Rule

RULE 47 - Annulment of Judgments of Final Orders and Resolutions

Case Title
CELERINA J. SANTOS v. RICARDO T. SANTOS; GR No. 18706; 2014-10-08

Doctrine
Annulment of judgment is the remedy when the Regional Trial Court's judgment, order, or resolution
has become final, and the "remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief (or other appropriate
remedies) are no longer available through no fault of the petitioner

FACTS

This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by Celerina J. Santos, assailing the Court of Appeals'
resolutions dated November 28, 2008 and March 5, 2009. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition
for the annulment of the trial court's judgment declaring her presumptively dead.

On July 27, 2007, the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac City declared petitioner Celerina J. Santos (Celerina)
presumptively dead after her husband, respondent Ricardo T. Santos (Ricardo), had filed a petition for
declaration of absence or presumptive death for the purpose of... remarriage on June 15, 2007. Ricardo
remarried on September 17, 2008 business did not prosper. As a result, Celerina convinced him to allow
her to work as a domestic helper in Hong Kong.

She allegedly applied in an employment agency in Ermita, Manila, in February 1995. She left Tarlac two
months after and was never heard from again. Ricardo further alleged that he exerted efforts to locate
Celerina.

He went to Celerina's parents in Cubao, Quezon City, but they, too, did not know their daughter's
whereabouts. He also inquired about her from other relatives and friends, but no one gave him any
information.

Ricardo claimed that it was almost 12 years from the date of his Regional Trial Court petition since
Celerina left. He believed that she had passed away.

Celerina claimed that she learned about Ricardo's petition only sometime in October 2008 when she
could no longer avail the remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief, or other appropriate
remedies.

On November 17, 2008, Celerina filed a petition for annulment of judgment before the Court of Appeals
on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction.

According to Celerina, her true residence was in Neptune Extension, Congressional Avenue, Quezon City.
This residence had been her and Ricardo's conjugal dwelling since 1989 until Ricardo left in May 2008.
[17] As a result of Ricardo's misrepresentation, she was deprived of any notice of and opportunity to
oppose the petition declaring her presumptively dead.

Celerina claimed that she never resided in Tarlac. She also never left and worked as a domestic helper
abroad.Neither did she go to an employment agency in February 1995. She also claimed that it was not
true that she... had been absent for 12 years. Ricardo was aware that she never left their conjugal
dwelling in Quezon City. It was he who left the conjugal dwelling in May 2008 to cohabit with another
woman.Celerina referred to a joint affidavit executed by their children to support her contention that
Ricardo made false allegations in his petition.

Celerina also argued that the court did not acquire jurisdiction over Ricardo's petition because it had
never been published in a newspaper. She added that the Office of the Solicitor General and the
Provincial Prosecutor's Office were not furnished copies of Ricardo's petition.

he Court of Appeals issued the resolution dated November 28, 2008, dismissing Celerina's petition for
annulment of judgment for being a wrong mode of remedy. According to the Court of Appeals, the
proper remedy was to file a sworn statement before the civil registry, declaring her reappearance in
accordance with Article 42 of the Family Code.

Issue:
Did the Court of Appeals err in dismissing Celerina's petition for annulment of judgment for being a
wrong remedy for a fraudulently obtained judgment declaring presumptive death?.

Ruling
Petition is meritorious. the case is REMANDED to the Court of Appeals for determination of the
existence of extrinsic fraud, grounds for nullity/annulment of the first marriage, and the merits of the
petition

Celerina argued that filing an affidavit of reappearance under Article 42 of the Family Code is
appropriate only when the spouse is actually absent and the spouse seeking the declaration of
presumptive death actually has a well-founded belief of the spouse's death. She added that it would be
inappropriate to file an affidavit of reappearance if she did not disappear in the first place. She insisted
that an action for annulment of judgment is proper when the declaration of presumptive death is
obtained fraudulently.

Celerina further argued that filing an affidavit of reappearance under Article 42 of the Family Code
would not be a sufficient remedy because it would not nullify the legal effects of the judgment declaring
her presumptive death.

Annulment of judgment is the remedy when the Regional Trial Court's judgment, order, or resolution
has become final, and the "remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief (or other appropriate
remedies) are no longer available through no fault of the petitioner.

