Aerofax - Bell Boeing V-22 Osprey - Tiltrotor Tactical Transport PDF
Aerofax - Bell Boeing V-22 Osprey - Tiltrotor Tactical Transport PDF
Y-22 Osprey
Tiltrotor Tactical Transport
Bill Norton
Bell Boeing
V·22 Osprey
Tiltrotor Tactical Transport
Bill Norton
An imprint of
Ian Allan Publishing
Bell Boeing V·22 Osprey
© 2004 William J Norton
Contents
ISBN 1 85780 165 2
__--ll
3
4
Introduction
5
3
3
,1
5
,1
,9
o
2
,
a
At time of writing the US Marine Corps MV-22B provide more than enough fascinating aviation Acknowledgements
Osprey tiltrotor aircraft had yet to enter full-rate history to fill this volume. A review of tiltrotor Many individuals gave generously of their time
production or deployment. This was the status flight technology offers a view into one of the and collected materials to help make this book
following nearly two decades of development few VSTOL approaches to be taken so far along possible. At Bell Helicopter Textron this
and flight test that saw marked changes to the the development path. The technology is not included Roy Hopkins II, Chuck Jacobus, Bob
vehicle, vacillations in Congressional and new, and a look at the predecessor vehicles Leder, Bob McClure, and Dick Peasley. Of the
Administration support despite steadfast reveals the long development path leading to Boeing Company thanks go to Phil Dunford,
USMC dedication to the machine, and three the Osprey. The struggle to realize a military Doug Kinneard, Jim Jagodzinski, Bill Leonard,
fatal accidents, Opinions about the Osprey application through multiple programs and the other Bill Norton, and Marty Shubert. From
throughout the aviation field was similarly conceptual designs emphasizes the vagaries the US Navy the author is grateful for support
divided between those who saw the tiltrotor as of the US Department of Defense weapon sys- from Ward Carroll, Gidge Dady, and Linda
an aeronautical advance that would surely tem acquisition process. The development of Drew. Marines who assisted include Lieutenant
come with sacrifices in treasure and lives, and the V-22 itself, marked by drawn-out sched- Colonel 'Curly' Culp and Major Chris Seymour.
those who saw a complex, expensive and dan- ules, up-and-down budgets, industry teaming, From the US Air Force debt is owed to lieu-
gerous craft unsuitable for military employ- crises and triumphs, is remarkable in that it pro- tenant Colonel Tom Currie, Major Tom Good-
ment. The controversy recalled the furor over duced a vehicle of such capability. So poten- nough, Major Greg Weber, and John Haire.
the introduction of the AV-8A Harrier into USMC tially significant is the Osprey in military aviation Marty Maisel, formerly of NASA Ames, was
service decades before. Both offered highly that it has spawned the US Air Force CV-22B especially helpful. Thanks also to retired Bell
desirable Vertical or Short Takeoff and Landing special operations variant, concepts of follow- test pilot Ned Gilliand. Jay Miller and the
(VSTOL) enhancements to the Marines' arse- on designs, experimental uninhabited air vehi- archivists at the Jay Miller Collection provided
nal in fUlfilling their challenging mission. Yet, cles, and made possible a long-dreamed of indispensable help. A special thanks to the late
both aircraft represented new technology that civil tiltrotor. In short, the significant and already John Schneider, formerly of Boeing Vertol,
was met with a mixture of suspicion and the considerable history of the V-22 Osprey more Michael Hirschberg of Vertiflite magazine, and
need to learn the best means of operation and than justifies a book on the subject. Ken Katz.
employment. If the history of the Osprey continues, this
Although the history of the Osprey may be book can be updated in the future. Feedback,
short - provided it continues into full-rate pro- research material, and additional photographs Bill Norton
duction and service - the story of its lineage, are welcome. Contact the author at william nor- January 2004
development, flight test, and characteristics [email protected].
V-22 Osprey 3
Abbreviations and Designations
A Amperage GTA ground test article NBC nuclear, biological and chemical
AC alternating current GW gross weight nm nautical mile
ale aircraft helo helicopter No number
AEW airborne early warning HF high frequency NOE Nap-of-the-Earth
AFB Air Force Base HIFR Hover In-Flight Refueling NORM normal
AFCS Automatic Flight Control System hp horsepower Nr rotor speed
AFFTC Air Force Flight Test Center HROD high rate of descent NVG night vision goggles
AFSOC Air Force Special Operations Command hrs hours " OAT outside air temperature
amp amperage HSD Horizontal Situation Display OBOGS On-Board Oxygen Generating System
AMT Air Maneuver Transport HSX Helicopter Sea eXperimental OGE out of ground effect
AOA angle of attack HUD head-up display OLC Opposed Lateral Cyclic
APLN airplane mode H-V height-velocity OPEVAL operational evaluation
APU auxiliary power unit H/WOG Hoist/Winch Operator's Grip OT operational test
AR aerial refueling HX Helicopter eXperimental Pax Patuxent River NAS
ASW anti-submarine warfare HXM Helicopter eXperimental Marines PFCS primary flight control system
ATV Air Test Vehicle Hz Hertz PRGB proprotor gearbox
aux auxiliary ICDS interconnected drive shaft PRTV Production Representative Test Vehicles
AVSS Active Vibration Suppression System ICS inter-communication system psf pounds per square foot
BFWS blade fold/wing stow IFF Identification Friend or Foe psi pounds per square inch
bhp brake horsepower IGE in ground effect PU/SS pitch-up with sideslip
BIT built-in test IMC instrument meteorological conditions P&W Pratt & Whitney
BuNo Bureau Number in inches P'I preplanned product improvement
C Centigrade IOC initial operational capability QTR Quad TiltRotor
cal caliber IOT&E Initial Operational Test and Evaluation RADALT radar altimeter
CAP Composite Aircraft Program IPS Ice Protection System RAF Royal Air Force
CAT cabin aux tanks IR infrared RAM reliability, availability and maintainability
CDU/EICAS Control Display Unit/Engine, Instruments, IRS Infrared Suppressor rev revolution
Crew Alerting System IT integrated testing RFP request for proposal
CFB Canadian Forces Base In Integrated Test Team RM&A reliability, maintainability and availability
cg center of gravity JSOR Joint Services Operational Requirements rpm revolutions per minute
c/n construction number JTAG Joint Technology Assessment Group RSI Radar Signal Indicator
COD carrier onboard delivery JVX Joint services advanced Vertical lift aircraft R&D research and development
COEA Operational Effectiveness Analysis (eXperimental) SAR search and rescue
CFG constant frequency generators kg kilogram SATCOM satellite communications
em centimeter km kilometer SCAS Stability and Control Augmentation System
CMDS countermeasures dispensing system kts knots SCP set clearance plane
CONV conversion mode kVA kilovolt-amps SOC shaft driven compressor
CSAR combat search and rescue kW kilo-Watts sec seconds
CSMU Crash Survivable Memory Unit Ib pounds SEMA Special Electronic Mission Aircraft
DC direct current LCD liquid crystal display SEO single engine operating
DMS Digital Map System LOS Laser Detector Set sfc specific fuel consumption
DoD Department of Defense LHA Amphibious Assault Ship (General Purpose) shp shaft horsepower
DoN Department of the Navy LHD Amphibious Assault Ship (Multi-purpose) SIRFC Suite of Radio Frequency
DT development test LPD Amphibious Transports Dock Countermeasures
DU Display Unit LPI low probability of intercept SOCOM Special Operations Command
EAPS Engine Air Particle Separator LRIP low-rate initial production SOF special operations forces
ECL Engine Condition Lever LSD Dock Landing Ships SPECOPS special operations
ECS environmental control system It liters STA static test articles
ECU Environmental Control Unit LTM Lateral Translation Mode STO short takeoff
EMC electromagnetic compatibility LWINS Light Weight Inertiai NaVigation System STOL short takeoff and landing
EMD Engineering and Manufacturing LZ landing zone TA terrain-avoidance
Development m meters TAGB tilt-axis gearbox
EW electronic warfare MAn Multi-mission Advanced Tactical Terminal TCL thrust control lever
F Fahrenheit MAW Marine Air Wing TF terrain following
FADEC FUll-Authority Digital Electronic Control max maximum TF/TA terrain following/terrain-avoidance
FBW fly-by-wire MC Mission Computers TARA Tilt Rotor Research Aircraft
FCC flight control computers MCAS Marine Corps Air Station UAV uninhabited air vehicle
FD Flight Director MDL mission data loader UHF ultra-high frequency
FUR Forward-Looking Infrared MFD multi-function display US United States
fit flight MFS Manned Flight Simulator USAF United States Air Force
FM frequency modulated mi statute mile USCG United States Coast Guard
FMU Fuel Management Unit min minimum USgal US gallons
FOV field of view MLR Medium-Lift Replacement USMC United States Marine Corps
fpm feet per minute mm millimeter USN United States Navy
fps feet per second MMR multi-mode radar VAC volts alternating current
FRP full-rate production MOn Multi-service Operational Test Team VERTREP vertical resupply
FS federal standard mps meters per second VFG variable frequency generators
FSD Full-Scale Development MTE Modern Technology Demonstrator Engine VHF very high frequency
ft feet MWGB midwing gearbox V/HXM Helicopter eXperimental Marines
FTR Future Transport Rotorcraft MWS Missile Warning System VRS vortex ring state
FY Fiscal Year NAS Naval Air Station VSS vibration suppression system
G acceleration due to gravity NASA National Aeronautics and Space VSLED Vibration, Structural Life,
GAO General Accounting Office Administration and Engine Diagnostic
GFE government furnished equipment nav navigation VSTOL Vertical or Short Takeoff and Landing,
GRDP ground refuel/defuel panel NAVAIR Naval Air Systems Command VSTOLmode
4 V-22 Osprey
Chapter One
Origination
The military helicopter's ability to takeoff and surface is available, such an aircraft could per- Above: The V·22 is much like any other large
land vertically is of tremendous tactical utility, form a short takeoff and landing (STOL) when rotorcraft, although with twin lateral tandem
rotors. Note the slight toe·out of the nacelles.
and it is an indispensable asset in modern war- vertical takeoff is precluded by weight or ambi-
Ron Culp
fare. However, the comparatively low airspeed ent conditions. The VSTOL aircraft have safety
and altitude at which the helicopter commonly advantages over the airplane such as eliminat-
flies makes it more vulnerable to enemy fire ing or reducing high-speed ground rolls for rotor system and, where present, a tail rotor.
than airplanes. The helicopter is typically con- takeoff and landing, and executing off-field Airplane flight control relies on deflecting sur-
strained to a service ceiling of around 10,000- emergency landings into a confined space. On faces against the passing air mass, requiring
20,OOOft (3,050-6,1 OOm), usually preventing it the other hand, VSTOL aircraft frequently have forward velocity. A VSTOL aircraft cannot use
from flying above weather. In fact, the all- little power margin and an engine failure while airplane controls in hover and the slow-speed
around performance of the helicopter is com- in hover or slow flight, even for a multi-engine end of conversion and reconversion. A rotor or
monly less than fixed-wing, conventional machine, can mean an immediate descent at some other source of adequate control power
takeoff and landing airplanes of similar weight. perhaps high sink rate. This, however, is a com- must be available.
The tail rotor on single-rotor helicopters is a Il)only accepted characteristic of most heli- Over decades nations and corporations
marked drain on engine power, adds to aircraft copters. have invested considerably in VSTOL. A fasci-
drag and noise, and is an ever-present hazard. Many approaches to achieving VSTOL flight nating assortment of these machines have
The helicopter reached the practical limits of its have been explored. The general design been built and tested, employing Virtually all-
capabilities decades ago in terms of size, requirement is a vertical component of conceivable approaches to VSTOL flight. In the
speed and range. Because of the rotor aerody- thrust/lift greater than the weight of the aircraft US, each armed service operates transport
namics, a practical limit of 200kts is general to permit vertical takeoff and hover. Normal helicopters for aerial assault, search and res-
acknowledged for rotorwing aircraft. propulsive thrust must then be available for for- cue, and vertical replenishment. All sought the
One answer to the helicopter's limitations ward flight. The conversion between vertical to potential benefits of a VSTOL transport.
has been to combine the speed, range, forward flight must smoothly transition Through these decades only a few military
endurance, payload, maneuverability, and between the two thrust/lift generation and vec- designs, the tri-service LTV-Hiller-Ryan XC-142
superior survivability of the airplane with the toring schemes. An adequate means of attitude being one, came even close to production
vertical lift capabilities of a helicopter. The control from hover, through conversion at low before being ultimately jUdged unsuitable.
result is the Vertical or Short Takeoff and Land- speed, and at cruise airspeeds is also manda- Designs to fill other combat and support mis-
ing (VSTOL) aircraft. If even a minimal runway tory. Helicopters do all this with an articulated sions that would benefit from VSTOL have also
V-22 Osprey 5
met with limited success. Throughout the world up to 'recirculate', interacting with aircraft aero- Above: This montage shows the tiltrotor concept
only the Harrier 'jump jet' fighter-bomber, first dynamics. It may spoil lift in hover (called 'suck- from helicopter mode for takeoff and landing at
the right side, conversion to forward flight in the
flown in 1960, and the later Yakovlev Yak-38 down') and can carry ground material aloft that
middle with forward tilting of the twin proprotors,
naval fighter have seen production. However, can damage the airframe and engine. If the and high-speed airplane mode at the left with the
only the Harrier can be considered truly suc- ground plume is hot, as from a vertically ori- proprotors serving as propellers. Bell Helicopter
cessful. Admittedly, these specialized aircraft ented engine exhaust, the recirculate air
are inferior to comparable warplanes in nearly ingested into the engine(s) ('reingestion') will Below left: This generalized diagram compares
the V-22's speed-altitude flight envelope with that
all respects save for their VSTOL capability. Yet produce a reduction in thrust. The high tem-
of a common tactical transport helicopter and
they represent useful systems in a mix of mod- peratures can also have detrimental effects on airplane, the Sikorsky H-60 and Lockheed C-130.
ern air combat weapons. other aircraft components. The generation of The tiltrotor nicely encompasses helicopter
There are decisive reasons why VSTOL has high velocity air is commonly accompanied by and airplane capabilities. Author's collection
almost always proven disappointing. The very high noise levels; annoying and possibly
Below right: A short takeoff (STO) has the
weight and cost penalties are usually too great, hazardous to personnel and aircraft structure
nacelles at about 60° and the pilots rotate at
resulting in expensive machines with marginal given long exposure. the appropriate airspeed. NAVAIR
performance when compared with helicopters Achieving VSTOL is a matter of engineering
and fixed-wing aircraft. The large excess power and performance tradeoffs, and the tiltrotor
required for hover has required a high thrust- generally sacrifices less for its benefit than lage naturally cancel the opposing rotor
to-weight ratio. The propulsion system has fre- other VSTOL concepts. The best use of the torques to eliminate the tail rotor. Hover perfor-
quently represented a disproportionate per- tiltrotor has generally appeared to be as a mance is not as great as a helicopter with its
centage of the vehicle's empty weight for a medium-lift transport where moderately high larger rotor diameter, but this sacrifice is
reduction in range and payload, plus adding cruise airspeeds are required, yet also needing accepted for the comparatively high cruise air-
considerably to the machine's cost, complex- to make several stops with brief low speed and speed. For APLN, flight control surfaces on the
ity, and maintenance demands. Hover perfor- hovering operations. wing and tail take effect as airspeed increases
mance has generally been poor, characterized following conversion.
by very high fuel consumption. The conversion The Tiltrotor The maximum speed of the tiltrotor is much
from vertical to forward flight and back again Most tiltrotor designs have the proprotors and greater than a comparable helicopter, and with
has also been a challenging stability and con- engines together in rotating wingtip nacelles. similarly improved endurance. The tradeoff is
trol problem, complicated by a narrow conver- The basic scheme is that the aircraft takes off typically slower cruise speeds than an airplane
sion corridor for some configurations. The as a helicopter (referred to as 'helicopter mode' of comparable weight and power. In VSTOL the
conversion corridor is the range of acceptable or VSTOL) with the two rotors/nacelles vertical airspeed upper limits are still defined by rotor
thrust vector angle as a function of airspeed. or 90°. These are then rotated forward to 0° for overstress and retreating blade stall. In APLN
Operational problems have also been conversion to high-speed wing-borne flight the low speed limits are set by wing stall, with the
endemic to many VSTOL designs. Many are ('airplane mode', APLN). Hence, the 'proprotor' propeller wash over the wing helping to reduce
characterized by high velocity columns of air, blades and hub serve dual use as helicopter this speed. The prop slipstream also helps to
called downwash, hitting the surface beneath rotors and airplane propellers. The counter- ensure adequate flow into the engine intake
the aircraft during vertical takeoff and landing. rotating proprotors on either side of the fuse- even at extreme attitudes and low airspeed.
This can cause surface erosion with high-
energy bits potentially striking and damaging
the aircraft or nearby personnel and equip-
ment. This air will spread out along the ground
as a ground plume or ground wash as another
potential hazard. Additionally, this air can rising
V-22 Performance
30,000
25,000
ALTITUDE
(FEET)
200 300
AIRSPEED (KNOTS)
6 V-22 Osprey
Above: A modest forward tilt of the nacelles and simultaneously for disk lift variation to change the aircraft to accelerate and decelerate.
a short ground roll allows takeoff at gross altitude or hover, but power only in APlN. The In some areas of the airspeed and nacelle
weights or ambient conditions that would
TCl commands symmetric rotor or mast angle conversion corridor the choice of control
preclude a vertical takeoff. Ron Culp
torque in both VSTOl and APlN. technique can be uncertain. The 30° nacelle
Below right: The value of the level deck angle As the aircraft accelerates through high- setting at the lower end of the acceptable air-
possible with the tiltrotor during transition to speed conversion, the controls change their speed for that angle is one such ambiguous
forward flight is graphically illustrated here. functions and the pilot's control strategy has to condition in then V-22, and accompanied by
Aircraft 10, during its 'return to flight' on 29 May
progressively change to resemble that of a airframe buffet. However, pilots are trained to
2003, converts effortlessly while the SH-60
safety chase helicopter beyond assumes a conventional fixed-wing aircraft. In APlN the use a few nacelle settings and certain air-
marked nose-down attitude to keep up - the rudder pedals produce yaw while the stick speeds during transition to help avoid confu-
rotors of the two aircraft nearly parallel. Navy becomes a climb, dive and roll rate controller, sion. The tiltrotor normally spends little time in
moving the ailerons/flaperons and an elevator. transition.
The TCl input (power) is used as a simple throt- The conversion is begun at an airspeed at
The cockpit controls serve common func- tle to set the longitudinal thrust while longitudi- which the wing is gaining in lift as the rotor lift
tions regardless of flight mode. In hover and nal stick is used to manage the aircraft energy decreases with tilt angle. This airspeed must
low speed flight, with the nacelles tilted near state by increasing or decreasing the flight path also be such that the wing and tail control sur-
vertical, the collective (or thrust control lever, angle at relatively constant speed, or allowing faces are sufficiently effective to control the air-
Tel) and cyclic (stick) provided familiar heli-
copter functions, and the proprotors employ
helicopter control mechanization. lateral cyclic
for roll and translation (sideward flight) com-
mands change in proprotor blade pitch angles
as they come around in rotation. This produces
either a sideways tilting of the rotor disks due to
asymmetrical proprotor lift, or differential col-
lective pitch (uniform but opposed blade angle
change on each proprotor for differential lift) , or
a mix of both side-to-side. Pitch control from
longitudinal cyclic displacement gives fore and
aft tilting of the rotor disks. For rearward trans-
lation, aft cyclic also brings the elevator up to
keep the tail from dropping due to airflow pro-
ducing a down tail load. In either axis the cyclic
produces increasing rate depending upon the
magnitude of displacement. Directional (yaw)
control with pedals uses differential cyclic pitch-
the rotor disks tilting differentially forward and
aft to produce a flat rotation about the vertical
axis. In VSTOL the TCl commands proprotor
collective (uniform) pitch and engine power
V-22 Osprey 7
Both pages: This series of drawings and notes
illustrates how the tiltrotor is controlled in flight
A
through the pilot thrust control lever, cyclic
•
Helicopter Airplane (stick) and directional pedals. A. Thrust Control
(power); B. Forward Cyclic; C. Aft Cyclic; D •
Lateral Cyclic (right); E. Pedal (left)
Bell Helicopter
8 V-22 Osprey
engines and thrust generation devices for ver-
tical, STOL, conversion, and cruise flight are D
the same. It combines well understood heli-
Helicopter Airplane
copter and airplane technologies. The tiltrotor
Differential collective
usually has a more generous conversion corri-
~
dor. The high-speed end of the corridor is
defined by prohibitive rotor and nacelle/wing
interface loads. The low-speed boundary is
usually detelmined by wing stall. The tiltrotor is
generally easier to stabilize than other configu-
rations, especially during conversion and
Left proprotor Increases
reconversion where both the helicopter and air- colleclive pitch
Left flaperon deflects downward
plane controls are available to greater or lesser Right proprotor decreases
collective pitch Right f1aperon deflects upward
degrees as airspeed changes. Turn perfor- Aircraft rolls to right
Proprotor discs tilt to right
mance across its speed range is superior to the
Aircraft rolls to right
helicopter.
The airplane configuration allows the tiltrotor
to be flown to altitudes far above that of a heli-
copter, or more comparable with turboprop air- upper wing surface underlying the rotors is the When close to the ground, the ground wash
craft. This allows flight above weather whereas opposite of that desired for lift, robbing the air- is comparable to that of a heavy lift helicopter.
a helicopter would be grounded, forced to craft of potential payload capacity. The flow on When close to the ground the meeting of the
divert, or fly in adverse conditions under the the wing moves inboard, meeting and foun- outwash from the opposite rotors under the
weather. The exterior noise during hover and taining up at the center to be recirculated centerline of the aircraft fountain up to impinge
transition is about that of a heavy helicopter through the rotors for a loss in rotor lift. These on the fuselage bottom and add to lift force.
and much less noisy than nearly all other effects can be reduced with deployed flaps, This flow is also directed forward and aft of the
VSTOL designs. In APLN the tiltrotor is quieter wing fences, and wing design choices. The aircraft, and can lift dust and other material to
than a turboprop aircraft by virtue of its lower leading edge-to-trailing edge directions of pro- obscure vision, although peripheral vision
proprotor tip speed, and only a three quarters protor rotation also reduces download. As the remains good. The ground plume can recircu-
the level of a helicopter - and without the dis- aircraft begins to move forward the rotor down- late and produce some loss of performance,
tinctive 'whop' - enhancing military covertness. wash is 'blown' aft such that as little as 20kts is although the high engine inlets on tilted
Vibration levels in APLN, where the aircraft required to SUbstantially reduce download. nacelles may reduce this effect. The jet exhaust
spends most of its time, is SUbstantially less Fuel, hydraulics, and electrical connections directly impinging on the ground raises surface
than in VSTOL, reducing component wear and must pass through the rotating nacelle inter- and aircraft lower extremities heating concerns.
failure rates. face that is an added maintenance burden However, the heating is much less than other
In the conversion to forward flight, flight at potentially impacting overall system reliability. VSTOL concepts and, combined with the com-
intermediate nacelle angles, and approach to The wingtip nacelles increase aircraft roll and paratively low velocity proprotor downwash,
hover the tiltrotor's deck angle can be main- yaw inertia, requiring more control power for represents an acceptably 'soft footprint'. Fur-
tained level or at a nose-low attitude for some maneuvers in all flight modes. Con- thermore, extended hovers at greater height
improved visibility. This is accomplished with versely, with the proprotors far removed from than comparable helicopters can help amelio-
thrust vectoring independent of aircraft attitude the fuselage, considerable control power is rate such concerns.
by using cyclic opposite the proprotor tilt angle available in VSTOL. Placing the engine far out- One of the greatest flight safety concerns
(for example, aft stick for a forward tilt). The heli- board somewhat reduces the risk to occupants with the tiltrotor has been engine-out landing.
copter must raise its nose dramatically to from engine fires and turbine bursts. For a single engine failure in a twin-engine tilt-
rapidly bleed speed in the approach to hover.
This is where the windows at the helicopter
Helicopler Airplane
pilot's feet become most important in maintain- E Rudder
Differential longitudinal cyclic
ing sight of the landing zone. The same is true
for the acceleration to forward flight. The heli-
copter must point its nose down, sometimes
considerably, to affect a rapid acceleration. The
prop rotor tilt also helps to make upslope and
downslope landings safer. The rotor disk can
be kept level to maximize longitudinal cyclic
authority to handle gusts and unexpected dis-
turbances, while the deck angle is made to
match the slope.
The principal penalties of the tiltrotor are
found in the weight and complexity of added
gearboxes, tilt mechanisms, and cross shaft-
ing, all contributing to increased unit and sup-
port costs. The issue of the rotor downwash or
download on the wing and fuselage in heli-
copter mode is an endemic tiltrotor concern
and one of the primary hurdles to achieving
• Right prop rotor disc tilts forward • Rudders deflect to the left
good hover performance. A reduction of just • Left proprotor disc lilts aft • Aircraft yaws left
1% in download can add 500 lb (225kg) of pay- • Aircraft yaws left
load. The outflow of the rotors impinging on the
V-22 Osprey 9
Left: The tiltrotor flight control effectors are
shown here, with both helicopter and airplane
elements being used throughout the envelope to
various degrees. Bell Helicopter
Airplane control
• Full·span control surfaces Helicopter control tions. Should the proprotors stop turning prior
• Combination flap/aileron (flaperon)
• Proprotor blades are primary flight control to reaching helicopter modes - a remote pos-
• Rudder
• Thrust Control lever (TCl) is throttle and collective pilch
• Elevator sibility unless the pilot makes a profound error-
the aircraft will come down quite fast and have
to execute a landing like an unpowered air-
rotor, the hazard is no more severe than with plane, respectively. For a horizontal landing, plane, possibly with proprotor blades below the
any other large multiengine rotorcraft, and the the approach and landing performance with bottom of the aircraft.
