No.

1916
February 22, 2006

China’s Influence in Africa:

Implications for the United States
Peter Brookes and Ji Hye Shin

Amid growing concerns about the People’s Repub-

lic of China’s burgeoning influence around the globe, Talking Points
Beijing has now set its sights on Africa. China’s inter-
est in Africa is not new. In the 1960s and 1970s, • China is rapidly expanding its influence in
Africa through copious diplomatic, financial,
Beijing’s interest centered on building ideological sol-
and military assistance, endangering U.S.
idarity with other underdeveloped nations to advance goals and visions for the region.
Chinese-style communism and on repelling Western
“imperialism.” Following the Cold War, Chinese • China’s quest for resources, energy, and
potential markets is supporting African dicta-
interests evolved into more pragmatic pursuits such
torships, hindering economic development,
as trade, investment, and energy. and exacerbating existing conflicts and
In recent years, Beijing has identified the African human rights abuses in troubled countries
continent as an area of significant economic and stra- such as Sudan and Zimbabwe.
tegic interest. America and its allies and friends are • The United States needs to develop a compre-
finding that their vision of a prosperous Africa gov- hensive strategy that encourages democratic
erned by democracies that respect human rights and principles, human rights, free markets, and
the rule of law and that embrace free markets is being cooperation in regional security and energy
challenged by the escalating Chinese influence in development.
Africa. • In order to protect and advance American
The People’s Republic of China (PRC) aids and abets interests in Africa, Washington should look
oppressive and destitute African dictatorships by legit- beyond traditional partners in Europe to the
democratic nations of Asia and Latin America
imizing their misguided policies and praising their to seek broader international cooperation.
development models as suited to individual national
conditions. Beijing holds out China’s unique develop-
ment model—significant economic growth overseen
by a disciplined, one-party totalitarian state with full
authority, if not control, over all aspects of economic
activity—as an example for others to emulate. This paper, in its entirety, can be found at:
www.heritage.org/research/asiaandthepacific/bg1916.cfm
Moreover, China rewards its African friends with Produced by the Asian Studies Center
diplomatic attention and financial and military assis- Published by The Heritage Foundation
tance, exacerbating existing forced dislocations of 214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE
Washington, DC 20002–4999
populations and abetting massive human rights (202) 546-4400 • heritage.org
Nothing written here is to be construed as necessarily reflect-
ing the views of The Heritage Foundation or as an attempt to
aid or hinder the passage of any bill before Congress.
No. 1916 February 22, 2006

abuses in troubled countries such as Sudan and hydrocarbon fuels. By 2004, China had become the
Zimbabwe. As a consequence, Chinese support for world’s second largest oil consumer, behind only
political and economic repression in Africa the United States.2 Chinese oil consumption is
counters the liberalizing influences of Africa’s tradi- expected to increase by 10 percent per year,3 while
tional European and American partners. China’s China’s oil and gas imports are forecast to increase
vigorous campaign to develop close ties with indi- from the present 33 percent of China’s total oil and
vidual African nations also reflects Beijing’s global gas demand to 60 percent by 2020.4 Asian oil and
quest to isolate Taiwan diplomatically (seven of the natural gas production is not growing fast enough
26 countries that have full diplomatic relations to meet Chinese demand, and a large portion of
with Taiwan are African).1 Middle Eastern oil and gas production is normally
The most pernicious effect of the renewed Chi- allotted to U.S. and European markets.
nese interest in Africa is that China is legitimizing In an attempt to gain control over its oil and gas
and encouraging Africa’s most repressive regimes, consumption needs as world spot market prices
thereby increasing the likelihood of weak and rise precipitously, Beijing has focused on African
failed states. The United States must also be alert to nations as likely hydrocarbon acquisition targets.
the potential long-term disruption of American An estimated 25 percent of China’s total oil imports
access to important raw materials and energy currently comes from Africa,5 and Beijing has
sources as these resources are “locked up” by Chi- placed a high priority on maintaining strong ties
nese firms for the PRC’s domestic market to main- with its African energy suppliers through invest-
tain China’s economic growth. ment, high-level visits, and a strict policy of “non-
U.S. national interests lie in effectively counter- interference in internal affairs” that Africa’s
ing these developments in Africa by deftly encour- dictators find comforting.
aging democratic processes, economic freedom, Chinese government firms have invested billions
and respect for human rights across the African of dollars in foreign exchange and have used Chi-
continent. nese engineering and construction resources on
infrastructure for developing oil, gas, mineral, and
The Quest for Natural Resources other natural resources in dozens of African coun-
For the past decade, the Chinese economy has tries, including Algeria, Angola, Gabon, Nigeria,
been expanding at a nearly double-digit annual Sudan, and Zimbabwe. The PRC’s new African
growth rate. This rapid expansion requires enor- energy investments are clearly intended to supple-
mous resources, especially energy. ment its Middle Eastern oil imports.
China’s sharply accelerating domestic energy • Sudan, which now supplies 7 percent of
demand, combined with declining domestic petro- China’s total oil imports,6 has benefited from
leum production and insufficient coal output, has the largest Chinese investments. The China
spurred Beijing to pursue stable overseas sources of National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) is the