The grounds for annulment of judgment are extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction.

It is extrinsic or collateral when a litigant commits acts outside of the trial which prevents a parly from
having a real contest, or from presenting all of his case, such that there is no fair submission of the
controversy

Celerina claimed that because of these, she was deprived of notice and opportunity to oppose Ricardo's
petition to declare her presumptively dead.
Celerina further claimed that the court did not acquire jurisdiction because the Office of the Solicitor
General and the Provincial

Prosecutor's Office were not given copies of Ricardo's petition.

Celerina filed her petition for annulment of judgment on November 17, 2008. This was less than two
years from the July 27, 2007 decision declaring her presumptively dead and about a month from her
discovery of the decision in October 2008. The petition was, therefore, filed within the four-year period
allowed by law in case of extrinsic fraud, and before the action is barred by laches, which is the period
allowed in case of lack of jurisdiction

The choice of remedy is important because remedies carry with them certain admissions, presumptions,
and conditions.

The filing of an affidavit of reappearance is an admission on the part of the first spouse that his or her
marriage to the present spouse was terminated when he or she was declared absent or presumptively
dead

Celerina does not admit to have been absent. She also seeks not merely the termination of the
subsequent marriage but also the nullification of its effects. She contends that reappearance is not a
sufficient remedy because it will only terminate the subsequent marriage but not nullify the effects of
the declaration of her presumptive death and the subsequent marriage.

Effect of New Rule in Ruling

No effect because there is no amendment of Rule 47 under the new rules

Rule
RULE 15 - Motions

Case Title: MARILOU S. LAUDE v. ROLINE M. GINEZ-JABALDE; GR No. 217456, Nov 24, 2015

Doctrine
While the general rule is that a motion that fails to comply with the requirements of Rule 15 is a mere
scrap of paper, an exception may be made and the motion may still be acted upon by the court,
provided doing so will neither cause prejudice to the other party nor violate his or her due process
rights. The adverse party must be given time to study the motion in order to enable him or her to
prepare properly and engage the arguments of the movant. In this case, the general rule must apply
because Pemberton was not given sufficient time to study petitioners' Motion, thereby depriving him of
his right to procedural due process.

FACTS
This involves the celebrated case of Jeffrey “Jennifer” Laude (Jennifer) killed at the Celzone Lodge on
Ramon Magsaysay Drive in Olongapo City allegedly by 19-year-old US Marine L/CPL Joseph Scott
Pemberton (Pemberton). A Complaint for murder was filed by Jennifer’s sibling, Marilou S. Laude,
against Pemberton before the Office of the City Prosecutor which Information was later filed with the
RTC in Olongapo City.
On 19 December 2014, Pemberton surrendered personally to the RTC Judge and was later arraigned. On
the same day of Arraignment petitioner Laude filed an Urgent Motion to Compel the Armed Forces of
the Philippines to Surrender the Custody of Accused to the Olongapo City Jail and a Motion to Allow
Media Coverage. The motion was scheduled on 22 December 2014, 2PM. According to petitioners, they
were only able to serve the Motion on Pemberton’s counsel through registered mail. In any case, they
claim to have also furnished a copy of the Motion personally at the hearing of the Motion. On 23
December 2014, the Urgent Motion was denied, as well as its motion for reconsideration.

Issue
Are the averments of the petitioner, that the 3-day notice rule should be should be liberally applied due
to the timing of the arrest and arraignment, tenable?

Ruling
No. Petition is denied. The failure of petitioners to comply with the three-day notice rule is unjustified.
Rule 15, Section 4 of the Rules of Court clearly makes it a mandatory rule that the adverse party be given
notice of hearing on the motion at least three days prior. Failure to comply with this notice requirement
renders the motion defective consistent with protecting the adverse party's right to procedural due
process.

While the general rule is that a motion that fails to comply with the requirements of Rule 15 is a mere
scrap of paper, an exception may be made and the motion may still be acted upon by the court,
provided doing so will neither cause prejudice to the other party nor violate his or her due process
rights. The adverse party must be given time to study the motion in order to enable him or her to
prepare properly and engage the arguments of the movant. In this case, the general rule must apply
because Pemberton was not given sufficient time to study petitioners’ Motion, thereby depriving him of
his right to procedural due process.

