CANON 12

RULE 138

Attorneys and Admission to Bar

Section 20. Duties of attorneys. — It is the duty of an attorney:

(a) To maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and to support the Constitution
and obey the laws of the Philippines.

(b) To observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers;

(c) To counsel or maintain such actions or proceedings only as appear to him to be just, and
such defenses only as he believes to be honestly debatable under the law.

(d) To employ, for the purpose of maintaining the causes confided to him, such means only
as are consistent with truth and honor, and never seek to mislead the judge or any judicial
officer by an artifice or false statement of fact or law;

(e) To maintain inviolate the confidence, and at every peril to himself, to preserve the secrets
of his client, and to accept no compensation in connection with his client's business except
from him or with his knowledge and approval;

(f) To abstain from all offensive personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or
reputation of a party or witness, unless required by the justice of the cause with which he is
charged;

(g) Not to encourage either the commencement or the continuance of an action or

proceeding, or delay any man's cause, from any corrupt motive or interest;

(h) Never to reject, for any consideration personal to himself, the cause of the defenseless or
oppressed;

(i) In the defense of a person accused of crime, by all fair and honorable means, regardless
of his personal opinion as to the guilt of the accused, to present every defense that the law
permits, to the end that no person may be deprived of life or liberty, but by due process of
law.
FAR EASTERN SHIPPING COMPANY vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PHILIPPINE PORTS AUTHORITY
G.R. No. 130150; October 1998
FACTS:
M/V PAVLODAR, owned and operated by the Far Eastern Shipping Company (FESC),
arrived at the Port of Manila and was assigned Berth 4 of the Manila International Port,
as its berthing space. Gavino, who was assigned by the Appellant Manila Pilots’
Association to conduct the docking maneuvers for the safe berthing, boarded the
vessel at the quarantine anchorage and stationed himself in the bridge, with the
master of the vessel, Victor Kavankov, beside him. After a briefing of Gavino by
Kavankov of the particulars of the vessel and its cargo, the vessel lifted anchor from the
quarantine anchorage and proceeded to the Manila International Port. The sea was
calm and the wind was ideal for docking maneuvers. When the vessel reached the
landmark, one-half mile from the pier, Gavino ordered the engine stopped. When the
vessel was already about 2,000 feet from the pier, Gavino ordered the anchor dropped.
Kavankov relayed the orders to the crew of the vessel on the bow. The left anchor, with
two (2) shackles, were dropped. However, the anchor did not take hold as expected.
The speed of the vessel did not slacken. A commotion ensued between the crew
members.  After Gavino noticed that the anchor did not take hold, he ordered the
engines half-astern. Abellana, who was then on the pier apron, noticed that the vessel
was approaching the pier fast. Kavankov likewise noticed that the anchor did not take
hold. Gavino thereafter gave the “full-astern” code. Before the right anchor and
additional shackles could be dropped, the bow of the vessel rammed into the apron of
the pier causing considerable damage to the pier as well as the vessel.
ISSUES:
(1) Is the pilot of a commercial vessel, under compulsory pilotage, solely liable for the
damage caused by the vessel to the pier, at the port of destination, for his negligence?;
(2) Would the owner of the vessel be liable likewise if the damage is caused by the
concurrent negligence of the master of the vessel and the pilot under a compulsory
pilotage?
HELD:
(1) Generally speaking, the pilot supersedes the master for the time being in the
command and navigation of the ship, and his orders must be obeyed in all matters
connected with her navigation. He becomes the master pro hac vice and should give all
directions as to speed, course, stopping and reversing anchoring, towing and the like.
And when a licensed pilot is employed in a place where pilotage is compulsory, it is his
duty to insist on having effective control of the vessel or to decline to act as pilot. Under
certain systems of foreign law, the pilot does not take entire charge of the vessel but is
deemed merely the adviser of the master, who retains command and control of the
navigation even in localities where pilotage is compulsory. It is quite common for states
and localities to provide for compulsory pilotage, and safety laws have been enacted
requiring vessels approaching their ports, with certain exceptions, to take on board
pilots duly licensed under local law. The purpose of these laws is to create a body of
seamen thoroughly acquainted with the harbor, to pilot vessels seeking to enter or
depart, and thus protect life and property from the dangers of navigation. Upon
assuming such office as a compulsory pilot, Capt. Gavino is held to the universally
accepted high standards of care and diligence required of a pilot, whereby he assumes
to have skill and knowledge in respect to navigation in the particular waters over which
his license extends superior to and more to be trusted than that of the master. He is
not held to the highest possible degree of skill and care but must have and exercise the
ordinary skill and care demanded by the circumstances, and usually shown by an
expert in his profession. Under extraordinary circumstances, a pilot must exercise
extraordinary care. In this case, Capt. Gavino failed to measure up to such strict
standard of care and diligence required of pilots in the performance of their duties. As
the pilot, he should have made sure that his directions were promptly and strictly
followed.

