Failure Modes, Effects and Diagnostic Analysis

Project:
Temperature Transmitters TT*300-*H
with 4..20 mA output

Customer:
ABB Automation Products GmbH
Minden
Germany

Contract No.: ABB 06/05-29

Report No.: ABB 06/05-29 R012
Version V4, Revision R1; January 2016
Stephan Aschenbrenner

The document was prepared using best effort. The authors make no warranty of any kind and shall not be liable in
any event for incidental or consequential damages in connection with the application of the document.
© All rights reserved.
Management summary
This report summarizes the results of the hardware assessment according to IEC 61508 carried
out on the Temperature Transmitters TT*300-*H with 4..20 mA output.
The Temperature Transmitter TT*300-*H is a configurable single or dual sensor channel (1 or 2
x RTD 2/3/4 wire, 2 x TE, 2 x mV, 1 x RTD 2/3 and 1 x TE / mV) analog 4..20mA device output.
Table 1 gives an overview of the different types that belong to the considered Temperature
Transmitters TT*300-*H with 4..20 mA output including hardware and software version
The hardware assessment consists of a Failure Modes, Effects and Diagnostics Analysis
(FMEDA). A FMEDA is one of the steps taken to achieve functional safety assessment of a
device per IEC 61508. From the FMEDA, failure rates are determined and consequently the
Safe Failure Fraction (SFF) is calculated for the device. For full assessment purposes all
requirements of IEC 61508 must be considered.

Table 1: Version overview

Type Description HW Version SW Version

TTH300-*H Head mounted temperature transmitter 1.06 / 1.07 1.01.08 / 1.03.00
TTF300-*H Field mounted temperature transmitter 1.06 / 1.07 1.01.08 / 1.03.00

For safety applications only the 4..20 mA output was considered. All other possible output
variants or electronics are not covered by this report.
The failure modes used in this analysis are from the exida Electrical Component Reliability
Handbook ([N2]). The failure rates are the basic failure rates from the Siemens standard
SN 29500 ([N3]).
The Temperature Transmitters TT*300-*H with 4..20 mA output can be considered to be
Type B1 elements with a hardware fault tolerance of 0.
The failure rates do not include failures resulting from incorrect use of the Temperature
Transmitters TT*300-*H with 4..20 mA output, in particular humidity entering through
incompletely closed housings or inadequate cable feeding through the inlets.
The listed failure rates are valid for operating stress conditions typical of an industrial field
environment similar to IEC 60654-1 class C (sheltered location) with an average temperature
over a long period of time of 40ºC. For a higher average temperature of 60°C, the failure rates
should be multiplied with an experience based factor of 2.5. A similar multiplier should be used
if frequent temperature fluctuation must be assumed.
It is assumed that the connected logic solver is configured per the NAMUR NE43 signal ranges,
i.e. the Temperature Transmitters TT*300-*H with 4..20 mA output communicate detected faults
by an alarm output current ≤ 3,6mA or ≥ 21mA. Assuming that the application program in the
safety logic solver does not automatically trip on these failures, these failures have been
classified as dangerous detected failures. The following tables show how the above stated
requirements are fulfilled.

1 Type B subsystem: “Complex” subsystem (using micro controllers or programmable logic); for details see
7.4.3.1.3 of IEC 61508-2.
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Table 2: Summary - Failure rates according to IEC 61508:2010 2

Failure category Failure rates (in FIT)

Safe Detected (λSD) 0

Safe Undetected (λSU) 0
Dangerous Detected (λDD) 313
Dangerous Detected (λdd); by internal diagnostics or indirectly 3 213
High (λH); detected by the logic solver 22
Low (λL) ; detected by the logic solver 78
Annunciation Detected (λAD) 0
Dangerous Undetected (λDU) 34

Annunciation Undetected (λAU) 6

No effect (λ#) 118
No part (λ-) 145

Total failure rate of the safety function (λTotal) 347

Safe failure fraction (SFF) 4 90%
DC 90%

SIL AC 5 SIL 2

A complete temperature sensor assembly consisting of the Temperature Transmitters TT*300-

*H and a thermocouple or RTD can be modeled by considering a series subsystem where a
failure occurs if there is a failure in either component. For such a system, failure rates are
added.
The failure rates are valid for the useful life of the Temperature Transmitters TT*300-*H with
4..20 mA output (see Appendix 2).
Appendix 3 gives typical failure rates and failure distributions for thermocouples and RTDs
which were the basis for the following tables.
Assuming that the Temperature Transmitter TT*300-*H will go to the pre-defined alarm state on
detected failures of the thermocouple or RTD, the failure rate contribution for the thermocouple
or RTD in a low stress environment is as follows:

2
It is assumed that practical fault insertion tests can demonstrate the correctness of the failure effects assumed
during the FMEDAs.
3 “indirectly” means that these failure are not necessarily detected by diagnostics but lead to either fail low or fail high

failures depending on the transmitter setting and are therefore detectable.

4
The complete sensor element will need to be evaluated to determine the overall Safe Failure Fraction. The number
listed is for reference only.
5 SIL AC (architectural constraints) means that the calculated values are within the range for hardware architectural

constraints for the corresponding SIL but does not imply all related IEC 61508 requirements are fulfilled. In addition it
must be shown that the device has a suitable systematic capability for the required SIL and that the entire safety
function can fulfill the required PFDAVG / PFH value.
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Table 3: TT*300-*H with thermocouple (close coupled)
λSD λSU λDD λDU SFF
0 FIT 0 FIT 408 FIT 39 FIT 91%

Table 4: TT*300-*H with two thermocouples (close coupled)

λSD λSU λDD λDU SFF
0 FIT 0 FIT 518 FIT 32 FIT 94%

Table 5: TT*300-*H with 2/3-wire RTD (close coupled)

λSD λSU λDD λDU SFF

0 FIT 0 FIT 352 FIT 42 FIT 89%

Table 6: TT*300-*H with two 2/3-wire RTDs (close coupled)

