S.

Béla VISKY, PhD

Protestant Theological Institute of Cluj-Napoca

Christianity and World Religions from the Perspective of Hans Küng

Hans Küng, the Swiss-born Catholic theologian (Sursee, b.1928- ), is undoubtedly one of the
most prominent thinkers of the turn of the century. A deep empathy pairs his relentless criticism;
he is as radical in formulating questions, as he is understanding towards those who are or have
ever been existentially affected by the issues under discussion. His faith, seeking for
understanding, stands at the core of his explorations, which encompass enormous philosophical,
theological, historical (both religious and ecclesiastic), psychological and, last but not least,
literary material. Nevertheless, while Anselm of Canterbury's proposition, fides querens
intellectum, together with its practical modalities could be understood as intellectual “physical
exercises” within the religious and ideological stability of the Middle Ages, the same enquiry
takes on more dramatic forms for an individual fighting the demons of modern and postmodern
relativism. Küng shows with convincing logical consistency that contemporary man's loss of
direction and values is the consequence of a nihilistic world-view and a moralism directly rooted
in atheism. He not only diagnoses, but also shows the way out, the source of strength which,
however, is never self-evident, nor can it be owned. He talks about the Holy Spirit, God’s
‘dynamis’ offered to this fallen world, not as a faceless, impersonal power, but as a reality that
can be addressed due to the fact that “…he has had a name, since he, forsaken by God and people,
died and at the same time, was set free from the power of death, and was lifted into God’s
eternity.”1
Küng's career began with studies in theology and philosophy, first in Germany, then
continuing at the famous papal university, the Pontifical Gregorian University. In 1954 he was
ordained as a priest and then continued his studies as a PhD student at the Catholic Institute of
Paris and the Sorbonne. The topic of his dissertation signaled a fundamentally ecumenical-
universal orientation: Rechtfertigung: die Lehre Karl Barths und eine Katholische Besinnung
(Karl Barth’s Doctrine of Justification and one of its Catholic Interpretations -1957). However,
his life goal was far from wanting to be an “ivory-tower” academic; before being invited to join
the University of Tubingen, he undertook pastoral counseling duties as a priest in a Luzern parish.
As an acknowledgement of his exceptional abilities and achievements, the young theologian was

1Hans Küng, Woran man sich halten kann. 1985. Quotation on the basis of its French translation,
Pourquoi suis-je toujours chrétien? Paris, 1988, p.94.
one of the official theologians invited to the Second Vatican Council (1962-1965), held in the
spirit of the Church’s opening up to modernism.
In his entire work to follow, he took upon himself the laborious and unrewarding task of
rediscovering connecting paths of dialogue between different Christian denominations, between
Christianity and other world religions, and between Christianity and modern philosophy. The
daring tone of his thick volumes Die Kirche (1967), Unfehlbar? Eine Anfrage (1970), Christsein
(1974), Existiert Gott? (1978); his approach from “below” (from a historical perspective) to such
traditional doctrines as Christology, the Trinity and other theological issues; his questioning of
papal infallibility and his somewhat Protestant proposition, according to which there is no room
in theology for discussing issues that are altogether missing from the Scripture – all these led to
his being denied the authority to teach on behalf of the Catholic Church by the Vatican’s
Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith in 1979. Since then, he has been a professor and
director of the Tubingen Institute for Ecumenical Research.
His ensuing publications represent consecutive stations in a journey already begun: he
continually confronts Christians, compelled to think globally about the fundamental, existential
challenges of the world. Although the list is not exhaustive, this can be seen in the following
works: Ewiges Leben? (1983), Theologie im Aufbruch (1987), Christentum und Weltreligionen
(Christianity and World Religions, written in several volumes between 1984-1994 and covering
Islam, Hinduism, Chinese religions, and Judaism), and Projekt Weltethos (1991 – also published
in Hungarian – Egyhazforum, 1994).
Illustrative of his methodology, in one of his works, examining the similarities between
the arguments of Christian and eastern, non-Christian mystics’, Küng mentions the denotation
which, strangely enough, both groups applied to God. This demonstrates that God is coincidencia
oppositorum, that is, the concurrence of opposites. Because He is height and depth, light and
darkness, minute and infinite, edge and center, absolute will and wish-less tranquility all at once.
But could what is comprised in God Himself be forged together by a theologian? We may
consider the work of Hans Küng, comprised in thousands of pages, to be the outline of a critical-
ecumenical theology, in which the author attempts something almost impossible: to accomplish
the convergence of opposites. He attempts to make a convergence among perspectives and
theological axioms that traditionally are thought of, or were thought of for a long time, as being
mutually exclusive. Thus, his extensive life-work attempts to address programmatically four
criteria.2 According to Küng, theological thinking should be simultaneously:

2 Theologie im Aufbruch. München, 1987, p.248.

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 1. catholic, maintaining the holistic character of the church, its universal perspective; and, at
the same time, “evangelical” in nature, meaning it is closely connected to the Scripture;
2. traditional, continually taking into account our ancestors’ experience and the main figures
of church history; and contemporary, facing the issues of the present;
3. Christo-centric, in a decisive and distinctive way, Christian; at the same time,
“ecumenical”, meaning it regards “the entire inhabited world”, all religions, Christian and
non-Christian alike;
4. scholarly-academic, fulfilling both the scientific requirements of research and the
conceptual-methodological ones of description; but, at the same time, preserving its life-
renewing, continually reforming, practical-pastoral character.

Probably it is most difficult to fulfill the above criteria when we try to engage in dialogue
with world religions that are so far from the Christian interpretation of life, the world and
salvation, such as Islam or, even more so, Hinduism, Buddhism or Chinese universism. The earth,
wrapped in a growing information web, with a convergence of economic and political interests,
has become a global village, setting the stage for an increasing number of potential meeting
points for different cultures defined by various religions. The encounter may constitute a source
of tension, a threat with a potential cost of human life in the hundreds and thousands (consider the
Arab-Israeli, Indian-Pakistani, Philippine Christian-Muslim etc. conflicts). On the other hand, it
could also mean a mutual, positive motivating force, without syncretic mingling, a deepening and
crystallizing of particular value sets that could gradually become a catalyst for serving the real
interests of man. Küng proclaims with growing emphasis, in fact, he had it printed on the title
page of several of his books, what has become a three-fold prophetic proclamation:

We have no chance for survival without a world ethos.

There is no world peace without religious peace.
There is no religious peace without dialogue among religions, which requires mutual study of
each other’s values.

When, according to an end-of-century world map of religions,3 three quarters of the

globe’s population live outside the cultural sphere of Christianity and 32-33% of “Christians”

3According to 1992 data, the religious distribution of the population of the Earth is the following:
32.1% - Christian (Catholic 18%, Protestant 10.5%, Orthodox 3.5%), 17.2% - Muslim, 13.45 -
Hindu, 5.9% - Buddhist, 5.6% - Chinese universist, 5.8% - Jewish, Sikh, Jainist, other, 20% -

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confess that they have fallen away from the church for some time, the postmodern era, with a
radically restructured thought and value system, is presenting itself as a new paradigm. What does
our Christian faith mean in this new light? And if there is no other name under the sky, by which
we are to be saved, but the name of Jesus Christ,4 what are we think of those billions of people
who, maybe precisely because of the sins of those who call upon this name, have not yet heard
this name? In the cavalcade of religions, denominations, sects, trends and currents, saints and
frauds, mad visionaries and those who “mathematically” try to prove God’s existence, no wonder
that contemporary man, though sincerely searching, becomes discouraged and uncertain. Two
extremes, in particular, threaten him: on the one hand, bitter, agnostic, cynical resignation, the
“all is true, therefore nothing is true” wisdom; and on the other, the embracing of exclusivist
world-views, denominational, etc. convictions, which consider the use of any means, including
‘holy war’, permissible in order to bring those “who live in darkness” “to light’.
Hans Kung, profoundly knowledgeable about world religions, has studied for decades the
complex, exceptionally emanating question of how Christianity relates to them all. Even though
we may not always agree with his findings, reflections, and conclusions, which will be presented
in five categories, it is certain that he has opened universal perspectives that no one has done
before throughout the two thousand year history of theological thinking.

1. Extra Ecclesiam nulla salus?5

1. 1. During the time of the church fathers and the late patristic era, within a limited geographical
perspective, Christianity, so to speak, covered ecumenicity – the world as known at that time.
They could interpret Mark 16:16, “He that believeth and is baptized shall be saved; but he that
believeth not shall be condemned,” as if everyone had already encountered the gospel. If the
unrepentant and hostile reject this saving grace, including not only the gentiles and later the
Muslims, but the Jews as well, along with those rendered heretics and schismatics by the Catholic
synods, they deserve God’s punishment. The roots of this approach are to be found already in the
2nd and 3rd centuries in the writings of Ignatius of Antioch, Iraeneus (Adversus haereses III/24),
and Clement of Alexandria (Paedagogus I:6). In an entirely negative formulation, we find it for
the first time in the writings of Origen (Jesu Nave 3:5): “May no one flatter themselves, may no

atheists and outside denominations. In: Hunyadi László: Az emberiség vallásai, Budapest, 1998,
376-377.
4 Acts 4:12.
5 This chapter is presented on the basis of the chapter entitled “Ausserhalb der Kirche kein Heil?”

from Küng’s book, Die Kirche (4th edition, Freiburg Basel Wien, 1967, p.371), along with material
from Christsein (München 1974 – French transl.: Etre Chrétien. Edition du Seuil, Paris, 1978,
p.90) that refer to the issue addressed.

