Group 2 - Bail (Complete)
Group 2 - Bail (Complete)
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
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8.1 BAIL
Guide Question(s): May a person arrested and detained for supposedly participating or
executing the commands of others in a rebellion be prevented from seeking bail in the event
that the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended? How about the person who heads
the rebellion?
ANSWER(S): According to Article 135 RPC, a person merely participating or executing the commands of
others in a rebellion shall suffer the penalty of reclusion temporal. Both the Rules of Court and the
Constitution provide that all persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua
and when the evidence of guilt is strong, shall before conviction be bailable. As the penalty for the person
merely executing the commands in a rebellion is only reclusion temporal, he may seek bail. This is even if
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Article 3 of the 1987 Constitution provides “the
right to bail shall not be impaired even when the writ of habeas corpus is suspended.”
But a person who heads the rebellion shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. As this is a non-bailable
offense, Rule 114, sec. 7 applies. “No person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment shall be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong regardless
of the stage of the criminal prosecution.” The judge is mandated to conduct a hearing to determine whether
or not the evidence of guilt is strong. If it is not, the person will be granted bail as a matter of right.
Because of the constitutional protection provided for bail, the right to bail will not be impaired even if the
writ of habeas corpus is suspended.
8.2 Definition; Purpose; Not a bar to objections on illegal arrest, lack of or irregular preliminary
investigation
Facts: Flaviano Cortes filed a complaint against RTC judge Catral for granting bail in murder
cases without conducting hearings and for reducing bailbonds that were too low in a case of
illegal possession of firearms and in a homicide case. In the murder cases, Catral said that he
acted on the prosecutor’s recommendation of bail and that the prosecutor opted not to introduce
evidence. In the case for illegal possession of firearms, Judge Catral reduced the bailbond
because there was no serious opposition from the prosecution. The OCA dismissed Cortes’
complaint because Judge Catral didn’t act in bad faith when he reduced the bailbonds.
Issue: W/N Judge Catral was guilty of Gross Ignorance of the Law - YES
Held: The SC held that Judge Catral was guilty of gross ignorance of the law for granting bail
to the accused without conducting the requisite hearing.
As provided in Rule 114, sec. 7, when a person is charged with an offense punishable by death,
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, bail is a matter of discretion. For this reason, a judge
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is mandated to conduct a hearing whether summary or otherwise, to determine whether the
evidence of guilt is strong.
Bail should be fixed according to the circumstances of each case. The amount fixed should be
sufficient to ensure the presence of the accused at the trial yet reasonable enough to comply
with the constitutional provision that bail should not be excessive. Therefore, whether bail is a
matter of right or of discretion, reasonable notice of hearing is required to be given to the
prosecutor or fiscal or at least he must be asked for his recommendation because in fixing the
amount of bail, the judge is required to take into account a number of factors such as the
applicant's character and reputation, forfeiture of other bonds or whether he is a fugitive from
justice.
However, the judge is not bound by the recommendation of the prosecutor and the affidavits
and the sworn statements of the witnesses, which are mere hearsay and cannot be the basis for
determining whether or not evidence of guilt is strong. In the case of Inocencio Basco v Judge
Rapatalo, the Court ruled that the judge is mandated to conduct a hearing even in cases where
the prosecution chooses to just file a comment or leave the application of bail to the sound
discretion of the court.
The duties of a trial judge in case of application for bail were reiterated in this case:
1. In all cases, whether bail is a matter of right or of discretion, notify the prosecutor of
the hearing of the application for bail or require him to submit his recommendation.
2. Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a hearing of the application for bail
regardless of whether or not the prosecution refuses to present evidence to show that
the guilt of the accused is strong for the purpose of enabling the court to exercise its
sound discretion.
3. Decide whether the guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary of evidence of
the prosecution
4. If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the approval of the
bailbond. Otherwise the petition should be denied.
Judge Catral granted bail to an accused charged with murder without having conducted any
hearing. The hearing could have determined whether or not the evidence of guilt was strong. He
tried to justify his actions by saying that he acted on the prosecutor’s recommendation who
chose not to introduce evidence. But as has been explained, the judge is not bound by the
recommendation of a prosecutor. Furthermore, the accused in the murder case of People v
Duerme was not yet arrested when bail was granted. Right to bail can only be availed by a
person who is in custody of the law or otherwise deprived of his liberty. It would be premature
to file a petition for bail for someone whose freedom has yet to be curtailed.
How bail was defined: Bail is the security required by the court and given by the accused to
ensure that the accused appears before the proper court at the scheduled time and place to
answer the charges brought against him or her. It is awarded to the accused to honor the
presumption of innocence until his guilt is proven beyond reasonable doubt, and to enable him
to prepare his defense without being subject to punishment prior to conviction.
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Facts: Yap sought bail on appeal when he was convicted of estafa at the RTC. The CA granted
bail at P5.5M and imposed certain conditions such as (1) securing a certification from the
Mayor if the petitioner would change residence and (2) issuance of hold departure order. Yap
contended that his rights against excessive bail and liberty of abode and travel were violated by
the CA resolution. The amount of P5.5M was already equivalent to the civil liability.
Issues:
Held:
Issue 1: The SC held that the appellate court had discretion to extend bail during the course of
appeal but it should do so with great caution because the accused had already been convicted at
the trial court. However, the Court found the P5.5 mail excessive and was reduced to P200,000.
The prohibition against requiring excessive bail is enshrined in the Constitution. As held De la
Camara v Enage, imposing bail in an excessive amount could render meaningless the right to
bail. Rule 114, Sec 9 outlines the factors in setting the amount of bail.
(i) The fact that the accused was a fugitive from justice when arrested; and
The Court noted that the discretion to extend bail during the course of the appeal should be
exercised with grave caution and for strong reasons, considering that the accused had been in
fact convicted by the trial court. Senator Vicente J. Francisco opined in an earlier case that bail
should be denied after judgment of conviction as a matter of wise discretion. “The importance
attached to conviction is due to the underlying principle that bail should be granted only where
it is uncertain whether the accused is guilty or innocent, and therefore, where that uncertainty is
removed by conviction it would, generally speaking, be absurd to admit to bail.” Despite Yap’s
conviction and the possibility of flight, the CA granted his application for bail. Nevertheless, it
must be said that the bail of P 5.5M is excessive as it is tantamount to the civil liability.
Issue 2: The SC also emphasized that the right to change abode and to travel is not absolute. It
can be impaired by a lawful order of the Court.
In setting the amount of bail, the court is not precluded from installing devices to ensure that the
accused would not jump bail. Options may include increasing the bail bond to an appropriate
level or requiring the person to report periodically to the court and to make an accounting of his
movements.
Article 3, sec. 6 of the 1987 Constitution states: The liberty of abode and of changing the same
within the limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court.
The petitioner in this case had left the country several times while the case was pending. The
CA then required the confiscation of his passport and the issuance of a hold departure order. As
an additional condition for the granting of bail, the petitioner needed to secure a certification
from the Mayor if the petitioner would change residence. As provided by the Constitution, the
liberty of abode and travel can be impaired by a lawful order of the court. In this case, the order
releasing Yap on bail was a lawful order.
Facts: Edward Serapio, who was a member of the Board of Trustees and the Legal Counsel of
the ERAP Muslim Youth Foundation was charged with plunder alongside President Joseph
Estrada and Jinggoy Estrada. Serapio filed a petition for bail, motion to quash the information
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and a petition for habeas corpus which the Sandiganbayan denied.
Issues:
Held:
An accused need not wait for his arraignment before filing a petition for bail. If he had to wait,
that would place the accused in a position where he has to choose between (1) filing a motion to
quash and thus delay his release on bail because until his motion to quash can be resolved, his
arraignment cannot be held and (2) foregoing the filing of a motion to quash so that he can be
arraigned at once and thereafter be released on bail. This would undermine his constitutional
right not to be put on trial except upon a valid complaint or information sufficient to charge him
with a crime and his right to bail.
When bail is a matter of right, an accused may apply for and be granted bail even before
arraignment. Adhering to the ruling in Lavides v CA, an application for bail involving an
offense punishable by reclusion perpetua to death may also be heard even before arraignment.
Furthermore, if the court finds in such case that the accused is entitled to bail because the
evidence against him is not strong, he may be granted provisional liberty even before
arraignment. In such a situation, bail would be “authorized” under the circumstances.
Issue 2: Motion to quash doesn’t bar petition for bail. There is no inconsistency between an
application for bail and filing of motion to quash. Bail is the security given for the release of a
person in the custody of the law, furnished by him or a bondsman, to guarantee his appearance
before any court as required under the conditions set forth under the Rules of Court. Its purpose
is to obtain the provisional liberty of a person charged with an offense until his conviction
while at the same time securing his appearance at the trial.
On the other hand, a motion to quash an information is the mode by which an accused assails
the validity of a criminal complaint or information filed against him for insufficiency on its face
in point of law, or for defects which are apparent in the face of the Information.
Motion to quash and petition for bail have objectives which are not antithetical to each other.
Issue 3: Petition for habeas corpus is not the appropriate remedy for asserting one’s right to bail,
when bail is a matter of discretion of the court.
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In this case, the reason for the delay in bail hearings was not solely attributed to the
Sandiganbayan. Serapio had filed various motions. On this note, a petition for habeas corpus is
not the appropriate remedy for asserting one’s right to bail. It cannot be availed where accused
is entitled to bail not as a matter of right but on the discretion of the court and the latter has not
abused such discretion in refusing to grant bail, or has not even exercised said discretion. The
proper recourse is to file an application for bail with the court where the criminal case is
pending and to allow hearings to proceed.