(2) The negligence on the part of Capt. Gavino is evident; but Capt. Kabancov is no less
responsible for the allision. The master is still in command of the vessel
notwithstanding the presence of a pilot. A perusal of Capt. Kabankov’s testimony
makes it apparent that he was remiss in the discharge of his duties as master of the
ship, leaving the entire docking procedure up to the pilot, instead of maintaining
watchful vigilance over this risky maneuver. The owners of a vessel are not personally
liable for the negligent acts of a compulsory pilot, but by admiralty law, the fault or
negligence of a compulsory pilot is imputable to the vessel and it may be held liable
therefor in rem. Where, however, by the provisions of the statute the pilot is
compulsory only in the sense that his fee must be paid, and is not in compulsory
charge of the vessel, there is no exemption from liability. Even though the pilot is
compulsory, if his negligence was not the sole cause of the injury, but the negligence of
the master or crew contributed thereto, the owners are liable. But the liability of the
ship in rem does not release the pilot from the consequences of his own negligence.
The master is not entirely absolved of responsibility with respect to navigation when a
compulsory pilot is in charge. Except insofar as their liability is limited or exempted by
statute, the vessel or her owners are liable for all damages caused by the negligence or
other wrongs of the owners or those in charge of the vessel. As a general rule, the
owners or those in possession and control of a vessel and the vessel are liable for all
natural and proximate damages caused to persons or property by reason of her
negligent management or navigation.
 Manila Pest Control, Inc. vs. Workmen's Compensation Commission, 25 SCRA 700 , October 29,
1968
Constitutional law; Due process; Acts showing no denial of.—Petitioner alleges that it was not officially
furnished a copy of the decision of the Workmen's Compensation Commission since the same was not
delivered to its counsel but to another and hence it was denied due process to be heard. In the reply-
memorandum of the Workmen's Compensation Commission it was shown that a copy of the decision was
furnished to petitioners counsel but its counsel refused to received the same and instead instructed the
server to deliver the same to another counsel. In view of the instruction the server proceeded to the
law office of the named counsel where the said decision was received by a clerk of the said office,
evidenced by a stamp pad bearing its name.
Held: Under the above circumstances, no due process question arose. What was done satisfied the
constitutional requirement. An effort was made to serve petitioner with a copy of the decision; that
such effort failed was attributable to the conduct of its own counsel. There is no reason why the
decision would have been served on some other counsel if there were no such misinformation, if there
was no such attempt to mislead.

National Bank vs. Uy Teng Piao, 57 Phil., 337, October 21, 1932
Attorney and Client; Attorney as Witness.—Although the law does not forbid an attorney to be a
witness and at the same time an attorney in a cause, the courts prefer that counsel should not testify
as a witness unless it is necessary, and that they should withdraw from the active management of the
case. (Malcolm: Legal Ethics, p. 148.)

THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, plaintiff-appellant, vs.UY TENG PIAO, defendant-

appellee.

Topic: a lawyer shall avoid being a witness for a client

Facts:
            On September 9, 1924, the Court of First Instance of Manila rendered a judgment in
favor of the Philippine National Bank and against Uy Teng Piao in civil case No. 26328 for the
sum of P17,232.42 with interest at 7 per cent per annum from June 1, 1924, plus 10 per cent of
the sum amount for attorney's fees and costs. The court ordered the defendant to deposit said
amount with the clerk of the court within three months from the date of the judgment, and in
case of his failure to do so that the mortgaged properties described in transfer certificates of title
Nos. 7264 and 8274 should be sold at public auction in accordance with the law and the
proceeds applied to the payment of the judgment.
Uy Teng Piao failed to comply with the order of the court, and the sheriff of the City of
Manila sold the two parcels of land at public auction to the Philippine National Bank on October
14, 1924 for P300 and P1,000 respectively.
On February 11, 1925, the Philippine National Bank secured from Uy Teng Piao a
waiver of his right to redeem the property described in Transfer Certificate of Title No. 8274, and
on the same date the bank sold said property to Mariano Santos for P8,600.1awphil.net
Evidently the other parcel, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 7264, was subsequently
resold by the bank for P2,700, because the account of the defendant was credited with the sum
of P11,300. In other words, the bank credited the defendant with the full amount realized by it
when it resold the two parcels of land.
 The bank brought the present action to revive the judgment for the balance of
P11,574.33, with interest at 7 per cent per annum from August 1, 1930.
One of the attorneys for the plaintiff testified that the defendant renounced his right to
redeem the parcel of land in Calle Ronquillo, Exhibit 1, because a friend of the defendant was
interested in buying it.

Issue: Whether or not lawyers shall avoid being a witness for a client

Held:
Yes.  With respect to the testimony of the bank's attorney, we should like to observe that
although the law does not forbid an attorney to be a witness and at the same time an attorney in
a cause, the courts prefer that counsel should not testify as a witness unless it is necessary,
and that they should withdraw from the active management of the case. (Malcolm, Legal Ethics,
p. 148.) Canon 19 of the Code of Legal Ethics reads as follows:
When a lawyer is a witness for his client, except as to merely formal matters, such as the
attestation or custody of an instrument and the like, he should leave the trial of the case to other
counsel. Except when essential to the ends of justice, a lawyer should avoid testifying in court in
behalf of his client.