Petitioners admit that they personally furnished Pemberton a copy of the Urgent Motion to Compel the
Armed Forces of the Philippines to Surrender Custody of Accused to the Olongapo City Jail only during
the hearing. They attempt to elude the consequences of this belated notice by arguing that they also
served a copy of the Motion by registered mail on Pemberton’s counsel. They also attempt to
underscore the urgency of the Motion by making a reference to the Christmas season and the “series of
legal holidays” where courts would be closed. To compound their obfuscation, petitioners claim that the
hearing held on December 22, 2014, attended by Pemberton’s counsel sufficiently satisfied the rationale
of the three-day notice rule. These circumstances taken together do not cure the Motion’s deficiencies.
Even granting that Pemberton’s counsel was able to comment on the motion orally during the hearing,
which incidentally was set for another incident, it cannot be said that Pemberton was able to study and
prepare for his counterarguments to the issues raised in the Motion. Judge Ginez-J abalde was correct to
deny the Urgent Motion to Compel the Armed Forces of the Philippines to Surrender Custody of
Accused to the Olongapo City Jail based on noncompliance of procedural rules. To rule otherwise would
be to prejudice Pemberton’s rights as an accused.

Effect of New Rule in Ruling

This is effected by the amended sections 4, 5 and 6 of Rule 15 of the New Rules of Court. Under the new
rule, there is no need to comply with the 3-day notice, since there is generally no hearing on a motion,
unless the court, in its discretion, sets the same for hearing if necessary. What is only needed now is to
ensure service of the motion or to give notice thereof on the other party and to provide the court proof
of the same. Also, Section 6 of the amended rule provides that a hearing on the motion is now just
discretionary, unlike the previous rule that it was mandatory. The court may, in its discretion and if it
deems necessary for resolution, call a hearing on the motion. In the case at bar, the failure to comply
with the 3 day notice rule may no longer affect the petition because hearing will only be discretionary
and that proof of service through registered mail will be sufficient.

Rule
RULE 18 - Pre-Trial; RULE 17 - Dismissal of Actions
A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC - Re: Proposed Rule on Guidelines to be Observed by Trial Court Judges and
Clerks of Court in the Conduct of Pre-Trial and Use of Deposition-Discovery Measures

Case Title: BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, VS. SPOUSES ROBERTO AND TERESITA GENUINO; G.R. No.
208792, July 22, 2015

Doctrine
A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC does not remove the plaintiff's duty under Rule 18, Section 1 of the Rules of Court
to promptly move ex-parte to set his or her case for pre-trial after the last pleading has been served and
filed.While pre-trial promotes efficiency in court proceedings and aids in decongesting dockets, A.M. No.
03-1-09-SC did not give sole burden on the courts to set cases for pre-trial.
A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC, providing that "within five (5) days from date of filing of the reply, the plaintiff
must promptly move ex parte that the case be set for pre-trial conference and if the plaintiff fails to file
said motion within the given period, the Branch COC shall issue a notice of pre-trial must be read
together with Rule 17, Section 3 of the Rules of Court on dismissals due to plaintiff's fault. Plaintiff
should thus sufficiently show justifiable cause for its failure to set the case for pre-trial; otherwise, the
court can dismiss the complaint outright.

Facts

Issue
Did the trial court act with grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the case without prejudice on the
ground of failure to prosecute when Bank of the Philippine Islands failed to file a motion to set case for
pre-trial conference?

Ruling
No. The court denied the petition. The trial court dismissed the Complaint pursuant to Rule 17, Section 3
of the Rules of Court. This dismissal operated as an adjudication on the merits:

SEC. 3. Dismissal due to fault of plaintiff. — If, for no justifiable cause, the plaintiff fails to appear on the
date of the presentation of his evidence in chief on the complaint, or to prosecute his action for an
unreasonable length of time, or to comply with these Rules or any order of the court, the complaint may
be dismissed upon motion of the defendant or upon the court’s own motion without prejudice to the
right of the defendant to prosecute his counterclaim in the same or in a separate action. This dismissal
shall have the effect of an adjudication upon the merits, unless otherwise declared by the court. A.M.
No. 03-1-09-SC entitled Re: Proposed Rule on Guidelines to be Observed by Trial Court Judges and Clerks
of Court in the Conduct of Pre-Trial and Use of Deposition-Discovery Measures took effect on August 16,
2004. This provides that:

I. Pre-Trial
A. Civil Cases

1. . . .

