SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 171722. January 11, 2016.]

REMEDIOS PASCUAL , petitioner, v s . BENITO BURGOS, ET AL. ,

respondents.

DECISION

LEONEN , J : p

Only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari. 1 The
factual ndings of the Court of Appeals bind this court. 2 Although jurisprudence has
provided several exceptions to these rules, exceptions must be alleged, substantiated,
and proved by the parties so this court may evaluate and review the facts of the case. In
any event, even in such cases, this court retains full discretion on whether to review the
factual findings of the Court of Appeals.
This Petition for Review on Certiorari 3 assails the Court of Appeals Decision 4
that reversed the trial court Decision, and ordered the trial court to disallow redemption
of the property and to consolidate ownership upon respondents, and Resolution that
denied reconsideration. 5 The Court of Appeals reversed the factual ndings of the trial
court. 6
Ernesto and Remedios Pascual (Pascual Spouses) and Benito Burgos, et al.
(Burgos, et al.) 7 co-own a shpond situated in Bulacan covered by Original Certi cate
of Title No. 21. 8
On September 8, 1965, Burgos, et al. led an action for partition of the shpond
and prayed for an "accounting of the income of the . . . fishpond from 1945[.]" 9
On August 31, 1976, the trial court rendered the Decision apportioning to Burgos,
et al. 17% and to the Pascual Spouses 83% of the shpond. 10 The Pascual Spouses
were also ordered to pay Burgos, et al. their unpaid shares in the income of the property
since 1945, until the actual partition and delivery of shares. 11
The Pascual Spouses appealed the trial court Decision before the Court of
Appeals, 12 which was denied on June 30, 1983. 13 The Petition for Review on Certiorari
led before this court was also denied on January 11, 1984, and the Motion for
Reconsideration denied on March 22, 1984. 14
While the appeal of the trial court Decision on the partition case was pending,
several incidents happened. On November 25, 1976, Burgos, et al. led a Motion for
Execution Pending Appeal of the money portion of the trial court Decision. 15 The
Motion was granted by the trial court. 16 The Pascual Spouses then led a Petition for
Certiorari before the Court of Appeals. 17
On July 5, 1978, the Court of Appeals dismissed the Pascual Spouses' Petition
for Certiorari assailing the grant of the Motion for Execution Pending Appeal. 18 The
Pascual Spouses then led a Petition for Review before this court, which was denied on
May 16, 1979. 19
On December 28, 1981, the trial court issued another order granting execution
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 pending appeal. 20 Thus, on February 9, 1982, the Deputy Sheriff of Bulacan addressed
a Notice of Levy to the Register of Deeds of Bulacan, notifying that the shpond and all
its improvements were being levied. 21
The Deputy Sheriff then issued a Notice of Auction Sale of Real Property setting
the public auction on March 23, 1982. 22 The auction sale was on the Pascual Spouses'
share of the fishpond. 23
On March 23, 1982, the auction sale was conducted and the Pascual Spouses'
share of the shpond was sold for P95,000.00 to Burgos, et al., through a certain
Marcial Meneses, the highest bidder. 24 A Certificate of Sale was then issued. 25
On February 23, 1983, after almost a year since the conduct of the auction sale,
the Pascual Spouses filed an Omnibus Motion before the trial court assailing the Writ of
Execution issued on December 28, 1981 and the ensuing levy and sale of their share in
the shpond. 26 The Pascual Spouses also "offer[ed] to post a bond to stay
execution[.]" 27 On April 21, 1983, the trial court denied the Pascual Spouses' Omnibus
Motion since the assailed orders had already become final and executory. 28
On April 25, 1983, the Pascual Spouses led an Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration and/or Extension of Time to Redeem before the trial court. 29 They
argued that the sale was void since the trial court Decision 30 on the partition case,
which was the basis for the Motion for Execution, was still pending appeal. 31 They also
argued that the Decision ordered that "the disputed property should not be touched
pending appeal[.]" 32 The Pascual Spouses also prayed that they be given until May 16,
1983 to redeem the property considering that the period of redemption already expired
on April 15, 1983. 33
Burgos, et al. led a Motion for Con rmation of Sale on July 8, 1983, and then a
Motion for Issuance of Writ of Possession on August 30, 1983. 34
In the Order dated September 16, 1983, the trial court denied the Pascual
Spouses' Urgent Motion for Reconsideration and/or Extension of Time to Redeem and
granted Burgos, et al.'s Motions for Con rmation of Sale and Issuance of Writ of
Possession. 35
Undeterred, the Pascual Spouses led on September 26, 1983 an Urgent Motion
to Quash and/or Recall Writ of Possession also before the trial court. 36 They argued
for the rst time that irregularities attended the auction sale, alleging anomalies in the
number of times the notice of sale was published, the unconscionably low price the
shpond was sold at the auction sale, the lack of authority of Marcial Meneses to buy
the shpond on behalf of Burgos, et al., and the insuf ciency in the description of rights
and interests to be sold in the notice of sale. 37
CAIHTE