λSD λSU λDD λDU SFF
0 FIT 0 FIT 414 FIT 32 FIT 92%

Table 7: TT*300-*H with thermocouple and 2/3-wire RTD (close coupled)

λSD λSU λDD λDU SFF
0 FIT 0 FIT 466 FIT 37 FIT 92%

Table 8: TT*300-*H with 4-wire RTD (close coupled)

λSD λSU λDD λDU SFF

0 FIT 0 FIT 360 FIT 36 FIT 90%

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Table 9: TT*300-*H with thermocouple (with extension wire)
λSD λSU λDD λDU SFF
0 FIT 0 FIT 1213 FIT 134 FIT 90%

Table 10: TT*300-*H with two thermocouples (with extension wire)

λSD λSU λDD λDU SFF
0 FIT 0 FIT 2309 FIT 41 FIT 98%

Table 11: TT*300-*H with 2/3-wire RTD (with extension wire)

λSD λSU λDD λDU SFF

0 FIT 0 FIT 693 FIT 129 FIT 84%

Table 12: TT*300-*H with two 2/3-wire RTDs (with extension wire)
λSD λSU λDD λDU SFF
0 FIT 0 FIT 1259 FIT 41 FIT 96%

Table 13: TT*300-*H with thermocouple and 2/3-wire RTD (with extension wire)
λSD λSU λDD λDU SFF
0 FIT 0 FIT 1784 FIT 41 FIT 97%

Table 14: TT*300-*H with 4-wire RTD (with extension wire)

λSD λSU λDD λDU SFF

0 FIT 0 FIT 808 FIT 39 FIT 95%

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Assuming that the Temperature Transmitters TT*300-*H will go to the pre-defined alarm state
on detected failures of the thermocouple or RTD, the failure rate contribution for the
thermocouple or RTD in a high stress environment is as follows:

Table 15: TT*300-*H with thermocouple (close coupled)

λSD λSU λDD λDU SFF
0 FIT 0 FIT 2213 FIT 134 FIT 94%

Table 16: TT*300-*H with two thermocouples (close coupled)

λSD λSU λDD λDU SFF
0 FIT 0 FIT 4309 FIT 41 FIT 99%

Table 17: TT*300-*H with 2/3-wire RTD (close coupled)

λSD λSU λDD λDU SFF

0 FIT 0 FIT 1100 FIT 207 FIT 84%

Table 18: TT*300-*H with two 2/3-wire RTDs (close coupled)

λSD λSU λDD λDU SFF
0 FIT 0 FIT 2221 FIT 48 FIT 97%

Table 19: TT*300-*H with thermocouple and 2/3-wire RTD (close coupled)
λSD λSU λDD λDU SFF
0 FIT 0 FIT 3265 FIT 139 FIT 95%

Table 20: TT*300-*H with 4-wire RTD (close coupled)

λSD λSU λDD λDU SFF

0 FIT 0 FIT 1263 FIT 84 FIT 93%

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Table 21: TT*300-*H with thermocouple (with extension wire)
λSD λSU λDD λDU SFF
0 FIT 0 FIT 18313 FIT 2034 FIT 90%

Table 22: TT*300-*H with two thermocouples (with extension wire)

λSD λSU λDD λDU SFF
0 FIT 0 FIT 40119 FIT 231 FIT 99%

Table 23: TT*300-*H with 2/3-wire RTD (with extension wire)

λSD λSU λDD λDU SFF

0 FIT 0 FIT 7913 FIT 1934 FIT 80%

Table 24: TT*300-*H with two 2/3-wire RTDs (with extension wire)
λSD λSU λDD λDU SFF
0 FIT 0 FIT 19129 FIT 221 FIT 98%

Table 25: TT*300-*H with thermocouple and 2/3-wire RTD (with extension wire)
λSD λSU λDD λDU SFF
0 FIT 0 FIT 29624 FIT 226 FIT 99%

Table 26: TT*300-*H with 4-wire RTD (with extension wire)

λSD λSU λDD λDU SFF

0 FIT 0 FIT 10213 FIT 134 FIT 98%

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 Table of Contents

Management summary .................................................................................................... 2

1 Purpose and Scope ................................................................................................... 9
2 Project management................................................................................................ 10
2.1 exida ......................................................................................................................... 10
2.2 Roles of the parties involved ...................................................................................... 10
2.3 Standards / Literature used ........................................................................................ 10
2.4 exida tools used ........................................................................................................ 11
2.5 Reference documents ................................................................................................ 11
2.5.1 Documentation provided by the customer ........................................................ 11
2.5.2 Documentation generated by exida ................................................................ 12
3 Description of the analyzed module ......................................................................... 13
3.1 System description ..................................................................................................... 13
4 Failure Modes, Effects, and Diagnostics Analysis ................................................... 14
4.1 Description of the failure categories ........................................................................... 14
4.2 Methodology – FMEDA, Failure rates ......................................................................... 15
4.2.1 FMEDA ............................................................................................................ 15
4.2.2 Failure rates .................................................................................................... 15
4.2.3 Assumptions .................................................................................................... 16
5 Results ..................................................................................................................... 17
5.1 Temperature Transmitters TT*300-*H ........................................................................ 18
6 Using the FMEDA results......................................................................................... 19
6.1 Example PFDAVG calculation....................................................................................... 19
7 Terms and Definitions .............................................................................................. 20
8 Status of the document ............................................................................................ 21
8.1 Liability ....................................................................................................................... 21
8.2 Releases .................................................................................................................... 21
Appendix 1: Possibilities to reveal dangerous undetected faults during the proof test .. 22
Appendix 1.1: Possible proof tests to detect dangerous undetected faults ........................ 22
Appendix 2: Impact of lifetime of critical components on the failure rate....................... 23
Appendix 3: Using the FMEDA results .......................................................................... 24
Appendix 3.1: TT*300-*H with thermocouple ..................................................................... 24
Appendix 3.2: TT*300-*H with RTD ................................................................................... 25
Appendix 3.3: TT*300-*H in redundant mode with drift monitoring .................................... 28

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1 Purpose and Scope
This document shall describe the results of the FMEDA carried out on the Temperature
Transmitters TT*300-*H with 4..20 mA output. Table 1 gives an overview of the different types
which have been assessed including the considered hardware and software versions. The
FMEDA is one part of the complete functional safety assessment according to IEC 61508
The FMEDA builds the basis for an evaluation whether whether the Temperature Transmitters
TT*300-*H with 4..20 mA output meet the average Probability of Failure on Demand (PFDAVG)
requirements and the architectural constraints / minimum hardware fault tolerance requirements
per IEC 61508. It does not consider any calculations necessary for proving intrinsic safety.