....

Within five (5) days from date of filing of the reply, the plaintiff must promptly move ex parte that the
case be set for pre-trial conference. If the plaintiff fails to file said motion within the given period, the
Branch COC shall issue a notice of pre-trial.

In every action, the plaintiffs are duty-bound to prosecute their case with utmost diligence and with
reasonable dispatch to enable them to obtain the relief prayed for and, at the same time, to minimize
the clogging of the court dockets. Parallel to this is the defendants’ right to have a speedy disposition of
the case filed against them, essentially, to prevent their defenses from being impaired.

Since the incidents occurred prior to the effectivity of A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC on August 16, 2004, the
guidelines stated therein should not be made applicable to this case. Instead, the prevailing rule and
jurisprudence at that time should be utilized in resolving the case.

Section 1 of Rule 18 of the Rules of Court imposes upon the plaintiff the duty to set the case for pre-trial
after the last pleading is served and filed. Under Section 3 of Rule 17, failure to comply with the said
duty makes the case susceptible to dismissal for failure to prosecute for an unreasonable length of time
or failure to comply with the rules.

Nevertheless, nowhere in the text of A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC does it remove the plaintiff’s duty under Rule
18,Section 1 of the Rules of Court to set the case for pre-trial after the last pleading has been served and
filed. Nowhere does it repeal Rule 17, Section 3 of the Rules of Court that allows dismissals due to
plaintiff’s fault, including plaintiff’s failure to comply with the Rules for no justifiable cause. Nowhere
does it impose a sole burden on the trial court to set the case for pre-trial.

Reading A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC together with Rule 17, Section 3 and Rule 18, Section 1 of the Rules of
Court accommodates the outright dismissal of a complaint upon plaintiff’s failure to show justifiable
reason for not setting the case for pre-trial within the period provided by the Rules. Thus, trial courts
must consider the facts of each case.

This court has allowed cases to proceed despite failure by the plaintiff to promptly move for pre-trial
when it finds that "the extreme sanction of dismissal of the complaint might not be warranted":36

It must be stressed that even if the plaintiff fails to promptly move for pre-trial without any justifiable
cause for such delay, the extreme sanction of dismissal of the complaint might not be warranted if no
substantial prejudice would be caused to the defendant, and there are special and compelling reasons
which would make the strict application of the rule clearly unjustified.

Between the parties, petitioner Bank of the Philippine Islands is in a better position to bear the costs of a
procedural misstep of its own doing as compared with respondents Spouses Genuino. The bank may
have had its reasons to waive payment or the pursuit of its claims. For instance, it could have weighed
that the costs of pursuing its litigation against respondents Spouses Genuino outweigh the potential
benefits. It could be that their business with the bank was far more valuable than the incidental rupture
in their relationship caused by this transaction. In all these possible cases, respondents Spouses Genuino
and other debtors have a right to rely on the non-action of the plaintiff. In their view, the non-filing of
the basic motion for setting of pre-trial would have been, at best, a reasonable economic signal that the
bank was no longer interested. At worse, it was clearly negligence of an entity with enough institutional
resources to maintain a large arsenal of in-house and external counsel. The bank’s explanation for its
own negligence is unavailing. While it is true that A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC does provide that the Clerk of
Court set the date of pre-trial,59 plaintiff should not be rewarded for his or her negligence.

Effect of New Rule in Ruling

There is no effect because Section 17 of the old rule and the new provisions are the same except for the
amendmemt to address gender sensitivity

Rule
RULE 132 - Presentation of Evidence; RULE 130 - Rules of Admissibility

Case Title: GENEVIEVE ROSAL ARREZA v. TETSUSHI TOYO; GR No. 213198, Jul 01, 2019

Doctrine
Philippine courts do not take judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws. They must be proven as fact
under our rules on evidence. A divorce decree obtained abroad is deemed a foreign judgment, hence
the indispensable need to have it pleaded and proved before its legal effects may be extended to the
Filipino spouse

Facts:
On April 1, 1991, Genevieve, a Filipino citizen, and Tetsushi Toyo (Tetsushi), a Japanese citizen, were
married in Quezon City. They bore a child whom they named Keiichi Toyo.

