EN BANC

[G.R. No. 135869. September 22, 1999.]

RUSTICO H. ANTONIO , petitioner, vs . COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

and VICENTE T. MIRANDA, JR. , respondents.

Pete Quirino-Quadra for petitioner.

The Solicitor General for public respondent.
Brillantes Navarro Jumamil Arcilla Escolin & Martinez Law O ces for private
respondent.

SYNOPSIS

The parties here are rival candidates for the Punong Barangay of Bgy. Ilaya, Las
Piñas, Manila. After Antonio was proclaimed winner, Miranda, Jr. led an election
protest. The trial court ruled in favor of the latter; and nine days from receipt of the
decision, Antonio led a Notice of Appeal. The Commission, however, dismissed the
same on the ground that Antonio failed to perfect his appeal within the prescribed time.
The issue here is, whether the period to appeal a decision of a municipal trial court to
the COMELEC in an election protest involving a barangay position is 5 days per
COMELEC Rules of Procedure or 10 days as provided for in RA 6679 and the Omnibus
Election Code.
When the Court declared in the case of Flores v. COMELEC that decisions of the
Municipal/Metropolitan Court in election protest cases involving barangay o cials are
no longer appealable to the RTC but to the COMELEC, the same includes the 10-day
period of appeal. The 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure have provided a uniform 5-
day period for taking an appeal consistent with the expeditious resolution of election-
related cases. It would then be absurd and therefore not clearly intended, to maintain
the 10-day period for barangay election contests.

SYLLABUS

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; ELECTION

PROTESTS INVOLVING BARANGAY OFFICIALS; PERIOD OF APPEAL; CASE OF FLORES
VS. COMELEC, ELUCIDATED. — Petitioner points out that in Flores vs. Commission on
Elections, this Court had declared that decisions of the Metropolitan or Municipal Court
in election protest cases involving barangay o cials are no longer appealable to the
Regional Trial Court but to the COMELEC pursuant to Section 2(2) of Article IX-C of the
1987 Constitution. Petitioner submits that the dispositive portion in the Flores case
only declared unconstitutional that portion of Section 9 of Republic Act 6679 providing
for appeal to the Regional Trial Court but not the ten (10) day period of appeal.
Petitioner's argument raises the presumption that the period to appeal can be severed
from the remedy or the appeal itself which is provided in Section 9, Republic Act 6679
and survive on its own. The presumption cannot be sustained because the period to
appeal is an essential characteristic and wholly dependent on the remedy. What was
invalidated by the Flores case was the whole appeal itself and not just the question of
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 which court to file the petition. ACaDTH

2. ID.; ID.; RULES OF PROCEDURE; UNIFORM PERIOD OF APPEAL IS FIVE

DAYS. — Section 6, Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution grants and authorizes the
COMELEC to promulgate its own rules of procedure. The 1993 COMELEC Rules of
Procedure have provided a uniform ve (5) day period for taking an appeal consistent
with the expeditious resolution of election-related cases. It would be absurd and
therefore not clearly intended, to maintain the 10-day period for barangay election
contests. In view of the Flores case, jurisprudence has consistently recognized that the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure are controlling in election protests heard by a regional
trial court. The Court en banc has held in Rodillas vs. COMELEC that "the procedure for
perfecting an appeal from the decision of the Municipal Trial Court in a barangay
election protest case is set forth in the COMELEC Rules of Procedure." More recently, in
Calucag vs. Commission on Elections, the Court en banc had occasion to state that: ". . .
Therefore, the COMELEC is the proper appellate court clothed with jurisdiction to hear
the appeal, which appeal must be led within ve days after the promulgation of the
MTC's decision . . ." Signi cantly, Section 5(5), Article VIII of the Constitution provides in
part that "[r]ules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain
effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; NON-COMPLIANCE THEREOF. — The period for ling an
appeal is by no means a mere technicality of law or procedure. It is an essential
requirement without which the decision appealed from would become nal and
executory as if no appeal was led at all. The right of appeal is merely a statutory
privilege and may be exercised only in the manner prescribed by, and in accordance
with, the provisions of the law. By virtue of Section 9(d), Rule 22 of the COMELEC Rules
of Procedure which provides that "an appeal may be dismissed upon motion of either
party or at the instance of the Commission for failure to le a notice of appeal within
the prescribed period," the COMELEC is precisely given the discretion, in a case where
the appeal is not filed on time to dismiss the action or proceeding.