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2 Project management
2.1 exida
exida is one of the world’s leading knowledge and certification companies specializing in
automation system safety and availability with over 300 years of cumulative experience in
functional safety. Founded by several of the world’s top reliability and safety experts from
assessment organizations and manufacturers, exida is a global company with offices around
the world. exida offers training, coaching, project oriented consulting services, internet based
safety engineering tools, detail product assurance and certification analysis and a collection of
on-line safety and reliability resources. exida maintains a comprehensive failure rate and failure
mode database on process equipment.

2.2 Roles of the parties involved

ABB Automation Products Manufacturer of the Temperature Transmitters TT*300-*H with
4..20 mA output.
exida Performed the FMEDA.
ABB Automation Products contracted exida in May 2014 with the update of the corresponding
FMEDAs and this report according to IEC 61508:2010.

2.3 Standards / Literature used

The services delivered by exida were performed based on the following standards / literature.

[N1] IEC 61508-2:2010 Functional Safety of

Electrical/Electronic/Programmable
Electronic Safety-Related Systems
[N2] Electrical Component Reliability Handbook, exida LLC, Electrical Component
3rd Edition, 2012 Reliability Handbook, Third Edition,
2012, ISBN 978-1-934977-04-0
[N3] SN 29500-1:01.2004 Siemens standard with failure rates for
SN 29500-1 H1:07.2011 components
SN 29500-2:09.2010
SN 29500-3:06.2009
SN 29500-4:03.2004
SN 29500-5:06.2004
SN 29500-7:11.2005
SN 29500-9:11.2005
SN 29500-10:12.2005
SN 29500-11:07.2011
SN 29500-12:02.2008
SN 29500-15:07.2009
SN 29500-16:08.2010
[N4] IEC 60654-1:1993-02, second edition Industrial-process measurement and
control equipment – Operating
conditions – Part 1: Climatic condition
[N5] Summary of failure rates and distributions exida summary of failure rates and
for RTD and TC V1R4.xls of 29.09.06 distributions for RTD and TC

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2.4 exida tools used
[T1] FMEDA Tool V5 FMEDA Tool
[T2] exSILentia Ultimate V3 SIL Verification Tool

2.5 Reference documents

2.5.1 Documentation provided by the customer
[D1] DS_TTF300-EN-C-09_2011.pdf Data Sheet DS/TTF300-EN
Rev. C 09.2011
[D2] DS_TTH300-EN-B-12_2010.pdf Data Sheet DS/TTH300-EN
Rev. B 12.2010
[D3] TTX_ELECTRONIC_SCH_SAP218533_REV107.pdf Circuit diagram “UHTE”
0218533 Rev 1.07 of
22.11.2011
[D4] Fault Insertion Test Sunrise_Final_07-02-21.pdf Fault insertion tests
Fehlerversuche_2007-02-
02_Emulator_M16C_MFW01_01_01.pdf
Fehlerversuche_2007-02-
08_Emulator_M16C_SFW01_01_10.pdf
Tuev_assessment_2007-01-
23_Emulator_M16C_Tests.pdf
Fault Insertion Test Sunrise_TÜV_Audittermin_07-
01-22_Test_Protocol.pdf
EMI_Impacttest_FW01.01.03.pdf
Fault Insertion Test Sunrise_FW01.01.03_2007-03-
22.pdf
Fault Insertion Test Sunrise_FW01.01.03_2007-03-
22_Test_Enviroment.pdf
Fehlerversuche_2007-03-
20_Emulator_M16C_MFW01_01_03.pdf
Fault Insertion Test AD Converter.pdf
[D5] IIM-IA-63-2015 - Impact Analysis_TTX_300- Impact analysis for changes
HART_FW_1 1 8_to_FW_1 3 0_Rev_1.1.pdf from hardware version 1.06 to
1.07 and firmware changes
from 1.1.8 to 1.3.0
[D6] EMC TestReport TTX200_TTX3x0-HART 1_07.pdf EMC Test Report TTH300-.H
HW. Rev. 1.07/ TTF300-.H
Rev. 1.06
[D7] II-A-01-2015-TT - Test Report TTX300 1.3.0 Stability Regression test TTH300
Test HART 7 Mode.pdf Software Rev. 1.3.0 HART 7
Mode
[D8] II-A-03-2015-TT - Test Report TTX300 1.3.0 Stability Regression test TTH300
Test HART 5 Mode.pdf Software Rev. 1.3.0 HART 5
Mode

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[D9] IIM-A-02-2015-TT - Test Protocol TTX300 1.3.0 Test Protocol – summary of all
Regression Test.pdf executed tests
[D10] IIM-A-04-2015-TT - Test Summary Report TTX300 Test report regarding “Change
Firmware 1.3.0.pdf Impact Measures and
Regression Tests”
[D11] IIM-A-10-2015-TT - Software Code Review TTX300 Software Code Review
HART7 FW 1.3.0.pdf regarding “Code changes from
Firmware 1.1.8 to 1.3.0”
[D12] IIM-A-13-2015-TT - Factory Calibration Certificate Calibration Certificate
TTH300 with Software Revision 1.3.0.pdf
[D13] IIM-FG-02-2015-TT-Release Report TTX300 MFW 1 Release Report TTX300 with
3 0.pdf Main Firmware Version
01.03.00