V-22 has comparatively good single engine the small, highly loaded wing would not com- With the proprotors in helicopter mode dur-
operating (SEO) performance under most con- pare with the engine-out characteristics of a ing an unpowered approach and landing, the
ditions. Where conditions such as gross weight comparable airplane. Also, the rotors must be aircraft nose is pitched down to ensure maxi-
(GW) and ambient temperatures present suffi- brought up enough to prevent a proprotor mum upflow through the rotors and 100% rotor
cient thrust margin to hold a hover, a common strike. However, the V-22 composite blades speed. Flaps are set to ensure adequate wing
SEO landing can be made. If performance would simply delaminate to 'broomstraw' if lift. Even if all goes well, the tiltrotor has quite
offers little or no hover capability, a forced land- striking the ground, reducing the hazard of marginal autorotation capabilities. However,
ing must be executed as it would for a heli- high-energy debris. The aircraft would still likely autorotation is not a principal design condition
copter. However, the wing provides an suffer substantial damage, but personnel injury for the proprotors because of the very low prob-
advantageous glide ratio (ground distance would be minimized. For a vertical landing from ability of this failure state and the other hori-
covered for altitude lost) making a roll-on short airplane mode, a power-off reconversion must zontallanding option. For the V-22, the descent
landing practical if a runway or reasonably be executed prior to the forced landing. The will be very steep and the rate initially quite high
smooth surface is within reach from a safe start- proprotors will continue to turn because of the in comparison to a helicopter because of
ing altitude. The V-22's advertised glide ratio is airflow through the rotor (autorotation). higher disk loading - 3,000-4,000fpm (15-
9:1, but a more realistic number under opera- There is the danger of system failures pre- 20mps) versus 2,000-2,500fpm (1 0-13rnps).
tional conditions would be 4: 1. This is far better venting tilt of the proprotors from airplane to Delaying full reconversion to the last few sec-
than helicopters and gives a greater margin for helicopter mode, or at least moving the rotor onds before touchdown, and using the small
finding a favorable landing site. A vertical land- tips above the ground plane for a safe STOL amount of aft proprotor tilt usually available, will
ing can be accomplished, but a high sink rate landing. This risk is sufficiently reduced with tilt greatly arrest the landing sink rate. As with the
may be present when approaching the ground. axis system redundancy and backup power. helicopter, a cyclic flare and judicious collec-
However, rolling the proprotors back just prior Furthermore, during reconversion the unpow- tive application can permit a low vertical and
to landing may arrest forward velocity and sink ered proprotors pass through a point where forward velocity at landing. However, the high
rate to zero if done properly. Also, unlike a heli- there is insufficient flow to maintain rotational rate of descent will make all this a decidedly dif-
copter that must come in at an extreme pitch speed. This point (70 0 tilt for the V-22) must be ficult proposition, with the final actions required
attitude to arrest speed, the tiltrotor's deck transitioned quickly while energy remains in the in a split second.
angle can be level or nearly so, increasing the rotating system by using the maximum tilt rate. The tiltrotor can theoretically be set down just
likelihood of a damage-free forced landing. Also, maintaining rotation of the proprotors and as well as a helicopter executing an autorotation
For a complete power failure, the tiltrotor interconnecting drive shaft near the normal rpm landing, as demonstrated in simulation. But, a
offers the advantage of selecting either a verti- range is usually essential in energizing the STOL approach and landing combining autoro-
calor horizontal landing. However, each has electrical or hydraulics system that powers the tational and wing lift would be the safer option.
significant limitations over the helicopter or air- conversion actuators and other essential func- Another concern with the tiltrotor, or perhaps
any VSTOL aircraft, is that control or propulsion
system failures can immediately generate a
state where a catastrophic accident will result.
These would be failures producing pro-
nounced asymmetric proprotor lift or thrust.
This problem is addressed with considerable
system redundancy and built-in tests.
10 V-22 Osprey
V-22 Osprey 11
I
U,S.Mt Y
I tilt' }
12 V-22 Osprey
Chapter Two
Background
Predecessor Tiltrotors first hover flight occurred on 15 June 1954. The 30.33-ft (9.25-m) length and 31.33-ft (9.55-m)
Aircraft with tilting propellers were conceived machine made its first partial transition five wingspan. Its normal operating weight was just
early in the history of manned flight, and tilting months later, eventually flying with about 70° of 4,8001b (2, 177kg). The 450 bhp (335kW) radial
rotors soon after the advent of helicopters. rotor tilt. After over 100 flights and 23 flight engine was mounted in the fuselage and drove
Much research worldwide have yielded many hours the aircraft crashed on 20 July 1955 twin three-bladed rotors. The power was trans-
tiltrotor concepts and even construction, but before completing a full conversion. The fric- ferred to the rotors via a short shaft to a trans-
very few have actually taken flight. The devel- tion lock on the collective slipped, generating a mission gearbox and then to the wingtips via
opment presented engineering challenges steep dive and could not be recovered in time. shafts within the wing. The main transmission
requiring decades of research and technology The similarly small, 2,249-lb (1,020-kg) GW, had a two-speed gear reduction feature for
maturation, with a few experimental aircraft Model 2 Convertiplane was flown in the latter rotor speeds to be stepped down from VSTOL
built to collect data, before a practical vehicle half of 1956 with a more powerful engine. It is rpm for APLN. The shafts drove wingtip-
could be realized. believed this machine never achieved com- mounted tiltable transmissions that turned the
The first true tiltrotor aircraft to fly was built by plete conversion before the program was aban- rotor masts. The design tools of the period
the Transcendental Aircraft Corporation. Their doned in 1957. yielded blades of comparatively low efficiency
Model1-G project was helped along with some Bell Aircraft, on its way to becoming a pre- in both the VSTOL and APLN, and the aircraft
Department of Defense (000) funding. The tiny mier helicopter manufacturer, performed tiltro- soon proved quite under-powered. In fact, the
aircraft had a maximum hover GW of just tor design studies as early as the 1940s. One of aircraft could not hover out of ground effect
1,7501b (794kg) and a wingspan of 21.00ft their earliest concepts was the Model 50 Con- (OGE).
(6.40m). The rotors were powered by a single vert-O-Plane followed by the 0-79 'rotor plane' The helicopter collective side lever with throt-
reciprocating engine within the fuselage. The for a single occupant. A series of tiltrotor tle twist-grip was retained for use in both
designs followed, including the 23,1 OO-Ib VSTOL and APLN. The change from helicopter
(10,478-kg) D82A transport and 82B rescue to airplane control of the rotor hub during con-
Facing page, top left: The tiny Transcendental
'Rotorplane', and the single-engine 0-100 version was entirely mechanical. Rotor tilt was
Model1-G is shown in hover during 1954 or
1955. The two-speed reduction gearbox is research vehicle. The 0-118 Convertiplane was commanded via a 'beep' switch on the collec-
visible at the wing root and above the 160 bhp a single-engine machine with two occupants tive that operated an electric motor and actua-
Lycoming 0-290-A reciprocating engine. and a reconnaissance/observation role. These tor located in each wingtip pod. The actuators
John Schneider via Marty Maisel studies clearly indicated that such an aircraft were mechanically interconnected via cross
was feasible and could yield great utility. shafting through the wing to ensure synchro-
Facing page, top right: Transcendental's Model 2
featured 18-ft (5.5-m) diameter three-bladed Bell was in an advantageous position when nized motion even in the event of the failure of
rotors tilted with electrical actuators. The the US Air Force and Army announced the one actuator. The proprotors could be tilted
considerable wing area without flaps implies a Convertible Aircraft Program competition in through their full range in just 10 seconds or
considerable download. John Schneider via 1950. Reviews had suggested that the technol- stopped at any intermediate angle.
Marty Maisel
ogy to achieve VSTOL flight was within reach. Months of ground tests at Bell's Hurst, Texas,
Facing page, middle left: One of Bell Helicopter's The program provided funds to resolve some of plant began in early 1955 and included secur-
earliest concepts for a tiltrotor transport aircraft the more daunting engineering uncertainties, ing the aircraft to an elevated platform or 'run-
was the D82B design. This version would have and eventually produce demonstration aircraft. stand' where full tilting of the powered rotors
featured interchangeable cargo pods, the aft Three proposals were selected in 1951, includ- could be performed. Ship 1 executed its first
fairing apparently sliding forward on the
ing Bell's XV-3 Convertiplane. Acceptance of hover on 11 August 1955. Control instability
fuselage to mate-up with the cockpit section for
fight without the pod. Jay Miller Collection the company's preliminary design followed during air taxi on the 18th resulted in a hard
with funding for construction and testing of two landing and minor damage. This began a long
Facing page, middle right: At roll-out the XV-3 vehicles. struggle with control and aeroelastic instabili-
(ship 1 shown) had very clean lines, including The XV-3 accommodated two pilots in tan- ties that saw repeated changes to the aircraft
a closely cowled engine mid-fuselage, no flaps,
dem seating and two litter-borne casualties in a and long periods of ground testing. Changes
and three-bladed proprotors. Development
testing would soon yield many changes. small cabin. The test aircraft was small at only included adjustments to the rotor mast length,
Jay Miller Collection
V-22 Osprey 13
__ - -
..
Left top: Although separated by nearly three
decades, the Bell 0-223 tiltrotor concept was
remarkably like the Osprey. Its size and
engine/nacelle layout are essentially the same,
with only the cruciform tail a marked variance.
Jay Miller Collection
14 V-22 Osprey
Right: Another of Bell's many tiltrotor designs
over the decades was the 0-266 medium
transport. 000 money funded considerable
design research although the aircraft was
never developed. Jay Miller Collection
V-22 Osprey 15
for a typical 45-minute miSSion. Maximum fered from grievous controllability difficulties.
range was 435nm, although a ferry tank and Of the characteristics experienced with the
auxiliary (aux) tank was eventually devised for XV-3, some were inherent to the tiltrotor design
the cabin. The longest flight was 1,475nm. and ineVitably exhibited by the XV-15. These
The two proprotors were connected by cross included a nose-down pitching during transi-
shafting in the wing. A centerwing gearbox was tion, large variations in power-required during
required because the wing dihedral and sweep the approach to hover, and lateral instability
mandated an angle change in the cross-shaft. during IGE hover. They are characteristics of
With both engines operating, the shaft was the laterally displaced rotors, the under-lying
unloaded but for the torque needed to turn any wing, and rotor wash interacting with the hori-
accessories driven off the shaft. A one-way zontal stabilizer. As the tiltrotor climbs and
overrunning clutch in the transmission auto- accelerates during nacelle rotation, the rotor
matically disengaged a failed engine so as not IGE lift addition diminishes as wing lift
to rob the rotating system of energy. Unlike the increases. The latter effect is seldom adequate
XV-3 proprotor blades, the TRRA had broad to prevent a momentary decrease in overall lift
and highly twisted blades. A helicopter-type that requires the pilot to bring up power to pre-
collective or 'power lever' was installed to the vent a slight sinking. This effect was of less sig-
left of each pilot. A power lever switch con- nificance with the XV-15 because it had more
trolled rotor rpm, with governors reducing the excess power than the XV-3. Like the XV-3, the
rate for APLN. TRRA displayed stick force reversal at low
A 'colley hat' switch on each power lever speeds from rotor inboard tip vortices generat-
commanded tilt. Moving the switch forward ing an upload on the horizontal stabilizer, in
commanded down rotation and aft com- addition to tail buffet. The effect was mild and
included a change to an H-configuration manded up tilt. Returning the switch to the cen- acceptable. The XV-15 control system made
empennage, a GW increase, and two 1,250- ter stopped the motion. A conversion speed the aircraft much easier and pleasant to fly than
shp (932-kW) Avco Lycoming T53 engines. switch allowed either 100% nacelle tilt rate the XV-3. The control runs for tiltrotors are, by
This required a substantial change to the trans- (7.Bo/sec) or 20% (1S/sec). The nacelles could their nature, longer than a helicopter's and
mission Bell already had running on the test be rotated down to 0° and up to 95°. A second more likely to suffer lost motion and excessive
stand, but the existing rotor and blade design switch permitted the nacelles to move at 1.5 friction. The design and construction of the
was retained. In April 1973, Bell Helicopter Tex- deg/sec to discrete angles of 90°,75°,60°, and XV-15 sought to reduce such effects that had
tron was selected to carryon and build two 0°. Tilting was accomplished with a hydrauli- plagued the XV-3.
XV-15 Tilt Rotor Research Aircraft (TRRA), or cally powered actuator pivot-mounted between
theXV-15. each nacelle and the wing box beam at the
Overall length of the XV-15 was 42.1 Oft wingtips. These actuators were interconnected Top left: This photo of the XV-15 reveals the
(12.B3m) and span between the outside rotor for synchronized operation via a separate cross downwash pattern under the tiltrotor with two
tips was 57.20ft (17.40m). It had a conventional shaft and phasing gearbox in the wing to fairly quiescent zones (the survivor in the water
airplane layout, the wing possessing 6S for- ensure uniform tilt angles. The aft 5° tilt sup- floating unmolested within one) with strong
lateral flow beyond these, and powerful jets
ward sweep with trailing edge flaps and out- ported aircraft backing on the ground, assisted
along the centerline projected off the nose and
board flaperons. The reduction in planform rapid deceleration on the ground or in flight, tail. Jay Miller Collection
area in hover with lowered flaps/flaperons and higher rearward flight speed than the ± 12°
saved 6.5% lift that would have been lost to of cyclic alone could provide. Taxi speed could Bottom left: The XV-15 was one of the most
download. The lowered surfaces also be controlled via the coolie hat, with only 5° of successful experimental aircraft ever developed
and decisively demonstrated the practicality of
increased lift from upwash off the ground. The forward tilt needed for most conditions.
the tiltrotor. Its lineage with the V-22 is readily
aircraft was a bit over the anticipated empty A three-axis Stability and Control Augmenta- evident. Jay Miller Collection
weight. With this and the engine/transmission tion System (SCAS) helped reduce pilot work-
choices, the aircraft could only takeoff vertically load while improving aircraft response and Bottom right: The XV-15 was the subject of
with full fuel under optimal conditions. It had a flying qualities. However, even the SCAS and all military utility demonstrations, here during low-
level nap-of-the-earth flight during the summer
maximum of 15,000 lb (6,804kg) GW for STOL other electronic system aids deactivated the
of 1982 at Fort Huachuca, Arizona. Adorned in
takeoff and landing, and 14,250 lb (6,464kg) for aircraft could be flown with tolerable workload. combat colors, a chaff dispenser has been
vertical operations. The aircraft was intended to This was a considerable achievement given that scabbed onto the aft portion of the sponson.
carry about 1,300 lb (590kg) of test equipment many non-augmented VSTOL designs had suf- NASA via Marty Maisel
-
I\II\SI\
-
702
16 V-22 Osprey
Right: This time in a Navy finish, the XV-15
executes a landing in August 1982 aboard the
Marine amphibious assault ship USS Tripoli
(LPH-10) while underway. Nothing was found to
be markedly difficult or different from normal
helicopter shipboard operations. NASA via
Marty Maisel
V-22 Osprey 17
Left: The X-22 was a substantial departure for
Bell at 16,7551b maximum GW and four three-
bladed ducted propellers. A series of drive
shafts and transmission gearboxes, 11 in total,
ensured that all propellers would turn if any the
four engines failed. Tony Landis collection
18 V-22 Osprey
Top: Boeing Vertol did pioneering work with
wings to off-loading the rotor during helicopter
forward flight. Here a CH-46 has been fitted
with such supplemental lifting surfaces, albeit
small to keep download low. Jay Miller Collection
Technology Base
Besides its tiltrotor demonstrators, Bell Aircraft
was at the forefront during the heyday of
VSTOL flight research in the United States. Ver-
tal, and eventually Boeing Vertol, pursued
advanced rotorcraft technology, including
improved helicopter flight control, system inte-
gration, and simulation. One of their proprotor
blade designs was tested briefly on the XV-15.
These efforts contributed immeasurably to the
V-22. The most visible products of this work
were their test vehicles. These gave the firms
considerable practical experience in solving
the unique problems associated with such
flight, and in testing these craft and their com-
ponents. Design and manufacturing tech-
niques, especially for gearboxes and
composite materials, were other fallout. Less
visible were the decades of analytical studies, Vertol also contributed much to VSTOL ified CH-47A Chinook. This incorporated stabil-
ground tests and design proposals for such research, building and flying the first success- ity augmentation plus basic attitude and head-
aircraft meeting a broad variety of military and ful tiltwing aircraft. This was the small VZ-2A, ing hold features. A variable-incidence wing was
commercial requirements. All this placed Bell taking to the air in 1957. The Model 347 of the installed atop the fuselage. The company had
and Boeing in a competitive position when a early 1970s sought improved handling quali- previously tested a CH-46 with small wings, but
000 tiltrotor project was launched. ties matched to greater maneuverability, and the 347 wing was large and included trailing
The first vehicle to result from Bell's intensive improved stability and control with a highly mod- edge control surfaces. The wing could rotate to
VSTOL research was the self-funded Model 65
Air Test Vehicle (ATV) of the mid-1950s. The
tiny demonstrator employed two turbojet
engines installed on either side of the fuselage
with mounts allowing them to be rotated
through 90 Although never to demonstrate full
0
•
V-22 Osprey 19
Top: Especially significant in the evolution of
the technology supporting the V-22 was the
Boeing 360. The 30,500 Ib helicopter produced a
20% improvement in payload, 30% increase
in airspeed, and a 60% rise in productivity
compared with similar rotorcraft. Boeing via
Jim Jagodzinski
85° leading edge up for hover to reduce down- design experience with advanced power trans- the late 1980s. Pursued as a company-funded
load. Control of rotor functions, wing incidence mission systems. Boeing went on in the 1980s technology demonstration, this was an entirely
and the automatic flaps were integrated via the to participate in the Army's Advanced Digi- new design. Featured was extensive use of
flight control system. A fly-by-wire (FBW) sys- tal/Optical Control System program, producing composites throughout in the low-drag air-
tem was then installed, making the 347 the first the world's first digital FBW helicopter flight frame. The rotor blades had advanced tran-
helicopter ever to fly with full electronic control. control system. The work was consummated sonic airfoils and the rotor incorporated
The 347 work was a lead-in to the Heavy Lift with flight testing on a Boeing-modified UH-60. elastomeric bearings for reduced vibration.
Helicopter, the giant XCH-62A. Although this Especially noteworthy was the Boeing Vertol The electronic cockpit design was dominated
program was cancelled, it provided valuable Model 360 Advance Technology Helicopter of by six multi-function displays (MFD). Of greater
note was the integrated dual automatic flight
control system and flight management system.
This included full-time three-axis stabilization
with flight control law gains adjusted as appro-
priate for the flight condition to optimize con-
trollability. Hover, heading, airspeed and bank
angle hold options were incorporated along
with coupled navigation modes.
Composite aircraft construction was a tech-
nology that was just maturing in 1981, but held
promise of allowing a lightweight airframe but
with optimized structural properties. In a few
years Boeing Vertol would garner valuable
experience with composites in with their Model
360 program that used the material in rotor and
blades, transmission and control systems, and
airframe. Likewise, Bell would increase its
composite structures capability with the Model
0-292 program funded by the US Army. This
Advanced Composite Airframe Program
sought to extend the technology for composite
aircraft manufacturing with a dramatic reduc-
tion in weight, cost, radar signature, and sur-
vivability. The resulting light helicopter, with an
ai rframe built almost entirely of these materials,
first flew in August 1985. Besides the high
strength-to-weight advantages, other benefits
of composites were corrosion resistance - crit-
ical for a maritime aircraft - resistance to fatigue
and crack propagation for long airframe life,
and a reduction in assembly parts. Composites
could also give improved ballistic and damage
tolerance for reduced severity of damage from
gunfire and shrapnel, and less vulnerability to
foreign object and 'hangar rash' damage. In the
event of a crash, the composite airframe failure
modes tend to dissipate more energy than
metallic structures, reducing the impact loads
imparted to occupants.
20 V-22 Osprey
A digital FBW control system, possibly using
fiber optics to carry the signals, was planned for
any new tiltrotor aircraft to eliminate the few
vices observed in the XV-15. Flight control could
be optimized to make the aircraft easier to fly
and to tailor control for specific modes of flight.
FBW also reduced weight by reducing or elimi-
nating mechanical control runs. Digital avionics
would increase reliability. Built-in test (BIT) fea-
tures of avionics and aircraft systems would
reduce maintenance time by allowing faults to
be isolated and diagnosed quickly to speed
repair, and reduce routine maintenance checks.
Throughout the 1970s and early 1980s Bell
continued basic tiltrotor research and design
studies, sometimes with government funding.
Bell soon had a whole family of conceptual
tiltrotor aircraft on the drawing board, among
them medium transports filling a variety of mili-
tary roles. Bell and Boeing amassed 9,000
hours of wind tunnel testing, with rotor designs Army missions including medium lift transport. manufacturing base. By the 1980s the techno-
and 27 scale aircraft designs models, and over Another variant was much like the XV-15, logical elements of a medium VSTOL transport
1,000 hours of flight simulation work. although perhaps a bit wider, and intended to was coming together. But, the DoD's work in
Bell's conceptual design work included fill the Army's Special Electronic Mission Air- the 1960s, that included the tiltwing XC-142
many that were modified XV-15s and others craft (SEMA) requirement. Artist concepts of and Canadair CL-84 Dynavert, and the tilt-prop
that were substantially larger but reflected the this machine had a side-mounted side-looking Curtiss-Wright X-19, had failed to yield accept-
same layout. These began to incorporate more airborne radar pod and under-wing EW pods. able designs and interest waned. The struggle
powerful engines, fuselage side sponsons for The D-323 was another XV-15 derivative, albeit for developmental funding during and after the
greater fuel capacity than the wing volume with a V-tail and boxy fuselage, designed to fill Vietnam War, and a debate over aviation mis-
could allow, and a rear loading ramp. Engine a US Marine Corps air assault mission and fea- sions and aircraft types, was not an environ-
infrared (IR) suppressors (IRS), aerial refueling turing a rear loading ramp and pivoting wing ment conducive to pursuing unusual designs
(AR) probe, rescue hoist, ground mapping stow feature. The D-316 and D-320 were that sacrificed performance for VSTOL. The
radar, and a gun also began to appear; desir- intended for the USAF combat search and res- services had to wait until political fortunes took
able accouterments for tactical transports. cue (SAR) mission. The D-317 was aimed at the another turn before again attempting to bring
External stores, including electronic warfare anti-submarine warfare (ASW) role and the D- forth a VSTOL transport aircraft, with a multi-
(EW) pods, rockets, and missiles, were seen in 318 the Navy Light Airborne Multi-Purpose Sys- service approach considered the only practical
artist's concepts. Such stores were problem- tem requirement. The D-319 series of aircraft avenue to such a venture.
atic because of the complex flowfields around were conceived in response to other Navy A truly versatile and high performance, prac-
the tiltrotor such that store jettison dynamics requirements. The GW of some of these pro- tical VSTOL tactical transport awaited the
increased the potential of an impact with the posed aircraft exceeded 18,0001b (8,165kg) advent of high thrust-to-weight ratio engines
airframe. Weapons would suffer from limited with cruise airspeeds of 250kts and ranges with good fuel economy, advanced propeller
fields of fire at most practical mounting loca- over 350nm, and could accommodate more aerodynamic and rotor system designs, elec-
tions because of the proprotor arcs while in air- than a dozen troops. tronic flight control with lightweight compo-
plane mode. Wing mounts were considered The best means of introducing such new nents, and lightweight composite materials. All
impractical, but mounts on the lower quadrant technology as a production tiltrotor aircraft is of these technologies, building upon the previ-
of the fuselage, both forward and aft of the pro- via a military program. The government pays ous decades of research, came together to
protor plane, were envisioned. for development and testing, revealing and make the V-22 Osprey tiltrotor aircraft a winning
Bell's tiltrotor designs in response to DoD resolving fundamental risks and establishing a solution.
programs show the evolution that eventually
produced the V-22. The D-314 series of
designs, circa 1975, were essentially scaled-up
XV-15s proposed under a US Army study
called Spectrum. These were to fill a number of
V-22 Osprey 21
22 V-22 Osprey
Chapter Three
The JVX Prog ram In their December 1982 report, the Joint Ser- aircraft, for additional savings. Although osten-
In December 1981, Secretary of Defense vices Operational Requirements (JSOR) group sibly more complex than a helicopter, the tilt-
Casper Weinberger announced DoD's inten- identified ten missions that a multi-service air- rotor's operating costs were expected to fall
tion to develop a multi-service aircraft to fill craft could likely perform. An associated between that of a fixed wing aircraft and a heli-
unspecified mission requirements for the VSTOL study team, the Joint Technology copter.
United States Marine Corps, Navy, Army and Assessment Group (JTAG), included represen- The results of the technology assessment
USAF. If successful, it would be the first aircraft tatives of the services, NASA, and industry. It recommended a tiltrotor as the most promising
developed to serve in all four armed services. focused on vertical lift aircraft needs across the design for a medium-lift multi-mission transport
This was a time of unprecedented peacetime armed forces and examined all likely candidate aircraft. The formal Joint services advanced
US defense budget growth and new weapons concepts. They looked at advanced rotorcraft Vertical lift aircraft (eXperimental), or JVX,
procurement, and the idea found ready con- technology, high-speed helicopter designs, development program was born in December
sideration. However, previous attempts at lift/cruise fan concepts, and tiltrotors. Evalu- 1982 with operational requirements for the
developing multi-service aircraft, such as the F- ated was the Sikorsky XH-59A experimental new system approved the same month. Based
111 and XC-142A, had proven unsuccessful or helicopter with its Advancing Blade Concept on Weinberger's initial announcement, a joint
produced disappointing results. The require- coaxial rotor system and twin auxiliary engines. rotary-wing development program office had
ments would have to be carefully tailored and In its compound helicopter configuration the been established in December 1981 with the
receive the ready acceptance of all services. XH-59A reached 238kts in level flight and Army as the executive service. By this time the
A joint program would reduce costs by 25,500ft (7,620m) altitude. The technology was Marines had an increasingly critical need for an
increasing commonality across all branches of probably suitable only for a light attack aircraft replacing the medium-lift CH-46E and
the armed forces. A common airframe would machine or a utility aircraft. the early model heavy-lift CH-53A and D air-
help economize manufacturing through larger The operational demonstrations of the XV-15 craft. Their program, the V/HXM or just HXM
production lots for reduced unit cost. Joint had proven more noteworthy. They appeared (Helicopter eXperimental Marines), had been
training, logistics commonality, and possibly to illustrate that the technology was finally initiated in 1981. It soon became the corner-
combined depot maintenance would cut available to permit a practical military VSTOL stone of JVX.
operating expenses. A challenge in making any transport. The tiltrotor held promise of doubling The V/HXM had sought an aircraft with an ini-
aircraft suitable for the Department of the the speed and range over the comparable heli- tial service introduction date of 1991, but the
Navy (DoN), Army, and Air Force were that their copters. Lower rotor loads and vibration levels requirement for a new medium vertical-lift air-
different maintenance concepts meant repair promised higher mission availability with craft dated back to 1969 following the Medium
manuals, tools distribution and training had be greater reliability, for lower maintenance and Assault Study of the previous year. The pro-
somewhat different. logistics demands than helicopters. This would gram had undergone a convoluted history. An
mean fewer personnel required to maintain the HX (Helicopter eXperimental) program in the
Facing page top: The venerable CH-46 Sea Knight V-22 Payload-Range
was a worthy mount in its heyday, but by the
1980s was becoming aged and expensive to
3,000 FT/91.5°F 10% RESERVES
operate - problems that were only exacerbated
in later years. Its performance limitations were
PAYLOAD· LB
hampering the evolution of USMC tactics. DoD
24,000 ,....-----------C-o-nf-;g-ur-at-;o-n-------O-W-E---LS-S-F-ue-I---LS-S....,
Facing page middle: The MH-S3 Pave Low provides A BASIC MV·22 33,988 7,660
the Ai r' Force a vertical lift platform for special B WITH AFT SPONSON TANKS 34.109 9,700
operation missions using a radar for low level 20,000 C WITH AFT SPONSON TANKS
AND WING TANKS 34.471 13,700
terrain following flight. However, it commonly o WITH AFT SPONSON TANKS,
has to be partially disassembled and flown to the WING TANKS, AND ONE JSIl:f'TANK 34.969 17,794
16,000
theater of operations onboard a CoS. USAF
V-22 Osprey 23
early 1970s had seen Bell propose the 0-310
tiltrotor for the Navy and 0-311 for the Marines.