After 19 years of marriage, the two filed a Notification of Divorce by Agreement, which the Mayor of
Konohana-ku, Osaka City, Japan received on February 4, 2011. It was later recorded in Tetsushi's family
register as certified by the Mayor of Toyonaka City, Osaka Fu.

On May 24, 2012, Genevieve filed before the Regional Trial Court a Petition for judicial recognition of
foreign divorce and declaration of capacity to remarry.
In support of her Petition, Genevieve submitted a copy of their Divorce Certificate,Tetsushi's Family
Register,the Certificate of Acceptance of the Notification of Divorce, and an English translation of the
Civil Code of Japan, among others. After finding the Petition sufficient in form and substance, the
Regional Trial Court set the case for hearing on October 16, 2012. On the day of the hearing, no one
appeared to oppose the Petition. After the jurisdictional requirements were established and marked,
trial on the merits ensued. On February 14, 2014, the Regional Trial Court rendered a Judgment denying
Genevieve's Petition. It decreed that while the pieces of evidence presented by Genevieve proved that
their divorce agreement was accepted by the local government of Japan, she nevertheless failed to
prove the copy of Japan's law. The Regional Trial Court noted that the copy of the Civil Code of Japan
and its English translation submitted by Genevieve were not duly authenticated by the Philippine Consul
in Japan, the Japanese Consul in Manila, or the Department of Foreign Affairs. Aggrieved, Genevieve
filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but it was denied in the Regional Trial Court's June 11, 2014
Resolution.

Issue
Did the Regional Trial Court err in denying the petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and
declaration of capacity to remarry filed by petitioner Genevieve Rosal Arreza a.k.a. Genevieve Arreza
Toyo?

Ruling
When a Filipino and an alien get married, and the alien spouse later acquires a valid divorce abroad, the
Filipino spouse shall have the capacity to remarry provided that the divorce obtained by the foreign
spouse enables him or her to remarry. Nonetheless, settled is the rule that in actions involving the
recognition of a foreign divorce judgment, it is indispensable that the petitioner prove not only the
foreign judgment granting the divorce, but also the alien spouse's national law. This rule is rooted in the
fundamental theory that Philippine courts do not take judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws.
Both the foreign divorce decree and the foreign spouse's national law, purported to be official acts of a
sovereign authority, can be established by complying with the mandate of Rule 132, Sections 2445 and
2546 of the Rules of Court.

Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or document may be proven as a
public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof
attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines,
such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in
the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b)
authenticated by the seal of his office.

Here, the Regional Trial Court ruled that the documents petitioner submitted to prove the divorce
decree have complied with the demands of Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25. However, it found the copy of
the Japan Civil Code and its English translation insufficient to prove Japan's law on divorce. It noted that
these documents were not duly authenticated by the Philippine Consul in Japan, the Japanese Consul in
Manila, or the Department of Foreign Affairs.

Neither can the English translation be considered as a learned treatise. Under the Rules of Court, "[a]
witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his [or her] personal knowledge[.]" The
evidence is hearsay when it is "not what the witness knows himself [or herself] but of what he [or she]
has heard from others." The rule excluding hearsay evidence is not limited to oral testimony or
statements, but also covers written statements.

The rule is that hearsay evidence is devoid of probative value. However, a published treatise may be
admitted as tending to prove the truth of its content if: (1) the court takes judicial notice; or (2) an
expert witness testifies that the writer is recognized in his or her profession as an expert in the subject.

Here, the Regional Trial Court did not take judicial notice of the translator's and advisors' qualifications.
Nor was an expert witness presented to testify on this matter. The only evidence of the translator's and
advisors' credentials is the inside cover page of the English translation of the Civil Code of Japan. Hence,
the Regional Trial Court was correct in not considering the English translation as a learned treatise.

Finally, settled is the rule that, generally, this Court only entertains questions of law in a Rule 45 petition.
Questions of fact, like the existence of Japan's law on divorce, are not within this Court's ambit to
resolve.

