction could trench on the equal protection clause, as it actually defeats the
purpose of local autonomy and decentralization as enshrined in the Constitution. Hence, the land area requirement
should be read together with territorial contiguity.

Another look at the transcript of the deliberations of Congress should prove enlightening:

28
CHAIRMAN ALFELOR. Can we give time to Congressman Chiongbian, with respect to his…

CHAIRMAN LINA. Okay.

HON. CHIONGBIAN. At the outset, Chairman Lina, we would like to apprise the distinguished Senator about the
action taken by the House, on House Bill No. 7166. This was passed about two years ago and has been pending in
the Senate for consideration. This is a bill that I am not the only one involved, including our distinguished Chairman
here. But then we did want to sponsor the bill, being the Chairman then of the Local Government.

So, I took the cudgels for the rest of the Congressmen, who were more or less interested in the creation of the new
provinces, because of the vastness of the areas that were involved.

At any rate, this bill was passed by the House unanimously without any objection. And as I have said a while ago,
that this has been pending in the Senate for the last two years. And Sen. Pimentel himself was just in South Cotabato
and he delivered a speech that he will support this bill, and he says, that he will incorporate this in the Local
Government Code, which I have in writing from him. I showed you the letter that he wrote, and naturally, we in the
House got hold of the Senate version. It becomes an impossibility for the whole Philippines to create a new province,
and that is quite the concern of the respective Congressmen.

Now, insofar as the constitutional provision is concerned, there is nothing to stop the mother province from voting
against the bill, if a province is going to be created.

So, we are talking about devolution of powers here. Why is the province not willing to create another province, when
it can be justified. Even Speaker Mitra says, what will happen to Palawan? We won’t have one million people there,
and if you look at Palawan, there will be about three or four provinces that will comprise that island. So, the
development will be hampered.

Now, I would like to read into the record the letter of Sen. Pimentel, dated November 2, 1989. This was practically
about a year after 7166 was approved by the House, House Bill 7166.

On November 2, 1989, the Senator wrote me:

"Dear Congressman Chiongbian:

We are in receipt of your letter of 17 October. Please be informed that your House No. 7166 was incorporated in the
proposed Local Government Code, Senate Bill No. 155, which is pending for second reading.

Thank you and warm regards.

Very truly yours,"

That is the very context of the letter of the Senator, and we are quite surprised that the Senate has adopted another
position.

So, we would like – because this is a unanimously approved bill in the House, that’s the only bill that is involving the
present Local Government Code that we are practically considering; and this will be a slap on the House, if we do not
approve it, as approved by the lower House. This can be [an] irritant in the approval of the Conference Committee
Report. And I just want to manifest that insofar as the creation of the province, not only in my province, but the other
provinces. That the mother province will participate in the plebiscite, they can defeat the province, let’s say, on the
basis of the result, the province cannot be created if they lose in the plebiscite, and I don’t see why, we should put
this stringent conditions to the private people of the devolution that they are seeking.

So, Mr. Senator, I think we should consider the situation seriously, because, this is an approved version of the House,
and I will not be the one to raise up and question the Conference Committee Report, but the rest of the House that
are interested in this bill. And they have been approaching the Speaker about this. So, the Speaker reminded me to
make sure that it takes the cudgel of the House approved version.

So, that’s all what I can say, Mr. Senator, and I don’t believe that it is not, because it’s the wish of the House, but
because the mother province will participate anyhow, you vote them down; and that is provided for in the Constitution.
As a matter of fact, I have seen the amendment with regards to the creation of the city to be urbanized, subject to the
plebiscite. And why should we not allow that to happen in the provinces! In other words, we don’t want the people
who wants to create a new province, as if they are left in the devolution of powers, when they feel that they are far
away from civilization.

Now, I am not talking about other provinces, because I am unaware, not aware of their situation. But the province of
South Cotabato has a very unique geographical territorial conglomerations. One side is in the other side of the Bay,
of Sarangani Bay. The capital town is in the North; while these other municipalities are in the East and in the West.
And if they have to travel from the last town in the eastern part of the province, it is about one hundred forty
kilometers to the capital town. And from the West side, it is the same distance. And from the North side, it is about
one hundred kilometers. So that is the problem there. And besides, they have enough resources and I feel that, not
because I am interested in the province, I am after their welfare in the future. Who am I to dictate on those people? I
have no interest but then I am looking at the future development of these areas.

