Integrated Bar of the Philippines v.

Mayor Atienza
G.R. No. 175241 | February 24, 2010 | First Division
Ponente - CARPIO MORALES, J.

Facts: The IBP, through its then National President Cadiz, filed with the Office of the
City Mayor of Manila a letter application for a permit to rally at the foot of Mendiola
Bridge on June 22, 2006 from 2:30 p.m. to 5:30 p.m. to be participated in by IBP
officers and members, law students and multi-sectoral organizations.

The Office of the Manila Mayor issued a permit dated June 16, 2006 allowing the IBP to
stage a rally on given date but indicated therein Plaza Miranda as the venue, instead
of Mendiola Bridge, which permit the IBP received on June 19, 2006.

Aggrieved, petitioners filed on June 21, 2006 before the Court of Appeals a petition for
certiorari. The petition having been unresolved within 24 hours from its filing, petitioners
filed before this Court on June 22, 2006 a petition for certiorari. The Court denied the
petition for being moot and academic, denied the relief that the petition be heard on the
merits in view of the pendency of the case in the CA, and denied the motion for
reconsideration.
 
The rally pushed through on June 22, 2006 at Mendiola Bridge, after Cadiz discussed
with P/Supt. Arturo Paglinawan whose contingent from the MPD earlier barred
petitioners from proceeding thereto. The MPD thereupon instituted a criminal action
against Cadiz for violating the Public Assembly Act in staging a rally at a venue not
indicated in the permit.

The appellate court ruled and found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of
respondent because the Public Assembly Act does not categorically require respondent
to specify in writing the imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil which warrants
the denial or modification of the permit and merely mandates that the action taken shall
be in writing and shall be served on respondent within 24 hours. The appellate court
went on to hold that respondent is authorized to regulate the exercise of the freedom of
expression and of public assembly which are not absolute, and that the challenged
permit is consistent with Plaza Mirandas designation as a freedom park where protest
rallies are allowed without permit.

Hence, the filing of the present petition for review on certiorari.

Issue: Whether or not the appellate court erred in holding that the modification of the
venue in IBPs rally permit does not constitute grave abuse of discretion?

Held: Yes, the appellate court erred in holding that the modification of the venue in IBPs
rally permit does not constitute grave abuse of discretion.

The respondent failed to indicate how he had arrived at modifying the terms of the
permit against the standard of a clear and present danger test which is an indispensable
condition to such modification.
In KMP v Ermita, the Court reiterated that the “freedom of assembly” is not to be limited,
much less denied, except on a showing, as is the case with freedom of expression, of a
clear and present danger of a substantive evil that the state has a right to prevent. The
sole justification for a limitation on the exercise of this right so fundamental to the
maintenance of democratic institutions, is the danger, of a character both grave and
imminent, of a serious evil to public safety, public morals, public health, or any other
legitimate public interest.
In Reyes v. Bagatsing, the Court elucidated that the public official concerned shall
appraise whether there may be valid objections to the grant of the permit or to its grant
but at another public place. It is an indispensable condition to such refusal or
modification that the clear and present danger test be the standard for the decision
reached. Also, the applicants must be heard on the matter.
The Supreme Court held that in modifying the permit outright, respondent Mayor gravely
abused his discretion when he did not immediately inform the IBP who should have
been heard first on the matter of his perceived imminent and grave danger of a
substantive evil that may warrant the changing of the venue. The opportunity to be
heard precedes the action on the permit, since the applicant may directly go to court
after an unfavorable action on the permit. Respondent mayor failed to indicate how he
had arrived at modifying the terms of the permit against the standard of a clear and
present danger test which is an indispensable condition to such modification. Nothing in
the issued permit adverts to an imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil, which
“blank” denial or modification would, when granted imprimatur as the appellate court
would have it, render illusory any judicial scrutiny thereof.

