REPUBLIC OF Marine Notice

THE MARSHALL ISLANDS

No. 2-011-31
OFFICE OF THE
MARITIME ADMINISTRATOR Rev. 11/11

TO: ALL SHIPOWNERS, OPERATORS, MASTERS AND OFFICERS OF

MERCHANT SHIPS, AND RECOGNIZED ORGANIZATIONS

SUBJECT: Piracy, Armed Attacks, Hijacking or Terrorism: Reporting Incidents, Ship

Security Plans and Best Management Practices.

References: (a) International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code (MI Marine
Notice 2-011-16)
(b) International Safety Management (ISM) Code (MI Marine Notice
2-011-13)
(c) Best Management Practices for Somali Based Piracy, Suggested
Planning and Operational Practices for Ship Operators, and Masters
of Ships Transiting the High Risk Area, Version 4 (August 2011)
(d) International Maritime Organization (IMO) MSC.1/Circ.1337, dated
4 August 2010
(e) IMO Resolution A.683(17), dated 6 November 1991
(f) IMO Resolution MSC. 305(87), dated 17 May 2010
(g) MSC/Circ. 805, dated 6 June 1997
(h) Post-Piracy Care for Seafarers Guidelines, Seaman’s Church
Institute, Version 3.0, 1 August 2011.
(i) MSC.1/Circ.1404, Guidelines to Assist in the Investigation of the
Crimes of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships, 23 May 2011
(j) MSC.1/Circ.1405, Interim Guidance to2 Shipowners, Ship Operators,
and Shipmasters on the Use of Privately Contracted Armed Security
Personnel on Board Ships in the High Risk Area, 23 May 2011
(k) MG-2-11-12, Guidance for Company Security Officers on Preparing a
Company and Crew for the Contingency of a Hijacking by Pirates
(Western Indian Ocean and Gulf of Aden)

PURPOSE:

This Notice requires Ship Security Plans (SSPs) pursuant to the International Ship and
Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code to include security measures to protect against incidents of
piracy, armed attacks (including armed robbery), hijacking or terrorism that at a minimum meet
internationally accepted Best Management Practices (BMPs) and Republic of the Marshall
Islands (MI) requirements. It also requires the reporting of all such incidents to the Maritime
Administrator (the “Administrator”) and authorities.

It is important to note that the Administrator considers the ISPS Code to be an extension
of the International Safety Management (ISM) Code under “Emergency Preparedness.” The

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Inquiries concerning the subject of this Notice should be directed to the Office of the Maritime Administrator, Republic of the Marshall
Islands, c/o Marshall Islands Maritime and Corporate Administrators, Inc., 11495 Commerce Park Drive, Reston, VA 20191-1506 USA.
MI-01, 8/06
ISM Code was amended to require companies to assess all identified risks to their vessels,
personnel and the environment and to establish appropriate safeguards. These risks include the
threat of piracy, armed attacks, hijacking and terrorism, particularly for vessels operating in High
Risk Areas as defined in Annex A.

The Administrator strongly endorses and recommends that ships subscribe to Ship
Security Reporting System (SSRS). This system provides a real-time link between ship
operations and naval operations by enhancing the counter-piracy effectiveness of the existing
Ship Security Alert System (SSAS) (see REQUIREMENTS section 2.2.1.b, below).

This Notice supersedes Rev 12/10 and reflects incorporation of the 4th edition of Best
Management Practices (BMP4) into the MI requirements for addressing piracy. It provides
additional clarity on the use of Private Maritime Security Companies (PMSC) and citadels and
addresses the expansion of piracy to West Africa and from the open seas to protected harbors and
ports.

APPLICABILITY:

1.0 SSP and BMPs Requirements

1.1 In addition to adhering to the reporting requirements, the following MI flagged vessels
that are subject to the ISPS Code and operate in High Risk Areas shall comply with the
SSP and BMPs provisions of this Notice:

 Passenger ships, including high-speed passenger craft;

 Cargo ships, including high-speed craft, of 500 gross tonnage (ITC 69) and upwards;
 Special Purpose Ships of 500 gross tonnage; and
 Self-propelled mobile offshore drilling units capable of making international voyages
unassisted and unescorted when underway and not on location.

1.2 Yachts shall comply with the BMPs provided in Section 16 of this Notice.

2.0 Reporting Requirements

All ships, including yachts, under the MI flag must comply with all reporting
requirements.

REQUIREMENTS:

1.0 SSP – Risk Assessment

1.1 MI shipowners and operators with vessels identified in section 1.1, above, must, along
with the Master, carry out a risk assessment of their vessel(s) to determine the likelihood
and consequences of a piracy attack, an armed attack, hijacking or terrorism and identify
and incorporate prevention, mitigation and recovery measures in their SSPs, taking into
consideration the guidance contained in MSC.1/Circ.1337, along with the BMPs
Guidelines (see Annex A) and additional Administrator-specific measures, including

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 those pertaining to radio and distress messages, contained in Annex A of this Notice,
each as may be updated or amended.

1.2 Incorporation of relevant provisions on piracy, armed robbery, terrorism and armed
attack into SSPs is required immediately, but need not be verified and approved until the
next scheduled ISM/ ISPS Code Audit. As outlined in §10.3.3 of MI Marine Notice
2-011-16, the provisions can be included as an Annex to the SSP to facilitate the
anticipated updates to the BMPs and guidance on post-piracy care for seafarers.

2.0 Reporting

2.1 General

The Administrator recognizes that an essential part of preventing, deterring and

suppressing attacks is prompt reporting to the proper authorities and organizations both
during and post-incident. As a result, not only must reporting be addressed by Companies
and ships as part of their BMPs in accordance with IMO Resolution A.683(17),
Prevention and Suppression of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships, the
Administrator is required to report in detail all incidents of piracy and armed robbery of
its vessels to the International Maritime Organization (IMO).

2.2 Initial Notification and Reporting

.1 Suez, Gulf of Aden (GoA), the Somali Basin Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean

.a Pre-Transit Registration and Notification

Ships must participate in the pre-transit registration and notification

requirements outlined in section 5.1.4 and 5.1.5 of the BMPs (see Annex A of
this Notice) for each transit made. All ships transiting the Red Sea, GoA, the
Somali Basin, Gulf of Oman, Arabian Sea and Western Indian Ocean are
being tracked and monitored through Long-Range Identification and Tracking
(LRIT) by EUNAVFOR. The shipowners of those ships reported to the
Administrator by EUNAVFOR found not to be registered with MSCHOA or
reporting to the UK Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) will be contacted
by the Administrator and reminded to bring their ships into compliance.

.b Ship Security Alert System (SSAS)

.i The following ships are required to comply with SOLAS Regulation XI-
2/6 for a SSAS:

 passenger ships, including high-speed passenger craft;

 cargo ships, including high-speed craft, of 500 gross tons and above;
and
 mechanically propelled mobile offshore drilling units as defined in
SOLAS regulation IX/1, not on location and on location in piracy High
Risk Areas. See MI Marine Notice 2-011-18.

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 .ii If attacked by pirates, or there is a clear and imminent threat of danger, a
ship should immediately activate its SSAS. This will alert the Company
Security Officer (CSO) and the Administrator. Additionally, if the ship is
subscribed to SSRS (see .c, below), it will also directly alert naval/military
forces. If a ship has not subscribed to SSRS, UKMTO should be notified
after SSAS activation.

.iii The transmission of a Ship Security Alert (SSA) should not be included
with any other routine reporting that the ship may conduct. The message
transmission should be generated automatically with no input from the
operator other than the activation of the system. Remember that two (2)
activation points are required: one (1) located on the navigation bridge and
one (1) other that would normally be accessible. The second activation
point should be kept confidential, known only to the Master, Ship Security
Officer (SSO) and other senior ship‟s personnel as may be decided by the
CSO.

.iv The SSA message must be capable of reaching the Administrator and CSO
from any point along the vessel‟s intended route and must include:

 the vessel name;

 the IMO Ship Identification Number;
 the Call Sign;
 the Maritime Mobile Service Identity;
 date and time;
 position;
 course and speed;
 name of CSO and 24/7 phone number;
 name of alternate CSO and 24/7 phone number; and
 a message stating that the SSAS has been activated and indicating the
ship is under threat or it has been compromised.

.c Ship Security Reporting System (SSRS)

.i Shipowners are authorized and strongly recommended to subscribe to the

SSRS because it provides a real-time link between ship operations and
naval/military operations by enhancing the counter-piracy effectiveness of
the existing SSAS.

.ii The SSRS is provided through a commercial service that continuously

monitors SSAS alerts and ship position reports, filters out alerts emanating
from outside the High Risk Area and depending upon the location of the
report, routes the information in real time to participating Naval
Operations Centres. Shipowners receive a notification email confirming
that security alert/position report information is being routed to a Naval
Operations Centre.

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 .iii The SSRS enables a rapid, coordinated response to a security alert by
automating alert transmissions and connecting ships directly to Task
Forces (via the relevant Naval Operations Centres). It minimizes
communication delays between the stakeholders. Naval/military forces are
provided with immediate knowledge of the location of a piracy attack,
pre/post attack ship positional information, and relevant ship-specific
information such as freeboard, speed and communication terminal details.

.iv Should crew members be under immediate duress, the SSRS offers a
covert method of automatically alerting naval/military forces and is
particularly effective in triggering a speedy response when used in
conjunction with a telephone call to UKMTO. Note that once activated, it
will automatically continue to report to the military authorities until
deactivated.

.v Be prepared to immediately verify SSRS activation with the UKMTO.

.vi The SSRS service can be accessed from the commercial website:
www.ssrs.org.

.2 Strait of Hormuz and Arabian Gulf

When transiting the Strait of Hormuz, Gulf of Oman and Arabian Gulf, as soon as
the Master feels that a threat is developing, he/she should immediately activate
the SSAS and call to report hostile or potentially hostile action (including
suspicious activity) to the COMUSNAVCENT Battlewatch Captain and UKMTO
(see Appendix I for contact details).

.3 Other High Risk Areas (see Annex A, 1.4)

When transiting these areas, as soon as the Master feels that a threat is
developing, he/she should immediately activate the SSAS to alert the Company
Security Officer and Administrator and call to report hostile or potentially hostile
action (including suspicious activity) to the local authorities, Regional
Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships
in Asia (ReCAAP) and/or International Maritime Bureau (IMB) (see Appendix I
for contact details) depending on ship location.

2.3 Follow-up Reporting of Incident

.1 Masters, owners or operators must immediately (within 24 hours) report by fax or

email the occurrence of all incidents of piracy and armed robbery, armed attacks,
attempted or actual hijacking, terrorism or other hostile or suspicious activity,
including apparent surveillance being conducted by small vessels, on or near their
vessels to:

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 Republic of the Marshall Islands Maritime Administrator
c/o Investigations
11495 Commerce Park Drive
Reston, Virginia 20191-1506 USA
Fax: +1-703-476-8522
Email: [email protected]
[email protected]

.2 The report should be submitted to the Administrator on form MI-109-2, Report of

Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships, contained in Appendix III of this
Notice.

.3 Reports received by the Administrator will be transmitted to:

 National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA), Bethesda, MD, USA;

 IMO, Maritime Safety Department, London;
 IMB, Essex, UK; and
 The International Shipping Federation, London.

.4 The MI-109-2 form also may be used for submissions to the international
organizations (e.g., Maritime Security Centre – Horn of Africa (MSCHOA),
UKMTO, Maritime Liaison Office (MARLO), IMB and IMO). BMPs dictate that
post incident reports be filled out by the Master and forwarded to the
Administrator for further forwarding to UKMTO and MSCHOA.

.5 Refer to Appendix I of this Notice for all contact details of the naval/ military
forces and IMB.

2.4. Reporting Acts of Violence Against Crew

.1 The RMI is a signatory to the 3 August 2011 Declaration Condemning Acts of

Violence Against Seafarers (the “Washington Declaration”). This Declaration
recognizes that such acts of violence are largely underreported and that this
information would be of value to the maritime community in the fight against
piracy.

.2 The International Maritime Bureau (IMB) of the International Chamber of

Commerce has undertaken to collect this information on violence against ships‟
crews. As such, the IMB has developed a questionnaire (see Appendix VI). This
questionnaire should be completed by MI-flag vessel owner/operators post-
incident.

.3 Importantly, the Declaration Condemning Acts of Violence Against Seafarers

requires all reporting bodies or agencies to refrain from reporting or confirming
the names of any vessel upon which an act of piracy or armed robbery has been
committed, until such time as the vessel owners/operators can confirm
notification to next of kin.

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 BEST MANAGEMENT PRACTICES GUIDELINES - ANNEX A

In an effort to counter piracy in the GoA, the Somali Basin and Indian Ocean, industry
has developed and prepared the Best Management Practices (BMPs) Guidelines which are
supported and endorsed by the Administrator through the New York Declaration. The BMPs
Guidelines aim to assist Companies and ships in avoiding piracy attacks by providing suggested
planning and recommended operational practices. The BMPs Guidelines complement guidance
provided in IMO‟s MSC.1/Circ.1337 (reference (d), of this Notice). This Annex is a
consolidation of the BMPs and additional guidance provided by the Administrator through
lessons learned. See Appendix VII for signatories to and updating of the BMPs.

1.0 Definitions

1.1 Armed Robbery

.1 Armed robbery against ships means any of the following acts:

(a) any illegal act of violence or detention or any act of depredation, or threat
thereof, other than an act of piracy, committed for private ends and
directed against a ship or against persons or property on board such a ship,
within a State‟s internal waters, archipelagic waters and territorial sea;

(b) any illegal act of violence or detention or any act of depredation, or threat
thereof, other than an act of piracy, committed for private ends and
directed against a ship or against persons or property on board such a ship
within a State‟s internal waters, archipelagic waters and territorial sea; or

(c) any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described above.