Without waiting for the resolution of the Urgent Motion to Quash and/or Recall
Writ of Possession, the Pascual Spouses initiated on April 24, 1984 a separate case for
annulment of execution of sale against Burgos, et al. 38 This was raf ed to Branch 6 of
the Regional Trial Court, Malolos, Bulacan. 39 Burgos, et al. then led a Motion for
Preliminary Hearing of their defense of lack of jurisdiction. 40 The trial court denied the
Motion, which prompted Burgos, et al. to file a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of
Appeals. 41 The Court of Appeals granted the Petition and ordered the dismissal of the
Pascual Spouses' annulment of execution sale case. 42 The Pascual Spouses led a
Petition for Review before this court, which was denied on March 10, 1989. 43
As to the Pascual Spouses' Urgent Motion to Quash and/or Recall Writ of
Possession, the trial court denied the Motion in the Decision dated October 10, 1984.
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 44 The Pascual Spouses led a Motion for Partial Reconsideration that was denied by
the trial court in the Order dated December 18, 1986. 45 The trial court also rejected the
Pascual Spouses' argument on the irregularities of the auction sale and, instead, upheld
its validity. 46 Thus, the Pascual Spouses led a Petition for Review before the Court of
Appeals assailing the trial court's October 10, 1984 Decision and its December 18,
1986 Order. 47
On May 6, 1994, the Court of Appeals 48 af rmed the trial court's Decision
upholding the validity of the auction sale. 49 However, it considered the Pascual
Spouses' allegation that the price at which the shpond was sold was unconscionably
low. 50 The Court of Appeals ordered the remand of the case to the trial court for
reception of evidence in order to determine the fair market value of the shpond at the
time of the auction sale and whether equity demands that the Pascual Spouses still be
allowed to redeem the property. 51 The dispositive portion of the Decision states:
WHEREFORE, this case is hereby remanded to the lower court, which is
hereby directed to receive evidence solely for the purpose of determining the fair
market value of the property in question on March 23, 1982, when the rights and
interests of defendants-appellants therein were sold at public action, and to
decide on the basis thereof, whether or not it is equitable to allow the
defendants-appellants to redeem the said rights and interests. In all other
aspects not inconsistent with this, the orders herein appealed from are hereby
AFFIRMED, with costs against the defendants-appellants. 52
Burgos, et al. led before this court a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing
the Court of Appeals Decision remanding the case to the trial court. 53 This court
denied the Petition on July 12, 1995, and the Resolution became nal and executory on
October 9, 1995. 54 The case was then remanded to the Regional Trial Court. 55
On April 23, 1999, the trial court set the case for hearing pursuant to the Court of
Appeals Decision dated May 6, 1994. 56
The Pascual Spouses presented three (3) witnesses 57 to prove that the fair
market value of the shpond sold at public auction in 1982 was P200,000.00 per
hectare. On the other hand, Burgos, et al. presented three (3) witnesses 58 to prove that
the fishpond's fair market value was only P10,000.00 to P20,000.00 per hectare.
The Pascual Spouses' rst witness, Silvestre Pascual, is the brother of Ernesto
Pascual. 59 He testi ed that, as the son of the shpond's owner and as a shpond
operator himself, he knew the value of the fishpond. 60 Silvestre Pascual testified that in
1963 or 1964, the shpond previously owned by his mother was sold to Ernesto
Pascual for P100,000.00. 61 In 1982, he learned from his friends and neighbors who
were also shpond operators that the value of the shpond was already P200,000.00
per hectare. 62
The Pascual Spouses' second witness was Guillermo Samonte, a shpond
caretaker. 63 He testi ed that the market value of the shpond was P200,000.00 per
hectare in 1982. 64 He knew this amount as he witnessed the sale transaction between
the Fishermen Corporation and Precillano 65 Gonzales Development Corporation. 66 To
prove the transaction, Guillermo Samonte presented a Deed of Absolute Sale 67 dated
November 19, 1981 and testi ed that the total consideration was P10,000,000.00. 68
The Deed documented a sale of a 481,461-square meter parcel of land in Bulacan for
P4,000,000.00. 69
Antonio Gonzales was the Pascual Spouses' third witness. He was the former
President of Precillano Gonzales Development Corporation and he purchased the
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 property testi ed to by Guillermo Samonte for the Corporation. 70 He corroborated the
testimony of Guillermo Samonte and clari ed that P4,000,000.00 was paid in cash to
the seller and the seller's loan of P6,000,000.00 to Philippine National Bank was
assumed by the buyer, totaling P10,000,000.00. 71
Burgos, et al.'s rst witness, Policarpio dela Cruz, was the son of Catalina
Antonio, one of the former owners of the shpond who sold her share to the Pascual
Spouses. 72 He claimed knowledge of the prices of shponds as he grew up in and
continued visiting Bulacan. 73 He testi ed that in 1982, rst-class shponds were sold
at P20,000.00 to P30,000.00 per hectare "while second[-]class shponds were sold at
a lower price." 74 The shpond in this case is considered second-class so it was priced
at P10,000.00 to P20,000.00 per hectare. 75
Policarpio dela Cruz presented two (2) tax declarations. 76 The rst tax
declaration with number 223 77 series of 1974 covered the shpond. The tax
declaration states that the market value of the shpond was P202,694.00. 78 The
second tax declaration with number 10468 79 series of 1980 covered a parcel of land in
Bulacan used as a shpond with an area of 12.9493 hectares. 80 The market value of
the property was P388,479.00. 81
Patricia delos Reyes was Burgos, et al.'s second witness. She testi ed that she is
the great grandniece of Benito Burgos and was in possession of the property pursuant
to this court's Decision. 82 She presented two (2) tax declarations covering the property
to prove its market value. 83 The rst was the same tax declaration presented by
Policarpio dela Cruz with number 223, 84 series of 1974. It showed that the property
had an area of 10.1347 hectares and market value of P202,694.00. 85 Tax declaration
number 223 series of 1974 was cancelled by tax declaration number 12807 86 dated
April 9, 1985, 87 the second tax declaration presented by Patricia delos Reyes. Tax
declaration number 12807 states that the market value of the property is P304,041.00.
88

