Volume I X Numbers 1-2

1977

Eastern
Churches
Review
Editors
George Every
John Saward
Kallistos Timothy W a r e

A Journal of Eastern Christendom

Clarendon Press . Oxford ISSN 0012-8740

0! >;'£
 EASTERN CHURCHES REVIEW

of Christian Doctrine: 'Perhaps one of the most important distinctions

between the Western and the Eastern theological traditions is to be found
in the different point at which each has chosen to locate the crux of inco- The Philosophical Structures of Palamism
herence in relating God to the world. The West places it between God and
the world. God is pure actuality How, then, is it that he creates? Can ROWAN D. WILLIAMS
his relation to his creation be a real relation to himself? . . . The Eastern
tradition is different.... The point of incoherence is pushed back into the On the surface, the Palamite position is deceptively simple: God
being of God himself It is there, at the heart of the divine being, that cannot be known, communicated or participated as he is in his 'essence',
the East locates the inescapable point of incoherence.'29 I have tried to but is known, communicated and participated in his 'energy' or 'energies'.
show why, in my view, there need be no 'incoherence' (which seems to mean God may thus be said to exist in two modes, being equally fully present
irrationality). Wiles comments on these different views: 'Each has its points in both; so that the man participating in the divine 'energy' by grace is
of strength and its points of weakness. Each, if used critically, can rightly authentically sharing the life of God, and is 'deified' by his participation.
be used to illuminate differing aspects of our experience. But for that very- The energies are not identical with the hypostases of the Godhead, rather
reason, each needs to be extremely restrained in the kind of claims that it they are possessed and exercised in common by all three persons. And
makes for its own particular vision.' 30 1 cannot see that it will do any good they are so exercised through all eternity, independently of the world's
to combine two points of 'incoherence'. But I should like to see in the existence, since God is always £v evEpyefq*, always active or actual. From
sentence last quoted a plea for mutual tolerance addressed to theologians the point of view of creation, they are what is designated by the 'divine
who articulate a common faith in the different languages of their philo- names', in Pseudo-Dionysius's sense, the proodoi which descend to us
sophical traditions. from the inaccessible Godhead and enable us to speak of it. And in
Maximus the Confessor's terminology, they are the logoi in which inhere
the divine ideas of created things. At one level, then, the energeiai are
simply the foundation of all creation's sharing in the life of God; and
more specifically they are that-by-which-we-know God in the life of
grace, the direct, unmediated ('uncreated') agency of God illuminating
our hearts and minds. The straits between the Scylla of intellectualism
and the Charybdis of agnosticism have been successfully navigated, the
authenticity of the contemplative vision is vindicated, the possibility of
a chastened natural theology is secured, and God's real independence of
and real involvement in the life of creation are each given their proper
weight.
Even more significantly, perhaps, the foundations are laid for a theology
which has as its centre God's act of self-giving, self-sharing, his
'transcending of his transcendence'; a theme very congenial to a great
many contemporary theologians. In writers such as Vladimir Lossky
and Christos Yannaras, 1 this is superbly integrated into a theological
synthesis of unusual depth and power, and made the basis for a fierce
polemic against what is seen as the static intellectualism of Western
theology, which, by failing to develop anything corresponding to the
Palamite distinction, prejudices any attempt to understand how God and
man can genuinely be related to each other except by some kind of
subject-object knowledge, human intellect beholding the divine essential
1
See especially the recently translated collection of Lossky's essays, In the Image and Likeness
of God (New York 1974 & London 1975); on Yannaras, see R. D. Williams, 'The Theology of
Personhood', in Sobornost' vi, 6 (1972), pp. 415-30.
" p p . 109-10. 'Lossky, The Vision of God (London 1963), chapter i, passim; In the Image and Likeness of
30
p. 111. God, pp. 51, 56-57, etc.
26 27
 EASTERN CHURCHES REVIEW THE PHILOSOPHICAL STRUCTURES OF PALAMISM