1.2 Piracy

.1 United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)

As contained in Article 101 of UNCLOS and as amended consistent with the

Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery
against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP), piracy consists of any of the following acts:

(a) any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation,

committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship
or a private aircraft, and directed:

i. on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or

property on board such ship or aircraft;

ii. against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the

jurisdiction of any State;

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 (b) any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an
aircraft with knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft; or

(c) any act inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in

subparagraph (a) or (b) above.

.2 BMPs Guidance on Definition of Piracy

To provide a clear, practical, working definition, the BMPs provide the following
as guidance for determining whether an attack is piracy:

(a) the use of violence against the ship or its personnel or any attempt to use
violence;

(b) attempt(s) to board the vessel where the Master suspects persons are
pirates;

(c) an actual boarding whether successful in gaining control of the vessel or

not; or

(d) attempts to overcome the ship‟s protective measures by the use of:
 ladders
 grappling hooks
 weapons deliberately used against or at the vessel.

1.3 Suspicious Activity

.1 Action taken by another craft may be deemed suspicious if any of the following
occur (the list is not exhaustive and should be treated as guidance):

(a) a definite course alternation towards the craft associated with a rapid
increase in speed, by the suspected craft, which cannot be accounted for a
normal activity in the circumstances prevailing in the area;

(b) small craft sailing on the same course and speed for an uncommon period
and distance, not in keeping with normal fishing or other circumstances
prevailing in the area;

(c) sudden changes in course toward the vessel and aggressive behavior.

.2 In helping to evaluate suspicious activity, the following may be of assistance to

determine the nature of a suspect vessel:

(a) the number of crew on board relative to its size;

(b) the Closest Point of Approach (CPA);

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 (c) the existence of unusual and non-fishing equipment (e.g., ladders,
climbing hooks or large amounts of fuel onboard;

(d) if the craft is armed in excess of the level commonly experienced in the
area;

(e) if weapons are fired in the air.

1.4 High Risk Areas

“High Risk Areas” are “areas of the ocean where acts of terrorism, piracy or armed
robbery have taken place.” An area defined as High Risk may change periodically or
over time due to changes in weather, tactics and areas of operation of the perpetrators.
Therefore, it is imperative that owners, operators and Masters assess areas of risk based
on the latest available information from the MSCHOA and NATO Shipping Centre
(NSC). Vessels also must be prepared to alter course at short notice to avoid pirate
activity when information is provided by NAV Warnings and/or naval/military forces.

.1 BMPs High Risk Area

(a) Somalia, the North West Indian Ocean and GoA: The High Risk Area
contained in the BMPs Guidelines is defined as an area bounded by Suez, the
Strait of Hormuz to the North (26ºN), 10°S and 78°E. (Note: the UKMTO
voluntary Reporting Area is slightly larger as it includes the Arabian Gulf).
Attacks have taken place at most extremities of the HRA, including at 78° E.
The possibility remains that they could take place further out. Attacks to the
South have extended into the Mozambique Channel and below 10°S. A high
state of readiness and vigilance should be maintained even to the South of the
Southerly limit of the High Risk Area. Therefore, the Administrator has
extended the limits of the HRA to 15ºS and advises against using the
Mozambique Channel altogether.

.2 Other High Risk Areas

(a) Strait of Hormuz and Gulf of Oman: The Strait of Hormuz and Gulf of
Oman are considered a High Risk Area by the Administrator. It is highly
recommended that all ships transiting the Strait of Hormuz exercise the
highest level of vigilance and caution, particularly during night transits
with increased monitoring of small vessel and boat activity. Ship Masters
that observe suspicious activity in the area and around their vessel are
advised to make as early an assessment of a threat as possible. See section
5.8, below.

(b) Waters Near Yemen: A piracy operating area has been established in the
southern end of the Red Sea. In addition, information suggests that al-
Qaida remains interested in maritime attacks in the Bab-al-Mandeb Strait,
Red Sea and the GoA along the coast of Yemen. It should be noted that
for reasons of customary international law, it is not possible for

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 international military forces (non-Yemeni) to be able to protect ships that
are attacked inside Yemeni Territorial Waters (12 miles).

(c) Indian Ocean: Recent attacks indicate that pirates are moving towards
the eastern part of the Indian Ocean approaching closer to Indian west and
south coast, Lakshadweep/Minicoy Islands, northern Maldives. There
have been reports indicating that pirates have and will continue to operate
as far south as the Mozambique Channel and 15°S latitude. Vessels
sailing in the western, central, eastern and northern parts of the Indian
Ocean should maintain strict antipiracy measures.

(d) South East Asia and South China Sea: The situation in Southeast Asia
has deteriorated recently. Although attacks at sea have increased, attacks
in the region are mainly opportunistic petty theft from ships at anchor or in
port. These occur in and around ports and anchorages in Indonesia,
Vietnam and the Philippines. Pirates in these regions are normally armed
with guns, knives and or machetes and attack at night. Attacks in the
South China Sea continue, particularly in the vicinity of the Anambas,
Natuna, Mangka Islands, Subi Besar and Merundung areas. Vessels
sailing in the South East Asia and the South China Sea should maintain
strict antipiracy measures, including maintaining a strict antipiracy watch
when transiting the Malacca Straits.

(e) West Africa: Piracy, armed robbery and reports of hostage-taking are
increasing in the Gulf of Guinea. Such incidents have occurred in: Benin
(Cotonou), Guinea (Conakry), Cameroon (Douala Outer Anchorage) and
Nigeria (Lagos and Bonny River). These incidents in West Africa are
different than those occurring off the Coast of Somalia and in the Indian
Ocean. Somali pirates, to date, have sought to hijack a vessel, her cargo
and crew and hold them until a ransom demand is paid. In contrast, the
perpetrators in West Africa are more violent, often terrorizing and injuring
the crews before robbing them and their ship of valuables and cargo. Most
recently, the United Nations voiced concern over the increase in piracy in
this West African sub-region. Vessels transiting these areas are advised to
take extra precautions and maintain appropriate anti-piracy BMPs.

(f) Latin America: .Increases in maritime criminal incidents, primarily

armed theft, have been noted off the Pacific Coast of Latin America,
particularly at the Peruvian port of Callao. Incidents of piracy (violent
attacks resulting in death) off the coast of Venezuela are a serious concern
especially for yachts. Yachts sailing in Venezuelan waters should exercise
a heightened level of caution and implement appropriate BMPs.

1.5 Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor (IRTC)

.1 IMO SN.1/Circ.281 provides the details of the IRTC in the GoA. This corridor
includes the creation of separate eastbound and westbound transit lanes. Each
lane is 5 nm wide and is separated by a 2 nm buffer zone. The IRTC eastbound

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 lane begins at 045° E between 11° 48‟.00 N and 11°53‟.00 N. The lane is
oriented along a straight line course of 072° and terminates at 053° E between
14°18‟.00 N and 14°23‟.00 N. The IRTC westbound lane begins at 053° between
14°25‟.00 N and 14°30‟.00 N. The lane is oriented along a straight line course of
252° and terminates at 045° E between 11°55‟.00 N and 12°00‟.00 N.

.2 This IRTC is subject to change by military authorities according to prevailing

circumstances. Shipowners, ship operators and Masters are urged to obtain up-to-
date information from the MSCHOA website and NAV-warnings promulgated for
that area.

1.6 UKMTO Voluntary Reporting Area (VRA)

This is the area bounded by Suez to the North, Arabian Gulf, 10°S and 78°E. UKMTO
acts as the primary point of contact for merchant vessels and liaison with military forces
in the region. UKMTO is the primary point of contact during an attack. Vessels are
strongly encouraged to send regular reports to UKMTO as follows:

 Initial Report;
 Daily Reports (at 08:00 GMT); and
 Final Report (upon departure from the high risk area or arrival in port).
 Upon port departure, resume the above cycle.

Note: UKMTO is unable to receive directly and respond to an SSAS as a designated

recipient when a vessel is outside the UKMTO Voluntary Reporting Area.

1.7 Private Maritime Security Company (PMSC)

PMSCs are private contractors employed to provide private contracted security

personnel, both armed and unarmed, on board for protection against piracy.

2.0 Typical Pirate Attacks

2.1 Commonly, two (2) high-speed (up to 25 knots) open boats/skiffs are used in attacks,
often approaching from the starboard or port quarter and/or stern. Skiffs are frequently
fitted with 2 outboard engines or a larger single 60hp engine.

2.2 Pirate Action Groups (PAG) operate in a number of different boat configurations. To
date, whatever the configuration, the attack phase is carried out by skiffs. PAG boat
configurations include:

 Skiffs only-usually two (2).

 Open whalers carrying significant quantities of fuel often towing two (2) or more
attack skiffs.
 Motherships which have included the very largest of merchant ships, fishing vessels
and dhows. These motherships have been taken by the pirates and usually have their
own crew onboard as hostages. Motherships are used to carry pirates, stores, fuel and
attack skiffs to enable pirates to operate over a much larger area and are significantly

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 less affected by the weather. Attack skiffs are often towed behind motherships.
Where the size of the mothership allows it, skiffs are increasingly being carried
onboard and camouflaged to reduce chances of interdiction by naval/military forces.
 Attackers also have been known to try to blend in with local fishing boats, lie in wait
in the IRTC or to disguise themselves as Coastguard, naval personnel, or pilots in
order to board the ship. When a target ship nears, the attackers‟ boats will break
cover and approach the ship to allow the attackers to board the ship.

2.3 Increasingly, pirates use small arms fire and Rocket Propelled Grenades (RPGs) in an
effort to intimate Masters of ships to reduce speed and stop to allow the pirates to board.
The use of these weapons is generally focused on the bridge and accommodation area. In
what are difficult circumstances, it is very important to maintain Full Sea Speed,
increasing speed where possible, and using careful maneuvering to resist the attack.

2.4 Somali pirates seek to place their skiffs alongside the ship being attacked to enable one or
more armed pirates to climb onboard. Pirates frequently use long lightweight leaders and
ropes, or a long hooked pole with a knotted climbing rope to climb up the side of the
vessel being attacked. Once alongside, one or more armed pirates climb onboard. Pirates
frequently use long lightweight ladders or grappling irons hooked to the ship‟s rail to
climb up the sides of the vessel being attacked. Once onboard the pirate (or pirates) will
generally make their way to the bridge to take control of the vessel. Once on the bridge
the pirate/pirates will demand that the ship slows/stops to enable further pirates to board.

2.5 Attacks have taken place at most times of the day. However, many pirate attacks have
taken place early in the morning, at first light. Attacks have occurred at night,
particularly clear, moonlit nights, but nighttime attacks are less common.

2.6 The majority of attempted hijacks have been repelled by ship‟s crew who have planned
and trained in advance of the passage and applied BMPs.

3.0 Implementing BMPs

3.1 Master‟s Discretion

While recognizing the absolute discretion of the Master at all times to adopt appropriate
measures to avoid, deter or delay piracy attacks in this region, the recommended BMPs
provide suggested planning and operational measures for shipowners, ship operators,
Masters and their crews.

3.2 Fundamental BMPs Requirements

.1 The three fundamental requirements of BMPs are:

 Register at MSCHOA (See sections 4.2 and 5.1.4, below)

 Report to UKMTO (See section 5.1.5, below)
 Implement Ship Protection Measures (See section 7.0, below)

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 .2 The Administrator also recommends reporting to UKMTO as backup (see section
5.1.5.iii.c, below).

3.3 Risk Assessment and Factors to Consider

.1 Any decision to navigate in areas where the vessel‟s security may be threatened
requires careful consideration and detailed planning to best ensure the safety of
the vessel and crew. Prior to transiting a High Risk Area, the owner and Master
should carry out their own risk assessment to assess the likelihood and
consequences of piracy attacks, armed attacks, hijackings or terrorism on the ship,
based on the latest available information. Owners are highly recommended to
utilize the Automated Voyage Risk Assessment (AVRA) services being offered
by BIMCO which will generate an ISPS Code compliant specific threat
assessment for the individual ship concerned. The outcome of this risk
assessment should identify measures for prevention, mitigation and recovery and
will mean combining statutory requirements with supplementary measures to
combat piracy. Not all BMPs may be applicable for each ship. Therefore, as part
of the risk analysis, an assessment should determine which BMPs are most
suitable for the ship and its specific voyage.

.2 Factors to be considered in the risk assessment should include, but are not limited
to:

(a) Crew and Passenger Safety

 The primary consideration should be to ensure the safety of the crew

and passengers. Care should be taken, when formulating measures to
prevent illegal boarding and external access to the accommodation,
that crew members will not be trapped inside and should be able to
escape in the event of another type of emergency, such as for example,
fire.
 Careful consideration should be given to the location of a Safe Muster
Point or Citadel (See section 6.14, below).
 Consideration should also be given to the ballistic protection afforded
to the crew who may be required to remain on the bridge during a
pirate attack, recognizing that pirates increasingly fire at the bridge of
a vessel to try to force it to stop.

(b) Freeboard

 It is likely that pirates will try to board the ship being attacked at the
lowest point above the waterline, making it easier for them to climb
onboard. These points are often on either quarter.
 Experience suggests that vessels with a minimum freeboard that is
greater than eight (8) meters have a much greater chance of
successfully escaping a piracy attempt than those with less.
 A large freeboard will provide little or no protection, if the
construction of the ship provides assistance to pirates seeking to climb

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 onboard. Should this be the case, further protective measures should
be considered.
 A large freeboard alone may not be enough to deter a pirate attack.