2.5.2 Documentation generated by exida

[R1] FMEDA V5 UHTE V5R3 Temperature.xls of 30.07.2014
[R2] FMEDA V5 UHTE V5R3 Temperature dual mode with drift alarm.xls of 12.11.2014
[R3] Zusammenfassung Fehlerraten V5R3.xls of 12.11.2014

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3 Description of the analyzed module
3.1 System description
The Temperature Transmitters TT*300-*H are isolated two-wire 4...20 mA devices used in
many different industries for both control and safety applications. Combined with a temperature
sensing device, the temperature transmitters become a temperature sensor assembly.
The Temperature Transmitters TT*300-*H with 4..20 mA output and with a temperature sensing
device can be considered to be Type B elements with a hardware fault tolerance of 0.
The temperature sensing devices that can be connected to the Temperature Transmitters
TT*300-*H are listed underneath:
• 2-, 3-, and 4-wire RTD
• Thermocouple
The FMEDA has been performed considering the worst-case input sensor configuration.

Figure 1 gives an overview of the Temperature Transmitters TT*300-*H with 4..20 mA output.

Figure 1: Temperature Transmitters TT*300-*H with 4..20 mA output

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4 Failure Modes, Effects, and Diagnostics Analysis
The Failure Modes, Effects, and Diagnostic Analysis was done by exida together with ABB
Automation Products. The results are documented in [R1] and [R2]. When the effect of a
certain failure mode could not be analyzed theoretically, the failure modes were introduced on
component level and the effects of these failure modes were examined on system level (see
fault insertion test report [D4]). This resulted in failures that can be classified according to the
following failure categories.

4.1 Description of the failure categories

In order to judge the failure behavior of the Temperature Transmitters TT*300-*H with 4..20 mA
output, the following definitions for the failure of the product were considered.
Fail-Safe State The fail-safe state is defined as output reaching the user defined
threshold value.
Fail Safe A safe failure (S) is defined as a failure that plays a part in
implementing the safety function that:
a) results in the spurious operation of the safety function to put the
EUC (or part thereof) into a safe state or maintain a safe state;
or,
b) increases the probability of the spurious operation of the safety
function to put the EUC (or part thereof) into a safe state or
maintain a safe state.
Fail Dangerous A dangerous failure (D) is defined as a failure that plays a part in
implementing the safety function that:
a) deviates the output current by more than 2% of full span and
prevents a safety function from operating when required
(demand mode) or causes a safety function to fail (continuous
mode) such that the EUC is put into a hazardous or potentially
hazardous state; or,
b) decreases the probability that the safety function operates
correctly when required.
Dangerous Undetected Failure that is dangerous and that is not being diagnosed.
Dangerous Detected Failure that is dangerous but is detected by internal or external
testing.
Fail high A fail high failure (H) is defined as a failure that causes the output
signal to go to the maximum output current (> 21mA).
Fail low A fail low failure (L) is defined as a failure that causes the output
signal to go to the minimum output current (< 3.6mA).
Annunciation Failure that does not directly impact safety but does impact the ability
to detect a future fault (such as a fault in a diagnostic circuit).
Annunciation failures are divided into annunciation detected (AD) and
annunciation undetected (AU) failures.
No effect Failure mode of a component that plays a part in implementing the
safety function but is neither a safe failure nor a dangerous failure.
No part Component that plays no part in implementing the safety function but
is part of the circuit diagram and is listed for completeness.

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4.2 Methodology – FMEDA, Failure rates
4.2.1 FMEDA
A Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) is a systematic way to identify and evaluate the
effects of different component failure modes, to determine what could eliminate or reduce the
chance of failure, and to document the system in consideration.
A FMEDA (Failure Modes, Effects, and Diagnostic Analysis) is a FMEA extension. It combines
standard FMEA techniques with extension to identify online diagnostics techniques and the
failure modes relevant to safety instrumented system design. It is a technique recommended to
generate failure rates for each important category (safe detected, safe undetected, dangerous
detected, dangerous undetected) in the safety models. The format for the FMEDA is an
extension of the standard FMEA format from MIL STD 1629A, Failure Modes and Effects
Analysis.

4.2.2 Failure rates

The failure modes used in this analysis are from the exida Electrical Component Reliability
Handbook ([N2]). The failure rates are the basic failure rates from the Siemens standard
SN 29500 ([N3]). The rates were chosen in a way that is appropriate for safety integrity level
verification calculations. The rates were chosen to match operating stress conditions typical of
an industrial field environment similar to IEC 60654-1, class C. It is expected that the actual
number of field failures will be less than the number predicted by these failure rates.
For hardware assessment according to IEC 61508 only random equipment failures are of
interest. It is assumed that the equipment has been properly selected for the application and is
adequately commissioned such that early life failures (infant mortality) may be excluded from
the analysis.
Failures caused by external events however should be considered as random failures.
Examples of such failures are loss of power, physical abuse, or problems due to intermittent
instrument air quality.
The assumption is also made that the equipment is maintained per the requirements of
IEC 61508 or IEC 61511 and therefore a preventative maintenance program is in place to
replace equipment before the end of its “useful life”.
The user of these numbers is responsible for determining their applicability to any particular
environment. Accurate plant specific data may be used for this purpose. If a user has data
collected from a good proof test reporting system such as exida SILStatTM that indicates higher
failure rates, the higher numbers shall be used. Some industrial plant sites have high levels of
stress. Under those conditions the failure rate data is adjusted to a higher value to account for
the specific conditions of the plant.