Furthermore, this criticism has been taken to heart by several British, context remains to be written;9 all I can hope to do here is to outline
especially Anglican writers, and Palamism has been presented as a some of the difficulties in Palamas's thought which seem to me most
heaven-sent solution to some of the more intransigent problems of the serious, to suggest, very tentatively, some possible explanations for these
contemporary Western religious mind.3 Such a reaction is assisted by difficulties in terms of late classical philosophy as well as patristic
the persistent claim of the neo-Palamite school that Palamism is the theology, and thus to indicate what may be dangers, or, at least, gravely
teaching, simpliciter, of the Christian East from Athanasius, or even ambivalent features in the system. However, I have no desire whatever
Irenaeus, onwards; 1 more particularly, that the ousia-energeia distinc- to belittle the stature either of Palamas or of his modern disciples; error
tion is already present in a fairly clear form in the writings of the and confusion are not the prerogative of small minds, and to be able
Cappadocian Fathers, and of Maximus the Confessor.5 The suggestion candidly to examine the points of incoherence in a theologian's work
beloved of Lossky, classically and brilliantly expounded in his lectures on should be a testimony to what the student has learned from that
The Vision of God, that an homogeneous, continuous 'Eastern' spiritual theologian at his greatest and best.
and theological tradition exists, culminating in Palamas, which can be
opposed to the fragmented, corrupted, rationalistic divinity of the The first issue which needs to be raised is the precise sense given
Western schools, is an appealing one; even more so as developed by in Palamism to the onsia, commonly rendered as 'essence', though surely
Christos Yannaras 6 or Philip Sherrard,7 so as to explain the secularism of better translated (as it commonly is in other contexts) 'substance'.10
the Renascence, the Enlightenment, and the modern age in general as a Lossky, in an unpublished lecture,11 denned the divine ousia in Byzan-
necessary consequence of the failure of scholasticism to sustain a seriously tine theology as designating God 'en dehors de tous rapports avec la
theological perspective. creature; and the consensus seems to be that ousia in divinis is that
It is because neo-Palamism is so popular and attractive a theological in God which cannot be known or participated by creatures.12 Only
nostrum in certain circles at present that I am moved to set out, at some the persons of the Trinity possess the divine ousia; if creatures did so,
length, certain questions and reservations concerning both the possibility God would be LAupiu-miarctTos, since 'H ouafa Trap' oacov ECTTI pieTexo^vri,
and the propriety of accepting such a system at its own valuation. Critical Toowras KOCI T&S \jTrooT6to-6is 6XEI.13 Strictly speaking, no participation at all
voices have been raised, on both sides of the Atlantic, casting doubt on is possible (the persons of the Trinity do not, of course, divide the ousia
both the inner coherence and the alleged patristic pedigree of Palamism;8 between them), since participation means 'possessing a part', and the
and no convincing replies have appeared. It is high time that students divine ousia is indivisible." Thus, if God's self-communication is real,
of Eastern Christianity in this country made some attempt to take account he must be 'more' than his ousia: "Exo 6 ©EOS KCCI 6 \xf\ EUTIV ofidcc15.
of such weighty criticisms. The truth is that a systematic, thoroughly Hence the notion of 'modes of existence', EV ouafot and EV EVEpysioc, and, as
critical study of Palamism in its philosophical as well as theological Palamas sometimes seems to say, ev urrocrrdtaEi also.18 If we fail to
distinguish ousia from energeia, the multiplicity of the energeiai might
'E.g. in the essay of John Musther, ' "Exploration into God": an examination', in Orthodoxy lead us into polytheism," the supposition of many divine substances.
and the Death of God, ed. A. M. Allchin (The Fellowship of St Alban and St Sergius, London A totally transcendent, indivisible 'hinterland' of divinity must exist
1971), pp. 57-77; cf. M. Paternoster, 'Against the Agnostics', in Sobomost' v, 10 (1970), pp. 709-20, behind the multiplicity of the divine acts. J.-M. Garrigues, in a brilliant
and D. W. Allen, 'Orthodoxy and the New Reformation', in Sobornost' v, 4 (1966), pp. 227-32.
*The Vision of God, pp. 30-36; cf. Dom E. Lanne, 'La vision de Dieu dans 1'oeuvre de saint essay, has recently said of Palamas, 'Aussi bien lui que ses adversaires
Irenee', in Irinikon xxxiii (1960), pp. 310-20. raisonnent a 1'interieur d'une notion d'essence divine dont l'aseite est
'A full bibliography would occupy far more space than I have at my disposal here. Apart from
Lossky's Vision of God and the not very accessible monograph of Archmandrite Kiprian Kern, caracterisee, par voie uniquement apophatique . . , comme pure
Antropologiia sv. Grigoriia Palamy (Paris 1950), the most comprehensive recent studies are those
of G. Habra, 'The Sources of the Doctrine of Gregory Palamas', in ECQ xii, 6-8 (1958), and 'La
signification de la transfiguration dans la theologie byzantine', in Collectanea Cisterciensia xxv e
(1963); and L. C. Contos, 'The Essence-Energies Structure of St Gregory Palamas with a Brief I say this, of course, without prejudice to Fr John Meyendorff's brilliant and indispensable
Examination of its Patristic Foundation', in Greek Orthodox Theological Review xii (1966). exposition, A Study of Gregory Palamas (London 1964).
'De I'absence et de Vinconnaissance de Dieu (Paris 1971). "This is not a point of major importance; but it should be noted that essentia in scholastic
''The Greek East and the Latin West (London 1959); cf. 'Christian Theology and the Eclipse of thought carries overtones of conceptual definition, intelligible form, and so on, which are rather
unhelpful here. I shall return to this later.
Man*, in Sobornost' vii, 3 (1976), pp. 166-79. , ,..,„, "Delivered on 17 November 1955, in Paris. I am indebted to Canon A. M. Allchin for a tran-
8
Eg. E. von Ivanka, 'Palamismus and Vateradition', in L'Eglise et les eglises, vol. n (Cheve- script of this lecture.
togne 1955), pp. 29-46; C. Journet, 'Palamisme et thomisme', in Revue Thomiste Ix (1940), pp. "See Palamas, Capita 78 (MPG cl, col. 1176B), 109-11 (1196A-1198A), 145 (1222BC), etc.
429-52; Dom P. Sherwood, 'Glorianter Vultum Tuum, Christe Deus: Reflections on reading 13
Cap. 109 (1196A); cf. Theophanes (MPG cl, col. 941A).
Lossky's The Vision of God', in St Vladimir's Seminary Quarterly x, 4 (1966), pp. 195-203; E. L. li
Cap. 110 (1196CD); cf. Theophanes (944A).
Mascall, The Openness of Being (London 1971), appendix iii, pp. 217-50; J.-P. Houdret, OCD, "Cap. 135 (1216B).
'Palamas et les Cappadociens', in Istina (1974), pp. 260-71; J.-M. Garrigues, OP, 'L'energie divine 16
E.g. Cap. 75 (1173B); cf. Meyendorff, op. cit., pp. 182-3.
et la grace chez Maxime le Confesseur', ibid., pp. 272-96; and Dom Illtyd Trethowan, 'Lossky on "Cap. 145 (1221c).
Mystical Theology', in The Downside Review 309 (October 1974), pp. 239-47.
28 29
 EASTERN CHURCHES REVIEW THE PHILOSOPHICAL STRUCTURES OF PALAMISM