In 1972 the USMC had been directed to work
with the Army on the UH-60 development, but
their different requirements could not be
accommodated in a single machine. The fol-
lowing year HXM was initiated and joined to the
Navy's HSX (Helicopter Sea eXperimental)
program, although the latter soon fell by the
wayside. By the mid-1970s the Navy was seri-
ously examining VSTOL to meet mission
requirements. One would be a subsonic sup-
port aircraft, VSTOLA and suitable for the HXM,
which emerged in late 1980 to which Bell pro-
posed the 0-321 and 0-324. This, too, went
away when funding failed to materialize. Late
that decade the USMC again had to show that
the UH-60 Black Hawk was unsuitable for their
mission, justifying continuation of the HXM.
Program initiation to develop the HXM was set
for 1982, but was again delayed.
By the 1980s the CH-46 was badly dated and
with no practical means of modification to meet
the realities of the current combat environment.
The last US model was produced in 1971. The
E-model upgrade was begun in 1972 as an
interim solution to the USMC medium-lift
needs. In the 1980s the helicopters were under-
going a safety, reliability and maintainability
improvement program to allow them to operate
suitably until a replacement could be fielding in
the 1990s. The CH-530 was not so bad off, but
upgrades would not help to reduce the exces-
sive cost of maintaining and operating the
aging aircraft.
The HXM requirements translated to carrying
24 troops (vice 11 in the CH-46E), plus the two
pilots and two crew chief/gunners. Its range
was to be 200nm (vice the 46's 95 with a 30-min
reserve), or a 1OOnm round trip from a ship, and
to hover OGE at 3,OOOft (914m) at 91SF
(33°C). Consequently, the support ship could
stand as much as 200nm offshore while the
HXM quickly deployed troops inland. This
would increase tactical surprise and help the
amphibious ship to avoid enemy defenses.
Alternatively, a cargo of 5,760 Ib (2,613kg) was
to be carried internally or 8,3001b (3,765kg)
externally. The aircraft would be faster and qui-
eter, increasing the element of surprise, and
24 V-22 Osprey
would have the endurance to circumnavigate
threats if necessary. The mandated 250-kts
cruise airspeed would be a tremendous
improvement over the Sea Knight's 105kts, not
to mention the specified 3-hours endurance
compared with the 46's 1 .4 hours. An AR capa-
bility and two fuel cells with a total 15,9501b
(7,235kg) of fuel temporarily installed in the
cabin would permit self-deployment to
2,1 OOnm. The new aircraft was also to survive
in a nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC)
environment and withstand hits from 12.7-mm
rounds. Two cabin-mounted and a forward-
firing gun were called out.
The stated USMC requirements would mean
a marked improvement to amphibious and
land assault troop lift, resupply and casualty the XV-15's 13.2-15.3psf (64.5-74.7kg/m'), Jolly Green Giant and the aging heavy-lift
evacuation missions. The ambitious 250-kts impacting some aspects of performance. A MH-53 helicopters. The Air Force mission,
requirement of the HXM virtually ensured that a means of folding the proprotor blades and eventually under United States Special Opera-
conventional helicopter could not be found stowing the wing to reduce aircraft dimensions tions Command's (SOCOM), included long-
acceptable. Nearly all the requirements were was also essential. The folded dimensions range, covert insertion and extraction of special
more severe than those of other services. were dictated by a maximum width to permit a forces and combat search and rescue (CSAR).
Self-deployment to reach distant operating sufficient number to be parked above and The requirement for a new platform dated from
locales is generally not practical for helicopters. below deck, a maximum height of 19.0ft (5.8m) the end of 1981 , greatly influenced by the failed
They are usually flown to their destination to clear the hangar door opening, and a verti- Iran hostage rescue mission using RH-53Ds.
aboard Air Force C-5 cargo aircraft or via slow cal stabilizer ground clearance to avoid contact During the April 1980 mission the assault
ship transport. Both require many hours to pre- with shipboard items. Apart from the LHA, the force had planned for two overnight hide and
pare the helicopter for shipment, with some JVX would have to operate from the Wasp-class refueling-sites before the assault on Teheran
partial disassembly, and ready it again for com- LHD amphibious assault ship, the 'small deck' because of the helicopters' range. The inability
bat, impacting operational responsiveness. Air Capable Ships, the Austin-class LPD to directly insert sufficient forces into an urban
HXM self-deployment would reduce the 000 (Amphibious Transport Dock), and the Whidbey environment at long range led to an overly
airlift burden and demands on airborne tankers. Island-class LSD (Dock Landing Ship) vessels. complex plan that ultimately doomed the oper-
The Marines also sought to greatly enhance The conceptual dimensions of the JVX were ation. With three times the range of the MH-53,
their night assault capabilities. The new aircraft to allow 7 aircraft to operate 'spread' on the the Osprey would need fewer aerial refuelings
was to have a cockpit compatible with night deck of the larger aviation amphibious ship (on and help ensure mission covertness.
vision goggles (NVG) and a Forward-Looking the 6 helicopter launch spots and another on The USAF sought an aircraft that could have
Infrared (FUR) system to display surrounding the bow). Some 17 others could parked to the flown at comparatively high speed directly to
terrain during night flight. Introducing updated side in the stowed configuration and 6 more Teheran from the carrier in the Arabian Sea in
navigation avionics would greatly improve crew below in the hangar deck for a total 30 aircraft one period of darkness. The requirement was
situational-awareness and first-pass location of aboard the ship. More fanciful layouts saw to carry 12 troops or 2,880 Ib (1 ,306kg) of cargo
the LZ. dozens aboard ship, but actual deployments to 700nm radius flying at 1,000ft (305m) and
The JVX would perform shipboard opera- would likely see only one JVX squadron (12 air- 250kts cruise and hover OGE at 5,000ft
tions. For a tiltrotor solution, the Navy Tarawa- craft) on any vessel, and seldom all topside. (1 ,524m) at 90°F (32°C) before returning at 500-
class amphibious assault ship (LHA) set the The Air Force special operations forces 1,000-ft (152-305-m) altitude with 10% reserve
maximum rotor diameter at 38.00ft (11.58m) for (SOF) mission would be in need of new aircraft fuel. They also wanted to fly at up to 54,000 Ib
a lateral tandem rotor layout. This was a reduc- by the early 1990s to replace remaining HH-3E (24,494kg) using a STOL takeoff.
tion from what some considered an optimal
43.0ft (13.1 m) for a medium-lift tiltrotor. The
requirement ensured 5-ft (1.5-m) from the deck
edge for the aircraft's wheels, 12.7ft (3.9m) of
rotor tip clearance from the island structure for
the spot opposite the island, and 1.0ft (0.3m)
APLN tip path clearance from the fuselage
sized by missions requirements. The conse-
quence was an increase in disk loading at typ-
ical anticipated gross weights to 17.5-23.2psf
(85.4-113.3kg/m') for the V-22 compared with
V-22 Osprey 25
The MH-53Js Pave Low in what became Air the Marine aircraft. Special equipment was The Navy logistical support mission saw a
Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) deemed essential to the special operations need for the JVX beginning in 1991 to replace
were growing old, expensive to operate, and (SPECOPS) mission. Among the unique gear many aging helicopters. It could take over ship-
not responsive to mission needs in the was radar for low-level terrain following/terrain- to-ship transport, vertical on-board delivery,
coming century. The mission demanded more avoidance (TFITA) flight at night and in instru- vertical resupply (VERTREP, delivery to vessels
secure communications, countermeasures, ment meteorological conditions (IMC), turreted without helo decks), and over-the-horizon
day or night, all-weather, low-altitude naviga- nose gun and a ramp gun, rescue hoist, and missile targeting. It was also seen as a poten-
tion, and other special gear. However, the specialized avionics such as a Downed Aircrew tial carrier onboard delivery (COD) aircraft,
USAF variant was to be 90% common with Locator System.
Top: The full-scale fuselage mockup shows the
canted forward bulkhead that helps prevent a
flipover in the event of a forced landing with
substantial forward velocity. Note also the FllR
mount projecting from the bulkhead.
Jay Miller Collection
26 V-22 Osprey
LTM
SEARCH
LIGHT
V-22 Osprey 27
the most JVX attention was CSAR, then served
by the HH-3 Sea King that also supported
SPECOPS. The HH-3 was not well suited to
these missions and the Navy had established
the Combat Aircrew Rescue Aircraft program to
find an alternative. The aircraft would require a
crew of five flying to a range of 460nm with four
rescuees and a cruise speed of 250kts. It had
to hover OGE in hot/high conditions for 15 min-
utes at the mission midpoint. The JVX would
allow a SAR aircraft to go farther to reach sur-
vivors, search a larger area longer, or pick up a
greater number of rescuees. These and other
missions were part of the Variable Mission Avi-
ation Platform program for which the JVX was
considered.
In March 1985 the Navy issued a preliminary
requirement for a VTOL anti-submarine warfare
platform. They announced in May that a deriv-
ative of the JVX would be replacing the S-38
Viking carrier-based ASW airplane and the SH-2
Seasprite helicopter. The JVX could operate
replacing the venerable C-2 Greyhound, but require catapult and arresting gear. Cargo is from the helicopter decks of other surface com-
providing the same cargo capacity to surface commonly delivered to a carrier via the C-2 and batants, freeing up aircraft carrier decks for
combatants equipped only with a helo deck. then distributed to other ships in a battle group more strike aircraft. The speed, range and
The JVX would likely not have the 'legs' of the via helicopter VERTREP. The JVX could elimi- endurance of the tiltrotor, combined with its
C-2, but would probably carry as much and not nate the intermediate step. The mission that got greater payload gave it many advantages for
the mission. The aircraft could get to the patrol
area faster than a helicopter, search an area
more quickly, and stay on station longer.
Search patterns could be much tighter than a
fixed-wing patrol aircraft. Dipping sonar would
be deployed or passive sensors dropped. The
JVX could set down on arctic ice while its dip-
ping sonar hung down through holes in the
sheet. This would allow prolonged missions
hunting subs under the ice yet saving fuel.
Minimal changes were to be made to the
baseline JVX to accommodate ASW. Concep-
tual designs showed the belly hatches normally
used for external load hooks turned into a
sonobouy dispenser forward and dipping
sonar aperture aft. Up to 60 sonobouys might
be carried and deployed from a hover or at very
low forward velocity. Consequently, the units
did not need to be as rugged as those
deployed by the S-3 or P-3 Orion, and could be
recovered and reused for cost savings. This
'soft-deployment' reduced sonobouy cost, but
the ability to recover the unit also meant that
they could be made more powerful and sensi-
tive. Initial concepts suggested an UYS-2
acoustic processor and electronic support
measures suite. For surface engagements an
28 V-22 Osprey
Top: The Ground Test Article allowed Bell to test
its wing, engine, and proprotor design before a
Boeing fuselage was available. The raised
runstand permitted nacelle rotation down to 0°
during ground runs, some that continued for
many hours. Jay Miller Collection
V-22 Osprey 29
Left and below: The fuselage of aircraft 1, the first
airworthy V-22, arrived in Texas on 26 January
1988. Its vertical tails had been removed for
clearance. The fitting at the top of the fuselage,
on the stow ring, is to allow a crane to lift the
fuselage onto a flatbed truck. Both Jay Miller
Performance
250kts continuous cruise airspeed with a dash of
275-300kts below 500ft (152m) altitude
-1 to +4G normal load factor for maneuvering
and threat evasion (+3G VTOL)
200-300nm combat range (700nm USAF),
1,400nm tactical range, 2,1 OOnm self-
deployment (unrefueled)
hover at 3,000ft (914m) OGE in 91 SF (33'C)
temperatures (4,000ft and 95'F/35°C USAF) with
8,300 Ib (3,765kg) external load
flight to 26,000ft (7,925m) with a 40,000ft
(12, 192m) ceiling
flyaway from an OGE hover under any condition
after losing an engine
30 V-22 Osprey
maintain SEQ altitudes of at least 15,000ft
(4,572m) at full payload and fly at cruise speed
to a landing
power-off glide or autorotation to survivable
emergency landing in the event of total power
loss
Accommodations
minimum crew of three
seating for 24 troops with full combat kit or
12 litters
20,0001b (9,072kg) roll-on/roll-off cargo for
short-haul missions
880 Ib (399kg) payload with 460nm radius
10,000 Ib (4,536kg) sling-load to 50nm on a
single belly hook, 15,000 Ib (6,804kg) on two
hooks
airdrop of cargo via parachutes
Weights
31 ,7681b (14,405kg) empty (guaranteed)
47,500 Ib (21 ,546kg) maximum VTOL
55,000 Ib (24,948kg) maximum STOL
60,400 Ib (27,397kg) self-deployment
Operational Considerations
AR capability
armament of 2-4 air-to-air missiles and two
20-mm or 40-mm cannons
The 0-327 became the starting point for weight, its carry-over to the JVX was advanta-
countermeasures for enhanced survivability
Bell's JVX proposal. With the T64-GE-T5E, per- geous in reducing aircraft vertical height for
'fold' to reducing dimensions for movement
formance would be boosted to better fit the hangar deck stowage without a complex and
aboard a amphibious ship
USAF long-range mission. Other features heavy tail-fold feature.
'unfold' and made ready in 45-kts wind on 12°
incorporated to meet that role included a FUR The JVX request for proposals was issued in
slope
and radar installed in the nose, an AR probe, December 1982 for a 15.5-month preliminary
operate from amphibious ships and austere
and a 7.62mm gun. Concept drawings also design effort. The intent was to select two con-
short strips ashore
showed a cluster of four Stinger missile launch tractors to compete in a 23-month preliminary
high reliability, availability and maintainability
tubes on the forward fuselage. The 0-237 was design portion. A 'simulator fly-off' would follow
(RAM), 5.52 man-hours/flight-hour (guaranteed,
also suggested as a COD. A variant with an H- with the modeled designs evaluated against
2.62 goal)
tail appears to have been the last step before JVX missions. The winner would then be cho-
operate in climates ranging from arctic to
the JVX proposal. Although the XV-15's H-tail sen. In the summer of 1982, plans envisioned
tropical
enhanced directional stability and reduced fabrication of the first aircraft beginning in
operation in sand, dust, snow, moderate icing
(45 minutes) and salt spray environments
operation under NBC warfare conditions
V-22 Osprey 31
Both pages: Rollout of the first V-22 Osprey
was a red-letter day in rotorcraft history and
the struggle to introduce VSTOL aircraft into
service. The 23 May 1988 event was staged at
Bell's Arlington plant using ship 1 temporarily
adorned with water-soluble combat colors.
Bell Helicopter (this page, left); others Jay Miller
32 V-22 Osprey
tion in weight, increase in reliability, and being considered. As the JVX conceptual and scaled proprotor system whirl stand tests
improved maintainability were also sought. Each design was rapidly congealing, the choice of with early measurements of wing downloads.
US turbine engine manufacturer expressed an engine remained open. Over 4,700 hours of wind tunnel tests were per-
interest in MTE. By early 1984 the Army's The Bell Boeing proposal submitted on 17 formed during this period. The confidence
requirement had evolved to 5,600-shp (4,175- February 1983 was the only response to the gained from the XV-15 led the team to forgo full-
kW). Should the program yield suitable tech- RFP. Seeing that a tiltrotor was favored and that scale proprotor tunnel tests.
nology, the three primary services were the Bell Boeing team was the clear leader, the To meet the SEMA mission and assist in
expected to jointly fund development for initial competition chose not to participate. This out- matching the USAF range requirement, a JVX B
production in 1986. come initially prompted the DoD to consider configuration was conceptualized. This dif-
By the time the Bell Boeing team was prepar- canceling JVX, but they decided to proceed fered from the A configuration in possessing
ing its proposal it appeared that MTE would not with a single design. The evaluators favored the cockpit pressurization and larger proprotors for
yield a suitable engine until the early 1990s. proposal and the team was awarded a $68.7 improved high altitude performance. When the
Consequently, an uprated version of the 4,855- million Stage 1 preliminary design contract on Army withdrew from the program the Navy
shp (3,620-kW) General Electric T64, called the 26 April 1983. The funding was split equally ordered termination of work on JVX B in Sep-
T64-GE-717, was considered as an interim between Bell and Boeing. tember 1983. Proceeding with a single USMC
power plant in the first 60 aircraft. This option The contractors immediately launched into configuration that could still meet USAF needs
might provide the power but not the sfc, relia- extensive analysis, trade studies, and ground reduced the design workload and eased a
bility, and other MTE specifications, and also tests. This included extensive wind tunnel work looming weight problem. However, the USAF
entailed additional costs for a future modifica-
tion to the final engine design. Likewise, a ver-
sion of the Avco Lycoming T55 was under
consideration. However, it later developed that
three engine manufacturers - General Electric,
Pratt & Whitney, and Allison - assured the air-
frame manufacturers that prototypes of their
MTE power plants would soon be available.
Consequently, the T64 option was abandoned
in the first half of 1985 and the first flight of the
JVX slipped six months to February 1988 to
accommodate the promised upgraded
engines. Both the P&W PW3005 and General
Electric GE 27, each derived from MTE, were
V-22 Osprey 33
- --- - - - - - - - - -~---------~- ---- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
34 V-22 Osprey
Right: Test pilots for the maiden flight of the
Osprey were Bell's Dorman Cannon and Boeing's
Dick Balzer. Both were very experienced, with
Cannon having contributed to the XV-15's
success. Shortly after this photo was taken,
Balzer died as a result of a freak hunting
accident. Author's collection
V-22 Osprey 35
- - - - -- -~----------------------
V-22 Full Scale Development runs. With digital flight control still relatively made up of 55 'black boxes' and 59 subsystem
The V-22 Osprey rapidly shaped up as one of new, each FSD aircraft featured an Analog assemblies. A 'glass' cockpit was dominated
the most advanced aircraft ever attempted to Backup Computer for flight controls and an by MFDs with many display formats for tremen:
that time. It used a triple-redundant digital FBW Analog Backup Engine Control to be used only dous information availability.
flight control system for stability augmentation in flight test. A center stick/cyclic was retained, vice the
and enhanced handling qualities, and also to The 'muscles' behind the flight controls was sidestick controller evaluated briefly on the
eliminate mechanical control complexity a triple-redundant 5,OOO-psi (345-bar) hydraulic XV-15 when a military tiltrotor was initially under
through the rotating wing stow interface. This system. The V-22 was the first aircraft to use consideration. It addressed the issues of cen-
also permitted a Conversion Protection System such a high-pressure system. It was adopted to ter stick motion limited by the pilot's legs, seat
to be readily incorporated to automatically allow smaller pump and actuator dimensions, or control panel, or obscuring panel displays.
ensure the pilot remained within the corridor. and smaller diameter tubes, for reduced The sidestick was found suitable and even
A Full-Authority Digital Electronic Control weight. However, it also compelled use of superior to the conventional cyclic in some sit-
(FADEC) system gave totally electronic control costly titanium and steel hydraulic lines. uations. However, the center stick was felt
of the engines and optimized performance. The The 'nervous system' of the aircraft included essential in VSTOL to recognize the cyclic posi-
use of FBW and FADECs greatly reduced air- dual-redundant data buses and mission com- tion precisely and judge remaining control mar-
craft weight by eliminating mechanical control puters. These integrated the avionics suite gin for operations like taking off from a slope
after a large change in center of gravity (for
example, following unloading of troops and
cargo). A major departure of the Bell Boeing
design from the XV-15 was deletion of the col-
lective 'power lever' for a pair of throttle-like
thrust control levers like that in the Harrier. This
control layout was intended to simplify the tran-
sition of both helicopter and fixed-wing pilots to
the tiltrotor and make operation easy in all
36 V-22 Osprey
Right: A very new and clean ship 3 performs
some of the earliest external load testing from
the aft hook. Noteworthy is the angle of the
open hook access doors. Bell Helicopter
~.I
craft for decades to come. Helicopter pilots
'pUll power' (raise the collective) to increase
rotor lift if the aircraft is sinking. In the V-22 the + ''2:..u-.'" . ... 0 ..... ,
pilot must 'push' the TCl for the same result.
More than once in the years to come a V-22
pilot reverted to 'helicopter thinking' when an
unexpected sink was sensed and instinctively
pulled the TCl back - tightening muscles to
drawing the forearm back as with raising a col-
lective - and a hard landing resulted. Use of
motion-based simulators to replicate the sink-
ing sensation should help to break this habit.
One approach is to think of the Osprey as an
airplane that hovers rather than as a helicopter.
Bell's rotor hub for the XV-15 provided the
starting point for the V-22 design. This was also
gimbaled, although with an elastomeric gimbal
hinge vice the XV-15's metal hinge. large out-
V-22 Osprey 37
Left: Aircraft 3 became the second V-22 to land
aboard ship (the Wasp), although the vessel was
not underway. Jay Miller Collection
38 V-22 Osprey
Right: At one point during the program aircraft 1
was given international orange fields to improve
visibility of the all-white aircraft. Here it is seen
during the final moments of gear retraction.
Jay Miller
V-22 Osprey 39
functional 'iron bird' built in Philadelphia using motion-based manned simulations were per- Testing with the GTA began in late Septem-
actual aircraft hardware with representative formed to optimize the flight controls, displays, ber 1988. The GTA had an entire wing, with the
dimensions and masses. Avionics develop- and cockpit lighting, and to train flight test engines and full drive system, mounted on a
ment was performed at the Boeing Military Air- crews. These three labs were eventually linked wheeled framework. This permitted drive sys-
craft Company in Wichita, Kansas, although for hardware-in-the-Ioop piloted simulations tem endurance, high-risk whirl, and aeroelastic
eventually moved to Philly. There the Avionics and to check system interfaces, helping stability tests to be performed safely. It was
System Integration Lab permitted testing and resolve problems and tune performance prior operated through full conversion on a new run-
trouble-shooting of the hardware and support- to flight test where such work would be more stand at Bell's Flight Research Center, Plant 6,
ing software. Software eventually exceeded a costly and time consuming. at the Arlington Municipal Airport, Texas. A pilot
million lines of code; then an extraordinary fig- Bell performed vital interconnect drive sys- operated the GTA from a nearby blockhouse.
ure. Boeing's hot bench tests of the integrated tem, drive shaft coupling, and proprotor gear- The limited evaluation of vital aircraft systems
systems commenced in 1987. Electrical sys- box bench tests to support thousands of hours and rotor performance helped to uncover and
tems bench tests helped to finalize the design duration, limit condition of 8,600shp, and fail- resolve problems before encountering them in
of this vital aspect of the aircraft. A Flight Simu- ure mode evaluations. A fuel system test rig flight. The rig would ultimately complete 249
lation Lab provided a high-fidelity simulation had tanks and system components installed in hours of operation that included maximum
model of the Osprey with a cockpit and out-of- a framework such as they would be in the power runs exceeding the takeoff rating of
window visual display. It was used for flight actual aircraft, and suspended from a gimbal the drive system. The final use was BFWS
control law development and flying qualities so that the assembly could be pitched and endurance trials.
assessment by pilots. More than 1,000 hours of rolled. Another runstand was built later as more air-
craft entered testing. The V-22 could be lifted
via pads under the wheels and then lowered
onto jacks so that the gear could be retracted.
The runstands, replete with electrical, lighting,
fuel, avionics cooling, and fire fighting services,
were vital in allowing systems to be wrung out,
with full tilting of the nacelles and under full
power, prior to flight.
The STA permitted more extensive verifica-
tion that the airframe could withstand simulated
ground, flight and landing loads. The 1.5-year
static loads testing at Boeing also supported
first-flight clearance. The static loads article
was later subjected to 'drop' tests of the entire
airframe to 12fps (3.7mps) in about 200 drops,
followed by a drop simulating a maximum
14.7fps (4.48mps) sink rate. This demonstrated
the ability of the airframe to react the loads from
high sink rate landing impacts, and certify the
structure and systems sound for shipboard
40 V-22 Osprey
Facing page, top: Boeing assembled and flight
tested the Osprey at its New Castle County
Airport facility, Wilmington, Delaware. The
first flight of ship 4, on 21 December 1989,
is captured here. Author's collection
V-22 Osprey 41
Left: Because of heating issues unrelated to the
shipboard trials, the IR suppressors had been
removed from aircraft 3 before it went to sea,
Elxposing the engine exhausts. Beyond is a
folded ship 4 and a CH·46 'chase plane'.
Jay Miller Collection
Flight Test
The MV-22 and CV-22 flight test program was
planned to encompass 4,110 flight hours and
run a little less than four years through March
1993. It would be a longer and more compre-
hensive test program than undertaken for any
other rotorcraft. The primary reason for this was
the multiple missions, the complex integrated
deck landings. The landing gear was sepa- wind tunnel to provide an operational demon- systems, and the multiple flight modes. Most of
rately subjected to strenuous testing in a spe- stration of engine inlet and proprotor blade the flights would be the responsibility of the
cial test rig to impact loads of 24fps (7mps), deicing, the engine's insensitivity to shed ice contractors and, with the teaming arrange-
essentially representing a crash landing condi- ingestion, and allowed optimization of the IPS. ment, flown at two widely separated sites.
tion. Fatigue testing at Bell simulated 10,000 Model tests in the tunnel with ice shapes These were Bell's Plant 6 and Boeing's flight
flight hours of specific loading conditions and demonstrated that planned vertical tail de-icing test center at the New Castle County Airport,
30,000 landings for two airframe lifetimes, ana- was unnecessary. Another part of the build-up Wilmington, Delaware. Anticipating the V-22
lytically extending this to four lifetimes. No sub- to all-weather clearance was lightning effects workload, Bell constructed an 80,000ft'
stantial structural failures or redesigns resulted testing. (7,432m') expansion to its Arlington facility.
from any of this work. The ability of the V-22 to stay afloat and The testing at separate contractor facilities
An Ice Protection System (IPS) was upright long enough for safe personnel egress was a cost-savings change from initial plans to
designed to allow the aircraft to fly into known following a ditching at sea was evaluated with a bring the aircraft to NAS Patuxent River, Naval
moderate icing conditions. Preliminary propul- 1/12th-scale model of the Osprey. This was Air Test Center, Maryland, early on. Revised
sion system icing tests were performed in a equipped with powered proprotors, and a vari- plans called for 61 % of the testing to be per-
formed by the contractors and 39% by the mil-
itary. The latter were to be logged by combined
contractor-military crews at 'Pax' River to allow
an ongoing assessment of military utility during
the course of development. The contractors
would perform all the high risk testing and
envelope expansion work while the govern-
ment looked at performance versus require-
ments and mission suitability. A few off-site
tests were planned, including sea trials aboard
ship. Flights by military crews alone would be
performed during operational evaluation (OPE-
VAL) at a number of locations. Motion-based
manned simulators and the XV-15 were
employed for aircrew raining.
The first V-22 was revealed to the world in a
rollout ceremony on 23 May 1988 at Arlington.