Burgos, et al.'s last witness was Antonio Magpayo, the Municipal Assessor in
Bulacan in 1975 and re-appointed in 1995. 89 Antonio Magpayo identi ed and showed
in his Book of Tax Declarations the tax declaration presented by Patricia delos Reyes.
90 He also testified that no tax declaration was issued in 1982. 91

On September 24, 2001, the trial court 92 gave credence to the evidence
presented by the Pascual Spouses. 93 The trial court considered the testimony of
Antonio Gonzales authoritative, having come from a disinterested witness who was a
shpond operator himself and who negotiated the sale of a 48-hectare shpond also in
Bulacan. 94 The trial court did not give any weight to the tax declarations presented by
Burgos, et al.'s witnesses as these did not re ect the actual fair market value of the
properties covered by these tax declarations. 95 The trial court held: DETACa

WHEREFORE, this Court nds the fair market value of the shpond in
question to be P200,000.00 per hectare or P2,000,000.00 in 1982. Considering
that it was only sold at an unusually lower price of P95,000.00 than its true
value, the Court consequently nds it equitable to allow the defendants to
redeem the rights and interests thereto within a period of ninety (90) days after
the finality of this decision.
SO ORDERED. 96
Burgos, et al. appealed the trial court Decision. 97
On June 30, 2005, the Court of Appeals rendered the Decision granting the
appeal. 98 It emphasized that the Decision, which remanded the case to the trial court,
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 still af rmed the validity of the auction sale and the issuance of a Writ of Possession in
favor of Burgos. 99 The case was remanded solely to determine the fair market value of
the property to decide on whether the Pascual Spouses can still redeem the property
as a matter of equity. 100
Upon review of the evidence presented by the parties, the Court of Appeals found
that there was a discrepancy between the testimony of Antonio Gonzales and the
provisions in the Deed of Sale presented. 101 Antonio Gonzales testi ed that the
purchase price of the shpond in the sale between The Fishermen Corporation and
Precillano Gonzales Development Corporation was P10,000,000.00. 102 P4,000,000.00
was paid in cash, while the buyer had to assume the P6,000,000.00 loan of the seller.
103 However, the Deed of Sale provides otherwise:

From the purchase price of P4,000,000.00, the BUYER shall undertake to

pay the existing indebtedness of SELLER to the National Investment and
Development Corporation and the Philippine National Bank in order to secure
the release of the mortgaged property. The amount paid to the National
Investment and Development Corporation shall be considered as part of the
purchase price. 104 (Underscoring in the original)
The Pascual Spouses offered no proof to clarify this inconsistency. 105
Moreover, the sale testi ed to by the witnesses of the Pascual Spouses was an
isolated transaction. 106 No evidence was presented to show that the shpond subject
of the sale was the same type, quality, and quantity of the disputed shpond. 107 The
Court of Appeals held that this sale cannot be deemed to re ect the fair market value
of the disputed fishpond. 108
On the other hand, the tax declarations presented by Burgos, et al., being public
documents, are prima facie evidence of the statements written there, including the
market value of the property. 109 Thus, the Pascual Spouses must present ample proof
to substantiate a contrary allegation, 110 which they failed to do. Thus:
WHEREFORE , this appeal is GRANTED . The Decision dated September
24, 2001 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 8, Malolos, Bulacan is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE . The trial court is ordered not to allow appellees to
redeem their former rights, interests and participation in the property covered by
Original Certi cate of Title No. 21, and to consolidate ownership of the same
upon appellants. 111
The Pascual Spouses led a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied by
the Court of Appeals in the Resolution dated February 13, 2006. 112
Remedios Pascual led this Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Court
of Appeals Decision and Resolution, which reversed and set aside the trial court
Decision.
Upon order 113 of this court, Burgos, et al. led a Comment 114 on September 21,
2006. This court then required Remedios Pascual to le a Reply. 115 Remedios Pascual
filed a Manifestation 116 stating that she was not filing a Reply.
The issues raised by petitioner Remedios Pascual and respondents Benito
Burgos, et al. are:
First, whether a petition for review before this court allows a review of the factual
findings of the lower courts; and
Second, whether this case presents an exception to the rule on this court's power
to review decisions of the Court of Appeals via a petition for review. If in the af rmative,
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 whether the price at which the fishpond was sold is unconsionably low.
We nd that the case does not fall under any of the exceptions. Thus, we do not
delve into the factual issues of the case and af rm the Decision of the Court of
Appeals.
I
Review of appeals led before this court is "not a matter of right, but of sound
judicial discretion[.]" 117 This court's action is discretionary. Petitions led "will be
granted only when there are special and important reasons[.]" 118 This is especially
applicable in this case, where the issues have been fully ventilated before the lower
courts in a number of related cases.
The Rules of Court require that only questions of law should be raised in petitions
filed under Rule 45. 119 This court is not a trier of facts. It will not entertain questions of
fact as the factual ndings of the appellate courts are " nal, binding[,] or conclusive on
the parties and upon this [c]ourt" 120 when supported by substantial evidence. 121
Factual ndings of the appellate courts will not be reviewed nor disturbed on appeal to
this court. 122
However, these rules do admit exceptions. Over time, the exceptions to these
rules have expanded. At present, there are 10 recognized exceptions that were rst
listed in Medina v. Mayor Asistio, Jr.: 123
(1) When the conclusion is a nding grounded entirely on speculation,
surmises or conjectures; (2) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken,
absurd or impossible; (3) Where there is a grave abuse of discretion; (4) When
the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) When the ndings of
fact are con icting; (6) When the Court of Appeals, in making its ndings, went
beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of
both appellant and appellee; (7) The ndings of the Court of Appeals are
contrary to those of the trial court; (8) When the ndings of fact are conclusions
without citation of speci c evidence on which they are based; (9) When the
facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs
are not disputed by the respondents; and (10) The nding of fact of the Court of
Appeals is premised on the supposed absence of evidence and is contradicted
by the evidence on record. 124 (Citations omitted)
These exceptions similarly apply in petitions for review led before this court
involving civil, 125 labor, 126 tax, 127 or criminal cases. 128
A question of fact requires this court to review the truthfulness or falsity of the
allegations of the parties. 129 This review includes assessment of the "probative value
of the evidence presented." 130 There is also a question of fact when the issue
presented before this court is the correctness of the lower courts' appreciation of the
evidence presented by the parties. aDSIHc

Petitioner asks this court to review the facts of the case:

This Honorable Court is now, from the foregoing, confronted with a
controversy as to which will prevail — the ndings of facts of the trial court
which is based on preponderance of evidence or the ndings of facts of the
court a quo which is based on the alleged misapprehension of facts allegedly
committed by the former court. 131
Petitioner admits that she is raising factual issues that this court cannot
entertain. 132 However, she argues that this case falls under the exceptions to this rule.
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 133