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one deceive themselves: outside the church no one shall be saved; for if anyone departs from it,
they will be the prey of death”. Cyprianos (De unitate ecclesiae, 6) formulates the same idea with
legal consistency: “Whoever severs themselves from the church and ties themselves to an
adulterer, excludes himself from the promises given to the church, and anyone who forsakes the
church of Christ will not partake in the benefits of Christ. That person will become unclean, a
foreigner, and an enemy. For God cannot be the father of those whose mother is not the church.
Just as any outsider could enter Noah’s Ark, anybody that wants may enter the church.” Here, as
well, it is evident that the people involved have already encountered the saving “ark” in some
form; at the very least, they know about it. Also, we see that if an axiom like this is formulated in
such a negative manner, then the idea of exclusion becomes more important than the initial
intention of acceptance and salvation and, being consistently carried through as such, it becomes
heresy. For example, Cyprianus’ consistency goes so far as to say that neither baptism
administered by a heretic nor their martyrdom is valid. Later, the church itself would refute this
thesis. The idea of Extra Ecclesiam can be found in Augustine as well (e.g., Sermoad
Caesariensis ecclesiae plebem, 6). Though he makes a difference between milder and stronger
heresy, he believes that there is no salvation for those lesser deviationists either. Ruspei
Fulgentius (De fide, ad Petrum 38:79), a disciple of Augustine, proves to be the most unrelenting
in formulating these theses in the negative mode: “Most certainly keep to this and do not question
it: not only all gentiles, but all Jews, all heretics and schismatics, all those who die outside of the
present catholic church, will partake in eternal fire prepared for Satan and his angels.”

1.2. Medieval Scholasticism kept to the same train of thought as Cyprian and Augustine in this
matter. In the course of formulating this axiom with a negative prefix, laying less emphasis on
depicting the joy of the saved than on presenting the suffering of the damned (as Dante does in
the Divine Comedy), the history of theological thinking of this period documents exaggerations or
abuses that the church will correct later on. For example, the following question arose: will the
authority of consecrated priests be suspended if they uphold teachings unaccepted by the
mainstream Catholic Church? Certainly, yes, such priests were sustained at first, but later the
official position of the infallible church changed and took the opposite view. Boniface VIII, the
Pope of the great Schism, in his bull “Unam Sanctam”, in order to avoid any misunderstandings,
clarified: there is no salvation outside of the church of the Pope, the Church of Rome. It was
during this time that three “simultaneous” popes mutually excommunicated each other. At the
decline of the Middle Ages, the Council of Florence (1442) further solidified the tenet valid since

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Origen and Cyprian. This means that every soul outside the Catholic Church only increases the
number of the damned, the massa damnata.

1.3. Modernity started, in fact, when Columbus landed on the shores of America, half a century
later. The geographical discoveries that followed, the Europeans’ venturing up to the “final
boundaries of the Earth”, the slow but steady conquest of the Copernican world-view, are all
events that led to a startling realization: people living on our European continent understood for
the first time that the Mediterranean region is not the whole inhabited world; that in the vast
space-time ocean of human history, Christianity is no more than a mere spot of color! It was not
exclusively owing to these realizations, but more likely due to the radically reforming entire
world-view of the 16th century, that in this period not only prominent, sage theologians such as
Bellarminus and Suarez, but the Council of Trent itself was compelled to take new positions.
With regard to extra ecclesiam, the Council of Trent overstepped the resolutions of the Council of
Florence, when it introduced the concept of wish-Christianity. According to this teaching, if
someone, through no fault of his own, does not partake in the benefits of baptism and the
community life of the church yet, nevertheless, they wish to do so, this is sufficient to make his
salvation likely. Let us note here that the churches of the Reformation have never taught that
salvation could be conditioned by membership of any organized church institution; according to
their congruent teaching, there is no salvation outside of Christ. Calvin acknowledges a religious
seed existent in all humans, the semen religionis, which provides a restricted and somewhat
ambiguous possibility for a natural knowledge of God. However, this is only sufficient to
condemn those who do not come to know God the Creator through Christ. He mentions the
Muslims, calling them “Turks”, “who proudly boast that the creator of heaven and earth is their
god, yet because of their repulsion for Christ, they replace the true God with idols”.6 Luther
agreed with the idea of having the Koran translated into German, only in order to make the
ungodliness of its followers more obvious. During the middle of the 17th century, in their battle
with the Jansenists, the Catholic Church re-sharpened old weapons and restated, slightly
modified, the known thesis, Extra Ecclesia nulla concenditur gratia. In contrast, Pius IX, a
prominent pope of the 19th century, asserted that those who do not live in the true religion because
of their ignorance are not burdened by sin. Then he continued by asking, who has the courage to
draw a line between different nations, customs, and cultures, with the intention of separating the
true from the untrue? Finally, the 20th century provided a turning point that predictably will define
the Roman Catholic position for a long time and will probably fundamentally influence the

6 Kálvin János: A keresztény vallás rendszere. Pápa, 1909, II. 6,4.

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change in the general world-outlook of Christendom. It happened that in 1943 an encyclical
(“Mystici Corporis”) defined the relationship of the church and the nations using a rather
exclusivist language. A young Jesuit by the name P. Feeney went further and started to profess
literally the old Extra Ecclesiam doctrine in Boston. This gradually became so uncomfortable for
the Catholic Church that the Vatican’s Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith first protested
and then excommunicated its errant prophet, who was advocating that there is no salvation
outside the church! This odd story is merely a prelude to the new approach conceived and
undertaken with complete theological consciousness and announced in the resolutions of the
Second Vatican Council. According to this, “If a person does not know the Father of our Lord
Jesus Christ, but acknowledges a Creator, or is searching for the unknown God in pictures or
shadows, then God is not far from them, because He gives life and breath to all (Acts 17), and the
Saviour wants all people to be saved (1 Timothy 2:4). Therefore, those who do not know, through
no fault of their own, the Gospel of Christ or His church, but are seeking God with sincere hearts
and, thanks to His grace, are striving to fulfill His will recognized in the commandments of their
conscience, may obtain eternal life.”
We may add that along Protestant lines, even if not in the form of such a concise
doctrine, the same standpoint prevails; suffice it to mention Barth’s theological position of
extended gratia irresistibilis.

1.4 Küng, having presented the subject from a theological historian’s viewpoint, comes to
evaluate all this, with his characteristic pragmatism, from a missiological and ecclesiological
perspective, without neglecting the biblical-theological foundation of his standpoint. He correctly
states that even though the Extra Ecclesiam principle might have proven to be a useful tool in
missions in the past, its utilization today would be to the detriment of the same missionary cause.
Conservative and some less conservative Catholic theologians, however, think that if this doctrine
is put aside, the essence of the church itself would be questioned; the saving ark would spring a
leak. They sense a double pressure: they have to measure up both to loyalty to tradition and to the
new, dogma-free doctrine that warrants the acknowledgement of multiculturalism and
“otherness”. Since neither claim can be ignored, Küng asserts that a considerable number of
theologians shifted to a pseudo-solution, namely, towards the extension of the church-definition.
As a very typical example he mentions Karl Rahner’s exposition on “anonymous Christianity”. In
this interpretation, any well-intended Hindu, Buddhist, Muslim, or a person belonging (or not
belonging) to any religious tradition – in a hidden way – could be considered a Christian. In his
opinion, on the Protestant side, differentiating between the church and churches, between the

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‘invisible’ and the ‘visible’ churches may carry dangers. Hans Küng rightly rejects such
speculative, incorporative attempts when he asserts that those who do not belong to a Christ-
confessing, baptized congregation cannot be considered to be members of the church. Because:
- in the New Testament, only such a Christ-confessing, baptized community is called ‘churchʼ;
- such a church-concept is not necessary for salvation to be considered possible for non-
Christians;
- this church-concept makes it impossible in mission work to encourage non-Christians to join the
church, given that all benevolent individuals already are its members;
- this devious approach offends the pride of outsiders, because it tries to baptize them, at least in a
“spiritual” sense, without their consent. What would our reaction be if a Tibetan monk, out of
good-intentions, considered Christians to be anonymous Buddhists?
With the “anonymous Christian” approach, boundaries between the church and the world
get washed away. Following this approach, Küng asks, will not Jesus easily become an avatar (an
incarnation of Vishnu) for the Hindu, a bodhisattva for the Buddhist, or a prophet for the Muslim?
The fact that God extends His grace to all of his creation doesn’t mean that all people should be
considered Christians or as belonging to the church. Kung suggests that if the church wants to
continue sustaining this tenet, it may do so, but only in its positive interpretation. The church
member, on “the inside”, from a personal perspective, may accept it as a promise and hope in the
all-time “here-and-now”, and can assert happily that there is no other means of salvation for him
or her. Instead of a negative formula prone to be misunderstood by others, its positive kernel
should be stressed: THERE IS salvation in the church, because where Christ is, there is the
church: ubi Christus, ibi Ecclesia.
From a Biblical-exegetical-theological viewpoint, Küng refers to I Peter 3:19–21,
according to which baptism or, more precisely, the event designated by it, serves our salvation in
the same way as the Ark did in Noah’s time. The sentences in the Scripture are not symmetrical;
the fact that THERE IS salvation within the Ark, cannot imply the truth of the logically opposite
assertion, according to which everybody outside of the Ark would have been lost for good, since
at this place in Scripture it says that Christ was preaching to the people who were disobedient in
those days. This means that “even the most infamous villain cannot be excluded from Christ’s
calling to salvation” (Fr. Hauck). As far as this interpretation of the Word is correct, says Küng,
here the meaning is that there is salvation also outside the church, provided there is not any
outside Christ.
According to Küng's suggestion, the content and contradictory history of Extra Ecclesiam
should be revealed by various dogmatic analyses, although its utilization in preaching the Word