As a matter of fact, if I am in politics, it’s incidental; I do not need to be there, but I can foresee what the creation of a
new province will bring to these people. It will bring them prosperity; it will bring them more income, and it will
encourage even foreign investors. Like the PAP now, they are concentrating in South Cotabato, especially in the City
of

General Santos and the neighboring municipalities, and they are quite interested and even the AID people are asking
me, "What is holding the creation of a new province when practically you need it?" It’s not 20 or 30 kilometers from
the capital town; it’s about 140 kilometers. And imagine those people have to travel that far and our road is not like
Metropolitan Manila. That is as far as from here to Tarlac. And there are municipalities there that are just one
municipality is bigger than the province of La Union. They have the income. Of course, they don’t have the population
because that’s a part of the land of promise and people from Luzon are migrating everyday because they feel that
there are more opportunities here.

So, by creating the new provinces, not only in my case, in the other cases, it will enhance the development of the
Philippines, not because I am interested in my province. Well, as far as I am concerned, you know, I am in the twilight
years of my life to serve and I would like to serve my people well. No personal or political interest here. I hope the
distinguished Chairman of the Committee will appreciate the House Bill 7166, which the House has already approved
because we don’t want them to throw the Conference Committee Report after we have worked that the house Bill has
been, you know, drawn over board and not even considered by the Senate. And on top of that, we are considering a
bill that has not yet been passed. So I hope the Senator will take that into account.

Thank you for giving me this time to explain.

CHAIRMAN LINA. Thank you very much, Congressman James. We will look into the legislative history of the Senate
version on this matter of creation of provinces. I am sure there was an amendment. As I said, I’ll look into it. Maybe
the House version was incorporated in toto, but maybe during the discussion, their amendments were introduced
and, therefore, Senator Pimentel could not hold on to the original version and as a result new criteria were
introduced.

But because of the manifestation that you just made, we will definitely, when we reach a book, Title IV, on the matter
of provinces, we will look at it sympathetically from your end so that the objective that you want [to] achieve can be
realized. So we will look at it with sympathy. We will review our position on the matter, how we arrived at the Senate
version and we will adopt an open mind definitely when we come into it.

CHAIRMAN ALFELOR. Kanino ‘yan?

CHAIRMAN LINA. Book III.

CHAIRMAN ALFELOR. Title?

CHAIRMAN LINA. Title IV.

CHAIRMAN ALFELOR. I have been pondering on the case of James, especially on economic stimulation of a certain
area. Like our case, because I put myself on our province, our province is quite very big. It’s composed of four (4)
congressional districts and I feel it should be five now. But during the Batasan time, four of us talked and conversed
proposing to divide the province into two.
There are areas then, when since time immemorial, very few governors ever tread on those areas. That is, maybe
you’re acquainted with the Bondoc Peninsula of Quezon, fronting that is Ragay Gulf. From Ragay there is a long
stretch of coastal area. From Albay going to Ragay, very few governors ever tread [there] before, even today. That
area now is infested with NPA. That is the area of Congressman Andaya.

Now, we thought that in order to stimulate growth, maybe provincial aid can be extended to these areas. With a big or
a large area of a province, a certain administrator or provincial governor definitely will have no sufficient time. For me,
if we really would like to stimulate growth, I believe that an area where there is physical or geographical
impossibilities, where administrators can penetrate, I think we have to create certain provisions in the law where
maybe we can treat it with special considerations.

Now, we went over the graduate scale of the Philipppine Local Government Data as far as provinces are concerned.
It is very surprising that there are provinces here which only composed of six municipalities, eight municipalities,
seven municipalities. Like in Cagayan, Tuguegarao, there are six municipalities. Ah, excuse me, Batanes.

CHAIRMAN LINA. Will you look at the case of --- how many municipalities are there in Batanes province?

CHAIRMAN ALFELOR. Batanes is only six.

CHAIRMAN LINA. Six town. Siquijor?

CHAIRMAN ALFELOR. Siquijor. It is region?

CHAIRMAN LINA. Seven.

CHAIRMAN ALFELOR.L Seven. Anim.

CHAIRMAN LINA. Six also.

CHAIRMAN ALFELOR. Six also.

CHAIRMAN LINA. It seems with a minimum number of towns?

CHAIRMAN ALFELOR. The population of Siquijor is only 70 thousand, not even one congressional district. But
tumaas in 1982. Camiguin, that is Region 9. Wala dito. Nagtataka nga ako ngayon.

CHAIRMAN LINA. Camiguin, Camiguin.