(c) Speed

 One (1) of the most effective ways to defeat a pirate attack is by using
speed to try to outrun the attackers and/or make it difficult to board.
 To date, there have been no reported attacks where pirates have
boarded a ship that has been proceeding at over 18 knots. It is possible
however that pirate tactics and techniques may develop to enable them
to board faster moving ships.
 Ships are recommended to proceed at Full Sea Speed or at least 18
knots where they are capable of greater speed, throughout their transit
of the High Risk Area. If a vessel is part of a Group Transit (GT)
within the IRTC, speed may be required to be adjusted. It is important
to note that even vessels of low speed have successfully evaded attack
by not stopping under threat.
 Increase to maximum safe speed immediately and as quickly as
possible after identifying any suspicious vessel in order to try to open
the Closest Point of Approach (CPA) from any possible attackers
and/or make the vessel more difficult to board.
 Reference should be made to the MSCHOA, NATO Shipping Centre
and MARLO websites for the latest threat guidance regarding attack
speed capability.

(d) Sea State

 Weather continues to be a primary factor determining when pirates

will operate. Pirates mount their attacks from very small craft (skiffs),
even where they are supported by larger vessels or “mother ships,”
which tends to limit their operations to moderate sea states.
 It is likely to be more difficult to operate these small craft effectively
in Sea State 3 and above.

(e) Pirate Activity: The risk of a piracy attack appears to increase

immediately following the release of a hijacked vessel and/or following a
period of poor weather when pirates have been unable to operate.

4.0 Company Planning

4.1 Prior to Entering High Risk Area

.1 Register Ship with MSCHOA

Ship operators should register for access to the restricted section of the MSCHOA
website (www.MSCHOA.org) prior to entering the area bounded by 78°E, 10°S
and 23°N and Suez. Registration with the MSCHOA website is required before a

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 Vessel Movement Registration Form can be submitted as provided in section
4.2.1, below.

The Administrator recommends, however, that preparation for registration should

begin as soon as the ship begins entering the HRA at the Suez Canal from the Red
Sea, at 26°N for ships entering via the Gulf of Oman from the north, at 15°S for
ships entering via the Indian Ocean from the south, and at 78°E for ships entering
via the Indian Ocean from the east.

.2 Monitor Websites

Great care should be taken in voyage planning given that pirate attacks are taking
place at extreme ranges from the Somali Coast, including most recently, West
Africa. It is critical to obtain the latest information on High Risk Areas from the
MSCHOA, NATO Shipping Centre and other relevant websites (see Appendix 1)
before planning and executing a voyage. All Navigation Warnings (e.g., SAT C,
IMB, ReCAAP or MI Marine Safety Advisories) also should be monitored and
acted upon as appropriate by the ship‟s Master.

.3 Review the SSA and SSP

Review the SSA and implementation of the SSP as required by the ISPS Code and
MI Marine Notice 2-011-16 to counter the piracy threat. Companies should have
procedures in place to act upon receipt of a ship-to-shore security alert, including
notification of the Administrator.

.4 Put the SSP in Place

The Company Security Officer (CSO) is encouraged to ensure that a SSP is in

place for a passage through the High Risk Area, and that this is exercised, briefed
and discussed with the Master and the Ship Security Officer. See MG 2-11-12 for
additional guidance for CSOs in preparing a Company and crew for the
contingency of a hijacking in the Western Indian Ocean and GoA.

.5 Offer Route Guidance

Offer the ship‟s Master guidance with regard to the recommended routing through
the High Risk Area and details of the piracy threat. Guidance should be provided
on the available methods of transiting the IRTC (e.g., a Group Transit or National
Convoys where these exist.)

 Group Transits. Group Transits coordinated by MSCHOA within the IRTC,

group vessels together by speed for maximum protection. Further details of
Group Transit schemes including departure timings can be found on the
MSCHOA website.
 National Convoys. A number of naval/military forces offer protected convoys
through the IRTC. Details of the convoy schedules may be found on the
MSCHOA website.

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 Reference should be made to the MSCHOA website for the latest routing
guidance and naval escorted convoys. See also section 5.3, below.

.6 Plan and Install Ship Protection Measures

The provision of carefully planned and installed Ship Protection Measures prior to
transiting the High Risk Area is very strongly recommended. Suggested Ship
Protection Measures are set out in section 7.0. Ship Protection Measures
significantly increases the prospects of a ship resisting a pirate attack.

.7 Conduct Crew Training

Conduct crew training sessions (including Citadel Drills where utilized) prior to
transits and debriefing sessions post transits.

4.2 Upon entering the High Risk Area

.1 Submit “Vessel Movement Registration” Form

A “Vessel Movement Registration” form should be submitted by the ship‟s

operator (or Masters where vessels have internet access) to MSCHOA before the
vessel enters the area bounded by 78°E, 10°S, 23°N and Suez.

Submission of the “Vessel Movement Registration” form may be accomplished

directly online or by fax or email. The MSCHOA website
(http://www.mschoa.org) should always be consulted to ensure that the most up to
date version of the form is used. User ID and Password are required which may
be applied for through the website (see 4.1.1, above).

.2 Best Management Practices

Ensure that BMPs measures are in place prior to entry into the High Risk Area.
.
4.3 Use of Private Contracted Armed Security Personnel (PCASP)

.1 The Administrator does not object to vessel owners, operators, and/or Masters
taking appropriate measures in regard to the safety and security of their vessels
and crew. MI legislation or regulations do not prohibit the use of PMSC.

.2 Whether to use PCASP and how to facilitate that detail is a decision for the
individual vessel owner/operator to make only after conducting a thorough risk
assessment of the voyage, consulting with appropriate parties, and ensuring all
other practical means of self protection have been employed.

.3 The risk assessment should include and document the following factors and
considerations:

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  vessel and crew security, safety and protection;
 whether all practical means of self protection have been effectively
implemented in advance;
 the potential misuse of firearms resulting in bodily injury or death;
 the potential for unforeseen accidents;
 liability issues, including those related to use of force;
 the potential for escalation of the situation at hand;
 compliance with international and all RMI laws and regulations; and
 careful consideration of any supplemental guidance on PCASP promulgated
by the Administrator.

.4 The risk assessment should take into account the guidelines provided in
MSC.1/Circ.1405, Rev.1 and include discussions with labour representatives, port
officials, charterers, legal counsel, and insurance underwriters as appropriate. It is
also important to involve the Master in the decision making process.

.5 The use of PCASP should not be considered an alternative to BMPs and other
protective measures.

5.0 Master’s Planning

5.1 Prior to Entering the High Risk Area

.1 Crew Briefing

It is recommended that the crew should be fully briefed on the preparations and a
drill conducted prior to arrival in the High Risk area. The attack response plan
should be reviewed and all personnel briefed on their duties, including familiarity
with the alarm signal signifying a piracy attack, the all clear and the appropriate
response to each. The drill should also consider the following:

 Testing of the vessel‟s Ship Protection Measures, including testing of the

security of all access points; and
 Thorough review of the Ship Security Plan.

.2 Emergency Communication Plan

Masters are advised to prepare an emergency communication plan, to include all

essential emergency contact numbers and pre-prepared messages, which should
be ready at hand or permanently displayed near the external communications
stations (e.g., telephone numbers of UKMTO, MSCHOA, MARLO, IMB Piracy
Reporting Centre (PRC), CSO, etc.).

.3 Define the Ship‟s AIS Policy

SOLAS permits the Master the discretion to switch off AIS if he believes that its
use increases the ship‟s vulnerability. However, in order to provide naval/military
forces with tracking information within the High Risk Area, it is recommended

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 that AIS transmission is left on across the entire High Risk Area, but restrict
output to ship‟s identity, position, course, speed, navigational status and safety
related information only. It should be noted that this is a change in the previous
guidance which recommended that AIS be left on only in the Gulf of Aden. If the
AIS is switched off during a transit, it should be activated immediately at the time
of an attack as it will be very difficult for responding naval/military forces to find
and identify the ship without it. Masters should check the MSCHOA and NATO
Shipping Center websites for any updates on AIS policy prior to passage.

.4 Vessel Movement Registration

Ensure that a “Vessel Movement Registration” submission has been submitted

with MSCHOA by the Company four (4) to five (5) days before entering:

 Suez for ships entering the region via the Red Sea;
 The Arabian Gulf at 26°N
 15° S for ships entering the region via the Indian Ocean (South); and
 78º E for ships entering the region via the Indian Ocean (East).

If the Form has not been completed and submitted by the Company, the Master
should submit it by email/fax. If it is completed by the Company, Masters should
satisfy themselves with their companies that their details are correctly registered
with MSCHOA. The MSCHOA website ( http://www.mschoa.org) should always
be consulted to ensure that the most up to date version of the form is used.

.5 Position Reporting

.a Initial Vessel Position Report

i. Masters having registered their ship with MSCHOA should send an

Initial Vessel Position Report to UKMTO. Report (noon position,
course, speed, and estimated and actual arrival times) to UKMTO and
MARLO three (3) to four (4) days before entering the GoA, passing
the Coast of Somalia or entering the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). The
reporting scheme covers the Suez area, Red Sea, Indian Ocean North
of 10° S and West of 78° E as well as the Arabian Gulf. The UKMTO
Vessel Position Reporting Form – Initial Report should be used to
make the report. It is very important to understand that naval/military
forces cannot be prepared to assist if they are unaware of the ship‟s
presence and location in the High Risk Areas.

ii. The Administrator recommends, based on actual attacks and shifts in

pirate activity, that ships initially report to the UKMTO team on
passing the following reference points:

 Suez for ships entering or leaving the region via the Red Sea;
 The Arabian Gulf/Strait of Hormuz at 26°N;

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  15°S for ships entering or leaving the IOR via the Indian Ocean
(South); and
 78º E for ships entering or leaving the region via the Indian Ocean
(East).

See Anti-Piracy Planning Chart Q6099 (Appendix IV of this Notice).

iii. Upon receiving the vessel‟s initial report, UKMTO will reply giving
specific threat guidance relevant at the time. Experience has shown
that to transit West of 60 E or within 600 nm of the Somali Coast
significantly increases the risk of pirate attacks, although attacks have
and will occur East of this area.

.b Report Frequency

Vessels are encouraged to increase the frequency of such reports to hourly

intervals when within six (6) hours of entering or navigating within the
IRTC.

.c Reports to MARLO

As an additional precautionary measure, Masters of vessels are advised to

provide passage information to MARLO 48 hours prior to transiting
through the GoA via email to [email protected], or telephone
+973-1785-1395.

5.2 To Dos whenTransiting through the High Risk Area

.1 Minimize Maintenance and Engineering Work by:

 Strictly controlling any work outside of the accommodations and limiting and
controlling access points.
 Ensuring all engine room essential equipment is immediately available; no
maintenance on essential equipment.

.2 Submit Daily Position Reports

Vessels are strongly encouraged to report daily to the UKMTO and MARLO by
email at 08:00 hours GMT while operating within the High Risk Area. The
UKMTO Vessel Position Reporting Form-Daily Position Report should be used.

.3 Review and Heed All Warnings and Information

The Master (and Company) should appreciate that the voyage routing may need to
be reviewed in light of updated information received. This information and
warnings may be provided by a number of different means including, NAV
WARNINGS-Sat C (and NAVTEXT in limited areas). It is important that all
warnings and information are carefully reviewed and considered.

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5.3 Group Transit

.1 Naval/military forces, coordinated by MSCHOA, operate the Group Transit

Scheme within the International Recommended Transit Corridor (IRTC). This
scheme groups vessels together by speed for maximum protection for their transit
through the IRTC. Guidance on the Group Transit Scheme, including the
departure timings for the different groups, is included on the MSCHOA website
or can be obtained by fax from MSCHOA.

a. It is strongly recommended that ships, particularly those that are low and
slow, use GT and conduct their passage within the IRTC, where
naval/military forces are concentrated.

b. Westbound ships should navigate to the Northern portion of the corridor,

and Eastbound ships should navigate in the Southern part of the IRTC.

c. During GTs, ships should not expect to be permanently in the company of

a warship or within visual range. But all warships in the GoA, whether
part of EU NAVFOR or coordinating with them, will be aware of the GoA
GTs and will have access to the full details of vulnerable shipping.

d. MSCHOA strongly recommends Masters make every effort to plan transit

periods of highest risk areas of the GoA for night passage (MSCHOA will
advise ships). Very few successful attacks have occurred at night.

e. Ships should avoid entering Yemeni Territorial Waters (YTW) or Omani

Territorial Waters (OTW) (12 miles) while on transit. This is for reasons
of customary international law, as it is very difficult for international
naval/military forces (non-Yemeni or Omani) to be able to protect ships
that are attacked inside YTW or OTW.

.2 Adjust Passage Plans

Ships may be asked to make adjustments to passage plans to confirm to

MSCHOA routing advice. Ships joining a GT should:

 carefully time their arrival to avoid a slow speed approach to the forming up
point (Point A or B);
 avoid waiting at the forming up point (Point A or B); and
 note that ships are particularly vulnerable to a pirate attack if they slowly
approach or wait at the forming up points (Points A and B).

5.4 National Convoys

Some countries offer independent convoy escorts through the IRTC where merchant
vessels are escorted by a warship. Details of the convoy schedules and how to apply to
be included are detailed on the MSCHOA website. It should be noted that most national

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 convoys require prior registration to enable vessels to join the convoy. Ships joining
national convoys should note the issues regarding Group Transit as they are also highly
relevant to vessels timing their arrival at a national convey forming up point.