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where there is no time and opportunity for detailed explanations should be avoided. As regards
re-interpreting traditional teachings, we need not be afraid to do so, because the entire history of
dogmas represents nothing but a history of re-interpretations. This is present in the most ancient
ecclesiastical tradition. For instance at the Nicaean Synod, after the essential unity of the three
persons of the Trinity was designated by the expression “one hypostasis”, they realized that this
formula could easily be misunderstood. Therefore, later, in sharp contrast, the difference between
the three persons came to be conveyed by the definition “one essence – three hypostases”.
Whereas at Chalcedon, the Christological formulae of the Ephesian Synod, which had been
strongly influenced by the thinking of Cyril of Alexandria, were deliberately ignored! Küng sees
John XXIII, the Pope of the synod “of the opening”, as a model to be followed because of his
capacity to distinguish between the essence and the form of faith.
At the end of this chapter I will take the liberty of formulating two critical remarks,
precisely in the spirit of Küng. It is a good thing that Küng, having consistently deconstructed the
old Catholic dogma, comes to the essential biblical truth that salvation can only be obtained in
Christ, irrespective of one’s situation of being within or outside a visible ecclesiastical
community. However, in sustaining the solus Christus principle, he seems to be less consistent
when speaking about the ways of salvation professed by the diverse religions of the world. This is
especially conspicuous in his views concerning the character and tasks of Christian missionary
activity, which will be discussed in more detail below.
The double viewpoint – approaching the issue from inside (from the situation of a
believer and member of an ecclesiastical community) and from the outside of such a community –
offers significant help for elucidating the relationship between Christianity and other world
religions. The difficulty lies only in setting the two-way interpretations in agreement with each
other and finding the balance between them. For if we are content with the idea that we possess
salvation here inside, and give up the idea that God intended to give the same salvation to all the
peoples of the world, we implicitly confine a faith, that is originally of a universal ambition, to
the narrow frame of relativism and subjectivism. Indeed, it is best for Christians to be occupied
with bending their own knees to the name of Christ; at the same time, if they were asked to give
up the belief that some day all knees will bend to this name, it would be like requesting them to
have a schizophrenic mindset. Küng is a thinker of too high a calibre not to see this dilemma. He
asserts clearly that both viewpoints should be sustained simultaneously. However, he seems to lay
more emphasis on the idea that the outer, objective, universal side of the truth of our faith cannot
be stressed with as much confidence as the inner side can. It seems that, according to him, this

9
would represent an insurmountable obstacle in the dialogue between religions. The issue of the
double viewpoint will be tackled once more below.

2. In search of common ground, refusing syncretism7

2.1. The above-mentioned, slogan-like assertions – there is no peace in the world without
religious peace, there is no religious peace without an inter-religious dialogue – lead necessarily
to a third proposition: there is no dialogue without a thorough research of the religious tradition of
the other party involved in the dialogue. Taking into account that in 19th century Europe
Hinduism and Buddhism were still considered to be one and the same religious phenomenon, and
that common people even nowadays know very little, apart from a few, superficially known data
and religious propositions, about the culture and religion of remote peoples, it becomes obvious
that dialogue can only be started by learning the concepts existent in the other tradition
concerning God, man, the world, life, and death. Hans Küng fulfills this requirement exceedingly
in his book,8 which contains a huge amount of information about Hinduism, Buddhism, Islam,
and Chinese universism but, in which, even while carrying on conversations with some world-
famous expert of these religions, he always keeps in view the essence. Despite being very
thorough, he doesn’t get lost in details. This knowledgeable and understanding approach is what
makes all the difference between his attitude towards world religions and the standpoint
represented by dialectic theology, according to which these religions are separated by an
unbridgeable gap from Christianity, as the latter is pure revelation which comes from above,
whereas the former are merely distorted manifestations of the upwardly directed will of the self-
deifying man and, as such, they are sheer paganism. Küng is much more involved in searching for
connection points9 between them.
This cannot be an illegitimate undertaking, he says, because it can be asserted even of
early Christianity, from a historical point of view, that if its theologians had not been able to find
bridges between the very different Semite and Greek conceptual systems (for ex. Justinus),

7 This chapter is presented on the basis of the books Christsein, p.90 and Existiert Gott?
(München, 1978). The quote here is based on the French translation of the latter, Dieu existe-t-
il?, (Paris, 1981, p.679).
8 Christentum und Weltreligionen. München, 1984–1994.
9 Though for us Calvinists – mutatis mutandis – Barth’s No! to these connection points meant the

touchstone of true faith for a long time, almost transforming this negation into the “j” of the Nicean
synod, we shouldn’t forget that later on Barth himself was able to revise his own earlier
standpoint. See the fragment of his letter, which was understood as a last message by E. Brunner
who, thanks to this message, left this world for God’s eternity with a smile on his face : “Sagen
Sie ihm doch ja, die Zeit, da ich meinte, ihm ein ‘Nein!’ entgegenrufen zu müssen, sei langst
vorüber, wo wir doch alle nur davon leben, dass ein grosser und barmherziger Gott zu uns allen
seingnadiges Ja sagt.” In: Karl Barth: Briefe. V., 1961–1968, Zürich, 1975, 327, letter nr. 207.

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Christianity would not have gone beyond the boundaries of a Judaist sect and so would have
fallen into oblivion. According to his theological method that starts “from below”, Küng defines
religions as personal, communitarian and social manifestations of man’s attitude towards the
Absolute (ab-solutum= unbound, not being connected to anything, autonomous). By posing the
fundamental questions, Where from? Where to? Why? For what purpose?, every religion carries
out a search for defining the existential situation of man living at any time in history, namely, his
attitude towards the Cosmos, God, eternal laws, sin, death, suffering, the possibility of
redemption and his fellow being. Considering these, Küng thinks it possible to outline, regarding
religious education and phenomenology, three areas where all these attitudes overlap each other,
if not always on the level of answers, at least on the level of posing the questions.
These are the following:
– every religion acknowledges the alienated nature of man, the fundamental dichotomy between
man and the world, the lack of original unity, and is aware of man’s longing for redemption from
suffering, sin, and his confined earthly existence;
– this redemption can be attained in some way; therefore there is a good, ultimate reality that
makes redemption possible;
– every religion has its outstanding personalities, prophets, and teachers to whom, according to
their followers, this ultimate reality was revealed in an exceptionally clear and intense manner.

2.2. Seen from the perspective of our – common! – human existence, these areas can really offer
us many starting points for dialogue. But this framework is too formal to let us ignore the huge
and, in some respect, insuperable differences between religions. Even if we were to take into
account the classic division of world religions, which distinguishes between the religions located
on this bank of the Indus River, which are prophetic religions based on divine revelation
(Judaism, Christianity, Islam) and those located on the opposite bank of the Indus, which are
mystical religions,10 focusing on eternal cycles (Hinduism, Buddhism), the antagonism would
become perceptible at once. These two different kinds of religious experience were described by
Swedish theologian and religious historian Nathan Söderblom (d. 1931) who was also archbishop
of Uppsala, as suppressing piety (mystical religions), as opposed to liberating piety (religions of
activity), respectively. Küng quotes the assertions of German religious historian Friedrich Heiler,
in whose opinion these two types of religious experience display essential structural differences:
the former is basically a negation of all desire for life, up to the point of ecstasy. The exact

10Etymologically, the expression “mystical” can be traced back to the Greek verb “müein” = keep
for ex. eyes, mouth, closed – so to remain silent, to be introverted.

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quotation says: “That form of connection with God in which the world and the self are radically
denied and human personality becomes dissolved, swallowed, absorbed in the infinite unity of the
divinity.” As opposed to this, prophetic religions are characterized by their believers’ acute desire
for life, their pursuit of goals and ideals and their intention to fulfill God’s will. Consequently,
there is a fundamental difference in their attitude towards history, sin, salvation, morals and
society. The mystic renounces, whereas the believer of a prophetic religion can have a gleam of
hope even in the deepest despair, which gives him power to go on: “Cast not away, therefore,
your confidence, which hath great recompense of reward” (Hebrews 10:35). The god-concept of
eastern religions can be more appropriately characterized by the impersonal, inconceivable Deus
absconditus, whose nature itself, according to the Upanishads (the later part of the Vedas, 8th
century B.C.) is “no, no”, and about whose reality, therefore, no positive statement can be made.
Of course, here we are mentioning merely two models of interpretation, and are by no means
asserting that these would be entirely pure religious manifestations, sharply separable from each
other. “Prophetic elements” can also be found in mystical religions. Likewise, prophetic religions
are not devoid of “mystical” thoughts and experiences, moreover, they have a good many
outstanding mystics. The above mentioned world-outlook of the Upanishades is not entirely
unknown in Christian circles either. In this respect, the Küng quotes Master Eckhardt: “Divinity
is so poor, so deprived, as if it didn’t exist at all – has got nothing, wants nothing and needs
nothing”. This idea is as much compatible with the ancient Greek view as it is with the teachings
of the Chinese Lao-tse (Tao Te King), or those held in the Bhagavad-Gita. On the other hand, in
prophetic religions Deus absconditus becomes Deus revelatus. He is Deus semper agens, the
Lord, the King, the Judge, and after all fear has been removed by trust, the Father. This God-
image can only be compatible with an ethical-voluntarist religious practice.
We cannot present here the individual religions in detail, or the parallelisms and
differences between their concepts and those of Christianity (this is exhaustively done by Küng in
his books). We merely would like to emphasize the idea that, besides his total openness to world
religions, Küng firmly distances himself from all and any idea of syncretism, and by no means
does he imagine world ecumenism as being some new, unitary world religion, made up of
disparate elements of different individual religions! He unequivocally warns that
phenomenological description of religions, out of too much enthusiasm, is inclined to stress only
the common features. Nevertheless, it cannot be overlooked indulgently that the Scripture, for
instance, does not have the same role in Islam as it does in Christianity; the Koran can only be
touched after a ritual hand-washing, because the book itself, the object, is considered to be the
Revelation. As opposed to this, for us the Revelation has been given in the history of the nation

