The Philosophical Heritage of V.I.

Lenin and

Problems of

Contemporary

War
( A SOVIET VIEW )

GENERAL-MAJOR A . S . MILOVIDOV, Editor-in -chief

COLONEL V . G . KOZLOV, Editor
MOSCOW 1972

TRANSLATED AND PUBLISHED

UNDER THE AUSPICES OF
THE UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
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For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U .S . Government Printing Office

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American Editor's Comment

The Philosophical Heritage of V. I. Lenin and Problems of Con
temporary War is the fifth volume in the “ Soviet Military Thought”
series to be translated and published under the auspices of the United
States Air Force. The original Russian edition was brought out in 1972
by the Military Publishing House (Voyenizdat) in 27,000 copies.
The book is obviously meant for wide educational use within the
Soviet military . It applies the principles of Leninist methodology and
analysis to a variety of significant philosophical problems of modern
warfare and development of the Soviet military organization .
The authors have concerned themselves with such matters as the
causes, social character, and types of war; the essence and nature of war;
Lenin 's concept of a socialist army and the sociological analysis of war;
and the role of the ideological struggle in modern warfare. Other topics,
such as the following, are also addressed : Soviet military science; the
military -technological base of the Soviet armed forces; science as a
factor in strengthening the national defense; troop training; improving
troop control; and civil defense .
The book was written by a “ collective” of authors, which includes
many of the Soviet Union 's most outstanding military -political spokes
men. The book's editors, General-Major A . S . Milovidov and Colonel
V . G . Kozlov, have participated in the writing of several other important,
recent works, including Marxism -Leninism On War and Army and
Methodological Problems of Military Theory and Practice .
The Philosophical Heritage of V . 1. Lenin and Problems of Con
temporary War was a Frunze Prize winner in 1973 and is listed as recom
mended reading in " The Soldier's Bookshelf” section of the Soldier's
Calendar for 1974 . The editors have stated that the volume is “ designed
for officers, generals and all students of Lenin 's military-theoretical
heritage” and that “ Relying on the philosophical heritage of V . I. Lenin ,
Soviet officers, generals and admirals are endeavoring to analyze more
deeply the features of modern war, to advance military theory and
practice , to do everything necessary to achieve further consolidation of
ournation's military strength .”
 The translation and publication of The Philosophical Heritage of V . I.
Lenin and Problems of Contemporary War does not constitute approval
by any US Government organization of the inferences, findings and con
clusions contained therein . Publication is solely for the exchange and
stimulation of ideas.
Table of Contents
Page
American Editor's Comment .. ..
Authorship . .. . . . .
Foreword to the Russian Edition .
Chapter 1. THE MODERN ERA AND PROBLEMS OF WAR AND
PEACE
P L A
C E . .. .. .. .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . ....
1. Lenin on the Nature of the Era and the Content of Wars . .. . . . . . .
2. The Problem of War and Peace in the Present Era
Chapter II. LENINIST PRINCIPLES OF SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS
OF WARS AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
1. Content and Tasks of Sociological Analysis of Wars:
Category of the Substance of Wars . . .
2. Leninist Doctrine on the Causes, Social Character and
Types of Wars ....
3. Lenin on the Social Consequences of Wars . . . . . .
Chapter III. AGAINST FALSIFICATION OF THE LENINIST
CONCEPTION OF THE ESSENCE AND NATURE OF WAR
1. Critique of Bourgeois Concepts of the Sources of Leninist
Doctrine on War . . . . . . .
2. Principal Methods of Distortion of Lenin 's Views on the
Essence and Nature of War . . . . . . .
3. Critique of an Opportunistic and Revisionist Interpretation
of the Essence of War . ..
Chapter IV . LENINIST CRITIQUE OF BOURGEOIS MILITARISM
AND THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1. V . I. Lenin on the Origin and Basic Features of Militarism . . . . .
2 . V . I. Lenin on Two Functions of Militarism . . .
3. Ideological Apologia of Militarism . ... . ..
Chapter V. V. I. LENIN ON THE SOCIALIST ARMY AND THE LAWS
GOVERNING ITS DEVELOPMENT .
1. The Essence of Lenin's Concept of the Socialist Army . . . .. .
2. V . I. Lenin on the Laws Governing the Development of the
Socialist Army .. .. . .. .. .. .. . . . ..
Chapter VI. THE MILITARY-PHILOSOPHICAL IDEAS OF LENIN
AND SOVIET MILITARY SCIENCE .. .. .. .. .
1. Lenin and the Creation of Soviet Military Science ... ...... ..
2 . Leninist Methodology of Solving Problems of Military Science .. ..
3. Critique of the Methodological Foundations of Bourgeois
Military Theory . .. . . . ..
Chapter VII. SOCIAL ACTIVITY OF THE MASSES AND THE
DEFENSE OF SOCIALISM .... ....... 119
1. V . I. Lenin on the Advantages of Socialism As a Source of
Social Activeness of the Masses . . . .. . .
2. Means of Developing Activity Among theMasses in the
Defense of Socialism . .. .
Chapter VIII. V . I. LENIN ON THE MATERIAL PREREQUISITES FOR
THE MILITARY POWER OF THE SOCIALIST STATE 137
1. Leninist Methodology of Investigating the Material Foundations
of the Military Power of the State . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2. CPSU Concern for Development of the Military - Technological
Base of the Soviet Armed Forces Under Present-Day Conditions .. .. 146