6.0 Outside the GoA

.1 Great care should be taken in voyage planning in the High Risk Area outside the
GoA given that pirate attacks are taking place at extreme range from the Somali
Coast. It is recommended that all vessels not making scheduled calls to ports in
Somalia, Kenya or Tanzania keep as far from the Somali Coast as possible. Ships
transiting South and East of the Coast of Somalia to ports outside of East Africa
should consider navigating to the East of Madagascar or (for guidance) maintain a
distance of more than 600 nm from the coastline and when routing North/South
consider keeping East of 60 E Longitude until East of the Seychelles. It is
important to obtain the latest information from MSCHOA before planning and
executing a voyage. Details can be obtained from the MSCHOA website or by
fax.

.2 Masters should still update UKMTO in the usual manner with their ship course
and details using the UKMTO Vessel Position Reporting Form.

7.0 Ship Protective Measures

7.1 General

The guidance within this section primarily focuses on preparations that might be within
the capability of the ship‟s crew, or with some external assistance. The guidance is
based on experience of piracy attacks to date and may require amendment over time if the
pirates change their methods. The Ship Protective measures described in BMPs are the
most basic that are likely to be effective. Owners of vessels that make frequent transits
through High Risk Areas may consider making further alterations to the vessel and/or
provide additional equipment, and/or manpower as a means of further reducing the risk of
piracy attack.

.1 If pirates are unable to board a ship, they cannot hijack it.

.2 Harden the ship before it enters the HRA. Check that ship protection measures
put in place in advance remain securely fitted and function as intended, being
mindful that temporary devices may work loose and consequently may only
provide a reduced level of protection.

.3 See Appendix II, Bridge Checklist, as an example of self-protection measures that

can be taken to avoid danger.

7.2 Watchkeeping and Enhanced Vigilance

.1 A proper lookout is the single most effective method of ship protection where
early warning of a suspicious approach or attack is assured, and where defenses

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 can be readily deployed. Therefore, prior to commencing transit of a High Risk
Area, it is recommended that preparations are made to support the requirement for
increased vigilance. Consideration should be given to:

 providing additional lookouts/bridge manning, taking into account the

vessel‟s minimum safe manning certificate and rest hour requirements, to
ensure additional lookouts for each Watch; additional lookouts should be fully
briefed;
 a shorter rotation of the Watch period in order to maximize alertness of the
lookouts.
 manning the engine room;
 ensuring that there are sufficient binoculars for the enhanced bridge team,
preferably anti-glare;
 the use of night vision optics;
 maintaining a careful Radar Watch.
 the use of well constructed dummies placed at strategic locations around the
vessel (e.g., at the rails to simulate additional lookouts) can give an
impression of greater numbers of people on watch. However, if ship design
creates lookout black spots and the security assessment identifies this risk,
then manpower may have to be used.

7.3 Closed Circuit Television (CCTV)

.1 Once an attack is underway and pirates are firing weaponry at the vessel, it is
difficult and dangerous to observe whether the pirates have managed to gain
access. The use of CCTV coverage allows a degree of monitoring of the progress
of the attack from a less exposed position. Recorded CCTV footage also may
provide useful evidence after an attack. Consider:

 the use of CCTV cameras, if fitted, to ensure coverage of vulnerable areas,

particularly the poop deck;
 positioning CCTV monitors at the rear of the bridge in a protected position;
and
 locating CCTV monitors at the Safe Muster Point/Citadel (see section 7.13
below).

.2 If CCTV systems are utilized, proper procedures must be in place for

maintenance, including documentation of repairs.

7.4 Maneuvering

Practicing maneuvering the vessel prior to entry into the High Risk Area is beneficial and
ensures familiarity with the ship‟s handling characteristics and how to effect anti-piracy
maneuvers whilst maintaining the best possible speed. (Waiting until the ship is attacked
before practicing is too late!). Where navigationally safe to do so, Masters are
encouraged to practice maneuvering their ships to establish which series of helm orders
produce the most difficult sea conditions for pirate skiffs trying to attack, without causing
a significant reduction in the ship‟s speed. The Master and Officers of the Watch should

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 be familiar with the impact of these zigzag maneuvers onboard their particular ship in all
sea conditions.

7.5 Alarms

.1 Sounding the ship‟s alarm/whistle serves to inform the vessel‟s crew that a piracy
attack has commenced and, importantly, demonstrates to any potential attacker
that the ship is aware of the attack and is reacting to it. If approached, continuous
sounding of the vessel‟s foghorn/whistle lets them know they have been seen. It
is important to ensure that:

 the Piracy Alarm is distinctive to avoid confusion with other alarms,

potentially leading to the crew mustering at the wrong location outside the
accommodation;
 crew members are familiar with each alarm, including the signal warning of
an attack and an all clear, and the appropriate response to it; and
 exercises are carried out prior to entering a High Risk Area.

7.6 Upper Deck Lighting

.1 It is recommended that the following lights are available and tested:

 weather deck lighting around the accommodation block and rear facing
lighting on the poop deck, consistent with Rule 20(b) of the International
Regulations for the Preventing Collision of Sea; and
 search lights for immediate use when required.

.2 Navigation lights should not be switched off at night. It is recommended that

ships proceed with just their navigation lights illuminated and the lighting
described above extinguished to avoid leading other ships to assume the ship is at
anchor).

.3 .Once pirates have been identified or an attack commences, illuminating the

lighting described above demonstrates to the pirates that they have been observed.

.4 The Administrator recommends procurement of high altitude white rocket

parachute flares for use in illuminating the local vicinity as well.

7.7 Deny Use of Ship‟s Tools and Equipment

.1 Pirates generally board vessels with little in the way of equipment other than
personal weaponry. It is important to try to deny pirates the use of ship‟s tools or
equipment that may be used to gain entry into the vessel. Tools and equipment
that may be of use to the pirates should be stored in a secure location.

.2 Check all ladders and outboard equipment are stowed or up on deck.

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7.8 Protection of Equipment Stored on the Upper Deck

.1 Small arms and other weaponry are often directed at the vessel and are
particularly concentrated on the bridge, accommodation section and poop deck.

.2 Consider providing protection, in the form of sandbags or Kevlar blankets, to gas

bottles (i.e. oxyacetylene) or containers of flammable liquids that must be stored
in these locations.

.3 Ensure that any excess gas bottles or flammable materials are landed prior to
transit.

7.9 Control of Access to Bridge, Accommodation and Machinery Spaces

.1 It is very important to control access routes to deter or delay pirates who have
managed to board a vessel and are trying to enter accommodation or machinery
spaces. It is very important to recognize that if pirates do gain access to the upper
deck of a vessel they will be tenacious in their efforts to gain access to the
accommodation section and, in particular, the bridge. It is strongly recommended
that significant effort is expended prior to entry to the High Risk Area to deny the
pirates access to the accommodation and the bridge.

.2 All potential access points (doors, hatches, portholes, vents, etc.) should be risk-
assessed and adequately secured, especially where the potential access point is
considered large enough for an attacker to gain entry.

.3 All doors and hatches providing access to the bridge, accommodation and
machinery spaces should be properly secured to prevent them being opened by
pirates.

.4 Careful consideration should be given to the means of securing doors and hatches
in order to afford the ship the maximum protection possible. Access to and from
the accommodation and internal work spaces should be reduced to a single point
of entry when transiting the High Risk Area.

.5 It is recommended that once doors and hatches are secured, a designated and
limited number are used for routine access when required, their use being strictly
controlled by the Officer of the Watch (OOW).

.6 Where doors and hatches are required to be closed for watertight integrity, ensure
all clips are fully dogged down in addition to any locks. Where possible,
additional securing such as with wire strops may enhance hatch security.

.7 Pirates have been known to gain access through portholes and windows. The
fitting of steel bars to windows will prevent this even if they manage to shatter the
window.

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 .8 Check that all outdoor equipment is stowed or up on the deck. This includes
blocking or lifting external ladders on the accommodation block to prevent their
use and to restrict external access to the bridge.

.9 Any measures employed should not obstruct an emergency EXIT from within the
internal space, while remaining secure from access by pirates outside. Where the
door or hatch is located on an escape route from a manned compartment, it is
essential that it can be opened by a seafarer trying to effect an exit by that route.
Where the door or hatch is locked it is essential that a key is available, in a clear
position by the door or hatch.

.10 Prior to entering the High Risk Area procedures for controlling access to
accommodation, machinery spaces and store rooms should be set out and
practiced.

7.10 Enhanced Bridge Protection

.1 The bridge is usually the focus of any pirate attack. In the initial part of the
attack, pirates direct weapons fire at the bridge to try to coerce the ship to stop. If
they are able to board the vessel, the pirates usually try to make for the bridge to
enable them to take control. Consider:

 providing Kevlar jackets and helmets to the bridge team for enhanced
protection during an attack (if possible, jackets and helmets should be in a
non-military color);
 while most bridge windows are laminated, further protection against flying
glass can be provided by the application of security glass film, often called
Blast Resistant Film;
 fabricated metal (steel/aluminum) plates for the side and rear bridge windows
and the bridge wing door windows, which may be rapidly secured in place in
the event of an attack; and
 the after part of both bridge wings (often open) can be protected by a wall of
sandbags.
 The sides and rear of the bridge, and the bridge wings, may be protected with
a double layer of chain link fence which has been shown to reduce the effect
of an RPG round. Proprietary anti-RPG screens area also available.

7.11 Physical Barriers

Pirates typically use long, lightweight hooked ladders, grappling hooks with rope
attached and long hooked poles with a climbing rope attached to board vessels underway.
Physical barriers should be used to make it as difficult as possible to gain access to
vessels by increasing the height and difficulty of any climb for an attacking pirate

Before constructing any physical barriers, it is recommended that a thorough survey is

conducted to identify areas vulnerable to pirates trying to gain access. Such barriers
should not materially impede access to life saving equipment.

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 .1 Razor Wire

 A robust razor wire barrier is particularly effective if constructed outboard of,

or overhanging, the ship‟s structure so as to make it difficult for pirates to
hook on their boarding ladder (or grappling hook) to the ship‟s structure.
 Razor wire (also known as barbed tape) creates an effective barrier when
carefully deployed. The barbs on the wire are designed to have piercing and
gripping action. Care should be taken when selecting appropriate razor wire
as the quality (wire gauge and frequency of barbs) and type will vary
considerably. Lower quality razor wire is unlikely to be effective.
 Three main types of razor wire are commonly available: unclipped (straight
strand), spiral (like a telephone cord) and concertina (linked spirals).
Concertina razor wire is recommended as the linked spirals make it the most
effective barrier.
 Razor wire should be constructed of high tensile wire, which is difficult to cut
with hand tools. Concertina razor wire coil diameters of approximately 730
mm or 980 mm are recommended.
 When deploying razor wire, personal protective equipment to protect hands,
arms and faces must be used. Moving razor wire using wire hooks (like meat
hooks) rather than by gloved hand reduces the risk of injury. It is
recommended that razor wire is provided in shorter sections (e.g. 10 meter
section) as it is significantly easier and safer to use than larger sections which
can be very heavy and unwieldy.
 A robust razor wire barrier is particularly effective if it is:
o Constructed outboard of the ship‟s structure (i.e. overhanging) to make it
more difficult for pirate to hook on their boarding ladder/grappling hooks
to the ship‟s structure.
o Constructed of a double roll of concertina wire-some vessels use a treble
roll of concertina razor wire which is even more effective.
o Properly secured to the vessel to prevent pirates pulling off the razor wire,
with for example the hook of a boarding ladder. Consideration should
also be given to further securing the razor wire with a wire strop thorough
the razor wire to prevent it being dislodged.

.2 Some vessels utilize fixed metal grills topped with metal spikes as an effective
barrier.

.3 Electrified Barriers

Electrified barriers are not recommended for hydrocarbon carrying vessels, but
following a full risk assessment, can be appropriate and effective for some other
types of vessels.

.4 Warning Signs

It is recommended that warning signs of the electrified fence or barrier are

displayed-inward facing in English/language of the crew, outward facing in
Somali.

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 The use of such outward facing warning signs might also be considered as a
deterrent even if no part of the barrier is actually electrified.

See below for an example of a warning sign.

Example of a warning sign in Somali, which states –

DANGER HIGH VOLTAGE ELECTRIC BARRIER

7.12 Water Spray and Foam Monitors

.1 The use of water spray and/or foam monitors has been found to be effective in
deterring or delaying pirates attempting to board a vessel. The use of water can
make it difficult for a pirate skiff to remain alongside and makes it significantly
more difficult for a pirate to try to climb onboard. Options include:

 Fire Hoses and Foam Monitors-Manual operation of hoses and foam monitors
is not recommended as this is likely to place the operator in a particularly
exposed position and therefore it is recommended that hoses and foam
monitors (delivering water) should be fixed in position to cover likely pirate
access routes. Improved water coverage may be achieved by using fire hoses
in jet mode and by utilizing baffle plates fixed a short distance in front of the
nozzle.
 Water cannons-These are designed to deliver water in a vertical sweeping arch
thus protecting a greater part of the hull. Many of these have been developed
from tank cleaning machines.
 Ballast pumps-Where possible to do so whips may utilize their ballast pumps
to flood the deck with water thus providing a highly effective water curtain
over the ship‟s side. This may be achieved by allowing ballast tanks to over-
flow on the deck, by using existing pipe-work when in ballast condition, or by
retrofitting pipe-work to allow flooding of the decks whilst in loaded
condition. Care must be taken to ensure that ballast tanks are not over-
pressurized causing damaged to hull and tanks, or vessel stability

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 compromised. If doubt it is recommended that the respective Classification
Society be contracted for advice.
 Steam-Hot water, or using a diffuser nozzle to produce steam, to deter pirates
has also been found to be very effective in deterring attacks.
 Water spray rails-Some ships have installed spray rails using a Glass
Reinforced Plastic (GRP) water main, with spray nozzles to produce a water
curtain to cover larger areas.
 Foam can be used, but it must be in addition to a vessel‟s standard Fire
Fighting Equipment (FFE) stock. Foam is effective as it is disorienting and
very slippery making it difficult to climb through.
 The following points are also worthy of note:
o Once rigged and fixed in position, it is recommended that hoses and foam
monitors are in a ready state (pressurized and ready for discharge),
requiring just the remote activation of fire pumps to commence delivery of
water.
o Where possible, no maintenance should be carried out on the vessel‟s sea
water systems whilst on passage in the High Risk Area. Note that in order
to utilize all pumps additional power may be required and therefore these
systems should also be ready for immediate use.
o Practice, observation, and drills will be required in order to ensure that the
results achieved by the equipment, provide effective coverage of
vulnerable areas.