separation excluant toute participation.'18 All physis in creation is he is, the absence in him of any potentiality to be other, greater or
§evri Tfis 6eias <pOcrecos.19 Eternally, finally, irreducibly over against the lesser, better or worse; and there is the activity whereby he makes him-
world stands the OirepouaioTris, the supra-substantial reality, of the un- self known in and to his creation. In re these are not distinct, but the
known God. Eternally radiating from this reality, and, in the temporal conditions of created existence are such that we apprehend the latter as
order, penetrating, animating and transfiguring the created universe, are a sequence of apparently discrete operations. The task of sound theology
the energeiai, the uncreated operations of God. And if it be objected that is to steer us away from the mythological notion that these are sequential
this is to introduce distinction into the being of God, Palamas is content to God; that is, that they are a series of distinct actions undertaken by
to admit the charge; but replies that, if we fail to make distinctions of God in some kind of temporal succession. However, what this means is
some sort in the divine life, we cannot intelligibly speak of God as that predication of God in the category of action is really no more than
Trinity.20 If predication concerning God can (in Aristotelean terms) a convenient fiction: normally, predication of to poiein is a matter of
be made only in the category of onsia, then the Trinitarian dogma, which identifying particular and discrete acts attributable to a contingent
predicates in the category of relation (to pros ti), is nonsense; and if the individual agent, it answers the question, 'What is x doing?' It should
category of relation may be admitted, so may that of action (to poiein), be clear that this is not properly applicable to God: strictly speaking,
though none of the other seven, since all suggest limitation and contin- action is predicated of God only in the category of ousia, since it is
gency.21 Thus the energeiai are <JV\X$S$T\K6S TTCOS,22 accidents of a sort, ultimately that whereby he is such as he is. And although piety allows a
though this is not to be taken to suggest that God is in any way subject great deal of latitude to language here, although, indeed, we may have
to change and chance, 'accidentality' in a general sense.23 In so far
no option in some circumstances but to employ a 'mythological' kind
as the energeiai are not the ousia of God, just as the hypostases are not,
of talk about the 'acts of God', we need to be fully aware of what we are
they are nearer to what the Aristotelean means by 'accidents'; but in
doing, and of the necessary correctives of strict logic.21 As for pre-
so far as accidentality implies contingency, mutability, corruptibility, and
dication in the category of relation, Palamas seems to have made a bad
so forth, they are not true accidents, but fall under one of the two most
'formal' of Aristotle's categories, that of action. blunder here. Predication of God in the category of to pros ti ought to
mean talking of the relation of God to other beings; and as such it is
Now what is wrong with all this? Most fundamentally, an enormous subject to precisely the same qualifications as is predication in the
confusion in terminology, and a surprising naivete in what may be called category of to poiein. That is to say, it does not (as it would in other
philosophical imagination. At least two (probably more) models of ousia contexts) treat of the modifications of a thing by the relations of which
are being employed, without any sense of their dubious compatibility, or it constitutes one term; the relation between God and the world is
any attempt at saying what exactly this term is supposed to be doing in asymmetrical, since God is not modified thereby.25 What has this to
the argument. In the latter part of the preceding paragraph, we have seen do with the doctrine of the Trinity? I am at a loss to see; but evidently
ousia used to mean approximately what Aristotle elsewhere in the the Cappadocian notion of the hypostases of the Trinity as distinguished
'Categories' calls 'secondary substance', 6ei>Te'poc ouala. Predication in the solely by their mutual relations is in the background somewhere. If, in
category of secondary substance is the ascription to a thing (a 'primary the Cappadocian manner, we treat each Person of the Trinity as a kind
substance') of those predicates which constitute it the kind of thing which of primary substance, it makes some sense to talk of 'generation' and
it is (as opposed to those which constitute it the particular thing it is). 'procession' as predicated in the category of relation (just as 'wisdom'
Presumably what we must understand Palamas as trying to say here is or 'goodness' would be predicated in the category of ousia); but even
that our speech about God is not restricted to statements about 'what he this is only an approximation, and creates problems of its own. In any
is', but extends to his acts towards us, and to his differentiation within case, there is no reason for believing that this is what Palamas has in
himself, as Trinity. But a moment's reflection should plainly show the mind; in the passages in question, he appears to be using 'God' as the
awkwardness of this. We may speak in two ways of the 'action' of God:
name of the primary substance involved (rather than 'Father', 'Son' or
there is his eternal activity - what the Thomist would call the actus
'Spirit'), and this renders his argument quite incomprehensible.26
essendi of God, the act whereby he is eternally and necessarily such as
Doubtless all this serves only to confirm the opinion of those who
18
insist that Aristotelean logic is ill-equipped to deal with the mysteries
L'energie divine et la grace chez Maxime le Confesseur', in Istina (1974), p. 275.
"Cap. 78 (1176B).
"E.g. Theophanes (929A). 2i
ll l am here in full agreement with Dom Illtyd Trethowan's article elsewhere in this issue.
Cap. 134 (1216B); cf. Meyendorfi, op. cit., p. 210. "For a classical exposition of this, see chapter viii of E. L. Mascall's He Who Is (London 1943).
"Cap. 127 (1209c); cf. Cap. 128 (1210CD). 2e
On 'God' not being a proper name, see G. E. M. Anscombe and P. Geach, Three Philosophers
"Cap. 135 (1215BC). (Oxford 1961), pp. 109-10, 118 ff.
30 31
 THE PHILOSOPHICAL STRUCTURES OF PALAMISM
EASTERN CHURCHES REVIEW
ousia. 'The divine ousia' ('Whatever-it-is-to-be-God') is the answer to the
of faith;27 but bad logic is no better than no logic, and Palamas's question, 'What are the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost?'33
muddles in this sphere are due less to the shortcomings of the Aristotelean Palamas's language, with its implications of 'parallel modes' of divine
system than to his own misunderstandings of its workings. Whence do existence (Tpicov OVTGOV TOO 0EOO, ovalas, evepyeiocs, TpiaSos Oirocrraaecov Qeicov
these misunderstandings arise? Very largely, I suggest, from the common . . .),3'1 reflects an intellectual world in which logic is treated as decrip-
Greek (and pre-scholastic Latin) tendency to regard Aristotelean logic as tive of fact, not regulative of language. And the theological danger
a somewhat pedestrian adjunct to the body of philosophy - a body chiefly here is precisely that against which theologians such as Lossky have
dependent upon Plato and his late classical interpreters, Plotinus, Proclus (very properly) warned, that of treating the divine ousia as something
and others, the result being a certain carelessness in the use of terms 'beyond' the Persons of the Trinity,35 an Eckhartian Urgrund. Yet, on
like onsia, a failure to recognize that the word has sharply distinct senses the Neoplatonic principle of the hierarchy of beings in which the more
in different systems, and, indeed, within the Aristotelean system itself.28 unified is superior to the less, it is impossible to avoid some such language.
Platonic metaphysics placed the concept of participation in a position Ousia here is the highest term in an ascending series, the perfectly
of pivotal importance: as A. C. Lloyd indicates,29 the Neoplatonists simple, indivisible, imparticipable inferiority of God: it is a mode of
regarded this as a solution to the questions posed in Aristotelean logic divine existence, God 'en dehors de tous rapports'. And, as such, it is of
about the actual relations of substance to quality, and (following on course, as Palamas recognized, a grossly inadequate account of the
from this) of genus to species. What had for Aristotle been 'a mere class Christian God: Palamas evidently does not want to surrender to
algebra',30 an organizing of terms, became for the Neoplatonists a Neoplatonism, to any elevation of the ousia above the Trinity,36 yet
problem of metaphysics, of ontology, a problem concerning the rela- the logic of his own language inexorably pushes him in this direction. If
tion of all things to each other, of part to whole, many to one. Platonism, energeia is distinguished from ousia, cos KOCI TT\S ova-lens "rfjv Cm-dorao-iv,37
after all, began with this problem; Aristotle, whose perspective upon it and if the ousia is held to be 'transcendent' to the energeiai,m then,
was so radically different, could be integrated into the Platonic world strictly, the ousia should also be transcendent to the hypostaseis. And
only by an 'ontologizing' of his logic, its transformation into a system although Palamas attempts to salvage orthodoxy by speaking of the
not of terms but of real relations. And one consequence of this is that 'trihypostatic ousia' as a single reality over against the energeiai,ss he
Aristotle's ousia, a simple entity and its definition,31 the answer or thereby sacrifices the polemically necessary point of the distinction of
answers to the question 'What is x?', is submerged in a quagmire of ousia from hypostasis.
Platonic speculations about the degrees of being, the manner in which
being is 'shared out' among entities in the world. Furthermore, what are we to make, in this connexion, of Palamas's
odd argument40 that if we fail to distinguish ousia from energeiai, we
Once this has been understood, it becomes possible to grasp more have no means of distinguishing the generation of the Son from the
clearly what precisely is going on in Palamism. A statement such as creation of the world, since the former is an 'essential' or 'natural' act,
"Exei 6 6e6s Kai 6 \XT\ io-nv ouafa, 'God possesses something other than ousia', while the latter is 'volitional'? As it stands, this implies that the begetting
is nonsense from an Aristotelean point of view: an entity is not a com- of the Son is some kind of internal differentiation of the divine ousia, a
pound of substance and qualities, a generic body draped in accidental process in the 'essential' life of God, and, once again, this is exactly
garments. An owsic-statement simply tells you what sort of thing you what writers like Lossky so strongly deprecate, insisting that the begetting
are dealing with; it does not refer to a mysterious core of essentiality to of the Son is the free personal act of the Father.41 No illumination is
which qualities are added.32 But this is really what Palamas is implying, shed by reverting to the awkward Nicaean practice of speaking of the
here and elsewhere: the point becomes even clearer if we consider his ousia of the Father42 as the 'agent' of the generation of the Logos. In
remarks about ousia and hypostasis, treating the Persons of the Trinity
as distinct from the 'substance' of God. The Persons are not other than "Ibid., pp. 117-18.
3
*Cap. 75 (1173B).
the ousia, another 'mode' of divine existence; quite simply, they are the " A s Dionysius appears to do (despite Lossky's attempts to maintain the contrary: see 'Apophasis
and Trinitarian Theology', in In the Image and Likeness of God, pp. 13-29).
"See Meyendorff, op. cit., p. 225. 36
See Meyendorff, op. cit., pp. 218 ff.
28
J. Owens, The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian 'Metaphysics' (Toronto 1951), provides an "Theophanes (929A).
exhaustive survey. I do not mean to accuse the Neoplatonists of an indifference to logic and the 38
Meyendorff, op. cit., pp. 218-19.
definition of terms; but, as diffused among Christian writers, their thought undeniably breeds ™lbid., pp. 215-16, 218-21.
confusions of this kind. "Cap. 96-98 (1189BC), 143 (1220D); Meyendorff, op. cit., pp. 221-4; and see G. V. Florovsky,
a9
In The Cambridge History of Later Creek and Early Medieval Philosophy, ed. A. H. Arm- 'The Concept of Creation in St Athanasias', in Studia Patristica VI, pp. 36-57.
strong (Cambridge 1970), pp. 319 ff. "See, e.g., The Mystical Theology of the Eastern Church (London 1957), pp. 58 ff.
"Ibid., p. 321. "See G. C. Stead's admirable discussion, 'The Significance of the Homoousios', in Studia
"See Anscombe and Geach, op. cit., pp. 7-13. Patristica III, part i, pp. 397-412.
32
Ibid., pp. 34-35.
C 33
32
 EASTERN CHURCHES REVIEW THE PHILOSOPHICAL STRUCTURES OF PALAMISM