II
Parties praying that this court review the factual ndings of the Court of Appeals
must demonstrate and prove that the case clearly falls under the exceptions to the rule.
They have the burden of proving to this court that a review of the factual ndings is
necessary. 134 Mere assertion and claim that the case falls under the exceptions do not
suffice.
Petitioner claims that this case presents two (2) exceptions to the rule against a
review of factual ndings by this court. 135 Petitioner alleges that the Court of Appeals
committed grave abuse of discretion. 136 Further, she states that the ndings of fact of
the Court of Appeals and of the Regional Trial Court are contrary to each other. 137
Respondents counter that the Court of Appeals Decision is "more consistent with
the testimony of the witnesses and the evidence presented by the parties during the
trial[.] " 138
III
The Court of Appeals must have gravely abused its discretion in its appreciation
of the evidence presented by the parties and in its factual ndings to warrant a review
of factual issues by this court. Grave abuse of discretion is defined, thus:
By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of
discretion must be grave as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or
despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility and must be so
patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual
refusal to perform the duty enjoined by or to act at all in contemplation of law.
Grave abuse of discretion refers not merely to palpable errors of
jurisdiction; or to violations of the Constitution, the law and jurisprudence. It
refers also to cases in which, for various reasons, there has been a gross
misapprehension of facts. 139 (Citations omitted)
This exception was first laid down in Buyco v. People, et al.: 140
In the case at bar, the Tenth Amnesty Commission, the court of rst
instance and the Court of Appeals found, in effect, that the evidence did not
suf ce to show that appellant had acted in the manner contemplated in the
amnesty proclamation. Moreover, unlike the Barrioquinto cases, which were
appealed directly to this Court, which, accordingly, had authority to pass upon
the validity of the ndings of fact of the court of rst instance and of its
conclusions on the veracity of the witnesses, the case at bar is before us on
appeal by certiorari from a decision of the Court of Appeals, the ndings and
conclusions of which, on the aforementioned subjects, are not subject to our
review, except in cases of grave abuse of discretion , which has not been shown
to exist. 141 (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioner fails to convince this court that the Court of Appeals committed grave
abuse of discretion in reversing the trial court's factual ndings and appreciation of the
evidence presented by the parties. Petitioner claims that:
[T]he court a quo gravely abused its discretion when it rendered its assailed
decision and resolution since it contravened the principle that " ndings of fact
of trial courts are entitled to great respect and are bindings [sic] on the Supreme
Court in the absence of showing bias, partiality, or grave abuse of discretion on
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 the part of the presiding judge" — (People vs. Vitancur, 345 SCRA 414) and the
principle that "in the absence of a palpable error or grave abuse of discretion on
the part of the trial judge, the trial court's evaluation of the credibility of
witnesses will not be disturbed on appeal" — (People vs. Mendez, 335 SCRA
147). 142
Other than saying that the Court of Appeals allegedly failed to apply doctrines
laid down by this court, petitioner has not presented this court with cogent reasons why
the Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion when it re-evaluated the evidence
presented by the parties and reached different factual findings.
Grave abuse of discretion, to be an exception to the rule, must have attended the
evaluation of the facts and evidence presented by the parties. In Cariño v. Court of
Appeals, 143 the issue presented before this court was "whether the respondent Court
of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in concluding that the Deed of Sale of
House and Transfer of Rights (Exhibit 'D-1'), on which the petitioners have based their
application over the questioned lot, is simulated and, therefore, an inexistent deed of
sale." 144 To resolve the issue, this court examined whether there was substantial and
convincing evidence to support the factual findings of the Court of Appeals. 145
In any case, the Court of Appeals' reversal or modi cation of the factual ndings
of the trial court does not automatically mean that it gravely abused its discretion. The
Court of Appeals, acting as an appellate court, is still a trier of facts. Parties can raise
questions of fact before the Court of Appeals and it will have jurisdiction to rule on
these matters. Otherwise, if only questions of law are raised, the appeal should be led
directly before this court.
This is not to say that the trial court's ndings of fact, especially with regard to
the credibility of witnesses, are of little weight. The doctrine in the cases cited by
petitioner, People v. Vitancur 146 and People v. Mendez , 147 is a time-honored rule. The
trial court's ndings of fact are given much weight because of the trial court judges'
rst-hand knowledge and familiarity with the disposition of the witnesses who testi ed
before them, and this is important in certain cases. However, this doctrine does not
diminish the Court of Appeals' jurisdiction in reviewing the factual ndings of the trial
court. Further, in the cited cases, the Court of Appeals did not even have the opportunity
to review the factual ndings of the trial court as the case was directly elevated to this
court on automatic appeal. 148
IV
The Court of Appeals' appreciation of the weight of the evidence presented by
the parties is opposed to that of the trial court. Unlike the trial court, the Court of
Appeals did not give any weight to Antonio Gonzales' testimony. 149 Instead, it relied on
the tax declarations presented by the parties to nd the market value of the shpond in
1982. 150
While the factual ndings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the
trial court, this alone does not automatically warrant a review of factual ndings by this
court. In Uniland Resources v. Development Bank of the Philippines: 151 ETHIDa