12
Israel and the story of Jesus of Nazareth and the Scripture is a testimony of this. Furthermore, it is
true that every religion has its holy men, but a Buddha concentrating on his own navel, or a
Jeremiah being harassed for his people, or a military leader attracted to feminine beauty, as was
Mohammed,11 are not all the same. Although in many respects the concept of love makes
Christianity and Buddhism draw near to each other, the maítri concept (= compassion) of the
latter cannot be the same as Christian agapé, owing to the difference between the impersonal and
personal God-image. We often tend to forget, for example, the huge enlightenment brought about
in Africa precisely by Christian mission.12 The gradual extinction of magic, superstitions and of
spirit worship; social humanization; a more positively-oriented work-ethics – all are unequivocal
consequences of a new, Christian world-outlook. Küng is right to warn about the frequent
injustice when an ideal form of one religion (here, of Christianity) is contrasted with the everyday
practice of another one, distorted compared with its own origins. He deliberately avoids this trap.
He is able to notice, and also ruthlessly scourge, the countless present and past sins of the
Christian Church, from the Crusades up to the abuses of the patriarchs, but he also points out that
all these were deviations, aberrations that could never be justified by the original Christian
program. This is not always true of other religions. For instance in Mexico, five years before the
discovery of America, 20000 people were massacred and sacrificed in the greatest temple there
during an immense, four day long cultic ceremony. Ignoring the humanistic attempt to re-
interpret the concept, extremist Muslim groups, even nowadays, can justly refer to jihad, the
Koran’s commandment urging towards “holy war”. Similarly, there is a great difference between
the cultic prostitution of the Hindu “diamond cart” tradition and Christian asceticism. Küng puts
it bluntly that the Hindu religion has had catastrophic economic consequences throughout the
whole sub-continent. He asserts of Gandhi, despite his respect for him, that it was regretful that
he accepted the cult of cows and the caste-system. Sarvapalli Radhnakrishnan, India’s first
President, is mentioned for his tolerance, which was as much influenced by European liberalism

11 From the viewpoint of religious history, what Mohammed accomplished in the first third of the
7th century within politeist-animist Arab culture is the very same thing that Moses had done
among the Hebrew tribes two thousand years earlier: a radical switch to monotheism, followed by
powerful social reforms. His significance in this respect is beyond doubt. However, putting him on
the level of the Biblical prophets, as Küng does, is more than questionable. “Isn’t it due to our
dogmatic prejudice that we recognize Amos, Hosea, Isaiah, Jeremiah and many others as
elected prophets, whereas we don't do the same in the case of Mohammed?” (Das Christentum.
München: 1994, p.70.
12 At this point it becomes obvious that although Küng had serious objections to missionary

activity, these refer to a greater extent to its unacceptable methods rather than to mission itself;
that is, to the sad historical fact that in many places, the propagators of the Christian Gospel
followed in the steps of extremely violent colonists. It is difficult to omit this in the history of
missions.

13
as it was by Hindu Vedas. In a way characteristic of an eastern world-view, he was inclined not
only to approach world religions with the knowledgeable respect of a sage, but also to mix them
up, lacking an adequate critical spirit and system of criteria. Radhnakrishnan, too, quotes the
frequently mentioned old Buddhist tale, according to which three blind beggars are feeling an
elephant, not knowing what it is. One of them, who has been feeling its leg, states that the
elephant is exactly like a tree-log. The second, grabbing its ear, yells no! This animal is like a
palm-leaf. According to the third, it can be compared to a rope, because he has been holding its
tail. The meaning of the parable is obvious to an eastern world-view: every religion can conceive
only a part of reality, each being right from its own point of view. It is true, says Küng, that it is
not a good idea to absolutize one’s own religion in an extreme way, stubbornly identifying a tree-
log to be the whole elephant, but the uniformization suggested by the parable lacks any critical
spirit, so it cannot be accepted!
Analyzing the doctrine of reincarnation in his work Ewiges Leben?,13 Küng admits its
essentially singular, positive character, namely the image of a perfect, intact moral world-order,
according to which every individual has determined his present happy or unhappy fate by his
previous life, which would offer a solution to the Theodicy problem, but a good many vital
questions remain without an answer. For example, analyzing the causes of our present situation,
how far back in time can we go along the serial chain of births? What is the original primary
cause of man’s karma? Is not the sterile “self” undergoing rebirth a mere abstraction, devoid of
the particular biological–social influences affecting the individual? What is the use of the series
of rebirths if we don’t know anything about our former lives? May Buddha’s recalling of his
hundred thousand former lives remain in the world of legends! Isn’t this chain of causality, in
which there is no room for God’s merciful love, too harsh, too unbearably implacable? Doesn’t it
mean that the history of a person and of mankind loses its uniqueness, its unrepeatability and also
its seriousness? Aren’t there “disorders” in world order that can not be explained in terms of any
human sin? Can an old Hindu teaching be connected with the doctrine of the absence of the
permanent self of Buddhism? In the case of the latter, how can an individual’s penal
responsibility be stated? Do para-psychological phenomena prove anything about one’s previous
life? As early as Confucius, the idea that a man can be reincarnated even as an animal in his next
life was considered to be incompatible with human dignity. Küng quotes the philosopher Karl
Jasper, who in his work Die massgebenden Menschen (München, 1974), by presenting the most
defining personalities of mankind – Buddha, Confucius, Socrates, Jesus – gives a synoptic
approach to world religions, firmly pointing out that their teachings are too different, too

13 München, 1982, p.65.

14
completely incompatible with each other for anybody that would wish to walk simultaneously all
the paths that have been opened by them.
Those thinkers who have undertaken the unrewarding task of mediating between
denominations or religions have often been subjected to unjust and unloving attacks from both
sides. (It is not by chance that in his book Theologie im Aufbruch, Küng stresses the idea that
Erasmus should have been given more attention among the chaos of the 16th century.) We
consider the synthesis made in this chapter to be important in order to avoid such
misunderstandings, and in order to make Küng's dialectic view clear; he lays as much emphasis
on the idea that nowadays nobody can live with the superior consciousness of being the exclusive
owner of the truth – in the so-called, “splendid isolation” – as on the idea that we should be
cautious not to mix the various religions; “it is impossible to avoid choice”.14

3. Christianity as the critical catalyst15 of world religions

3.1. How should Christianity relate to world religions today? It is impossible to answer this
question without taking into consideration some lessons learnt from past experience. As we
mentioned earlier, if Christianity met the cultural and conceptual challenges when entering the
Hellenistic world, even if sometimes not in the most fortunate way, the next meeting or, more
precisely, the clash with the Eastern world meant a challenge of a similar scale. Although
Christians have been recorded in India since the 3-4th century, and Nestorian Christians reached
China in the 6th and Franciscans in the 13th century, we can talk about a real mission only from
the 16th century on. The obstacles the first Christians` mission work had to face can be well
demonstrated by the spiritual and, unfortunately, church-political struggle they fought for
“finding” the name of God in China. We are aware of the complicated spiritual-historical
background behind the process of how “God”`s name in the different languages and cultures
evolved. The four letters of the holy tetragram, JHVH, etymologically encompasses the word life
The German “Gott”, along the line of the Gothic-Germanic origin, can be traced back to the
ancient Indian word “huta” which means someone who is called upon or to whom sacrifices are
made. The word “Theos” used by Plato has an uncertain origin, but surely for the Greek it meant
the experience of the unavoidable, extraordinary power that grasps mankind. The “Deus” of the
Romans can also be traced back to the ancient Hindu word “devás” which means “who gave”.
This is the origin of the words Dios, Dio, Dieu in the Latin languages. Is the name of God simply
a semantic sign then, or more than that? And if the Mount Sinai story speaks about God’s name

14 Christsein, p.107.
15 Existiert Gott? (Dieu existe-t-il?). p.679.

15
by which the impersonal numen becomes nomen, which cannot be “guessed”, but only received
as a gift of divine self-revelation, then what does that mean, for example, in the Chinese (or
Hungarian) Bible translation? What does it mean if God’s name is referred to as “Allah” in the
Arabic translation of the Bible and if thousands of Christians speaking this language address God
by this name? Are we talking about the essence of the ultimate reality or merely about a
conventional sign? Along with many others, St. Francis Xavier (1552) had to face such questions
in Japan when using the word “Deusu” which was artificially created from Latin to refer to God.
This proved unfortunate, as his opponents twisted the word to “dai-uso”, which means “big lie”
in Japanese. About fifty key words were translated from Latin using the same method, (garasa –
grace, susutanshija – substance, Spiritsu Santo – Holy Spirit). The Italian Jesuit Matteo Ricci
walked a different path. He was one of the pioneers of the Chinese mission from 1583 and as a
sign of appreciation of his sacrificial work he received the right to live in the imperial city of
Beijing beginning in 1610. He found that two names were used in Chinese to refer to God. One
was Shang-ti (higher Lord) carrying personal connotations, and the other the more impersonal
Tien (heaven) (Tao is an abstract, philosophical idea). Although Ricci and his co-workers used
the words Deus and Theos, they represented a tolerant missionary approach which accepted some
level of adaptation to the local language and culture. Thus, for example, they somewhat combined
the two above-mentioned names of God, and created the word Tien Zhu = the Lord of Heaven.
Ricci's famous catechism also carries this title, Tien Zhu Shi Yi (True Teaching about God). When
in 1610, at the age of 57, burnt up in the work of the mission, he suddenly died, he left this legacy
behind. Merely a quarter of a century later in 1634, Dominican and Spanish Franciscan
missionaries arrived in China and a fight called the ‘battle of ritesʼ broke out in the history of the
Catholic Church. The new arrivals were astonished to find certain practices of honoring ancestors
and Confucius among the local Christians and they were appalled that Tien Zhu, the Chinese
name for God, was being used. Meanwhile, by the end of the 17th century, Christian mission had
become somewhat successful, to the extent that in 1692 Emperor K`ang-shi officially legalized
the spreading of the gospel in China and many hoped for the conversion of the Emperor himself.
Leibniz,16 the great figure of the European Enlightenment, referred to him as the most eminent
ruler in the world. The Pope, however, was not satisfied and wanted a clarification in the matter
of names for liturgical use, concepts and local rites. The Emperor sent the Pope a report compiled

16 According to Küng, Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz’s work published in 1716, entitled Treatise on
Chinese Philosophy bears witness to the fact that he was one of the first thinkers, if not the very
first, who acknowledged the pluralist nature of mankind, its being made up of races and cultures
of equal value. In Leibniz’s opinion, just as Christians teach the Gospel and new sciences in
China, so should the Chinese teach natural ethics and politology in Europe.