CHAIRMAN ALFELOR. That is region? Camiguin has five municipalities, with a population of 63 thousand. But we do
not hold it against the province because maybe that’s one stimulant where growth can grow, can start. The land area
for Camiguin is only 229 square kilometers. So if we hard fast on requirements of, we set a minimum for every
province, palagay ko we just leave it to legislation, eh. Anyway, the Constitution is very clear that in case we would
like to divide, we submit it to a plebiscite. Pabayaan natin ang tao. Kung maglalagay tayo ng set ng minimum, tila
yata mahihirapan tayo, eh. Because what is really the thrust of the Local Government Code? Growth. To devolve
powers in order for the community to have its own idea how they will stimulate growth in their respective areas.

So, in every geographical condition, mayroon sariling id[i]osyncracies eh, we cannot make a generalization.

CHAIRMAN LINA. Will the creation of a province, carved out of the existing province because of some geographical
id[i]osyncracies, as you called it, stimulate the economic growth in the area or will substantial aid coming from the
national government to a particular area, say, to a municipality, achieve the same purpose?

CHAIRMAN ALFELOR. Ano tayo dito sa budget. All right, here is a province. Usually, tinitingnan lang yun, provision
eh, hindi na yung composition eh. You are entitled to, say, 20% of the area.
There’s a province of Camarines Sur which have the same share with that of Camiguin and Siquijor, but Camiguin is
composed only of five municipalities; in Siquijor, it’s composed of six, but the share of Siquijor is the same share with
that of the province of Camarines Sur, having a bigger area, very much bigger.

That is the budget in process.

CHAIRMAN LINA. Well, as I said, we are going to consider this very seriously and even with sympathy because of
29
the explanation given and we will study this very carefully.

The matters raised during the said Bicameral Conference Committee meeting clearly show the manifest intention of
Congress to promote development in the previously underdeveloped and uninhabited land areas by allowing them to
directly share in the allocation of funds under the national budget. It should be remembered that, under Sections 284
and 285

of the LGC, the IRA is given back to local governments, and the sharing is based on land area, population, and local
30
revenue.

Elementary is the principle that, if the literal application of the law results in absurdity, impossibility, or injustice, then
31
courts may resort to extrinsic aids of statutory construction, such as the legislative history of the law, or may
consider the implementing rules and regulations and pertinent executive issuances in the nature of executive and/or
legislative construction. Pursuant to this principle, Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR should be deemed incorporated in the
basic law, the LGC.

It is well to remember that the LGC-IRR was formulated by the Oversight Committee consisting of members of both
32
the Executive and Legislative departments, pursuant to Section 533 of the LGC. As Section 533 provides, the
Oversight Committee shall formulate and issue the appropriate rules and regulations necessary for the efficient and
effective implementation of any and all provisions of this Code, thereby ensuring compliance with the principles of
local autonomy as defined under the Constitution. It was also mandated by the Constitution that a local government
code shall be enacted by Congress, to wit—

Section 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall provide for a more responsive and
accountable local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization with effective mechanisms of
recall, initiative, and referendum, allocate among the different local government units their powers, responsibilities,
and resources, and provide for the qualifications, election, appointment and removal, term, salaries, powers and
functions and duties of local officials, and all other matters relating to the organization and operation of the local units.
(Emphasis supplied.)

These State policies are the very reason for the enactment of the LGC, with the view to attain decentralization and
countryside development. Congress saw that the old LGC, Batas Pambansa Bilang 337, had to be replaced with a
new law, now the LGC of 1991, which is more dynamic and cognizant of the needs of the Philippines as an
archipelagic country. This accounts for the exemption from the land area requirement of local government units
composed of one or more islands, as expressly stated under Sections 442 and 450 of the LGC, with respect to the
creation of municipalities and cities, but inadvertently omitted from Section 461 with respect to the creation of
provinces. Hence, the void or missing detail was filled in by the Oversight Committee in the LGC-IRR.

With three (3) members each from both the Senate and the House of Representatives, particularly the chairpersons
of their respective Committees on Local Government, it cannot be gainsaid that the inclusion by the Oversight
Committee of the exemption from the land area requirement with respect to the creation of provinces consisting of
one (1) or more islands was intended by Congress, but unfortunately not expressly stated in Section 461 of the LGC,
and this intent was echoed through an express provision in the LGC-IRR. To be sure, the Oversight Committee did
not just arbitrarily and whimsically insert such an exemption in Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR. The Oversight Committee
evidently conducted due deliberation and consultations with all the concerned sectors of society and considered the
33
operative principles of local autonomy as provided in the LGC when the IRR was formulated. Undoubtedly, this
34
amounts not only to an executive construction, entitled to great weight and respect from this Court, but to legislative
construction as well, especially with the inclusion of representatives from the four leagues of local government units
as members of the Oversight Committee.