DECISION

GONZAGA-REYES , J : p

Is the period to appeal a decision of a municipal trial court to the Commission on

Elections ("COMELEC") in an election protest involving a barangay position ve (5) days
per COMELEC Rules of Procedure or ten (10) days as provided for in Republic Act 6679
1 and the Omnibus Election Code? This is the sole issue posed in the instant petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure seeking to annul the order
dated August 3, 1998 of the Second Division of the COMELEC, 2 dismissing the appeal
of petitioner Rustico Antonio for having been led out of time pursuant to COMELEC
Rules of Procedure, and the order promulgated on October 14, 1998 of the COMELEC
en banc, denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration. prLL

The antecedents as found by the COMELEC in the order dated October 14, 1998
are:
"The parties in this case were rival candidates for the Punong Barangay of
Barangay Ilaya, Las Piñas City, Metro Manila. After the board of canvassers
proclaimed protestee-appellant Rustico Antonio, protestant-appellee Vicente T.
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 Miranda, Jr. led an election protest docketed as Election Protest Case No. 97-
0017 against Antonio before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Las Piñas City
(Branch LXXIX). The trial court rendered a Decision dated 9 March 1998, the
dispositive portion of which states:

WHEREFORE, the Court declares the protestant Vicente Miranda as

the duly elected Barangay Chairman of Barangay Ilaya, Las Piñas City,
Metro Manila.

Antonio admitted receipt of the above-quoted decision on 18 March 1998.

Subsequently, Antonio led a Notice of Appeal with the trial court on 27 March
1998 or nine (9) days after receipt thereof. Meanwhile, Miranda moved to execute
the trial court's decision. Rustico, in his Opposition to the Motion for Execution or
Execution Pending Appeal, argued against Miranda's motion for execution. After
the trial court denied the motion for execution, the records of this case was
forwarded to the Commission (Second Division). prcd

On 10 August 1998, protestee-appellant Rustico Antonio received from this

Commission (Second Division) an Order dated 3 August 1998 stating as follows:

In the light of the aforequoted rules, protestee RUSTICO ANTONIO,

failed to perfect his appeal within the ve (5) days period prescribed for
perfecting his appeal, as he led his Notice of Appeal only on March 27,
1998 or nine (9) days after receipt of the decision sought to be appealed.

The Period aforestated is jurisdictional and failure of the protestee

to perfect his appeal within the said period deprives the Commission of its
appellate jurisdiction.

ACCORDINGLY, the instant appeal is hereby DISMISSED for lack of

jurisdiction."

Hence, this motion for reconsideration. Cdpr

T h e instant Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED and We AFFIRM the

Order dated 3 August 1998 of this Commission (Second Division)." 3

In the instant petition for certiorari, petitioner argues that the COMELEC
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it
dismissed the appeal for the following reasons:
"(a) In barangay electoral protest cases, the period of appeal is ten (10) days
from receipt of the decision of the Metropolitan or Municipal Trial Court.
This is provided for by Sec. 9 of R.A. 6679 and Sec. 252 of the Omnibus
Election Code;

(b) The provisions of Sec. 21, Rule 37 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure
providing for a ve-day period within which to appeal from the decision of
the Metropolitan or Municipal Trial Court could not prevail upon the
express provisions of Rep. Act No. 6679 and Sec. 252 of the Omnibus
Election Code;
(c) Moreover, the COMELEC committed an error of jurisdiction when it
disregarded the provisions of Sections 5, 6 & 7, Rule 22 of the COMELEC
Rules of Procedure requiring the ling of briefs by the appellant and the
appellee. The questioned resolution of August 3, 1998 was issued motu
propio and without prior notice and hearing. The petitioner was fast
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 tracked; prLL