16
by the Court of Justice for Rites, which stated that Confucius was not honored as a divinity, but
instead as a doctor and teacher, nor were ancestors being worshipped, and the different names of
God referred to one and the same Lord of Heaven and Earth. However, Clement XI made an
unfortunate decision by fully prohibiting native Chinese rituals for Christians in 1704, while
Confucius was depicted as a public idol worshipper and also an atheist. In 1710, despite the
protest of the indigenous Chinese priests, the Inquisition strengthened the earlier orders with a
new decree and permanently forbade the formerly used names of Shang ti and Tien, tolerating
only Tien Zhu. This decree has not been withdrawn up to this day! As a result, in 1717
missionaries were permanently exiled from the country. After K`ang-shi’s death, Christians were
ruthlessly persecuted and their churches demolished. In 1742, Pope Benedict XIV permanently
forbade both native Chinese and Indian rituals. Christian mission was able to return to these
territories only in the shadow of the English colonization of the 19th century. While Protestants
referred to God by the ancient Shangti name, in Catholic missions the canonized Tien Zhu name
was used, and thus the majority of the Chinese understood, of course, that one group believed in
one God and the other believed in another God. In 1940 the tolerance decree of Pius XII, which
referred to the Chinese mission and was reminiscent of Ricci’s spirit, arrived somewhat late, to
put it mildly; and while Christians were disputing with one other, rather than seizing the historic
possibility of taking a unified and authentic stand in mission, atheist Maoism became a substitute
for religion for over one billion people. In Küng`s understanding the historic lesson described
above makes an argument for the need of a new behaviour model.

3.2. If two chemical substances enter into a reaction with each other, a necessary reaction occurs,
as a result of which both components suffer some level of change. The meeting of two (or more)
world religions will initiate similar processes. Our question, of course, is how can you control
these? And where is the boundary beyond which change is of such a great level that we cannot
talk about permissible change any more, but about loss of identity and syncretism? And if no one
would deny the basic truth that “the form may change, the content may not”, are we sure that
these two are easily separable? Surely, for the eastern religions, the encounter with Christianity
and its culture was a real shock, which was also a call to purify their own faith and deepen their
real foundations. Küng sees the importance of this in a certain positive demythologizing process,
since the more monotheism is strengthened in a given region, the more idol worship and
superstition will decrease and social commitment be strengthened. In light of this, the Bhagavad-
Gita may be reinterpreted, as well as the concept of the Islamic jihad. And while (mostly
Western) Christianity has related to its traditional values with great historic and textual criticism

17
and constant critical practice for the past three centuries, it can be rightly expected that the world
of the East should perform the same revision to its own traditions' material. Küng summarizes the
challenges of Christianity towards world religions as follows:
a. The Hindu, Buddhist or Islamic world should step out of the millennial tradition of the
ahistorical or anti-historical mindset that mostly thinks along the lines of mythologies, for which
the Koran is a revelation straight from heaven, untouched even by the breeze of historic
relativism. Are the inheritors of this tradition able to understand their holy book on a historic
level and not as a miracle-book which foretells all happenings in advance and prescribes, for
example, general legislation or the place of women in the societies of Saudi-Arabia, Pakistan,
Afghanistan, Iran or Iraq for all times? Should not these countries be neutral, realizing that true
democracy and freedom of conscience cannot be achieved without separating the state from
religion (the church)?
b. The cyclical view of time and history is a fertile ground for personal fatalism and social
determinism, while scientific progress testifies to the linear development of history, just as the
Jewish-Christian-Islamic view does, and only on these grounds can personhood and personal
rights be seriously considered. Can the East pay attention to these warnings? If one sees no
possibility to escape from the ruthless iron laws of karma or from the samsara (eternal cycles)
here on Earth, then from where does one take the courage to act?
c. Is not the caste-system the opposite of the moral world order on behalf of which hundreds of
millions (despite the fact that it was abolished officially in 1947) consider it sustainable even
today? Is not the closed world of the castes in contrast with the natural mobility of our planet
which is becoming a global village?
d. Does not the Buddhist monastic system, for which life on Earth is no more than an appearance,
merely the veil of Maya, continuously represent a cosmic pessimism, passivity, and infinite
indifference towards social problems as certain forms of Chinese Taoism do?
e. Even though Confucianism is one of the most practical religions in the sea of eastern
mysticism, Chinese traditionalism, which is still powerful, represents the ideology of submission.
That is why since the fall of the Emperor in 1912 and the ascent of communism in 1949,
Confucianism has proved to be a suitable background to Maoism. Just as it is not by chance that
Russia, whose religion is Orthodoxy, the most rigidly authoritarian branch of Christianity,
became the cradle of communism in 1917.

Küng immediately, and justly, warns that the listed shortcomings cannot fill Christians with
contentment and a clear conscience, as they too have their own fundamentalists, hierarchical

18
traditionalists and their gated communities which support social conservatism by their passivity.
And let us not forget that it is not only the Asian religions that could learn much from a dialogue.
Christianity, too, could be motivated by it to re-think certain teachings or practices. The
monotheism17 of Islam is noteworthy, as is the simplicity of its whole dogmatic system, which is
able to create unity and solidarity through which national-racial tensions can be dealt with. In
contrast to the anthropomorphist concept of our Jewish-Christian tradition, the transpersonal god-
image of Asian religions is challenging; while the positive anthropology of Confucian humanism
which emphasizes the value and importance of education, may cause the Christian dogma of
original sin to be interpreted with more complexity. While stating that there are no inferior or
superior races, cultures or religions, Küng nevertheless points out that these Asian systems of
faith and the societies which have been influenced by them need an even greater reformation than
Christianity!
Küng draws our attention to an interesting and challenging cultural-historical parallel: if the ideal
of the Renaissance was ancient Greece, and if modern thinking brought about by the
Enlightenment turned primarily towards the rationalism of China (Leibniz, Wolff), then we can
rightly assert of our contemporary age, being on the verge of post-modernism, that it is under the
spell of the unifying spirit of India.

Having said all this, let us return to our basic question: how can Christianity be present in the
world of other religions? In such a way, says Küng, that Christianity should not mean
Europeanism or Americanization. We have to differentiate between local culture and local
religion. While the latter is of course prohibited for a follower of Christ, it is natural and possible
to conceive Arabic, African, Indian or Chinese Christianity as having its own cultural flavour. We
have arrived to one of the most sensitive questions: is it possible to harmonize mission with

17In Küng’s opinion, the speculative trinity-dogma, being alienated from the christology of the
primary Jerusalem community, eclipses the unequivocal nature of monotheism. According to him,
as a result of this dogma and of the hellenistically interpreted doctrine of pre-existence and
incarnation, Christians have an erroneous image of Jesus, as if somehow the transfigurated
Jesus had (again) merged with the Father. Referring to the vision of the martyr Stephen, who
sees Jesus at the right hand of God’s glory, Küng prefers to speak about inthronization, the
“sharing of the throne” between the Father and the Son. He quotes a competent Catholic
historian in whose opinion Christians were unable to resist spiritually the Islamic invasion of
North-Africa because the simple monotheism of Islam was more atrractive to them. The Jesus-
image of the Koran reflects, though vaguely, the christology of the Judaist Christians of the
Jerusalem community. That’s why “the Jesus-interpretation of the Koran can no longer be
considered as a Muslim heresy, but instead as an Arabian located christology of primitive
Christian colouring”. (Das Christentum. 142.) At the same time: “I accept the truth of the great
christologic synods from Nicaea to Chalcedon.” (Párbeszéd az iszlámról, Bp. 1998, 201.) See
also: Das Christentum. 70,126.