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4.2.3 Assumptions
The following assumptions have been made during the Failure Modes, Effects, and Diagnostic
Analysis of the Temperature Transmitters TT*300-*H with 4..20 mA output.
• Failure rates are constant, wear out mechanisms are not included.
• Propagation of failures is not relevant.
• Failures during parameterization are not considered.
• The device is locked against unintended operation/modification.
• The HART protocol is only used for setup, calibration, and diagnostics purposes, not during
normal operation.
• Practical fault insertion tests can demonstrate the correctness of the failure effects
assumed during the FMEDAs.
• Sufficient tests are performed prior to shipment to verify the absence of vendor and/or
manufacturing defects that prevent proper operation of specified functionality to product
specifications or cause operation different from the design analyzed.
• Materials are compatible with process conditions.
• The mean time to restoration (MTTR) after a safe failure is 24 hours.
• The worst-case internal fault detection time is 2 minutes. Depending on the application, this
interval needs to be considered directly in the SIL verification.
• The common cause factor for the temperature sensing devices in redundant mode is
considered to be 5%. The end-user is responsible for determining the appropriate common
cause factor for a particular application.
• The listed failure rates are valid for operating stress conditions typical of an industrial field
environment similar to IEC 60654-1 class C with an average temperature over a long
period of time of 40ºC. For a higher average temperature of 60°C, the failure rates should
be multiplied with an experience based factor of 2.5. A similar multiplier should be used if
frequent temperature fluctuation must be assumed.
• For safety applications only the considered 4..20 mA output is used.
• The 4..20 mA output signal is fed to a SIL 2 compliant analog input board of a safety PLC.
• The device is operated in the low demand mode of operation.
• External power supply failure rates are not included.
• When using the 4..20 mA output signal the application program in the safety logic solver is
configured according to NAMUR NE43 to detect under-range and over-range failures and
does not automatically trip on these failures; therefore these failures have been classified
as dangerous detected failures.

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5 Results
DC = λDD / (λDD + λDU)
λtotal = λSD + λSU + λDD + λDU

According to IEC 61508 the architectural constraints of an element must be determined. This
can be done by following the 1H approach according to 7.4.4.2 of IEC 61508-2 or the 2H
approach according to 7.4.4.3 of IEC 61508-2.
The 1H approach involves calculating the Safe Failure Fraction for the entire element.
The 2H approach involves assessment of the reliability data for the entire element according to
7.4.4.3.3 of IEC 61508-2.
This assessment supports the 1H approach.
According to 3.6.15 of IEC 61508-4, the Safe Failure Fraction is the property of a safety related
element that is defined by the ratio of the average failure rates of safe plus dangerous detected
failures and safe plus dangerous failures. This ratio is represented by the following equation:
SFF = (ΣλS avg + ΣλDD avg) / (ΣλS avg + ΣλDD avg+ ΣλDU avg)
When the failure rates are based on constant failure rates, as in this analysis, the equation can
be simplified to:
SFF = (ΣλS + ΣλDD) / (ΣλS + ΣλDD + ΣλDU)
Where:
λS = Fail Safe
λDD = Fail Dangerous Detected
λDU = Fail Dangerous Undetected
As the Temperature Transmitters TT*300-*H with 4..20 mA are only one part of a sensor
element, the architectural constraints should be determined for the entire sensor element.

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5.1 Temperature Transmitters TT*300-*H
The FMEDA carried out on the Temperature Transmitters TT*300-*H with 4..20 mA output
leads under the assumptions described in section 4.2.3 to the following failure rates:

Failure category Failure rates (in FIT)

Safe Detected (λSD) 0

Safe Undetected (λSU) 0
Dangerous Detected (λDD) 313
Dangerous Detected (λdd); by internal diagnostics or indirectly 6 213
High (λH); detected by the logic solver 22
Low (λL) ; detected by the logic solver 78
Annunciation Detected (λAD) 0
Dangerous Undetected (λDU) 34

Annunciation Undetected (λAU) 6

No effect (λ#) 118
No part (λ-) 145

Total failure rate of the safety function (λTotal) 347

Safe failure fraction (SFF) 7 90%
DC 90%

SIL AC 8 SIL 2

6 “indirectly” means that these failure are not necessarily detected by diagnostics but lead to either fail low or fail high

failures depending on the transmitter setting and are therefore detectable.

7
The complete sensor element will need to be evaluated to determine the overall Safe Failure Fraction. The number
listed is for reference only.
8 SIL AC (architectural constraints) means that the calculated values are within the range for hardware architectural

constraints for the corresponding SIL but does not imply all related IEC 61508 requirements are fulfilled. In addition it
must be shown that the device has a suitable systematic capability for the required SIL and that the entire safety
function can fulfill the required PFDAVG / PFH value.
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6 Using the FMEDA results
The following section describes how to apply the results of the FMEDA. It is the responsibility of
the Safety Instrumented Function designer to do calculations for the entire SIF. exida
recommends the accurate Markov based exSILentia tool for this purpose.
The following results must be considered in combination with PFDAVG values of other devices of
a Safety Instrumented Function (SIF) in order to determine suitability for a specific Safety
Integrity Level (SIL).

6.1 Example PFDAVG calculation

An average Probability of Failure on Demand (PFDAVG) calculation is performed for a single
(1oo1) Temperature Transmitter TT*300-*H with 4..20 mA output considering a proof test
coverage of 74% as indicated in Appendix 1.1. A mission time of 10 years has been assumed,
an average Mean Time To Restoration of 24 hours and a maintenance capability of 100%. The
failure rate data used in this calculation are displayed in section 5.1. The resulting PFDAVG (for a
variety of proof test intervals) is displayed in Table 27.
For SIL2 applications, the PFDAVG value needs to be < 1.00E-02.

Table 27: PFDAVG values

PFDAVG for T[Proof]
1 year 2 years 5 years 10 years
5.01E-04 6.10E-04 9.38E-04 1.48E-03

As the Temperature Transmitter TT*300-*H with 4..20 mA output is part of an entire safety
function it should only consume a certain percentage of the allowed range. Assuming 25% of
this range as a reasonable budget it should be better than or equal to 2.50E-03. The calculated
PFDAVG values are within the allowed range for SIL2 according to table 2 of IEC 61508-1 and do
fulfill the assumption to not claim more than 25% of the allowed range for a proof test interval of
up to 5 years.
The resulting PFDAVG graphs generated from the exSILentia tool for a proof test of 1 year are
displayed in Figure 2.