Chapter IX . V. I. LENIN ON THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION AND

ITS SIGNIFICANCE IN STRENGTHENING THE ARMED FORCES 54

1. Lenin's Ideas on the Cultural Revolution and How to

Accomplish It
2. Significance of the Cultural Revolution in Strengthening the 162
Armed Forces ...
Chapter X . SCIENCE AS A FACTOR IN STRENGTHENING THE
NATIONAL DEFENSE CAPABILITY
1. V . I. Lenin on the Social Role of Science . . . . . . . . .
2. Features and Means by Which Science Influences Military Affairs .. 180
CHAPTER XI. LENIN 'S IDEAS ON MORAL -POLITICAL AND
PSYCHOLOGICAL TRAINING OF TROOPS .. . .. ... 187
1. Lenin 's Theoretical Heritage — The Ideological Basis of
Moral-Political and Psychological Training of Troops .. . .. . . .. 187
2. Features of the Moral-Psychological Effect of Modern War
on the Moral Resources of Military Personnel .. .. .. .. 193
3. The Necessity of More Fully Considering Qualitative Changes
in Personnel . . . . . . . ...... 200

Chapter XII. THE ROLE AND PLACE OF IDEOLOGICAL STRUGGLE

IN MODERN WARFARE ... .. .
1. Ideological Struggle and War . ..
2. New Tactics of Bourgeois Propaganda and Lenin 's Principles of
Ideological Struggle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. .. .... .. .. .. . . . . . . . . . . . 214

Chapter XIII. LENIN ON DEVELOPMENT

SCIENTIFIC GUIDANCE
. . . .. . . .
OF MILITARY
ORGANIZATIONAL
1. Lenin's Ideas on Scientific Guidance of Military
Organizational Development .
2. Significance of Lenin 's Ideas for Improving Troop Control .. . .. .. .. 231
Chapter XIV . SOCIOPOLITICAL SUBSTANCE OF CIVIL DEFENSE 240
1. Politics, War and Civil Defense
2. The Class Substance of Civil Defense in Capitalist States .. . .. .
3. The Social Nature of Soviet Civil Defense . . . . 248

Chapter XV. METHODOLOGY OF LENINIST SCIENTIFIC

FORESIGHT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . : : : . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1. V . I. Lenin on the Foundations of Scientific Prediction . .
2. Some Features of Leninist Scientific Prediction and Their
Application to Military Affairs .... . 259
Chapter XVI. THE LENINIST STYLE OF SCIENTIFIC CREATIVITY . . 268
1. Leninist Criteria of Scientific Creativity ...... ..
2. Dialectical Flexibility and the Definiteness of Lenin 's Reasoning . ... 274
3. The Ethics of Scientific Creativity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 280

