HAZARD IDENTIFICATION,

ASSESSMENT AND CONTROL

S.D.BHARAMBE
Industrial Hygiene and Safety Section
Health Safety and Environment Group
BARC, Trombay Mumbai-85
[email protected]
 • Legal

• Social

• Economic
 ENVIRONMENTAL STRESSES IN A
WORKPLACE
STRESSES ARE:

• PHYSICAL AGENTS
(ionizing radiation, non-ionizing radiation,
noise, extremes of temperature)
• CHEMICAL AGENTS
(solvents, acids, caustics, alcohols)

• BIOLOGICAL AGENTS
(bacteria, mold, fungus, insect-related
contaminants)

• ERGONOMIC FACTORS
(workstation design ,tool design, repetitive
and cumulative trauma, fatigue, and exertion)
 WHAT IS RISK?

Risk is a quantitative expression of Hazard.

It is the probability of occurrence of an undesired event with

a specific consequence in a specified period.
Mathematically it is expressed as:

Risk = Frequency x Magnitude

(Consequences/y) (Events/y) (Consequences/event)
1. Process/ System Check-lists
2. Safety Review
3. Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA)
4. "What If" Analysis
5. Fault Tree Analysis (FTA)
6. Event Tree Analysis (ETA)
7. Cause-Consequence Analysis
8. Relative ranking - Dow and Mond Indices
9. Failure Modes, Effects and Criticality
Analysis (FMECA)
10. Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) Studies
Process / System Check List

• Identification of common hazards

• Ensure compliance with standard procedures.

A checklist is easy to use and can be applied at following

stages of facility/plant

 Design,
 Construction,
 Start-up,
 Operation, and
 Shutdown.

Limitations:
1. Qualitative in nature
2. Limited to the experience base of check list authors
3. Needs be audited and updated regularly.
QUALITATIVE TECHNIQUES
Safety Review
• formal weeklong, examination of plant by a team

• interview with many people in the plant: operators,

maintenance staff, engineers, management, safety staff, and
others, depending upon the plant organisation.

Objective:
• identify plant conditions or operating procedures that could
lead to an accident and significant losses in life or property.

• recommendations alongwith justification, recommended

responsibilities, and completion dates.

• To ensure the plant and operating and maintenance

procedures match the design intent and standards.

• Periodicity once in 2-3 years

QUALITATIVE TECHNIQUE
Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA)

PHA consists of formulating a list of the hazards related to:

• Raw materials, intermediate, final products, reactivity,

• Plant equipment
• Interface among system components
• Operating environment
• Operations
• Facility
• Safety equipment.

• Cost - effective method

• Early identification of hazards, thus saving time and cost
• Used in the early design phase, when the basic plant elements
and materials are defined.

QUALITATIVE TECHNIQUE can be extended for QUANTIFICATION

"What If" Analysis

• Questioning techniques

• Examination of possible deviations from the design, construction,

modification or operation intent.

• Powerful procedure if the staff is experienced; otherwise, the results are likely
to be incomplete.

"What If" concept uses questions which begin with "What If .... ". For example:
"What if" the wrong material is delivered?
"What if" Pump A stops running?
"What if" the operator opens valve B instead of A?

Useful for identification of Possible accident event sequences and thus Identify the
hazards, consequences, and perhaps potential methods for risk reduction.

• Can be used for existing plants during the process development stage, or
at pre-startup stage

• a very common usage is to examine proposed changes to an existing plant.

QULITATIVE TECHNIQUE which can provide input for QUANTIFIED ANALYSIS

Relative ranking - Dow and Mond Indices

Dow and Mond indices provide a direct and easy method for
providing a relative ranking of the risks in a chemical process
plant.

Assignment of Penalities and credits based on plant features-

• Penalties for process materials and conditions that can
contribute to an accident.
• Credits are assigned to plant safety features that can mitigate
the effects of an accident.

These penalties and credits are combined to derive an index that

is a relative ranking of the plant risk.

This method facilitates a relative quantitative ranking plus

qualitative information on equipment exposed to possible damage
through accident propagation.
Failure Modes, Effects and Criticality Analysis (FMECA)

tabulation of the system or plant equipment, its failure modes,

each failure mode's effect on the system/plant, and a criticality
ranking for each failure mode.

The failure mode is a description of how the equipment fails;

The effect of the failure mode is the system response or
accident resulting from the equipment failure;

FMECA identifies single failure modes that either directly result

in or contribute significantly to an important accident.