At that time the first flight was scheduled for
June (soon changed to around 15 August) and
initial delivery of the first production example in
December 1991. Flight test slipped and the
contractors were under pressure from the Navy
to fly before the end of November to help head
off potential budget cuts. A new first flight date
of mid-December 1988 was later announced,
but this too was missed. Contributing to the
42 V-22 Osprey
After aircraft 1 was returned to its red and white
lest colors and 5 was lost in an accident, ship 4
was the only Osprey left in the Marine colors. It
is seen here aboard the USS Wasp in December
1990 folded and shackled to the deck. DoD
V-22 Osprey 43
buffet. Large openings in the nose gear doors rotor wake being blown onto the horizontal tail
were covered. and producing a pitch-up tendency. At its
Fixed surface rebalancing to 'detune' the worse the pilot could run out of longitudinal
structural modes, the wing fences, rotor rebal- cyclic and trim while compensating, making it
ancing, and the addition of pendulum absorbers impossible to react to gusts or other unantici-
in the hubs to damped rotor-driven vibrations pated inputs. With work the V-22 achieved
all failed to adequately quell the vibrations to excellent flying qualities with all flight control
the satisfaction of the pilots or specifications. A features functioning and acceptable handling
vibration suppression system (VSS) system qualities in failure states. The author, with pre-
based on hydraulically driven masses was dominately light aircraft experience, was able
introduced below the cockpit floor of the test to fly the V-22 simulator in all modes with no
aircraft. This was an electrically controlled sys- difficulty.
FSD aircraft had three pitot probes installed tem that sought to actively reduce specific The rotor wash from the V-22 was stronger
ahead of the windscreen and three flush static vibration modes by moving the masses in an than a conventional helicopter of similar weight
ports on each side of the nose. This layout was opposing motion. Concentrating on the cock- but comparable to that of a heavy lift helicopter.
found to be subject to sensing errors of unac- pit helped reduce pilot fatigue and vibration- Repeated demonstrations of operati~:ms with
ceptable magnitude because of aerodynamic induced failures of sensitive equipment in the ground personnel and gear beneath the hover-
interference, and the three pitot probes were forward fuselage. Although reducing vibration ing Osprey showed that it was possible to work
felt to be so close together that a single bird- levels by about four-fifths, comparable to a tur- safely in this area. The concept of operations
strike could disable all three. The hardware was boprop aircraft and below specification limits, would probably have personnel enter and exit
replaced with four carefully shaped 'dogleg' the VSS never quite worked properly. the machine via the rear cargo ramp with
pitot-static probes, two on either side of the The tiltrotor has always presented additional engines running to avoid the strongest ground
nose. Air scoops were installed in the nacelles challenges with regard to vibration and the flow.
after it was found the nacelles and proprotor greater likelihood of rotor and structural modes The Osprey's especially hot engine exhaust
gearboxes lacked adequate cooling airflow, coupling to create new problems, especially in was another area of concern. The IR signature
especially above 600 tilt. airplane mode. But, the electronic flight control of the V-22 proved to be in excess of stringent
Work quickly identified performance short- system meant additional challenges. The reso- requirements dictated for survivability, and the
falls requiring concentrated effort to quantify nant frequencies were picked-up by rate gyros original IRS generated excessive drag. The
the lift and drag, finding areas of flow separa- and accelerometers and fed back through the Osprey's signature was actually a sixth that of
tion and then performing aerodynamic 'clean- system. Although filtered to some extent, these a medium-lift helicopter and the lowest of any
up'. One change to result were vortex still created instances of instability, both in flight aircraft then in the DoD inventory. When close
generators added across the midwing fairing. and on the ground, and with or without the pilot to or on the ground in helicopter mode the hot
After trying solutions on aircraft 1 that included inadvertently contributing. The desire to have a exhaust plumes flowing inboard was uncom-
nacelle strakes, a wing fence was added near highly responsive aircraft, despite its missions fortable for ground crew working around the
each nacelle to redirect vortices shed from this as a transport aircraft, led to high gain features aircraft and it raised the fuselage skin tempera-
region that otherwise generated empennage of the system that were found to increase sus- ture. More significantly, the hot air was drawn
ceptible to instability. The FBW also provided into the fuselage-mounted avionics cooling
the most ready means of resolving the problem air inlets, taxing the cooling system. Design
(save for mechanical control modifications) changes would be required.
through gain changes, modifying or 'shaping' The aft nacelle was modified as a variable
the pilot inputs, and the adjustment of elec- geometry suppressor exit consisting of two tita-
tronic filters. More common resonances, control nium panels on the inboard and outboard sides
sensitivities, and handling qualities improve- that were electrically operated. On and near the
ments were addressed in the same manner. ground these deflected outboard to turn the
Dealing with a largely 'electric airplane', many flow away from the fuselage. Up and away they
problems in other systems could also be opened and closed to vary the exhaust area at
resolved through software changes. the end of the nacelle for optimal signature.
High workload in hover was attributed to the Automatic positioning of the doors resulted in
IGE lateral darting or skittishness and an unsta- fUll-open during VSTOL and partially open dur-
ble rolling tendency, both previously experi- ing APLN. In APLN, the pilot had the option of
enced on the XV-3. The task of controlling pitch closing the doors to three-quarters full to maxi-
attitude was eased with automatic flap modula- mize the small percentage of engine exhaust
tion as a function of airspeed and nacelle angle. thrust (about 2.5% of aircraft weight). During
A pitch coupling with sideslip in quartering testing an 8in (20cm) extension was installed
headwind was also uncovered. Pitch-up with on the inboard IR suppressor door to enhance
sideslip (PU/SS) was a consequence of the the outboard deflection of the exhaust. While
the new IRS functioned as expected, the addi-
tional weight and complexity was not welcome
and efforts continued to find alternatives. There
Top: The Osprey fit on the elevator and through
the hangar doors the first time without difficulty. were also configuration changes from the effort
Aircraft 4 is shown aboard the USS Wasp (LHD-1). to reduce the external drag of the IRS.
Bell Helicopter OWing to mounting geometry on the forward-
swept wing, the nacelles are canted or 'toed'
Left: One solution to the airframe heating
outboard about 1.80 when upright. Under
problem was to mechanically direct the engine
exhaust away from the fuselage when on the power the proprotors generate an upward
ground with the deflector panels seen here. bending moment on the wing that reduces the
Jay Miller Collection toe-out, but otherwise the angle slightly lowers
44 V-22 Osprey
Right: Ship 5 met an ignominious end on its
first flight, 11 June 1991, when miswired roll
rate gyros rendered it uncontrollable. Note the
paint pattern on the bottom of the aircraft.
Author's collection
V-22 Osprey 45
- --- - - - - -- - - - - - -- - - --~~~~-----------------------
proprotor over the edge of the deck, the ground The purpose of DT-IIC was an intermediate press accounts. The remaining test aircraft
jets from the two proprotors did not join and technical evaluation of the V-22 in support of a were flying again by 10 September 1991.
produce a strong outwash forward and aft of 000 limited production decision and to evalu- Aircraft 4 spent February through July 1992
the aircraft. The asymmetric downwash at ate readiness to begin the first phase of OPE- in climatic testing at Eglin AFB, Florida, being
deck-edge did not unduly increase control VAL. The flight portion at Pax was prematurely subjected to temperatures ranging from -65° to
workload. Another concern was that hot engine terminated with the crash of aircraft 5 on 11 125°F (-54 to 52°C), rain at up to 5in/hr
exhaust would damage the deck or equipment, June 1991. All V-22s were grounding pending (12.7cm/hr), freezing precipitation, snow, and
such as life raft containers and fuel servicing results of the accident investigation. wind to 45kts. The climatic testing succeeded
points just below the deck edge. This, too, Aircraft 5 was just 3 minutes into its maiden in qualifying V-22 systems for extreme weather
proved to be unfounded. No significant nega- flight at Wilmington when it impacted the conditions while identifying areas for improve-
tive results were uncovered aboard ship and ground from a 15-ft (4.6-m) hover. Handling dif- ment. Field trials with the same aircraft in icing
further sea trials were planned for late the fol- ficulties in the roll axis became evident almost conditions were planned for later in Canada.
lowing year. immediately on liftoff, with aircraft response Aircraft 4 left Eglin on 20 July 1992 for MCAS
Typical of any developmental aircraft, gov- wildly out of phase with pilot inputs. The first Quantico, Virginia, where the machine was
ernment testing identified many significant and attempt at setting the aircraft down resulted in scheduled to conduct a week of troop exiting
minor deficiencies. Among the problems was the left nacelle impacting the pavement and trials and operational demonstrations. However,
unacceptably high pilot workload during the destroying the IR suppressor. In the next during reconversion on the last 18 seconds of
IGE low-speed/hover phase of flight. The attem pt the left nacelle and proprotor struck the its approach the aircraft suddenly descended
testers found inadequate mission radius to ground, flipping the ship over onto its back. The at high rate, rolling slightly right and nose
meet the USN mission and it fell 180nm short of aircraft slewed around within 200-300ft (61- down. It impacted the Potomac River from 100-
the USAF's 700nm requirements. There were 91 m) before coming to rest with the cockpit 150ft (30-46m) about half a mile from the run-
drive systems problems, an inability of the separated at the splice joint. Both pilots way. The seven aircrew and test team members
troop seats to accommodate a fully equipped escaped with only minor injuries. A small fire were killed. The airframe had accumulated
Marine rifleman, and overall low system relia- was quickly extinguished but aircraft 5 was 103.4 hours offlighttime in 94 flights to that date.
bility. Even the company pilots judged the destroyed. The V-22 test fleet had logged over The entire fleet had 762.6 hours in 643 flights.
cockpit displays deficient in ease of use and 550 hours in 463 flights to that time. The subsequent investigation revealed that
suitability of the displayed information, with too The crash of 5 was attributed to two of the flammable fluid, for which there were several
much button-pushing for even the most routine three fight control system roll rate gyros being potential sources, had leaked and pooled within
tasks. On the plus side the excellent visibility wired in reverse. A reversal of the wiring in one the right nacelle near the engine inlet. This then
from the cockpit was judged to facilitate ship- gyro had been identified during the manufac- flowed into the engine when the nacelle was
board operations and landing in confined ture of both aircraft 1 and 3, and corrected, but tilted up, causing three power surges and a fire.
areas. The potential of the design to satisfy its the potential for the mistake was not properly The engine then failed. The backpressure from
US military missions was readily evident. communicated to those assembling 5. The the surges damaged the inlet and engine nose
Sling load trials began in February 1991. This error was not caught and was actually made cap, allowing the fire to migrate into the nacelle.
commenced with a 2,000-lb (907-kg) ballast worse by a second gyro being mis-wired in that The crew was by then fighting for their lives with
hanging from the aft hook, but this was the control system voting logic would discount a cascading serious of faults and system fail-
extended to 4,000-lb (1 ,814-kg) and dual-hook the proper gyro signal. Also, the flight control ures. The sudden power loss was not fatal, the
loads were soon being lifted. The ability to take- BIT, that would have detected the fault, was not port engine continuing to drive both proprotors,
off and accelerate to 100kts in less than 30 sec- run prior to the flight. The reversed sensing of but the nacelle fire reached extreme tempera-
onds with a sling load was phenomenal and the two gyros rendered the aircraft uncontrol- tures. With flame applied directly to the com-
would be of great tactical value. The Osprey lable. Changes to drawings and quality control posite drive shaft, the vital component was
would be the first fixed-wing aircraft capable of measures were implemented to help prevent critically damaged in just seconds. When this
carrying a sling load. By the end of February such future errors. The problem was clearly not failed the essential link between the proprotors
1991 the four test aircraft had accumulated associated with the unique nature of the air- was severed. As the rpm began to decay on the
400.8 flight hours over 340 flights. craft, although this fact was generally lost in right proprotor, the left engine power was auto-
matically reduced to a low level to prevent loss
of control. This near total loss of power doomed
the aircraft. Further-more, the shaft failure
released hydraulic fluid and, coupled with a
flight control computer electrical failure, dramat-
ically reduced control authority.
46 V-22 Osprey
The investigation found no fault with the Trials had included initial shipboard evaluation, ment dollars for production from Fiscal Year
basic tiltrotor concept or the V-22 design, but formation flight, night and simulated instrument (FY) 89 to FY90. This would delay production a
Bell Boeing made changes to the Osprey tests. While many developmental issues were year and IOC by approximately six months.
based on the findings. More drain holes were uncovered in the flight test, none revealed a Being a year latter than originally stated in the
added to the nacelle where fluids might pool. fundamental problem with the tiltrotor concept contract meant that the option of initiating pilot
Changes to the inlet helped ensure that fire or major aspects of the V-22 design. production at a predetermined price was lost.
would not spread elsewhere in the nacelle, and The last FSD test ship, aircraft 6, was nearing The plan by that time was to buy just 10 pilot
electrical ignition sources were moved. The completion at Plant 6. However, work was production machines, with 4 planned for FY92
firewall within the nacelle was extended and the halted before June 1991. The wing and fuse- and 6 in FY93. There were still many voices that
cross shafting adjacent to the engine was even- lage was never mated before funding ran out. insisted starting pilot production was prema-
tually replaced with a more heat-tolerant mate- ture given the little testing that had been per-
rial. In the meantime, a flame-resistant shield Cancellation Threat formed to date on a radically different aircraft
was installed at the outboard end of the drive Original plans were that the first four production with uncertainty about its suitability for the
shaft within the nacelle. Greater separation of lots would be bought on fixed-price contracts USMC mission. The overall buy of aircraft was
critical flight hydraulic lines and control system based on preliminary cost estimates. Delays also to be stretched out. The Osprey was to be
wiring was introduced and nacelle cooling experienced during development prompted produced in ten lots, with the largest being 132
increased. Cockpit caution and warning lights the Navy to slip expending advanced procure- aircraft in 1996's Lot 4, or 11 aircraft per month.
for interconnect drive shaft integrity and nacelle
fires were added or improved. The in-depth
safety review also identified non-optimal
design characteristics elsewhere in the aircraft
for which other changes were introduced.
Following the fatal accident the Ospreys
remained grounded for 11 months. This, politi-
cal battles over the program, and the manufac-
turer's hesitancy to spend more of their own
money without certainty of return on the invest-
ment made the V-22 appear to be dead. Bell
soon ceased virtually all work on the V-22 while
Boeing continued only a low-level effort. Most
of the flight envelope had been cleared with the
following end-point conditions achieved:
V-22 Osprey 47
Top: The FSD Static Test Article fuselage is
essentially as complete as it gets for the
purpose of its ground tests. Without the wing,
the fuselage must be ballasted to prevent it
tipping back. Author's collection
48 V-22 Osprey
tain elements was ill advised. All such contracts some nervous. Helicopter and airplane pilots 1,600 Ib (544-726kg) carried over into pilot pro-
for major weapon systems would eventually be alike had to see for themselves the unique duction but eliminated in Lot 1.
cancelled save for the C-17A airlifter. The part- advantages of the tiltrotor and how they out- An increase in the transmission rating from
nership of Bell and Boeing, plus Allison and weighed any disadvantages when compared 4,200shp (3,134kW) to 4,570shp (3,410kW)
P&W, was not entirely efficient. While they were to what they were used to flying. The testing was implemented, allowing the aircraft to use
working closely on development and flight test, had only begun this process, addressing each more available engine power.. This would com-
they were separately developing competitive contentious issue raised by detractors and pensate for the remaining excess weight and
bids and production capacity for the pilot pro- consistently proving them wrong. get the CV-22 closer to its required range. The
duction, entailing duplicative expense. The downwash proved comparable to that option of up-rating the engine from 6,150
The V-22 pushed aerospace technology in produced by the heavy CH-53. Both would (4,589kW) to as much as 1O,OOOshp (7,462kW)
many ways, despite the original assessment bowl over the unwary, but with the proper was also considered, although this would
that the technological risk was low and a proto- training it was possible to ensure safety of per- require further increase in the transmission
type was not required. The tiltrotor concept may sonnel working around the machines. The rel- capacity. However, these options would only
have been demonstrated as sound with the atively high downwash velocity did kick up further exacerbate program costs.
XV-15, but the V-22 was a considerable depar- ground material, mainly to the nose and tail. The Pentagon's decision to cancel the
ture from this comparatively simple demonstra- Some forward obscuration was experienced, Osprey appeared to undercut Congressional
tor. It brought together many new or advanced but the pilots found it acceptable. The 'brown- plans to decide the production issue in the
technologies for the first time in the most com- out' from blowing dust is also not atypical of spring of 1990 when the COEA it had ordered
plex production combat rotorcraft to that time, heavy lift helicopters. Light material could was to be ready. Data from the accelerated
already unusual in fundamental aspects and circulate and end up in filters and screens, flight test fed the COEA. It concluded that the
with quite ambitious requirements. Considering and some inside the cabin. Testing had shown Osprey was the most cost and operationally
these challenges, it is remarkable how quickly that in APLN the aircraft produced about a third effective choice for a broad range of missions
the team had built and begun testing the air- the noise of a CH-53 and much less than a than existing helicopters, and with lower life
craft, and how comparatively successful the C-130. In helicopter mode it was comparable cycle costs. It was simply the only aircraft that
design proved to be. However, these complex- to the 53. met the JVX requirements. Alternatives evalu-
ities meant that the development was bound to The IRS reduced the exhaust plume to a tol- ated were a mix of UH-60s and CH-53s. The
be long. The design was clearly deficient in erable 390-515°F (200-270°C) at the face of the report estimated that the Osprey's unique char-
some areas, such as being overweight and exhaust or 50-100°F (12-38°C) above ambient acteristics would increase survivability four-fold
falling short of the USAF range requirement, at the height of a man with the aircraft in a 10-ft over the current fleet of helicopters while also
and many areas required further maturation (3-m) hover. Although vegetation immediately improving productivity.
before a fieldable warplane resulted. The Air beneath the exhausts was burned, the material Although not requested by the Administra-
Force was willing to accept the range defi- was just blown away and no fires were ever tion, from 1990 to 1992 substantial bipartisan
ciency. Falling short on some requirements was experienced. The proprotor wash mixed cool Congressional support saw hundreds of mil-
perhaps to be expected in a multi-service pro- air with the exhaust. lions of dollars appropriated for MV-22 and
gram. The developers needed more time to As for the 'thousands of moving parts flying CV-22 development, testing, and building pro-
complete development, but instead schedule, in formation', the V-22 had the same number of duction-representative examples. Although the
funding, and personnel fell into disarray. gearboxes but fewer transmission shafts than President signed all these DoD authorization
The USMC and USAF strongly defended the successful CH-47. Furthermore, the bills, the Bush administration was not convinced
their need for the V-22. Flight test had shown Osprey's FWB system eliminated the mechan- that the nation needed or could afford the
the V-22 performance meet or exceed nearly all ical control runs found in the 47. Those who Osprey. The Navy released only a fraction of the
requirements, with plans in hand to correct operated rotorcraft did not see this complexity money to the contractors. The service correctly
deficiencies. But, as with most major weapon as a limitation. Composite components under- stated that the funding was far less than required
system programs, there were many powerful went rigorous testing and suspicion about their and the future of the program was undecided.
national leaders who opposed the Osprey as suitability would dissipate over years of suc- Congress insisted DoD obligate the funds
too expensive and complex, saw its faults as cessful operation. already authorized and the General Accounting
fatal, and judged it the wrong aircraft for the The V-22 was very different from the CH-46 Office (GAO), Congress' investigative arm,
mission. Many in the aviation community and and CH-53, and would require many changes judged Secretary Cheney's orders to terminate
military also expressed grave doubts about to existing concepts of operation to integrate all production contracts to have been improper.
introducing such a radical technology into a the new machine into the Marine and USAF The tug-of-war between the Legislative and the
combat environment as severe as USMC oper- missions. For example, some conditions where Executive branches almost ended up in court.
ations. The crash of aircraft 4 and 5 had certainly the powerful Sea Stallion would be able to It was difficult for the contractors to carryon
colored'many opinions, despite investigation hover over an objective would require a STOL activities in this uncertain climate, especially as
findings. Accidents during flight testing had landing by the Osprey. However, other perfor- they were spending a good deal of their own
become rare and their lack considered the mance aspects of the V-22 were most welcome money. Manufacturing and test operations
norm. and selling features, especially its speed. Most were minimized and many persons reassigned
Most prospective operators welcomed a new operators were eager to get their hands on the or let go. An atmosphere of pessimism and low
aircraft with the range, payload and speed of Osprey. morale was pervasive. The loss of invaluable
the V-22. But, rumors of unacceptable down- Aircraft 1 was approximately 1,000 Ib (454kg) expertise on what was still an experimental air-
wash velocity and exhaust temperatures, cou- over-weight at first flight. By that point the con- craft was deeply felt whenever the team
pled with the natural suspicion of such an odd tractors had identified changes that promised to resumed operations. The bursts of activity, for
machine, had its insidious affect. The scuttle- reduce weight by 2,000 Ib (907kg). However, by demonstrations instead of comprehensive test-
butt was that the Osprey would drown survivors late 1990 the excess had reached 2,8001b ing, usually generated tremendous schedule
in the water or knock over persons on the (1 ,270kg). Work continued through the remain- pressures that led to unwise shortcuts of nor-
ground. It would set fire to LZs or disappear in der of FSD to cut this and any additional weight mal procedures and employee fatigue. These
a cloud of recirculated dirt and vegetation. Just likely to appear as continued development factors may well have contributed to the over-
the complexity of all the moving parts and the revealed the need for design changes. Identi- sights leading to aircraft 5's accident and left
use of composites in crucial components made fied weight savings would leave some 1,200- many individuals bitter.
V-22 Osprey 49
••••••••••••••••
50 V-22 Osprey
Chapter Five
Resurrection The experimental Boeing Model 360 (BH-360) MVX. This program was approved in 1992 for
The Marines continued to express their belief in and developmental Sikorsky S-92 (not flying which $3.4 billion was identified in the DoD's
and urgent need for the Osprey, making it their until December 1998) might have been revised 1990-94 five-year budget plan. The initial
number one acquisition priority. The delay to meet requirements. The CH-47E or a modi- requirements document contained perfor-
introduced by initiating another acquisition pro- fied version (CH-47X, presumably but unlikely mance figures that only the Osprey could meet,
gram would be a major impediment to mod- making it compatible with shipboard opera- and the USN was instructed to rewrite it to 'even
ernization plans. They were convinced that tions), in a mix with modified UH-60s was con- the playing field'. The revised requirements
another helicopter would burden them with a sidered. Even the European EH101 and Super emphasized only the short-range amphibious
less suitable aircraft for decades. The tiltrotor Puma were contemplated. assault mission, setting aside for the time being
promised twice the speed, three times the pay- In the face of mounting acrimony between the SPECOPS and SAR requirements. A 50-hr
load, and four times the range of the CH-46 - Congress and the Administration, something demonstration was to be held as all candidates
vital qualities in an era when US forces had fewer positive had to be done about the Osprey and already had flying prototypes or production
overseas bases and needed to react to distant the requirement. The DoD generated a number examples.
trouble spots rapidly with overwhelming force. of plans delaying and stretChing-out produc- The MLR requirements, when compared with
The Sea Knight would simply not meet Corps tion, contributing to budget-cutting goals but the JVX, saw the cruise speed reduced to
combat requirements in the coming decades. It preserving the program while alternatives were 180kts required with 200kts desired, and elimi-
and the CH-53D were approached an average considered. Studies and continued Osprey nated the 2,1 OO-Nm self-deployment. The com-
25 years age, with added flight restrictions, and FSD would, some pointed out, ensure that paratively low airspeeds and range made it
becoming increasingly costly to operate. revising and procuring the V-22 was weighed appear doubtful that anything but a helicopter
Following the cancellation decision, a study against alternatives in seeking the most cost- would be found affordable. V-22 proponents
was launched to seek alternatives satisfying the effective means of meeting the need. Others protested that this did not emphasize the
USMC needs. Over the next few years a num- saw it only as a delaying tactic while the Osprey speed, range and mission flexibility of the air-
ber of individual and mixes of aircraft were con- was allowed to wither from chronically low craft that helped justify its higher unit cost. It
sidered. The DoD proposed a combination of funding. At the very least it spelled a minimum also meant that further Osprey development
heavy-lift CH-53Es and a derivative of the Black one- or two-year delay in production that would and production would concentrate solely on
Hawk, called the UH-60(S) or CH-60X. The be intolerably costly to the contractors. the MV-22, with attendant increase in unit cost.
smaller size of the UH-60 would have required The Navy responded with a proposal for Major revisions to the V-22 would also bring
fundamental changes to USMC task forces, what was called the Medium-Lift Replacement additional costs associated with reengineering
including the size of squads and the makeup of (MLR), the notional aircraft tentatively dubbed and test in a vicious cycle.
their equipment. The Corps examined upgrades
and life-extension programs for the Sea Knight,
tentatively called the CH-46X, to keep it oper-
ating beyond its 30-year, 10,OOO-hour life.
Reopening production was also considered.
52 V-22 Osprey
assembled the team was 3891b (176kg) below
the weight reduction goal, giving a comfortable
margin for the almost inevitable growth during
development testing.
In April 1993 Bell and Boeing submitted their
EMD proposal. Their redesign exercise was
considered successful and the decision was
made to award another $2.65 billion develop-
ment contract. This included continued testing
of two FSD aircraft, construction of four new
flight test articles, plus six LRIP aircraft for OPE-
VAL. The EMD contract was signed in June
1994 with the program to run through 1998.
The neglected FSD contract was canceled with
nearly $2 billion expended. Under the new con-
tract, Bell Boeing would collaborate in produc-
tion using the division of responsibility
established during FSD. The Navy abandoned
plans for a second source for the engine.
The total cost of EMD was to be $3.4 billion.
Unlike FSD, this was a cost plus biannual award
fee contract, with award payments based upon
performance. Congress capped the V-22 pro-
gram at $1 billion per year, making cost-cutting
a dominant issue. With production, the whole
effort was expected to cost $37 billion.
By the time the first EMD aircraft was assem- duction configuration with changes likely found The basic Osprey mission requirements
bled the changes and production efficiencies necessary during testing. Full-rate production remained unchanged, but some specifics were
got the anticipated unit cost down to $32.3 mil- was to begin in 1999 with 9 machines. How- revised. The EMD specifications remained
lion while working to a $29.4 million goal. This ever, some still perceived these numbers as demanding. The 'threshold' requirements were
assumed a 523-aircraft buy at two units per inefficiently low and uneconomical while others the minimum acceptable while the customer
month and compared with the $41.8 million felt they were too many and costly prior to com- desired the 'objective'. Some of the thresholds
predicted in early 1993. This effort used a plete testing and a decision to proceed. were identified as key performance parameters
design-to-cost philosophy, trading capabilities Continuing defense budget reductions cre- of particular interest during testing. The most
when necessary to reach the cost goal. The ated pressures to cut the V-22 program to pay salient of these critical technical indicators are
irony would be that just a few years later, when for unplanned military operations and bolster given below. 'MV' indicates requirements
low-rate production funding was being calcu- readiness. Consequently, production plans applicable only to the MV-22, 'CV' those for the
lated, inflation and additions during develop- were altered again. All the delivery dates were CV-22, and the rest applicable to both. The two
ment would see the cost back at around $36 slip two years with a reduction in the total num- models were expected to be 85% common
million a copy (estimated $49.7 million for the bers. Initially the Marine requirement was for (90% in hardware, 60-80% software, similarly in
CV-22). 425 aircraft, the USAF 50, and Navy 48. In 1997 avionics).
In September 1994 the program was rebase- the USMC quantity was reduced to 360 follow- The maintainability and mission readiness
lined with new target dates. Many feared ing a major 000 force structure review, while it figures were among the most comprehensive
delaying production further would see subcon- was recommended the production rate and demanding to be adopted by any aircraft
tractors and suppliers curtailing support, with increase from 24 to 36 to ensure more rapid program to that time. They were important for
costs rising to bring in replacement compa- fielding and realize savings from economy of ensuring that the Osprey could be supported
nies. The new plan had production funding scale. with reduced manning and operations funding,
commencing in 1996 for long-lead items and
the first four LRIP articles delivered in 1997.