Conclusion ... .. .. 287

vili
Authorship

This book was prepared by the following group of authors: Colonel

N . I. BASOV (Ch. XIV ) ; Candidate of Philosophical Science Colonel
V . M . BONDARENKO (Ch . X ) ; Doctor of Philosophical Science Lieu
tenant Colonel D . A . VOLKOGONOV (Ch. XI) ; Candidates of Philo
sophical Science Colonel A . P . DMITRIEV ( § 2 Ch. XIII) ; Lieutenant
Colonel V . N . IVANOV ( § 1 Ch . XIII ) ; N . B . KARABANOV ( § 1
Ch. I) ; Colonels V . G . KOZLOV (Ch. VIII ) ; T . R . KONDRATKOV
( $ $ 1 and 2 Ch . III ) ; V. K . KONOPLEV (Ch. XV ) ; Candidate of
Historical Science Colonel M . M . LISENKOV (Ch. IX ) ; Candidate of
Philosophical Science Colonel G . G . LUKAVA (§ 2 Ch. VI) ; Doctor
of Philosophical Science General-Major A . S . MILOVIDOV _ Director
of the group (Ch. XVI, Conclusion ) ; Candidate of Philosophical Science
Colonel V . I. MOROZOV (§ 1 Ch. VI) ; Doctors of Philosophical Sci
ence Colonels N . A . Ponomarev (§ 3 Ch. III, Ch. IV ) ; Ye. I. RYBKIN
(Ch. II) ; I. A . SELEZNEV (Ch . XII) ; Candidates of Philosophical
Science Colonel (K . V . SPIROV ( $ 3 Ch. VI) ; A . A . TIMORIN (Ch.
V ) ; V . F . KHALIPOV (§ 2 Ch . I) ; A . A . SHIRMAN (Ch. VII).
Foreword to theRussian Edition