With the formulation of the LGC-IRR, which amounted to both executive and legislative construction of the LGC, the
many details to implement the LGC had already been put in place, which Congress understood to be impractical and
not too urgent to immediately translate into direct amendments to the LGC. But Congress, recognizing the capacity
and viability of Dinagat to become a full-fledged province, enacted R.A. No. 9355, following the exemption from the
land area requirement, which, with respect to the creation of provinces, can only be found as an express provision in
the LGC-IRR. In effect, pursuant to its plenary legislative powers, Congress breathed flesh and blood into that
exemption in Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR and transformed it into law when it enacted R.A. No. 9355 creating the
Island Province of Dinagat.

Further, the bill that eventually became R.A. No. 9355 was filed and favorably voted upon in both Chambers of
Congress. Such acts of both Chambers of Congress definitively show the clear legislative intent to incorporate into
the LGC that exemption from the land area requirement, with respect to the creation of a province when it consists of
one or more islands, as expressly provided only in the LGC-IRR. Thereby, and by necessity, the LGC was amended
by way of the enactment of R.A. No. 9355.

What is more, the land area, while considered as an indicator of viability of a local government unit, is not conclusive
in showing that Dinagat cannot become a province, taking into account its average annual income of ₱82,696,433.23
at the time of its creation, as certified by the Bureau of Local Government Finance, which is four times more than the
minimum requirement of ₱20,000,000.00 for the creation of a province. The delivery of basic services to its
constituents has been proven possible and sustainable. Rather than looking at the results of the plebiscite and the
May 10, 2010 elections as mere fait accompli circumstances which cannot operate in favor of Dinagat’s existence as
a province, they must be seen from the perspective that Dinagat is ready and capable of becoming a province. This
Court should not be instrumental in stunting such capacity. As we have held in League of Cities of the Philippines v.
35
Commission on Elections —

Ratio legis est anima. The spirit rather than the letter of the law. A statute must be read according to its spirit or intent,
for what is within the spirit is within the statute although it is not within its letter, and that which is within the letter but
not within the spirit is not within the statute. Put a bit differently, that which is within the intent of the lawmaker is as
much within the statute as if within the letter, and that which is within the letter of the statute is not within the statute
unless within the intent of the lawmakers. Withal, courts ought not to interpret and should not accept an interpretation
that would defeat the intent of the law and its legislators.

So as it is exhorted to pass on a challenge against the validity of an act of Congress, a co-equal branch of
government, it behooves the Court to have at once one principle in mind: the presumption of constitutionality of
statutes. This presumption finds its roots in the tri-partite system of government and the corollary separation of
powers, which enjoins the three great departments of the government to accord a becoming courtesy for each other’s
acts, and not to interfere inordinately with the exercise by one of its official functions. Towards this end, courts ought
to reject assaults against the validity of statutes, barring of course their clear unconstitutionality. To doubt is to
sustain, the theory in context being that the law is the product of earnest studies by Congress to ensure that no
constitutional prescription or concept is infringed. Consequently, before a law duly challenged is nullified, an
unequivocal breach of, or a clear conflict with, the Constitution, not merely a doubtful or argumentative one, must be
demonstrated in such a manner as to leave no doubt in the mind of the Court.

WHEREFORE, the Court resolved to:

1. GRANT the Urgent Motion to Recall Entry of Judgment by movants-intervenors, dated and filed on
October 29, 2010;

2. RECONSIDER and SET ASIDE the July 20, 2010 Resolution, and GRANT the Motion for Leave to
Intervene and to File and to Admit Intervenors’ Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated July 20,
2010;

3. GRANT the Intervenors’ Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated May 12, 2010. The May 12,
2010 Resolution is RECONSIDERED and SET ASIDE. The provision in Article 9(2) of the Rules and
Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991 stating, "The land area requirement shall not
apply where the proposed province is composed of one (1) or more islands," is declared VALID.
Accordingly, Republic Act No. 9355 (An Act Creating the Province of Dinagat Islands) is declared as VALID
and CONSTITUTIONAL, and the proclamation of the Province of Dinagat Islands and the election of the
officials thereof are declared VALID; and

4. The petition is DISMISSED.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 79956 January 29, 1990

CORDILLERA BROAD COALITION, petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON AUDIT, respondent.

G.R. No. 82217 January 29, 1990

LILIA YARANON and BONA BAUTISTA, assisted by their spouses, BRAULIO D. YARANON
and DEMETRIO D. BAUTISTA, JR., respectively; JAMES BRETT and SINAI C.
HAMADA, petitioners,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT, HON. CATALINO MACARAIG, Executive Secretary, HON.
VICENTE JAYME, Secretary of Finance, HON. GUILLERMO N. CARAGUE, Secretary of Budget
and Management, and HON. ROSALINA S. CAJUCOM, OIC National Treasurer, respondents.