19
tolerance? In my opinion we can definitely not think about this double task as if the clear and
straightforward mandate of the Bible were in tension with tolerance, an uncomfortable
contemporary requirement and a symptom of our age. We would misunderstand the character of
Biblical dynamis if we failed to notice in it the exhortation towards patience, even to a greater
extent and in a more radical way than is required by our age. The misinterpretation of “compelle
intrare” has had many tragic consequences throughout church history. With a special sensitivity
to those fake missionary phenomena performed in the name of the gospel, which in fact are
totally opposed to the gospel, Küng feels compelled to state that today we do not need missionary
conquests, but an authentic Christian presence among other religions, a testimony given in word
and act. A Christianity which maintains the need to be unconditional, yet it is ready for self
revision and can say no both to syncretism,18 which relativizes truth and finally leads to an
agnostic indifference, and to the desire for dominance by those who think themselves the
exclusive owners of truth. Beyond doubt, the path marked out by Küng is narrow, here and there
being narrower than a blade, to the extent that it becomes impossible to keep one’s balance on it.
He does not succeed either (maybe because this knot cannot be undone on a theoretical level!),
especially regarding the issue of mission. Taking into account the ideas stated above, we ask:
what kind of mission is possible? Küng`s answer is the following: serving people within their
own religion! Christianity should turn to the other religions with a dialectic of acknowledgement
and rejection in such a way that it would be a kind of detergent in their religious-cultural fabric, a
“critical catalyst”! Christianity should be the “crystallizing pot” of the values of these religions
and should not desire to be more. No matter how appealing Küng`s systematic deconstruction of
the Christian superiority complex would be, I ask, with a just skepticism, what that would look
like in practice. If sometime in the far future, due to Christianity, the idea of a personal God
becomes stronger in Buddhism, or the caste-system becomes weaker or reincarnation comes to be
rejected in Hinduism, would this be the fulfillment of the mandate given by Christ? And if in the
case of the denominations within Christianity, we are already so tolerant as to consider that one’s
joining our denomination is not the most important thing, but that one should sincerely follow
Christ within their own community, then can the boundary between Christianity and other world
religions be stepped over in the same way? Does that mean that the Christian missionary should
encourage his or her Vishnuite neighbour in Benares to be more deeply committed to “their own
values”? Küng`s standpoint in this matter is problematic. According to him, it would be
preferable if Christian mission “would not see its first and foremost goal to reach the highest

The possible positive meaning of the expression in Küng’s etymology is interesting: it would
18

mean “the Cretans together”, that is, the Cretan city-states against their common enemy.

20
number of personal conversions, but much more in bringing about an authentic dialogue between
the religions.”19 Küng seems to consider spreading the gospel from person to person, anticipating
a personal response, to be substitutable with the abstract “model of interaction between cultures
and religions”. What should the above-mentioned Vishnuite do if he encounters the light of the
gospel? Should he be an anonymous Christian within a Hindu setting? We have previously
mentioned that Küng abhors the Rahneric idea of “anonymous Christianity” and he deeply agrees
with Jaspers, who thinks it is impossible that two such different roads should be followed at the
same time. Küng`s cautiousness is surely due to previous experiences of mission done in a violent
way using unworthy means. But can the only two alternatives be to have either a mission that is
disrespectful and aggressive toward the individual, on the one hand; or simply a critical
interaction between the world religions, on the other? Should one give up the joy and freedom
and the love that prompts us to share with others from the hidden treasure that we have found due
to grace? Paul is so compelled by the love of Christ, that when Agrippa excuses himself – you
have almost persuaded me to become a Christian – Paul forgets about his shackles and answers,
“I would to God, that not only thou, but also all that hear me this day, were both almost, and
altogether such as I am…”20 All Christian missions must give up the fallacy of possessing truth
and hypocritical proselytism; however, what can never be given up is a free, disinterested call to
Christ, rooted in love, taking the addressed person into consideration, and a hope that the
addressed person will answer this call with all of his or her existence. This, of course, does not
mean that in larger contexts the described “critical catalyst” function or the creation of an
“authentic dialogue between religions” could not be encouraged. Why could we not say here too,
in agreement with Küng's flexibleness, that the two do not exclude but complement each other?

4. What is truth then?

4.1. If we put the question that way, the reply comes naturally with a question:
– what nature of truth are you thinking about, because the answer can not be independent of that?
– Historical scientific truth, for example.
– Then I say, the criterion of truth is nothing else than the exact correspondence between a given
historic event and its description (time frame, power lines, system of allies, political constellation,
etc.)
– But to what extent can we use the word “exact” here?
– I admit that we can only talk about relative exactness here.

19 Christsein, p.118.
20 Acts 26:29, “… except these bonds”, he adds, in order to avoid misunderstandings.

21
– History is a messy matter. Rather, let’s talk about natural scientific truth!
– In that case, I think that it is important to ask whether a certain physical equation is an adequate
description of a particular phenomenon?
– Finally, something certain! The Newtonian “Force = Mass x Velocity square” is perfectly
adequate, so it is true, isn’t it?
– It depends on the speed of the system in which the phenomenon is taking place! Approaching
the speed of light, Newton gives way to Einstein.
– Don’t drive me crazy! You are totally confusing me! So, the equations learned by heart are not
certain either?
– Yes, they are, but within certain boundaries...
– What is truth then?
– What kind of truth?
– So, back to square one! We are right where we started!
– This is also a proof of the Earth being round.
– You are witty, but now I do not dare to ask what is religious truth like?

With the help of such a simple imaginary conversation, I think I am able to shed light on the fact
that it is not easy to enter into the complexity of truth. Küng's great merit is that he does not shun
this act, but tries to cut paths that can be walked in the often impenetrable jungle of religions. To
our question – what could be the criterion of religious truth? – a Christian would immediately
reply: it is nothing other than Jesus Christ, Truth Himself, in His full human and divine reality.
This measure can be applied to a cross-denominational dialogue; furthermore, it should be
applied with all consistency, and formally, as well! We realize, though, that in a dialogue with
world religions, or with atheists or agnostics, the statement of faith mentioned above cannot be
used as a formal criterion for truth. But why do we consider religious truth to be overtly
complicated? I quote Justin Martyr from the 2nd century, the defender of Christian faith: “It is not
easy to find the father and ruler of the universe and it is even more difficult to clearly talk about
Him to others. This is what Christ did by His own power. Nobody believed Socrates and he died
in Christ because of His teaching, which Socrates knew only partly.” If Justin states of the 4th
century BC Greek philosopher that he “partly knew Christ”,21 and “he died in Christ”, the very
same thing that the apostle says about the Corinthian Christians who died in Christ,22 then where
does the borderline of truth lie? If the gospel of John mostly explains Christ through the metaphor

21 Vanyó László: A II. századi görög apologéták. Budapest: 1984, p128.

22 I Corinthians 15:18.

22
of light – He is the light of the world – then should we not be careful when drawing the line as to
who can tell up to where light reaches? If this can be applied to Socrates, Küng asks, why can it
not be applied to the religious thinkers of other nations? Is the Japanese Amida-Buddhism, which
proclaims committed love and sanctification through faith in a personal God, not closer to the
light of the world than most pagan European philosophies are? But what would that mean?
Should we agree with Gandhi who states, “I believe in the Bible, just as I believe in the Gítá. I
consider all great religions of the world to be as true as mine. It is painful, that some of those are
distorted by their own followers.”23 Having said that, the question can not be avoided:

4.2. Is there a true religion? Küng presents a method, whose philosophic elaboration was made by
William James at the beginning of the 20th century. According to this, the truth content of a
conviction, an ideology or religion can never be assessed through a subjective-psychological
process, but only through a pragmatic check. So, the criterion of the values of a system of beliefs
is never dependent on its origins, but on its results, its emanation, the sum of its measurable
effects, and the consequence it has on personal or social life. “We have to ask, says James, what
feeling it would create, what our conduct of life would be like if the object of our truth were true.
The full meaning of a certain faith can be reduced to its practical consequences”.24 Similar
thoughts are expressed by P. Leuba, quoted by James: “Does God really exist?” In what way does
He exist? What is His nature like? It does not matter. The final goal of religion is not God, but
life, a more spacious, richer, more fulfilling life. The religious inclination, on every level, is the
love of life”.25 Regarding this, we can say that this pragmatic criterion is attractive for many
reasons. In its essence it confirms the teachings of Jesus: you will know the tree from its fruit. In
the Calvinist-Puritan tradition, good results have the role of confirming faith. The well-known
parable of Lessing's drama Wise Nathan comes to mind. Three sons each inherit a ring from their
father but none of them knows which one is the original, the real one. The ring obviously
represents the Jewish, Christian and Muslim religions. From the three, only one can be real, says
Sultan Saladin to the wise man, leading him to a strange trap at the same time: “A man like you
will not remain at the place where the whim of birth has thrown him: or if he will, it will only be
due to insight, reasons and the best choice”.26 But what insight (Einsicht) is provided, if it can not
be proven which is the original and real ring on a theoretical level? What remains is only practice:

23 Existiert Gott? p.702.

24 Ibid. 706.
25 Ibid.
26 Theologie im Aufbruch. München: 1987, p.276 o.

23
“Each should strive for incorruptible, unbiased love”.27 The power of the ring will be shown in
“humbleness, peace at heart, good deeds, an inner submission to God”.28 Furthermore, the true
ring, the good religion, is one which testifies about the miraculous power that “makes one
favourable before God and people”.29 Küng himself often thinks on the basis of this pragmatic
criterion when talking about the catastrophic economic consequences of Hinduism, for example.
He rightly warns about the pitfalls of an ethical utilitarianism of this kind. Because, what can be
called an effective, successful, beneficial view or practice? Did Catholicism or Rousseau have a
good or bad effect on Europe? A belief in God does necessitate a practical response, but practice
cannot be the exclusive criterion of truth, since an unsuccessful theory can also be true.

When one accepts or rejects a system of beliefs - and William James agrees with this – it is
finally a decision of faith, even if the examination of its consequences is really determining, and
to a certain extent works as a criterion for truth. The pragmatic view is by itself one-sided –
experience and reflection have to go hand in hand, since without experience, reflection is empty,
and does not know what it is talking about, but experience without reflection is blind and does not
know where it is heading. When searching for the final criterion, Küng arrives at a dialectical
end-result.30 In this sense, God's hidden truth cannot be grasped by rationality, so we cannot talk
about external rationality, but internal rationality which leads to a basic certainty in the
following way: when a person undertakes the risks of trusting God, then he experiences that this
trust, beyond all doubt, is a trust that makes sense, a hope that does not put him to shame.