The entire revolutionary era in human history is associated with the

name and activity of Vladimir Il’ich Lenin — the brillant successor to the
revolutionary teachings of K . Marx and F . Engels, and the founder of our
Party and the Soviet state. V . I. Lenin provided answers to the most
urgent questions which had arisen during the course of historical develop
ment. He comprehensively developed the theory of socialist revolution
and the building of a new society. He provided the workers with a scien
tifically based strategy and tactics; and he led the struggle for bringing
the ideals of socialism to life.
All progressive humanity expresses its sincere admiration of V . I.
Lenin — the brillant thinker. “ Lenin was the greatest scholar of the
revolution , as well as a revolutionary in science; he introduced a new
stage in the development of Marxist theory, enriching all the component
parts of Marxism - philosophy, political economy and scientific com
munism .” 1
Having absorbed all the wisdom of the history of mankind, V. I.
Lenin was able with all dialectical comprehensiveness to embrace the
objective logic of the development of social events ; and by the force of
his brillant intellect to expound on a new field of social processes to the
most profound depths.
Many centuries of history have not revealed a man who to such a
degree was able to influence the minds and senses of people and to
breathe such strength into them as was V . I. Lenin . With each year,
under the conditions of rapid development of public life , his gigantic
stature grows increasingly greater. It becomes even more obvious that
historical development is proceeding along the course predicted by
Marxist-Leninist theory . The great truth of Lenin 's revolutionary thought
has been disseminated everywhere . Leninism has emerged as the most
influential force of the contemporary world , not only in our country but
in all corners of the globe.
The Leninist heritage has been and remains an inexhaustible source
of ideological-theoretical strength for the Communist Party and the
Soviet people, our battle plan in the struggle to achieve communism .
In the Keynote Address of the CC to the 24th Party Congress, General
Secretary of the CC CPSU Comrade L . I. Brezhnev declared : “ Leninism ,
as an eternally vital, developing science has been, is now , and will con
tinue to be at the focal point of the ideological life of the Party ; the
foundation of all its revolutionary -transformational activity. Relying on
the ideological heritage of V . I. Lenin , the Party regards its most im
portant task to be that of finding solutions to the urgent problems of the
building of communism , based on Leninist ideas and methodology ." 2
One of the most important component parts of the theoretical heritage
of Lenin is his military-philosophical and military-theoretical activity ,
conditioned by the urgency of the requirements of the revolutionary
struggle and the protection of the gains of socialism from imperialist
aggression .
The brillant theorist and architect of the new socialist world , V . I .
Lenin , was also the most profound theorist in philosophical problems of
modern war, armed forces and military science. With his name are as
sociated the founding of the Soviet Armed Forces and their heroic
history. To him belongs the credit for establishing the military program for
the proletarian revolution and for his teachings on defense of the socialist
Fatherland.
Basing his ideas on the military -philosophical tenets of the founders
of Marxism , V . I. Lenin gave a profound and scientific analysis of the
natural laws of wars in the imperialist era ; he discovered their basic
sources and class nature; and he described the decisive role which must be
played by the popular masses in modern wars.
V . I. Lenin was the founder of Soviet military science, and he placed
it on a firm methodological basis. He expressed a number of important
propositions in the field of military art; and determined the basic principles
of Soviet force development, organization of the Armed Forces, and
training and education of military personnel.
Considering the constant threat of imperialist aggression, V . I. Lenin
regarded in dialectical unity all the elements of the military power of a
state as the totality of its economic, scientific, morale and military
potentials. In his definition, no single one of these elements of military
power had a self-sufficient significance. It was, therefore, important to
know them not only as component parts of the whole, but also to under
stand their dialectical interrelationship . Weakness of only one of the
elements of the whole prevents application of the necessary force, since
no chain is stronger than its weakest link. “ The strength or safety of all
the remaining links of the chain except one will not save the cause. If
the wooden link is broken , the entire chain fails.” 3 It would suffice, for
example , only to underestimate the role of science in military affairs in
order to reveal that weak link which could lead to irretrievable losses.
Therefore, V . I. Lenin demonstrated not only the overall dependence of
the defensive power of a country on the level of development of science
in that country, and on the application of the achievements of science in
military affairs ; but also revealed new characteristic features of the re
lationship of science and military affairs under contemporary conditions.
V . I. Lenin viewed all the elements of the military power of a country
as mutually influencing each other in the life of requirements of the
contemporary world . However, in this dialectical unity Vladimir Il’ich
taught that the decisive element was the economic one, and that in the
final analysis its condition and development would determine any trans
formations in military affairs . And it is even more important to consider
this under contemporary conditions, at a time when the relationship
between the military organization of a country and its economic system
has become particularly close and direct.
V . I. Lenin considered the problem of insuring a high degree of combat
capability and combat readiness in the Armed Forces from the point of
view of the potential for efficient mobilization of the physical and
spiritual strengths of the people to defeat the enemy. In this regard , he
clearly defined the place and role of the subjective factor in war, and
most of all the political and military leadership . The Leninist principle
of the unity of political and military leadership in a war, the reliance on
the masses, the realism of the basis of goals and plans, the consideration
of interrelationship of forces in the struggle against the enemy, the
collective nature of leadership and personal responsibility are also basic
principles in the present era.
Warning against overstatement, V. I. Lenin expounded with all de
cisiveness the idea that in the presence of the objective prerequisites
necessary for waging war the decisive role would be played by proper
leadership ; leadership capable of organizing forces and directing them
toward successful accomplishment of the assigned missions which would
determine the fate of the battle , an operation , or a strategic plan as a
whole. The best example of this is the military activity of Lenin himself.
With his brilliant perspicacity he was able to grasp and diagnose the
intrinsic meaning of events, and to unerringly determine the decisive link