FMECA is not efficient for identifying combinations of

equipment failures that lead to accidents. This is useful in
design, construction and operation stages of a plant.

A FMEA is equivalent to a FMECA without a criticality ranking.

 FMEA Form

Identify failure modes Determine and assess

Identify causes of the Prioritize
and their effects actions
failure modes
and controls
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 FAULT TREE ANLALYSIS

• Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) is one of the most important

logic and probabilistic techniques used in Probabilistic
Risk Assessment (PRA) and system reliability assessment.

• Fault Trees are deductive method for identifying ways in

which hazards can lead to accident.

• The approach starts with a well defined accident ,or top

event, and works backwards towards the various
scenarios that can cause the accident.
• Event-cause model
 FTA Technique
• It is a widely used tool for systems safety
analysis
• Employs a deductive technique, focusing on
a particular accident event
• It breaks down an accident event into its basic
causes
• A graphic model, displaying –
– Equipment faults
– Human errors

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EVENT TREE ANALYSIS
Event tree analysis evaluates
• potential accident outcomes that might result
following an equipment failure or process upset
known as an initiating event.
• It is a “forward-thinking” process, i.e. the analyst
begins with an initiating event and develops the
following sequences of events
• Evaluating for both the successes and failures of the
safety functions as the accident progresses.
• Consideration of human faults are also analysed
EVENT TREE ANLALYSIS- Example
 Causes and Consequences
FAULT TREE ANALYSIS EVENT TREE ANALYSIS

CAUSES CONSEQUENCES

Backward Event Forward

Deductive: Inductive:
TOP EVENT INITIATING EVENT
30-Aug-17 Safeways Safety Consultants 23
 What is Hazop?

HAZOP = HAZard and OPerability Study

Definition:
Method for identifying and assessing
hazards that may represent risks to
personnel or equipment, or cause
inefficient operations

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 What is Hazop?

In a nutshell, Hazop is a study to

determine and eliminate or reduce
potential hazards
Look at every part of process and ask
what would happen if it fails and
provide a solution
It is a methodical investigation of a
system.
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 Aim of Hazop Study
A hazard introduces the potential for an unsafe condition,
possibly leading to an accident or a disaster.

• Study of possible deviations in

operations
• Identify hazards
• Eliminate or reduce hazards
• Mitigate consequences of hazards
Why not eliminate all hazards?

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 Overview of Hazop Study Technique

Knowledge/ Team’s
Work Experience Leadership
Hazop Study
By Team

Preparation Attitude

Info for Study

Team’s Hazop Documentation (Design Data,
Experience P&ID)

Worksheet

Conse-
Deviations Causes Safeguards Actions
quences

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 Divide system into
study nodes

Select a node

Record Apply all

No
the consequences Yes specialized guide words
and causes and in turn. Any hazards or
suggest remedies operating problems?

Need more Not Sure

information
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 Deviations from Design Intent
Guide Words Attribute / Deviation
Parameter

No Flow No flow
More Pressure High pressure
As well as One phase Two phases
Other than Operations Maintenance
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 HAZOP Guide Words
and Their Meaning
1. No … Negation of the design intent
2. Less … Quantitative decrease
3. More … Quantitative increase
4. Part of … Qualitative decrease
5. As well as … Qualitative increase
6. Reverse … Logical opposite of the intent
7. Other than … Complete substitution (no part of
the design intent is achieved but something
quite different happens)
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 Guide Words

NONE e.g., NO FLOW caused by blockage; pump failure; valve

closed or jammed : leak: valve open ;suction vessel empty;
delivery side over - pressurized : vapor lock ; control failure
REVERSE e.g., REVERSE FLOW caused by pump failure : NRV failure or
wrongly inserted ; wrong routing; delivery over pressured;
back- siphoning ; pump reversed
MORE OF e.g., MORE FLOW caused by reduced delivery head ; surging
; suction pressurised ; controller failure ; valve stuck open
leak ; incorrect instrument reading.

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 Guide Words

MORE OF MORE TEMPERATURE, pressure caused by external fires;

blockage ; shot spots; loss of control ; foaming; gas release;
reaction;explosion; valve closed; loss of level in heater; sun.
LESS OF e.g., LESS FLOW caused by pump failure; leak; scale in delivery;
partial blockage ; sediments ; poor suction head; process
turndown.
LESS e.g., low temperature, pressure caused by Heat loss;
vaporisation ; ambient conditions; rain ; imbalance of input and
output ; sealing ; blocked vent .
PART OF Change in composition high or low concentration of mixture;
additional reactions in reactor or other location ; feed change.