its original context, the distinction between the 'natural' procession of it is no more so than the whole Platonic tradition from which it springs.
the Son and the 'volitional' procession of the world was designed simply 'Having part' of something does not, in Neoplatonic metaphysics, mean
to affirm against the Arians, Homoiousians, Homoeans, and Eunomians anything quite so simple as possessing a determinate bit of a determinate
the truth that the Logos is God by nature, uncreated: his generation is whole: rather it signifies a sharing in some circumscribable aspect or
kata physin in the loose sense that it is something eternally and neces- attribute of a superior reality. The 'materialist' colouring derives from
sarily bound up with God's 'act of being', it is not incidental to the the fact that these attributes are conceived as having a kind of
divine life. How it is to be reconciled with speculations about the substantiality of their own, some sort of independent reality. X
monarchia of the Father,'13 and so on, is a question with which the 'participates' in Y if the highest characteristics of X are also present
unphilosophical minds who first formulated the phrase did not concern in Y: body (for instance) 'participates' in soul in so far as it mirrors
themselves; and it is mere darkening of counsel to turn it into an certain of the properties of soul. But these properties of soul are not of
argument for Palamism, as if two comparable kinds of operation, two the essence of soul; that remains 'imparticipated', d^OeKTos, as it has
comparable kinds of causality, were involved. In any other than the its own proper level distinct from and superior to that of body.51 This
loose sense proposed, this language leads us back to a notion of the scheme, first clearly set out by Iamblichus, was to become the basic
oiisia as existing in some way prior to the hypostaseis of the Trinity. It model for Proclus's logic and metaphysics, and, through that medium,
seems that the notion of an absolutely transcendent divine interiority for the theology of Pseudo-Dionysius and Maximus the Confessor. It is
can be secured only at the cost of orthodox trinitarianism;44 once the basis of the Neoplatonic commonplace that all reality is organized in
ousia has been 'concretized' into a core of essential life, it will inevitably a triadic structure, describable from various points of view as amethektos,
take on some associations of superiority or ontological priority.45 methektos and metechon, moni, proodos and epistrophi, hyparxis, dynamis
and energeia, and so on;52 but the general structure may be summed
up in the triad of ousia, zoi and nous.5'6 A reality is what it is and
The moment has perhaps come when we need to raise the question of
nothing else, it shares its distinctive existence with nothing; it is ousia.
why it is so important to secure such a notion, why 'pure separation
It 'proceeds' from its pure simplicity in the exercise of its reality in rela-
excluant toute participation' is the only possible way of conceiving the
tions with other entities; it is zoi. And by entering into the life of another
inmost life of God for Palamas and his school. The answer is not so
reality in such relations, by communicating certain qualities to it, it has
self-evident as a Palamite might claim. We have already noted Palamas's
an inferior and dependent kind of life in that other reality, which unites
contention that for creatures to share in the divine ousia would mean
the second reality to the first; it is nous.
their elevation to the level of the persons of the Trinity;46 or, as he
says elsewhere,47 their sharing in the attributes of God (omnipotence, For the pagan Neoplatonist such as Proclus, this means that, at the
omniscience, and so on). Here, the imparticipability of God's ousia is a highest level of reality, the intelligible world participates in the 'pro-
corollary of the absolute distinction between creature and Creator: the cession' of creative intellect, but not in the self-subsistent being of the
idea that a creature could have ousia in common with God is a blasphemy One, the ultimate transcendent ousia. Although all ousiai are in a sense
from which Palamas turns in horror.48 Related to (but not quite 'transcendent', all except the first are dependent members of a series
identical with) this is the argument'9 that, since 'participation' means initiated by the procession of the divine intelligence; but the divine
'having part', the divine ousia, being simple and indivisible, is beyond ousia is neither participated nor participating, it is a member of no
participation. This is more of a logical point, and is not quite so crude series. Furthermore, ousia strictly (as in the whole Platonic tradition54)
as might at first appear (more on this later). But material to both these signifies determinate being ; and while 'the divine ousia' is a possible
arguments is the common implication that the divine ousia is a concrete locution for describing the distinctive reality of the One, it must not be
reality-the 'stuff' which constitutes the God-ness of God. This sounds read as suggesting that the One is bound by 'form', 'essence' or definition
very materialistic, as Dom Polycarp Sherwood has pointed out;10 but of any kind.55 It is not that the One is 'unreal', rather that its reality
«A more difficult notion than Eastern theologians generally allow.
is of so radically different an order from that of finite being that Plato's
44
A point well made in an otherwise highly opaque study by G. Grondijs, 'The Patristic Origins gnomic utterance in the Parmenides,™ that TO EV . . . o08c<ncos . . . oGafas
of Gregory Palamas's Doctrine of God', in Studia Patristica V, part iii, pp. 323-8.
"Despite the insistence in Cap. 136 (1216D) that there is no ousia without energeia. '^Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy, p. 298.
"Cap. 109 (1196A). "For a long but not exhaustive list of such triads, see Cambridge History, p. 314.
53
"Theophanes (940B). See E. R. Dodds's edition of Proclus, Elements of Theology (Oxford 1933), appendix i, p. 313.
s
is
Cap. 78 (1176B); cf. Cap. I l l (1198A); Triads (Defense des saints hesychastes, ed. J. Meyen- *See G. E. L. Owen, 'Plato on Not-Being' in Plato: a Collection of Critical Essays. I. Metaphysics
and Epistemology, ed. G. Vlastos (New York 1971), pp. 223-67.
dorff [Louvain 1959]), III, ii, 5. "Plotinus, Enneads V, v, 6; Cambridge History, pp. 238, 291.
"Cap. 110 (1196D); cf. Theophanes (944A). 56
137C-142A.
"Art. cit., pp. 201-2.
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 EASTERN CHURCHES REVIEW THE PHILOSOPHICAL STRUCTURES OF PALAMISM