Opinions:
J. Vitug: The justice concurs that the arraignment of an accused is not a prerequisite to the
conduct of hearings on a petition for bail; that there is no inconsistency between an application
of an accused for bail and his filing of a motion to quash; and that there is no basis for the
issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. However, for the matters in GR 148769 which pertains to
an allegation that the information charged more than one offense and in GR 149116 where it
was alleged that the Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion in denying Serapio’s
omnibus motion, J. Vitug voted to remand the case to the Sandiganbayan for further
proceedings on the bail application of Serapio.
Facts: Two burnt cadavers identified as the bodies of Vicente Bauzon and Elizer Tuliao were
found in Isabela. The accused police officers were acquitted of murder but one officer, SPO2
Maderal, remained at large. When he was arrested, he pointed at petitioners Miranda, Dalmacio
and Ocon as among those responsible for the crime. Warrants of arrest were issued against them
by Judge Tumaliuan. The petitioners filed an urgent motion to quash the warrants of arrest but
they were absent during the hearing. For this reason, the judge denied their motions because the
court didn’t acquire jurisdiction over their persons. But when Judge Anghad took over the case,
he cancelled the warrants because there was an appeal filed before the Secretary of Justice and
because he had doubts as to the existence of probable cause due to the political climate in the
city at that time. Nevertheless, the CA ruled that Judge Anghad committed grave abuse of
discretion and directed him to issue warrants of arrest against the petitioners. The CA also
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opined that an accused cannot seek any judicial relief if he does not submit his person to the
jurisdiction of the court.
Issue: W/N accused can seek any judicial relief without submitting his person to the
jurisdiction of the court - YES
Held: Neither custody of the law nor jurisdiction over the person of accused is required in the
following: (1) in civil cases, motions to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant; (2) in criminal cases, motion to quash a complaint on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused; (3) motions to quash warrant of arrest. These
3 special appearances are exceptions to the rule that the filing of pleadings and seeking
affirmative reliefs constitute submission of one’s person to the jurisdiction of the court.
The Court differentiated “custody of the law” and “jurisdiction over the person,” as laid out in
the case of Santiago v Vasquez. Custody of the law is required before the court can act upon the
application for bail. It signifies restraint on the person who is deprived of his own will and
liberty. Custody of the law is literally custody over the body of the accused. It is accomplished
either by arrest or voluntary surrender. On the other hand, jurisdiction over the person of the
accused is acquired upon his arrest or voluntary appearance.
One can be under the custody of the law but not yet subject to the jurisdiction of the court over
his person, such as when a person arrested by virtue of a warrant files a motion to quash the
warrant before his arraignment takes place. On the reverse, one can be subject to the jurisdiction
of the court over his person but not be under the custody of the law, such as when an accused
escapes custody after his trial has commenced.
In Pico v Combong, it was cited that a person applying for bail must be in the custody of the
law or otherwise deprived of liberty. The SC stood by this pronouncement as far as bail was
concerned but clarified that as a general rule, one who seeks affirmative relief is deemed to
have submitted to the jurisdiction of the court. The only exception is “special appearances” such
as motion to quash warrant of arrest.
It is incongruous to grant bail to one who is free. In the same way, one should not be required to
surrender his freedom before asserting it. For this reason, it’s unnecessary for petitioners, who
haven’t been arrested, to submit their persons to the jurisdiction of the court before they can file
a motion to quash their warrants. Human rights enjoy a higher preference in the hierarchy of
rights than property rights, demanding that due process in the deprivation of liberty must come
before its taking and not after.
However, the Court held that quashing a warrant of arrest based on a petition for review with
the Secretary of Justice and based on doubts with regard to probable cause due to political
climate was an act of grave abuse of discretion on the part of Judge Anghad.
How bail was defined: In Feliciano v. Pasicolan, we held that "[t]he purpose of bail is to
secure one’s release and it would be incongruous to grant bail to one who is free. Thus, ‘bail is
the security required and given for the release of a person who is in the custody of law.’" The
rationale behind this special rule on bail is that it discourages and prevents resort to the former
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pernicious practice wherein the accused could just send another in his stead to post his bail,
without recognizing the jurisdiction of the court by his personal appearance therein and
compliance with the requirements therefor.
Facts: Jose Antonio Leviste, charged for the murder of Rafael delas Alas, was convicted by the
RTC for homicide. He was sentenced to suffer 6 years and 1 day of prision mayor as minimum
to 12 years and 1 day of reclusion temporal as maximum. Leviste applied for bail pending
appeal but the CA denied his application. It applied the bedrock principle in the matter of bail
pending appeal, that the extension of bail should be exercised with grave caution and for strong
reasons. Leviste accused the CA of grave abuse of discretion. He claims that in the absence of
bail-negating circumstances enumerated in sec 5, Rule 114, his bail should have been granted
automatically.
Issue: W/N bail should be automatically granted if bail-negating circumstances are absent - NO
Held: The granting of bail pending appeal should be exercised with great caution and for strong
reasons. It is a matter of wise discretion of the court which involves balancing the interests of
society and of those of the accused.
Rule 114, sec 5 states, “Upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, the accused who has been
sentenced to prison must typically begin serving time immediately unless, on application, he is
admitted to bail.” The accused’s interest in bail pending appeal includes freedom pending
judicial review, opportunity to efficiently prepare his case and avoidance of potential hardships
of prison. On the other hand, society’s interests include protecting itself by swiftly incarcerating
an individual who is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of a crime serious enough to warrant
prison time, prevention of the accused’s flight from court custody, protection of the community
from potential danger and the avoidance of delay in punishment. These two interests should be
balanced. In addition to this, the Court has applied a strict approach in granting bail when it’s
discretionary.
If the penalty imposed by the trial court is imprisonment exceeding six (6) years, the accused
shall be denied bail, or his bail shall be cancelled upon a showing by the prosecution, with
notice to the accused, of the following or other similar circumstances:
Based on the evolution of the rule on bail pending appeal, a stringent standards approach must
be applied. With this, the rule must be interpreted to mean that when the bail-negating
circumstances enumerated above are absent, the granting of bail pending appeal becomes
discretionary.
The earliest rules made all grants of bail after conviction for a non-capital offense by the Court
of First Instance discretionary. The 1988 amendments made applications for bail pending
appeal favorable to the appellant-applicant. Bail before final conviction in trial courts for non-
capital offenses or offenses not punishable by reclusion perpetua was a matter of right,
meaning, admission to bail was a matter of right at any stage of the action where the charge was
not for a capital offense or was not punished by reclusion perpetua.
In January 1992, Administrative Circular No. 12-94 made bail pending appeal (of a conviction
by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment) discretionary. Later, A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC modified Administrative Circular
No. 12-94 and reiterated the "tough on bail pending appeal" principle. Pursuant to this policy,
the presence of bail-negating conditions calls for the denial or revocation of bail pending
appeal.
Citing Yap v CA, the denial of bail pending appeal is a matter of wise discretion. In this present
case, Leviste was already convicted by the trial court and sentenced to a penalty exceeding 6
years of imprisonment. After conviction by the trial court, the presumption of innocence
terminates and, accordingly, the constitutional right to bail ends. The grant of bail becomes
subject to judicial discretion. Leviste applied for bail because of his advanced age, health
condition and because he claimed that he was not a flight risk. Exercising great caution, the CA
denied bail because bail is not a sick pass for an ailing or aged detainee. In addition, Leviste
failed to prove that he was gravely ill.
Held: Enrile’s poor health justifies his admission to bail. The Court didn’t consider the
presence of mitigating circumstances because it’s factual in nature and must be dealt with in the
trial court. In granting Enrile’s bail, the court became mindful of the principal purpose of bail
which is to guarantee the appearance of the accused at trial, or whenever so required by the
court.
The country has a responsibility in the international community arising from the national
commitment under the Universal Declaration of Human Right. Enshrined in the Constitution is
the principle of upholding the worth and dignity of every person. Article 2, sec 2 of the 1987
Constitution states: “The state values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full
respect of human rights.” With this, the Philippines has the responsibility of protecting and
promoting the right of every person to liberty and due process, ensuring that those detained or
arrested can participate in the proceedings before a court, to enable it to decide without delay on
the legality of the detention and order their release if justified.
Hence, the national commitment to uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the
worth and dignity of every person has authorized the grant of bail not only to those charged in
criminal proceedings but also to extraditees upon a clear and convincing showing:
In Dela Rama v People’s Court, the Court held that “unless allowance of bail is forbidden by
law in the particular case, the illness of the prisoner independently of the merits of the case, is a
circumstance, and the humanity of the law makes it a consideration which should, regardless of
the charge and the stage of the proceeding, influence the court to exercise its discretion to admit
the prisoner to bail.
Enrile has shown that he is not a flight risk and that there are humanitarian reasons to be
considered in his case. His social and political standing and his having immediately surrendered
to authorities indicate that he is unlikely to be a flight risk. He has always respected the legal
processes of the country, even when he was charged with rebellion many years ago. Enrile is
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also suffering from several life threatening ailments. Granting the provisional liberty to Enrile
will not only enable him to receive proper treatment for his condition and allow him to prepare
for his defense, but more importantly it will guarantee his appearance in court for trial. For this
reason, the SC held that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in denying bail
to Enrile.