(d) The alleged winning margin of the private respondent over the petitioner
as found by the Metropolitan Trial Court of Las Piñas is only four (4) votes
the results being MIRANDA — 1,171; ANTONIO — 1,167. The people's will
must not go on procedural points. "An election protest involves public
interest, and technicalities should not be sanctioned when it will be an
obstacle in the determination of the true will of the electorate in the choice
of its public o cials." [ Macasundig vs. Macalanagan, 13 SCRA 577; Vda.
De Mesa vs. Mensias, 18 SCRA 533; Juliano vs. Court of Appeals, 20 SCRA
808; Genete vs. Archangel, 21 SCRA 1178; Maliwanag vs. Herrera, 25 SCRA
175; De Castro vs. Genete, 27 SCRA 623]

(e) The questioned resolutions violated the above principle because the
COMELEC did not appreciate the contested ballots." 4

In dismissing the appeal, the COMELEC relied on Section 21, Rule 35 of the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure which reads:
"SECTION 21. Appeal. — From any decision rendered by the court, the
aggrieved party may appeal to the Commission on Elections within ve (5) days
after the promulgation of the decision."

On the other hand, petitioner contends that the period of appeal from decisions
of the Municipal Trial Courts or Metropolitan Trial Courts involving barangay o cials is
governed by Section 9 of Republic Act 6679 and Section 252 of the Omnibus Election
Code.
Section 9 of Republic Act 6679 reads:
"SECTION 9. A sworn petition contesting the election of a barangay
o cial may be led with the proper municipal or metropolitan trial court by any
candidate who has duly led a certi cate of candidacy and has been voted for a
barangay o ce within ten (10) days after the proclamation of the results of the
election. The trial court shall decide the election protest within thirty (30) days
after the ling thereof. The decision of the municipal or metropolitan trial court
may be appealed within ten (10) days from receipt of a copy thereof by the
aggrieved party to the regional trial court which shall decide the issue within thirty
(30) days from receipt of the appeal and whose decision on questions of fact
shall be nal and non-appealable. For purposes of the barangay elections, no pre-
proclamation cases shall be allowed." LLphil

Similarly, Section 252 of the Omnibus Election Code provides:

"SECTION 252. Election contest for barangay o ces . — A sworn
petition contesting the election of a barangay o cer shall be led with the proper
municipal or metropolitan trial court by any candidate who has duly led a
certi cate of candidacy and has been voted for the same o ce within ten days
after the proclamation of the results of the election. The trial court shall decide
the election protest within fteen days after the ling thereof. The decision of the
municipal or metropolitan trial court may be appealed within ten days from
receipt of a copy thereof by the aggrieved party to the regional trial court which
shall decide the case within thirty days from its submission, and whose decisions
shall be final."

In applying Section 21 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure rather than Section 9

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 of Republic Act 6779 and Section 252 of the Omnibus Election Code, the COMELEC
rationalized thus:
"Antonio asserts that Section 9 of Republic Act 6679 and Section 252 of
the Omnibus Election Code providing for a ten-day period to appeal prevails over
the provisions of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure. According to Antonio, quasi-
judicial bodies, including this Commission, cannot amend an act of Congress and
in case of discrepancy between the basic law and an interpretative or
administrative ruling, the former prevails. Generally, yes. But the situation herein
does not fall within the generic situation contemplated therein.

No less than the 1987 Constitution (Article IX-A, Section 6 and Article IX-C,
Section 3) grants and authorizes this Commission to promulgate its own rules of
procedure as long as such rules concerning pleadings and practice do not
diminish, increase or modify substantive rights. Hence, the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure promulgated in 1993 as amended in 1994 is no ordinary interpretative
or administrative ruling. It is promulgated by this Commission pursuant to a
constitutionally mandated authority which no legislative enactment can amend,
revise or repeal.
The COMELEC Rules of Procedure (Rule 37 Section 21) provides that from
the decision rendered by the court, the aggrieved party may appeal to the
Commission on Elections within ve (5) days after the promulgation of the
decision . Rule 22 Section 9(d) of Our Rules of Procedure further provides that an
appeal from decisions of courts in election protest cases may be dismissed at
the instance of the Commission for failure to le the required notice of
appeal within the prescribed period . llcd