in a chain of various phenomena. In paying tribute to the amazing ex
amples of artful leadership in armed struggle by V . I. Lenin , the 2d
Congress of USSR Councils, in its message on the death of the leader
noted that he “ . . . was a man of thunder and tempest; he led the powerful,
all-conquering elements of the masses into the granite shores of revolu
tionary expediency and reason. . . . His ability to organize the masses
was astounding. He was the greatest military leader of all countries, of
all time, and of all people. Hewas the leader of a new civilization which
would liberate the world .” 4 .
The task of successfully building a new society and its defense V . I.
Lenin assigned to the Communist Party, to its undivided leadership , its
collective wisdom and its indestructible political authority among the
masses. The leadership by the Communist Party of the Armed Forces, the
strengthening of the role and influence of Party organizations in the army
and navy, is the very foundation of Soviet military force development.
Lenin placed the effectiveness of all facets of control of ideological
and organizational influence on military personnel in dependence on the
scientific approach to military force development. He developed prin
ciples, and indicated the ways and means of developing resources and
methods for resolving the principal tasks in a given field .
The leader of the Party provided military personnel with the principles
of scientific criticism of bourgeois ideology; he demanded implacability
and resolution in the ideological war. “ Our task ,” he taught, “ is to over
come all resistance by the capitalists, not only military and political but
ideological as well, and in the most profound and powerful manner." 5 V .
I. Lenin resolutely insisted on preserving the purity of Marxist views on
problems of war and peace , dealing a decisive rebuke to any manifesta
tion of opportunism .
Guided by Leninist ideas, our Party conducts a successful struggle
against both metaphysical and dogmatic attitudes toward military theory,
as well as against revisionism and an eclectic approach in this field .
The military -philosophical heritage of V . I. Lenin comprises the
richest theoretical basis for development of military theory and practice
under contemporary conditions. The basic tenets of Leninism on military
questions are consolidated and creatively developed in decisions of the
congresses and conferences of our Party , of plenums of the CC CPSU , in
Party documents devoted to the 100th birthday of V . I. Lenin , and in
documents of international conferences of Communist and Workers'
Parties.
The military-philosophical ideas of V . I. Lenin have withstood the
test of time. They are convincingly confirmed by our brilliant victories
in the Civil War and the Great Patriotic War, and by the steadily in
creasing might of the army and navy in the post-war period .
The current stage of development of the Soviet Armed Forces has
posed new and even more complex tasks. The most important military
philosophical problems are those of determining the place and significance
of problems of war and peace in the current era ; of emphasizing the
Leninist principles of sociological analysis of contemporary wars as
social-historical phenomena; of criticizing distortions of the Leninist
conception of the interrelationship of politics and war; of analyzing the
dialectics of the elements of the military power of a state , and the material
and spiritual prerequisites for a high state of combat readiness of the
Soviet Armed Forces; of organically combining the achievements of the
scientific -technical revolution with the superior features of socialism in
the interest of strengthening the defenses of the country ; of raising the
level of scientific direction of force development and command of troops;
of further developing military cooperation among the fraternal socialist
countries and strengthening combat coordination between their armed
forces; of stressing the significance of the philosophical heritage of V . I.
Lenin in solving the basic problems of Soviet military science and others.
The Leninist military -philosophical heritage makes it possible not
only to correctly understand the present and to scientifically determine
the main thrust of the activity ; but also to look toward tomorrow , to
accomplish scientific prognostications, to predict events, and to act without
losing sight of the entire totality of circumstances, which are frequently
extremely multifaceted and contradictory.
The military -philosophical heritage of V . I. Lenin is many-sided .
Many profound and comprehensive works have been devoted to it. How
ever, neither those works already published nor the present research , it
stands to reason , make any pretense to a complete exposition of the
entire wealth of philosophical ideas on military questions; nor at a com
plete solution to all the theoretical tasks which are posed and implemented
by the Communist Party in the field of strengthening the defensive might
of the Soviet socialist state. In the present work an attempt has been made
to examine only a few of the philosophical problems of war and peace
and military force development, under conditions of the new stage of
development of the Armed Forces of the USSR in light of the military
philosophical heritage of V . I. Lenin . It also attempts to show the activity
of the Communist Party in developing and implementing military policy
on a sound theoretical foundation of Marxist-Leninist teachings on war
and armed forces.
The authors have attempted to avoid a simple systematization and
commentary on the views of V. I. Lenin . They have undertaken an even
more complex task — that of creatively applying the principles of scientific
methodology and the Leninist approach to analysis of the urgent problems
of contemporary war and Soviet force development; of demonstrating
as classic examples the Leninist style of work and his demands on himself
and others in the process of military -scientific research . The extent to
which these tasks have been accomplished must be left to the judgment
of the reader.
Under conditions of the radical transformations which are occurring
in military affairs, an independent and creative solution to the problems
of war and military force development is particularly urgent. This is
occasioned by the necessity for comprehensive application by military
personnel of scientific achievements in military affairs and for insuring a
truly scientific approach to command and control of troops. The great
Lenin has bequeathed us a brillant example of the creative approach to
military theory. The Leninist philosophical heritage and his method of
approach to military problemsare a reliable reference point and guide to
action .
1 " On the 100 -th Anniversary of the Birthday of Vladimir Ilich Lenin,” Tezisi Tsk
KPSS ( Theses of the CC CPSU ) , Moscow , Politizdat, 1970, p . 6 .
*Materialy XXIV S ' yezda KPSS (Materials of the 24th CPSU Congress ), Mos
cow , Politizdat, 1971, p. 102.
* V . I. Lenin , Polynoye Sobranive Sochineniy (Complete Collected Works), Vol.
32, p 201.
“ S ' ' yezdy Sovetov SSSR v Postanovleniyakh i Rezolyutsiyakh (Congresses of the
USSR Councils in Decisions and Resolutions), Press of the “ Register of the
Supreme Council of the RSFSR ," 1939, pp 37 – 38.
* V . I. Lenin , Polnoye Sobraniye Sochineniy, Vol. 41, p 406.
Chapter I. TheModern Era and Problems of War
and Peace