Annual lots were to be 5 aircraft in Lot 1, 7 in
each of Lots 2 and 3, and 8 in Lot 4. This would
generale the 25 machines required to support
OPEVAL and training. It also ensured that the
fewest practical aircraft would be subjected to
costly modifications to bring them to final pro-
V-22 Osprey 53
.- - - - - - - ---------------------------------------
54 V-22 Osprey
Right: The V-22 Integrated Test Team occupied
the two hangars and attached offices seen in
this image at Patuxent River NAS, Maryland,
during EMD. NAVAIR
V-22 Osprey 55
Left: An EMD Osprey occupies one of the ITT
hangars during late night maintenance. The
nacelles and proprotors are in the 'maintenance'
position, leveling the nacelles for ease of
access. NAVAIR
56 V-22 Osprey
Right: A formation of EMD test aircraft provided a
rare photo op. Both are fitted with
instrumentation booms in place of their AR
booms. NAVAIR
V-22 Osprey 57
~ -~ - - - - -------------------------------
58 V-22 Osprey
tors to schedule slips. Other impediments were
delays in avionics software delivery, slow
development of IPS hardware and software,
and parts shortages as lRIP began.
Testing throughout 1997 saw a monthly
average of only 7.1 flight hours per aircraft com-
pared with the target 15 hours. A recovery plan
introduced in 1998 brought an average 19.6
hours per airframe. However, so much essen-
tial testing remained at the scheduled end of
EMD flight testing that the program had to be
extended nearly a year.
The In goal of eliminating government-only
testing to reduce program duration and cost
meant there was essentially only one inte-
grated test period, IT-liD. However, a separate
operational test period in the midst of this work,
OT-IID, required an interim evaluation of readi-
ness for transition of the aircraft to OT testers.
This period, IT/DT-IID, tested some of the more
operationally oriented systems and capabilities
to clear them for OT-IID. The IT-liD develop-
ment testing continued while OPEVAl (OT-IIE) ficulty. The only surprises were an inadvertent Above: Slope landing tests employed specially
was ongoing. However, even this arrangement load jettison and another instant when a twisted prepared landing pads at different angles
laid in at Pax River. The pilot has just set down
proved somewhat disruptive as the flow of test- load began to oscillate and the crew chief
level on a cross·slope preparatory to easing
ing was interrupted to clear capabilities for chose to jettison. In 1998 the AR envelope began onto the slope. Author's collection
near-term evaluation or aircraft were occasion- to be cleared with 'dry plugs' on the KC-130
ally set down for weeks to prepare systems and tanker. The Special Insertion and Extraction rig Below: The Special Patrol Insertion and
instrumentation for looming trials. was also tested. This involved flying the aircraft Extraction rig allows up to four persons to
be attached to a cable dangling from the aft
Significant flight control system changes had with up to four persons attached to a cable
cargo hook so that they can employ their
been introduced with the EMD aircraft such that dangling from the aft cargo hook. Further helo- weapons. Aircraft 10 tests the rig on the V·22
nearly a full spectrum of stability and control casting trials were performed over the Chesa- for the first time. NAVAIR
and flying qualities tests' were needed. The typ- peake Bay. Parachute jumps and fastrope were
ical fine-tuning for optimal handling qualities in conducted from the ramp.
all phases of flight was undertaken. This Rotor performance trials took the aircraft to
included seeking effortless conversions and Hot Springs, West Virginia, in early 1998. High
reconversions without adjustments in cyclic or density altitude testing was performed with
TCl due to trim, pitch attitude, or altitude aircraft 8 at Fort Huachuca, Arizona, in Sep-
changes. Likewise, it was desirable that the tember-October 1998. This included hover per-
'beeping' between 100% and 84% rotor speed formance tests with the aircraft tethered to the
(Nr) for changes in flight mode, and autoflap ground to measure lift force. Critical azimuth
surfaces retraction, be free of trim change testing in Arizona involved flying in translation
requiring pilot compensation. The Opposed
lateral Cyclic was again evaluated. It was
judged to be too great a penalty for the mea-
sured benefits and deleted. lateral Swash plate
Gearing was retained. For slope landing trials,
along the runway at various headings while
evaluating handling qualities. This saw the
Osprey flying sideways and backwards at up to
45kts. It allowed the known PU/SS handling dif-
ficulties to be further quantified. Acoustic levels
-
larger and steeper concrete pads, at 6°,9°, and were measured by flying over a microphone
12° were built on sloping ground at Pax. Apart array on the ground.
from handling qualities, the tests also allowed In early 2000 aircraft 10 was at CFB Shear-
data collection of gear loads during sink rates water, Halifax, Nova Scotia, for initial natural in-
up to 12fps (4mps). flight icing tests. Future improvements in the
The mission-representative evaluations lent IPS meant that further testing would be required.
interesting insight into capabilities. The basic By 23 August 1998 the EMD testing had
sling loads envelope was cleared with little dif- accumulated 316flights for 627.7 hours. During
V-22 Osprey 59
the deck on the ability to precisely hover and
maneuver. Flight tests would also look at sling
loads, SEO run-on landings, STO, and night
operations. An assessment of general move-
ment of the aircraft on the ship, including the
elevators and hangar deck, was performed.
The usual shipborne launch and recovery
procedures were utilized for the MV-22 with
some adaptation. As before, no deleterious
deck edge effects were noted. A demonstration
of the ability to move the aircraft and secure it to
a 'slash' parking spot within 5 minutes of land-
ing was an important aspect of the shipboard
work, requiring BFWS. The ability to accurately
taxi around the deck rather than always being
towed proved a decided advantage.
Short take-offs were performed with great
success, offering a means to get off with heavy
loads when deck space permitted. The roll
began ahead of the island and 100-200ft (30-
60m) aft of the bow. At 70° nacelle, gross
weights of 47,300 lb (21,455kg) and moderate
headwinds, the aircraft was aloft with a ground
roll less than one full turn of the main gear tires.
Full power was applied promptly and the
Osprey climbed away smartly. This work sug-
January 1999 the EMD fleet passed the 1,000- netic compatibility/electromagnetic interference gested that rapid operations couid be devel-
flight hour milestone (2,200 total for the V-22). testing in a simulated shipboard EM environ- oped in which the MV-22 landed on a stern
Basic envelope expansion was considered ment was also performed at Pax with 10. This spot, taxied ahead of the island, took on
complete in July 1998. The aircraft had been was necessary to clear the aircraft for sea trials. another load, and 'STOed off' while keeping the
taken to 342kts, 3.9G, 60,5001b (27,442kg) The planned 30-day shipboard tests were helo spots clear.
GW, 25,000ft (7,620m) altitude, and flown with performed aboard the USS Saipan (lHA-2) Observed was a tendency, when on the deck
a 10,000 Ib (4,536kg) sling load to 230kts. operating off Norfolk, Virginia. The landing tri- with rotors turning, to develop a roll in rotor-
The vulnerability of the Osprey's electronics als began on 14 January 1999. It was planned wash from helicopters. As an interim measure
to lightning strike was tested in June 1999 when that aircraft 10 would be operated from six of the two spots ahead of the MV-22 were to be left
aircraft 10 was placed in a shielded hangar at the vessel's nine helicopter spots under vari- vacant until this issue was resolved. Jerkiness
Pax, surrounded with a copper wire grid, and ous crosswind conditions to examine dynamic in the lateral axis and horizontal darting
subjected to 10,000 amp charges. Electromag- interference issues of the complex airflow over became evident during precision landings with
quartering headwinds above 20kts. This made
the hover and landing task more difficult, occa-
sionally requiring several landing attempts.
This was not atypical for rotorcraft in windy con-
ditions and was considered tolerable. All went
well until a left-seat landing on spot 7, forward
of the port side elevator and opposite the aft
end of the island. The aircraft began to drift
slightly toward the island and the pilot put in left
cyclic to correct. The V-22 rolled too far left, lag-
ging the centering of the stick, and the pilot
made a full right input to bring the wing up and
full Tel to flyaway. The aircraft had rolled to 3r
bank angle just 10ft (3.1 m) above the deck.
Only the fact that the left nacelle was over the
deck edge prevented a proprotor or nacelle
strike. In examining the event it was learned
60 V-22 Osprey
that the high lateral workload in the crosswind
conditions, with flow off the superstructure
drawn into the right rotor, had exceeded the
control system's capability, aggravated by
inadequate lateral trim authority.
Months of control law adjustment and shore- "f
based evaluations, both in simulation and
flight, resolved the instability seen aboard
Saipan. There was pressure on the team to
move quickly as successful completion of sea
trials was a criteria for approval of the Lot 3 LRIP
and long-lead funding of Lot 4. Tests to mea-
sure improvements in aircraft responsiveness
focused on a lateral repositioning task in hover.
An attempt was also made to examine once
again the long-argued deck edge effects while
hovering above stacked shipping containers
under various wind conditions. Some change
in lateral trim was required in this asymmetric
condition, but it left plenty of control margin.
Adequacy of flight control changes was suc-
cessfully demonstrated during a return of 10 to
Saipan in August 1999 off Norfolk. LSD opera-
tions were conducted in September onboard
USS Tortuga (LSD-49) with its two helo spots.
The 75 launches and recoveries completed the
embarked sea trials. The aircraft had per-
formed 642 day and night shipboard launches
and recoveries for 98 flight hours.
Sea trials cleared basic launch and recover
envelopes for OPEVAL. It did not, however,
clear the aircraft for takeoff or landings on the
LHA's spots 5 and 6 directly opposite the The four MV-22Bs and risk reduction A-mod- most new military aircraft development pro-
island. Unanticipated protuberances on the els logged about 3,600 flight hours by the time grams. By mid-2000 aircraft 10 had been
structure were found within the clearance zone of OPEVAL. Each B-model had flown about 400 grounded to serve as a maintenance trainer.
and the decision was made to postpone this flight hours for 711 flights totaling 1,469.6 flight The four Lot 1 LRIP articles were delivered in
testing. This would probably never be done on hours. This was markedly fewer hours than 1999 in preparation for operational testing.
the LSDs because the vessels were scheduled
for retirement within a few years. However, this
requirement had largely sized the aircraft and
rotor system. Lower disk loading and improved
performance may have been possible without
this constraint.
Six MOn pilots participated in OT-IID at Pax,
New River, and Eglin with 142.6 hours in 63
flights on ships 9 and 10. This was exit criteria
for approval of LRIP Lot 3 and contract imple-
mentation for Lot 4. For this purpose Critical
Operational Issues were assessed, including
reliability, maintainability and availability
(RM&A), sortie generation, and logistics sup-
portability. There were still system limitations
and immaturities when 9 and 10 were handed
to the MOn, but valuable insights were still
obtained.
V-22 Osprey 61
.. - - - - -- - --------------------------------
--
Readiness for OPEVAL was based upon drogue could not be safely accomplished Above: Flying low over the Chesapeake Bay near
IT/OT-IIO assessment. EMO was declared com- because of KC-1 0 AR system difficulties at the Pax, ship 10 raises a 'rooster tail' of spray.
Chris Seymour collection
plete on 30 April 2000. This, however, left many low airspeeds. A few requirements were also
planned tests incomplete. It was judged that changed prior to OPEVAL, including increasing
sufficient understanding of the aircraft and a the land-based STO from a required 500ft 25,000ft (7,620m), taken off at 60,5001b
suitable envelope had been cleared for OPE- (150m) to 3,000ft (915m) - somewhat chal- (27,440kg) and seen 3.9G.
VAL. The MV-22B still failed to meet some main- lenging the definition of 'short'. An exami nation of 14's wreckage revealed
tainability and reliability requirements and was OPEVAL, originally planned to begin in Jan- no mechanical faults. The investigators con-
still essentially a developmental vehicle. This is uary 1999, commenced in November and was cluded that the formation had arrived at their
not atypical of a new system, especially one in to run through June 2000. The MOTT operated destination late and 2,000ft (610m) high. The
which all the BIT functions were not working under the auspices of HMX-1 at Quantico lead pilot descended at a high rate to land on
properly. A number of significant capabilities whose mission included USMC rotorcraft oper- the first approach rather than going around and
were not cleared. Some were to be approved ational test. They were to use the first four LRIP increasing tardiness. The effort at executing a
based on further EMO testing before the end of machines with a planned 700 flight hours dur- steep descent with a tail wind caused the pilot
OPEVAL so that they could be included in the ing 350 missions at Pax, New River, China to reduce forward speed, robbing the aircraft of
evaluation, while others would take longer. All Lake, MCAS Yuma, Arizona, Hurlburt Field translation rotor lift. This produced vortex ring
this would be considered in the MOTT's report. AFB, Florida, and other sites. A single aircraft state (VRS).
This is not unusual and the Navy claimed that was also sent to Kirtland AFB, New Mexico, for VRS occurs when a rotorcraft descends at a
the 22 deficiencies/waivers were actually fewer evaluation by the USAF's 58th Special Opera- high rate with low forward velocity. The rotor is
than any other aircraft in their history. tions Wing. OPEVAL included the full scope of descending through its own downwash with
Among the outstanding issues was a dis- permitted USMC operations to include week- the blades experiencing a very high inflow inci-
concerting tendency of the aircraft to momen- long exercises with all four aircraft aboard the dence angle. Adding power (increasing blade
tarily settle when interim power was deselected. USS Essex (LHO-2) off the West Coast of the angle through collective) only exacerbates the
Interim power increased mast torque to 109% US. Another round of trials was performed off problem until the blades stall. Alternatively,
at 104% Nr for heavy weight or hot day opera- the East Coast. At Yuma, the work included the when the descent rate approaches the down-
tions. NBC protection needed further work, the transport of over 700 troops in 40 airlift mis- wash velocity, the air is moving up through the
cargo handling system was incomplete, air- sions. The OPEVAL report was expected in rotors as fast as or faster than it is being pushed
drop was prohibited, and the rescue hoist was October to support the FRP decision that down. The rotor loses lift. The descent rate
again found unusable. Efforts were still under- month. increases and cannot be arrested even with full
way to reduce noise and vibration levels, and The program suffered a tragic setback when power. Because of blade twist, the inner por-
BIT had a high false alarm rate. Flight into icing aircraft 14, the newest MV-22B with just 135 tion of the disk stalls first. This produces an
conditions and air combat maneuvering were flight hours, crashed on the night of 8 April 2000 upward column of air while the outer portion of
still prohibited. Additional operational limita- outside Tucson, Arizona, during an OPEVAL the disk continues to produce downwash. This
tions were issued during OPEVAL based on exercise. The 19 Marines aboard were killed opposing motion results in a recirculating vor-
ongoing flight test. when the aircraft rolled over and dived into tex of air through the disk in a ring pattern. The
Additional icing and AR trials were to be per- the ground from 245ft (75m) while making a common recovery procedure is to reduce
formed concurrent with OPEVAL, along with landing approach to the Marana Northwest power and push over with cyclic to gain forward
other ongoing clearance activities. Attempts in Regional Airport. The lead ship (11) in the velocity and translational lift, flying out of the
October 1999 to clear the aircraft to take gas formation of two, about 1,000ft (305m) ahead, disturbed air.
from the Air Force's KC-10 proved fruitless. landed hard (about 15fps/4mps), rolling off Aircraft 14's steep descent was not in con-
Refueling from the tanker's wing pods felt the paved surface and through a shallow ditch formance with the flight manual limit of 800fpm
uncomfortable to the pilots because of the KC- that tore off the AR probe. The V-22 test fleet (4mps) below 500ft (152m) at less than 40kts
10's wingtip vortices interacting with the out- had flown some 3,000 hours since the last (an adopted CH-46 operational limit) -
board proprotor. Refueling from the center crash eight years before, had been to 342kts, although the presentation in the manual and
62 V-22 Osprey
----------------- ----~~---~~---------------~------------------
the consequences were not well understood. halved to accelerate EMD, but then only two ence in formation. Testing for the latter
The pilot, seeking to maintain his position on thirds of these were actually flown - those included mapping the wake by flying over an
the lead, was descending at 1,800fpm (9mps) essential for showing the adequacy of the plac- array of laser beams with the aircraft at various
with the nacelle back at 95 0 and the nose up at ard. Anything more was considered unneces- conditions and configurations. During HROD
5-T. In addition, the 8-15-kts tailwind had as sary given schedule pressures. Although such work the conditions evident in the crash were
much as a 5-1 O-kts gust component. These fac- adjustments are practical based on analysis of reproduced and resulted in a dramatic depar-
tors produced an extremely high proprotor inci- collected data, such cuts had apparently ture from controlled flight. The testing and VRS
dence with respect to the inflow. This was become endemic of the V-22. With so little studies suggested the V-22 was not especially
increased even further on the right rotor when understood about HROD effects on tiltrotors, susceptible to VRS and could be safely flown to
the pilot corrected his heading with a 5-15 right
0
they appeared unwise in hindsight. more than 1,400fpm (7mps) at 30kts. Although
banking turn with a bit of coordinating right Getting the aircraft into OPEVAL and meeting there appeared to be more that could be
pedal. The right rotor lost lift first and the aircraft 10C on time had become paramount. Empha- learned about tiltrotor rotor stalls, enough was
dramatically rolled and yawed right. The low sis on completing a thorough engineering test revealed to safely opera~ the V-22.
altitude did not permit a safe recovery, even if program preparatory to investing billions of Aircraft 15 was assigned to OPEVAL when it
the pilot had recognized the VRS condition. dollars in production had unwittingly become was delivered in June, replacing 14. Resuming
Aircraft 11 apparently also suffered a loss of lift, secondary. It subsequently became an open on 5 June, OT-IIE ended on 22 July after 522
causing its hard landing. question, echoed in a GAO report, whether sorties and 805 flight hours, and carrying more
It is possible that 14, flying trail, also encoun- reduced testing had sufficiently documented than 700 troops. The OPEVAL report was
tered disturbed air if it descended below the the performance, characteristics, and safety of released on 13 October 2000.
lead. This is a recognized rotorcraft phenome- the system prior to the machines being handed The OT team found inadequate situational
non that can produce a strong downward force. to the MOTT. At the same time, criticism was awareness for the cabin crew because of lim-
On two other occasions during OPEVAL pilots leveled at the operational test community for ited FOV, poor lighting under certain condi-
reported uncommanded rolls during formation too readily accepting test articles with incom- tions, some lack of suitable warning, caution,
flight. Helicopter formations commonly land plete development testing and significant limi- and advisory annunciations, and other factors.
lead-firstto ensure that trailing aircraft do not fly tations. Even some development testers felt it Although the cockpit was kept comfortable, it
through the wake of those in front. was more than likely the MOTT would suffer an was difficult to cool the cabin to desirable tem-
Above 70 0 conversion angle the V-22 pro- incident because of what they perceived to be peratures. On the positive side, the V-22's
protor is subject to stall the same as a heli- precipitous transition to OPEVAL. speed, range, and handling qualities far
copter rotor. Although never intentionally The crash raised another hue and cry from exceeded medium lift helicopters. All key per-
investigated on the XV-15 or V-22, the highly those who felt the Osprey fatally flawed. Heard formance parameters were met and, in many
loaded rotor with considerable blade twist, and again were the familiar criticisms that the air- cases, exceeded the program threshold
limited test results, had led some to believe that craft was too complex, too radical, too hard to requirements. Maximum cruise speed was
VRS was not a tiltrotor characteristic. Others fly, too expensive, and simply the wrong choice measured at 258kts versus the required 240.
claimed that the large blade twist exacerbates for the Marines. The investigation results and The minimum amphibious external lift require-
VRS potential. The lateral tandem rotor layout steadfast adherence to the Osprey by the ment of 30nm was exceeded by 20nm. On a
will mean sharp rolls and thrust fluctuations Marines allowed the din to fade away without typical Marine mission the aircraft flew its 50-
should one rotor enter VRS before the other risk to the program. The V-22 was becoming Nm distance with 11,700 Ib (5,307kg) of pay-
due to increased cyclic or yaw. As the aircraft known as the 'Teflon Weapon' because none of load compared with the objective 10,000 Ib
rolls, the down-going rotor experiences a fur- the criticisms stuck. Still, it appeared to some, (4,536kg). The STO distance on a dry and hard
ther increase in airflow velocity and angle with three V-22 crashes prior to deployment, runway was expected to be 950ft (depending
through the rotor. The pilot will naturally apply that the aircraft might experience a similar high on GW) compared with the requirement of
opposite cyclic to raise the wing, further exac- number of losses and deaths in USMC service 3,000ft (914m), and 140ft (43m) versus 300ft
erbating the effect. The aircraft rolls over as did the Harrier before it was learned how to (91 m) shipboard. The aircraft would complete
uncontrollably. Consequently, tiltrotor VRS is operate that machine safely. a self-deployment 4 hours faster than required.
inherently more critical than a helicopter, yet The MV-22s were flying again on 19 May It was anticipated the 2,1 OOnm self-deployment
recovery can be more positive simply by rolling 2002. Additional testing was undertaken to would be exceeded by 161-179nm. The mean
the nacelles forward as little as 150 . characterize VRS potential and the optimal turn-around time requirement of 15 minutes
Investigation of the accident led to the 800- recovery technique, in addition to wake influ- was actually just 8 minutes.
fpm descent rate limitation being applied
whenever the nacelles were aft of 80 0 , regard-
less of airspeed. Pilots were also instructed not
to fly closer than 200ft (61 m) behind another
Osprey nor 50ft (15m) below (another CH-46
restriction). These prohibitions raised concern
that they would prevent the operators from real-
izing the full potential of the aircraft. However, it
was hoped that subsequent testing would ease
the restrictions.
The investigation team took NAVAIR and
DoD leadership to task for conducting only a
small portion of their high rate of descent
(HROD) testing. Planned test points were
V-22 Osprey 63
Although deficiencies were noted and some
tasks could not be performed because of
waivers, the aircraft was found operationally
suitable and effective for the USMC mission. Of
243 operational requirements, the aircraft had
failed to meet only 17. The remaining issues
with the aircraft were considered minor and
efforts were already underway to address
them. However, the testers concluded that the
MV-22B was not suitable for sea deployment
because of maintenance and serviceability
problems. The principal complaint was unreli-
able BFWS. Frequent failures affected mainte-
nance accessibility and the ability to move the
aircraft below deck. The most significant relia-
bility issues centered on the hydraulic and the
drive systems. '
Of the RM&A metrics, only 2 of 12 were
unequivocally met. Most significant was that
the machine fell considerably short of the
threshold requirement of 82% or more Mission
Capable Rate, seeing only 57%. Consequently,
the conclusion that the Osprey was suitable
seemed so discordant to some in Congress
that they were calling for an investigation. Pro-
ponents countered that the aircraft had met the
more significant 17-hours Mean Flight Hours
Between Aborts. However, the MV-22 was sim-
ply not as reliable, and required more labor to
maintain, than the helicopters it was to replace.
But the V-22 RM&A requirements were among
the most demanding levied on any aircraft pro-
gram. One of the waivers going into OPEVAL
was for reliability, it being clear that the aircraft
would fall short. The program office planned to
use the reliability data to target improvement
efforts. Most major weapon systems go
through a cycle of improvements over the first
years of service to reach desired reliability and
readiness levels.
Despite the controversy, the OPEVAL con-
clusions were allowed to stand.
It was critical that BFWS reliability be
improved and demonstrated quickly so that
vital shipboard suitability would be clear before
the Pentagon formally considered full-rate pro-
duction. Bell Boeing worked diligently on fixes.
An MV-22 deployed to the USS Bataan (LHD-5)
on 31 October 2000 for a day of BFWS evalua-
tions that it easily passed.
The program was hoping to make their case
for FRP in early December 2000. However, the
DoD's director of Operational Test and Evalua-
64 V-22 Osprey
-----------------------------------------------------------------
V-22 Osprey 65
With the unique tiltrotor V-22 incorporating so
much new technology, especially as a produc-
tion article, such expectations were perhaps
unwarranted.
The program suffered another blow in Janu-
ary 2001 when the Marine officer commanding
VMMT-204 was relieved of duty. The action fol-
lowed an anonymous letter posted to the Sec-
retary of the Navy by a mechanic in the unit. It
accused the Colonel of requesting his person-
nel falsify records to conceal low aircraft readi-
ness and high maintenance manhours. The
assertion was supported with a tape recording
of a meeting in which the officer openly admit-
ted they had to lie to save the program.
The 000 Inspector General took responsibil-
ity for the investigation into the readiness
'cover-up'. In addition, the GAO launched its
own investigation into the wisdom of full-rate
production. This brought to five the number of
concurrent investigations of the Osprey under-
way in early 2001. Hearings on Capitol Hill were
certain to follow. The aircraft was unlikely to be
cleared to resume flight operations until all
reports were in and recommendations had
been considered.
Aircraft 18 went down at night, in VSTOL, five
miles short of the New River runway. The close
routing of tubes, hoses and wire bundles within
the tight confines of the nacelle, combined with
high vibration levels, contributed to chaffing of
a hydraulic system No 1 line in the left nacelle
until the titanium tube burst. This line provided
pressure to the three swash plate actuators in
the nacelle. But, losing one of three hydraulic
systems should not have rendered the aircraft
unflyable.
For redundancy, each swashplate actuator
is powered by No 1 and 2 of the three hydraulic
systems. The electronic controls detect rapid
fluid loss and takes action to isolate No 1 pres-
sure from the damaged portion of the system.
The No 3 utility system then takes up the load to
maintain pressure to the actuators, but with a
reduced actuation rate. Consequently, the left
hand swashplate responded at a lower rate
than the right proprotor swashplate during the
mishap.
The hydraulic system switchover and differ-
ence in swashplate rates activated the primary
flight control system PFCS FAIL/RESET switch/
light and tone in the cockpit. The pilot, follow-
ing procedures, pressed the switch to reset the
PFCS. Because of a vehicle management system
software logic error, this momentarily caused
66 V-22 Osprey
the proprotor governor to move all six blades to
zero pitch. The aircraft lost thrust and deceler-
ated. The system recovered quickly, but the
return of the proprotors to their normal state
caused a sudden aircraft acceleration. The left
proprotor, operating partially on the utility sys-
tem, recovered more slowly than the right. This
saw as much as 10° difference in collective and
a violent yaw to starboard. The PFCS FAIL!
RESET reoccurred and pilot reset eight times.
This repeatedly caused the aircraft to deceler-
ate and accelerate, accompanied by strong
yaw, roll and pitch. The longitudinal forces also
produced involuntary pilot inputs to the TCl,
compounding control difficulties. The aircraft
eventually stalled and descended into the ter-
rain. While more than three attempts to reset
the system was contrary to good practice, the
crew had inadequate insight into what was
happening and little chance of recovering to a
safe landing in any event.
The recommendations of the accident board testing, roughly $12 billion invested (the Penta- nature of the tiltrotor, was largely ignored. The
ran from correcting the software fault to gon's sixth largest development program), and on-again off-again nature of the Osprey's
redesigning the hydraulic system. The latter the aircraft was still not ready for fleet deploy- development was not reviewed. Few compar-
included changes in the nacelle to reduce ment. All was held forth as evidence the pro- isons were made with other military rotorcraft
chaffing, a substitution of material for the local gram should be cancelled. The varied nature of development programs and early deployment
hydraulic lines, and redesign of the lines to the the four accidents, none owing to the unique to reveal that the V-22 was not especially
swashplate actuators to enhance triple-redun-
dancy. They criticized testing for not having
examined the contributing failure conditions
and took the designers to task for having inad-
equate understanding of the effect of proprotor
rate changes on controllability. Although a
Crash Survivable Memory Unit (CSMU) recorded
flight data during the accident, the investigators
judged it inadequate.