7.13 Safe Muster Point

.1 A safe muster point is a designated area chosen to provide maximum physical

protection to the crew, preferably low down within the vessel. In the event of a
suspicious approach, members of the crew not required on the bridge or the
engine control room (ECR) will muster here. A Safe Muster Point is a short-term
safe haven, which provides ballistic protection should the pirates commence firing
with small arms weaponry or RPGs.

.2 The Administrator recommends that a safe mustering location be designated and

mustering procedures rehearsed in order to delay access to control of the ship and
to buy time. Ideally this should be away from external bulkheads and portholes.
Strategy for placement of a safe muster point also should include due
consideration of fire protection systems aboard the vessel.

7.14 Citadel Guidelines

.1 Use of Citadels

a. A Citadel is a designated pre-planned area purpose-built into the ship where,

in the event of imminent boarding by pirates, all crew will seek protection. A
Citadel is designed and constructed to resist a determined pirate trying to gain
entry and provides longer term protection (for a fixed period of time as
determined by a risk assessment) of the crew as compared to a safe muster
point.

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 .b Since January 2010 there have been 26 cases where pirates have actually
boarded vessels, but have been unable to take control because the vessels crew
have all successfully sought refuge in a pre-planned Citadel; however there
have also been several cases where Citadels have been breached. This
breaching may be attributed to a number of factors, including poor
construction and location of the Citadel.

c. With the use of Citadels increasing, the pirates have similarly gained
experience in defeating a Citadel. This includes use of weapons, ship board
tools and attempts to smoke out the crew and/or set fire to the vessel.
Importantly, Somali pirates‟ knowledge and modus operandi continue to
evolve over time. As their knowledge on Citadels increases, then their ability
and methodology in attempting to defeat a citadel will also change, and
therefore more robust protection will be required.

d. Initially the Citadel concept was restricted to the GoA where a rapid response
by the naval/military forces was considered possible. In these cases the crew
generally retreated to a locked Engine Room and thence blacked out the vessel
to await assistance. However, more recently attacks and illegal boardings
have occurred further out in the Indian Ocean, including the Somali Basin and
Arabian Sea. In these cases the possibility of a response by naval/military
assets is more remote, and with the paramount consideration being the safety
of the crew, it becomes essential that any use of a Citadel is properly planned
with all factors being considered.

e. Consideration will have to be taken as to the exact use of the Citadel should
the vessel have a Security Team on board. The Citadel will only be effective
if all crew, security teams and personnel onboard embarked for the passage
are secured within the Citadel. When determining the operating instructions
for a Citadel it should be borne in mind that Military Forces will not board a
vessel unless all personnel onboard are confirmed as safely secured within the
Citadel.

f. If a Citadel is utilized, clear and comprehensive procedures on its use should

be written into the SSP. Citadel use should be practiced and drilled in order
for all crew to understand their roles, and to train in the time taken to ensure
an effective lock down. The procedures also should address rules for exiting
the Citadel in cases where the pirates are employing weapons, particularly in
anger.

g. Due to the ongoing debate on the use of Citadels and their method of
employment, CSOs and Masters are advised to check regularly with the
MSCHOA and NATO Shipping Centre website for proper guidance in their
establishment and use.

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 .2 Risk Assessment

a. Any decision to utilize a Citadel should be based upon a thorough risk

assessment that is conducted on a ship-by-ship basis. The use of a Citadel
should be complementary to, rather than a replacement for, ship protection
measures set out in the BMPs and in this Notice.

b. The risk assessment, which is dependent upon the vessel‟s trading patterns,
construction and needs, should consider, but is not limited to:

 physical size, speed and vulnerability of the vessel;

 the ability to meet the Citadel criteria as provided in section 7.14.4, below;
 geographical trading area including consideration that the naval/military
forces may not be able to offer assistance;
 that all other avenues of self protection based upon BMPs have been
effectively implemented; and
 the potential consequences of an escalation of the situation.

.3 Citadel Design

a. A Citadel must be designed and constructed to resist a determined pirate

trying to gain entry. If the risk assessment determines that a citadel is
required, consideration should be given to:

 Location of the Citadel

 Time frame for Citadel survivability
 Construction of the Citadel
 Use and operation of the Citadel
 Naval/military forces response/assistance

b. New ships should be designed with security and safety in mind, particularly if
contemplating transits through High Risk Areas. During the design and
construction process, consideration should be given as how best to ensure that
the accommodation block and decks can be locked down while still meeting
all relevant SOLAS requirements, including those for fire protection and
means of escape.

c. Establishment of a Citadel is likely beyond the capability of a ship‟s staff

alone and may well require external technical advice and support.
Owners/operators should contact the Administrator for more specific guidance
on the construction and use of citadels.

.4 Military Considerations

a. Having a Citadel does not guarantee a naval/military force response.

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 b. Naval/military forces apply criteria before considering a boarding operation to
release crew from the Citadel. These criteria are contained on the MSCHOA
and NATO Shipping Centre websites and currently are as follows:

 100% of the crew must be secured in the Citadel (Remember: the whole
concept of a Citadel approach is lost if any crew member is left outside
before it is secured).
 The crew of the ship must have self contained, independent, reliable
2-way external communications (sole reliance on VHF communications
is not sufficient).
 The pirates must be denied access to ship propulsion.

c. Other factors which determine the ability of the naval/military forces to

respond even if the conditions in b. above are satisfied include:

 The location of the vessel that has been boarded illegally in relation to the
naval vessel. In addition to any geographic limitations between two
vessels, some naval assets have a strict area of operations which are
imposed upon them. They are not permitted to use force outside of this
area.
 In many cases the naval/military force is required to have a specially
trained team on board to enable an „opposed boarding‟ to be conducted.
 The naval/military forces may have to obtain approval for an opposed
boarding from the flag state of the vessel to be boarded and from the
Foreign Office for all Nationalities on board. The Administrator is
required to provide UKMTO in writing assurances that all personnel
onboard are confirmed by the CSO to be safely secured within the Citadel
before military forces will be authorized to attempt an opposed boarding
of a vessel.
 Weather considerations may prohibit an opposed boarding.
 Any opposed boarding takes time to plan and requires assistance from the
owners/ship operators.
 Owners should have/keep ship plans available to send to the military in
suitable electronic format.

7.15 Crew Training and Drills

.1 Proper awareness and security training for crew members is essential and one (1)
of the best self-protective measures available. Owners and operators are
encouraged to provide training and drills to their crews – from the most junior
levels up to Masters-on how to respond to an attack.

7.16 Other Measures

.1 Consider minimizing external communications (radios, handsets and AIS

information) to essential safety and security related communication and SOLAS
information only, during transit of the GoA and passing the Coast of Somalia.

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 .2 Increase readiness and redundancy by running additional auxiliary machinery,
including generators and steering motors.

.3 If the ship has a comparatively low freeboard, consider the possibility of

extending the width of the gunwales to prevent grappling hooks from gaining
hold. Check the MSCHOA website for examples of such measures.

8.0 In Transit – Operations

8.1 Ship‟s crew should not be exposed to undue risk when employing Self Protective
Measures (SPMs).

8.2 All ships inside the GoA are strongly urged to use the IRTC and follow MSCHOA GT
advice and timings as promulgated on the MSCHOA website.

8.3 If you intend to follow a GT through the IRTC: Transit at the GT speed but remain aware
of the ship‟s limitations. (Current advice, for example, is that if your maximum speed is
16 knots, consider joining a 14 knot GT and keep those 2 knots in reserve.)

8.4 If you do not intend to follow a GT through the IRTC: Maintain full sea speed through
the High Risk Area. (Current advice is that if the maximum speed of the ship is more
than 18 knots, then do not slow down for a GT, maintain speed and aim to transit as much
of the High Risk Area in darkness as possible).

8.5 Maintain maximum CPA with any ship acting suspiciously.

8.6 Ships should continue to report their noon positions and speed, actual departure times and
estimated arrival times during transit using UTC.

8.7 Ships should comply with the International Rules for Prevention of Collision at Sea at all
times; navigation lights should not be turned off at night. Masters should endeavor not to
impede the safe navigation of other vessels when joining and leaving the IRTC.

8.8 Provide deck lighting only as required for safety. Lighting in the shadow zones around
the ship‟s hull may extend the area of visibility for lookouts, but only where consistent
with safe navigation. Where fitted, and deemed suitable, consider the immediate use of
“remotely operated” ship search lights. If suspicious activity around the vessel is
observed, the use of search lights may startle and deter a potential attack. Current naval
advice is to transit with navigation lights only.

8.9 Keep photographs of pirate “mother ships” on the bridge. Immediately report all
sightings of suspect mother ships to UKMTO and the IMB PRC at:

UKMTO: +971 505 523 215 / [email protected]

IMB PRC: +60 3 2031 0014 / [email protected] or [email protected]

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 Such reports may also be relayed to MSCHOA or MARLO using the following contact
details:
MSCHOA: [email protected]

MARLO: +973 39401395 / [email protected]

Such reporting will aid in building a clearer picture of pirate activity which will assist in
better protecting shipping and eradicate the threat to freedom of navigation in the area.
(See Appendix III of this Notice for an MI Report of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against
Ships (MI-109-2) form for forwarding such information or any other information
concerning an attack or sighting.)

8.10 The Master should try to make as early an assessment of a threat as possible. As soon as
the Master feels that a threat is developing he should immediately activate the SSAS and
call the UKMTO.

8.11 Keep a good lookout for suspicious craft, especially from astern. Note that most attacks
to date have occurred from the port quarter.

8.12 Protect the crew from exposure to undue risk. Only essential work on deck should occur
in transit of the high risk area. Masters should, in so far as possible, keep crew members
clear from external deck spaces during hours of darkness, while being mindful of their
obligation to maintain a full and proper lookout in all directions at all times.

8.13 Use light, alarm bells and crew activity to alert suspected pirates that they have been
detected.

8.14 A variety of other additional commercially available non-lethal defensive measures are
available that could be considered; however, these should be assessed by companies on
their merits and on the particular characteristics of the ship concerned.

9.0 Pirate Attack – Approach Stage

9.1 Pirates generally do not use weapons until they are within two cables of a vessel,
therefore any period up until this stage can be considered “approach,” and gives a vessel
valuable time in which to activate its defenses and make it clear to pirates that they have
been seen and the vessel is prepared and will resist.

9.2 Initiate and follow the ship‟s pre-prepared emergency procedures plan.

9.3 In addition to the emergency alarms and announcements for the benefit of the vessel‟s
crew sound the ship‟s whistle/foghorn continuously to demonstrate to any potential
attacker that the ship is aware of the attack and is reacting to it.

9.4 If not already at full speed, increase to a maximum to open the CPA. Try to steer a
straight course to maintain a maximum speed.

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9.5 If the Master has exercised the right to turn off the AIS during transit of the piracy area,
this should be turned on.

9.6 Activate the Emergency Communication Plan

 Activate the SSAS, which will alert your CSO and the Flag Administrator.
 Make „Mayday” call on VHF Ch. 16 (and backup Ch. 08, which is monitored by
naval units).
 Sound the emergency alarm and make a “Pirate Attack” announcement in
accordance with the ship‟s emergency procedures plan.
 Call in order of priority:
.1 UKMTO (+971 50 552 3215);
.2 MSCHOA (+44(0) 1923 958545)
.3 MARLO (+973 3940 1395)
.4 IMB (+60 3 2098 5763)
 Once established maintain contact with UKMTO. An attack should be reported to
UKMTO even if a vessel is part of a national convoy so other merchant ships can
be warned.
 Send a distress message via the Digital Selective Calling system (DSC) and
Inmarsat-C, as applicable.

9.7 All crew, except those required on the bridge or in the engine room, should muster either
at their designated Safe Muster Point or the Citadel if the ship is appropriately
constructed so that the crew are given as much ballistic protection as possible should the
pirates get close enough to use weapons.

9.8 Activate water and spray (e.g., fire pump) and other appropriate self-defensive measures.

9.9 Ensure that all external doors and, where possible, internal public rooms and cabins, are
fully secured.

10.0 Pirate Attack – Attack Stage

10.1 Reconfirm that all ship‟s personnel are in a position of safety.

10.2 As the pirates close in on the vessel, Masters should commence small alternations of
helm whilst maintaining speed to deter skiffs from lying alongside the vessel in
preparation for a boarding attempt. These maneuvers will create additional wash to
impede the operation of the skiffs.

10.3 Substantial amounts of helm are not recommended, as these are likely to significantly
reduce a vessel‟s speed.

10.4 If the bridge/engine room is to be evacuated the main engine should be stopped and all
way taken off the vessel if possible (and if navigationally safe to do so). All remaining
crew members should proceed to the designated Safe Muster Point.

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11.0 Pirate Attack – Pirates Take Control Stage

11.1 Before the pirates gain access to the bridge, inform UKMTO. Ensure that the SSAS has
been activated, and ensure that the AIS is switched on.