Primicias v Fugoso 80 PHIL 71 (1948)

Facts: An action was instituted by the petitioner for the refusal of the respondent to issue a permit to
them to hold a public meeting in Plaza Miranda for redress of grievances to the government. The reason
alleged by the respondent in his defense for refusing the permit is, "that there is a reasonable ground to
believe, basing upon previous utterances and upon the fact that passions, specially on the part of the
losing groups, remains bitter and high, that similar speeches will be delivered tending to undermine the
faith and confidence of the people in their government, and in the duly constituted authorities, which
might threaten breaches of the peace and a disruption of public order." Giving emphasis as well to the
delegated police power to local government. Stating as well Revised Ordinances of 1927 prohibiting as
an offense against public peace, and penalizes as a misdemeanor, "any act, in any public place, meeting,
or procession, tending to disturb the peace or excite a riot; or collect with other persons in a body or
crowd for any unlawful purpose; or disturb or disquiet any congregation engaged in any lawful
assembly." Included herein is Sec. 1119, Free use of Public Place.

Issue: Whether or Not the freedom of speech was violated.

Held: Yes. Dealing with the ordinance, specifically, Sec. 1119, said section provides for two
constructions: (1) the Mayor of the City of Manila is vested with unregulated discretion to grant or
refuse, to grant permit for the holding of a lawful assembly or meeting, parade, or procession in the
streets and other public places of the City of Manila; (2) The right of the Mayor is subject to reasonable
discretion to determine or specify the streets or public places to be used with the view to prevent
confusion by overlapping, to secure convenient use of the streets and public places by others, and to
provide adequate and proper policing to minimize the risk of disorder. The court favored the second
construction. First construction tantamount to authorizing the Mayor to prohibit the use of the streets.
Under our democratic system of government no such unlimited power may be validly granted to any
officer of the government, except perhaps in cases of national emergency.

The Mayor’s first defense is untenable. Fear of serious injury cannot alone justify suppression of free
speech and assembly. It is the function of speech to free men from the bondage of irrational fears. To
justify suppression of free speech there must be reasonable ground to fear that serious evil will result if
free speech is practiced. There must be reasonable ground to believe that the danger apprehended is
imminent. There must be reasonable ground to believe that the evil to be prevented is a serious one.
The fact that speech is likely to result in some violence or in destruction of property is not enough to
justify its suppression. There must be the probability of serious injury to the state.
Navarro vs. Villegas

31 SCRA 371

FACTS: The petitioner has applied for a permit to conduct an assembly in Plaza Miranda during a
weekday. Respondent Mayor has offered Sunken Gardens as an alternative, guided by a lesson gained
from the events of the past few weeks. The Mayor appraised that a public rally at Plaza Miranda, as
compared to one at the Sunken Gardens as he suggested, poses a clearer and more imminent danger of
public disorders, breaches of the peace, criminal acts, and even bloodshed as an aftermath of such
assemblies, and petitioner has manifested that it has no means of preventing such disorders.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent mayor violated Article 131 in not granting the petition to hold an
assembly in Plaza Miranda.

HELD: Respondent Mayor possesses reasonable discretion to determine or specify the streets or public
places to be used for the assembly in order to secure convenient use thereof by others and provide
adequate and proper policing to minimize the risks of disorder and maintain public safety and order;
Respondent Mayor has expressly stated his willingness to grant permits for peaceful assemblies at Plaza
Miranda during Saturdays, Sundays and holidays when they would not cause unnecessarily great
disruption of the normal activities of the community and has further offered Sunken Gardens as an
alternative to Plaza Miranda.

Article 131, RPC:

Prohibition, interruption, and dissolution of peaceful meetings. – The penalty of prision correccional in
its minimum period shall be imposed upon any public officer or employee who, without legal ground,
shall prohibit or interrupt the holding of a peaceful meeting; or shall dissolve the same.

The same penalty shall be imposed upon any public officer or employee who shall hinder any person
from joining any lawful association or from attending any of its meetings.

The same penalty shall be imposed upon any public officer or employee who shall prohibit or hinder any
person from addressing, either alone or together with others, any petition to the authorities for the
correction of abuses or redress of grievances.