Guide Question(s): Who can avail of the right to bail? When can it be availed of? Does an
accused need to wait for his or her arraignment before applying for bail? Is the filing of a
complaint or information necessary before bail may be applied for? Would the answers to the
foregoing questions be the same in cases involving offenses punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment?
ANSWER(S): The Rules of Court, jurisprudence and the Constitution show who can avail of the right to
bail. Rule 114 sec. 1 defines bail as the security given for the release of a person in custody of the law.
Miranda v Tuliao, citing Pico v Combong, emphasizes further that a person applying for bail must be in the
custody of the law or otherwise deprived of liberty. Persons who have either been arrested, detained or
otherwise deprived of their freedom can seek the protective mantle of the right to bail (Paderanga v CA).
Article 3, sec 13 of the 1987 Constitution states that “all persons, except those charged with offenses
punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by
sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law.” The case of Enrile v
Sandiganbayan also discussed that the national commitment to uphold human rights as enshrined in the
Constitution, also authorizes the grant of bail not only to those charged in criminal proceedings but also to
extraditees upon the showing of two conditions: (1) the detainee will not be a flight risk or a danger to the
community; and (2) there exists special, humanitarian and compelling reasons.
An accused doesn’t need to wait for his or her arraignment before applying for bail or for a complaint or
information to be filed. As held in Serapio v Sandiganbayan, the arraignment of an accused is not a
prerequisite to the conduct of hearings on his petition for bail. A person is allowed to petition for bail as
soon as he is deprived of his liberty by virtue of his arrest or voluntary surrender, even before a complaint
or information is filed against him. The Court referred to the doctrine in Lavides v CA that in cases where it
is authorized, bail should be granted before arraignment, otherwise the accused may be precluded from
filing a motion to quash. It must be understood then that hearing on a petition for bail doesn’t always
precede arraignment. The basic rule is that as soon as a person is deprived of liberty because of his arrest or
voluntary surrender, he may apply for bail. Arraignment was taken up in Lavides because the facts revealed
that the accused also filed a motion to quash the information aside from applying for bail. To condition the
grant of bail on arraignment would force the accused to select between filing a motion to quash the
information and foregoing such. Choosing a motion to quash first would delay the release of the accused
on bail because the motion to quash must be settled first. If the accused foregoes the filing of motion to
quash so that he can be arraigned and then be released on bail, his constitutional right would be violated as
he would be put on trial without a valid complaint or information.
For cases involving offenses punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, an application
for bail may also be heard even before the accused is arraigned. It follows then that an information or
complaint need not be filed yet.
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Rule 114, sec 7, “No person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua
or life imprisonment shall be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong regardless of the stage of the
criminal prosecution.” As held in Cortes v Catral, a judge is mandated to conduct a hearing to determine
whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong. If the evidence of guilt is strong, then the person cannot be
admitted to bail. But if the evidence of guilt is not strong then he can be granted provisional liberty. This
hearing can take place before arraignment thus the accused can be granted bail even before the
arraignment.
Not everyone charged with a capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment will be granted bail. Bail will only apply if the evidence of guilt is not strong. But recently,
in Enrile v Sandiganbayan, where Enrile was charged with plunder, an offense punishable by reclusion
perpetua, it has been held that bail can be granted for humanitarian reasons. For the purpose of bail is not to
punish but to ensure that the accused appears before trial.
Guide Question(s): What is the difference between “custody of law” and “jurisdiction over
the person”? How may each of these be accomplished or acquired? Which of these is required
before an application for bail may be granted? What is the rationale behind such requirement?
ANSWER(S): Custody of the law pertains to restraint on the person who is deprived of his own will and
liberty. It literally means custody over the body of the accused. It is accomplished either by arrest or
voluntary surrender. On the other hand, jurisdiction over the person of the accused is acquired upon his
arrest or voluntary appearance (Miranda v Tuliao).
The Miranda case citing Feliciano v Pasicolan, explained that a person applying for bail must be in the
custody of the law or be deprived of liberty for bail cannot be granted to one who is free. This is to prevent
the pernicious practice where the accused sends another in his stead to post his bail without recognizing the
jurisdiction of the court by his personal appearance and by complying with the requirements.
All kinds of bail are subject to conditions (be it cash, property, surety, or recognizance). As to the
requirements, first, the accused must sign a written undertaking containing the conditions of bail which he
must comply with as a condition for his release. Second, the following conditions must be complied with:
1. The accused's undertaking is effective from approval of bail until promulgation of judgment of the
Regional Trial Court, unless bail is otherwise cancelled;
2. The accused is required to appear before the court whenever it is so required, either by the court or
by the Rules;
3. The accused waives the right to be present during the trial of his case if, despite notice, he fails to
appear before the court without justification; and
4. The bondsman undertakes to surrender the accused to the court for execution of the final judgment.
Note: It is to be noted that the court granting the bail may impose other conditions aside from
these four.
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And third, the original papers must state the accused's full name and address, the amount of bail, and the
conditions of bail. Attached to the original papers are photographs of the accused showing his face, and his
left and right profiles.
Guide Question(s): When would the bail bond become effective? When would it lose its
effectivity?
ANSWER(S): The rule states that the bail bond is "effective upon approval, and unless cancelled, shall
remain in force at all stages of the case until promulgation of judgment of the Regional Trial Court,
irrespective of whether the case was originally filed in or appealed to it."
Bail shall be effective until promulgation in the Regional Trial Court, whether or not the criminal action
was instituted in the Regional Trial Court or was appealed to it from a decision of the Metropolitan or
Municipal Trial Court. It is to be noted that in a case where bail may still be availed of after the
promulgation of the Regional Trial Court decision, the accused may apply for bail again, since the
effectivity of the earlier bail has lapsed.
The conditions imposed operates as a valid restriction on the accused’s right to travel. The person
admitted to bail may be prevented from leaving the Philippines, which is "a necessary consequence of the
nature and function of a bail bond." Preventing one’s departure from the Philippines is justified, otherwise,
said orders and processes will be nugatory, and inasmuch as the jurisdiction of the courts from which they
issued does not extend beyond that of the Philippines they would have no binding force outside of said
jurisdiction.
Guide Question(s): Would the failure of the accused to appear at the trial necessarily be
deemed as a waiver of his or her right to be present thereat?
ANSWER(S): No. The rule states that the failure of the accused to appear at the trial shall be deemed as a
waiver of his or her right to be present thereat if it was without justification and despite due notice. If the
failure of the accused to appear at the trial is without justification and despite due notice, the trial, as a
result, may proceed in absentia. The requisites for a trial in absentia are:
1. the accused has already been arraigned;
2. the accused has been duly notified of the trial; and
3. the failure of the accused to appear is unjustified.
The fact that the accused has waived his appearance at the trial which shall proceed in absentia does not
deprive the prosecution of the “right to require the presence of the accused for purposes of identification by
its witnesses which is vital for the conviction of the accused."
Guide Question(s): Does the accused’s waiver of such right release him or her from his or her
obligation under the bail bond to appear before the proper court whenever required by the
court or the Rules?
ANSWER(S): No. Such waiver does not release the accused from the obligation to appear whenever
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required by the court or the rules, as "the accused may waive his right but not his duty or obligation to the
court."
Guide Question(s): In which of the following instances is bail a matter of right—(a) after
conviction by the Municipal Trial Court of an offense punishable by prision correccional; (b)
before conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense punishable by life imprisonment;
(c) after conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense punishable by prision mayor; (d)
all of the above?
ANSWER(S): A, after conviction by the Municipal Trial Court of an offense punishable by prision
correccional. Under Section 4, Rule 114, a person in custody, before or after conviction by the Municipal
Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, and Municipal Circuit Trial Court, is entitled to bail as a matter of
right. Those persons in custody before conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable
by life imprisonment, death, or reclusion perpetua are likewise entitled to bail as a matter of right.
Summary: Rufina Chua met Wilfred Chiok, who represented himself as a licensed stockbroker
and an expert in the stock market. Chiok issued two checks as payment to Chua but when
petitioner deposited them in the drawee bank, the checks were dishonored for insufficient funds,
reason for respondent to be charged with estafa. The trial court convicted respondent of estafa
and sentenced him to suffer twelve (12) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to twenty (20)
years of reclusion temporal, as maximum. The prosecution then filed a motion for cancellation
of bail on the ground that respondent might flee or commit another crime. The prosecution
presented a Record Check Routing Form issued by the Bureau of Immigration showing that
respondent has an Alien Certificate of Registration (ACR) and Immigrant Certificate of
Residence (ICR). Trial court issued an Omnibus Order canceling his bail. Respondent filed with
the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari with application for a temporary restraining order
(TRO) and a writ preliminary injunction. CA issued a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining
the arrest of respondent, holding that the latter should not be deprived of his liberty pending
resolution of his appeal as the offense for which he was convicted is a non-capital offense; and
that the probability that he will flee during the pendency of his appeal is merely conjectural.
Hence, the instant petition for certiorari.
In resolving the issue as to whether or not the filing of the motions for Injunctions assailing
the Omnibus Order cancelling the bail is proper, the Supreme Court held in the negative,
averring Section 5, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure which provides for
instances where bail becomes a matter of discretion. It ruled that private respondent’s
appropriate remedy against the trial court’s Omnibus Order canceling his bail is by filing with
the Court of Appeals a motion to review the said order. The filing of a separate petition via a
special civil action or special proceeding questioning such adverse order before the appellate
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court is proscribed. Hence, the Court of Appeals erred in not dismissing outright respondent’s
petition for certiorari. The basic rule is that such petition may only be availed of when "there is
no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law."