USTEXEI, is
closer to the truth than any suggestion that It is 'supereminently' be ascribed to the processions. We are told06 that it is a single activity,
ousia (though such language is used by Porphyry57). Hence the Proclan one hyperousios aktis, that is at work in all the proodoi, yet also that
term (so enthusiastically borrowed by Pseudo-Dionysius) O-n-epoucnoTTis, these are really differentiated operations. If their multiplicity is logically
'supersubstantiality', used to signify the uncircumscribed ousia of the posterior to the multiplicity of creatures, if they are multiple only qua
One.58 The zoi of the One, its participate procession in 'intellect', is thus modes of participation of creatures in God, there is less of a problem;
necessarily a movement away from indivisibility and simplicity to and this, of course, is roughly the solution developed by Aquinas - a
another order of reality, and for Proclus this is the order of the divine kind of 'demythologizing' of the whole network of imagery and specula-
'henads',59 multiple divine subsistents, which as it were embody or tion about the 'divine Ideas'.07 If, on the other hand, their multiplicity
hypostatize divine qualities and mediate them to finite subsistents. It is logically and ontologically prior to the multiplicity of things, as the
is wholly characteristic of the extremely concrete or 'realist' tendency in most plausible reading of Proclus and Dionysius would imply, we are
Neoplatonic thought that the divine qualities or attributes are thus left with an intermediate class of mysterious divine 'powers', which,
regarded as entities, prior to their finite instantiation. Participation may although they are 'God', are not included in the simplicity of his ousia
not be a materialistic conception; but it certainly is far more than a
(or hyperousiotis). And this is problematic because it is by no means
merely linguistic one. Having said that, of course, it is by no means easy
clear what may be their relation to the created order. They constitute a
to say precisely what third option there is between nominalism and the
'mechanism of mediation'; but if they are eternal adjuncts of the divine
extreme of quasi-materialist realism; but this is a wider problem than
being, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that the world must be eternal,
can satisfactorily be discussed here. What is significant is that the Proclan
henads are an intermediate order of multiple 'divinities' prior to the in so far as the dynameis are eternally engaged, by their very nature, in
world, yet necessarily connected to this lower order (since their 'purpose' communicating the divine perfections to some second term or order of
is solely mediation between the One and finite being). And for Proclus being. God and the world appear to be bound up in a kind of organic
there was no problem in identifying the henads with the deities of unity - a foreshadowing of Whitehead or Hartshorne. It is practically
classical mythology.60 impossible to salvage from this any notion of contingency in the world,
except by ascribing contingency to the proodoi; in which case we must
In a pagan context, none of this presents any difficulty; transferred to ask, Contingency upon what?
the Christian thought world, however, it is less straightforward, as the This particular aporia is a problem which Palamas inherits and handles
history of the Dionysian influence in Eastern and Western theology very awkwardly. The real plurality of the energeiai seems to be asserted
amply demonstrates. The Areopagite never uses the language of 'henads'; in several passages,68 and Meyendorff accepts this as Palamas's teach-
but it is evident that the proodoi or dynameis of his system serve precisely ing.68 And however many qualifications may be made, by Palamas70
the same end, the provision of some mechanism of mediation. First or his exegetes, about the real indivisibility and unity of the ApeT^
among the proodoi are the hypostases of the Trinity;01 then come the in all these operations, we are still left with an order of distinct realities,
various 'names', the 6sovu|ji(ai vorixai,62 the names of the Forms or Ideas, divine henads, between God's ousia and the world. Palamas can even
foremost among these being the name of 'Good',03 followed by those
go so far as to say that 'some' energeiai 'have a beginning and an end',
of Being, Wisdom, Life, Power and Peace and so on;64 and finally,
while others (prognosis, thelisis, pronoia and autopsia, for instance) are
from the viewpoint of creation, these processions are the theia theli-
eternal;71 a form of words which certainly suggests a real plurality
mataK upon which particular creaturely subsistences are grounded, the
prior to creation. And this is further borne out by his extraordinary
aitia of things. Leaving aside the complex question of what exactly
Dionysius means by numbering the Persons of the Trinity among the assertion (already cited)'2 that we are in danger of polytheism if we
"E.g. De div. nom. i, 4 (617B-624C); ii, 5 (641D-644B).
proodoi, the main problem seems to be what kind of multiplicity is to "De div. nom. ix, 7 (932AC). On 'analogy', see Lossky, 'La notion des "analogies" chez Denys
le Pseudo-Areopagite', in Archives d'histoire doctrinale et litteraire du moyen-age v (1931), pp.
279-309; on the divine ideas in Aquinas, see E. L. Mascall, Existence and Analogy (London 1949),
"Cambridge History, p. 238. pp. 152 ff., and F. C. Coplestone, Aquinas (London 1955), pp. 102, 147.
"See, e.g., Proclus, Elements 115; Dionysius, De myst. theol. i, 1 (MPG iii, col. 997B); Cambridge "'Cap. 100 (1189D-1192A), 145 (1221c); Theophanes (941CD); Triads III, ii, 7 and 25.
History, p. 469. "'Op. cit., pp. 220-1; cf. Lossky, Mystical Theology, p. 80.
SB
Proclus, Elements 113-58, passim. "E.g. Triads III, i, 23; III, ii, 7.
,1
^Cambridge History, p. 307. Triads III, ii, 7-11. The implication is that energeiai associated with creation begin and end,
"De div. nom. ii, 9 (MPG iii, col. 674-7). whereas 'reflexive' energeiai within the divine life do not. But obviously both are considered
M
De myst. theol. iii (1033A). to have the same sort of plurality; and, since this plurality is supposed to be connected with the
"3De div. nom. iii, 1 (680B). multiplicity of participant creaturely forms, we are no nearer a solution. And are even the 'eternal'
M
De div. nom. v-viii, xi, passim. energeiai strictly 'reflexive'? How are prognosis and pronoia conceivable independently of a
e
?De div. nom. v, 8 (822c-824c). temporal world?
"Cap 145 (1221c).
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 EASTERN CHURCHES REVIEW THE PHILOSOPHICAL STRUCTURES OF PALAMISM