4.3. Küng, in his book Theologie im Aufbruch, describes four characteristic ways of approaching
different religions.31
a. None of the religions are true! So states classic atheism, while religious phenomena are
considered, according to the categories of Feuerbach, Marx, and Freud, to be projections of
desires, opium necessitated by social misery, or the father-need of the adult who remains a child
for ever. But the agnostic standpoint, referring unilaterally, and unjustly, to Immanuel Kant, also
falls into these categories. According to it, we are dealing with things beyond the boundaries of
the clear mind, the truth content of which cannot be proven, so it would be better not to deal with
them! Küng rightly reveals the lack of foundation of this stance, since it is obvious that it is not a

27 Ibid.
28 Ibid.
29 Ibid.
30 Dieu existe-t-il?, p.665.
31 278 pp.

24
matter of a mathematical certainty, but of a deeply rooted primary trust to say yes to the ultimate
foundation of existence proclaimed by religions. However, if atheists consider that nothing can
comprise this foundation, or say that there is no foundation at all, then their standpoint is just as
irrational as the decision of faith.
b. All other religions are false, only ours is true! declares traditional Catholicism, but we can just
as well put the Eastern Orthodox, or the traditional Hindu, Muslim, or fundamentalist Protestant
viewpoints into this category. Preserving one’s own identity is not at all the same as obsessively
sticking to propositions of this kind.
c. All religions are equally true! So say generous broadminded people, but definitely not those
who really know the world of religions, with all their particularities. Could the solution be to
make a difference between the objective practice of religion (institutions, rites, teachings etc.) and
subjective religiosity? The latter can never exist in the form of some ethereal, crystal-pure
religious form, since it is always affected, determined or at least influenced by a particular
religious milieu. Küng, rejecting this “clarifying direction” asks, why would errare humanum est
not be valid for religions, just as for any other human act? Neither the shallow relativism of
“everything is possible” nor exclusive absolutism can suppress our searching for truth; and only
that truth which sets free deserves to be called truth. Therefore, examine the souls! The fact that
we accept, because of God’s sovereignty, that He has mercy for whom He wills and therefore, He
can give salvation, if He wills, to anyone, irrespective of their religion, does not mean that we see
in each religion the same content of truth. In this sense, Küng warns, we have to make a
difference between the concepts of salvation and truth.
d. Only one religion is true – ours – but each religion participates in this truth. Our thinker
considers this model to be one of generous inclusivism, rooted primarily in Hinduism. According
to this, each religion represents a certain stage of the singularly true Hinduism. Moreover,
everybody was once a Hindu, and it is due to the decline of this age that many have departed from
this. We have already referred to K. Rahner`s approach, as a Christian version of this, which
considers all well intended Hindus, Muslims, Animists and Buddhists to be anonymous
Christians. As if we could only be at peace about their final destiny if we saw them as Christians
first, as if God could only grant salvation to these people if they first became Christians in some
form.

If none of the above mentioned models is really acceptable, how can we find our way in this
maze? Küng puts the following signs on our path:

25
– instead of indifference, more distance towards the fundamentalism that proclaims itself to be an
absolute standard;
– instead of relativism, active relationship (Relativität-Relationalität);
– instead of syncretism, more synthesis;
– instead of denominational antagonisms, real ecumenism.

If we Christians are challenged to think about truth in the spirit of Christian freedom, then we
must do so in a way that we would not give up truth for freedom, but we would not give up
freedom for some apparent truth, either.32

5. The criterion of religious truth

When analyzing the sensitive question of the criterion of truth, it is obvious that none of the
religions have a monopoly on truth, and we Christians cannot claim it, either. We “only” confess
the truth but we are not the ones revealing it. Meanwhile, we know that the borderline between
truth and falseness does not lie between our religion and other religions, but often within one
religion or within our own conscience. Hans Küng, ignoring the different truth-theories
concerning the theory-reality relationship (correspondence, reflection, consensus, coherence),
builds the description of his criterion of truth along a triple spiral.33

5.1. (Humanity: general ethical criterion) The basic question is the following: do religious goals
justify all means? Even the abuse of political and economic power, or the abuse of personal
freedom, sexuality and authority? Can a religious command be something that is inhumane? Are
human sacrifice, the burning of widows, the persecution of heretics, temple prostitution, and holy
war justifiable in the name of religion? Or can mindless masochistic asceticism, the use of drugs,
promiscuity, or the manipulation of a frenzied crowd by a hurricane of sounds be considered to be
legitimate paths of religious practice just because they give rise to mystical experiences? Can
racism, male chauvinism, or the suicide of extreme sects be acceptable, just because they are
“activities of a religious nature”? Can the adjective “religious” be an impenetrable cover for any
act, the synonym for intangibility, because it refers to things which are divine and, so, not subject
to judgment? The obvious NO has to be made clear, because it seems that this is not yet fully
obvious, and no part of the world is exempt from this ethical uncertainty. Let us add: these
borderlines cannot be blurred even by the uncritical mentioning of the faith-test of Abraham in
32 “…kein Verrat der Freiheit um der Wahrheit willen. Aber gleichzeitig auch: kein Verrat der
Wahrheit um der Freiheit willen” Theologie im Aufbruch, p.285.
33 Ibid., p.286.

26
sacrificing Isaac!34 I can only agree with Küng`s emphatic statement, that Christianity – at least in
its effect, and here the pragmatic criterion returns – is radical humanism; the power of religion
manifests itself to the fullest where real humanity is given space on the horizon of the absolute.
The church has to admit that secular humanism, against which it has fought many times, in fact
canonized ancient Christian values in a legal form, e.g., in the General Statement of Human
Rights of the UN in 1948. In contrast to this stands the sharía, the numerous clauses of Islamic
law derived from the Koran regarding the status of women in society, or the status of non-
Muslims employed in a Muslim country. Similarly, the concept of jihad has to be reinterpreted as
something meaning not necessarily a war fought with weapons, but also an inward war, a
personal endeavour. As only the Unconditional can grant enforcement to all ethical values, it is
vital that a minimal ethical agreement be made between world religions. Let this positive process
be irreversible with the participation of world religions, just as slavery cannot be brought back on
the socio-ethical level. Küng interprets the otherwise vague general concept of humanity
expressed in the key sentences of the resolution of the World Conference of Religions for Peace
in Kyoto in 1970 to include the following emphases:
– the fundamental unity of human families and the dignity and equality of all individuals;
– the freedom of the individual and the freedom of conscience;
– the realization and acceptance of the fact that power does not equal justice;
– the conviction that love, compassion, generosity, and the power of the Spirit is stronger than the
power of hate, selfishness, or animosity;
– the obligation of solidarity with the oppressed.

In what cases can a conviction, which surrounds and motivates humans, be considered good? If,
and only if, it develops the potential of humans in personal and social contexts, if it helps humans
to become fully human. But we lose our sense of humanity if we deny the trans-human, the
dimension that is beyond humans, the absolute, the unconditional – without this, man remains a

34 In the apartment of the ill-famed Belgian “priest” who murdered his own family, above the
entrance there was a painting depicting the scene of Isaac‘s being sacrificed by his father! We
cannot give here a theological-philosophical analysis of the issue, suffice it to say that it concerns
the so-called Euthyphro-dilemma, first discussed by Plato. Namely: is something good because it
is commanded by God, or does God command something because it is good? Do the moral
requirements stand above God, or vice versa? The insoluble dilemma is answered at once by
Alister E. McGrath (Bridgebuilding. In Hungarian: Híd, Budapest:1997), who says that for poli-
theist Greeks this question had a real basis, but Christians believe that they were given their
moral sense by the God that represents supreme good, that‘s why there is no real split between
our moral axioms connected to it and God‘s will. This is a significant point of view, although it is
not satisfying, because God is also “the fundamentally different one”. See also Kierkegaard‘s
essay entitled The Three Stadia.

27
torso. So, we need the horizon of the transcendent, and what is permissible and what is not within
that can be judged based on the basic norms of humanity. In this sense, the religion that, with its
institutions, traditions, teachings, life-style, and communal solidarity, helps the person in his
specific individual-social reality; nourishes his sense of justice, integrity, and freedom; and heals
and fulfills his personality – only this religion can refer to a divine foundation. The false and bad
religion is the one that impedes man from these things.

5.2. (The authentic or canonic: general religious criterion) In the sense of the general religious
criterion, each religion has to accept its own origin, source, the figure of the founder without
legends, and its own guideline-providing writings – The Vedas, Ji King, The Torah, The New
Testament, The Koran - as an undebatable normative factor for the sake of its own further
development. The history of religion testifies that no religion is exempt from producing
unconfirmable, fantastic thoughts and practices. In this respect, it can be questioned whether or
not tantrism can be still considered part of Buddhism or whether many sects that refer to Christ
are, in fact, part of Christianity. To state this or to decide similar questions is the “internal” affair
of every religion, but someone who does not accept Buddha, the dharma (teachings) and the
sangha (community of monks), cannot be considered a “real” Buddhist, nor can someone for
whom – while allowing for different interpretations – the New Testament is not the decisive
forum for their faith, or for whom Christ is not God's ultimate self-revelation, be considered be a
“true” Christian. This is important from the point of view of inter-religious councils, because
although none of the religions can fully refrain from applying their own specific truth criteria to
other religions, this has to be done with reference to the basic values and writings of their
dialogue partner, and not to their own; otherwise, they will not understand each other.