CORTES, J.:

In these consolidated petitions, the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 220, dated July 15, 1987,
which created the (Cordillera Administrative Region, is assailed on the primary ground that it pre-
empts the enactment of an organic act by the Congress and the creation of' the autonomous region
in the Cordilleras conditional on the approval of the act through a plebiscite.

Relative to the creation of autonomous regions, the constitution, in Article X, provides:

AUTONOMOUS REGIONS

Sec. 15. There shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the
Cordilleras consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical areas sharing
common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures, and
other relevant characteristics within the framework of this Constitution and the national
sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines.

SEC. 16. The President shall exercise general supervision over autonomous regions to
ensure that laws are faithfully executed.

Sec. 17. All powers, functions, and responsibilities not granted Constitution or by law to the
autonomous regions shall be vested in the National Government.

Sec. 18. The Congress shall enact an organic act for each autonomous region with the
assistance and participation of the regional consultative commission composed of
representatives appointed by the President from a list of nominees from multi-sectoral
bodies. The organic act shall define the basic structure of government for the region
consisting of the executive department and legislative assembly, both of which shall be
elective and representative of the constituent political units. The organic acts shall likewise
provide for special courts with personal, family and property law jurisdiction consistent with
the provisions of this Constitution and national laws.
 The creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when approved by majority of the
votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose, provided that only
provinces, cities, and geographic areas voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be included
in the autonomous region.

Sec. 19. The first Congress elected under this Constitution shall, within eighteen months
from the time of organization of both Houses, pass the organic acts for the autonomous
regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras.

Sec. 20. Within its territorial jurisdiction and subject to the provisions of this Constitution and
national laws, the organic act of autonomous regions shall provide for legislative powers
over:

(1) Administrative organization;

(2) Creation of sources of revenues;

(3) Ancestral domain and natural resources;

(4) Personal, family and property relations;

(5) Regional urban and rural planning development;

(6) Economic, social and tourism development ;

(7) Educational policies;

(8) Preservation and development of the cultural heritage; and

(9) Such other matters as may be authorized by law for the promotion of the general welfare
of the people of the region.

Sec. 21. The preservation of peace and order within the regions shall be the responsibility of
the local police agencies which shall be organized, maintained, supervised, and utilized in
accordance with applicable laws. The defense and security of the regions shall be the
responsibility of the National Government.

A study of E.O. No. 220 would be incomplete Without reference to its historical background.

In April 1986, just after the EDSA Revolution, Fr. Conrado M. Balweg, S.V.D., broke off on
ideological grounds from the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and its military arm
the New People's Army. (NPA).

After President Aquino was installed into office by People Power, she advocated a policy of
national reconciliation. She called on all revolutionary forces to a peace dialogue. The CPLA
heeded this call of the President. After the preliminary negotiations, President Aquino and
some members of her Cabinet flew to Mt. Data in the Mountain Province on September 13,
1986 and signed with Fr. Conrado M. Balweg (As Commander of the CPLA and Ama Mario
Yag-ao (as President of Cordillera Bodong Administration, the civil government of the CPLA
a ceasefire agreement that signified the cessation of hostilities (WHEREAS No. 7, E.O. 220).
 The parties arrived at an agreement in principle: the Cordillera people shall not undertake
their demands through armed and violent struggle but by peaceful means, such as political
negotiations. The negotiations shall be a continuing process until the demands of the
Cordillera people shall have been substantially granted.

On March 27, 1987, Ambassador Pelaez [Acting as Chief Negotiator of the government], in
pursuance of the September 13, 1986 agreement, flew to the Mansion House, Baguio City,
and signed with Fr. Balweg (as Chairman of the Cordillera panel) a joint agreement,
paragraphs 2 and 3 of which state:

Par. 2- Work together in drafting an Executive Order to create a preparatory body that could
perform policy-making and administrative functions and undertake consultations and studies
leading to a draft organic act for the Cordilleras.

Par. 3- Have representatives from the Cordillera panel join the study group of the R.P. Panel
in drafting the Executive Order.

Pursuant to the above joint agreement, E.O. 220 was drafted by a panel of the Philippine
government and of the representatives of the Cordillera people.

On July 15, 1987, President Corazon C. Aquino signed the joint draft into law, known now as
E.O. 220. [Rejoinder G.R. No. 82217, pp. 2-3].