fail to distinguish ousia from energeia. The difficulty is still that of The Palamite may reply that the primary and unifying reality in God
conceiving an eternal plurality of mediating agencies in the absence of is the Trinity of Persons: the Persons are what possess both ousia and
a co-eternal second term. MeyendorfF makes a valiant attempt to energeia.16 This is indeed, as Meyendorff argues, entirely faithful to
defend the contingency of the created order in Palamism by insisting the characteristic Cappadocian and early Byzantine tendency to regard
that, since the creation is the work of God's unconditioned will, it ousia in trinitarian theology as having no more than a weak or generic
cannot be eternal and necessary; he cites Palamas as having alleged that, sense - Aristotle's deutera ousia once again. We first apprehend God as
while God eternally possesses the power to create, it is not eternally personal, and then abstract to the divine ousia. However, in the classical
actualized. But this is gross: it involves us in supposing that God is disussions of this by the Cappadocians,77 ousia was held to designate,
subject to some form of temporal succession, that his 'decision' to create quite simply, to koinon in G o d - t h a t which the Persons share; and this
is comparable to human choice, that he has unfulfilled or unrealized must include both God's 'being-in-himself and his actions. Against the
potencies-in short, that he is mutable. What Meyendorff apparently Eunomians, Basil and the Gregories insist78 that God's energeia is not
does not understand is that it is no answer to this to say that God's ousia divided amongst the three Persons; precisely because ousia and energeia
is immutable and His energeiai mutable,71 as this drives a very con- are inseparable, the energeia is one. The same argument is used by
siderable wedge between the two terms: what is true of one 'mode' Maximus against Monenergism in Christology - two ousiai, therefore
or aspect of God is not true of another. The unity of God is far more two energeiai"1 - and Damascene follows suit, describing the divine
gravely imperilled by this than any Palamite or neo-Palamite seems to energeia as ufcc ofcra KalOTTATI,80in virtue of the simplicity of the divine
have grasped; it is the purest Neoplatonism, an affirmation of two wholly ousia. It seems, in fact, as if the appeal to trinitarian dogma points us
distinct orders of reality in God.76 And (to repeat an already laboured towards an identification of ousia with energeia: if the primary realities,
point), since the second and inferior order exists (strictly) only as a the 'first substances', are the Persons of the Trinity, then ousia and
means of participation for yet further orders, we are faced with the energeia are alike modes of predication concerning them. And since we
prospect of two eternal realities, God in se and God as participated by are dealing with a perfectly simple ousia, we are dealing also with a
creatures. And what is it - what, logically, could it be - that unifies them? perfectly simple energeia: we are not (as we have already seen in this
By definition they do not have 'essence' or 'form' in common. Why, then, paper) talking about qualification of the substance by contingent and
have we any right to call both 'God'? What sort of statement are we discrete operations. Neither the ousia nor the energeia are or can be
making if we say, 'the One, or the Imparticipable, and the Creator and subjects of predication in their own right. They are not even really
Redeemer are the same God'l The dialectic of participate and distinct modes of predication: action is predicated of God in the
imparticipable is acceptable in a Neoplatonic context, since the absolute category of substance.
distinction of the One, the hyperousiotis, from Its 'processions' or zoi is This is straightforward Aristoteleanism, of course, and quite under-
not in question: there is nothing impelling the Neoplatonist to insist standably so: the classical trinitarian schema was developed with
that the participant reality shares in anything more than a zoi which is virtually no reference to Neoplatonism. And energeia, for Aristotle, means
discontinuous (a distinct hypostasis, in Plotinian and post-Plotinian no more than 'actuality' - or, more strictly, actuality of an 'entelechous'
language) with the transcendent ousia. Only for the Christian do zoi and kind, one which comprises, or is, its own end (seeing or understanding,
ousia have to be brought somehow together. Nor is the Neoplatonist say, as opposed to learning or building, which are determined by external
disturbed by the notion of an eternal 'emanation' of all things from ends).81 Actuality is the most universally applicable definition of being,
divine intellect; yet here it is discontinuity which the Christian is obliged 'being there other than potentially', offered in the 'Metaphysics', the
to assert, the complete distinction between created and uncreated, the only definition which can be extended to extra-terrestrial, immaterial and
wholly dependent and the wholly self-subsistent, the contingent and the incorruptible realities.82 Of such it might be said that their ousia is
necessary. energeia, or that 'actuality is predicated of them in the category of
73
0p. cit., pp. 222-3. Meyendorff tends to assume that 'eternal' and 'necessary' are coterminous; "Meyendorff, op. cit., pp. 212-13, 214-16, 217, 219-20, etc.
but a study of Aquinas's discussion of this thorny problem (Summa Theologiae I, xix, 3, 7 and 10, "See, for instance, Basil, Epp. 214 and 236 (MPG xxxii, col. 789AC, 883AC); Gregory of Nyssa,
and I, xxv, 1) shows the possibility of distinguishing God's eternal and necessary 'willing' (that is, Quod non sint tres dei (MPG xlv, col. 116A-136A).
loving) of himself, from his eternal and immutable but not necessary willing of the universe; and "Basil, Adv. Eunomium i, 24 (MPG xxix, col. 565A); Gregory of Nyssa, Quod non sint tres dei
the eternal willing of the universe from the willing of an eternal universe. (MPG xlv, col. 133A), and De comm. not. (MPG xlv, col. 180c), etc.
"Sherrard, op. cit., p. 38, puts the distinction in precisely these terms. ™Disp. cum. Pyrrho (MPG xci, col. 337c, 345D-348A); Ambig. (MPG xci, 1052, 1060A), etc.
"Meyendorff, op. cit., p. 224, denies that Palamas regards the energies as 'objects or "things"', *°Defid.orth. (MPG xciv, col. 860c).
since they are not 'essences' (i.e., presumably, 'first substances'); the fact remains that if they are "Metaphysics VII, 6, 1048A25-B37.
treated as subjects of predication (as they are by Palamism), they are being treated a 'things'. "Metaphysics XI, 6, 1071B20.