In case at bar, Antonio led his notice of appeal before the trial court on
the ninth (9) day from receipt of the decision appealed from or four (4) days after
the ve-day prescribed period to appeal lapsed. Therefore, the present appeal
must be dismissed. For it is axiomatic that the perfection of an appeal in the
manner and within the period laid down by the COMELEC Rules of Procedure is
not only mandatory but also jurisdictional. As a consequence, the failure to
perfect an appeal within the prescribed period as required by the Rules has the
effect of defeating the right of appeal of a party and precluding the appellate
court from acquiring jurisdiction over the case. So the High Court rules in
Villanueva vs. Court of Appeals, et al. (205 SCRA 537). And so, it should also be in
the case at bar.
Worth noting is that Our Rules of Procedure may be amended, revised or
repealed pursuant to the 1987 Constitution (Article VIII Section 5[5]) providing that
rules of procedure of . . . quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless
disapproved by the Supreme Court. But far from being disapproved the COMELEC
Rules of Procedure received approbation and has constantly been cited by the
Supreme Court in a number of decisions such as in the case of Pahilan vs.
Tabalba (230 SCRA 205, at 211) and Rodillas vs. Commission on Elections (245
SCRA 702, at 704). In the more recent case of Calucag vs. Commission on
Elections promulgated on 19 June 1997 (G.R. No. 123673), the Supreme Court
stated that: cdrep

Therefore, the COMELEC is the proper appellate court clothed with jurisdiction to hear
the appeal WHICH APPEAL MUST BE FILED WITHIN FIVE DAYS AFTER THE PROMULGATION
OF THE MTC DECISION . . . (page 4-5).

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 The repeated recognition given by the Supreme Court of this ve-day rule
within which to le the required notice of appeal will make questionable the
legislative enactment providing for a ten-day period." 5

Without adopting the foregoing ratiocination of the COMELEC, we nonetheless

find the instant petition devoid of merit.
It is beyond cavil that legislative enactments prevail over rules of procedure
promulgated by administrative or quasi-judicial bodies and that rules of procedure
should be consistent with standing legislative enactments. In relation to the above-
quoted Section 9 of Republic Act 6679 and Section 252 of the Omnibus Election Code,
petitioner points out that in Flores vs. Commission on Elections 6 , this Court had
declared that decisions of the Metropolitan or Municipal Court in election protest cases
involving barangay o cials are no longer appealable to the Regional Trial Court but to
the COMELEC pursuant to Section 2(2) of Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution. 7
Petitioner submits that the dispositive portion in the Flores case only declared
unconstitutional that portion of Section 9 of Republic Act 6679 providing for appeal to
the Regional Trial Court but not the ten (10) day period of appeal. The dispositive
portion of the Flores case reads:
"1. Declaring Section 9 of Rep. Act No. 6679 UNCONSTITUTIONAL
insofar as it provides that barangay election contests decided by the municipal or
metropolitan trial court shall be appealable to the regional trial court:"
LLpr

Petitioner admits that the provisions in Republic Act No. 6679 and for that matter the
Omnibus Election Code providing for appellate jurisdiction to the Regional Trial Court
had been declared unconstitutional in the aforecited Flores case. A verbatim
comparison of both provisions reveals that they provide the same remedy, that is,
appeal from a decision of the municipal or metropolitan trial court in barangay election
cases to the regional trial court. Both provisions provide that (1) results of a barangay
election may be contested by ling a sworn petition with the municipal trial court within
ten days from proclamation; (2) the MTC shall decide within thirty days per Republic
Act No. 6679 or fteen days per Omnibus Election Code; and (3) the decision of the
municipal trial court may be appealed to the regional trial court within ten days from
receipt by the aggrieved party, which decision is nal and non-appealable. There is no
appreciable basis to make a distinction between the two provisions, except for their
different numbers, to advance that they provide for two different remedies. It would be
super uous to insist on a categorical declaration of the unconstitutionality of the
appeal provided for in Sec. 252 of the Omnibus Election Code, as the same appeal in
Sec. 9, Republic Act No. 6679 had already been categorically declared unconstitutional.
Further, Sec. 252 of the Omnibus Election Code 8 as amended by the new law, Republic
Act No. 6679 9 , has in effect, been superseded by the latter. While the appellate
procedure has been retained by the amendatory act, Republic Act No. 6679
nonetheless supersedes the verbatim provision in the Omnibus Election Code. Hence, it
was not necessary for Flores to mention Sec. 252 of the Omnibus Election Code,
considering that as aforestated, Section 9 of Republic Act No. 6679 was a mere
reenactment of the former law.
Petitioner is of the opinion, though, that the unconstitutionality extended only as
to which court has appellate jurisdiction without affecting the period within which to
appeal. According to petitioner, only the portion providing for the appellate jurisdiction
of the Regional Trial Court in said cases should be deemed unconstitutional. The rest of
the provisions, particularly on the period to appeal, free from the taint of
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 unconstitutionality, should remain in force and effect in view of the separability clauses
contained in Republic Act 6779 10 and the Omnibus Election Code. 11 cda