Executive Order No. 220, issued by the President in the exercise of her legislative powers under Art.
XVIII, sec. 6 of the 1987 Constitution, created the Cordillera Administrative Region (CAR) , which
covers the provinces of Abra, Benguet, Ifugao, Kalinga-Apayao and Mountain Province and the City
of Baguio [secs. 1 and 2]. It was created to accelerate economic and social growth in the region and
to prepare for the establishment of the autonomous region in the Cordilleras [sec. 3]. Its main
function is to coordinate the planning and implementation of programs and services in the region,
particularly, to coordinate with the local government units as well as with the executive departments
of the National Government in the supervision of field offices and in identifying, planning, monitoring,
and accepting projects and activities in the region [sec. 5]. It shall also monitor the implementation of
all ongoing national and local government projects in the region [sec. 20]. The CAR shall have a
Cordillera Regional Assembly as a policy-formulating body and a Cordillera Executive Board as an
implementing arm [secs. 7, 8 and 10]. The CAR and the Assembly and Executive Board shall exist
until such time as the autonomous regional government is established and organized [sec. 17].

Explaining the rationale for the issuance of E.O. No. 220, its last "Whereas" clause provides:

WHEREAS, pending the convening of the first Congress and the enactment of the organic
act for a Cordillera autonomous region, there is an urgent need, in the interest of national
security and public order, for the President to reorganize immediately the existing
administrative structure in the Cordilleras to suit it to the existing political realities therein and
the Government's legitimate concerns in the areas, without attempting to pre-empt the
constitutional duty of the first Congress to undertake the creation of an autonomous region
on a permanent basis.

During the pendency of this case, Republic Act No. 6766 entitled "An Act Providing for an Organic
Act for the Cordillera Autonomous Region," was enacted and signed into law. The Act recognizes
the CAR and the offices and agencies created under E.O. No. 220 and its transitory nature is
reinforced in Art. XXI of R.A. No. 6766, to wit:
 SEC. 3. The Cordillera Executive Board, the Cordillera Region Assembly as well as all
offices and agencies created under Execute Order No. 220 shall cease to exist immediately
upon the ratification of this Organic Act.

All funds, properties and assets of the Cordillera Executive Board and the Cordillera
Regional Assembly shall automatically be transferred to the Cordillera Autonomous
Government.

It is well-settled in our jurisprudence that respect for the inherent and stated powers and
prerogatives of the law-making body, as well as faithful adherence to the principle of separation of
powers, require that its enactment be accorded the presumption of constitutionality. Thus, in any
challenge to the constitutionality of a statute, the burden of clearly and unequivocally proving its
unconstitutionality always rests upon the challenger. Conversely, failure to so prove will necessarily
defeat the challenge.

We shall be guided by these principles in considering these consolidated petitions.

In these cases, petitioners principally argue that by issuing E.O. No. 220 the President, in the
exercise of her legislative powers prior to the convening of the first Congress under the 1987
Constitution, has virtually pre-empted Congress from its mandated task of enacting an organic act
and created an autonomous region in the Cordilleras. We have carefully studied the Constitution and
E.O. No. 220 and we have come to the conclusion that petitioners' assertions are unfounded. Events
subsequent to the issuance of E.O. No. 220 also bear out this conclusion.

1. A reading of E.O. No. 220 will easily reveal that what it actually envisions is the consolidation and
coordination of the delivery of services of line departments and agencies of the National Government
in the areas covered by the administrative region as a step preparatory to the grant of autonomy to
the Cordilleras. It does not create the autonomous region contemplated in the Constitution. It merely
provides for transitory measures in anticipation of the enactment of an organic act and the creation
of an autonomous region. In short, it prepares the ground for autonomy. This does not necessarily
conflict with the provisions of the Constitution on autonomous regions, as we shall show later.

The Constitution outlines a complex procedure for the creation of an autonomous region in the
Cordilleras. A regional consultative commission shall first be created. The President shall then
appoint the members of a regional consultative commission from a list of nominees from multi-
sectoral bodies. The commission shall assist the Congress in preparing the organic act for the
autonomous region. The organic act shall be passed by the first Congress under the 1987
Constitution within eighteen months from the time of its organization and enacted into law.
Thereafter there shall be held a plebiscite for the approval of the organic act [Art. X, sec. 18]. Only
then, after its approval in the plebiscite, shall the autonomous region be created.