38 39
 EASTERN CHURCHES REVIEW THE PHILOSOPHICAL STRUCTURES OF PALAMISM
83
substance'. They are there, in actuality, and so are ousiai in the fondness for language suggesting that 'incomprehensibility' is an inherent
sense of 'first' or 'primary' substances, they are real entities; and because property of the divine ousia66 is puzzling: 'incomprehensible' means
this is all that can be said by way of defining them, their 'secondary' 'not open to comprehension by any comprehending subject'. Lossky
substantiality is simply 'being there', actuality, energeia. We have here, objects to the suggestion that God's unknowable character is a function
in fact, the roots of the Thomist conception of God as pure act, his of the weakness or limitation of our finite minds; but what else can it
essentia (deutera ousia) being his act-of-existing, esse or actus essendi. be? I think that Lossky (and others who have followed him) has confused
Energeia corresponds very closely in meaning to actus essendi, being-in- the simple statement that 'God is incomprehensible in virtue of the
act, in the Aristotelean context; it does not designate a mode of necessary limitation of our minds' with the notion (not seriously defended
participable being, distinguishable from imparticipable being, since (as by any Christian thinker) that our inability to know God as he is is an
Palamas himself insists, following Maximus)84 there can, logically, be accidental limitation of our minds, contingent upon their association
no such thing as non-actual substance. Ousia must be, by its nature, with the body. Aquinas's teaching that the vision of God after this life
ev 4vepysfq<; there can be no isolable core of pure unmoving interiority, is a vision of God's essentia (a red rag to the Palamite bull) means only
an 'inner substance', a further subject of predication. (It will by now, that, in patria, God's actus essendi is present to us directly, without the
perhaps, be clear why I have avoided the term 'essence' so far as possible intervention of any mediating created species f it is quite clear (though
throughout this paper, as implying some such concrete interior Lossky seems to misunderstand this)88 that it is not a comprehension of
substantiality.) what-it-is-to-be-God.
Now, if ousia is thus regarded, in Aristotelean fashion, as an abstract
or formal notion, not the name of a quasi-object, it is evident that know-
ledge of any ousia 'in itself is unthinkable (not, as in Iamblichan This account of the divine incomprehensibility avoids the problem of
Neoplatonism, impossible, but strictly inconceivable): there is nothing 'participation': the only kind of participation at issue here is that which
to know. What is known is 'substance-in-act', the properties of a thing neo-Thomist writers (with a nod in the direction of Husserl) commonly
experienced as affecting the knowing subject, the esse, the actual call 'intentional' - a concept which, as I understand it, means simply that
existent in relation. Ousia, to borrow Heidegger's language,85 is always the subject 'becomes' the object in so far as the object occupies and
parousia. And intellect, for the Aristotelean, is, at the finite level, passive 'informs' (in the strict sense) the subject.89 'You are the music while
to and 'informed' by being-in-act. Thus to say in this system that know- the music lasts.' What is happening in the subject (to put it very crudely)
ledge is of energeia rather than ousia is to state the obvious. What then is what the object is doing, the way in which it is making itself present
becomes of the 'essential' unknowability of God? Clearly we know God to the subject. The Western mystical tradition has resolutely insisted
only in so far as he acts upon us, as he is 'present' to us, never as he is that the deification of man in grace is the identification of his will with
'present' to himself; but this is not peculiar to our knowledge of God. God's: what he effects is what God effects, his acts are, as it were, God's,
What is peculiar to it is that, since God's actus essendi is wholly simple, while still remaining his.90 What happens in man is what God is
uncircumscribed, self-subsistent, and infinite, since it is not definable doing. Is this an adequate account of theosisl Most Eastern Christian
by reference to any other entity, it can never be experienced or under- writers would probably deny that it is; but, if so, they should attempt
stood in its fulness by the finite subject. It is conceivable that a finite to explain what more is involved, without adverting to a model of
^existent can be grasped in some way by a finite intellect, that its 'participation' which (as we have seen) creates severe problems for a
'working' can be adequately organized into concepts by the intellect, rational and scriptural theology. Part of my purpose in this essay has
although its esse-as-such, its 'being there' as a unique subsistent, is not been to demonstrate that Palamism is, philosophically, a rather unhappy
available for conceptualizing, and it would be a gross error, a category marriage of Aristotelean and Neoplatonic systems, the characteristic
.mistake, to treat it as such. But the 'workings' of God cannot be so extreme realism of Neoplatonic metaphysics colouring (and confusing)
organized, since they are simply the diverse ways in which his single a terminology better understood in terms (inadequate though they may
actus essendi is present to us; they are not contingent and circumscribed be) of the Aristotelean logic already applied to Christian trinitarianism.
events, comparable to the activity of finite existents. Do we need to 86
See, e.g., Mystical Theology, pp. 30, 34, 39.
say any more than this about God's incomprehensibility? Lossky's "Sherwood, art. cit., pp. 198-9; Journet, art. cit., p. 450.
"The Vision of Cod, chapter i, passim; cf. Journet, art. cit., p. 444.
" J . H. Randall, Aristotle (New York 1960), pp. 129-33; cf. Cambridge History, p. 50. ""See Trethowan, 'Lossky on Mystical Theology', p. 244.
80
"E.g. Cap. 136 (1216D). This is expressed with unique sensitivity in St John of the Cross's commentary on the second
"The connection is made by Yannaras: see, most recently, his book To prosopo kai o eros redaction of the Spiritual Canticle, stanzas 38 and 39: see The Complete Works, tr. E. Allison
(Athens 1976), pp. 49-54. Peers (London 1943), vol. ii, pp. 389-403.

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If this contention is correct, Palamism, as classically argued, is bound to it stands can provide anything like an adequate vehicle for this, but the
a realist and near-materialist idea of participation which leads to grave adaptations of it made by a thinker such as Yannaras seem to hold great
terminological incoherences: if such a view of participation is considered promise. And lest anyone should imagine that Western theology is
to be desirable in Christian theology (and my own belief is that it is totally barren in this respect, I may add that creative adaptation of a
not), let us at least have more rigorous consideration of the terms being somewhat rococo scholastic vocabulary has been the method employed
used, and less borrowing from Aristotelean sources. And if this view by several of the foremost Western European theologians of this century
is not thought desirable, we must accept that Palamism as a metaphysical - Maritain, Rahner and Farrer within the Thomist tradition, for instance.
theory must be relegated to the demi-monde inhabited by comparable The problem here is that-thanks largely to the untiring efforts of
interesting but ultimately incoherent speculations - those of Origen, Lossky and his disciples - Palamism has come to be presented as the
Gilbert de la Porree and others, and indeed (let us be candid) those doctrine of the Eastern church on the knowledge of God, and any critical
advanced in some pages of Gregory of Nyssa, Augustine, or Aquinas. questioning of Palamism is interpreted as an attack upon the contempla-
Palamism has proved an extraordinarily vigorous and fertile influence tive and experiential theology of Orthodoxy. However, I have already
in the Eastern Christian thought of this century, and, as a result, has indicated that many scholars, by no means unsympathetic to the Eastern
come to occupy a privileged position within this world. However, I tradition, have cast serious doubt upon whether the Palamite distinction
would argue that it has been most fruitful where it has been treated with of ousia from energeia is really a legitimate development of the theology
the least 'fundamentalism': in Lossky's writings, it is qualified by an of the Cappadocians or Maximus. To discuss this fully would require a
impressively consistent personalism,91 the distinction between' nature' separate paper, so I shall limit myself to noting (following von Ivanka)
and 'person' playing a far more significant role than that between that the 'Palamite' passages in the writings of the Cappadocians95
'essence' and 'energy', despite Lossky's ardent defence of the latter should be set against several others96 in which we are told that God's
throughout his life; and this personalist perspective is equally prominent dynameis or energeiai are themselves unknowable or incomprehensible.
in the work of Florovsky, Staniloae, Clement and Yannaras. Staniloae's We know the divine physis through its energeia, not 'in itself';97 but
Palamism92 is marked by his almost unique understanding of the (far we do not comprehend either. This reproduces almost exactly Philo's
more systematic) cosmology of Maximus the Confessor: the energeiai teaching98 that we do not know the einai of God, but his hyparxis,
are assimilated very strictly to Maximus's creative logoi (thus developing through the dynameis which are peri to on, yet these themselves are not
a favourite theme of Lossky's), and their relation to the created order reducible to distinct, separable, comprehensible notions. Here too we
greatly elucidated. And Yannaras, perhaps the most brilliant philosophical may recognize the familiar Thomist slogan, that we know of God quod est,
theologian in the Orthodox world at present, has united the personalism that he is, but not quid sit, what he is; and that therefore we know
and voluntarism of Lossky and Florovsky to an analysis of concepts of him in his esse, not through the concept of any delimitable essentia.
'being' drawn from Heidegger's metaphysic: here, being as presence Since the Cappadocians are not preoccupied with the problem of
(ousia as parousia), actuality as self-transcendence (ekstasis), and know- participation, it is unlikely that, despite their marked Neoplatonic
ledge as 'intentional' relation are presented with rare clarity and rigour.93 associations,99 their use of ousia and dynamis or energeia implies any
For none of these writers (despite their protestations to the contrary) more than this fairly simple epistemological point. Note too that Gregory
is Palamism systematically normative; for all of them, however, it is an of Nyssa can speak100 as if knowledge of God in his 'works' is merely
indispensable means towards an 'existential' Christian theology - a a preliminary to the knowledge gained by discovering the image of God
theology, that is to say, which focuses upon the act of God's self-
communication to men. As was noted at the beginning of this paper, it is "Basil, De Spiritu Sancto 9 (MPG xxxii, col. 108D), Ep. 189 (MPG xxxii, col. 692C-693D), Ep. 234
this which constitutes a great part of the attractiveness of Palamism; the (col. 869AB); Gregory Nazianzen, Or. 38, in Theophaniam, 7 (MPG xxxvi, col. 317B); Gregory of
difficulty is to state such a theology without capitulation to either a Nyssa, Contra Eunomium 13 (MPG xlv, 960C-961A), etc.
"Basil, Adv. Eunomium ii, 32 (MPG xxix, col. 648AB); Gregory of Nyssa, In. Cant. 11 (MPG
Neoplatonic hierarchical cosmology, or an immanentist 'process' meta- xliv, col. 1009B), De beat. 7 (MPG xliv, col. 1280AB).
physic.94 I have yet to be convinced that the Palamite terminology as "Basil, Ep. 189 (MPG xxxii, 692D).
<*De itnmut. xii, 62; xvii, 78-81.
89
"This has evidently greatly influenced MeyendorfFs presentation. For a use of the ousia-dynamis^energeia triad, see De beat. 7 (MPG xliv, col. 1280AB).
92 IOO
E.g. in 'Christian Responsibility in the World', in The Tradition of Life, ed. A. M. Allchin (The As in De beat. 6 (MPG xliv, col. 1268C-1269A); cf. De horn. opif. 11 (MPG xliv, col. 153C-155B).
Fellowship of St Alban and St Sergius, London 1971). The most recent monograph on Gregory's epistemology, Zum Problem der Erkenntnis bei Gregor
03
For a summary of Yannaras's system, see the present writer's article, 'The Theology of Person- von Nyssa, by Maria-Barbara von Stritzky (Minister 1973), tends to confirm that energeia can
hood' (n. 1, supra). mean for him no more than an effect of God's action in the world (p. 44), and that the problem
84
For an attempt to suggest a way forward here, see N. D. O'Donoghue, 'Creation and Participa- of participation is not conceived in a crudely 'realist' fashion (pp. 23-25, 47, 102, etc.); 'Der Begriff
tion', in Creation, Christ and Culture, ed. R. W. A.' McKinney (Edinburgh 1976), pp. 135-48. der methexis ist nicht mehr ontologisch zu verstehen' (p. 109).