Figure 2: PFDAVG (t) values

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7 Terms and Definitions

DC Diagnostic Coverage of dangerous failures (DC = λdd / (λdd + λdu))

FIT Failure In Time (1x10-9 failures per hour)
FMEDA Failure Mode Effect and Diagnostic Analysis
HART Highway Addressable Remote Transducer
HFT Hardware Fault Tolerance
Low demand mode Mode where the frequency of demands for operation made on a safety-
related system is no greater than one per year and no greater than twice
the proof test frequency.PFDAVG Average Probability of Failure on
Demand
PFDAVG Average Probability of Failure on Demand
SFF Safe Failure Fraction summarizes the fraction of failures, which lead to a
safe state and the fraction of failures which will be detected by
diagnostic measures and lead to a defined safety action.
SIF Safety Instrumented Function
SIL Safety Integrity Level
Type B element “Complex” element (using micro controllers or programmable logic); for
details see 7.4.4.1.3 of IEC 61508-2
T[Proof] Proof Test Interval

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8 Status of the document

8.1 Liability
exida prepares reports based on methods advocated in International standards. Failure rates
are obtained from a collection of industrial databases. exida accepts no liability whatsoever for
the use of these numbers or for the correctness of the standards on which the general
calculation methods are based.
Due to future potential changes in the standards, best available information and best practices,
the current FMEDA results presented in this report may not be fully consistent with results that
would be presented for the identical product at some future time. As a leader in the functional
safety market place, exida is actively involved in evolving best practices prior to official release
of updated standards so that our reports effectively anticipate any known changes. In addition,
most changes are anticipated to be incremental in nature and results reported within the
previous three year period should be sufficient for current usage without significant question.
Most products also tend to undergo incremental changes over time. If an exida FMEDA has not
been updated within the last three years and the exact results are critical to the SIL verification
you may wish to contact the product vendor to verify the current validity of the results.

8.2 Releases
Version History: V4R1: Second HW and SW version added; January 20, 2016
V4R0: Updated to IEC 61508:2010; January 19, 2016
V3R0: TT*200-*H and TSP with TT*200-*H removed; November 6, 2012
V2R0: Product names changed, software and hardware versions updated;
November13, 2009
V1, R0: Internal review comments incorporated, software version updated;
April 2, 2007
V0, R2: External review comments incorporated; March 19, 2007
V0, R1: Initial version; January 11, 2007
Authors: Stephan Aschenbrenner
Review: V4R0: Andreas Stelter (ABB); January 19, 2016
V0, R1: Harald Müller (ABB); March 18, 2007
V0, R2: Rachel Amkreutz (exida); April 2, 2007
Release status: Released to ABB Automation Products GmbH as part of a complete functional
safety assessment by TÜV Nord according to IEC 61508.

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Appendix 1: Possibilities to reveal dangerous undetected faults during the
proof test
According to section 7.4.5.2 f) of IEC 61508-2 proof tests shall be undertaken to reveal
dangerous faults which are undetected by diagnostic tests.
This means that it is necessary to specify how dangerous undetected faults which have been
noted during the FMEDA can be detected during proof testing.
Appendix 1 shall be considered when writing the safety manual as it contains important safety
related information.

Appendix 1.1: Possible proof tests to detect dangerous undetected faults

A suggested proof test consists of the following steps, as described in Table 28.
Table 28 Steps for Proof Test

Step Action
1 Bypass the safety PLC or take other appropriate action to avoid a false trip
2 Send a HART command to the transmitter to go to the high alarm current output and
verify that the analog current reaches that value.
This tests for compliance voltage problems such as a low loop power supply voltage
or increased wiring resistance. This also tests for other possible failures.
3 Send a HART command to the transmitter to go to the low alarm current output and
verify that the analog current reaches that value.
This tests for possible quiescent current related failures
4 Perform a two-point calibration of the transmitter
5 Restore the loop to full operation
6 Remove the bypass from the safety PLC or otherwise restore normal operation

This test will detect 74% of possible “du” failures in the transmitter.

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Appendix 2: Impact of lifetime of critical components on the failure rate
According to section 7.4.9.5 of IEC 61508-2, a useful lifetime, based on experience, should be
assumed.
Although a constant failure rate is assumed by the probabilistic estimation method (see section
4.2.3) this only applies provided that the useful lifetime9 of components is not exceeded.
Beyond their useful lifetime the result of the probabilistic calculation method is therefore
meaningless, as the probability of failure significantly increases with time. The useful lifetime is
highly dependent on the component itself and its operating conditions – temperature in
particular (for example, electrolyte capacitors can be very sensitive).
This assumption of a constant failure rate is based on the bathtub curve, which shows the
typical behavior for electronic components. Therefore it is obvious that the PFDAVG calculation is
only valid for components which have this constant domain and that the validity of the
calculation is limited to the useful lifetime of each component.
It is assumed that early failures are detected to a huge percentage during the installation period
and therefore the assumption of a constant failure rate during the useful lifetime is valid.
Table 29 shows which components with reduced useful lifetime are contributing to the
dangerous undetected failure rate and therefore to the PFDAVG calculation and what their
estimated useful lifetime is.
Table 29: Useful lifetime of components contributing to λdu
Type Name Useful life at 40°C
Capacitor (electrolytic) - Tantalum C210, C206 Appr. 500 000 hours
electrolytic, solid electrolyte
When plant experience indicates a shorter useful lifetime than indicated in this appendix, the
number based on plant experience should be used.