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 Guide Words

MORE THAN Impurities or extra phase Ingress of contaminants such as air,

water, lube oils; corrosion products; presence of other
process materials due to internal leakage ; failure of isolation
; start-up features.
OTHER Activities other than normal operation start-up and
shutdown of plant ; testing and inspection ; sampling ;
maintenance; activating catalyst; removing blockage or scale
; corrosion; process emergency ; safety procedures activated
; failure of power, fuel, steam , air, water or inert gas;
emissions and lack of compatibility with other emission and
effluents.

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 Who should do it?

Hazop study is a team work

It cannot be done by an individual
person
It can be done manually or by using a
computer software.

(Contd.)

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 HAZOP Study Process
Select the section of the process for study
Identify nodes on the P&ID
Identify parameters/attributes for each node
Investigate deviations from design intent by
applying guide words to each process
parameter or attribute one by one at a node
Investigate, for each deviation, the causes and
consequences and decide on the remedy
Document the results

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Typical Hazop Team Members
Designer or Project Engineer
Process Engineer or Technologist
Plant Manager or Supervisor
Instrument Engineer
Maintenance Engineer
Inspection Engineer
Secretary / Recorder

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 Conducting a Meeting
Discussions should stick to the point; the basic
purpose of a Hazop Study is to find hazards and
their causes, not to solve problems.
Team Leader should stop the meeting, or call for
a break, if it has become ineffective or
unproductive.
There should be a time limit on a Hazop Meeting
with intermittent breaks
Avoid continuous sitting for more than two hours.

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HAZOP Procedure Outlines
A Hazop team is formed.
A latest updated copy of P&ID (process and
instrumentation drawing) is used.
“Nodes” are marked on the drawing (P&ID).
Any one node is selected for applying Hazop
study.
All possible deviations at each node are
studied for their causes and consequences.
Remedies are then suggested. (Contd.)
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Modifications to Guide Words
SOONER or LATER for OTHER THAN,
when considering time
WHERE ELSE for OTHER THAN when
considering position, sources, or
destination
HIGHER and LOWER for MORE and
LESS, when considering elevations,
temperatures, or pressures.
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 Possible Process Deviations

Parameter/ Guide Meaning

Attribute Word (Deviation)
Flow No No flow
More More flow than expected
Part of Is incomplete
Reverse Flow in wrong (reverse) direction
Other than Complete, but incorrect
Sooner Flow occurs before it was intended
Later Occurs after it was intended

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 Example: Attribute - Guide Word
Interpretations
Parameter/ Guide Interpretation
Attribute Word (Deviation)
Event No Event does not happen
(e.g., pressure As well as Another event takes place as well
drop at the Other than An unexpected event occurs
end of poly.) instead of the anticipated event
Action No No action takes place
(e.g., operator As well as Additional (unwanted) actions take
intervention, place
manual cat. Part of An incomplete action is performed
Addition, etc.) Other than An incorrect action takes place

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 Continuous Process: Diammonium Phosphate (DAP) Plant

T-1: A B
Phosphoric T-2:
Acid (P.A.) Ammonia
Study Study
Node 1 Node 2

Reactor Study
C Node 3

Hazop T-3:
DAP
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 HAZOP WORKSHEET
Unit: DAP Node: 1 Process Parameter: Date: 21.6. 2006
Flow
Guide Deviatio Causes Consequences Suggested
Word n Action
No No flow 1. Valve A fails closed Excess ammonia in Automatic closure
2. P.A. tank T-1 empty reactor . Ammonia release of valve B on loss
3. Pipe ruptures/ in work area. of P.A. supply.
plugged
Less Less flow 1. Valve A partially Excess ammonia in Automatic closure
closed. reactor. Release to work of valve B on loss
2. Partial plug or leak area, with amount of P.A. supply.
in line. released related to Set point decided by
quantitative reduction in toxicity vs. flow
supply. (Team to calculation.
calculate toxicity vs. flow
reduction.)
More More Wrong flow control. Excess P.A. degrades Provide a flow ratio
flow product. No hazard to controller with
work area. alarms and trip..
Part of Low conc. Wrong supply by Excess ammonia in Check P.A. conc.
of P.A. vendor. reactor. Release to … before charging T-1