11.2 Offer no resistance to the pirates once they reach the bridge. Once on the bridge the
pirates are likely to be aggressive, highly agitated and possibly under the influence of
drugs (including khat, an amphetamine like stimulant); so remaining clam and
cooperating fully will greatly reduce the risk of harm.

11.3 If the bridge/engine room is to be evacuated, then the main engine should be stopped, all
way taken off the vessel, if possible (and if navigationally safe to do so), All remaining
crew members should proceed to the designated Safe Muster Point with their hands
visible.

11.4 Leave any CCTV running.

12.0 In the Event of Military Action

12.1 In the event that naval/military forces take action onboard the ship, all personnel should
keep low to the deck, cover their head with both hands (always ensuring that hands are
visible and not holding anything) and make no sudden movements unless directed to by
friendly forces.

12.2 Military Forces may initially secure all persons encountered and question their identity.
This is standard practice. Brief and prepare ship‟s personnel to expect this and to
cooperate fully during the initial stages of military action onboard.

12.3 Do not use flash photography.

12.4 Be aware that English is not the working language of all naval units in the region. This is
why early registration with MSCHOA, use of GT timings, and updating your position
with UKMTO are essential. They all provide a better probability that naval support will
be nearby and ready to respond immediately if the pirates attack.

12.5 Naval/military forces will endeavour to respond rapidly to ongoing acts of piracy.
However, because of the very large distances across the High Risk Area a Naval/military
response may not be possible.

13.0 Post-Incident Reporting

13.1 Following any piracy attack or suspicious activity, it is vital that a detailed report of the
event is reported to MSCHOA, UKMTO, IMB and the Administrator.

13.2 This will ensure full analysis and trends in piracy activity are established as well as
enabling assessment of piracy techniques or changes in tactics, in addition to ensuring
appropriate warnings can be issued to the merchant shipping in the vicinity.

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13.3 Masters are therefore requested to complete the piracy report form contained in Appendix
III of this Notice. The report should contain descriptions and distinguishing features of
any suspicious vessels that were observed. The report form can be used for submissions
to the international organizations (e.g., MSCHOA, UKMTO, MARLO, IMB, IMO) as
well as to the Administrator.

14.0 Prosecution of Pirates

14.1 The capture, prosecution and sentencing of pirates and armed robbers is one of the most
appropriate deterrent actions available to Governments, including the RMI. Moreover,
for naval/military forces to hold suspected pirates following a pricy incident, a witness
statement from those affected from the piracy incident is necessary.

14.2 The RMI conducts its investigations, including those involving piracy and armed
robbery, in accordance with the IMO Code of International Standards and Recommended
Practices for a Safety Investigation Into a Marine Casualty or Marine Incident (Casualty
Investigation Code) as adopted by Resolution MSC 255(84) and as prescribed in MI-260,
Rules for Marine Safety Investigations, and MI-264, Rules for Marine Administrative
and Adjudicatory Proceedings.

14.3 Those investigating crimes of piracy and armed robbery against ships should be
conducting their investigation in accordance with the IMO guidelines contained in
MSC.1/Circ.1404. These guidelines recognize the flag State‟s right to conduct its own
investigation as well as its need for immediate access to the ship and crew upon the ship‟s
arrival.

14.4 Proper evidence collection is an important part of building a case against suspected
pirates. INTERPOL, an international police organization of which the RMI is a member,
offers assistance to ship owners/operators in taking appropriate steps to preserve the
integrity of the evidence left behind at the crime scene. It is recommended that ship
owners/operators contact INTERPOL‟s Maritime Piracy Task Force through its
Command and Co-ordination Centre (CCC) within three (3) days of a hijacking of their
vessel. See Appendix 1 for INTERPOL contact details.

14.5 Should an MI vessel be attacked by pirates, the Administrator shall coordinate with
naval/military officials and Interpol for cooperation in the investigation. MI
owners/operators of such vessels are requested to contact the Administrator for further
guidance on this post incident coordination.
.
15.0 Post-Piracy Care for Seafarers

Adherence to BMPs and the presence of naval escorts in High Risk Areas have been
shown to reduce the risks of pirate attacks. In spite of these precautions, pirates remain
unpredictably capable of attacking and hijacking vessels, placing crew members in
harm‟s way. The Seaman‟s Church Institute has published guidelines for addressing the
needs of the crew and their families should a ship be attacked. These guidelines
(reference (j) of this Notice) are provided for informational purposes in Appendix V of
this Notice.

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16.0 Yachts

16.1 Advice Against Operations in High Risk Areas

Sailing vessels are particularly vulnerable to attack due to their low speed and low
freeboard The Maritime Administrator strongly advises against any operation and travel
by RMI flagged yachts in the following High Risk Areas:

 Gulf of Aden;
 Arabian Sea;
 Indian Ocean and Red Sea as bounded by the following latitude and longitude: 15°N
in the Red Sea, 26°N in the Arabian Sea, 78°E and 15°S in the Indian Ocean and the
Mozambique Channel; and
 Gulf of Guinea, West Africa.
 Straits of Malacca
 South China Sea

16.2 Precautions

Should such travel be deemed essential in the High Risk Areas identified in section 16.1,
above, the Maritime Administrator highly recommends that Masters and
owners/operators:

(a) Follow, to the extent practicable for yachts, the Best Management Practices (BMPs)
as contained in this Notice. This includes considering the necessity (assessing of the
risk) of travel through High Risk Areas and alternatives, such as transporting the
vessel by yacht carrier.

(b) Register with the Maritime Security Centre Horn of Africa (MSCHOA) for up-to-date
advice and guidance on passage around the Horn of Africa. See Appendix 1 for
contact information.

(c) Report regularly to the UK Maritime Trade Organization (UKMTO) Dubai by

providing position, course and speed. See Appendix 1 for contact information.

(d) Discuss the proposed voyage with your insurers and/or P and I Club prior to sailing.

(e) Update emergency plans regularly with the latest advice provided by informational
sources, including the MSCHOA, IMB and the International Sailing Federation
(ISAF). See Appendix 1 for contact information.

(f) For a discussion on the carriage and use of PMSC (i.e., armed or unarmed guards),
see section 4.3, above.

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 (g)

APPENDIX I
CONTACT LIST OF MILITARY AND OTHER AUTHORITIES

The following authorities have roles in combating piracy and other attacks against merchant
shipping.

1.0 MSCHOA

1.1 MSCHOA is the planning and coordination authority for EU Naval Forces
(EUNAVFOR).A Ship and its passage plan should be registered with MSCHOA at
http://www.mschoa.org prior to entering the High Risk Area (including the
Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor (IRTC)).. Note that the EUNAVFOR
operational area does not extend East of 65°East.

1.2 MSCHOA may be reached directly at:

+44 (0) 1923 958545 (telephone)

+44 (0) 1923 958520 (fax)
[email protected] (email)

2.0 UKMTO

2.1 UKMTO office in Dubai is the first point of contact for ships in the region. . The day-
to-day interface between Masters and the naval/military forces is provided by UKMTO
which talk to merchant ships and liaise directly with MSCHOA and the naval
commanders at sea and ashore. UKMTO administers a Voluntary Reporting Scheme,
under which merchant ships are encouraged to send regular updates on their position and
intended movements. These reports are comprised of:

 Initial Report;
 Daily Reports; and
 Final Report (upon departure from the high risk area or arrival in port).

UKMTO uses the emerging and relevant information from these reports to help the
naval/military units maintain an accurate picture of shipping, thereby improving
responsiveness to any incident. UKMTO is also a material source of information on the
establishment and use of citadels.

2.2 The preferred method of communication with UKMTO for routine reporting is email to
[email protected]; Fax: +971-4-306-5710; or Telex: (51) 210473.

2.3 In case of emergency, the UKMTO may be reached by the 24-hour Duty Phone:

+971-50-552-3215

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3.0 MARLO Information Exchange

3.1 MARLO operates as a conduit for information exchange between the Combined
Maritime Forces (CMF) and the commercial shipping community within the region.

3.2 Passage information should be provided to MARLO 48 hours prior to transiting through
the GoA via email to [email protected], telephone +973-1785-3925, or cell
+973-1785-1395.

3.3 In case of emergency, the MARLO may be reached by the 24-hour Duty Phone:

+973-3940-1395

4. NATO Shipping Centre (NSC)

NSC provides the commercial link with NATO‟s Maritime Forces. The NSC is NATO‟s
primary point of contact with the maritime community and is used by NATO as the tool
for communicating and coordinating initiatives and efforts with other military entities
(e.g., UKMTO, MSCHOA and MARLO) as well as directly with the maritime
community.

Telephone: +44(0) 1923 956574

Fax: +44(0) 1923 956575
Email: [email protected]
Website: www.shipping.nato.int

5.0 IMB

5.1 IMB is a specialized division of the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) whose
principal area of expertise is in the suppression of piracy through its PRC in Kuala
Lumpur, Malaysia. It maintains a 24/7 watch system reporting pirate attacks in this area
to the CMF and issuing warnings about hotspots. It also offers valuable advice as to what
to do when pirates actually succeed in getting aboard.

5.2 It is recommended that Masters of vessels transiting the GoA include the IMB PRC as
part of the reporting procedures by email to [email protected].

5.3 In case of emergency, the IMB may be reached by the 24/7 Helpline Number: +60-3-
2031-0014 or by the 24/7 Help Email: [email protected].

5.4 Other useful IMB contact points are:

IMB PRC website: www.icc-ccs.org

Fax: +60 3 2078 5769
Telex: MA34199 IMBPCI.

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6.0 COMUSNAVCENT Battlewatch Captain

When transiting the Strait of Hormuz, as soon as the Master feels that the threat is
developing, he/she should immediately call to report hostile or potentially hostile action
to:

COMUSNAVCENT Battlewatch Captain at +973-1785-3879.

7.0 ReCAAP Information Sharing Centre

Tel: +65 6376 3091

Fax: +65 6376 3066
Website: www.recaap.org
Email: [email protected]

8.0 INTERPOL

INTERPOL is an international police organization with 188 member countries that

facilitates cross border police co-operation to combat international crime. INTERPOL
hosts a secure website to provide support to ship operators who have had their vessels
hijacked by pirates. Their Maritime Piracy Task Force can assist in taking the
appropriate steps to preserve the integrity of the evidence left behind the crime scene.
The INTERPOL Command and Co-ordination Centre (CCC) operators in all four of
INTERPOL‟s official languages-English, French, Spanish and Arabic.

Website: www.interpol.int
Email: [email protected]
Telephone (24 hrs): +33(0) 4 72 44 76 76

9.0 The International Sailing Federation (ISAF)

The ISAF has posted guidelines and warnings for yachts on their website at:
www.sailing.org/piracy.

10.0 Marshall Islands Duty Officer

Tel: +1-703-476-3762
Email: [email protected]

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 APPENDIX II
BRIDGE CHECKLIST
Vessel owners, operators, Master and crew should limit and avoid danger by taking these additional
measures:
Transit the GoA by way of the Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor (IRTC).
Maintain a minimum distance of 60° E Longitude from the East Coast of Somalia.
Avoid sailing between Socotra and Somalia and through the Mozambique Channel.
Maintain high alert and be on the lookout for small craft in the Strait of Hormuz.
Maintain at least 50 nm radius around Socotra.
Establish special operating procedures for vigilance and for the event of an attack.
Practice piracy drills, provide refresher training for the crew concerning anti-piracy measures.
Ensure crew radios and in-vessel communications are in good working order.
Secure a pre-designated safe mustering point for crewmembers to gather.
Secure alternative steering location, if possible.
Maintain a single point of entry into the house.
Secure deck lighting (except for mandatory navigation lights).
Maintain contact numbers for MARLO and UKMTO in the wheelhouse.
Increase monitoring of VHF communications on Channel 16 (back-up Channel 08).
Keep unnecessary communications to a minimum except to make contact with naval units and
other vessels as soon as the vessel enters the High Risk Area.
Continue the use of AIS but limit information to Vessel Name and Maritime Mobile Service
Identity (MMSI) so that it may still be identified by coalition forces. Coalition Maritime Forces
have AIS monitoring capability.
All available radars should be used and constantly monitored.
Post additional 24-hour lookouts forward, amidships and aft.
Maintain a 24-hour watch by crew for suspicious activity, including a sharp lookout for suspicious
small boats operating in the vicinity.
Increase and maintain speed to at least 15 kts. The faster the better.
Maneuver to avoid small craft and take aggressive evasive measures, if necessary.
Take defensive precautions prior to entering the area including rigging fire hoses, spotlights,
concertina wire, etc. Experience has demonstrated the use of high pressure fire hoses to be very
effective at repelling boarders.
Consider other non-lethal measures such as focused sonic devices, guard dog security teams,
etc.