9 Useful lifetime is a reliability engineering term that describes the operational time interval where the failure rate of a

device is relatively constant. It is not a term which covers product obsolescence, warranty, or other commercial
issues.
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Appendix 3: Using the FMEDA results
The Temperature Transmitters TT*300-*H with 4..20 mA output together with a temperature
sensing device become a temperature sensor assembly. Therefore when using the results of
this FMEDA in a SIL verification assessment, the failure rates and failure modes of the
temperature sensing device must be considered.

Appendix 3.1: TT*300-*H with thermocouple

The failure mode distributions for thermocouples vary in published literature but there is strong
agreement that open circuit or “burn-out” failure is the dominant failure mode. While some
estimates put this failure mode at 99%+, a more conservative failure rate distribution suitable
for SIS applications is shown in Table 30 and Table 31 when thermocouples are supplied with
the Temperature Transmitters TT*300-*H with 4..20 mA output. The drift failure mode is
primarily due to T/C aging. The Temperature Transmitters TT*300-*H with 4..20 mA output will
detect a thermocouple burn-out failure and drive their output to the specified failure state.
Table 30 Typical failure rates for thermocouples (with extension wire)

Thermocouple Failure Mode Distribution Low Stress High Stress

Open Circuit (Burn-out) 900 FIT 18000 FIT

Short Circuit (Temperature measurement in error) 50 FIT 1000 FIT
Drift (Temperature measurement in error) 50 FIT 1000 FIT
Table 31 Typical failure rates for thermocouples (close coupled)

Thermocouple Failure Mode Distribution Low Stress High Stress

Open Circuit (Burn-out) 95 FIT 1900 FIT

Short Circuit (Temperature measurement in error) 4 FIT 80 FIT
Drift (Temperature measurement in error) 1 FIT 20 FIT
A complete temperature sensor assembly consisting of the Temperature Transmitters TT*300-
*H with 4..20 mA output and a temperature sensing device can be modeled by considering a
series subsystem where a failure occurs if there is a failure in either component. For such a
system, failure rates are added. Assuming that the Temperature Transmitters TT*300-*H with
4..20 mA output will go to the pre-defined alarm state on detected failures of the thermocouple,
the failure rate contribution for the thermocouple is:

Low stress environment (extension wire) High stress environment (extension wire)
λdd = 900 FIT λdd = 18000 FIT
λdu = 50 FIT + 50 FIT = 100 FIT λdu = 1000 FIT + 1000 FIT = 2000 FIT

Low stress environment (close coupled) High stress environment (close coupled)
λdd = 95 FIT λdd = 1900 FIT
λdu = 4 FIT + 1 FIT = 5 FIT λdu = 80 FIT + 20 FIT = 100 FIT

This results in a failure rate distribution and SFF to:

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Table 32: TT*300-*H with thermocouple (low stress – with extension wire)
λSD λSU λDD λDU SFF
0 FIT 0 FIT 1213 FIT 134 FIT 90%

Table 33: TT*300-*H with thermocouple (low stress – close coupled)

λSD λSU λDD λDU SFF
0 FIT 0 FIT 408 FIT 39 FIT 91%

Table 34: TT*300-*H with thermocouple (high stress – with extension wire)
λSD λSU λDD λDU SFF
0 FIT 0 FIT 18313 FIT 2034 FIT 90%

Table 35: TT*300-*H with thermocouple (high stress – close coupled)

λSD λSU λDD λDU SFF

0 FIT 0 FIT 2213 FIT 134 FIT 94%

Appendix 3.2: TT*300-*H with RTD

The failure mode distribution for an RTD also depends on the application with the key variables
being stress level, RTD wire length and RTD type (2/3 wire or 4 wire). The key stress variables
are high vibration and frequent temperature cycling as these are known to cause cracks in the
substrate leading to broken lead connection welds. Failure rate distributions are shown in
Table 36 to Table 39. The Temperature Transmitters TT*300-*H with 4..20 mA output will
detect open circuit, short circuit and a certain percentage of drift RTD failures and drive their
output to the specified failure state.
Table 36 Typical failure rates for 4-Wire RTDs (with extension wire)

RTD Failure Mode Distribution Low Stress High Stress

Open Circuit (Burn-out) 410 FIT 8200 FIT
Short Circuit (Temperature measurement in error) 20 FIT 400 FIT
Drift (Temperature Measurement in error) 70 FIT 10 1400 FIT 11
Table 37 Typical failure rates for 4-Wire RTDs (close coupled)

RTD Failure Mode Distribution Low Stress High Stress

Open Circuit (Burn-out) 41,5 FIT 830 FIT
Short Circuit (Temperature measurement in error) 2,5 FIT 50 FIT
Drift (Temperature Measurement in error) 6 FIT 12 120 FIT 13

10 It is assumed that 65 FIT are detectable if the 4-wire RTD is correctly used.
11
It is assumed that 1300 FIT are detectable if the 4-wire RTD is correctly used.
12 It is assumed that 3.5 FIT are detectable if the 4-wire RTD is correctly used.

13
It is assumed that 70 FIT are detectable if the 4-wire RTD is correctly used.
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Table 38 Typical failure rates for 2/3-Wire RTDs (with extension wire)

RTD Failure Mode Distribution Low Stress High Stress

Open Circuit (Burn-out) 370,5 FIT 7410 FIT
Short Circuit (Temperature measurement in error) 9,5 FIT 190 FIT
Drift (Temperature Measurement in error) 95 FIT 1900 FIT

Table 39 Typical failure rates for 2/3-Wire RTDs (close coupled)

RTD Failure Mode Distribution Low Stress High Stress

Open Circuit (Burn-out) 37,92 FIT 758,4 FIT
Short Circuit (Temperature measurement in error) 1,44 FIT 28,8 FIT
Drift (Temperature Measurement in error) 8,64 FIT 172,8 FIT
A complete temperature sensor assembly consisting of the Temperature Transmitters TT*300-
*H with 4..20 mA output and a temperature sensing device can be modeled by considering a
series subsystem where a failure occurs if there is a failure in either component. For such a
system, failure rates are added. Assuming that the Temperature Transmitters TT*300-*H with
4..20 mA output will go to the pre-defined alarm state on a detected failure of the RTD, the
failure rate contribution for the RTD is:
4-wire RTD with extension wire:

Low stress environment High stress environment

λdd = 410 FIT + 20 FIT + 65 FIT = 495 FIT λdd = 8200 FIT + 400 FIT + 1300 FIT = 9900 FIT
λdu = 5 FIT λdu = 100 FIT

4-wire RTD close coupled:

Low stress environment High stress environment

λdd = 41.5 FIT + 2.5 FIT + 3.5 FIT = 47.5 FIT λdd = 830 FIT + 50 FIT + 70 FIT = 950 FIT
λdu = 2.5 FIT λdu = 50 FIT

2/3-wire RTD with extension wire:

Low stress environment High stress environment

λdd = 370.5 FIT + 9.5 FIT = 380 FIT λdd = 7410 FIT + 190 FIT = 7600 FIT
λdu = 95 FIT λdu = 1900 FIT

2/3-wire RTD close coupled:

Low stress environment High stress environment

λdd = 37.92 FIT + 1.44 FIT = 39.36 FIT λdd = 758.4 FIT + 28.8 FIT = 787.2 FIT
λdu = 8.64 FIT λdu = 172.8 FIT

This results in a failure rate distribution and SFF to:

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Table 40: TT*300-*H with 4-wire RTD (low stress – with extension wire)
λSD λSU λDD λDU SFF
0 FIT 0 FIT 808 FIT 39 FIT 95%

Table 41: TT*300-*H with 4-wire RTD (low stress – close coupled)
λSD λSU λDD λDU SFF
0 FIT 0 FIT 360 FIT 36 FIT 90%

Table 42: TT*300-*H with 4-wire RTD (high stress – with extension wire)
λSD λSU λDD λDU SFF
0 FIT 0 FIT 10213 FIT 134 FIT 98%

Table 43: TT*300-*H with 4-wire RTD (high stress – close coupled)

λSD λSU λDD λDU SFF

0 FIT 0 FIT 1263 FIT 84 FIT 93%

Table 44: TT*300-*H with 2/3-wire RTD (low stress – with extension wire)
λSD λSU λDD λDU SFF
0 FIT 0 FIT 693 FIT 129 FIT 84%

Table 45: TT*300-*H with 2/3-wire RTD (low stress – close coupled)
λSD λSU λDD λDU SFF
0 FIT 0 FIT 352 FIT 42 FIT 89%

Table 46: TT*300-*H with 2/3-wire RTD (high stress – with extension wire)
λSD λSU λDD λDU SFF
0 FIT 0 FIT 7913 FIT 1934 FIT 80%

Table 47: TT*300-*H with 2/3-wire RTD (high stress – close coupled)

λSD λSU λDD λDU SFF

0 FIT 0 FIT 1100 FIT 207 FIT 84%

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Appendix 3.3: TT*300-*H in redundant mode with drift monitoring
This appendix shows the failure rates when the Temperature Transmitters TT*300-*H with 4..20
mA output are used in redundant mode with two temperature sensing devices connected to it.
To obtain the overall failure rates of the sensor assembly, use the failure rates of the
Temperature Transmitters TT*300-*H with 4..20 mA output for redundant mode and add failure
rates of both temperature sensing devices. The temperature sensing device failure rates should
be adjusted to reflect the additional coverage (95%) on the normally undetected failures
provided by the drift alarm.

Table 48: TT*300-*H with two thermocouples (low stress – with extension wire)
λSD λSU λDD λDU SFF
0 FIT 0 FIT 2309 FIT 41 FIT 98%

Table 49: TT*300-*H with two thermocouples (low stress – close coupled)
λSD λSU λDD λDU SFF
0 FIT 0 FIT 518 FIT 32 FIT 94%

Table 50: TT*300-*H with two thermocouples (high stress – with extension wire)
λSD λSU λDD λDU SFF
0 FIT 0 FIT 40119 FIT 231 FIT 99%

Table 51: TT*300-*H with two thermocouples (high stress – close coupled)
λSD λSU λDD λDU SFF
0 FIT 0 FIT 4309 FIT 41 FIT 99%

Table 52: TT*300-*H with two 2/3-wire RTDs (low stress – with extension wire)
λSD λSU λDD λDU SFF
0 FIT 0 FIT 1259 FIT 41 FIT 96%

Table 53: TT*300-*H with two 2/3-wire RTDs (low stress – close coupled)
λSD λSU λDD λDU SFF
0 FIT 0 FIT 414 FIT 32 FIT 92%

Table 54: TT*300-*H with two 2/3-wire RTDs (high stress – with extension wire)

λSD λSU λDD λDU SFF

0 FIT 0 FIT 19129 FIT 221 FIT 98%

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Table 55: TT*300-*H with two 2/3-wire RTDs (high stress – close coupled)
λSD λSU λDD λDU SFF
0 FIT 0 FIT 2221 FIT 48 FIT 97%

Table 56: TT*300-*H with thermocouple and 2/3-wire RTD (low stress – with extension wire)
λSD λSU λDD λDU SFF
0 FIT 0 FIT 1784 FIT 41 FIT 97%

Table 57: TT*300-*H with thermocouple and 2/3-wire RTD (low stress – close coupled)
λSD λSU λDD λDU SFF
0 FIT 0 FIT 466 FIT 37 FIT 92%

Table 58: TT*300-*H with thermocouple and 2/3-wire RTD (high stress – with extension wire)
λSD λSU λDD λDU SFF
0 FIT 0 FIT 29624 FIT 226 FIT 99%

Table 59: TT*300-*H with thermocouple and 2/3-wire RTD (high stress – close coupled)
λSD λSU λDD λDU SFF
0 FIT 0 FIT 3265 FIT 139 FIT 95%

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