We do not agree.
First, petitioner's argument raises the presumption that the period to appeal can
be severed from the remedy or the appeal itself which is provided in Section 9, Republic
Act 6679 and survive on its own. The presumption cannot be sustained because the
period to appeal is an essential characteristic and wholly dependent on the remedy.
Aptly, the rules on statutory construction prescribe:
"The general rule is that where part of a statute is void as repugnant to the
Constitution, while another part is valid, the valid portion, if separable from the
invalid, may stand and be enforced. The presence of a separability clause in a
statute creates the presumption that the legislature intended separability, rather
than complete nullity, of the statute. To justify this result, the valid portion must
be so far independent of the invalid portion that it is fair to presume that the
legislature would have enacted it by itself if it had supposed that it could not
constitutionally enact the other. Enough must remain to make a complete,
intelligible, and valid statute, which carries out the legislative intent. The void
provisions must be eliminated without causing results affecting the main purpose
of the act in a manner contrary to the intention of the legislature. The language
used in the invalid part of the statute can have no legal effect or e cacy for any
purpose whatsoever, and what remains must express the legislative will
independently of the void part, since the court has no power to legislate.
The exception to the general rule is that when the parts of a statute are so
mutually dependent and connected, as conditions, considerations, inducements,
or compensations for each other, as to warrant a belief that the legislature
intended them as a whole the nullity of one part will vitiate the rest. In making the
parts of the statute dependent, conditional, or connected with one another, the
legislature intended the statute to be carried out as a whole and would not have
enacted it if one part is void, in which case if some parts are unconstitutional, all
the other provisions thus dependent, conditional, or connected must fall with
them. 1 2 cdphil

In the instant petition, the exception applies. Section 9 of Republic Act No. 6679
and Section 252 of the Omnibus Election Code, without the constitutionally in rm
portion on the appellate jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts in barangay election
protest cases, does not remain complete in itself, sensible, capable of being executed
and wholly independent of the portion which was rejected. In other words, with the
elimination of the forum, the period cannot stand on its own. Moreover, when this Court
stated that "Section 9 of Rep. Act No. 6679 is declared unconstitutional insofar as it
provides that barangay election contests decided by the municipal or metropolitan trial
court shall be appealable to the regional trial court", it meant to preserve the rst two
sentences on the original jurisdiction of municipal and metropolitan trial courts to try
barangay election protests cases but not, as advanced by the petitioner, the ten-day
period to appeal to the Regional Trial Court. This is the logical and sound interpretation
of subject portion of the Flores case.
Second, what was invalidated by the Flores case was the whole appeal itself and
not just the question of which court to le the petition. If the remedy itself is declared
unconstitutional how could the period to appeal possibly survive? How could the time
limit exist if there is nothing to be done within such time?
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 Third, we cannot indulge in the assumption that Congress still intended, by the
said laws, to maintain the ten (10) day period to appeal despite the declaration of
unconstitutionality of the appellate jurisdiction of the regional trial court, Republic Act
No. 7166 1 3 amending the Omnibus Election Code, evinces the intent of our lawmakers
to expedite the remedial aspect of election controversies. The law was approved on
November 26, 1991, after the Flores case which was promulgated on April 20, 1990,
and presumably, the legislature in enacting the same was cognizant of the ruling in
Flores. Said law provides the same ve (5) day period to appeal decisions of the trial
court in election contests for municipal o cers to the COMELEC. Section 22 thereof
reads: LLjur