Undoubtedly, all of these will take time. The President, in 1987 still exercising legislative powers, as
the first Congress had not yet convened, saw it fit to provide for some measures to address the
urgent needs of the Cordilleras in the meantime that the organic act had not yet been passed and
the autonomous region created. These measures we find in E.O. No. 220. The steps taken by the
President are obviously perceived by petitioners, particularly petitioner Yaranon who views E.O. No.
220 as capitulation to the Cordillera People's Liberation Army (CPLA) of Balweg, as unsound, but
the Court cannot inquire into the wisdom of the measures taken by the President, We can only
inquire into whether or not the measures violate the Constitution. But as we have seen earlier, they
do not.
2. Moreover, the transitory nature of the CAR does not necessarily mean that it is, as petitioner
Cordillera Broad Coalition asserts, "the interim autonomous region in the Cordilleras" [Petition, G.R.
No. 79956, p. 25].

The Constitution provides for a basic structure of government in the autonomous region composed
of an elective executive and legislature and special courts with personal, family and property law
jurisdiction [Art. X, sec. 18]. Using this as a guide, we find that E.O. No. 220 did not establish an
autonomous regional government. It created a region, covering a specified area, for administrative
purposes with the main objective of coordinating the planning and implementation of programs and
services [secs. 2 and 5]. To determine policy, it created a representative assembly, to convene
yearly only for a five-day regular session, tasked with, among others, identifying priority projects and
development programs [sec. 9]. To serve as an implementing body, it created the Cordillera
Executive Board composed of the Mayor of Baguio City, provincial governors and representatives of
the Cordillera Bodong Administration, ethno-linguistic groups and non-governmental organizations
as regular members and all regional directors of the line departments of the National Government
as ex-officio members and headed by an Executive Director [secs. 10 and 11]. The bodies created
by E.O. No. 220 do not supplant the existing local governmental structure, nor are they autonomous
government agencies. They merely constitute the mechanism for an "umbrella" that brings together
the existing local governments, the agencies of the National Government, the ethno-linguistic groups
or tribes, and non-governmental organizations in a concerted effort to spur development in the
Cordilleras.

The creation of the CAR for purposes of administrative coordination is underscored by the mandate
of E.O. No. 220 for the President and appropriate national departments and agencies to make
available sources of funds for priority development programs and projects recommended by the
CAR [sec. 21] and the power given to the President to call upon the appropriate executive
departments and agencies of the National Government to assist the CAR [sec. 24].

3. Subsequent to the issuance of E.O. No. 220, the Congress, after it was convened, enacted
Republic Act No. 6658 which created the Cordillera Regional Consultative Commission. The
President then appointed its members. The commission prepared a draft organic act which became
the basis for the deliberations of the Senate and the House of Representatives. The result was
Republic Act No. 6766, the organic act for the Cordillera autonomous region, which was signed into
law on October 23, 1989. A plebiscite for the approval of the organic act, to be conducted shortly,
shall complete the process outlined in the Constitution.

In the meantime, E.O. No. 220 had been in force and effect for more than two years and we find
that, despite E.O. No. 220, the autonomous region in the Cordilleras is still to be created, showing
the lack of basis of petitioners' assertion. Events have shown that petitioners' fear that E.O. No. 220
was a "shortcut" for the creation of the autonomous region in the Cordilleras was totally unfounded.

Clearly, petitioners' principal challenge has failed.

II

A collateral issue raised by petitioners is the nature of the CAR: whether or not it is a territorial and
political subdivision. The Constitution provides in Article X:

Section 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the Philippines are the
provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays. There shall be autonomous regions in
Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras as hereinafter provided.
 xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged,
abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria
established in the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes
cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.

We have seen earlier that the CAR is not the autonomous region in the Cordilleras contemplated by
the Constitution, Thus, we now address petitioners' assertion that E. 0. No. 220 contravenes the
Constitution by creating a new territorial and political subdivision.

After carefully considering the provisions of E.O. No. 220, we find that it did not create a new
territorial and political subdivision or merge existing ones into a larger subdivision.

1. Firstly, the CAR is not a public corporation or a territorial and political subdivision. It does not have
a separate juridical personality, unlike provinces, cities and municipalities. Neither is it vested with
the powers that are normally granted to public corporations, e.g. the power to sue and be sued, the
power to own and dispose of property, the power to create its own sources of revenue, etc. As
stated earlier, the CAR was created primarily to coordinate the planning and implementation of
programs and services in the covered areas.