1. The seven countries are Burkina Faso, Chad, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, and Swaziland.
2. U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Agency, “Country Analysis Brief: China,” at www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/
china.html (September 15, 2005).
3. David Blair, “Oil-Hungry China Takes Sudan Under Its Wing,” The Telegraph, April 23, 2005, at www.telegraph.co.uk/news/
main.jhtml?xml=/news/2005/04/23/wsud23.xml (August 22, 2005).
4. Peter S. Goodman, “China Invests Heavily in Sudan’s Oil Industry,” The Washington Post, December 23, 2004, at
www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A21143-2004Dec22 (August 22, 2005).
5. Howard W. French, “China in Africa—All Trade, with No Political Baggage,” The New York Times, August 8, 2004, at
www.nytimes.com/2004/08/08/international/asia/08china.html (August 22, 2005).
6. Blair, “Oil-Hungry China Takes Sudan Under Its Wing.”

page 2
No. 1916 February 22, 2006

single largest shareholder (40 percent) in the • In February 2004, Chinese President Hu Jintao
Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company, visited Algeria, Gabon, and Nigeria—the three
which controls Sudan’s oil fields,7 and has African oil giants—to consolidate further the
invested $3 billion in refinery and pipeline con- security of energy supplies.
struction in Sudan since 1999. • In June, Chinese Vice President Zeng Qinghong
• In March 2004, Beijing extended a $2 billion visited Tunisia, Togo, Benin, and South Africa,
loan to Angola in exchange for a contract to which have significant mineral reserves.
supply 10,000 barrels of crude oil per day.8 • In October–November 2004, National People’s
Under the agreement, the loan will be heavily Congress Chairman Wu Bangguo visited
reinvested in infrastructure construction, with Kenya, Zimbabwe, Zambia, and Nigeria.
70 percent of the loan funds going to Chinese
companies and the remaining 30 percent going All of these visits focused on joint oil, mineral,
to local subcontractors.9 and renewable resource exploration opportunities in
the region. In return, top leaders from Kenya,
• In July 2005, PetroChina concluded an $800 Liberia, South Africa, and Zimbabwe visited Beijing
million deal with the Nigerian National Petro- and secured further investment and economic assis-
leum Corporation to purchase 30,000 barrels tance from China. In January 2006, Foreign Minister
of oil per day for one year.10 Li Zhaoxing’s trip to six West African nations—Cape
• In January 2006, China National Offshore Oil Verde, Senegal, Mali, Liberia, Nigeria, and Libya—
Corporation (CNOOC), after failing to acquire was accompanied by the release of “China’s African
American-owned Unocal, purchased a 45 per- Policy,” an official Chinese government paper aimed
cent stake in a Nigerian offshore oil and gas field at promoting economic and political cooperation as
for $2.27 billion and promised to invest an addi- well as joint energy development without interfering
tional $2.25 billion in field development.11 in each other’s internal affairs.
• Gabon’s declining oil industry also saw massive The Chinese government has combined its
investment from China National Petrochemical efforts to secure exclusive access to African natu-
Corporation (SINOPEC), which plans to explore ral resources with an aggressive political cam-
Gabon’s onshore and offshore oil reserves. paign to ingratiate itself with Africa’s tyrants and
• South Africa and Zimbabwe remain Beijing’s despots. For example, Sudan’s government has
major sources for platinum and iron ore. long abetted and perpetrated genocide against
large non-Muslim populations in its Darfur
In 2004, there were more than a dozen exchange region. While the United States, the European
visits of high-level party and government officials Union, Japan, and other Western democracies
between China and African countries. Most of the have sought to impose U.N. sanctions against the
exchanges have centered on economic and energy Sudanese regime over the issue, China has
cooperation. For instance: opposed U.N. actions against Khartoum.