It bears emphasizing that mere disagreement between the Court of

Appeals and the trial court as to the facts of a case does not of itself warrant
this Court's review of the same. It has been held that the doctrine that the
ndings of fact made by the Court of Appeals, being conclusive in nature, are
binding on this Court, applies even if the Court of Appeals was in disagreement
with the lower court as to the weight of evidence with a consequent reversal of
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 its ndings of fact, so long as the ndings of the Court of Appeals are borne out
by the record or based on substantial evidence. While the foregoing doctrine is
not absolute, petitioner has not suf ciently proved that his case falls under the
known exceptions. 152 (Citations omitted)
The lower courts' disagreement as to their factual ndings, at most, presents
only prima facie basis for recourse to this court:
One such exception, of course, is where — as here — the factual ndings
of the Court of Appeals con ict with those of the Trial Court, but it is one that
must be invoked and applied only with great circumspection and upon a clear
showing that manifestly correct ndings have been unwarrantedly rejected or
reversed. On the one hand, the trial court is the bene ciary of the rule that its
ndings of fact are entitled to great weight and respect; on the other, the Court
of Appeals is, as a general proposition, the ultimate judge of the facts in a case
appealed to it — a prerogative which is at the same time a duty conferred upon
it by law. Thus, while a — con ict in their ndings may prima facie provide
basis for a recourse to this Court, only a showing, on the face of the record, of
gross or extraordinary misperception or manifest bias in the Appellate Court's
reading of the evidence will justify this Court's intervention by way of assuming
a function usually within the former's exclusive province. There is no showing
here of such exceptional circumstances, petitioners advertence to certain
ndings of the Court of Appeals in her view contrary to the weight or import of
the evidence notwithstanding. In short, nothing in the record warrants this
Court's substituting its own assessment of the evidence for that of the Court of
Appeals in contravention of the general rule that restricts to questions of law the
scope of its review of the latter's decisions. 153 (Citation omitted)
Garcia, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al. , 154 the case cited by Medina 155 as basis
for this exception, supports this pronouncement. In Garcia, this court considered the
contrary ndings of the Court of Appeals and the trial court as one of the
circumstances compelling this court to nd out whether the case falls under the
exceptions allowing it to review factual findings of the Court of Appeals. 156 Thus:
The preliminary question which poses itself in connection with this rst
assignment of error is whether this Court may make its own ndings of fact
independently of those made by the Court of Appeals. The general rule is that
the appellate court's ndings are conclusive, but this rule is not without some
recognized exceptions, such as:
(1) When the conclusion is a nding grounded entirely on
speculations, surmises or conjectures; (2) when the inference is
manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is a
grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts; (5) when the ndings of fact are
con icting; (6) when the Court of Appeals, in making its ndings,
went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to
the admissions of both appellant and appellee.
Several circumstances compelled us to go into the record of this case in
order to nd out whether or not it falls within the exceptions above stated : rst,
the ndings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court;
second, said ndings are in the nature of conclusions, without citation of the
speci c evidences on which they are based; and third, the facts set forth in the
petition as well as in the petitioners' main and reply briefs, with the
corresponding references to the record, are not disputed by the respondents.
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 These facts are necessary for a clear understanding and proper resolution of the
issue of rescission in this case. 157 (Emphasis supplied)
The three (3) circumstances in Garcia that compelled this court to look into the
records of the case to determine whether an exception exists were then included as
exceptions to the rule in Tolentino v. De Jesus 158 and subsequent cases. 159 In
Remalante v. Tibe, 160 this court, in a footnote, discussed:
In Sacay v. Sandiganbayan, the Court enumerated four more exceptions:
. . . (7) the ndings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the
trial court; (8) said ndings of fact are conclusions without citation of speci c
evidence on which they are based; (9) the facts set forth in the petition as well
as in the petitioners' main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents;
(10) the nding of fact of the Court of Appeals is premised on the supposed
absence of evidence and is contradicted by the evidence on record.
However, in Garcia, the Court considered exception Nos. 7, 8 and 9 as
circumstances that, taken together, compelled it to go into the record of the case
in order to nd out whether or not it fell within any of the six established
exceptions.
On the other hand, exception No. 10 may be considered as an illustration
of the fourth exception — that the judgment is based on a misapprehension of
facts. 161
Petitioner failed to show why the factual ndings of the Court of Appeals are
without any basis. Petitioner does not dispute the tax declarations relied upon by the
Court of Appeals. Instead, petitioner insists that the testimony of Antonio Gonzales
should be given weight despite the valid and substantial basis provided by the Court of
Appeals to nd otherwise. She still failed to clarify and explain the anomaly between
Antonio Gonzales' testimony on the purchase price of the shpond sold to Precillano
Gonzales Development Corporation and the provision on the purchase price in the Deed
of Sale presented.
We do not nd any compelling reason to review the factual ndings of the Court
of Appeals. It is time for this long dispute that has vexed both parties to be nally laid
to rest.
WHEREFORE , the Petition for Review is DENIED .
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, Brion, Del Castillo and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Footnotes

1. Rules of Court, Rule 45, sec. 1.

2. Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Leobrera , 461 Phil. 461, 469 (2003) [Per J. Ynares-
Santiago, Special First Division].
3. Rollo, pp. 10-25.
4. Id. at 26-40. The case was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 73060. The Decision was penned by
Associate Justice Magdangal M. de Leon and concurred in by Associate Justices
Salvador J. Valdez, Jr. (Chair) and Mariano C. Del Castillo (now an Associate Justice
of this court) of the Eighth Division.
5. Id. at 41-42. The Resolution was penned by Associate Justice Magdangal M. de Leon and
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 concurred in by Associate Justices Mariano C. Del Castillo (Chair) and Arturo D. Brion
(now an Associate Justice of this court) of the Special Former Eighth Division.
6. Id. at 39, Court of Appeals Decision.

7. The names of the other respondents are not indicated in the rollo or in the lower courts'
records.

8. RTC records, p. 18, Court of Appeals Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 15902.

9. Id.
10. Id. at 18-19.
11. Id.

12. Rollo, p. 29, Court of Appeals Decision. The case was docketed as CA-G.R. No. 62252-R.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 30.
15. Id. at 27.
16. Id.

17. Id. The case was docketed as CA-G.R. No. 07052-R.

18. Id.

19. Id.

20. Id. at 28.

21. Id.

22. Id.
23. Id.

24. Id.

25. Id.
26. Id.

27. Id.
28. Id.

29. Id.

30. RTC records pp. 18-30. The case was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 15902. The Decision
was penned by Associate Justice Hector L. Ho leña and concurred in by Associate
Justices Pedro A. Ramirez and Cancio C. Garcia of the Eighth Division.