5.3. (The specifically Christian criterion) It is appropriate for Küng to state that the most urgent
task of Christianity is to first apply its own criteria to itself, in a direct and most radical way. In an
indirect way, of course, it can extend to other religions as well, examining, without self-praise, to
what extent the spirit considered as Christian is present in other religions; and what measure of
the light35 they receive, the light for which we beg, too. It is important that there should be a
certain hierarchy of values within Christian teaching and life practice. Not each Biblical sentence
has the same ideatic weight. Obviously, the theologumenon presenting the death and resurrection
of Jesus in all traditions of the New Testament does not have the same weight as the peripheral
35Can this light be called Holy Spirit? I don‘t consider its usage correct in this respect, because a
non-Christian does not require this name and because, according to the New Testament, the
working of the Holy Spirit is bound to the person of Jesus Christ.

28
comment referring to the Millennium. The central place of love-ethics cannot be confused with
the particular practice of speaking in tongues in Corinth. I consider Küng`s suggestion, which
makes dialogue about the usually hopelessly vague question of religious identity and openness,
according to which we have to differentiate between an internal (committed) and an external
(neutral, religious-historic) perspective possible, to be very important. As he says, an expert in
international law is familiar with varied legislation; however, he fully commits himself to the
laws of his own country, and for him and his fellow-citizens that is the valid legislation.
Similarly, both points of view have to be integrated in the case of religion. If a religion really
becomes my religion, only then can my quest for truth really acquire depth, says Küng. For us,
there is only one true religion, Christianity, just as for the Buddhist there is only one, Buddhism.
In each case, it is not a matter of general geographical or astronomical truth, but a matter of
existential truth. No one can rise up above religions as if in a balloon, no one can find a
standpoint of total neutrality or objectivity. Because someone who watches people on the street
from his window and is not willing to converse with others who are watching the same street
from their windows, is far removed from reality and has not yet realized that we all share the
same human existence, all being inhabitants of the same street named Terra! Küng does not leave
us in doubt regarding his own position. “This religion – Christianity – is the true religion for me,
the truth of which I can explain, and of which I might convince others too. For me, Christianity is
the path on which I walk, it is the religion in which I consider I have found the truth regarding my
life and death.”36 He answers the question, “Why am I a Christian?” (his whole life work is about
this) in the following way: because I trust myself to the God who is God of Abraham, Isaac,
Jacob and of the prophets, who not only acted in the history of Israel, but revealed Himself in an
outstanding way in the story of Jesus of Nazareth who, despite his death on the cross, did not
remain in death, but was risen to God's eternal life. He is the Messiah, the Word of God made
flesh, Son of God.
Christians must never forget that it is not Christianity in which they believe! That is a very
ambiguous reality, thus it can not be elevated to the pedestal of “absolute religion”, as Hegel did.
“No, in world history there is only one Absolute: the Absolute Himself”,37 and the decisive
measure is Jesus Christ, compared with whom Christianity itself has appeared very often as a
false religion!38

36 Theologie im Aufbruch, p.300.

37 Ibid., p.301.
38 Ibid.

29
5.4. (Towards the understanding of a greater truth, or the fifth model) As long as we understand
religious truth not as a system of teachings, but as God’s personal self- revelation given to us as a
gift, as long as “the truth as an encounter”39 actually happens, then we cannot see ourselves other
than as travelers awaiting more and more surprises on our way towards getting to know an ever
greater truth. This, however, cannot cause us to doubt that we are truly on the road and on the
right one, but every stop means a risk of going off that road. How should we look at those –
asking this question for the last time in this essay – who walk on a different path? Küng offers a
threefold answer which we accept for ourselves, although we think some amendments are
necessary, hoping that this way a fifth model may take shape:
a. From the outside, from the point of view of the religious historian, there are several true
religions (not all): those that fit the general religious and human criteria.
b. From the inside, from the circle of Christianity, for me only one way, following Christ, was
given, since it would be impossible to walk on more than one path at the same time.
c. The other religions, from this point of view, are neither false, nor true, but conditionally true:
“if in essence it does not contradict the Christian message, but complements it, corrects it,
enriches it”.40

Now, let us consider amendments for each thesis:

aa. Küng talks about the true religions as paths to salvation (Heilswege), along which humans are
walking towards a goal, and these paths cross each other again and again. The term is misleading
and I do not recommend its use; although we believe that God is able to save those on a journey
on different paths, and He does save them – out of His own mercy and according to the law
written in their hearts (Romans 2:15) – God does so, not through these paths (magic, superstition,
spiritual darkness), but in spite of them, as Küng suggests.41 To give a specific example, the
sinner on Jesus' right on the cross was surely saved, but it does not follow that his ways were
“paths to salvation”. To avoid misunderstandings, I do not consider that the term “paths to
salvation” should be exclusively Christian. Only Christ is the way to salvation, truth and life. This
is why the formula of the Second Vatican Council is not fully reassuring, as it tries to give a
compromising solution when, on one hand, it talks about general-universal (ordentlich) ways to
salvation and “different paths”, while, on the other hand, it considers the Christian teaching about
salvation as “outstanding”(ausser ordentlich), the “way” itself.

39 See the personalist approach interpreted in terms of the concepts “I - Thou” conceived by
Martin Buber in Emil Brunner’s work, Wahrheit als Begegnung.
40 Theologie im Aufbruch, p.305.
41 Christsein, p.108.

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Can “pagans” be saved then? Yes, if for me this means God’s love and the recognition of His
sovereignty. However, the moment when this yes would serve to decrease the importance of
mission, the answer changes to no, because I say with Paul, how shall they believe in him of
whom they have not heard? And how shall they hear without a preacher?42
bb. When Küng says that Christ is the Word, the Image and the Way43 “for believers, and only for
them, while for others He is the invitation to this way, and other similar statements, it seems as if
he gives up the objective side of Christian faith. As if we should be satisfied with the fact that
Christ for us is the decisive measure (das entscheidende Regulativ), but as to whom He really is
in his objective-cosmic reality, we cannot know anything. It is true that this latter knowledge is
(also) faith knowledge, and not a mathematical reality, but it is not a mere projection either. Faith,
although a most particularly subjective reality, can never give up the objectivity of its object; and
will not the object of my faith be really personal only if I believe that it is general as well? About
Christ, it can only be stated with full assurance that “He is my Lord” if, at the same time, it is not
in doubt that He is the Lord of the universe; and vice versa: he can be seen as general reality only
by somebody for whom He has become a personal reality. It is true that none of the religions own
the whole truth, not even Christianity, but at the same time it is sure that what was revealed in
Christ is part of the whole truth, its faithful, “adequate” image.
cc. We are glad to see that although Küng tries to be as objective as he can till the end, finally he
uses a “Christian screening”. So we can accept constructive and useful elements from other
religions as well. Moreover, we can recognize crumbs of God's wisdom in them, as long as they
do not contradict the “essence” (im Entscheidenden) of our faith. But what can be, we ask, the
measure of this compatibility? And although there are tendencies in the East that try to grasp
God's personal nature and Christianity has its mystics who dilute God into an impersonal ocean,
are these systems not fundamentally different? Does not reincarnation represent a sharp
delineation, separating the contemplative East from the West which, embracing the thought of a
linear life-time, has created culture and civilization? Wonderful hymns, true sentences that
express honorable experiences and rich imaginative myths that interpret complicated reality can
be found in each religion. But in none of them do we find the personal unity realized in a historic
figure, encompassing all existing, about whom the Scriptures gives testimony by pointing to the
figure of Jesus of Nazareth, He Himself in His humiliated-glorified, living reality is the Truth.
Which religion could pass the screening test of this interpretation of essence? Maybe Islam,
which denies the death of Jesus on the cross? But let us not forget that historic Christianity cannot

42 Romans 10:14.
43 Christsein, p.108.

31
pass the test more easily than any other religion can. Since truth is with God and we, travelers on
Earth, cannot own it, only partake of it, while we see dimly, as if in a mirror, but even after that!

BIBLIOGRAPHY

 Hans Küng, Christsein. München: Piper, 1974. In its French translation, Etre chrétien.
Paris: du Seuil, 1978.
 Hans Küng, Die Kirche. Freiburg-Basel-Wien: Herder, 1967.
 Hans Küng, Existiert Gott? München, Piper, 1974. In its French translation, Dieu existe-
t-il? Paris: du Seuil, 1981.
 Hans Küng, Ewiges Leben? München: Piper, 1982.
 Hans Küng, Was ist Kirche? München-Hamburg: Siebenstern, 1970.
 Hans Küng, Heute noch an Gott Glauben? München: Piper, 1977.
 Hans Küng, Das Christentum. Wesen und Geschichte. München: Piper, 1994.
 Hans Küng, Christentum und Weltreligionen. Hinduismus. With co-author Heinrich von
Stietencron. München: Piper, 1984. In its Hungarian translation, Párbeszéd a
hinduizmusról. Budapest: Palatinus, 1999.
 Hans Küng, Christentum und Weltreligionen. Der Islam. With co-author Josef van Ess.
München: Piper, 1984. In its Hungarian translation, Párbeszéd az iszlámról. Budapest:
Palatinus, 1997.
 Hans Küng, Christentum und Weltreligionen. Buddhismus. With co-author Heinz
Bechert. München: Piper, 1995.
 Hans Küng, Theologie im Aufbruch. München: Piper, 1987.
 Hans Küng, Projekt Weltethos. München: Piper, 1991
 In Hungarian translation: Hans Küng, Világvallások etikája. Budapest:
Egyházfórum/Református Zsinati Iroda, Budapest, 1994.

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