Effect of New Rule in Ruling

This is effected by the new insertion in sec 25 of Rule 132 because the it makes it clear that the
document that is accompanied by a certificate or its equivalent may be presented in evidence without
further proof, the certificate or its equivalent being prima facie evidence of the due execution and
genuineness of the document involved. However, the certificate shall not be required when a treaty or
convention between a foreign country and the Philippines has abolished the requirement, or has
exempted the document itself from this formality. Hence, in the case at bar, the copy of the Divorce
certificate should be sufficientand may no longer require any further proof.

Rule

Case Title: People v. Dela Rosa y Likinon; G.R. No. 227880

Doctrine:
discrepancies between the statements of the affiant in his affidavit and those made by him on the
witness stand do not necessarily discredit him since ex parte affidavits are generally incomplete. As
between the joint affidavit and the testimony given in open court, the latter prevails because affidavits
taken ex-parte are generally considered to be inferior to the testimony given in court

Facts
Two separate informations were filed against Rosa y Likinon a.k.a “Salary” (Dela Rosa) charging Dela
Rosa with qualified human trafficking. Dela Rosa pleaded not guilty on the charges. To which, trial
ensued. The prosecution presented AAA, BBB and PO2 De Leon as its witnesses. AAA testified that she
was at home when she received a call from Dela Rosa, asking to meet at JJ’s supermarket for an errand.
However, upon meeting, the two proceeded to a hotel in Angeles City. Dela Rosa introduced Kim, a
Korean man to AAA. Kim performed a fellatio on AAA and other sexual acts. Afterwards, Kim paid Dela
Rosa and gave P700 to AAA. On another day, Dela Rosa texted AAA and asked if she has a “lady friend”.
With Dela Rosa’s threat in mind, AAA complied. She asked BBB then 15 year old to accompany her to
Avante Hotel. Kim told AAA and BBB to wait for him for his contact who would be bringing drugs in the
hotel room. Around 15 minutes later, police officers barged into the hotel room and arrested Kim. BBB
testified to the same events that transpired. BBB told PO2 De Leon of what happened during an
interview in the following day. Based on these interviews, the police arrested Dela Rosa. Dela Rosa
denied the prosecution’s versiom of events. The Regional Trial Court acquitted Dela Rosa for what
happened to BBB. As for what happened to AAA, the trial court found Dela Rosa guilty beyond
reasonable doubt. The trial court gave credence to AAA’s clear, candid and positive testimony. Dela Rosa
appealed her conviction. She argued that the prosecutiom failed to prove her guilt beyond reasonable
doubt. She questioned AAA’s credibilty given her failure to mention the February 2013 incident in the
sworn statement of PO2 De Leon. The office of the Solicitor General countered the Brief and argued that
the testiomony had no material inconsistencies. The Court of Appeals denied the Dela Rosa’s appeal and
affirmed the RTC’s decision. The Court of Appeals affirmed the presence of all elements of qualified
trafficking and foudn that Dela Rosa’s contentions regarding AAA’s credibility deserved scant
consideration. Dela Rosa filed a Notice of Appeal. The appeal forwards the sole issue of whether or not
the Court Of Appeas correctly affirmed the conviction of accused-appellant. Accused-Appellant
maitnains that the CA erred in affirming the conviction because of the amterial and irreconcilable
differences between AAA’s sworn statement and oral Testimony. But for the office of the Solicitor
General, the absence of the February 2013 incident is not fatal. The court resolves to dismiss the appeal.

Issue
Did the RTC and CA erred in affirming the conviction of Accused-Apellant and was the Office kf the
Solicitor General correct in finding that the inconsistencies in AAA’s testimony and sworn statement not
fatal?

Ruling
No. Accused-Appellant was mistaken. The trial court’s assignment of roobative value to witness
testimonies will not be disturbed except whent he significant matters were overlooked, because it has
the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witness in the stand. Furthermore, People v SPO1
Gonzales Jr. Provides that sworn statements often conflicts with testimonies given in open court. This is
because sworn statements are seldom complete or comprehensive accounts of what actually happened.
The reasoning informs the rule that “affidavits taken ex parte are generaly considered inferior to the
testimony given in the open court. In any event, AAA’s failure to mention the February 2013 incident is
understandable gigen the question asked of her in her sworn statement.

Effect of New Rule in Ruling

There is no effect because there is no amendment in the new rules of court.