31. Rollo, pp. 28-29, Court of Appeals Decision.

32. RTC records, p. 20.

33. Rollo, pp. 28-29, Court of Appeals Decision.

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 34. Id. at 29.

35. Id.
36. Id. at 30.

37. Id.

38. Id. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 7442-M.
39. Id.

40. Id. at 31.

41. Id.; RTC records, p. 22, Court of Appeals Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 15902. The case was
docketed as CA-G.R. No. 19179.

42. RTC records, pp. 22-23, Court of Appeals Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 15902.

43. Id. at 23.

44. Id. at 21-22.

45. Id. at 22.

46. Id.

47. Id. at 18.

48. Id. at 18-30. The case was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 15902. The Decision was penned
by Associate Justice Hector L. Hofileña and concurred in by Associate Justices Pedro
A. Ramirez and Cancio C. Garcia of the Eighth Division.

49. Id. at 24-27.

50. Id. at 29.

51. Id.

52. Id.
53. Id. at 34.

54. Id.

55. Id. at 35.

56. Id. at 36.

57. Rollo, p. 43, Regional Trial Court Decision. The witnesses were "Silvestre Pascual, the son
of the former owner of the property and a shpond operator himself, Guillermo
Samonte, a shpond caretaker of Lito Samonte and a former shpond caretaker of
Antonio Gonzales at Taliptip, Bulacan, Bulacan, and Atty. Antonio Gonzales, the
former President of Prescillano Gonzales Development Corporation."

58. Id. at 44. The witnesses were "Policarpio A. [d]ela Cruz, the son of one of the heirs, Patricia
de los [sic] Reyes, the great grandniece of plaintiff Benito Burgos and Antonio
Magpayo[,] Jr., the Municipal Assesor [sic] of Bulacan, Bulacan."
59. Id.

60. Id. at 43.

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 61. Id. at 44.
62. Id.

63. Id.
64. Id.

65. Prescillano (Id. at 43) and Precillano (Id. at 45) are used interchangeably in the records.

66. Id. at 45.

67. RTC records, pp. 94-97.

68. Rollo, pp. 44-45, Regional Trial Court Decision.

69. RTC records, p. 96, Deed of Absolute Sale.

70. Rollo, p. 45, Regional Trial Court Decision.

71. Id.
72. Id. at 45-46.

73. Id. at 46.

74. Id. at 45.

75. Id.

76. Id. at 46.

77. RTC records, p. 107.

78. Id.

79. Id. at 109.

80. Id.

81. Id.
82. Rollo, p. 46, Regional Trial Court Decision.

83. Id.

84. RTC records, p. 129.

85. Id.

86. Id. at 128.

87. Id.

88. Id. at 128.

89. Rollo, p. 47, Regional Trial Court Decision.

90. Id.

91. Id.
92. The Decision was penned by Judge Manuel R. Ortiguerra of Branch 8 of the Regional Trial
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 Court of Malolos, Bulacan.

93. Rollo, p. 48, Regional Trial Court Decision.

94. Id.

95. Id.
96. Id.

97. Id. at 26, Court of Appeals Decision.

98. Id. at 39.

99. Id. at 33.

100. Id. at 33 and 39.

101. Id. at 35.

102. Id.

103. Id.
104. Id.

105. Id. at 37.

106. Id. at 38.

107. Id.

108. Id.
109. Id. at 36.

110. Id.

111. Id. at 39.

112. Id. at 41-42, Court of Appeals Resolution.

113. Id. at 63, Supreme Court Resolution dated June 26, 2006.
114. Id. at 76-82.

115. Id. at 87, Supreme Court Resolution dated November 29, 2006.

116. Id. at 93-94.

117. RULES OF COURT, Rule 45, sec. 6.

118. RULES OF COURT, Rule 45, sec. 6.

119. RULES OF COURT, Rule 45, sec. 1.

120. Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Embroidery and Garments Industries (Phil.), Inc. ,
364 Phil. 541, 546 (1999) [Per J. Pardo, First Division].
121. Siasat v. Court of Appeals , 425 Phil. 139, 145 (2002) [Per J. Pardo, First Division];
Tabaco v. Court of Appeals, 239 Phil. 485, 490 (1994) [Per J. Bellosillo, First Division];
a n d Padilla v. Court of Appeals , 241 Phil. 776, 781 (1988) [Per J. Paras, Second
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 Division].

122. Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Leobrera , 461 Phil. 461, 469 (2003) [Per J. Ynares-
Santiago, Special First Division].
123. 269 Phil. 225 (1990) [Per J. Bidin, Third Division].

124. Id. at 232.

125. Dichoso, Jr. v. Marcos , G.R. No. 180282, April 11, 2011, 647 SCRA 495, 501-502 [Per J.
Nachura, Second Division] and Spouses Caoili v. Court of Appeals , 373 Phil. 122, 132
(1999) [Per J. Gonzaga-Reyes, Third Division].