It further held that the resolution of CA granting respondent’s application for a writ of
preliminary injunction enjoining the implementation of the trial court’s Omnibus Order
canceling his bail, is bereft of any factual or legal basis. To be entitled to an injunctive writ, the
applicant must show that (1) he has a clear existing right to be protected; and (2) the acts against
which the injunction is to be directed are in violation of such right. The first requisite is absent.
Respondent has no right to be freed on bail pending his appeal from the trial court’s judgment.
His conviction carries a penalty of imprisonment exceeding 6 years (to be exact, 12 years of
prision mayor, as minimum, to 20 years of reclusion temporal, as maximum) which justifies the
cancellation of his bail pursuant to the third paragraph of Section 5 (b), (d) and (e) of Rule 114.
Moreover, he failed to appear despite notice during the promulgation of judgment. His
inexcusable non-appearance not only violated the condition of his bail that he "shall appear"
before the court "whenever required" by the latter or the Rules, but also showed the probability
that he might flee or commit another crime while released on bail.
Doctrine:
● The resolution of CA granting respondent’s application for a writ of preliminary
injunction enjoining the implementation of the trial court’s Omnibus Order canceling his
bail, is bereft of any factual or legal basis. To be entitled to an injunctive writ, the
applicant must show that:
1. he has a clear existing right to be protected; and
2. the acts against which the injunction is to be directed are in violation of such
right.
● Absent any of the requisite would warrant respondent’s lack of right to be freed on bail
pending his appeal from the trial court’s judgment.
● After conviction by the RTC wherein a penalty of imprisonment exceeding 6 but not
more than 20 years is imposed, and not one of the bail-negating circumstances in Section
5, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure is present and proved, bail is a
matter of discretion.
● Pursuant to Section 5, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, the
appropriate remedy of the accused against the trial court’s order cancelling his bail is by
filing with the Court of Appeals a motion to review the said order. The petition for
certiorari with prayer for a TRO and a writ of preliminary injunction is not the proper
recourse in assailing the trial court Omnibus Order canceling his bail.
Guide Question(s): Does a finding that none of the five bail-negating circumstances is present
automatically result in the grant of bail?
ANSWER(S): No. The absence of bail negating circumstances in cases where the penalty is imprisonment
exceeding six (6) years does not automatically lead to a grant of bail, as discretion would still be exercised
by the court. According to Leviste v. CA, if none of the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of
Section 5, Rule 114 is present, the appellate court has the discretion to grant or deny bail. An application
for bail pending appeal may be denied even if the bail-negating circumstances in the third paragraph of
Section 5, Rule 114 are absent.
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LEVISTE V. CA, April 12, 2007, G.R. No. 140842
Summary: Charged with the murder of Rafael de las Alas, Leviste was convicted by the RTC of
Makati City for the lesser crime of homicide and sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of
six years and one day of prision mayor as minimum to 12 years and one day of reclusion
temporal as maximum. He appealed his conviction to the CA. Pending appeal, he filed an urgent
application for admission to bail pending appeal, citing his advanced age and health condition,
and claiming the absence of any risk or possibility of flight on his part. The CA denied his
application for bail. The Supreme Court held that in an application for bail pending appeal by an
appellant sentenced by the trial court to a penalty of imprisonment for more than six years, the
discretionary nature of the grant of bail pending appeal does not mean that bail should
automatically be granted absent any of the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of
Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court. It emphasized that if none of the circumstances
mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 is present, the appellate court has the
discretion to grant or deny bail. An application for bail pending appeal may be denied even if the
bail-negating circumstances in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 are absent. It also held
that bail will not be granted after conviction by the RTC when penalty imposed is death, life
imprisonment or reclusion perpetua.
Doctrine:
● An application for bail pending appeal may be denied even if the bail-negating
circumstances in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 are absent.
● It also held that bail will not be granted after conviction by the RTC when the penalty
imposed is death, life imprisonment or reclusion perpetua.
● In the exercise of discretion whether or not bail is to be granted, the court must strike a
balance between the interests of the accused and that of society.
○ On Interest of the Accused
■ An accused not released on bail is incarcerated before an appellate court
confirms that his conviction is legal and proper. An erroneously
convicted accused who is denied bail loses his liberty to pay a debt to
society he has never owed.
■ Even if the conviction is subsequently affirmed, however, the accused's
interest in bail pending appeal includes:
1. Freedom pending judicial review
2. Opportunity to efficiently prepare his case and
3. Avoidance of potential hardships of prison.
○ On Interest of the Society
■ Society has a compelling interest in protecting itself by swiftly
incarcerating an individual who is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of a crime serious enough to warrant prison time.
■ Other recognized societal interests in the denial of bail pending appeal
include:
1. Prevention of the accused's flight from court custody
2. Protection of the community from potential danger
3. Avoidance of delay in punishment
Guide Question(s): In which of the following instances is bail pending appeal a matter of
discretion—(a) upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense punishable by
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reclusion perpetua; (b) upon conviction by the Municipal Trial Court of an offense punishable
by prision correccional; (c) upon showing by the prosecution, with notice to the accused, of
some bail-negating circumstance in a case where the penalty imposed by the trial court is
imprisonment of six years; (d) all of the above?
ANSWER(S): C, upon showing by the prosecution, with notice to the accused, of some bail-negating
circumstance in a case where the penalty imposed by the trial court is imprisonment of six years.
Guide Question(s): Which court has the discretion to allow or disallow bail pending appeal—
(a) the trial court; (b) the appellate court; or (c) it depends on the circumstances?
Guide Question(s): What is the appropriate remedy of the accused against the trial court’s
order cancelling his or her bail?
ANSWER(S): The appropriate remedy of the accused against the trial court’s order cancelling his or her
bail is a motion for reconsideration to reinstate bail. In Chua v. CA, the Supreme Court underscored that
the petition for certiorari with prayer for a TRO and a writ of preliminary injunction is not the proper
recourse in assailing the trial court Omnibus Order canceling his bail. Private respondent’s appropriate
remedy against the trial court’s Omnibus Order canceling his bail is by filing with the Court of Appeals a
motion to review the said order. Furthermore, the appropriate remedy of the accused against the trial
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court’s order denying his or her petition for bail is to file a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65
of the Rules of Court, if the order was issued without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Guide Question(s): May bail still be allowed after a judgment of conviction has become final?
ANSWER(S): As a general rule, no bail shall be allowed after the judgement has become final, as what is
left is for him to serve the sentence. An exception to the rule is when the accused has applied for probation
before commencing to serve sentence of penalty and offense within the purview of Probation Law. The
application for probation must be filed within this period of perfecting an appeal. Such filing operates as a
waiver of the right to appeal. And as an exception to the exception, the accused shall not be allowed to be
released on bail after he has commenced to serve his sentence. Bail is not a sick pass for an ailing or aged
detainee or prisoner needing medical care outside the prison facility. A mere claim of illness is not a
ground for bail (People v. Fitzgerald).
●No person charged with a capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment shall be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the state of
the criminal prosecution.
o A capital offense is one which, under the law existing at the time of its commission and of
the application for admission to bail, may be punished with death.
▪ However, with the passage of Republic Act No. 9346, the imposition of death
penalty was prohibited. Instead, the court imposed the penalty of either reclusion
perpetua (imprisonment for 20 years and 1 day to 40 years) or life imprisonment,
depending on whether the law violated makes use of the nomenclature under the
Revised Penal Code (R.A. 9346, Sec. 2).
o When one is charged of a capital offense, or one punishable by reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, and the evidence of guilt is strong, bail shall be denied as it ceases to be a
matter of right or discretion. Examples of such offenses are the following:
▪ Promoting, maintaining, or heading a rebellion or insurrection
▪ Leading or in any manner directing or commanding others to undertake a coup
d’etat
▪ Qualified bribery
▪ Parricide
▪ Kidnapping and serious illegal detention
▪ Kidnapping and failure to return a minor
▪ Illegal recruitment constituting economic sabotage
▪ Plunder
o On the other hand, when one is charged of a capital offense, or one punishable by reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, and the evidence of guilt is not strong, bail becomes a
matter of right.
o Whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong is a matter of judicial discretion which shall
be exercised only after a hearing. To clarify, this “discretion” to be exercised by the court
does not make this kind of bail a matter of discretion. What is subject to the discretion of
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the court is whether or not the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong.
●However, in Enrile v. Sandiganbayan, the Court granted bail to the non-bailable offense of plunder
on the ground of special, humanitarian, and compelling circumstances.
Summary: Senator Juan Ponce Enrile, among with several others, was charged with plunder by
the Office of the Ombudsman before the Sandiganbayan for his alleged involvement in the
diversion and misuse of appropriations under the Priority Development Assistance Fund
(PDAF). When Enrile filed a motion praying that he be allowed to post bail should probable
cause be found against him, the Sandiganbayan denied it on the ground of its prematurity
considering that Enrile had not yet then voluntarily surrendered or been placed under the custody
of the law, and thereafter ordered Enrile's arrest. Enrile contends before the Supreme Court that
bail is a matter of right in his case because 1) the prosecution failed to show clearly and
conclusively that Enrile, if ever he would be convicted, is punishable by reclusion perpetua, 2)
the prosecution failed to show clearly and conclusively that evidence of Enrile’s guilt is strong,
and 3) he is not a flight risk. The Supreme Court granted Enrile's petition and granted his
provisional release.