7. Goodman, “China Invests Heavily in Sudan’s Oil Industry.”

8. Don Lee, “China Barrels Ahead in Oil Market,” The Los Angeles Times, November 14, 2004, at energybulletin.net/3159.html
(September 19, 2005).
9. Drew Thompson, “China’s Emerging Interests in Africa: Opportunities and Challenges for Africa and the United States,”
African Renaissance, Vol. 2, No. 4 (July/August 2005), at www.csis.org/media/csis/press/0508_china_african_interests.pdf (Sep-
tember 19, 2005).
10. Xinhua News Agency, “China, Nigeria Sign Oil Supply Pact,” July 9, 2005, at news.xinhuanet.com/english/2005-07/09/
content_3195552.htm (September 20, 2005).
11. Kate Linebaugh and Shai Oster, “CNOOC Pays $2.27 Billion for Nigerian Oil Gas Stake,” The Wall Street Journal, January 10,
2006, at online.wsj.com/article/SB113680307278841473.html (January 10, 2006).

page 3
No. 1916 February 22, 2006

Over the past several years, the Khartoum gov- media outlets during the 2005 parliamentary
ernment has forced hundreds of thousands of peo- election campaign.15
ple to flee their homes in southern oil fields largely When President Robert Mugabe seized power in
owned by the CNPC.12 In fact, Sudanese govern- 1980, Zimbabwe was one of the most prosperous
ment troops and government-aligned militias have nations in Africa. However, for the past decade,
used Chinese-made helicopter gunships, based at Mugabe has relentlessly repressed political oppo-
airstrips maintained by Chinese oil companies, in nents and opposing tribes, and the country’s econ-
raids that devastated hundreds of towns and vil- omy has contracted drastically. Now Zimbabwe is
lages around the oil installations. facing chronic food shortages and 70 percent
Chinese Deputy Foreign Minister Zhou Wen- unemployment. In May 2005, Mugabe ordered
zhong’s comments in a recent interview demon- implementation of “Operation Murambatsvina
strate China’s utter lack of concern for political (Clear the Filth), a program of forcible eviction and
volatility in Africa: demolition of tens of thousands of houses and
Business is business. We try to separate informal building structures of urban residents.”
politics from business. Secondly, I think the The U.N. estimates that the forcible evictions and
internal situation in the Sudan is an internal demolition of residential and business structures
affair, and we are not in a position to has displaced 700,000 people, most of whom sup-
impose upon them.13 ported Mugabe’s political opposition. Mugabe has
compounded the catastrophe by denying interna-
Weapons Sales and Military Cooperation tional humanitarian aid agencies access to render
African dictatorships are regular buyers of Chi- humanitarian aid.16
nese weapons and military equipment, which The Mugabe regime’s repeated abuses led the
they often use to oppress minority populations, United States and the European Union to impose
quash political opposition, harass neighboring sanctions against Zimbabwean officials who had
countries, and extinguish any glimmers of “formulated, implemented, or supported policies
democratization. In 2004, despite the U.S. and that have undermined Zimbabwe’s democratic
EU arms embargo against Zimbabwe, China sold institutions.”17 Increasing isolation and pressure
Zimbabwe fighter aircraft and military vehicles from the West have caused Zimbabwe to develop
for $200 million.14 In addition, China provided a close relations with China, adopting a “Look East”
military-strength radio-jamming device, which policy that provides Mugabe with a lifeline to resist
the Harare government used to block broadcasts Western sanctions and criticism.18 China provides
of anti-government reports from independent for Mugabe’s military needs without interfering in