The Navy promptly set to work on the soft-
ware problem and nacelle changes. Efforts
were already underway to replace the CSMU
with a more capable unit that also included
cockpit voice recording. Criticism was leveled
at the 5,000-psi hydraulic pressure and tita-
nium lines. These and the redundancy/failure
features had undergone detailed safety analy-
sis and many aspects were common in rotor-
craft. Fundamental hydraulic system redesign
and other proposed changes to address differ-
ent swash plate actuator rates in a failure state,
if deemed essential prior to FRP, would be
costly and significantly delay the program. All
would need to be carefUlly considered.
Much erroneous and misleading reporting in
the press fanned a flurry of attacks on the V-22.
Opponents pointed to four crashes with 30
deaths, 15 years of development and extensive
V-22 Osprey 67
- --.- -- ._- --~ - - --~-~~---~-~~~~---------------=--------
accident-prone. Few military warplanes were production numbers, or substitution of existing requirements in a way that no alternative could.
without things to be fixed at time of production helicopters. The cost figures offered for the Starting over with another aircraft would take
and fielding, and it was unreasonable to expect alternatives did not account for the changes many years and hundreds of millions of dollars
the V-22 to be perfect - although certainly safe. required to adapt them to the Marine mission. to get to where the V-22 was then in its devel-
Likewise, the readiness of the V-22 was not Even if the Osprey continued, voices called for opment, and likely with a less capable machine.
clearly compared with other warplanes at a at least another year improving reliability and They concluded that the basic tiltrotor technol-
similar stage in development. Such analysis additional testing before FRP and IOC. ogy was not flawed. The manufacturers should
would have shown that the Osprey was not in The independent 'Slue Ribbon' panel be allowed to keep the production line 'warm'
particularly poor shape. reported on 19 April 2001 with a mix of good and their vendors committed. However, pro-
Opponents again urged the often-heard and bad news. It found the V-22 of value both duction was to proceed at the lowest practical
suggestions of V-22 cancellation, reduction in to the military and the US economy. It filled rate so that few aircraft would later need to be
modified to the final configuration. The recom-
mended nacelle changes were primarily to sim-
plify access for easier inspections, in addition
to the hydraulics issues. The panel also sought
further development and testing to improve
reliability and maintainability. They suggested
tests and training to deal with VRS and asym-
68 V-22 Osprey
metrical rotor lift. Associated was the sugges- reliability improvements before commitment released in February 2002. It pointed to the
tion for a cockpit warning system to help avoid to production. Their preliminary report also budget and schedule pressures, usually from
the hazardous regime. The panel's report accused the Navy of omitting or curtailing vital outside the program, driving managers to cut
pointed to a major program restructuring. testing, casting into doubt the safety of the air- corners in testing. Fallout from these observa-
A NASA panel formed to examine tiltrotor craft and readiness for FRP and fielding. The tions was that a board of senior Pentagon per-
aeromechanics phenomenology from a techni- criticism of deferred or deleted testing was sonnel assumed responsibility for high-level
cal perspective reported in November 2001 echoed by a Defense Science Board report program decisions.
that they also found no 'show-stoppers' and
echoed many of the recommendations of the
Blue Ribbon Panel. They called for more test-
ing and analysis of VRS, formation, and ship-
board flowfield effects, but also suggested
dropping the requirement for autorotation land-
ing to a survivable landing under all conditions.
Apart (rom being virtually impossible in the
V-22, it was met by few if any multi-engine
transport helicopters. The Marines had to
deliver in December 2001 yet another analysis
of alternatives to the MV-22. As anticipated, the
GAO recommended additional testing and
V-22 Osprey 69
-- ._-._-----~-~~----------~-~----------------=----~-.,..
..
The fate of the program rested with the new changes to cockpit indications for situational Above: A brand new MV-22B, aircraft 13,
Bush administration. It was conducting a awareness, and revised emergency proce- cruises in airplane mode a few hundred feet
above a river estuary during OPEVAL in 2000.
detailed review of military requirements during dures. The software and hardware revisions
Ron Gulp
the many V-22 investigations. It was clear the required many months of design and ground
Marines needed a new aircraft and starting testing. No one felt comfortable operating the
another program would only add cost and time aircraft until this was done. Thousands of hours aircraft or introduced into the production line
during a period high operations tempo was of evaluations provided valuable insight, yield- over the coming years. Block B would be intro-
wearing out equipment at an accelerated rate. ing additional software and hardware changes duced in 2004 and C in 2007. These efforts only
This was especially so following the 11 Sep- or long-range plans for same. added to the persisting weight problem and
tember 2001 terrorist attacks on New York City Although the V-22 program expected to certain performance deficits, prompting reen-
and the Pentagon. Operations in Afghanistan resume flying in April 2001, this proved opti- ergizing of weight-reduction efforts to meet the
required the Sea Knights to fly long distances mistic. A healthy openness in examining all adjusted 33,140 Ib empty weight specification.
from their ships to the land-locked country. The issues raised by program personnel and out- Flying only resumed after numerous high-
USMC's 229 CH-46 helicopters were suffering side reviewers revealed much work to be done. level reviews and approvals. The modified and
dramatically rising operating costs. Likewise, Efforts were made to ensure the work was much-inspected aircraft 10 finally took to the air
the USAF had to adjust its force planning to event- and not schedule-driven. Teams from at Pax on 29 May 2002 after nearly 18 months
retain the MH-53s a bit longer while awaiting the the services and contractors examined all sys- grounded. Ship 8 following on 19 October with
CV-22. However, the war on terrorism did not tems for latent design flaws. A list of hundreds HROD its principal focus. Planning had settled
greatly reduce the threat to cut major defense of changes resulted, but careful assessment on 18 months and about 1,800 hours of MV-22
programs, especially those that appeared concluded that only a subset, termed Block A, testing to complete EMD in 2004. Five fleet-rep-
designed for major battles with heavy equip- had to be corrected, with favorable flight test resentative aircraft, 21-24 and 34, joined the
ment rather than 'transformational' weapons in results, prior any training aircraft returning to Pax work as trainers and supplemental test air-
the new era where highly mobile light forces flight. craft. Aircraft 21, the first production machine
appeared to be paramount. Pundits managed Block A was to included annunciation of modified with the Block A changes, flew on 7
to cast the Osprey in both categories, with the flight beyond 800-fpm rate of descent and less September 2002 and ferried to Pax on 12 Octo-
SOF mission becoming more important in the than 40kts. It was hoped this limit would be ber. 34, the first produced with Block A, arrive
new era. extended, especially as it impeded certain on 20 August 2003. By 30 May 2003 the con-
The mishap opened many issues about the CV-22 TF operations. The test aircraft would get tinued EMD testing had added 500 hours of
thoroughness of past failure mode analyses, the equivalent of the Block A and begin flying V-22 flying - and another 500 by 5 December-
ground tests, and adequacy of the flight test. when all was ready. Others would follow, with for a total of about 6,400 on all V-22s.
The wisdom of not testing failure modes in flight VMMT-204 not expected to resume operations The planning and flying in 2003 was very pro-
was questioned. Analyzing the ship 18 event, before December 2003. The remaining ductive and without major incident, restoring
other failure states, and their consequences changes were broken into Block B, with the confidence of many. Testing wrung out
required improvement in analytical tools and enhanced suitability and nacelle maintenance design changes to enhance safety and reliabil-
simulators for suitable accuracy and fidelity. access. C contained improved mission capa- ity, continued HROD work, looked at formation
The work especially focused on hydraulic fail- bilities, provided funding was forthcoming. All influences, and reopen many incomplete test
ures and their affect on aircraft handling, were to be made as modifications to existing plans. The Pentagon also called for another
70 V-22 Osprey
examination of combat maneuvering, AR, and Top: Aircraft 21, en route to Pax River during
dust and debris recirculation effects during October 2002, prepares for departure from its
refueling stop at Wright· Patterson AFB, Ohio.
landing. 10 went out to the USS fWD Jima (LHD-
Note the lack of an AR probe. Navy
7), off Norfolk, on 14 January 2003 for five days.
This continued with 10 and 22 on an 11-day Right: Cargo airdrop tests from the MV·22,
deployment to USS Bataan in November 2003. aircraft 21, were performed in early 2003. The
The team gathered more data on the uncom- extraction parachutes on the two bundles have
inflated to pUll out the recovery parachutes. Navy
manded roll-on-deck phenomenon from rotor-
wash of other aircraft. Another phase of
shipboard trails was planned for April 2004.
The Navy had engaged industry and academia established at New River on 28 August 2003. It
to model deck flowfield effects on the V-22 and was anticipated VMX-22 would continue testing
understand the influences. Software modifica- MV-22 upgrades for many years with 4 of its 16
tions made the lateral damping feature of the aircraft. It would provide aircraft and personnel
flight controls active on-gear to see if this to VMMT-204.
helped mitigate the effect. Additional work to
reduce PU/SS was undertaken. Aircraft 10 CV·22B Development and Testing
would also perform additional AR testing, 10 Planning for the CV-22 resumed in 1995 and
and 22 work on mission systems tests, 21 on the contractors' proposal was submitted that
nightformation, and 21 and 22 on austere land- December. But, it was January 1997 before the
ing trials. 21 was also used in developing the deal was cut and half of that year spent formu-
airdrop' capabilities and looking at the associ- lating the EMD plan. Bell Boeing had sought
ated cg shift, with a deployment to Fort Bragg, $780 million for the effort but the Navy was able USAF was also compelled to reduce its perfor-
North Carolina, in January-February 2003. This to commit only $490 million. The EMD aircraft mance requirements for the realities of the
included parachute-recovered loads of up to had not been built to support CV-22 testing. established Osprey platform and AFSOC 'oper-
2,0001b (910kg) and paratroop drops. Aircraft However, savings would be realized by reman- ators' would also have to adapt to the airplane.
24 was to get a faux CV-22 radar for testing of ufacturing MV-22 to the CV standard after com- Markedly different performance and interior
radome deicing along with the complete nat- pleting the bulk of MV testing. dimensions than the MH-53 would make some
ural icing test of the IPS in Nova Scotia during The USAF was faced with an aircraft opti- eXisting equipment and tactics unsuitable.
December 2003. This was to continue the fol- mized for the Marine mission and so, as has Even the oxygen equipment and headsets
lowing winter. become traditional for SPECOPS, had to adapt were nonstandard.
Another OPEVAL was to be proceeded by an the machine. As always planned, the CV-22B The CV-22 would require a more capable EW
OT-IIF assessment period. The MOn was would feature additional wing fuel cells extend- system, the rescue hoist, plus enhanced navi-
reestablished for OPEVAL Phase II planned for ing flight time by 1.5 hours for a typical mission. gation and communication systems. The flare/
November 2004 through April 2005 in which The ability to install these cells was part of the chaff dispensers were to be replaced with USAF
RM&A would be vital measures. Its work would baseline V-22 design, but the other features units. The AN/APQ-186 multi-mode radar (MMR)
be under the auspices of a new unit, VMX-22, would require reengineering the aircraft. The was selected along with the AN/ALQ-211 Suite
V-22 Osprey 71
- ---------- -- -- ------~~~------~-~---------------------
72 V-22 Osprey
length and with a greater diameter for sufficient Because of delays and fleet groundings, the
stiffness. This was first flown on aircraft 10 in CV-22 program was well behind schedule
late 1999. While solving the visibility problem, when the much-inspected aircraft 7 resumed
the length would be a hindrance to shipboard flying on 11 September 2002. TF flight was first
movement. However, the Marines would only fit demonstrated in April 2003 and early results
the probe as a kit for ferry or special missions, were very good. It had been decided that 9
requiring about an hour installation time. Both would be further modified with some aspects of
7 and 9 were fitted with the new probe, but ini- future CV-22B upgrades. This saw the aircraft
tial MMR testing found it fell within the radar grounded from 18 September 2000 to 14 July
field-of-regard during starboard turns, risking 2003. It was to undergo further modifications in
erroneous fly-up commands. However, plan- the summer of 2004 to a final production con-
ning for a fully retractable, telescoping probe figuration. Testing increased slightly as some
was already underway. It would extend to work was shifted to Edwards from the heavily
10.99ft (3.35m) but would retract to a mere taxed MV-22s. It appeared the project would
stub. The program committed to this design in run through Spring 2006 when operational test-
2000 and a dummy of the exposed portion was ing would begin using ship 9 and two LRIP Pro-
installed on the CV test birds. duction Representative Test Vehicles (PRTV).
To relieve the schedule and training pressures,
and the risk of so much work only with 9,
Right: The USAF flight engineer, outside on
MV-22B aircraft 25 was selected as an Addi-
intercom, and a ground crewman monitor engine
start-up preparatory to a test or training flight. tional Test Article for CV-22B modification in
Aircraft 7 was given a unique Osprey nose logo. Philly beginning in September 2003 to join the
Edwards team in November 2004. Although ini- to evaluate upgrades already planned, made it
Below: A vital element of the CV-22 testing was tial plans were to restore the aircraft to MV-22B increasingly likely 7 and 9 would remain Edwards
optimizing antenna installations for the best
standards, but it could possibly be adopted by CV testbeds until perhaps 201 O. Aircraft 7 might
EW system performance. This was achieved
through many weeks of trials with the aircraft 9 the USAF in its CV configuration. be retired after 2006 and replaced with a pro-
suspended in Edwards' huge anechoic chamber. The need to conduct additional testing to duction CV-22B. It was expected 8 and 10
Both AFFTC give AFSOC full performance capabilities, and would be retired in about the same timeframe.
V-22 Osprey 73
74 V-22 Osprey
Chapter Five
Photographs on the preceding page: The $1.454 billion contract for the first three both began at Plant 6 in late 1998. Ship 11 flew
Top: The interior of the V-22 wing upper surface LRI P lots was signed in June 1996. The release on 30 April 1999, was official delivered to the
shows the integral skin and stringers in the one- of $42 million for Lot 1 long-lead procurement USMC on 14 May, and ferried to Pax on the
piece composite structure. Jay Miller Collection was approved based on the limited operational 27th. Assembly then shifted to Bell's $40 million
Middle: The first V-22 wing, for the GTA, is being
assessment during risk reduction testing of the Tiltrotor Assembly Center at Amarillo Interna-
fitted into a manufacturing fixture. Visible is the modified FSD aircraft with numerous opera- tional Airport, Texas. Opening in Spring 1999, it
right-hand tip closeout rib for the torque box tional limitations, and very limited flying on enclosed 200,000ft2 (18,580m 2). Aircraft 13 was
and the fixed trailing edge panels over the cove EMD's aircraft 7. Criteria for the $402 million Lot the first assembled in Amarillo, and delivered in
ahead of the flaperons (not installed). 1 (5 MV-22Bs) approval in April 1997 were ferry December 1999.
Jay Miller Collection
of 7 to Pax, meeting the empty weight, and fly- Boeing performs about 50% of production
Bottom left: The FSD Static Test Article fuselage ing to 220kts. The 1998 Lot 2 approval (5 work, building the fuselage in Ridley Park. This
nears completion in 1988 at Boeing's Ridley MV-22Bs) was predicated on delivery of the is done from the floor beams up as a forward
Park, Pennsylvania, assembly site. Note the
next two EM D aircraft to Pax and completion of fuselage (avionics cabinets, fully appointed
cabin ditching hatch opening atop the aft
fuselage. Tony Landis collection a specific portion of the static loads tests. Some cockpit and nose), mid fuselage (cabin and
opined that these represented largely mean- sponsons), and aft fuselage (ramp sill to tail).
Bottom right: Enormous jigs were integral to the
ingless milestones and inadequate data from These three sections were spliced together.
V-22 FSD manufacturing process. In the fore-
ground, ship 4 fuselage assemblies have been overly artificial tests. However, it was necessary The fuselage is flown to Amarillo, typically by
joined in the late summer of 1988. Beyond is the to built production-representative airframes for C-17 or C-5. The wings, proprotors, and asso-
lower lobe belly skin of ship 5. Author's collection OPEVAL and initial training. Construction of the ciated components come in from Bell's Dallas/
next 19 MV-22s (9 in Lot 3 and 10 Lot 4) was Fort Worth plants. It takes roughly two years
Below: The assembly hall in Ridley Park, in
August 1988. The fuselage of ship 2 is about
approved in January 2000. to build an Osprey. The engines continue to
90% complete and 3 (foreground) is still Construction of aircraft 11 and 12 assem- be furnished by the government. Allison
awaiting its empennage. Author's collection blies began in May 1997. Final assembly of became part of Rolls-Royce in the first half of
V-22 Osprey 75
keeping missions where rapid positioning and
resupply of highly mobile forces was para-
mount. Congress had appropriated $1.3 billion
in January 2000 for FY01 to procure MV-22s
at full-rate, plus long-lead procurements for
CV-22s.
The 360 MV-22s, 50 CV-22s, and 48 HV-22s
o represented $37.3 billion in production, sup-
port, and upgrades. The program formulated
plans to acquire 16 MVs and 4 CVs in FY01's
Lot 5, plus 18 MVs and several CVs in FY02's
Flight!?afety
Lot 6, with first delivery in 2003. The CVs were
to peak at 2-5 per year. The USAF paid for the
common airframe while SOCOM funded
CV-unique content. The Marines were consid-
ering converting part of their order to C\(s. They
sought to buy a maximum 30 MV-22Bs per
year, although desiring to raise this to 36 in
order to field the aircraft more quickly and to
reduce overall costs. Navy HV-22 production
was to begin in 2010, possibly raising the over-
all monthly rate to as many as 42. All these
quantities and out-year planning numbers fluc-
tuated as budgets were adjusted.
Unit costs continued to be a major issue. At
the beginning of EMD estimates varied
1995. In 2000 the T406-AD-400 was renamed more statements in the press that the aircraft between $40 and $57.5 million, with uncertain-
the AE-11 07C Liberty. was not measuring up to expectations and its ties at that stage to be expected. The Navy's
In October 2000 the Amarillo plant was very high cost. One of the more serious such events target was $45-47 million, but this appeared
busy with the late LRIP. Aircraft 19 was occurred in late August 2000 when, following a increasingly unrealistic by Spring 2000. The
approaching its delivery date and Bell was precautionary landing, inspection revealed a CV-22 cost rise was the greatest. This
beginning its plans to double the assembly loose coupling in the interconnect drive shaft. prompted a reduction in planned annual buys
building area in 2003, and a flight hangar was This was quickly remedied, but it highlighted and peak production rate down to 24, stretch-
being considered. The work force there was the many changes expected over the first few ing-out the buy. Unfortunately, this would see
expected to increase from the 248 employees years of production. For example, some 86 the badly aged CH-46 serving on through 2015.
at the end of 2000 to 1,500 people by 2008. changes were introduced through modifica- The CV purchase would extend to 2013.
Likewise, Boeing's Philadelphia site more than tions within a year of turning MV-22s over to Although keeping annual costs in check, it did
doubled from 135,000ft' (12,540m') in a reno- OPEVAL. not help reduce unit costs to original estimates.
vation and relocation completed in June 2003. EMD ran far beyond the 1998 target. But, as By the end of 2000 a dispute arose during
The first years of flight test and training saw this phase was coming to an end in 2000, the negotiation when the manufacturers presented
many short fleet groundings to address uncov- future of the V-22 appeared bright. Recent mil- a much higher cost, reported to be about
ered deficiencies or to introduce minor itary operations demonstrated that the aircraft $66-70 million.
improvements. While common with new air- would greatly enhance the America's ability to The decision to proceed to FRP was targeted
craft, this always attracted public attention and respond to unconventional warfare or peace- for 27 November 2000. The first FRP contract
was expected to be signed in March 2001,
worth $1 billion.
The first unit to received production MV-22s
was VMMT-204, created at MCAS New River on
10 June 1999. They would take on the first
dozen machines and 20 instructor pilots as the
sole V-22 aircrew and maintainer training unit
for both USMC and AFSOC. Their first aircraft
were the four machines completing OPEVAL.
IOC was set for January 2001 with 12 aircraft.
76 V-22 Osprey
Right: The cargo hold of the V·22 prototype
during pre-flight maintenance at Bell's Arlington
Municipal Airport facility. Jay Miller
V-22 Osprey 77
--~_._~~~-~~-~-~~------------;
78 V-22 Osprey
All the production and fielding plans were Production Aircraft Summary
suspended following the crash of 18 and the
long period of redesign and evaluation that fol- Year Funded Type Bu No / c/n Delivered Disposition Notes
lowed. When deployment planning was again 1997 LRIP Lot 1 MV-22B 11 165433/90011 25 May 1999 VMMT-204 initially OPEVAL test asset
solidified, the same general scheme was likely MV-22B 12 165434/90012 1Nov 1999 VMMT-204 -_ initially OPEVAL test asset
to be adopted. The grounding left VMMT-204 MV-22B 13 165435/90013 13 Nov 1999 VMMT-204 initially OPEVAL test asset
with eight MV-22s, 11-13, 15-17, and 19-20. MV-22B 14 165436/90014 17 Jan 2000 crashed 8April 2000 initially OPEVAL test asset
The new 21-22 were then ready for flight at MV-22B 15 165437/90015 12 Mar 2000 VMMT-204 initially OPEVAL test asset
1998 LRIP Lot 2 MV-22B 16 165438/90016 30 July 2000 VMMT-204
Amarillo, seven were in final assembly, and 15 MV-22B 17 165439/90017 7Jul2000 VMMT-204
aircraft under fabrication. MV-22B 18 165440/90018 21 Aug 2000 crashed 11 Dec 2000 initially VMMT·204 training asset
The plans for production beyond 2000 were MV-22B 19 165441/90019 15 Oct 2000 VMMT-204
immediately revised pending any future full- MV-22B 20 165442/90020 6Nov 2000 VMMT-204
rate decision. The Blue Ribbon Panel had rec- MV-22B 21 165443/90021 11 Oct 2002 VMX-22 initially Pax test asset
MV-22B 22 165444/90022 16 Jan 2003 VMX-22 initially Pax test asset
ommended that LRIP continue at the lowest 1999 LRIP Lot 3 MV-22B 23 165837/90023 9Jul2003 VMX-22 initially Pax test asset
practical rate. Keeping the production line MV-22B 24 165838/90024 1Apr 2003 VMX-22 initially Pax test asset
'warm' was vital in retaining knowledgeable, MV-22B 25 165839/90025 AFFTC to be remanufactured as CV-22B test asset
skilled labor, the commitment of subcontrac- MV-22B 26 165840/90026
tors and vendors, and keeping overall produc- MV-22B 27 165841/90027
MV-22B 28 165842/90028
tion costs down. It was understood that the MV-22B 29 165843/90029
aircraft being manufactured would require 2000 LRIP Lot 4 MV-22B 30 165844/90024
modifications later, at some expense. MV-22B 31 165845
Contracts valued at $1.5 billion for 9 MV-22s MV-22B 32 165846
in FY01, and 9 MV-22 (delivery through 2004) MV-22B 33 165847
MV-22B 34 165848 17 Jul2003 first with production Block Achanges
plus 2 CV-22 PRTVs (delivery through 2005) in
MV-22B 35 165849
FY02, were let as modifications to existing con- MV-22B 36 165850
tracts. The pressures on the CV-22 testing and MV-22B 37 165851
training schedule had prompted earlier initia- MV-22B 38 165852
tion of CV construction, with IOC expected in MV-22B 39 165853
MV-22B 40 165956 late addition, out of sequence BuNo
October 2009. As 11 machines was considered
2001 LRIP Lot 5 MV-22B 41 165940 late 2003 VMX-22 first to VMX-22
the lowest practical annual number, another MV-22B 42 165941
LRIP contract for 11 Lot 7 machines was let in MV-22B 43 165942
early 2002 at $770 million. Beyond this, $1.8 bil- MV-22B 44 165943
lion was programmed for 9 MVs and 2 CVs in MV-22B 45 165944
MV-22B 46 165945
FY04, including hundreds of millions more for
MV-22B 47 165946
continued R&D, and $1 .5 billion for the same in MV-22B 48 165947
FY05. Billions were being appropriated for the MV-22B 49 165948
program with an uncertain future. Until late in 2002 LRIP Lot 6 MV-22B 50 165949
2002, aircraft continued rolling off the Amarillo MV-22B 51 166383 (165950?)
MV-22B 52 166384 (165951 7)
line that could not be flown or delivered. This
MV-22B 53 166385 (165952 7)
began to tax the ability to store them within the MV-22B 54 166386 (165953 7)
available space, expansion of the facility having MV-22B 55 166387 (165954 7)
been suspended. MV-22B 56 166388 (165955 ?)
With encouraging development and testing MV-22B 57 166389 (1659567)
progress, the V-22 got a boost in May 2003
CV-22B W5 020024/91005 t
MV-22B 58 166390
when the skeptical Pete Aldridge, Under Secre- CV-22B W6 020025
tary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and 2003 LRIP Lot 7 MV-22B 59 166391 31 Dec 2004 *
Logistics, declared his satisfaction with the pro- MV-22B 60 166392 31 Jan 2004 *
gram's progress. By summer 2003 the program MV-22B 61 166393 28 Feb 2005 *
was urged to increase LRIP from 11 to 15 air- MV-22B 62 166394 31 Mar 2005 *
MV-22B 63 166395 30 Apr 2005 *
craft annually beginning in FY05 vice FY07, and MV-22B 64 166396 31 May 2005 *
climbing to 41 by 2009, as a means of reducing MV-22B 65 166397 30 Jun 2005 *
unit cost through economy of scale and has- MV-22B 66 166398 31 Jul2005 *
tening deployment. However, the desire to MV-22B 67 166399 31 Aug 2005 *
ensure funds remained for development and MV-22B 68 30 Sept 2005 *
MV-22B 69 31 Oct 2005 *
upgrades kept the FY05 number at 11, with
2004 LRIP Lot 8 MV-22B 70
plans for 17 in FY06, and increases of 50% each MV-22B 71
year thereafter. This could be critical in meeting CV-22B W7 040026
the general objective to slash unit cost by $10.7 MV-22B 72
million to about $58 million by 2010. A CV-22 MV-22B 73
MV-22B 74
was expected to cost about $65.8 million.
MV-22B 75
A full-rate production decision was expected CV-22BW8 040027
in October 2005 following the second round of MV-22B 76
OPEVAL. With more than 50 aircraft produced MV-22B 77
by the time, program cancellation would seem MV-22B 78
The rest are undefined
doubtful. Indeed, Marine Corps IOC was
planned for September 2004 and fleet deploy- * planned; t CV-22B assigned USAF tail numbers are xx0024 through xx0073, where the xx will be the last two digits of the fiscal
ment in December 2005. year contracted. Corresponding production numbers were supposed to run from 91001 through 91050.
V-22 Osprey 79
..~
'~""""~'
flapping ~
-::':~:.C._. '
:Z~~?ng edge .