Doctrine: There exist special, humanitarian and compelling circumstances that authorize the
grant of bail even if the offense charged is supposedly nonbailable. Taking into consideration the
accused's social and political standing and his having immediately surrendered to the authorities
upon his being charged in court, the unlikelihood of his flight or escape and the currently fragile
state of his health present compelling justification for his admission to bail.
Guide Question(s): Who has the burden of proving that the guilt of the accused who is
charged with an offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment
is strong?
ANSWER(S):
● When an accused is charged with an offense that is punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life
imprisonment, the prosecution has the burden of showing that evidence of guilt is strong (Rule
114, Section 8). During the hearing, the prosecution must present all the evidence and the
witnesses it may want to introduce before the court resolves the application. Within 48 hours after
this hearing, the court must issue an order containing a summary of the evidence presented, as well
as the conclusion of whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong (A.M. No. 12-11-2-SC (2014)).
Summary: Flaviano Cortes charged Judge Segundo B. Catral of the RTC of Aparri, Cagayan
with Gross Ignorance of the Law because the latter allegedly granted bail in murder and illegal
possession of firearms cases without hearing, and granted bail that was too low in a homicide
case. The Office of the Court Administrator recommended the dismissal of such administrative
sanction, but the Supreme Court disagreed and found Catral guilty.
Guide Question(s): Why is it still mandatory for the court to conduct a hearing or ask
searching questions even in cases where the prosecution chooses to just file a comment or
leave the application for bail to the sound discretion of the court, or even if the prosecution
refuses to adduce evidence or fails to interpose an objection to the motion for bail?
ANSWER(S):
● Being mandatory and indispensable, a bail hearing must nonetheless be set by the court wherein
the judge can ask searching and clarificatory questions for the purpose of determining the existence
of strong evidence against the accused, and issue the order, after such hearing, should there be a
finding that the evidence against the accused is strong. Such is consistent with the constitutional
right of the accused to be presumed innocent until proven guilty. Judges who do not conduct a
hearing shall be held administratively liable as such constitutes gross ignorance of the law and the
rules.
Guide Question(s): What must the court’s order granting or refusing bail contain? What is the
reason therefor?
ANSWER(S):
● The order granting or refusing bail issued by the judge must contain a summary of the evidence
presented during the hearing and the reason for the grant or refusal. Otherwise, such order will be
void. The reason for this is to safeguard the constitutional right of the accused to be presumed
innocent. There must be clear grounds before he or she can be denied his liberty.
Summary: Edward Serapio was a member of the Board of Trustees and the Legal Counsel of the
Erap Muslim Youth Foundation, to which former Ilocos Sur Governor Luis "Chavit" Singson
donated P200 million. When Singson accused former President Joseph Estrada and his cohorts
of engaging in several illegal activities, Serapio was included among the defendants in
subsequent complaints before the Office of the Ombudsman. The Office of the Ombudsman,
upon finding probable cause, charged the defendants, including Serapio, with the crime of
plunder before the Sandiganbayan. Serapio filed an Urgent Petition for Bail. The Ombudsman
opposed said petition, saying that Serapio should have been arraigned first before he can avail of
bail, and thereafter filed a motion for joint bail hearings of Joseph and Jinggoy Estrada, and
Serapio.
Doctrine: A person charged with a capital offense such as plunder is not absolutely denied the
opportunity to obtain provisional liberty on bail pending the judgment of his case. However, as
to such person, bail is not a matter of right but is discretionary upon the court. When bail is
discretionary, there must be a showing that the evidence of guilt against a person charged with a
capital offense is not strong for the court to grant him bail. Thus, upon an application for bail, a
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hearing thereon must be conducted, where the prosecution shall be accorded the opportunity to
present all the evidence it may deem necessary for this purpose. When it is satisfactorily
demonstrated that the evidence of guilt is strong, it is the court's duty to deny the application for
bail. Otherwise, bail becomes a matter of right.
Guide Question(s): Can a joint hearing on separate petitions for bail filed by different accused
be conducted? Under what circumstances can such joint hearing be had? How about a joinder
of the hearing on a petition for bail with the trial of a criminal case against another accused?
ANSWER(S):
● Nothing in the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure or the Rules of Procedure of the
Sandiganbayan prohibits the joint hearing of two or more petitions for bail filed by different
accused, or the joinder of the hearing of a petition for bail with the trial of a criminal case against
another accused. A joint hearing of two separate petitions for bail by two accused is in fact
advantageous as it would avoid duplication of time and effort of both the prosecution and the
courts and minimizes the prejudice to the accused, especially so if both movants for bail are
charged of having conspired in the commission of the same crime and the prosecution adduces
essentially the same evident against them. However, whether or not there should be a joint hearing
of two or more separate petitions for bail or a joinder of the hearing of a petition for bail with the
trial of a criminal case should be addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. The court, in
deciding the matter, must also take into consideration the speedy resolution of the bail hearing
which, when joined with the trial for a criminal case, will be prejudicial for the accused petitioning
for bail.
Guide Question(s): When must the petition for bail be set for summary hearing if such
petition is filed after the filing of the information?
ANSWER(S):
● If the petition for bail is filed after the filing of information, the summary hearing will be set after
arraignment and pre-trial (A.M. No. 15-06-10-SC, 10(a)).
Guide Question(s): How must witnesses be presented during the bail proceedings?
ANSWER(S):
● The witnesses will be examined on their direct testimonies or affidavits to ascertain if the evidence
of guilt of the accused is strong. The form of testimony depends on the court in which the petition
will be heard.
• In first level courts, the testimonies of the witnesses may be in the form of
either subscribed written statements given to law enforcement or peace
officers, or affidavits or counter-affidavits submitted before the investigating
prosecutor. In case these are not available, testimonies can be in the form of
judicial affidavits, which are subject to additional direct and cross-
examination questions (A.M. No. 15-06-10-SC, 11(a)).
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• For second level courts, the Sandiganbayan, or the Court of Tax Appeals, the
testimonies must generally be in oral form when the innocence or culpability
of the accused depends on the eyewitnesses. The exception lies in criminal
cases where the demeanor of the witness is not essential, in which case the
testimonies are in the same form as in first level courts (A.M. No. 15-06-10-
SC, 11(b)).
● There is no particular order as to the presentation of the witnesses as the court may shift from one
witness to another while questioning. Counsels from both sides are allowed to examine the
witnesses as well (A.M. No. 12-11-2-SC).
Guide Question(s): Are oral arguments and/or memoranda required for the resolution of a
petition for bail?
ANSWER(S):
● Because the proceedings during a bail hearing is summary in nature, there is no need for oral
arguments or submission of memoranda (A.M. No. 15-06-10-SC, 10(a)).
Guide Question(s): Within what period must a petition for bail be heard and resolved?
ANSWER(S):
● Generally, a petition for bail shall be heard and resolved within 30 days from the date of the first
hearing, which period is non-extendible. Particularly in drug cases, however, bail hearings must be
heard and resolved within 20 calendar days also from the date of the first hearing (A.M. No. 15-06-
10-SC, 10(a)).
Guide Question(s): What is the appropriate remedy against the resolution of a petition for
bail?
ANSWER(S):
● The accused can move for reconsideration on the resolution of the petition for bail, and this motion
shall be resolved within a non-extendible period of 10 calendar days from the date of its
submission (A.M. No. 15-06-10-SC, 10(a)). However, in instances where the lower court commits
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the accused may file a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
8.4 Amount of Bail; Guidelines; When Not Required; Increase or Reduction of Bail
● In fixing the amount of bail, Section 9, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
provides the following factors to be considered:
(a) Financial ability of the accused to give bail;
(b) Nature and circumstances of the offense;
(c) Penalty for the offense charged;
(d) Character and reputation of the accused;
(e) Age and health of the accused;
(f) Weight of the evidence against the accused;
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(g) Probability of the accused appearing at the trial;
(h) Forfeiture of other bail;
(i) The fact that the accused was a fugitive from justice when arrested; and
(j) Pendency of other cases where the accused is on bail.
● These factors are NOT EXCLUSIVE. The determination of the amount of bail is a balancing of
various considerations, all with the end view of serving the purpose of bail – that is, to assure the
presence of the defendant when required.
Summary: Flaviano Cortes charged Judge Segundo B. Catral of the RTC of Aparri, Cagayan
with Gross Ignorance of the Law because the latter allegedly reduced the bail in case of Illegal
Possession of Firearm from P180,000 as recommended by the provincial prosecutor to P30,000.
Catral also allegedly imposed a bail of P14,800 to the accused in a homicide case, which amount
was deemed too low by Cortes. The Office of the Court Administrator recommended the
dismissal of such administrative sanction, but the Supreme Court disagreed and found Catral
guilty.
Doctrine: As long as in fixing the amount of bail, the court is guided by the purpose for which
bail is required, that is, to secure the appearance of the accused to answer charges brought
against him, the decision of the court to grant bail in the sum it deems appropriate will not be
interfered with.
Summary: Francisco Yap, Jr. aka Edwin Yap was convicted of estafa for misappropriating
amounts equivalent to P5,500,500. He appealed the RTC decision and moved to be allowed
provisional liberty under the cash bond he had filed earlier in the proceedings, but was denied.
When he filed before the Court of Appeals a Motion to Fix Bail For the Provisional Liberty of
Accused-Appellant Pending Appeal, he was allowed to post bail in the amount of P5,500,500.