12. Goodman, “China Invests Heavily in Sudan’s Oil Industry.”

13. French, “China in Africa: All Trade, with No Political Baggage,” p. A12.
14. “Cash-Hungry Zimbabwe Splashes Out on Fighter Jets,” Business Day (Zambia), June 10, 2004, at www.bday.co.za/bday/content/
direct/1,3523,1635614-6078-0,00.html (August 22, 2005).
15. Abraham McLaughlin, “A Rising China Counters U.S. Clout in Africa,” The Christian Science Monitor, March 30, 2005, at
www.csmonitor.com/2005/0330/p01s01-woaf.html (August 22, 2005).
16. Human Rights Watch, “‘Clear the Filth’: Mass Evictions and Demolitions in Zimbabwe,” Briefing Paper, September 11, 2005,
p. 1, at hrw.org/backgrounder/africa/zimbabwe0905/zimbabwe0905.pdf (February 10, 2006), and “Zimbabwe: Mass Evictions
Lead to Massive Abuses,” September 11, 2005, at hrw.org/english/docs/2005/09/11/zimbab11718_txt.htm (September 14, 2005).
17. Press release, “U.S. Targeted Sanctions on Zimbabwean Government Officials,” White House, Office of the Press Secretary,
March 7, 2003, at www.state.gov/p/af/rls/prsrl/18546.htm (February 8, 2006).
18. Jonathan Watts and Andrew Meldrum, “Mugabe Finds Succour in Beijing Deals,” The Guardian, July 27, 2005, at www.guardian.
co.uk/zimbabwe/article/0,2763,1536808,00.html (September 26, 2005).

page 4
No. 1916 February 22, 2006

his “internal affairs” and praises Mugabe as “a man • In April 2003, approximately 175 People’s Liber-
of great achievements, devoted to world peace and ation Army (PLA) soldiers and a 42-man medical
a good friend of the Chinese people.”19 team were deployed to the Democratic Republic
China has a history of selling weapons and arms of Congo on a peacekeeping mission.23
production lines via state enterprises and front • In December 2003, 550 peacekeeping troops,
companies to other repressive regimes, such as equipped with nearly 200 military vehicles and
Liberia and Sudan. water-supply trucks, were sent to Liberia,24
• Nearly 80 percent of Sudan’s $500 million marking China’s largest overseas operation
annual oil revenue is used to purchase weapons under U.N. auspices since it deployed 800 mili-
to subdue the rebels in southern Sudan.20 With tary engineers to Cambodia from 1992 to 1994.
Chinese assistance, the Sudanese government • China has also deployed about 4,000 PLA troops
recently built three weapons factories near to southern Sudan to guard an oil pipeline25 and
Khartoum. recently reaffirmed its intention to strengthen
• In 2003, several Hong Kong firms were accused military collaboration and exchanges with Ethi-
of smuggling illegal arms including Chinese- opia, Liberia, Nigeria, and Sudan.
made AK-47s, machine guns, and rocket-pro- Promoting Trade, Investment, and an
pelled grenade launchers into Liberia and
Economic Development Model
neighboring Sierra Leone and the Ivory Coast,
where rebels and mercenaries were involved in China’s burgeoning relationship with Africa is
civil wars.21 The illegal arms trade led the U.N. alarming not only because it has facilitated Chinese
Security Council to pass a resolution in Decem- energy and weapons dealings, but also because it is
ber 2004 banning all trade in arms, timber, and competing with U.S.–African trade. The China–
diamonds with Liberia. The resolution noted Africa Cooperation Forum (CACF) was founded in
the link between illegal trade in natural 2000 to promote stronger trade and investment
resources such as diamonds and timber and the relations between China and African countries in
proliferation and trafficking of illegal arms, both the government and private sectors. The
which is fuelling and exacerbating conflicts in CACF has produced two ministerial meetings and
West Africa, particularly in Liberia.22 four meetings of senior officials, contributing to the
rapid growth of trade and investment over the past
Beijing’s involvement in sub-Saharan African five years.
security issues has expanded to peacekeeping
operations, exchange programs, and military In 1999, the annual volume of trade between
deployments. China and Africa was $5.6 billion.26 After the
establishment of the CACF, Sino–African trade