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 APPENDIX III
MI-109-2, REPORT OF PIRACY AND ARMED ROBBERY AGAINST SHIPS
THIS SPACE FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Phone: +1-703-620-4880 OFFICE OF THE MARITIME ADMINISTRATOR
Fax: +1-703-476-8522 REPUBLIC OF THE MARSHALL ISLANDS
Email: [email protected] 11495 Commerce Park Drive
[email protected] Reston, Virginia 20191-1506 USA

REPORT OF ACTS OF PIRACY AND/OR ARMED ROBBERY AGAINST VESSELS

INSTRUCTIONS
1. This form is to be completed to report incidents of piracy, armed attacks, 4. This form should be completed by the Master or person in
hijacking or terrorism. charge, or, if neither is available, by the owner or his duly
authorized agent.
2. An original of this form shall be submitted to the Maritime Administrator
5. Attach separate form MI-109-1 to this report for each person
as soon after the occurrence of the incident (attempted or actual).
injured, killed, or incapacitated in excess of 72 hours as a result
3. This form must be completed in full. Entries which do not relate to a of this incident.
particular case should be indicated as not applicable by inserting the 6. Attach separate form MI-109 to this report for any damage or
initials “N/A.” loss to/of vessel.
I. VESSEL PARTICULARS / OWNER / SHIPMANAGER
1. Vessel Name

2. Official Number 3. IMO Number

4. Gross Tonnage and Length Overall 5.Vessel Type

6. Propulsion Type and Rated Horsepower / KW 7. Ship‟s Freeboard (Meters)

Forward: Amidships: Aft:
8. Name of Owner

9. Ship Management‟s Name, Address and Telephone including CSO‟s and/or DPA‟s Name, Email and Telephone

10. Cargo Details (Type/Quantity)

11. Numbers of Crew and Nationality – Leave blank if crew list attached

II. ATTACK PARTICULARS / VESSEL POSITION AND STATUS

12. Type of Attack
Attack Successful Attack thwarted by external forces Attack thwarted by ships practices
Attack aborted Suspicious Activity
13. Date of Incident 14. Time 15. Zone Description 16. Period of Day
UTC Day Night Twilight
17. Visibility Local 18. Wind 19. Sea State
< 2 miles 2- 5 miles > 5 miles Force: Direction (°True): Wave height: Swell height:
20. Geographic Location of Vessel at Time of Incident
(a) Latitude (b) Longitude (c) Geographical Name of Body of Water

(d) Last Port of Departure (e) Date of Departure

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 II. ATTACK PARTICULARS / VESSEL POSITION AND STATUS (continued)
(f) Scheduled Port of Arrival (g) Date of Expected Arrival

21. If attacked at anchor - name of anchorage In port limits

Yes No MARSEC Level
22.If attacked while moored alongside - name of port facility
MARSEC Level
21. If attacked while underway
(a) Ship Heading: Degrees True
(b) Speed: Knots
III. SHORE / PORT AUTHORITY CONTACT DETAILS
23. Notified applicable authorities (Maritime Administrator, Coastal State, UKMTO, Port Authority, etc.)
No
Yes If Yes, to whom:
24. Reported to Port Facility Security Officer No Yes If Yes, name and contact details

25. Actions taken by shore or port authorities e.g., Coastal State, UKMTO, Naval Task Forces, etc.

26. Preferred method of vessel‟s external communications (SATCOM, Radio, other)

IV. INCIDENT DETAILS

27. Method used by perpetrators to cause the vessel to lay-to and/or embark the vessel

28. Type of weapons used by perpetrators

29. Number of perpetrators involved and duration of attack, type of attack (e.g., attempted/boarded. whether attack was aggressive / violent)

30. Suspected or known identity and description of perpetrators (e.g., dress, physical appearance, language spoken, if known)

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 IV. INCIDENT DETAILS (continued)
31. Details of incident (In addition to above type of small craft and communication equipment please describe: how vessel was approached; how
perpetrators boarded vessel; and how perpetrators established control of crew. Attach separate sheets if necessary.)

32. Consequences to crew (During the attack and treatment while perpetrators were onboard - attach separate sheets if necessary.)
Serious injuries or loss of life? Yes No If yes, complete and attach form MI-109-1, Report of Personal Injury or Loss of Life.

33. Post incident consequences and impacts (e.g., Noticeable changes in crew‟s behavior, morale, damages to the ship (description), items stolen
(estimated financial impact), other, etc. - attach separate sheet if necessary.)

34. Incident Prevention & Response Actions (As appropriate address effectiveness of Best Management Practices‟ (BMP), armed security team, citadel,
how crew was internally alerted, use of SSAS, etc. - attach separate sheet if necessary.)

35. Recommended SSP & BMP amendments (Proposed new measures needed to prevent recurrence, i.e., set higher MARSEC level, additional lighting,
employment of an armed security team, etc. - attach separate sheet if necessary).

V. REPORT
36. Date of Report 37. Submitted by (Print Name)

38. Signature 39. Title

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 APPENDIX IV
ANTI-PIRACY PLANNING CHART – RED SEA, GULF OF ADEN AND ARABIAN SEA

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 APPENDIX V

POST-PIRACY CARE FOR SEAFARERS

POST-PIRACY CARE FOR SEAFARERS

GUIDELINES
CENTER FOR SEAFARERS‟ RIGHTS
THE SEAMEN‟S CHURCH INSTITUTE

AUG 1, 2011
VERSION 3.0

PREAMBLE The following guidelines are intended to provide a general structure for caring for
seafarers following a piracy incident. These guidelines emerge from a study currently underway at the
Seamen‟s Church Institute (SCI) designed to develop recommendations for clinical assessment and
intervention. SCI welcomes comments from interested parties as develops specific guidelines to address
the mental health impact of piracy on seafarers. This document addresses a continuum- from transiting
high-risk areas without incident to prolonged captivity of seafarers.

1. ANTICIPATING THE POSSIBILITY OF PIRACY

Piracy threatens 21st century seafarers. While most piracy incidents are thought to take place around the
Horn of Africa, piracy remains problematic on the West Coast of Africa, the Indian Ocean and
throughout the South East Asian archipelago. Although adherence to Best Management Practices
(BMPs), presence of Group Transits via EUNAFOR and national naval escorts through the Gulf of Aden
have reduced the risks of attacks, pirates remain unpredictably capable of attacking and hijacking
vessels throughout the whole high-risk area as defined in the BMPs. Because of this, all maritime
industry stakeholders should take preparatory steps to protect the well-being of their crews at sea, from
stress management techniques to coping with prolonged activity.

1.1 THE MAINTENANCE OF ACCURATE MEDICAL INFORMATION Shipowners should maintain

accurate health records for their crews. Complete medical records include the results of the most recent
physical examination and details about any medical condition that could worsen at sea. This includes
any medication-dependent condition, as well as any physical ailment that could deteriorate in a high
stress setting. A detailed history should provide information about prior surgeries, immunizations,
allergies, family medical history, and a complete personal history, including information about prior
illnesses and major life events (marriages, divorces. deaths of loved ones). This information facilitates
immediate follow-up medical planning for release of a captive seafarer.

1.2 ANTICIPATORY TRAINING Seafarers should develop appropriate instincts and survival skills
necessary to contend with captivity. Seafarers gain mental confidence through drills aboard the vessel
that practice deterrence techniques. Seafarers should be trained in basic captive survival skills that
anticipate their interaction with hostile pirates. Cultural sensitivity training to avoid offending and
angering the pirates should be included. Anticipating crew isolation or group adhesion issues can
strengthen morale during prolonged captivity. Most importantly, seafarers should understand known
intimidation tactics used by pirates, including: 1) providing frightening misinformation about family
members; 2) suggesting that the ship owners will neglect them; 3) physical abuse; 4) death threats or
mock executions; 5) psychological tactics aimed at isolating or dividing crew or breaking crew morale,
increasing their desperation, and thus pressuring negotiations.

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2. AT THE FIRST NEWS OF A PIRACY INCIDENT
The news of a piracy incident can induce panic among all involved. Clear and reliable lines of
communication between the vessel and its stakeholders and between stakeholders and the families of the
crew pay huge dividends in managing palpable anxiety and distracting rumors. Therefore, regular
briefings become critical from the first sign of a problem. While respecting confidential negotiations,
clarifying even partially known information regarding crew location and conditions builds trust among
ship management, media and family members.

2.1 WORKING WITH CREWMEMBERS‟ FAMILIES should be notified immediately of an incident to

avoid their finding out first from potentially intrusive news outlets. After the first contact, families
should be updated by telephone, if possible, or by email at intervals no greater than 24 hours-- even if
nothing has progressed. Shipowners should also prepare relatives for the possibility that pirates, as part
of their intimidation tactics, will contact them. Families should be instructed to refrain from making
statements to the press about the situation, since publicity may impede effective negotiation and may
prolong captivity of loved ones. Further; the seafarers‟ dependents should be reassured that they will
receive compensation from the shipowners according to contract provisions.

3. WHEN A CREW IS BEING HELD

When pirates hold a vessel captive, often little that can be done directly to address the needs of the
crew. While negotiations are underway, however, several procedures can begin.

3.1 PREPARING FOR THE CREW‟S RELEASE Individual crewmember potential needs should be
identified before release. This information should be solicited from the crewmembers medical records,
and family members. Importantly, this includes anticipating pre-existing conditions that might worsen
under captivity. Examples include:

 Conditions that require medication that may run out during captivity
 Conditions that worsen under stress, including but not limited to: cardiac problems, including
histories of arrhythmias, heart attacks [myocardial infarctions]; stroke: asthma, emphysema, or
chronic bronchitis; anxiety disorders; post-traumatic stress disorder.

Anticipating possible reactions among crewmembers based on knowledge of their medical history
facilitates preparation for their release.

3.2 PROVIDING TIMELY INFORMATION TO THE CREW‟S FAMILIES As stated in 2.1, families
should be updated on a daily basis. Families should be provided a named point-of-contact who remains
available to them by email and telephone. Much like the owners of hijacked vessels and others with
vested interests, families of crewmembers may feel powerless and afraid. Unlike those involved in
negotiating, however, families have no access to current information. Allying with families enhances
their ability to assist with recovery that might be needed by providing supportive home environments,
helping to identify delayed symptoms from captivity, and by helping link crewmembers with appropriate
caregivers (medical centers. behavioral health clinics).

Families should be asked to maintain the confidentiality of all information shared and not disclose this
information to the media. Families should be encouraged to report any attempts by pirates to
communicate with them, and families should be encouraged not to respond to these attempts.

3.3 ANTICIPATING THE SEAFARER‟S POTENTIAL NEEDS While most seafarers will be protected
by their natural resilience from debilitating post-captivity side effects, ship operators should anticipate
that crewmembers will need follow-up care. In the midst of a hostage situation, ship operators and

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insurance companies can identity qualified professionals in the seafarer‟s home community who can
provide care, if needed. Contact information of available and properly trained and licensed medical
doctors and mental health professionals (psychologists, psychiatrists. social workers, licensed
counselors) should be maintained. These professionals should be placed on standby for possible
treatment. These services, when required, should be covered as part of the standard medical follow-up
offered to the seafarer.

4. WHEN RELEASE IS IMMINENT

4.1 PREPARATIONS Plans should be made to inform families immediately after seafarers are released.
Families should be encouraged to respect the confidentiality of negotiations and be prepared for the
possibility of modifications to any timetable provided. Preparations should be made for crewmembers
to be provided with telephones as close to release as possible to talk with loved ones.

4.2 A DEBRIEFING PROTOCOL Debriefing should include appropriate company, military, and
medical interviews. Immediate medical triage evaluates apparent illness/injury and future risk for
conditions that could impede a crewmember‟s ability to return to work or pose a risk to life. An
evaluation that conforms to established standards should be made (the M.I.N.I., for example, provides
suitable measure of emotional functioning that could be used for this purpose). Evaluations should be
performed by licensed medical doctors or allied health professionals (e.g., nurses) qualified to conduct
assessments.

5. WHEN THE CREW HAS BEEN RELEASED

5.1 MEDICAL ASSESSMENT Evaluation should be made as soon as possible. Ideally, this should
precede any debriefing. Information that government/military personnel receive from a detainee will be
less accurate if disclosed in the context of significant medical or psychological distress. Qualified
medical or allied health professionals (e.g., nurses, social workers) should conduct assessments. Written
summary of the assessment, describing the seafarer‟s physical and emotional state, should be translated
into the seafarer‟s native language by a competent medical translator and given to the crewmember to
take home to his local medical providers. Also, the seafarer should receive an up-to-date list of
professionals and facilities near the seafarer‟s home capable of providing follow-up assessment and care
as needed. The seafarer‟s personal medical information should be treated as protected and private. No
other stakeholders, including the agency funding the assessment, should be allowed access to this
information. This policy should be extended to all of the seafarer‟s confidential health information.
Medical data required to determine fitness for employment should be gathered in a separate medical
evaluation, also at company expense.

5.2 REPATRIATION Following release, crew should be sent back to home countries as soon as
possible after being cleared for travel. When crewmembers are cannot leave the point of disembarkation
for more than three (3) days, efforts should be made to facilitate family travel to that point to expedite
reunification. Families should be briefed about the status of their family crewmember in a culturally
appropriate manner. Families and crewmembers should be equipped with a list of symptoms (see
Appendix A) to watch for in the seafarer. They should also be provided with the contact information for
professionals available to provide treatment for any symptoms that might occur.

6. WHEN THE CREW IS TO RETURN TO DUTY

6.1. SYMPTOM PRESENTATION TIMELINE Symptoms do not always occur immediately after a
traumatic event. Post-traumatic and other emotional symptoms can present themselves when an

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individual returns to a setting similar to the original incident. Seafarers should be trained to recognize
warning signs of symptoms and should be furnished with the contact information of professionals who
could be contacted privately if needed while at sea or expected ports of call.

6.2 FOLLOW-UP ASSESSMENTS Physical and psychological assessments should be conducted three
months after release from captivity. If the seafarer has returned to sea during this time, the assessment
should be conducted as soon as practicable at a port of call or immediately following the end of the
contract. Both crewmembers and insurers benefit from engaging trained, licensed mental health
professionals to conduct assessments. In regions where these clinicians are not available, evaluations
can be conducted via phone or Internet (Several assessments have online forms that have been translated
into many languages.)

CONCLUDING REMARKS

As our research continues, the Center for Seafarers‟ Rights at SCI will update guidelines where
appropriate. If you have any questions or desire consultation, refer to the contact information below.