-.:..-.-.-::.::::..::> .-
12 i n .
clearance line ~
I
'
1-_.-/ .."-................ __ --
80
V_2 0=spre~Y=~ __~
~~ _
Chapter Six
The Future
Follow-On Development Planning for Follow-on Test and Evaluation many operational enhancements in pre-
Many potential improvements and additional began in earnest in 2000. Much work remained planned product improvement (P 3 1) would only
capabilities were identified during the course of from EMD that simply continued, with some crystallize in future years. The volume of work
V-22 development that could not be immedi- capabilities remaining to be implemented and would see test teams maintained at Pax River,
ately incorporated because of budget or evaluated. These included identified avionics New River, and Edwards for many years.
schedule constraints. Fortunately, research upgrades, a full evaluation of sling load config- Among the systems being addressed for
and development funding continued to be urations throughout the speed range, the long- potential revision was the fuel system that, lack-
authorized by Congress after the end of EMD. planned cabin auxiliary fuel tanks, complete ing positive pilot control of pumps and valves,
However, these were limited resources com- clearance of AR, and work on the cabin over- had proven operationally cumbersome. Fuel
pared with the many potential fixes and pressurization capability. Efforts continued on cells that failed to meet crashworthiness stan-
improvements. The program's cost cap meant removing remaining flight restrictions and even dards were to be retrofitted with those from a dif-
slow progress on the design and testing of further opening the operational envelope. ferent manufacturer. The fuel dump line below
upgrades. By late 2000 some 149 changes had There were many undesirable or unimple- the aft portion of the aircraft was in a flow field
been identified and 122 were being actively mented aspects of the cargo handling and that could carry fuel onto the aircraft and poten-
pursued. The aircraft would see upgrades, aerial delivery system to be addressed over tially into avionics cooling inlets. The line was to
modifications, and testing for years to come. In the coming years. NAVAIR built a functional be moved or replaced with one that dropped
some cases the continuing development would mockup of the cabin at Pax to facilitate that down. To aid in cg management, the starboard
be reversing compromises made at the begin- work. The balky rescue hoist was to be aft sponson fuel tank would be deleted and fuel
ning of EMD to reduce aircraft weight and cost addressed with tests of an electrical unit in July cells added in the wings, actually increasing
but which proved operationally ill advised. 2004. Of greater concern was that the forward overall capacity. Many operators felt the V-22
door was too narrow to safely hoist aboard a would greatly benefit from addition of a true
survivor seated on a foliage penetrator or in a head-up display (HUD). Slow trimming and the
Photographs on the preceding page:
Stokes litter at the end of the cable. This prob- ability to stall the trim motor meant a residual
Top left and right: One concept for the nose gun lem would not be easily remedied. pitching moment remained during conversion
installation had the turret at the end of an Responding to the ship 14 and 18 crashes and reconversion. Climate control also required
extended nose fairing. This artist's concept also took precedence, but also offered an opportu- improvement as cabin temperatures could not
shows the extendible AR probe. Author's collection nity to incorporate fixes judged prudent or com- be easily maintained at comfortable levels. The
Upper left: This drawing shows the fully
plementary. Congress made known its NBC kit for the environmental control unit was
retractable AR probe at its extended length and concerns that the V-22 did not have a suitable abandoned when the requirement was deleted.
a notional gun installation. Mounting the gun in flight data recorder and cockpit voice recorder, The kit had suffered developmental problems
an extended nose turret would improve field-of- and that some manner of warning of impending and it was proving difficult to achieve an ade-
fire and eased integration issues. However, VRS should be incorporated. Resolving safety, quate pressure differential to prevent haz-
proximity to the CV-22 radar seen here raises
vibration concerns. Author's collection
reliability, maintainability, and affordability ardous agents from breaching the interior. In
issues impacting operational suitability, cost, any event, during combat the ramp would be
Upper right: External tanks and ordnance has been and weight remained paramount until a FRP dropped and the cabin contaminated. Instead,
an open question since the earliest day of the decision. Block Bs and C changes were being the crew and passengers would rely on per-
JVX. This concept drawing shows how proprotor programmed as flight testing resumed, but sonal protective gear.
arc is addressed, but jettison dynamics in the
complex and varying tiltrotor flow field would be
a tougher nut to crack. Bell Helicopter
V-22 Osprey 81
-- - - - - - - - - --- - ------------------------------=-------
~~~
~-~----
these changes would be included in a Block 10
l
Right: The first tiltrotor UAV, the Bell Boeing
Pointer, rises to a hover on its maiden flight.
The poles mounted beneath the aircraft are to
reduce motion rates .and prevent excessive
angles close to the ground. Bob McClure
collection
V-22 Osprey 83
Left: Bell Boeing conceived a number of
commercial derivatives of the Osprey in the
early years of JVX development. These began
with minimally revised aircraft like those
shown here with a cargo carrier firm.
Jay Miller Collection
84 V-22 Osprey
Right: Bell Boeing's artist concept for the Quad
TiltRotor retains blade fold but a wing stow feature
appeared impractical. The size of the machine
would ban it from all but the flight decks of the
largest carriers, although the manufacturers'
showed a notional vessel that could accomm-
odate the aircraft below deck. Bell Helicopter
V-22 Osprey 85
-- _. -_. ~ - - - - ------------------------------:------....,...
) I
Bottom: The first Bell/Agusta BA 609, N609TR,
during post·fIight maintenance at Bell's
Arlington Municipal Airport (Plant 6) facility,
/
/ early 2003. Jay Miller
Bell pursued the potential of the tiltrotor as a requirements the tiltrotor consistently came out
higher-speed aircraft before and after award of ahead in speed, range, endurance and payload.
the JVX contract. One design proposed using In early 1999, Bell Boeing revealed a QTR
minimally modified V-22 wing/nacelles and design that had been under study for about two
possibly empennage on a new fuselage to pro- years as a possible offering in a FTR competi-
duce an armed escort/gunship. The pilots/gun- tion. Bell had first looked at a quad tiltrotor in
ners were under a bubble canopy and it had a 1979 as the D-322. The later QTR concept had
modest cabin. It featured a chin-mounted a cruciform tail, but this was eventually
gatling gun, top-mounted sensor pod, six changed to just a vertical tail without rudder.
Maverick air-to-surface missiles, and two· Even this was then eliminated for a tailless
Sidewinder air-to-air missiles mounted exter- design when it became clear the four propro-
nally. This concept had merit in that the V-22's tors provided all the essential directional con-
speed made it impractical to fly with attack heli- trol. These were all to be connected through a
copters for fire-support. But, the 'AV-22' power transmission system for safe control in
received a cool reception in the late 1980s and engine-out scenarios. The forward wing would
did not resurface except as an armed BA 609. be derived from the V-22 while the aft wing, of
With the tiltrotor apparently proving to be greater span, employed a root stub with the
viable and practical, numerous other tiltrotor V-22 structure outboard. Bell estimated that the
designs, both military and commercial, were QTR would be approximately 50-60% common
conceived by Bell and Boeing that had little with the V-22, greatly reducing development
commonality with the Osprey. One that costs and time.
attracted attention was the Quad TiltRotor About the size of a stretched C-130 save for
(QTR) transport with engines and rotors at the a wider interior, the QTR was to have six times
tips of two tandem wings. In 2000 the 000 was the internal volume of the V-22, twice the verti-
looking at the feasibility of a heavy-lift VSTOL cal lift capability, and accommodate more than
transport in the class of the C-130. The Army's 90 troops. A ferry range of 1,749nm at a cruise
FTR program looked at tiltrotors as a potential airspeed of 280-300kts, hover GW of 100,000 Ib
candidate and the Navy COD requirement (45,359kg) and maximum GW of 140,0001b
would benefit from higher capacity than the (63,503kg), were estimated. It was expected
C-2A. In studies of VSTOL aircraft for these that 15,000-25,000 Ib (6,804-11 ,240kg) of cargo
86 V-22 Osprey
Right: Cockpit and instrument panel of the first
Model 609. Flat panel displays have become the
standard accouterments for advanced aircraft of
this type. Jay Miller
(..1 ..
V-22 Osprey 87
VIEW LOOKING AFT
-------63FT---------1
4 ft 11 in
88 V-22 Osprey
Chapter Seven
Osprey Described
The following detailed description represents The wing features a 1OO-in (2.5-m) chord and induced vibration ofthe rotor; the three-per-rev-
the aircraft in mid-2003. Changes since that 23-in (0.6-m) thick airfoil at its deepest dimen- olution (3/rev) excitation. The fence atop the
time and other models of the V-22 may render sion. The thick section helps in low-speed lift outboard wing surfaces lessens the inboard
the description inaccurate in some respects. generation, and promotes increased wing stiff- curving of the vortices shed from the
ness to combat aeroelastic instabilities, while wingtip/nacelle interface that impact the
Structure also providing greater internal volume for fuel empennage. This reduces random vibration
The V-22 structure is a semimonocoque design cells. A 6° forward sweep ensures sufficient from tail buffeting during conversion. A strake
consisting mostly of carbon/epoxy composite clearance at maximum proprotor blade flap- is attached to both sides of the fuselage just for-
material in a frame/longeron construction with ping. The 3S dihedral is principally to ensure ward of the wing leading edge roots. They redi-
stiffened skins. Approximately 50% of the struc- fuselage clearance during the blade fold/wing rect airflow to reduce the energy of vortices
ture is made up of this material, about 10% of stow operation. The wing is mounted to a shed from this region that would otherwise
glass fiber composite, and some 20% metals. 91-inch (2.3-m) diameter steel flexring or impart unacceptable buffeting loads to the ver-
The requirements for a fail-safe structure with 'carousel' atop the fuselage. This permits the tical tails.
high ballistic survivability led to a multi-element wing to be rotated 90° on the ground - parallel The Active Vibration Suppression System
redundant design. The engine nacelles are to the fuselage - while also transferring flight consists of masses in the cockpit area driven
made mostly of titanium (for heat resistance) loads to the fuselage. The wing is locked into by electromechanical motors at frequencies
and aluminum with some graphite epoxy com- the flight position by four pins that are hydrauli- determined by a computer using structural
posite. The proprotors are fiberglass/epoxy cally retracted before the stowing action response measured at the cockpit. This
composite material blades spars and skins with begins. More than 1,900 electrical connections reduces or cancels the dominant 3/rev vibra-
Nomex honeycomb afterbody shapes, carboni as well as fluid lines pass from the fuselage tion mode by producing an equal and opposite
epoxy composite-material blade grips, fiber- into the wing through this interface without force. Up to 1,000 Ib (436kg) of force can be
glass/epoxy rotor yokes, and steel rotor masts. crimping. generated, with only the forward fuselage
A Structural Load Limiting feature of the flight directly benefiting.
control system helps in controlling proprotor The V-22 is designed for high occupant sur-
Preceding page top: The three-view includes the
and aerodynamic loads imparted to the struc- vivability in the event of a crash landing. The
early short aerial refueling probe, later revised;
inset: the 'folded' dimensions are shown. ture via maneuvering. Both static load margins cockpit is designed to allow impacts up to 25G
Both Author's collection and oscillatory fatigue limits are ensured by to be survivable. The aircraft can be belly
restricting or modifying the pilot input, or auto- landed as an airplane to reduce the high sink-
Preceding page bottom left: Some of the elements matically preventing adverse vehicle response. rate impacts common with helicopter autorota-
standard to the MV·22B and CV-22B are evident
This also assists in preventing unintentional tion landings. The main nose bulkhead is
in this image, including the twin pitot static
probes, angle-of-attack vane, knee window, overstress of the airframe by limiting the normal installed with the top angled forward. This anti-
and windshield wipers. Author's collection load factor a pilot can command depending plow feature helps to protect against the aircraft
upon many parameters. .overturning during crash-landing with forward
Preceding page bottom right: The object protruding
The V-22 incorporates a number of passive momentum. The graphite-fiberglass propro-
just ahead of the side emergency exit is the
laser detector set sensor array. Author means to reduce vibration throughout the air- tors are designed to shred on contact with the
craft. Rotor pendulum absorbers consist of ground under power, eliminating the hazard of
Below left: Base of the aft fuselage and tail. The three steel arms extending radially from the high velocity material. Also, the direction of
aircraft model and Bureau Number are stenciled rotor mast, each with a pendulum rod and rotation should send most material away from
on the aft end of the fuselage side as seen here
30-401b (14-18kg) weight. The swinging fre- the fuselage. Engine nacelles and even the
on aircraft 9. Author
quency of the pendulum is tuned to naturally wing can depart the aircraft with little risk of fatal
Below right: Details of the fuselage strake. Author counter and damp the primary rotation- damage to the fuselage. In the event of a water
V-22 Osprey 89
Top left: Crew entry/exit door. Jay Miller
Legend
00 Canopy'....indows
00® cabin hatches
00 Main door and upper cabin hatches
o Rear ramp
90 V-22 Osprey
The Cockpit Management System replaces display allow selection of functions or modes
the conventional cockpit layout of individual identified by adjacent legends on individual
instruments and control heads as the primary 'layers' ('pages') of displays. The MFD moding
crew interface with aircraft systems. This is pri- cursor control on each cyclic grip permits
marily done through four color multi-function pilots to select the mode for the switches, and
displays that dominate the instrument panel. which MFD is being addressed. There are five
They provide extensive flexibility in display principal flight display modes or 'top layers'.
composition to suit mission and situation. A Flight displays include the Primary Flight Dis-
Standby Flight Display in the center of the con- play (with or without FUR image underlay), Ver-
trol panel is supplemented by conventional tical Situation Display (with or without FUR
instruments providing essential information in underlay and control layer), and hover/transi-
the event of a failure rendering the MFDs inop- tional flight display. Navigation functions
erative. A glare shield that holds the Flight includes the Horizontal Situation Display (HSD,
Director Panel, plus other controls and indica- with or without moving map underlay), HSD
tors, tops the instrument panel. It also houses, control functions, flight plan sequencing, navi-
in front of each pilot, Remote Frequency Indi- gation (nav) aid selection, nav update and
cator Selectors, and switch/indicators for store, nav system setup, and Digital Map Sys-
MASTER ALERT and PFCS FAIL/RESET. The tem (OMS) controls. The FUR functions include
Control Display Unit/Engine, Instruments, FUR display, FUR controls, and FUR setup lay-
Crew Alerting System (CDU/EICAS) display ers. Status functions provide graphical status
and twin keyboards are located at the forward pages of aircraft system functions and textural Above: Some of the blade fold mechanism is
end of the center console. status pages. Finally, system functions dis- evident as well as the proximity of the left hand
The MFDs are individually programmable to plays include operator functions for the display nacelle to the nose. Author's collection
provide flight symbology, sensor video, com- (such as declutter) and maintainer system
Below: The MV·22 cockpit reflects modern design
munications-navigation, and system status dis- functions.
practices. Photographed from just inside the
plays. Switches control display intensity and The CDU/EICAS display and two associated cockpit door, the space aft of the center console
contrast, and brightness for day or night oper- keypad units dominate the center console would be occupied by a crew chief in the jump
ations. Nineteen bezel keys surrounding each between the pilots. This is primarily used to dis- seat folding down from the door. Boeing
V-22 Osprey 91
Left: The generic MV-22 cockpit instrument panel
shown with side and overhead consoles. The
1. BATTERY INDICATOR PANEL 27. ICS CONTROL PANEL
2. CARGO HOOKIHOIST CONTROL PANEL 28. BLANK PANEL CV-22 varies somewhat and years of service will
3. RAMP DOOR CONTROL PANEL 29. PEDAL ADJUSTMENT CONTROL PANEL see other changes. Bell Helicopter
4. BLADE FOLD/WING STOW SWITCH 30. MULTIFUNCTION DISPLAY·
5. UGHTING CONTROL PANEL 31. MULTIFUNCTION DISPLAY
6. PRIMARY UGHTING PANEL 32. SIDESUP INDICATOR Bottom left: The cyclic grip with imbedded
7. APU CONTROL PANEL 33. CDUIEICAS
8. FUGHT CONTROL PANEL 34. CDU KEYBOARD switches. Bell Helicopter
9. ENGINE CONTROL PANEL 35. LANDING GEAR CONTROL UNIT
10. FUEL DUMP PANEL 36. MULTIFUNCTiON TRACK
11. NOSE WHEEL STEERING PANEL HANDLE CONTROL PANEL Bottom right: The switches and controls for the
12. FIRE SUPPRESSION PANEL 37. PARKING BRAKE HANDLE
13. EMERGENCY OXYGEN PANEL 38. FLAP CONTROL PANEL Digital Map associated with the Track Handle
14. ANlARG-210 MANUAL RADIO CONTROL PANEL 39. CDU KEYBOARD are detailed here. Bell Helicopter
15. PFCS FAllJRESET 40. TCL FORCE ADJUSTMENT KNOB
SWITCHIINDICATOR 41. THRUST CONTROL LEVEL (TCL)
16. MASTER ALERT SWITCHIINDICATOR 42. ANlAPR-39INDlCATOR (IP1150)
17. REMOTE FREQUENCY 43. SIDESUP INDiCATOR
INDICATOR SELECTOR 44. MULTIFUNCTION DISPLAY Cockpit lighting is compatible with night
18. STANDBY FUGHT DISPLAY 45. MULTIFUNCTION DISPLAY
19.
20.
FUGHT DIRECTOR CONTROL PANEL
STANDBY ATTITUDE COMPASS
46. ICS CONTROL PANEL vision goggles. The NVG is the AN/AVS-6 Avia-
47. BLANK PANEL
21. STANDBY MAGNETIC INDICATOR 48. MiSSiON DATA LOADER PORT tor Night Vision Imaging System, commonly
22. STANDBY AIRSPEED INDICATOR 49. ANlAPR-39 CONTROL PANEL
23. STANDBY ALTIMETER 50. ANIALE-47 DISPENSER CONTROL PANEL called 'ANVIS 6'. This includes a HUD Display
24. REMOTE FREQUENCY 1 51. PEDAL ADJUSTMENT CONTROL PANEL
25. ~~g~~;~~~~CTOR 2
10 Unit (DU) monocle that can be fitted on either
SWITCHIINDICATOR
26. MASTER ALERT
11
~13 side of the goggles. The NVG/HUD shows flight
~14
SWITCHIINDICATOR 3 and navigation data in various display formats
12
4 allowing the pilot to fly the aircraft at night with
minimum reference to cockpit instruments. The
17
DU cable connects to the vehicle and control is
via a unit in the overhead console, with display
layer selection also via the Helmet-Mounted
Display switch on each cyclic.
The cockpit is fitted with large windscreens,
side windows, overhead windows, and knee
windows. The windscreen is designed for bird-
45 strike protection and the entire cockpit provides
aircrew protection from rifle-caliber rounds. A
:::e.....--
• oo~
46
rearview mirror is fitted on the windscreen bow
at the forward end of each side window. The
28 ~--',----. side windows can be jettisoned for emergency
29---o"""--,,,--.Jl egress. Jettison actuators are on the forward
windshield posts as well as external, firing pyro-
~===L::I--37 technic charges. The armored pilot seats incor-
36
porate a vertical stroking feature to attenuate
crash energy and reduce the likelihood of injury.
play cautions and warnings, and provides control to inhibit radio transmission, plus wind- The cockpit door opens into the cockpit pas-
graphical depictions of systems for control and shield wiper, environmental control system sageway. A jump seat installed on the cockpit
to diagnose faults. It functions much the same (ECS), and exterior lighting control. The con- door can be folded down after closing the door.
as the primary MFDs. The keyboards allow sole also contains a radar warning system dis- An evaluation pilot or USMC crew chief may
rapid access to the radio and navigation setup, play, the landing gear lever, flap handle, and a occupy the seat. But, it is essential seating for
Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) control, elec- track handle. This handle slews the FUR, digi- the USAF flight engineer in the CV-22 to assist
tronic flight plan management, mission sum- tal map display, and radar, and has provisions pilots in operating the extra equipment sup-
maries such as fuel and cargo, emission for operating a nose gun. porting their mission.
PILOT
SELECTION
RANGE I SCALE
SELECT SENSOR I CURSOR
SLEW I CAPTUR E
FUNCTlON
CANCEL
SPARE
PROVISIONAL TRIGGER
ON BACK OF GRIP
CENTER ON CURSOR
CAPTURE
(BACK OF GRIP)
92 V-22 Osprey
Cabin
The cabin is divided into four zones, each per-
mitted 8,850-lb (4,014-kg) maximum cargo 1
weight. The floor is made up of seven Nomex
honeycomb panels covered with graphite
epoxy and fitted with 40 cargo tie-down rings in
\ G
5
A
four rows. Four tie-down rings are also located
in two fuselage frames and four on the cargo
ramp. The two types of tie downs are rated to
5,0001b (2.268kg) and 10,000 Ib (4,536kg).
Thirty-five receptacles for mounting raised
cargo roller rails are also installed in the floor,
and 15 on the ramp. When not in use the rails 8 7
are stowed at the base of the cabin sidewall.
Aluminum shoring is available to help distribute
tire point loads of wheeled vehicle. These
planks have holes placed to allow access to
tied own rings.
A fold-down, side facing, flight engineer seat
is installed on the left avionics cabinet at the for-
ward end of the cargo compartment. Twenty-
four plastic fold-down troop seats, each
crashworthy/energy attenuating to 6G, are
mounted to the cabin sidewalls.
Three side window/escape hatches and an
overhead ditching hatch facilitate emergency
cabin egress. Jettison actuators activate
pyrotechnic charges to open these hatches.
The 3-ft (0.9-m) wide main cabin door in the
starboard forward portion of the cabin is the pri-
mary means for crew entrance and exit. The
upper portion slides up on tracks or can be
removed for emergency egress. The bottom of
the door folds out and incorporates steps.
Because the door is in the path of the propro-
tor in APLN, the door is automatically pre-
vented from being opened while in flight with
the engine nacelles between 0° and 45°. The
door can be opened in VSTOL or CONV for the
purpose of scanning outside the aircraft and
hoisting someone aboard. If the door is open,
safety interlocks prevent the engine nacelles
from being rotated forward beyond 45°. In
VSTOL, on or close to the ground, a good deal
of airflow enters through the door, especially if
the ramp is down. This can carry ground mate-
rial lifted up by the groundwash into the cabin.
One job of the crew chief or flight engineer is to
sweep out the cabin.
V-22 Osprey 93
- ~ -- - ---------------------------------------::----------
94 V-22 Osprey
down to the ground in areas where landing is maneuver adjustment for such aspects as con-
impractical. From the horizontally positioned trol authority and rate limiting, plus stall and
ramp, the 2-inch (50-mm) Fast Rope Infiltra- over-g protection. It also provides unique con-
tion/Exfiltration System lines are attached to a trol modes for specific phases of flight such as
deployed trapeze with cross beam above the the typical attitude hold, heading hold, and turn
aft end of the cargo ramp. The MV-22 rope has coordination. For example, the system auto-
lead woven into it to help prevent it being blown matically compensates for asymmetric pro pro-
too far aft by downwash. Fastrope exfiltration tor thrust and torque splits that occur with roll
consists of as many as six persons on each of rate, plus dynamic maneuver artificial damp-
the two ropes (only two on a forward rope) ing, among many other beneficial features. An
holding on as the aircraft flies away. This allows important characteristic is conversion protec-
a rapid departure if immediate landing to on- tion that automatically rotates the nacelles or
load the troops is impractical. An alternative is modulates the tilt rate to correspond with the
the Special Insertion and Extraction rig or Sta- allowable conversion corridor airspeed limits.
bilized Extraction system that has clips along This also prevents wing stall or excessive rotor
the rope so that the soldiers can hang from the oscillatory loads and empennage buffet that
rope with their hands free to fire weapons. The can promote fatigue damage while the pilot
MV-22B is also expected to continue the mis- seeks the best performance for the circum-
sion of deploying troops into water, most com- stances. If the high end of the corridor is
monly by 'helocasting' a zodiac craft into the exceeded, the AFCS will rapidly reduce the
water from the ramp followed by the swimmers. nacelle angle with a resulting increase in air-
speed and loss of altitude if the pilot fails to
Flight Controls compensate. However, it prevents sinking dur-
The Primary Flight Control System (PFCS) and ing conversion from VSTOL to APLN by reduc-
the Automatic Flight Control System (AFCS) ing the nacelle actuation rate. The pilot can
make up the Vehicle Management System in a override conversion protection nacelle motion
triple-redundant digital fly-by-wire system. This with a full nacelle movement commanded via
means that there are three independent flight the thumb switch.
control computers (FCC) with only one The V-22 is statically and dynamically stable
required for flight - although a mission would and could conceivable be flown without a FBW
normally be terminated in the event of a FCC system. However, handling qualities would be
failure. The computers command the surfaces, poor in some regions of the envelope and
nacelle angle, and proprotors hubs using three require considerable pilot compensation at a
hydraulic systems. System components are high workload. Many operational limitations
separated to the extent possible to increase would have to be imposed to replace the auto-
survivability such that one hit by an enemy matic protection aspects of the electronic flight
round will not prove catastrophic. Each chan- controls.
nel is monitored for catastrophic faults and The fundamental means of controlling the
dropped off-line should one be detected. Each tiltrotor was explained in Chapter One,
FCC communicates with other systems via although the V-22 application has many elec-
dedicated data buses. Airspeed and altitude tronic aids making control of the aircraft not
are sensed via four heated pitot-static probes entirely intuitive. The automatic phased mixing
,~- -
mounted in pairs on either side of the nose. Alti-
tude sensing is supplemented by a RADALT
good to 4,500ft (1 ,370m).
Pilot control movements are translated into CABLE CUrrER
1B
SHEAVE HEAD ,~-,--
electrical signals by transducers and fed to the ASSEMBLY
FCCs. The system adjusts the input and the
feedback, with flight behavior tailored and vehi- CABLE
cle stability augmented. Hence, it automatically
operates some aspects of fl ight control without
the need for pilot intervention to make the air-
craft easier to fly. The AFCS is the principal SWIVEL HOOK
source of these functions, although carried out ASSEMBLY
by the PFCS. It provides automatic control and
'"
DO
BOOM
Top: Details of one of the two external cargo
hooks on an EMD aircraft. Author
LEVEL WIND
Middle: As troop mount up, aft fuselage details ASSEMBLY
are observed. These include the toes folded DRIVE SYSTEM
back against the ramp. 000 HYDRAULIC BRAKE
CABLE DRUM
Bottom: The rescue hoist design and installation CYCLOCENTRIC MECHANISM -----'i\<'r"'k HYDRAULIC
was still subject to change at time of writing, but
was expected to appear as seen in this drawing.
MOTOR
Author's collection
V-22 Osprey 95
RBL 34.0 Pallet loading
40 inch x 48 inch
pallet
14 14
RBL340
40 inch x 48 inch pallet
All dimensioos are in inches
64.0 IN.
CLEAR UPPER RAMP
DOOR
STA 559.2 TO STA 701.5
=
62.8 IN.
C1..EAR
P:--~=:~:~~+--------1-------Im:cd
POSmON
of airplane and helicopter control and the tors, each driven by one of the three indepen- Top left: The cargo compartment dimensions are
requirement to counter undesirable dynamics dent hydraulic systems. Each rudder is driven provided in this drawing. Author's collection
or aerodynamics makes the earlier explanation by a single actuator and different hydraulic sys-
Top right: Clearances around standard-size
somewhat superficial. For example, the pro- tems, and always move identically. Failures palletized cargo is minimal in the V-22. Reaching
protor collective pitch and engine power is allowing the use of only one rudder would not gear and control in the aft cabin, or to scan
automatically modulated to satisfy the TCl be severe as rudders are not critical in most cir- outside from that area, becomes essentially
torque command and maintain rotor rpm while cumstances, and one alone is usually suffi- impossible with such cargo configurations.