The creation of administrative regions for the purpose of expediting the delivery of services is
nothing new. The Integrated Reorganization Plan of 1972, which was made as part of the law of the
1âw phi 1

land by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 1, established eleven (11) regions, later increased to twelve
(12), with definite regional centers and required departments and agencies of the Executive Branch
of the National Government to set up field offices therein. The functions of the regional offices to be
established pursuant to the Reorganization Plan are: (1) to implement laws, policies, plans,
programs, rules and regulations of the department or agency in the regional areas; (2) to provide
economical, efficient and effective service to the people in the area; (3) to coordinate with regional
offices of other departments, bureaus and agencies in the area; (4) to coordinate with local
government units in the area; and (5) to perform such other functions as may be provided by law.
[See Part II, chap. III, art. 1, of the Reorganization Plan].

We can readily see that the CAR is in the same genre as the administrative regions created under
the Reorganization Plan, albeit under E.O. No. 220 the operation of the CAR requires the
participation not only of the line departments and agencies of the National Government but also the
local governments, ethno-linguistic groups and non-governmental organizations in bringing about the
desired objectives and the appropriation of funds solely for that purpose.

2. Then, considering the control and supervision exercised by the President over the CAR and the
offices created under E.O. No. 220, and considering further the indispensable participation of the line
departments of the National Government, the CAR may be considered more than anything else as a
regional coordinating agency of the National Government, similar to the regional development
councils which the President may create under the Constitution [Art. X, sec. 14]. These councils are
"composed of local government officials, regional heads of departments and other government
offices, and representatives from non-governmental organizations within the region for purposes of
administrative decentralization to strengthen the autonomy of the units therein and to accelerate the
economic and social growth and development of the units in the region." [Ibid.] In this wise, the CAR
may be considered as a more sophisticated version of the regional development council.

III
Finally, petitioners incidentally argue that the creation of the CAR contravened the constitutional
guarantee of the local autonomy for the provinces (Abra, Benguet, Ifugao, Kalinga-Apayao and
Mountain Province) and city (Baguio City) which compose the CAR.

We find first a need to clear up petitioners' apparent misconception of the concept of local autonomy.

It must be clarified that the constitutional guarantee of local autonomy in the Constitution [Art. X, sec.
2] refers to the administrative autonomy of local government units or, cast in more technical
language, the decentralization of government authority [Villegas v. Subido, G.R. No. L-31004,
January 8, 1971, 37 SCRA 1]. Local autonomy is not unique to the 1987 Constitution, it being
guaranteed also under the 1973 Constitution [Art. II, sec. 10]. And while there was no express
guarantee under the 1935 Constitution, the Congress enacted the Local Autonomy Act (R.A. No.
2264) and the Decentralization Act (R.A. No. 5185), which ushered the irreversible march towards
further enlargement of local autonomy in the country [Villegas v. Subido, supra.]

On the other hand, the creation of autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras,
which is peculiar to the 1987 Constitution contemplates the grant of political autonomy and not just
administrative autonomy these regions. Thus, the provision in the Constitution for an autonomous
regional government with a basic structure consisting of an executive department and a legislative
assembly and special courts with personal, family and property law jurisdiction in each of the
autonomous regions [Art. X, sec. 18].

As we have said earlier, the CAR is a mere transitory coordinating agency that would prepare the
stage for political autonomy for the Cordilleras. It fills in the resulting gap in the process of
transforming a group of adjacent territorial and political subdivisions already enjoying local or
administrative autonomy into an autonomous region vested with political autonomy.

Anent petitioners' objection, we note the obvious failure to show how the creation of the CAR has
actually diminished the local autonomy of the covered provinces and city. It cannot be over-
emphasized that pure speculation and a resort to probabilities are insufficient to cause the
invalidation of E.O. No. 220.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin,
Sarmiento, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring:

I concur in the result because with the enactments of Republic Acts No. 6658 and No. 6766, the
questioned Executive Order No. 220 has been superseded. The basic issues have become moot
and academic. The Cordillera Regional Consultative Commission and the Cordillera Autonomous
Region have taken over the functions of the Cordillera Administrative Region. The latter office has
become functus oficio. Moreover, there can be no question about the validity of its acts because if it
is not de jure, at the very least it is a de facto office.
I make these observations because I have grave doubts about the authority of the President to
create such an office as the Cordillera Administrative Region (CAR) by mere executive fiat. The
office has to be created by statute. To me, the functions of CAR go beyond ordinary planning and
preparation for the real office. In fact, Congress had to pass Republic Act 6658 for this purpose.
CAR was an agency which accelerated economic and social growth in the Cordilleras, coordinated
the implementation of programs, accepted projects and activities in the Cordilleras, and discharged
basic administrative functions. It was a de facto agency whose acts are valid but not a de jure or fully
valid creation.