CONTACT INFORMATION

Dr. Michael Stuart GARFINKLE

EMAIL: [email protected]
T +1 973 589 5828
SKYPE drgarfinkle

Center for Seafarers‟ Rights

The Seamen‟s Church Institute
118 Export Street
Newark, NJ 07114 USA

Citation information: Garfinkle, M. S. (2010). Preliminary Guidelines for Post-Piracy Care. Working
paper, the Seamen’s Church Institute, Center for Seafarers’ Rights, New York, Version 3.0.

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APPENDIX A-SYMPTOMS TO WATCH

The following, non-exhaustive list of symptoms could suggest 27. DIFFICULTY IN MAKING DECISIONS
the presence of psychological distress. After release from 28. FEELING AFRAID TO TRAVEL ON BUSES,
captivity and prior to returning home, seafarers and their SUBWAYS, OR TRAINS
families, should be furnished with this list and instructions to 29. TROUBLE GETTING YOUR BREATH
connect with local healthcare professionals should any of the 30. HOT OR COLD SPELLS
following present and persist [from Derogatis, 1993]: 31. HAVING TO AVOID CERTAIN THINGS, PLACES,
OR ACTIVITIES BECAUSE THEY FRIGHTEN
1. NERVOUSNESS OR SHAKINESS INSIDE
YOU
2. FAINTNESS OR DIZZINESS
32. YOUR MIND GOING BLANK
3. THE IDEA THAT SOMEONE ELSE CAN
CONTROL YOUR THOUGHTS 33. NUMBNESS OR TINGLING IN PARTS OF YOUR
BODY
4. FEELING OTHERS ARE TO BLAME FOR
34. THE IDEA THAT YOU SHOULD BE PUNISHED
MOST OF YOUR TROUBLES
FOR YOUR SINS
5. TROUBLE REMEMBERING THINGS
35. FEELING HOPELESS ABOUT THE FUTURE
6. FEELING EASILY ANNOYED OR IRRITATED
7. PAINS IN HEART OR CHEST 36. TROUBLE CONCENTRATING
37. FEELING WEAK IN PARTS OF YOUR BODY
8. FEELING AFRAID IN OPEN SPACES
9. THOUGHTS OF ENDING YOUR LIFE 38. FEELING TENSE OR KEYED UP
39. THOUGHTS OF DEATH OR DYING
10. FEELING THAT MOST PEOPLE CANNOT BE
40. HAVING URGES TO BEAT, INJURE, OR HARM
TRUSTED
11. POOR APPETITE SOMEONE
41. HAVING URGES TO BREAK OR SMASH THINGS
12. SUDDENLY SCARED FOR NO REASON
13. TEMPER OUTBURSTS THAT YOU COULD 42. FEELING VERY SELF-CONSCIOUS WITH
OTHERS
NOT CONTROL
43. FEELING UNEASY IN CROWDS
14. FEELING LONELY EVEN WHEN YOU ARE
WITH PEOPLE 44. NEVER FEELING CLOSE TO ANOTHER PERSON
45. SPELLS OF TERROR OR PANIC
15. FEELING BLOCKED IN GETTING THINGS
DONE 46. GETTING INTO FREQUENT ARGUMENTS
47. FEELING NERVOUS WHEN YOU ARE LEFT
16. FEELING LONELY
ALONE
17. FEELING BLUE
48. FEELING OTHERS NOT GIVING YOU PROPER
18. FEELING NO INTEREST IN THINGS
CREDIT FOR YOUR ACHIEVEMENTS
19. FEELING FEARFUL
20. YOUR FEELINGS BEING EASILY HURT 49. FEELING SO RESTLESS YOU COULD NOT SIT
STILL
21. FEELING THAT PEOPLE ARE UNFRIENDLY
50. FEELINGS OF WORTHLESSNESS
OR DISLIKE YOU
51. FEELING THAT PEOPLE WILL TAKE
22. FEELING INFERIOR TO OTHERS
ADVANTAGE OF YOU IF YOU LET THEM
23. NAUSEA OR UPSET STOMACH
24. FEELING THAT YOU ARE WATCHED OR 52. FEELINGS OF GUILT
53. THE IDEA THAT SOMETHING IS WRONG WITH
TALKED ABOUT BY OTHERS
YOUR MIND
25. TROUBLE FALLING ASLEEP
26. HAVING TO CHECK AND DOUBLE CHECK
WHAT YOU DO

CONTACT INFORMATION Center for Seafarers‟ Rights DR Michael Stuart GARFINKLE

The Seamen‟s Church Institute EMAIL [email protected]
118 Export Street TELEPHONE +1 973 589 5828
Newark, NJ 07114 USA SKYPE drgarfinkle

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 APPENDIX VI

DECLARATION CONDEMNING ACTS OF VIOLENCE AGAINST SEAFARERS

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 APPENDIX VII

BMPs SIGNATORIES AND UPDATING BMPs

1.0 BMPs Signatories

1.1 In an effort to counter piracy in the Gulf of Aden (GoA) and off the Coast of Somalia, the
following international industry organizations, which represent the vast majority of shipowners
and operators transiting the region, are signatories to the BMPs:

 Baltic and International Maritime Council (BIMCO)

 Cruise Lines International Association (CLIA)
 International Chamber of Shipping (ICS)
 International Group of Protection and Indemnity Clubs (IGP&I)
 International Maritime Bureau (IMB)
 International Maritime Employers‟ Committee Ltd. (IMEC0
 International Association of Dry Cargo Ship Owners (INTERCARGO)
 InterManager
 International Association of Independent Tanker Owners (INTERTANKO)
 International Shipping Federation (ISF)
 International Transport Workers Federation (ITF)
 International Parcel Tankers Association (IPTA)
 Joint War Committee (JWC)
 Joint Hull Committee (JHC)
 Oil Companies International Marine Forum (OCIMF)
 Society of International Gas Tanker and Terminal Operators (SIGTTO)
 The Mission to Seafarers
 The World Shipping Council (WSC)

1.2 These BMPs are supported by the following naval/military Force/Law Enforcement
Organizations:

 Combined Maritime Forces (CMF)

 EU NAVFOR (The European Union Naval Force)
 INTERPOL
 Maritime Liaison Office (MARLO)
 Maritime Security Centre Horn of Africa (MSCHOA)
 Operation Ocean Shield
 NATO Shipping Center (NSC)
 UK Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO)
 United Nations Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (UNCGPCS)
 Signatories to the New York Declaration

2.0 Updating BMPs

2.1 It is anticipated that these BMPs will be periodically updated based upon operational experience
and lessons learned. This Notice incorporates revisions made in the 4th edition of the BMPs.

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2.2 BMPs should be read with reference to the Maritime Security Centre Horn of Africa (MSCHOA)
website (www.mschoa.org), “Advice to Masters” section where additional relevant information
(e.g., counter-piracy information, including areas of High Risk, coordinates of the Internationally
Recommended Transit Corridor and transit speed for GoA GT) will always be posted and
available for unrestricted download (PDF format).

2.3 The BMPs Guidelines also can be found on the “Piracy Alert” section of www.icc-ccs.org and
on the “Home Page” of www.marisec.org.

2.4 The UK Maritime Operations piracy website (www.noonsite.com/General/Piracy) is another

good source of counter-piracy information.

2.5 The National Geospatial Agency (NGA) is a United States Department of Defense combat
support agency that maintains a website (http://www.nga.mil/portal/site/maritime) providing
global maritime geospatial intelligence. Owners, operators and Masters are encouraged to take
advantage of the information on the site which includes Anti-Shipping Activity Messages
(locations and descriptive accounts of specific hostile acts), Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI)
Worldwide Threat to Shipping Reports (summary of recent piracy acts and hostile actions), and
Broadcast Warnings (persons in distress, or objects and events that pose an immediate hazard to
navigation).

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 INDEX

PURPOSE: ...................................................................................................................................................1
APPLICABILITY: .......................................................................................................................................2
1.0 SSP and BMPs Requirements ..........................................................................................................2
2.0 Reporting Requirements ..................................................................................................................2
REQUIREMENTS:......................................................................................................................................2
1.0 SSP – Risk Assessment....................................................................................................................2
2.0 Reporting..........................................................................................................................................3
2.1 General .................................................................................................................................3
2.2 Initial Notification and Reporting ........................................................................................3
.1 Suez, Gulf of Aden (GoA), the Somali Basin Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean ........3
.a Pre-Transit Registration and Notification ......................................................... 3
.b Ship Security Alert System (SSAS).................................................................. 3
.c Ship Security Reporting System (SSRS) .......................................................... 4
.2 Strait of Hormuz and Arabian Gulf .........................................................................5
.3 Other High Risk Areas (see Annex A, 1.4) .............................................................5
2.3 Follow-up Reporting of Incident .........................................................................................5
2.4. Reporting Acts of Violence Against Crew ..........................................................................6

BEST MANAGEMENT PRACTICES GUIDELINES - ANNEX A .........................................................7

1.0 Definitions........................................................................................................................................7
1.1 Armed Robbery....................................................................................................................7
1.2 Piracy ...................................................................................................................................7
1.3 Suspicious Activity ..............................................................................................................8
1.4 High Risk Areas ...................................................................................................................9
1.5 Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor (IRTC) ...................................................10
1.6 UKMTO Voluntary Reporting Area (VRA) ......................................................................11
1.7 Private Maritime Security Company (PMSC) ...................................................................11
2.0 Typical Pirate Attacks ....................................................................................................................11
3.0 Implementing BMPs ......................................................................................................................12
3.1 Master‟s Discretion ............................................................................................................12
3.2 Fundamental BMPs Requirements ....................................................................................12
3.3 Risk Assessment and Factors to Consider .........................................................................13
4.0 Company Planning .........................................................................................................................14
4.1 Prior to Entering High Risk Area.......................................................................................14
.1 Register Ship with MSCHOA ................................................................................14
.2 Monitor Websites ...................................................................................................15
.3 Review the SSA and SSP .......................................................................................15
.4 Put the SSP in Place ...............................................................................................15
.5 Offer Route Guidance ............................................................................................15

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 .6 Plan and Install Ship Protection Measures.............................................................16
.7 Conduct Crew Training..........................................................................................16
4.2 Upon entering the High Risk Area.....................................................................................16
.1 Submit “Vessel Movement Registration” Form ....................................................16
.2 Best Management Practices ...................................................................................16
4.3 Use of Private Contracted Armed Security Personnel (PCASP) ......................................16
5.0 Master‟s Planning ..........................................................................................................................17
5.1 Prior to Entering the High Risk Area .................................................................................17
.1 Crew Briefing.........................................................................................................17
.2 Emergency Communication Plan ..........................................................................17
.3 Define the Ship‟s AIS Policy .................................................................................17
.4 Vessel Movement Registration ..............................................................................18
.5 Position Reporting .................................................................................................18
.a Initial Vessel Position Report ......................................................................... 18
.b Report Frequency ............................................................................................ 19
.c Reports to MARLO......................................................................................... 19
5.2 To Dos whenTransiting through the High Risk Area ........................................................19
5.3 Group Transit .....................................................................................................................20
5.4 National Convoys...............................................................................................................20
6.0 Outside the GoA ............................................................................................................................21
7.0 Ship Protective Measures ...............................................................................................................21
7.1 General ...............................................................................................................................21
7.2 Watchkeeping and Enhanced Vigilance ............................................................................21
7.3 Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) ....................................................................................22
7.4 Maneuvering ......................................................................................................................22
7.5 Alarms ................................................................................................................................23
7.6 Upper Deck Lighting .........................................................................................................23
7.7 Deny Use of Ship‟s Tools and Equipment .........................................................................23
7.8 Protection of Equipment Stored on the Upper Deck .........................................................24
7.9 Control of Access to Bridge, Accommodation and Machinery Spaces .............................24
7.10 Enhanced Bridge Protection ..............................................................................................25
7.11 Physical Barriers ................................................................................................................25
7.12 Water Spray and Foam Monitors .......................................................................................27
7.13 Safe Muster Point ...............................................................................................................28
7.14 Citadel Guidelines ..............................................................................................................28
.1 Use of Citadels .......................................................................................................28
.2 Risk Assessment ....................................................................................................30
.3 Citadel Design ........................................................................................................30
.4 Military Considerations .........................................................................................30
7.15 Crew Training and Drills ...................................................................................................31
7.16 Other Measures ..................................................................................................................31
8.0 In Transit – Operations ..................................................................................................................32
9.0 Pirate Attack – Approach Stage .....................................................................................................33
10.0 Pirate Attack – Attack Stage ..........................................................................................................34

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11.0 Pirate Attack – Pirates Take Control Stage....................................................................................35
12.0 In the Event of Military Action ......................................................................................................35
13.0 Post-Incident Reporting .................................................................................................................35
14.0 Prosecution of Pirates ....................................................................................................................36
15.0 Post-Piracy Care for Seafarers .......................................................................................................36
16.0 Yachts ............................................................................................................................................37
16.1 Advice Against Operations in High Risk Areas ................................................................37
16.2 Precautions .........................................................................................................................37

APPENDIX I CONTACT LIST OF MILITARY AND OTHER AUTHORITIES ...........................38

APPENDIX II BRIDGE CHECKLIST ................................................................................................41

APPENDIX III MI-109-2, REPORT OF PIRACY AND ARMED ROBBERY AGAINST SHIPS ...42

APPENDIX IV ANTI-PIRACY PLANNING CHART – RED SEA, GULF OF ADEN AND

ARABIAN SEA ...........................................................................................................45

APPENDIX V POST-PIRACY CARE FOR SEAFARERS ................................................................46

APPENDIX VI DECLARATION CONDEMNING ACTS OF VIOLENCE AGAINST

SEAFARERS ...............................................................................................................51

APPENDIX VII BMPs SIGNATORIES AND UPDATING BMPs ......................................................55

1.0 BMPs Signatories...........................................................................................................................55
2.0 Updating BMPs ..............................................................................................................................55

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