19. Mure Dickie and John Reed, “China Hails Mugabe’s ‘Brilliant’ Diplomacy,” Financial Times, July 27, 2005, at news.ft.com/cms/
s/c9fd6d06-fe4a-11d9-a289-00000e2511c8.html (September 26, 2005).
20. Ibid.
21. Agence France-Presse, “Hong Kong Transships Arms to Liberia From China,” May 13, 2003.
22. U.N. Security Council Resolution 1521, December 22, 2003, at daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N03/669/60/PDF/
N0366960.pdf?OpenElement (October 26, 2005).
23. John Pomfret, “China Sending Troops as Congo Peacekeepers,” The Washington Post, February 12, 2003, at www.washingtonpost.
com/wp-dyn/articles/A59231-2003Feb11.html (August 22, 2005).
24. Xinhua News Agency, “60 Chinese Peacekeeping Soldiers Leave for War-Torn Liberia,” December 10, 2003, at
www.china.org.cn/english/2003/Dec/82079.htm (September 14, 2005).
25. Bill Gertz and Rowan Scarborough, “Chinese in Sudan,” Inside the Ring, March 5, 2004, at www.gertzfile.com/gertzfile/
ring030504.html (August 22, 2005).

page 5
No. 1916 February 22, 2006

more than quintupled to $29.5 billion in 2004.27 of employment. State-run China Radio Interna-
By the end of October 2005, annual Sino–African tional launched its first overseas radio station in
trade for the year totaled $32.2 billion, surpassing Kenya in January 2006 to provide 2 million Ken-
the 2004 total.28 The volume of trade between the yans with 19 hours of daily programming on major
United States and Africa also increased remarkably, news from China and around the world, including
more than doubling from $26.9 billion in 1999 to China’s exchanges with African countries.33
$58.9 billion in 2004. However, African trade with Moreover, the Chinese government has actively
China is growing at a much faster rate: an average advocated a Chinese-style economic development
of more than 50 percent annually since 2002.29 model to African countries, based on a restricted
In 2004, Chinese direct investment in Africa market system constrained by the overarching pri-
reached $135 million, with 77 additional Chinese ority of maintaining a single-party, totalitarian gov-
companies doing business in the region.30 At the ernment. Many authoritarian African regimes,
fourth CACF Senior Officials Meeting in August desperate to invigorate their fraying economies
2005, attended by delegations from 46 African while maintaining a strong grip on political power,
countries and observers from six African regional seem to find the Chinese economic development
organizations, China proposed upgrading the third and reform model preferable to the free-market and
CACF ministerial meeting in 2006 to a summit representative-government policies promoted by
meeting involving the heads of state from China and the United States and the European Union.
Africa,31 which was welcomed by all participants.
Advancing Diplomatic Influence
China has also offered aid to its African partners,
ranging from building infrastructure to treating China’s ideological support of African despots
infectious diseases such as malaria and HIV/AIDS. lends them international legitimacy and influence
Since the 1960s, over 15,000 Chinese doctors have in the United Nations and other international are-
worked in 47 African states treating nearly 180 mil- nas that help to blunt pressure from the Western
lion patients.32 Chinese-sponsored roads and rail- democracies on human rights, economic openness,
ways are under construction in Kenya, Rwanda, and political freedoms. At the same time, when it
and Nigeria, and a mobile telephone network is serves Chinese interests, Beijing succors would-be
being built in Tunisia. These projects are often con- junta leaders and illiberal rebels who want power
tracted to Chinese firms rather than local busi- and would roll back political reforms in immature
nesses, adding little to the local economy in terms democracies. These rebels seem to believe that if
they want to overthrow a legitimate government,

26. International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade Statistics: Yearbook 2004 (Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund,
2004), p. 131.
27. Liang Guixuan, “Perspectives on China–Africa Trade and Economic Cooperation,” May 9, 2005, at www.chinese-embassy.
org.za/eng/znjl/t194633.htm (September 15, 2005).
28. People’s Republic of China, Ministry of Commerce, “Import Sources by Continents/Regions,” December 21, 2005, at
english.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/statistic/ie/200512/20051201131047.html (January 18, 2006), and “Export Markets by Continents/
Regions,” December 21, 2005, at english.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/statistic/ie/200512/20051201130999.html (January 18, 2006).
29. International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade Statistics database.
30. Guixuan, “Perspectives on China–Africa Trade and Economic Cooperation.”
31. Xinhua News Agency, “China, Africa to Further Cooperation Under Forum Framework,” August 24, 2005, at english.people.
com.cn/200508/24/eng20050824_204249.html (September 15, 2005).
32. Drew Thompson, “China’s Soft Power in Africa: From the ‘Beijing Consensus’ to Health Diplomacy,” Jamestown Foundation
China Brief, Vol. 5, No. 21 (October 13, 2005).
33. Xinhua News Agency, “China’s First Overseas FM Radio Station in Kenya,” January 27, 2006, at www.china.org.cn/english/
2006/Jan/156593.htm (February 6, 2006).