Yap assailed this, saying that the CA committed grave abuse of discretion in basing the bail on
Yap's civil liability, in imposing the other conditions for the grant of bail, and in setting the bail
in a prohibitory and excessive amount. The Supreme Court partially granted Yap's petition,
reducing the amount of bail to P200,000.
Doctrine: To fix bail at an amount equivalent to the civil liability of which the convicted is
charged is to permit the impression that the amount paid as bail is an exaction of the civil
liability that accused is charged of. This cannot be allowed because bail is not intended as a
punishment, nor as a satisfaction of civil liability which should necessarily await the judgment of
the appellate court.
Guide Question(s): What is the rationale for the prohibition under Article III, Section 13 of
the Constitution against requiring excessive bail?
ANSWER(S):
● The purpose for bail is to guarantee the appearance of the accused at the trial, or whenever so
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required by the court. The amount should be high enough to assure the presence of the accused
when required but no higher than is reasonably calculated to fulfill this purpose. Imposing an
excessive amount renders meaningless the right to bail (De la Camara v. Enage). Although the
accused is given the opportunity to be bailed out, when the amount is so excessive as to be
unreasonable, the provisional liberty supposed to be afforded to the accused becomes still beyond
his reach. It would have the same effect as not exercising the right to bail at all.
● Because the Supreme Court exercises supervisory powers over lower courts, the former has the
authority to hold the latter accountable for imposing excessive bail or unreasonable conditions
(Villasenor v. Abaño).
Guide Question(s): What was the hold-departure order in Yap, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals
(supra) for? Aside therefrom, what other conditions were imposed under the bail bond in the
said case to ensure against the risk of flight? Did such conditions impair the rights of the
accused under Article III, Section 6 of the Constitution to change abode and to travel?
ANSWER(S):
● The hold-departure order imposed against Yap Jr., preventing him from leaving the Philippines
unless expressly permitted by the court which issued the same order, was to ensure against the risk
of flight.
● Aside from said hold-departure order, Yap Jr. was also required to secure a certification or
guaranty from the Mayor of his place of residence that states that Yap Jr. is a resident of the area
and that he will remain therein until a final judgment is rendered in his case. In case he transfers
residence, it must be with prior notice to the court.
● Such conditions imposed against Yap Jr. was not a violation of his right under Article III, Section 6
of the Constitution. Although the Constitution grants him the liberty of abode and the right to
travel, such is not without limits. The same provision states that the right shall not be impaired
except upon lawful order of the court or except in the interest of national security, public safety, or
public health, as may be provided by law. The conditions imposed against Yap Jr. were not a
violation of the latter’s right because such conditions constitute lawful order of the court. They
were imposed to ensure that Yap Jr. will be present at trial or at all times whenever the Court
requires, consistent with the nature and function of a bail bond. Additionally, the court made no
prohibition against Yap Jr. changing his residence – he was merely required to inform the court in
case he does so.
Guide Question(s): Is the Department of Justice’s Bail Bond Guide binding upon the courts?
How should it be regarded by the courts?
ANSWER(S):
● The Department of Justice’s Bail Bond Guide is not binding upon the courts, but it merits attention
as an expression of policy of the Executive Branch, through the Department of Justice, in the
enforcement of criminal laws. Although the courts can take the Bail Bond Guide in consideration
when imposing an amount for the bail bond, they can choose to impose a higher amount when
dictated by the circumstances.
Guide Question(s): What is the proper remedy to question the court’s order fixing the amount
of bail?
ANSWER(S):
● In Yap Jr. v. Court of Appeals, Yap Jr. moved to reconsider the amount fixed as his bailbond.
When the Court of Appeals denied such motion in a resolution, Yap Jr. filed a petition for
certiorari before the Supreme Court, alleging among others that the respondent court erred in fixing
the amount of bail using as basis Yap’s civil liability.
● The order fixing the amount of bail is not subject to appeal (A.M. 12-11-2-SC, Sec. 4). But when
the accused does not have the financial ability to post the amount of bail initially fixed by the
court, the accused may move for its reduction. He may submit documents or affidavits for such
purpose (A.M. 12-11-2-SC, Sec. 3).
Rule 114, Sec. 10. Corporate surety. — Any domestic or foreign corporation, licensed as a
surety in accordance with law and currently authorized to act as such, may provide bail by a
bond subscribed jointly by the accused and an officer of the corporation duly authorized by its
board of directors.
RELIANCE SURETY & INSURANCE CO. v. AMANTE, G.R. No. 150994, 30 June 2005
Facts: Reliance Surety & Insurance Co., Inc. (Reliance), a duly organized insurance firm, filed
a Special Appearance and Motion to Set Aside Orders/Writs of Execution with the RTC after
receiving letters from Insurance Commission which enclosed copies of Orders/Judgments and
Writs of Execution against the bail bonds allegedly issued by Reliance. Reliance alleges that
the bonds in question were issued by one Evelyn Tinio. RTC denied the motion and its
corresponding motion to reconsider. Reliance then filed a Notice of Appeal which RTC also
denied on the ground of Reliance’s failure to pay the appeal fee. Reliance filed another motion
to reconsider, contending that the rules cited by the RTC were inapplicable as they pertained to
civil actions and not to criminal cases, and that there was nothing in the Rules of Criminal
Procedure that requires the payment of appeal fees in criminal cases. RTC denied the motion,
characterizing the incident as having a “civil nature” which has not been subsumed by the
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criminal nature of the cases under which Reliance’s motion was captioned. CA affirmed the
ruling of RTC, citing the Revised Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals (RIRCA) which
provides that “appeals from orders of confiscation or forfeiture of bail bonds shall be treated as
appeals in civil cases,” and that “no payment of docketing and other legal fees shall be
required in criminal cases except in petitions for review of criminal cases and appeals from
confiscation or forfeiture of bail bond.” Reliance files this petition before the SC, maintaining
that the RIRCA could not supplant, amend or modify the Rules of Court and as such the
quoted provisions of the same relied by the CA are null and void for doing so.
Issue: WON Reliance, in its appeal from the forfeiture of bail bond, is required to pay an
appeal fee? YES
Held: The Court held the ruling of both RTC and CA that the character of such appeal is civil
in nature. It affirmed that the liability of the bondsmen on the bail bond arises not from the
violation of, or an obligation to comply with, a penal provision of law. It emerges instead from
a contract, the bond subscribed jointly by the accused and the surety or bondsmen. The
obligation of the accused on the bond is different from that of the surety in that the former can
be made to suffer a criminal penalty for failure to comply with the obligations on the bail
bond. However, the surety is not under a similar pain of punishment, as its liability on the bail
bond would merely be civil in character. Moreover, it upheld that CA is empowered to
promulgate its own rules or orders pertaining to its operations and RIRCA is a by-product of
this authority.
Moreover, the Court held that Reliance is presumed to have been afforded its opportunity to be
heard through the procedure surrounding the confiscation or forfeiture of a bail bond by the
trial court. It expounded that any domestic or foreign corporation, licensed as a surety in
accordance with law and currently authorized to act as such, may provide bail by a bond
subscribed jointly by the accused and an officer of the corporation duly authorized by its
board of directors. Once the obligation of bail is assumed, the bondsman or surety becomes
in law the jailer of the accused and is subrogated to all the rights and means which the
government possesses to make his control of him effective. According to Rule 114, Section 21,
the trial court may summarily declare the bond as forfeited upon non-appearance of the
accused. This is followed by a 30-day period within which the bondsmen are given time to
produce the principal and to show cause why a judgment should not be rendered against them
for the amount of the bond. In the present case, Reliance did not proffer any indication that this
procedure was not followed. Moreover, it only filed the subject motion years after the
judgment became final.
Rule 114, Sec. 12. Qualifications of sureties in property bond. — The qualification of
sureties in a property bond shall be as follows:
(a) Each must be a resident owner of real estate within the Philippines;
(b) Where there is only one surety, his real estate must be worth at least the amount of the
undertaking;
(c) If there are two or more sureties, each may justify in an amount less than that expressed
in the undertaking but the aggregate of the justified sums must be equivalent to the whole
amount of bail demanded.
In all cases, every surety must be worth the amount specified in his own undertaking over
and above all just debts, obligations and properties exempt from execution.
Rule 114, Sec. 13. Justification of sureties. — Every surety shall justify by affidavit taken
before the judge that he possesses the qualifications prescribed in the preceding section. He
shall describe the property given as security, stating the nature of his title, its encumbrances,
the number and amount of other bails entered into by him and still undischarged, and his
other liabilities. The court may examine the sureties upon oath concerning their sufficiency
in such manner as it may deem proper. No bail shall be approved unless the surety is
qualified.
Guide Question(s): May a property bond be constituted on a motor vehicle? How about on a
condominium of a foreigner who has been living in the Philippines for about 20 years? How
about on the family home of the accused?
ANSWER(S): Rule 114, Section 11 expressly defines a property bond as “an undertaking constituted as
lien on the real property given as security for the amount of the bail.” (Emphasis supplied) The provision
expressly limits it to “real property”, specifically that of “land”. Therefore, a property bond cannot be
constituted on a personal property such as a motor vehicle, a condominium, or a house.
Guide Question(s): When a cash bail that is posted in behalf of the accused by some other
person is allowed, who would be considered as the parties to the transaction? Can the amount
posted be applied for purposes other than the payment of fine and costs?