"SECTION 22. Election Contests for Municipal O cers . — All election

contests involving municipal o ces led with the Regional Trial Court shall be
decided expeditiously. The decision may be appealed to the Commission within
ve (5) days from promulgation or receipt of a copy thereof by the aggrieved
party. The Commission shall decide the appeal within sixty (60) days after it is
submitted for decision, but not later than six (6) months after the ling of the
appeal, which decision shall be final, unappealable and executory."

There would be no logic nor reason in ruling that a longer period to appeal to the
COMELEC should apply to election contests for barangay officials.
Fourth, since the whole remedy was invalidated, a void was created. Thus, the
COMELEC had to come in and provide for a new appeal in accordance with the
mandate of the Constitution. As correctly pointed out by the COMELEC, Section 6,
Article IX-A 1 4 of the 1987 Constitution grants and authorizes the COMELEC to
promulgate its own rules of procedure. The 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure have
provided a uniform ve (5) day period for taking an appeal 1 5 consistent with the
expeditious resolution of election-related cases. It would be absurd and therefore not
clearly intended, to maintain the 10-day period for barangay election contests. Hence,
Section 3, Rule 22 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure is not in con ict with any
existing law. To adopt a contrary view would defeat the laudable objective of providing
a uniform period of appeal and defy the COMELEC's constitutional mandate to enact
rules of procedure to expedite disposition of election cases.
In view of the Flores case, jurisprudence has consistently recognized that the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure are controlling in election protests heard by a regional
trial court. 1 6 The Court en banc has held in Rodillas vs. COMELEC 1 7 that "the procedure
for perfecting an appeal from the decision of the Municipal Trial Court in a barangay
election protest case is set forth in the COMELEC Rules of Procedure." More recently, in
Calucag vs. Commission on Elections 1 8 , the Court en banc had occasion to state that:
LLphil

"It follows that after the promulgation of Flores, the same arguments
propounded therein by the petitioner may no longer be employed. Article 8 of the
Civil Code states that "(j)udicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the
constitution shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines." Said
pronouncement of the Court, having formed part of the law of the land, ignorance
thereof can no longer be countenanced. Therefore, the COMELEC is the
proper appellate court clothed with jurisdiction to hear the appeal,
which appeal must be led within ve days after the promulgation of
the MTC's decision . The erroneous ling of the appeal with the RTC did not toll
the running of the prescriptive period . . . . The ve-day period having expired
without the aggrieved party ling the appropriate appeal before the COMELEC, the
statutory privilege of petitioner to appeal is deemed waived and the appealed
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 decisions has become final and executory."

Signi cantly, Section 5(5), Article VIII of the Constitution provides in part that "
[r]ules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective
unless disapproved by the Supreme Court."
Equally devoid of merit is the contention that petitioner was fast tracked
because the COMELEC did not require the parties to le their appeal briefs; that the
dismissal was issued motu proprio without prior notice and hearing; and that dismissal
of the appeal defeats the people's will on procedural points. Su ce it to state that the
period for ling an appeal is by no means a mere technicality of law or procedure. It is
an essential requirement without which the decision appealed from would become nal
and executory as if no appeal was led at all. The right of appeal is merely a statutory
privilege and may be exercised only in the manner prescribed by, and in accordance
with, the provisions of the law. 1 9 Further, by virtue of Section 9(d), Rule 22 of the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure which provides that "an appeal may be dismissed upon
motion of either party or at the instance of the Commission for failure to le a notice of
appeal within the prescribed period", the COMELEC is precisely given the discretion, in a
case where the appeal is not filed on time to dismiss the action or proceeding.
The COMELEC, therefore, did not commit an abuse of discretion in dismissing
the appeal.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED for lack of
merit. The assailed orders of the Commission on Elections dated August 3, 1998 and
October 14, 1998 are hereby AFFIRMED. cdll

SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban,
Quisumbing, Purisima, Buena and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
Pardo, J., took no part.