126. Go v. Court of Appeals , 474 Phil. 404, 411 (2004) [Per J. Ynares-Santiago, First Division]
and Arriola v. Pilipino Star Ngayon, Inc. , G.R. No. 175689, August 13, 2014, 732 SCRA
656, 673 [Per J. Leonen, Third Division].
127. Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Embroidery and Garments Industries (Phil.), Inc. ,
364 Phil. 541, 546-547 (1999) [Per J. Pardo, First Division].

128. Macayan, Jr. v. People , G.R. No. 175842, March 18, 2015
<http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2015/march2015/175842.pdf> 9 [Per J.
Leonen, Second Division]; Benito v. People , G.R. No. 204644, February 11, 2015
<http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?
le=/jurisprudence/2015/february2015/204644.pdf> 7 [Per J. Leonen, Second
Division].

129. Republic v. Ortigas and Company Limited Partnership , G.R. No. 171496, March 3, 2014,
717 SCRA 601, 613 [Per J. Leonen, Third Division] and Cirtek Employees Labor Union-
Federation of Free Workers v. Cirtek Electronics, Inc. , 665 Phil. 784, 788 (2011) [Per J.
Carpio Morales, Third Division].

130. Republic v. Ortigas and Company Limited Partnership , G.R. No. 171496, March 3, 2014,
717 SCRA 601, 612 [Per J. Leonen, Third Division].
131. Rollo, p. 23, Petition.

132. Id. at 20.

133. Id. at 21.

134. Borlongan v. Madrideo , 380 Phil. 215, 223 (2000) [Per J. De Leon, Jr., Second Division]:
"In civil cases the burden of proof to be established by preponderance of evidence is
on the plaintiff who is the party asserting the af rmative of an issue. He has the
burden of presenting evidence required to obtain a favorable judgment, and he,
having the burden of proof, will be defeated if no evidence were given on either side."
135. Rollo, p. 21, Petition.

136. Id. at 22.

137. Id.

138. Id. at 77, Comment.

139. United Coconut Planters Bank v. Looyuko , 560 Phil. 581, 591-592 (2007) [Per J. Austria-
Martinez, Third Division].
140. 95 Phil. 453 (1954) [Per J. Concepcion, En Banc].
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 141. Id. at 461.
142. Rollo, p. 22, Petition.

143. 236 Phil. 566 (1987) [Per J. Padilla, Second Division].

144. Id. at 573.

145. Id.

146. 399 Phil. 131 (2000) [Per J. Mendoza, Second Division].

147. 390 Phil. 449 (2000) [Per J. Gonzaga-Reyes, En Banc].

148. People v. Vitancur , 399 Phil. 131, 133 (2000) [Per J. Mendoza, Second Division] and
People v. Mendez, 390 Phil. 449, 454 (2000) [Per J. Gonzaga-Reyes, En Banc].
149. Rollo, pp. 37-38, Court of Appeals Decision.

150. Id. at 36-37.

151. G.R. No. 95909, August 16, 1991, 200 SCRA 751 [Per J. Gancayco, First Division].
152. Id. at 755.

153. Fernan v. Court of Appeals, 260 Phil. 594, 598-599 (1990) [Per J. Narvasa, First Division].

154. 144 Phil. 615 (1970) [Per J. Makalintal, En Banc].

155. Medina v. Mayor Asistio, Jr., 269 Phil. 225, 232 (1990) [Per J. Bidin, Third Division].

156. Garcia, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al. , 144 Phil. 615, 619 (1970) [Per J. Makalintal, En
Banc].
157. Id. at 618-619, citing Roque v. Buan, et al., 128 Phil. 738, 746-747 (1967) [Per J. Angeles,
En Banc]; Ramos, et al. v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. of the Phils., et al. , 125 Phil. 701,
704 (1967) [Per J. J. P. Bengzon, En Banc]; and Hilario v. The City of Manila, et al. ,
128 Phil. 100, 101 (1967) [Per J. J. P. Bengzon, En Banc].
158. 155 Phil. 144, 151 (1974) [Per J. Makasiar, First Division].

159. Sacay v. Sandiganbayan , 226 Phil. 496, 512 (1986) [Per J. Feria, En Banc] and AMA
Computer College-East Rizal, et al. v. Ignacio , 608 Phil. 436, 454 (2009) [Per J. Chico-
Nazario, Third Division].
160. 241 Phil. 930 (1988) [Per J. Cortes, En Banc].

161. Id. at 936, citing Sacay v. Sandiganbayan , 226 Phil. 496, 512 (1986) [Per J. Feria, En
Banc]; Garcia, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al. , 144 Phil. 615, 619 (1970) [Per J.
Makalintal, En Banc]; and Salazar v. Gutierrez, et al. , 144 Phil. 233, 239 (1970) [Per J.
Makalintal, En Banc].

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