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ANSWER(S): In the case of Esler v. Ledesma, as quoted in Esteban v. Alhambra, the two parties to the
transaction in a cash bail is the State and the defendant, regardless if it is posted by the accused himself or
by another party on his behalf. The purpose to which such cash bond may be used is also clearly outlined in
Section 14, Rule 114 i.e. for payment of fine and costs. Therefore, it cannot be applied for any other
purpose. However, any excess shall be returned to the accused or to the third party who made such deposit.
ESTEBAN v. ALHAMBRA, G.R. No. 135012, 7 September 2004, 437 SCRA 560
Facts: Gerardo Esteban is accused in four criminal cases. His sister-in-law, Anita Esteban,
posted cash bail of P20,000 in each case for his temporary liberty. While out on bail and
during the pendency of said criminal cases, Gerardo was again charged with another crime for
which he was arrested and detained. “Fed up with Gerardo’s actuation,” Anita refused to post
another bail and instead, filed with the trial court an application for cancellation of the cash
bonds she posted in the four criminal cases, alleging that she is terminating the cash bail by
surrendering the accused who is now in jail. RTC denied her request, holding that Anita did
not voluntarily surrender the accused as he was in fact arrested for another criminal case. Anita
appeals directly to the Supreme Court, contending that her application has basis on Section 22,
Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure which provides that “the bail may be
cancelled upon surrender of the accused…”
Held: The Court held the cash bail cannot be cancelled as Anita did not surrender the accused,
charged in the four criminal cases, to the trial court. Instead, the accused was arrested and
detained because he was charged in a subsequent criminal case. The Court further clarified that
Section 14, Rule 113 treats cash bail differently from other bail bonds. A cash bond may
be posted either by the accused or by any person in his behalf. In Esler v. Ledesma, the Court
declared that the two parties to the transaction in a cash bail is the State and the defendant.
Thus, as far as the State is concerned, the money deposited is regarded as the money of the
accused. It can be applied in payment of any fine and costs that may be imposed by the court.
The right of the government is in the nature of a lien on the money deposited.
Guide Question(s): May the cash bail be deposited with the judge?
ANSWER(S): NO, a judge is not authorized to receive cash bail from the accused (Naui v. Mauricio).
Section 14, Rule 114 is explicit to whom the cash bail must be deposited, namely, “the nearest collector of
internal revenue or provincial, city or municipal treasurer.” In the case of Sidro v. People, it was held that if
the money is received by the court, the proper procedure aside from directing the accused to the proper
recipients, is for the court to formally direct the clerk of court to officially receive the cash and to
immediately deposit it with the municipal treasurer’s office. The transaction must not only be properly
receipted but must also appear in the records of the case.
Issue: WON MTCC Judge Mauricio is guilty of gross negligence and not simple
misconduct? YES
Held: A judge is not one of those authorized to receive a deposit of cash bail; nor should such
cash be kept in the judge’s office, much less in his own residence. According to Section 14,
Rule 114, only the collector of internal revenue, city or provincial, city or municipal treasurer
is authorized to receive bail in cash. Furthermore, MTCC Judge Mauricio failed to forward the
receipt of the cash bail, release order and supporting papers to the RTC where the criminal
case against De Guzman was pending, in violation of Section 19, Rule 114.
Dispositive: MTCC Judge Mauricio is guilty of gross ignorance of the law and gross
negligence.
Facts: MCTC Judge Proceso Sidro issued a warrant of arrest for Roque Vicario for resisting
arrest under RPC 151, with bail set to P10,000 for his provisional liberty. Vicario was arrested
but was able to communicate to his friend Castillo to borrow P1,000 for his bail bond. Castillo
and her father Agustin Cardenas was able to come up with the amount and initially paid the
same to an MCTC employee who then directed them to MCTC Judge Sidro’s residence.
Cardenas reminded the Judge that the money should be remitted to the municipal treasurer, to
which, the Judge replied that it can be paid with him. The Judge issued a provisional receipt in
his own handwriting to Cardenas and Castillo. Vicario was released based on the Judge’s
orders however, he did not deposit the cash bond with the Office of the Municipal Treasurer
which was later made known to Vicario after attempting to withdraw the bail bond as the case
against him was dismissed. Vicario, Cardenas and Castillo tried to demand the same from the
Judge who then threatened to revive the case against Vicario. Vicario filed a complaint for
violation of the Anti-Graft Law with the Office of Ombudsman against the Judge.
Sandiganbayan convicted the Judge for the crime charged.
Issue: WON Judge Sidro can receive cash bond remitted by the accused? Generally NO,
but if a judge has received the same, proper procedure must be followed.
Held: A judge is not one of those authorized to receive cash bail from the accused; nor is he
authorized to keep the money in his office. Judge Sidro should have instructed the third parties
depositing on behalf of the accused, to deposit the cash bail, either in the office of the nearest
revenue collector or in the office of the municipal treasurer. Even if he acquiesced to the plea
of the latter to receive the cash bond, it was incumbent upon him to have turned over the
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money to the clerk of court and to direct the same to issue an official receipt and to
immediately deposit the same with the nearest revenue collector or municipal treasurer. The
transaction must not only be properly receipted for but must also appear in the records of the
case.
8.5.4 Recognizance
Rule 114, Sec 15. Recognizance. — Whenever allowed by law or these Rules, the court
may release a person in custody to his own recognizance or that of a responsible person.
Rule 114, Sec. 16. Bail, when not required; reduced bail or recognizance. — No bail shall
be required when the law or these Rules so provide.
When a person has been in custody for a period equal to or more than the possible maximum
imprisonment prescribe for the offense charged, he shall be released immediately, without
prejudice to the continuation of the trial or the proceedings on appeal. If the maximum
penalty to which the accused may be sentenced is destierro, he shall be released after thirty
(30) days of preventive imprisonment.
A person in custody for a period equal to or more than the minimum of the principal penalty
prescribed for the offense charged, without application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law
or any modifying circumstance, shall be released on a reduced bail or on his own
recognizance, at the discretion of the court.
Rule 114, Sec. 24. No bail after final judgment; exception. — No bail shall be allowed
after the judgment of conviction has become final. If before such finality, the accused has
applies for probation, he may be allowed temporary liberty under his bail. When no bail was
filed or the accused is incapable of filing one, the court may allow his release on
recognizance to the custody of a responsible member of the community. In no case shall bail
be allowed after the accused has commenced to serve sentence.
Guide Question(s): Does R.A. No. 10389 impose strict standards for determining whether an
accused should be deemed an indigent? Are all such indigents qualified for release on
recognizance?
ANSWER(S): No, R.A. 10389 does not impose strict standards to determine whether an accused should be
deemed as an indigent. In fact, Section 4 authorizes the courts to use their discretion in the matter even if
the salary and property requirements provided by Section 18, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court (definition of
indigent litigants) are not met. The law notes that the courts may use other relevant factors and conditions
demonstrating the financial incapacity to determine indigency (Section 4). However, the law also provides
certain disqualifications for release on recognizance, despite having the status of being indigent. Section 7
enumerates such disqualifications as follows:
(a) The accused bad made untruthful statements in his/her sworn affidavit prescribed under Section
5(a);
(b) The accused is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, habitual delinquent, or has committed a crime
aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration;
(c) The accused had been found to have previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded
sentence or has violated the conditions of bail or release on recognizance without valid
justification;
(d) The accused had previously committed a crime while on probation, parole or under conditional
pardon;
(e) The personal circumstances of the accused or nature of the facts surrounding his/her case
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indicate the probability of flight if released on recognizance;
(f) There is a great risk that the accused may commit another crime during the pendency of the
case; and
(g) The accused has a pending criminal case which has the same or higher penalty to the new crime
he/she is being accused of.1âwphi1
ANSWER(S): Section 5 of R.A. 10389 provides that the release on recognizance is a matter of right when
the offense is not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment. However, the accused or
any person on behalf of the accused must file the application for the same (a) before or after conviction in
the MTC and before conviction in the RTC. Moreover, if the case is pending before the RTC and that a
person is in custody for a period equal to or more than the minimum of the principal penalty prescribed for
the offense charged (without the application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law or any modifying
circumstance), such person shall be released on his own recognizance.
Guide Question(s): May the spouse of a person applying for his or her release on
recognizance become the custodian of such applicant? How about the senior pastor of a church
located in a city adjacent to the municipality where the said applicant resides? May an accused
be released on his or her own recognizance?
ANSWER(S): The spouse and the senior pastor located in another municipality do not qualify as
custodians under Section 8 of R.A. 10389, since the law prohibits any relative of the applicant within the
fourth degree of consanguinity (or affinity) and requires that they must be in the same barangay (or at least
the same city or municipality) with the accused.
The accused, however, may be released on his or her own recognizance. This is provided in Section 5
which states that if the case is pending before the RTC and that a person is in custody for a period equal to
or more than the minimum of the principal penalty prescribed for the offense charged (without the
application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law or any modifying circumstance), such person shall be
released on his own recognizance.
ANSWER(S): According to Section 17 of Rule 114, a person in custody who is not yet charged in court
may apply for bail with any court in the province, city or municipality where he is held. On the other hand,
a person arrested and detained for an offense with which he or she has been charged may file bail
depending on where such person was arrested. If he was arrested where the case was pending, the accused
may file bail in the court where his case is pending or in the absence or unavailability of the judge thereof,
with another branch of the same court within the province or city. However, if he was arrested in another
place, then he may either file bail in the court where his case is pending or with any RTC in such province,
city or municipality. If there is no judge available in the RTC, he may file with any metropolitan trial
judge, municipal trial judge or municipal circuit trial judge in such province, city or municipality.