page 6
No. 1916 February 22, 2006

China will work to bolster their international legit- assistance, Beijing has secured recognition from six
imacy in the United Nations and other interna- additional African countries at Taiwan’s expense.
tional fora. Lesotho and Niger switched their diplomatic rec-
As China’s power and influence grows, Beijing is ognition to the PRC in 1994 and 1996, respectively.
becoming more willing to challenge the United The Central African Republic, Guinea-Bissau, and
States, EU nations, and others in international are- South Africa switched their recognition from Taipei
nas to protect its interests in Africa. Over time, dif- to Beijing in 1998, and Liberia switched recognition
ferences between China and democracies over to Beijing in 2003 shortly before China dispatched
human rights and basic political and civil rights will PLA troops to assist with Liberian water-supply
sharpen. For example, in September 2004, the U.N. projects. In addition to ongoing efforts to sever Tai-
Security Council passed Resolution 1564, which wan’s few remaining connections in Africa, China
condemned the mass killing of civilians in the Dar- has also sought repeatedly to maintain the support
fur region, but stopped short of imposing oil sanc- of its African partners for its “one China” policy via
tions if Khartoum did not act to stop the killing. diplomatic attention, economic investment, and
China abstained from the vote and threatened to other assistance.
veto any further move to impose sanctions.34
What the United States Should Do
In July 2005, Britain, backed by the United
States and seven other countries, led a Security China’s broad energy, trade, political, diplomatic,
Council briefing on Zimbabwe’s slum demolition and even military interests in Africa threaten to
campaign in an effort to organize a formal debate in undermine American and European efforts to pro-
the General Assembly and possibly generate a mote peaceful, pluralistic, and prosperous societies
punitive Security Council resolution.35 Meanwhile, in the region. To protect and advance American
Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe visited interests and influence in Africa, the United States
Beijing, seeking financial assistance for his failing should:
economy. Because of Beijing’s strong support for • Develop a coordinated, comprehensive strat-
Mugabe and opposition to Security Council action, egy. Appropriate U.S. agencies should develop
the U.N. was unable to reach a consensus on fur- a comprehensive and coordinated strategy
ther formal discussions of the issue. based on a review of the challenges and obsta-
Another significant Chinese objective in Africa is cles in each country and the available American
to isolate Taiwan diplomatically in an effort to pres- resources. Consistent, constant, and coherent
sure Taipei toward unification. Seven African coun- American engagement in Africa will help to
tries—Burkina Faso, Chad, Gambia, Malawi, Sao counter the illiberal forces that stunt African
Tome and Principe, Senegal, and Swaziland—cur- development.
rently maintain official diplomatic relations with • Increase the U.S. diplomatic profile in Africa.
Taiwan. The United States has demonstrated considerable
Curtailing Taiwan’s diplomatic influence was not commitment to promoting economic growth and
a high priority on China’s Africa policy agenda until development, representative government, health,
the early 1990s, when the competition between and human rights in Africa. Since 1960, Wash-
China and Taiwan to win diplomatic recognition ington has provided $51.2 billion (in 2003 dol-
from individual African countries escalated drasti- lars) in official bilateral development assistance to
cally. Now, through offers of massive economic sub-Saharan Africa.36 The United States is the

34. CNN, “Sudan Faces Threats of Sanctions,” September 18, 2004, at www.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/africa/09/18/sudan.un.sanction
(September 14, 2005).
35. Agence France-Presse, “China Greets Mugabe with Open Arms,” Taipei Times, July 28, 2005, at www.taipeitimes.com/News/
world/archives/2005/07/28/2003265364 (August 22, 2005).