Bell Helicopter
providing over-torque protection. cient. A horn extending ahead of the rudder
Proprotor cyclic and collective control is hinge line at the top contains mass for dynamic Above: Installation of the stanchions for the
affected via three actuators displacing a fixed balance to ensure stability in un powered con- dozen casualty litters leaves just enough room
swashplate, that in turn displacing a rotating ditions. for attendants and the crew chief to move
swashplate that changes the blade angles to tilt Full-span flaperons are split into two seg- about in the cabin and to access emergency
equipment. Bell Helicopter
the proprotor disk or change blade pitch. ments per side for safety redundancy, although
Within the mast is a slipring that transmits the twin segments always moving together.
power and dozens of electrical signals for pro- Moving down as flaps the surfaces move aft to
protor functions through the rotating interface. open a slot between it and the wing. An aut- one of the three hydraulic systems in a scheme
The FCCs also signal the engine FADEC units oflap feature will automatically command sym- that helps to ensure that all segments can be
to alter fuel flow for RPM adjustment. The metrical flap settings appropriate for the mode moved in most system failure scenarios.
amount of power increase with forward TCl of flight and airspeed. Autoflaps uses high set- The PFCS electronically operates all of the
movement is determined by the FADECs tings up to 72.so below 40kts to reduce wing aerodynamic surfaces and rotor actuators, with
based on the mode of flight, nacelle angle, and download. The 40° setting is used between 50 the appropriate gearing, and phasing in and
other factors. Proprotor pitch is controlled and 160kts to augment wing lift and improve out of swashplate and aerodynamic surface
automatically in airplane mode to maintain a pitch attitude control during transition. control, as would a mechanical control system.
constant rpm and reduce blade flapping. Heli- Between 160 and 200kts the flaperons are var- One important function is sensing longitudinal
copter and airplane control logic, through the ied between 0° and 40° as a linear variation with rotor flapping (blowback) during transient
cyclic and TCl, are smoothly faded together airspeed to prevent ballooning during recon- maneuvers and high speed, particularly as the
during conversion, with 60° nacelle angle the version. The pilot may manually select flap set- nacelles rotate forward, and protecting the air-
point of approximately half of each. The flaps tings of 0°, 20°, 40° and full. Differential flaperon craft from high blade loads and mast bumping.
are used in both VSTOl and APlN, but roll con- movement side-to-side produce rolling This allows the aircraft to operate at the corners
trol with flaperons, rudders movement and ele- moments. The flight control system will ensure of the envelope with less concern.
vators are locked out in VSTOL. Full elevator that manual flaperon settings beyond 40° can- A single conversion actuator per side,
authority is available up to 140kts. not be selected with the nacelles below 30° to between the nacelles and the wingtips, per-
Control surfaces on the H-shaped empen- prevent loss of roll control effectiveness due to forms nacelle rotation. These are telescoping
nage consist of a single-piece elevator and two flow separation off the flaperons. Each flaperon hydraulic ballscrew actuators. Because of their
identical rudders. The elevator, being a critical segment is powered by two hydraulic actua- criticality, each is operated by the two primary
surface, is powered by three hydraulic actua- tors, each of the eight total being driven off on hydraulic systems, with the aUXiliary system as
96 V-22 Osprey
a backup. A backup means for moving the The proprotor wash over the wing delays and capability demonstrated. Up-slope and downs-
ballscrew via an electrical motor in the FSD air- masks wing stall while in APLN, with little or no lope landings are fairly routine in the V-22
craft was eliminated in EMD. The nacelle buffet as natural warning. As lift degrades the because of the ability to tilt the thrust vector, or
moves at 4-8°/sec, proportional to TCL switch aircraft begins a 2,000-2,300fpm (10-12mps) keep the proprotor disk vertical and the deck
displacement. Conversion between VSTOL descent and the artificial stall warning goes off. angle parallel to the sloping surface. This also
and APLN requires 12 seconds. If no action is taken the sink increases ensures maximum swashplate control author-
A means of helping the pilot remain within markedly. An accelerated stall, in a turn, is ity is available for maneuvers and dealing with
the conversion corridor is an arc of permissible characterized by wing drop that makes the stall gusts or other disturbances. This is especially
nacelle angles for the existing airspeed dis- warning essential. Also, the V-22's com para" helpful in an upslope departure where care is
played on the primary flight display MFD page. tively small rotor diameter makes it highly toler- required to guard against excessively nose-
In APLN, with the nacelles on the downstop, the ant of wind gusts and turbulence. high attitudes and a tail strike. The V-22 also
rpm limit will prevent exceeding the conversion The rotation of the nacelle forward to APLN has generous control and safety in cross-slope
corridor speed limit. The upper boundary is not produces a forward shift in the aircraft's cg. The landings, requiring as much as 33° of cross-
constant but varies with Mach number, and the reverse is true for reconversion. The nose slope angle for a static rollover. However,
corridor is programmed to be compatible with would tend to follow the nacelle movement, pri- before a rollover occurs the weight on the
gross weight. After moving the nacelles to the marily because the thrust line is above the cg downslope main and the nose gear would
downstop with the TCL switch, another quick and because of the slight cg shift with nacelle allow the airplane to slew around into a safer
input 'autobeeps' Nr from 100% (390rpm) to motion. This movement is automatically coun- downslope heading.
84% (330rpm), or to return to 100% in prepara- tered by the flight control system to some Osprey low-speed flight close to the ground
tion for reconversion. 'Beeping' is also used to extent. The pilot frequently must manually has idiosyncrasies that require pilot familiariza-
refer to use of the nacelle rotation switch to trimmed residual pitch, although this may yet tion. One is the relative wind critical azimuths,
make fine adjustments to tilt angle. be corrected. The cg also moves forward with which are 30-60° and 300-330° with 20-45kts.
Helicopter mode refers to flight with the fuel burn, although not as quickly. Maneuver or acceleration into these avoid
nacelles at between 80° and 97.5", but com- A welcome characteristic of the tiltrotor is the regions in VTOL mode are characterized by
monly 90° (fully vertical). There are mechanical use of nacelle angle for energy management, uncommanded pitch-up with sideslip. PU/SS is
stops at the 0° and 97.5° (7.5" aft) positions to allowing rapid changes in airspeed and a consequence of upwind rotor downwash on
ensure against exceeding these limits. VSTOL descent rate. Indeed, the V-22 can accelerate the horizontal tail during sideslip or quartering
mode has been used to refer to flight with the from a hover to 230kts in a remarkable 18 sec- headwinds giving a nose-up pitching moment.
nacelles between 90° and 60°, while conversion onds, then decelerate and reconvert to a hover The pitch-up reduces forward vision, causes
mode is with the nacelles at 84° to 1°. Transition in an identical period. CONV gives best angle rearward drift, and robs the pilot of full longitu-
has come to refer to flight with the nacelles in of climb performance while APLN provides best dinal control margin that may be required to
motion. Nacelles at 60° are a convenient posi- rate of climb. deal with gusts, all increasing workload. A
tion where the pilot can transition to airplane The V-22 can operate safely from a go up- PU/SS compensation is programmed into the
flight logic from helicopter iogic. Nacelles 0° or slope, downslope, or cross-slope, with greater control laws that rolls the nacelles forward 2-5°.
horizontal, on the mechanical downstop, is air-
plane mode.
The Flight Director (FD, the autopilot) core
modes are barometric and radar altitude
hold/select, airspeed hold/select, heading
hold/select, and hover hold. Hover hold keeps
the aircraft in a hover, hands-off, with less than
1° heading error, less than 1° of pitch and roll
variation, and with no more than 20ft (6m) drift
through 2 minutes - steady enough to allow
external hoist pickups. The other core modes
allow hands-off cruise, departures, and
descents. Other FD modes are Inertial Naviga-
tion and Electronic Navigation. Coupled navi-
gation modes include Instrument Landing
System, Tactical Air Navigation, and Navigation
Reference Point. These are guided modes only,
with autohover the only 'hands-off' feature.
Approach-to-hover and departure-from-hover/
go-around modes remained to be perfected.
Flight Characteristics
The V-22 tiltrotor configuration has many
unique flight characteristics, some that can be
advantageous and others requiring training to
employ properly and avoid hazards.
V-22 Osprey 97
- - - -- - ----------------------------=-----------;
98 V-22 Osprey
Control of the engine is via a dual-redundant
Full-Authority Digital Electronic Control system
that optimizes performance without undue
attention from the aircrew. Its principal purpose
is to covert the power demand signal from the
FCS into a fuel flow command. However, it also
automatically monitors and limits power tur-
bine torque and speed, and gas generator
speed and temperature. Starting, health and
limits monitoring, torque matching, and fuel
efficiency all benefit from the precision offered
by the FADEC. Usually the crew's only interac-
tion with the engine is via the TCL. Separate
controls for each engine, including two Engine
Condition levers (ECl), are located in the
engine control panel on the overhead console.
The ECl selections are CRANK, START, and FLY.
Although simply switches, the ECl replicates
familiar overhead levers found in helicopters.
The Torque Command Limiting System pre-
vents proprotor mast over-torques, adjusting
the torque produced by full TCl based on the
mode of flight and conditions. If an engine fail-
ure is detected, power is immediately and auto-
matically increased on the remaining engine to
the SEO contingency power rating of 6,834shp
(5,096kW). This compensates for the reduction
in blade pitch to maintain rpm that would oth-
erwise also produce a loss in thrust or lift. The
cockpit overhead console INTERIM POWER
switch/light provides a mast torque increase up
to 109% for 103.8% Nr at full TCl and is com- (nacelle rotation point off the wing) in the Above: Unpowered flaperons can droop farther
monly used to provide additional lift during mid/upper portion of each nacelle. Each con- than their normal maximum deflection angle.
The opening in the mid-wing fairing aft of the
heavy weight or hot day takeoffs. It is only sists of a bevel gearbox and an accessory gear-
flaperon is the SOC exhaust. Lower photograph
available at nacelle angles greater than 80 0 box. The bevel gearbox changes the angle of provides a good view of the slot above the flap.
and below 50kts. Interim power can be armed the drive to transmit power from the PRGB to Author; Jay Miller
for automatic activation when these conditions the TAGB in the opposite nacelle. This connec-
are met. tion synchronizes left and right proprotor Below: The large and heavy engine nacelles were
analogous to mounting a Bell 206 JetRanger
The V-22 drive train is comprised of two pro- speed via the ICDS and allows power transfer
helicopter at each wingtip. Author
protor gearboxes (PRGS), two tilt-axis gear- in either direction during SEO operation. It also
boxes (TAGB), the midwing gearbox (MWGB), performs a 1.81 :1 speed reduction between the
and an interconnected drive shaft (ICDS) sys- pylon-mounted drive shaft and the ICDS. The
tem. Should the torque of one engine fall below accessory gearbox provides power to engine
that commanded, uniform proprotor rpm is ancillary components.
maintained via the ICDS that runs through wing The two engines are housed in the two tilting
and connects the engines. Apart from deliver- nacelles. The nacelles can be raised manually
ing torque to the proprotors, the drive system for maintenance, particularly with the aircraft in
also distributes engine power to the various the hangar deck of a vessel when the APU can-
systems and components required for flight not be operated. Various openings allow out-
and mission accomplishment. The transmis- side air to flow into the nacelle to cool
sions are equipped with an emergency lubrica- components, assisted by the transmission
tion system that ensures a minimum 30 compartment blower. Lines running into the
minutes cruise flight after loss of primary lubri- nacelle from the wing, such as for hydraulics
cation. They are also pressurized to prevent the and fuel, are fitted with swivel joints. A fairing
intrusion of contaminants. between the nacelle and the wing encloses the
The PRGB transmit power and provides a conversion actuator that performs the tilting.
37.8:1 engine-to-proprotor rotational speed The nacelles incorporate panels for ready
reduction. It is located between the engine and maintenance access to the engine and gear-
the proprotor in the forward portion of the boxes, four hinged panels on the outboard side
nacelle. The PRGB is connected to the TAGB of the nacelles being primary. The engines are
by a pylon-mounted drive shaft. The PRGB also frequently serviced with the nacelles tilted to 00
serves as a forward mounting point for the and the proprotors rotated to ensure that they
engine though a gimbal assembly, and pro- do not strike the deck. With the nacelles in this
vides a load path from the proprotor to pylon 'maintenance position' the lower two outboard
support structure. access panels can serve as platforms for main-
The left and right TAGS are mounted on the tenance personnel, reducing the need for work
outboard end of the conversion spindle stands.
V-22 Osprey 99
- - - -- --- - - - -----~--------------------____:-----'"'i
Fuel System
The principal fuel tanks are two 478 USgal
(1,809 lit) cells in the forward portion of each
sponson. A 316 USgal (1 ,197 lit) cell is located
in the aft portion of the starboard sponson. Ini-
tially intended in FSD as a tank for the CV-22
and available as a kit for the MV-22, it was
adopted as common equipment. Fuel is fed to
The Engine Air Particle Separators (EAPS) in include a Coanda deflector system. This blows each engine via an 88 USgal (334 lit) feed tank
the inlet is important for operations in dusty and engine bleed air perpendicular to the exhaust just inboard of each wingtip with crossfeed/
sandy conditions. This is a scavenging device flow, deflecting it away from the fuselage. This crosstransfer fuel lines and valves. The system
at the bottom of the inlet just ahead of the operates only with the aircraft on the ground provides a 10-sec negative-g capability via a
engine face that draws in heavy particles from and has the effect of reducing the velocity and small reservoir in each feed tank. Should fuel
the airflow and dumps them overboard. temperature of the exhaust flowing towards the flow from the sponsons be interrupted, the feed
The nacelles also house the Infrared Sup- fuselage. tanks provide approximately 30 minutes flight
pressors. The IRS reduces the infrared signa- The ICDS runs through the MWGB housed time. Each has a suction lift pump to draw fuel
ture of the aircraft by mixing the hot engine within the wing cavity above the cabin. A num- from the sponson tank on its side of the aircraft,
exhaust with cooler air drawn from within and ber of vital accessories and the APU are and each engine has an engine-driven suction
outside the nacelle. It also reduces the intensity mounted to the MWGB. This gearbox, pump to draw fuel from the feeds. A boost
and length of the heat plume extending from accessed by doors in the overwing fairing, pump in each sponson is normally used above
the nacelles to lower this hazard during ground affects a cross-shaft angle change required by 10,000-ft(3,048-m) altitude to transfer fuel to
operations. The end of the IRS and nacelle wing sweep and dihedral. Drive shafting the feeds, in the event of suction pump failure,
between the two TAGBs and MWGB consists of or during fueling/defueling and fuel dumping.
ten ICDS segments. Among the MWGB acces- The sponson and wing crosstransfer capability
sories is the rotor brake. This normally stops ensures that fuel from any tank will feed the
the proprotors in 10 seconds after engine shut- operating engine during SEO scenarios. The
down and application of the brake. An emer- CV-22 has a 294-USgal aux tank inboard of
gency stop from 100% rpm is possible in 20 each feed tank in the wing. In a typical mission
seconds. Rotor locks prevent proprotor rota- profile this extends unrefueled endurance by
tion on the ground in winds up to 45kts and 1.5 hours. In late 2003 the decision was made
even with one engine idling. to delete the aft sponson tank and add two 138
The 300-shp (225kW) APU is a centrifugal US gal (522 lit) tanks to the wings to improve cg
flow gas turbine that burns aircraft fuel. Inlet air management. This would see MV-22B fuel
is drawn from the MWGB compartment and the capacity increase to 1,724 from 1,448 US gal
exhaust is on top of the aircraft. The unit may be (6,526 from 5,481 lit).
started and engaged with the proprotor drive The V-22 features accommodations for up to
train operating or still. The APU drives the three internal aux tanks installed on the cargo
MWGB as motive force for minimum electrical, deck for self-deployment. These allow the air-
hydraulic, and pneumatic power for ground craft to reach to the farthest point on the globe
checkout, engine starting, BFWS, and environ- within two days with only ground refueling. For
mental control. This eliminates the need for the CV-22, the cabin aux tanks (CAT) are also
ground support equipment away from the main used for longer-range operations. The pal-
operating location. The APU control panel is in letized CAT units can be loaded and rigged in
the cockpit overhead console. about one hour per tank, and the aircraft fully
SPINDLE
BEAM
PITCH HORN
SWASHPLATE
NON-ROTATING RING
much more compatible AR speed range. A low- writing and it was possible the capability would nitrogen bottle located in the starboard spon-
speed drogue was under development at time be deleted. It was suspected more fuel would son facilitates blow-down. The pressurized gas
of the V-22 EMD that was expected to improve be burned hovering than that drawing aboard unlocks and powers the actuators.
AR with the KC-130. Initial flight trials demon- via the low flow rate hose. Well doors are mechanically linked to the
strated that the original AR probe was too short gear and thus are opened and close via the
for some pilots to comfortably observe Landing Gear gear cycle without separate actuators. The
probe/basket contact. Late in EMD it was The tricycle landing gear includes nose and opening stroke of the nose doors carries the
decided to use a lengthened probe on the twin main struts fitted with two wheels each. upper portions into the well to reduce the depth
MV-22Bs that would be supplied as a kit and The extend/retract actuators also serve as drag of the exposed portion for easier access to
would probably only be installed when likely to struts while the gear posts serve as vertical components and towing freedom. The forward
be needed. As originally conceived this kit, shock struts. The nose gear retracts aft and up. main gear doors only open during the gear
installed and checked in about one hour, The main gear retract forward and up into the extend and retract cycle. However, as a main-
added 631b (29kg). To ensure it would be out sponsons. Each main gear is designed with a tenance feature the doors can be dropped to
of the field of regard of the radar, the CV-22 two-stage gas/oil shock absorbing system to the ground, or lowered farther should the air-
probe was designed to be fully retractable, with cope with the impact loads of a 12fps (3.7mps) craft be jacked up, to provide access to the
only a small portion exposed at the aircraft sink-rate hard landing and 24fps (7.3mps) gear well. The aft triangular segment of this
nose. crash landing, and allows the crossing of a 4in door is hinged such that it can be rotated for-
The V-22 was designed to be refueled while (10cm) bump during ground roll. The tires pro- ward against the bottom of the door to lay flat
hovering off a vessel at sea using the Hover In- vide adequate flotation to permit VTOL from against the ground when the door is manually
Flight Refueling (HIFR) capability. A fuel hose exceedingly soft surfaces. dropped down. This allows the door to open
would be drawn aboard through the main cabin Gear actuation is via hydraulics while a pneu- farther and provides pads on which the door
door using the rescue hoist and then con- matic emergency blow-down system, one-shot can rest without damage. The larger aft main
nected to the HIFR receiver just inside the door. only, is provided in the event of an electrical or gear doors can be raised and locked such that
The HIFR feature had not been tested to date of hydraulic malfunction. A 2,800-psi (193-bar) it serves as a maintenance platform. For this
purpose the door has no-skid material on the
outer surface.
Landing gear extension is automatically
inhibited above 140kts and warnings activated.
Below 60kts airspeed and 200ft radar (60m)
altitude, warnings will activate if the gear is not
down. Pressing the mute switch on the landing
gear panel silences the aural warning, but the
gear handle light will continue to flash. Aural
warnings are digitized recordings of Barbara
(Barb) Smith, once deputy program manager
of the V-22. Instead of the usual pilot com-
plaints about 'Bitching Betty', they substitute
'Bitching Barb'.
Spar caps
Spar closure
On the ground the hydraulically powered Blade fairing ~
Avionics
A pair of redundant Advanced Mission Com-
puters (AMC or just MC) and three data buses
are the heart of the digital avionics system. The
software that integrates all the avionics is occa-
sionally altered and reloaded into each aircraft
to incorporate improvements or additional
capabilities. Avionics components are distrib-
uted within the aircraft to the extent possible to
reduce system vulnerability.
BIT monitors approximately 850 individual
system tests. The Warning, Caution, and Advi-
sory system provide indications on the cockpit
MFDs while others are displayed on panels
dedicated to specific systems. A Crash Surviv-
able Memory Unit (flight data recorder) is
90
80
rn
UJ
UJ 70
a::
C,!)
UJ
0 60 UPPER LIMIT
I
UJ
~
C,!) 50
z
<{
UJ
~ 40
~
UJ
(.)
<{
z 30
/
V-22 Osprey 107
Left: Nose landing gear. FUR turret is rotated to
the stowed position. Jay Miller
~
MIDWING GEARBOX
S EE VIEW "S" ~
SEE VIEW "A" - - - -......
SHAFT SUPPORT
(DOUBLE BEARING)
CONVERSION SPINDLE
ORlVESHAFT---------2;:"
WING
NOTE
ASSEMBLY~
TRANSMISSION
ADAPTER
PYLON AFT TIP SPAR
SUPPORT
VIEW "A"
PYLON MOUNTED
PRQPROTOR GEARBOX DRIVESHAFT
VIEW ·'8"
between center of vertical tails 17.75ft (5,41m) Control Surface Rotation Limits
between outboard moldline of Elevator, up 30°
vertical tails 18,42ft (5.61m) down 20°
outboard mold line of engine nacelles 50.92ft (15.52m) Rudder, either side of center 20°
VSTOL 84,46ft (25.74m) Flaperon, for roll 25° up 40° down
APLN 83.92ft (25.58m) as flaps 72.5° down
· . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. ..........................•.
wing stowed 18,42ft (561m)
Length Landing Gear
nose to tail 57.33ft (17,47m) Wheel track
wing stowed 63.00ft (19.20m) outside of outer wheels 15,42ft (470m)
Height strut to strut 13.00ft (3.96m)
tip of spinner, VSTOL 22.08ft (6.73m) Wheelbase 25.00ft (7.62m)
rotor tip path, VSTOL 20.83ft (6.35m) Nose gear steering angle ±75°
top of tail beacon 17.92ft (5,46m) Tip-back angle on ground, max 13.00°
nacelle rotation axis 12.33ft (3.76m) Roll angle on ground, max 14,40°
wing stowed 18.25ft (5.56m)
elevator centerline 9.67ft (2.95m) Weights
bottom of vertical tail 617ft (1.88m)
Empty (objective) 33,1401b (15,030kg)
bottom of engine nacelle, VSTOL 433ft (1.32m)
Design gross (60% fuel) 39,5001b (17,917kg)
cabin floor 2.80ft (0 85m)
Takeoff gross (VTDL, sea level), max 52,6001b (23,860kg)
fuselage bottom - nominal 1.50ft (0,46m)
... .. .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. STD gross, max 57,0001b (25,855kg)
Wing Self-deployment GW (smooth field STO) 57,000-60,500Ib (25,855-27,440kg)
Area
incl flaperons and across fuselage 382.00ft' (35,49m') Fuel Capacity (pre-Block B changes)
exposed, including flaperons 301,40ft' (28.00m')
Total usable (MV), JP-5 1,448 USgal (5,481 lit) 9,850 Ib (4,470kg)
Span (engine axis to engine axis, spinner tip)
Total usable (CV), JP-5 2,036 USgal (7, 707 lit) 13,8451b 6,280kg)
VSTOL 46.83ft (14.20m)
Cabin aux. tank (two load able), each 430 USgal (1,630 lit)
APLN 45.83ft (13.97m)
Refuel rate, max
Sweep angle 6.00° forward
pressure refuel & AR =400 USgal/min (1,515IiVmin)
Dihedral angle 3.50°
gravity refuel =100 gal/min (380 lillmin)
Chord length 833ft (2.54m)
Defueling rate, suction or gravity drain = 80 USgal/min (303 lillmin)
Airtoil max thickness 1.92ft (0.58m)
Fuel dump rate 800lb/min (365kg/min)
Thickness to chord ratio 23%
Below, left: The aft fairing on the Below, right: The inlet aft of the door Bottom left:The MV-22 and CV-22 antennas and other prominent
port sponson of the MV-22B has is for avionics cooling air. This is sensors are detailed here. Author
the radar warning receiver antenna a particle separator made up of a
at top and Missile Warning System series of holes that induce swirl Below: The V-22 exterior lights are detailed in this diagram.
sensor below. Jay Miller and separate large particles. Author Author's collection
EXTERIOR LIGHTS
•
ANTI-COLLISION
FORMATION /
PROBE
7 '\
REFUELING
SEARCH/LANDING
SEARCH/LANDING
\
posmON
POS!TION (RED)
V-22 Osprey t 11
-----------------_ .. _-
Chapter Nine
Tiltrotor Gallery
Two views of the Bell XV·3 as displayed at the U.S. Army Aviation Museum at Ft. Rucker, Alabama during August of 1987. The aircraft is configured and
painted as it was during its final year of flight test under the auspices of the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA), the predecessor to
today's National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). Both Jay Miller
I
I
Above: A large portion of the MV-22 test fleet
in 2003 is seen on the flight test ramp at NAS
Patuxent River, Maryland. Navy
Below: Aircraft 22 was delivered with an overall silver finish for reflectivity testing with the new lightweight paint.
The photo was taken at Bell's Amarillo, Texas final assembly facility. Bell Helicopter
Above: One of the EMD test aircraft flies in apparent serenity over a Maryland coastline near Patuxent River NAS. NAVAIR
Below: The first EMD test aircraft, ship 7, cruises in airplane mode above wetlands during flight testing in the latter half of the 1990s. NAVAIR
Below: The Model 609 during post-flight maintenance in the main Bell flight test facility hangar. Note that the engine nacelles are rotated to near horizontal
flight attitude for maintenance access. Jay Miller
AIR WAR ON THE EDGE THE X-PLANES Red Star Volume 8 Red Star Volume 14
AHistory of the Israel Air Force X-l toX-45 RUSSIA'S EKRANOPLANS MIL Mi-8/Mi-17
and its Aircraft since 1947 New, totally revised third edition Caspian Sea Monster and other WIG Craft Rotary-Wing Workhorse and Warhorse
Bill Norton Jay Miller Sergey Komissarov Yefim Gordon and Dmitriy Komissarov
ONTHEEDGE
AIR * WAR
An in-depth book on the aircraft, units This new, totally revised and updated Known as wing-In-ground effect (WIGE) Since 1961, when it first took to the air,
and exploits of the Israel Air Force. version of 'The X-Planes' contains craft or by their Russian name of the basic design of the Mi-8 has evolved.
Detailed type-by-type coverage a detailed and authoritative account ekranoplan, these vehicles operate on Every known version, both civil and
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Included for the first time are all of the propulsion systems and disposition. bureaus are covered, including the participating in countless wars of
badges and heraldry of the units of the Included are rare cockpit illustrations. Orlyonok, the only ekranoplan to see varying scale. The type is probably best
IAF, in full colour. Each X-Plane is also illustrated by a squadron service, the Loon and the KM, known for its service in the Afghan War.
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Hbk, 282 x 213 mm, 432pp, 470 b/w, Hbk, 280 x 216mm, 440pp, c980 Softback, 280 x 215 mm, 128 pages 179 b/w and 32 colour photographs,
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"
Tiiinrn I
facility in Hurst, Texas at the start of its delivery flight
to the US Marines Corps at Patuxent River, Maryland.
Above: The first Bell/Boeing V-22 following roll-out
on May 23, 1988. Both Jay Miller
9 781857 801651
Front cover: The rigging team has no difficulty working
beneath the hovering Osprey as they hook up a USA $29.95! UK £16.99
HMMWV for sling carriage under aircraft 8. NAVAIR