Guide Question(s): When can a person under detention by legal process be released or
transferred? Who has the authority to order such release or transfer?
ANSWER(S):
● Rule 114, Section 3 provides two occasions when a person under detention by legal process may be
released or transferred. The first is upon order of the court, such as in the case of a judgment of
acquittal; and second, when the accused is admitted to bail.
● In both cases referred to in Rule 114, Section 3, it is the court who has the authority to order such
release or transfer of the accused. More specifically, Section 19 of the same Rule specifies that it is
“the judge with whom the bail was filed in accordance with section 17 of this Rule” who can
authorize the release or transfer. Nevertheless, if the bail is filed with a court other than where the
case is pending, the judge who accepted the bail shall forward it, together with the order of release
and other supporting papers, to the court where the case is pending, which may, for good reason,
require a different one to be filed.
ESTEBAN v. ALHAMBRA, G.R. No. 135012, 7 September 2004, 437 SCRA 560
Facts: Anita Esteban previously posted cash bail of P20,000 in each of the four criminal cases
filed against her brother-in-law Gerardo Esteban for the latter’s provisional liberty. While out
on bail and during the pendency of the four criminal cases, Gerardo was again charged with
another crime for which he was arrested and detained. Fed up with Gerardo’s antics, Esteban
filed with the trial court an application for the cancellation of the four cash bonds she posted.
She alleged therein that she is "terminating the cash bail by surrendering the accused who is
now in jail.” Respondent judge Alhambra denied petitioner’s application to cancel bonds and
her subsequent motion for reconsideration, finding that Gerardo was not surrendered by
petitioner but was actually arrested for an entirely different crime.
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Held: Petition is denied and the SC rules that the cash bail cannot be cancelled. Petitioner did
not surrender the accused to the trial court. The accused was arrested and detained because he
was charged in a subsequent criminal case. The first paragraph of Section 22 contemplates of a
situation where, among others, the surety or bondsman surrenders the accused to the court that
ordered the latter’s arrest. Thereafter, the court, upon application by the surety or bondsman,
cancels the bail bond. Moreover, the bail bond posted for the accused was in the form of cash
deposit which, as mandated by Section 14 (formerly Section 11) of the same Rule 114, shall be
applied to the payment of fine and costs, and the excess, if any, shall be returned to the accused
or to any person who made the deposit.
RELIANCE SURETY & INSURANCE CO. v. AMANTE, G.R. No. 150994, 30 June 2005
Facts: On June 18, 1997 petitioner Reliance Surety & Insurance Co., Inc., received from the
Insurance Commission a letter enclosed with five (5) Orders/Judgments and Writs of
Execution against the bailbonds allegedly issued by petitioner. Alleging that the said bonds are
false and spurious, Reliance, on 5 October 1998, filed with the RTC of Cabanatuan City a
Special Appearance And Motion to Set Aside Orders/Writs of Execution, which Respondent
RTC Judge Amante, Jr. denied. Reliance thus filed a Notice of Appeal, which the RTC
disallowed for Reliance’s failure to pay the corresponding appeal fee. Reliance then filed a
Motion for Reconsideration of the disallowance of their Notice of Appeal, was denied in an
Order dated 24 August 1999. Reliance then filed a Petition for Mandamus with the Court of
Appeals, praying that the orders disallowing the Notice of Appeal be declared null and void.
However, the CA dismissed said petition, citing the Revised Internal Rules of the Court of
Appeals (RIRCA) in concluding that Reliance was obligated to pay the corresponding docket
fees, and failure to do so was ground to dismiss the appeal.
Issue: WON Reliance’s Notice of Appeal is the proper remedy against the Order denying
its Motion to Set Aside Writ of Execution ? NO
Held: The petition is denied and Reliance is not entitled to the relief prayed for. Section 22,
Rule 114 of the Rules of Court provides two occasions upon which the trial court judge may
rule adversely against the bondsmen in cases when the accused fails to appear in court and
gives the bondsmen 30-days to answer the forfeiture judgment. However, Reliance did not
exercise its right to timely appeal the judgment rendered on the bail bonds, or to move within a
reasonable time to set aside the writs of execution. Its Motion to Set Aside was filed at least
nine months since the writs of execution were issued. When Reliance finally undertook steps
to acquit itself of liability on these bail bonds but faced denial of its relief by the RTC, it failed
to lodge the correct mode of judicial review when it filed a notice of appeal instead of a special
civil action for certiorari.
Appeal does not lie as the remedy from an order denying a motion to set aside a writ of
execution. Appeal may have been properly available from the five judgments on the bail bonds
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in the five criminal cases, as such judgments would have constituted as the final orders on the
matter whether Reliance should be held liable on these bonds. However, appeal cannot be
undertaken from the RTC’s Order, arising as it did, at the execution stage. Instead, from
receipt of the Order denying its motion to set aside the writs of execution, the only permissible
mode of review for Reliance was a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 with the
Court of Appeals.
Finally, even if Reliance is entitled to an appeal, the same cannot be granted for its failure to
pay the prescribed docket fees for appealing the order dismissing petitioner’s motion to set
aside order/writ of execution
Guide Question(s): What is/are the proper remedy or remedies to assail the judgment against
the bondsmen on the bond? How about the writ of execution issued to enforce such judgment?
ANSWER(S):
● The proper remedy to assail the judgment against the bondsmen on the bond is an appeal through a
motion for reconsideration to reinstate the bail. In cases where the bond is forfeited for the
bondsmen’s failure to produce the accused before the court, the bondman is granted a period of 30
days within which to produce their principal and to show cause why no judgment should be
rendered against them for the amount of their bail. Moreover, in the case of Reliance the Supreme
Court stated that the special civil action of certiorari to assail a judgment of forfeiture may be
available under exceptional circumstances, although the availability of appeal as a remedy to such
judgment greatly raises the bar for the allowance of the certiorari action.
● The writ of execution itself may, in theory, be assailed through the special civil action for certiorari.
However, this remedy is qualified again by the limited circumstances under which certiorari may
avail, such as when the court acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in denying the said motion.
Guide Question(s): What is the import of the Supreme Court’s characterization in the said
case of the judgment against the bondsmen on the bond as a final order, which “has been
defined as one which disposes of the whole subject matter or terminates a particular
proceeding or action, leaving nothing to be done but to enforce by execution what has been
determined”?
ANSWER(S):
● The import of such pronouncement by the Supreme Court is that characterizing the order of
forfeiture against the bondsmen as a final order allows the same to be open to the remedy of appeal.
As further discussed by the Court in the same case, such characterization puts an appeal from a
judgment on the bond under the umbrella of Section 1, Rule 122 of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure, which provides that appeals in criminal cases avail only from a judgment or final order.
Guide Question(s): Would the arrest and detention of an accused previously released on bail
amount to his or her surrender as contemplated under Rule 114, Section 22 if he or she is so
arrested and detained for another crime with which he or she is subsequently charged?
ANSWER(S):
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● No, the arrest and detention of an accused previously released on bail would not amount to his or
her surrender as contemplated under Rule 114, Section 22 if he or she is so arrested and detained for
another crime with which he or she is subsequently charged. In the case of Esteban vs. Alhambra
where a person, while out on bail pending resolution of his criminal cases, was again arrested for
another crime, the Supreme Court ruled that the “the first paragraph of Section 22 contemplates of a
situation where, among others, the surety or bondsman surrenders the accused to the court that
ordered the latter’s arrest” and not where the “accused was arrested and detained because he was
charged in a subsequent criminal case.” (Esteban vs. Alhambra, supra)
Guide Question(s): Would a warrant of arrest be necessary for the purpose of surrendering the
accused?
ANSWER(S):
● Rule 114, Section 23 states that “for the purpose of surrendering the accused, the bondsmen may
arrest him or, upon written authority endorsed on a certified copy of the undertaking, cause him to
be arrested by a police officer or any other person of suitable age and discretion.” Thus, no arrest
warrant is necessary in case where the bondsman himself brings the person of the accused to the
proper authorities. However, a written authority is needed if the bondsman surrenders the accused
by endorsing the authority to arrest the latter to police officers.
Guide Question(s): Would the bail be automatically cancelled upon conviction of the
accused?
ANSWER(S):
● Rule 114, Section 22 provides three cases wherein the bail shall be deemed automatically cancelled:
(1) upon acquittal of the accused; (2) upon dismissal of the case; or (3) upon execution of the
judgment of conviction. It is thus clear from the second paragraph of Section 22 that the bail is
automatically cancelled not upon the issuance of the judgment conviction of the accused, which
may still be appealed, but upon execution of the judgment of conviction
Guide Question(s): Can executive judges of the Regional Trial Courts direct their Clerks of
Court to conduct monthly inspections of provincial, city and municipal jails and prisoners
within their respective jurisdictions?
ANSWER(S):
● No, Executive Judges of the Regional Trial Courts cannot direct their Clerks of Court to conduct
monthly inspections of provincial, city and municipal jails and prisoners within their respective
jurisdictions. Rule 114, Section 24 states that, “The executive judges of the Regional Trial Courts
shall conduct monthly personal inspections of provincial, city, and municipal jails and their
prisoners within their respective jurisdictions” (Emphasis supplied). Moreover, the conduct of such
personal inspections is not included in the limited duties of the Clerks of Court in the absence or by
direction of the judge, as provided in Section 5, Rule 136 of the Rules of Court.