Footnotes

1. An Act To Amend Republic Act No. 6653 To Postpone The Barangay Elections To March
28, 1989, Prescribing Additional Rules Governing The Conduct Of Barangay Election And
For Other Purposes.
2. Composed of Commissioners Julio F. Desamito and Japal M. Guiani.
3. Rollo, pp. 36-37.
4. Ibid., p. 10.
5. Rollo, p. 38.
6. 184 SCRA 484.
7. "Sec. 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and functions:
(1) ....

(2) Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections,
returns, and quali cation of all elective regional, provincial, and city o cials, and
appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving elective municipal o cials decided by
trial courts of general jurisdiction, or involving elective barangay o cials decided by trial
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 courts of limited jurisdiction.
Decisions, nal orders, or rulings of the Commission on Elections contests involving
elective municipal and barangay offices shall be final, executory, and not appealable.

(3) ....
(4) ....

(5) ....
(6) ....
(7) ....
(8) ....
(9) ....

8. Approved on December 3, 1985.

9. Approved on November 4, 1988.
10. SEC. 17. If any part or provision of this Act is declared invalid or unconstitutional, the
other parts or provisions thereof shall remain valid and effective.
11. Sec. 281. Separability clause. — If for any reason any section or provision of this Code,
or any portion thereof, or the application of such section, provision or portion to any
person, group or circumstance is declared invalid or unconstitutional, the remainder of
this Code or the application of such section, provision or portion thereof to other persons,
groups or circumstances shall not be affected by such declaration.
12. Ruben E. Agpalo, Statutory Construction, 1990, pp. 27-28, quoting Lidasan vs.
Commission on Elections, 21 SCRA 496.
13. An Act Providing for Synchronized National and Local Elections and for Electoral
Reforms, Authorizing Appropriations Therefor, and For Other Purposes (November 26,
1991). llcd

14. SEC. 6. Each Commission en banc may promulgate its own rules concerning pleadings
and practice before it or before any of its o ces. Such rules however shall not diminish,
increase, or modify substantive rights.
15. Rule 22 — Appeals from Decisions of Courts in Election Protest Cases

SEC. 3. Notice of Appeal. — Within ve (5) days after promulgation of the

decision of the court, the aggrieved party may le with said court a notice of appeal, and
serve a copy thereof upon the attorney of record of the adverse party.
Rule 27 — Pre-Proclamation Controversies
SEC. 10. Appeals from Rulings of Board of Canvassers. — (a) A party aggrieved
by a ruling of the Board of Canvassers shall, within forty-eight hours from receipt of a
copy of the ruling of the Board of Canvassers, le with the Board a written and veri ed
Notice of Appeal; and within an inextendible period of ve (5) days, he shall le his
appeal to the Commission.

Rule 35 — Election Contests Before Courts of General Jurisdiction

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 SEC. 21. Appeal. — From any decision rendered by the court the aggrieved party
may appeal to the Commission on Elections within ve (5) days after the promulgation
of the decision.
Rule 36 — Quo Warranto Case Before Courts of General Jurisdiction
SEC. 14. Appeal. — From any decision rendered by the court, the aggrieved party
may appeal to the Commission on Elections, within ve (5) days after the promulgation
of the decision.
Rule 37 — Review of Decisions of the Commission
SEC. 3. Decisions Final After Five Days. — Decisions in pre-proclamation cases
and petitions to deny due course to or cancel certi cates of candidacy, to declare a
candidate as nuisance candidate or to disqualify a candidate, and to postpone or
suspend elections shall become nal and executory after the lapse of ve (5) days from
their promulgation, unless restrained by the Supreme Court.
16. Abeja vs. Tañada, 236 SCRA 60 (1994).
17. 245 SCRA 702 (1995).
18. 274 SCRA 405 (1997), emphasis supplied.
19. Laza vs. Court of Appeals, 269 SCRA 654. cdrep

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