42 43
 EASTERN CHURCHES REVIEW

in one's own heart. Here as elsewhere101 energeia seems to be used

as if it meant no more than what is causally effected by God in the world. The Debate about Palamism
And this may be compared to Maximus's statement103 that, in the
diverse logoi of created things, we behold the energeiai of God as if ARCHIMANDRITE KALLISTOS WARE
they were many, our finite intellects instinctively multiplying God's
activity into an infinite plurality. Many more passages in the Cappadocians WITH the appearance, eighteen years ago, of Fr John MeyendorfFs work
and Maximus could be adduced; and the conclusion they suggest is that Introduction a I'etude de Gregoire Palamas (Paris 1959),1 there began a
Palamas's distinction has no more than verbal parallels in earlier theology. new era for the study of Palamism in the West. Hitherto most Western
He has hardened a somewhat ad hoc epistemological point into an scholars, whether Roman Catholic or Protestant, had regarded Palamite
ontological differentiation really present in God,103 in order, apparently, theology as an aberration of little doctrinal interest. This attitude was
to safeguard a view of participation-in-God, theosis, which seems shared even by Anglican admirers of the Christian East: J. M. Neale spoke
insupportably 'realist'. of Palamism as an 'absurd and erroneous doctrine',2 while Athelstan Riley
If the Orthodox theologian can accept that Palamism is a novel meta- dismissed the 14th-century hesychasts with the words, 'Of the abuse of the
physical experiment in Byzantine theology, rather than the crystallization contemplative life no better example can be found'.3 Negative judgements
of universally accepted beliefs going back to the Age of the Councils, he such as these received powerful support from the articles on Palamas and
may, in the long run, be better able to appreciate its real value and the Palamite controversy that Martin Jugie contributed in the early 1930s
interest in its historical setting. If Palamas is concerned to defend an to the Dictionnaire de theologie catholique.4. The Palamite distinction be-
excessively realist view of theosis, we must ask why, what was he tween essence and energies was presented by Jugie as an innovation lacking
determined to rule out; and this may lead us in turn to ask whether any sound basis in earlier Patristic tradition; an innovation, moreover,
Western notions of the knowledge of God have not, indeed, been very involving elementary blunders in philosophy and dogmatic theology, and
excessively nominalist, extrinsic and conceptual, giving too small a place conflicting with the doctrine of divine simplicity. In reality Jugie did little
to that which is fundamental to the revelation of God in Jesus, his more than summarize the points which previous Western authors had
nature as self-gift,101 kenotic compassion and identification with the already made, and he did not add much that was entirely new.
affliction of his world. This is a theological question of enormous con- From the Orthodox side, studies published in the 1930s and 1940s by
temporary (and perennial) importance; but it is not to be resolved by Krivocheine and Staniloae, by Lossky and Kern, indicated that there was
the resuscitation of a piece of dubious scholasticism. Let us be grateful very much more to be said in defence of Palamism than Jugie had imagined;
to Palamas for witnessing to his own vision of God as self-sharing love; but at the time their writings had a somewhat limited impact on the West.
and let us at least do him the courtesy of not canonizing the confusions Only with the appearance of Meyendorfi's book did Western Christians
of its expression. have readily at their disposal a comprehensive account of St Gregory Pala-
mas's theology, written from a sympathetic standpoint. In Meyendorff's
view Palamism not only possessed an impressive Patristic pedigree, but
was also based upon a truly Biblical understanding of the unity of man's
nature.
Initially MeyendorfE's study was welcomed by most Roman Catholic and
Anglican readers as a convincing vindication of St Gregory, although
reservations continued to be voiced in some quarters, especially by E. von
Ivanka. Now, somewhat more than a decade after the book's first publica-
tion, doubts about Palamism are once more being expressed in Catholic
and Anglican circles. This need not surprise us. No single book, however
101
Cf. Gregory Nazianzen, Or. theol. v, 6 (MPG xxxvi, col. 140AB). brilliant, could settle all the historical and doctrinal issues connected with
U2
Ambig. 22 (MPG xci, col. 1257AB); attention is drawn to the importance of this passage in JPublished in English as A Study of Gregory Palamas (London 1964).
A. Riou, Le monde et Viglise selon Maxime le Confesseur (Paris 1973), pp. 60-61, an unusual and 2
A History of the Holy Eastern Church. Part I. General Introduction, vol. ii (London 1850),
provocative study. p. 871. Neale's view of Palamism has probably been coloured by the one-sided account in Leo
"'Sherwood, art. cit., pp. 196-7, 199, argues that the ousia-energeia distinction in the Cappado- Allatius, De libris et rebus ecclesiasticis (Paris 1646), pp. 193-219, and De Ecclesiae Occidentalis
cians can still be said to have some ontological or metaphysical content. I am not sure; but it does atque Orientalis perpetua consensione (Cologne 1648), col. 801-39.
seem to me that it is basically epistemological, and that no systematic ontological proposals are s
Athos or the Mountain of Monks (London 1887), p. 193.
being made. <-DTC xi (1932), col. 1735-1818.
1M
See O'Donoghue, art. cit., pp. 142-3, 146-8.
44 45