page 7
No. 1916 February 22, 2006

largest humanitarian aid donor ($3.3 billion in tently violate human rights or resist the transi-
2003) and also the largest source of bilateral and tion to representative government and by
multilateral support to combat HIV/AIDS, promoting this policy in both international
malaria, and other infectious diseases.37 financial institutions and the United Nations.
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice’s reorgani- • Increase trade and economic relations with
zation and expansion of diplomatic posts, com- Africa. Although U.S.–Africa trade accounts
bined with extensive public diplomacy to for only about 1 percent of total U.S. trade, it
publicize U.S. assistance efforts in Africa and has grown rapidly since passage of the African
shared interests between the two regions, will Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) in 2000.
help to change the pervasive African perception AGOA significantly lowers, through 2015,
that the United States cares little for the region. trade barriers to goods exported from African
To further these efforts, President George W. countries, provided that they have established
Bush should go on an extended trip to Africa to or are making progress toward market-based
strengthen relations with Africa. economies, enhancing the rule of law, represen-
• Encourage human rights, democratic princi- tative governance, lowering barriers to U.S.
ples, and good governance. Atrocious human trade and investment, improving human rights,
rights violations in Sudan, Zimbabwe, and and other goals.38
some West African nations remain a primary While AGOA is a positive step, the United
concern. The United States should make a States should continue to press the region and
more consistent effort to moderate the conduct individual countries for permanent free trade
of repressive African regimes and to help young agreements that liberalize trade in goods and
African democracies lay the institutional foun- services, lower investment barriers, and
dations for a free, open, stable, and prosperous strengthen property rights. Such agreements
society in their individual countries and would encourage stronger economic growth
throughout the region. and increase economic ties between the United
To this end, the United States has made “good States and trade partners in Africa. Charity and
governance” a requirement to qualify for Mil- international aid will not solve Africa’s prob-
lennium Challenge Account aid. Washington lems, but economic reform and growth can.
should go a step further by denying bilateral • Encourage development of energy resources.
economic assistance to countries that consis- Africa is an increasingly important oil supplier

36. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, International Development Statistics, at www.oecd.org/dataoecd/
50/17/5037721.htm (February 10, 2006).
37. U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, “The U.S. Approach to International Development: Building on the
Monterrey Consensus,” September 12, 2005, at www.state.gov/r/pa/scp/2005/53037.htm (February 8, 2006).
38. The 37 AGOA-eligible countries are Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Chad, Republic of
Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Gabon, the Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya,
Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sao Tome and
Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia. Côte d’Ivoire (Ivory
Coast) was removed from the list in December 2004. This is an important signal that the U.S. takes the criteria seriously,
which is the only way to ensure that they are effective. U.S. Department of Commerce, International Trade Administration,
“African Growth and Opportunity Act: Country Eligibility,” at www.agoa.gov/eligibility/country_eligibility.html (February 8,
2006), and Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, 2005 Comprehensive Report on U.S. Trade and Investment Policy Toward Sub-
Saharan Africa and Implementation of the African Growth and Opportunity Act, May 2005, at www.ustr.gov/assets/
Trade_Development/Preference_Programs/AGOA/asset_upload_file215_7746.pdf (February 8, 2006). Congress took additional
steps to help African nations when it passed the AGOA Acceleration Act in June 2004, which extended market access under
AGOA to 2015. AGOA Acceleration Act of 2004, Public Law 108–274, at www.agoa.gov/agoa_legislation/AGOAIII_text.pdf
(February 8, 2006).

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No. 1916 February 22, 2006

for the United States, providing 15 percent of partners in Europe to the democratic nations of
total U.S. oil imports, which is forecast to Asia and Latin America to help advance these
increase to 25 percent within the next decade. important issues.
Given America’s desire to diversify its energy
supplies, the United States should press coun- Conclusion
tries in Africa to open their oil and gas sectors China is actively expanding its influence in
to foreign investment and remove regulatory Africa to secure supplies of natural resources, to
and other barriers that constrain economic counter Western political and economic influence
development of those resources. while expanding China’s global influence, and to
• Increase security engagement. The American further isolate Taiwan. As a result, Chinese support
military is the world’s premier fighting force, for political and economic repression in Africa is
making many nations eager to gain access to U.S. countering the liberalizing influences of Africa’s tra-
military training and facilities. Security engage- ditional European and American partners. It is in
ment, including the International Military Edu- the U.S. national interest to address these develop-
cation and Training program (IMET), will ments in Africa by deftly encouraging democratic
increase the likelihood of advancing U.S. goals, processes, economic freedom, and respect for
such as civilian control of the military and coun- human rights across the African continent.
terterrorism and peacekeeping capabilities. —Peter Brookes is Director of the Asian Studies
• Seek new international partners. Interna- Center, and Ji Hye Shin is a Research Assistant in the
tional cooperation is a “force multiplier,” and Asian Studies Center, at The Heritage Foundation.
Washington should look beyond traditional

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