Strict adherence to requirements ofthe Leninist method of investigating

societal affairs is of determining significance for a thorough understanding
of the major social processes of the present day. In his writings Lenin
gave a masterful dialectical analysis of the root problems of the 20th
century, including a comprehensive description of our age , pointed out
the correct ways to solve fundamental problems connected with this age,
including the problems of war and peace and defense of the revolutionary
conquests of peoples. Under present-day conditions as well these problems
can be correctly stated and solved only on the basis of a Leninist approach
toward a study of the nature, content, contradictions and specific features
of our age , taking into consideration the state and prospects of competition
between the two world systems.

1. Lenin on the Nature of the Era and the Content of Wars

Lenin approached his investigation of our age as a theorist and leader
of the socialist revolution. He focused the entire might of his genius on
using the strength of dialectical materialist analysis and prediction of
societal development to solve the root problems of revolutionary renewal
and reorganization of the world , for the struggle against imperialism and
wars engendered by imperialism , for the successful building and sure
defense of socialism and Communism .
In Leninist scientific logic investigation of the dialectic of development
of the concept of historical era or age is inseparable from the principle
of historical and theoretical unity. This is clearly demonstrated in the
example of the initial division of historical eras under capitalism and
imperialism into the past and present eras. The differences between them
are determined on the basis of a fundamental, class indicator. Rejecting
the abstract concept of opportunists and revisionists on the historical era
in general, Lenin emphasized : “Marx 's method consists first and fore
most in taking into consideration the objective content of the historical
process at a specific given moment, in a given specific situation, in under
standing first of all that the movement of what class constitutes the main
spring of potential progress in this specific situation .” 1
The true substance of an historical era can be thoroughly compre
hended only with an historical analysis of the objective movement of that
class which occupies a central position in a given period of development
of human society. Different historical ages are determined not by time
boundaries, not by degrees of cultural development, but rather by their
class substance, their sociopolitical foundation . To proceed solely from
the cultural, geographic or abstracted historical factor in defining the
term “era " or " age” means ignoring the sociopolitical, class content of a
historical era .
In contrast to the dogmatists , Lenin saw in the relationship between
the content of wars and the character of an age not an absolute but rather
a historically fluid link. This found vivid expression in the Marxist
Leninist doctrine of just and unjust wars. Lenin attached enormous sig
nificance to this social and military -theoretical problem in studying each
era and war.
The dialectical method opposes a hollow , abstracted approach to the
concepts of war and age, comprehensively examining the historical features,
the historical types of wars in each era or age separately. The main
thing, noted Lenin , which is usually forgotten , which is not given sufficient
attention in evaluating a specific war, is an analysis of "what historical
and historical-economic conditions caused it.” 2 The question of various
types of wars is inseparably linked first and foremost with the question
of the true substance of the given historical age .
A Leninist analysis of all historical types of modern wars corroborates
the inevitable link between a given war and its historical era . Lenin noted :
“ The great French Revolution opened up a new era in the history of
mankind . From that time up to the Paris Commune, from 1789 to 1871,
wars of a bourgeois -progressive, national-liberation character constituted
one of the types of wars.” 3 Their basic political objective was the dis
integration and destruction of the systems of serfdom , feudalism , and
absolutism in all the nations of Europe. For this reason these bourgeois,
national-liberation wars are characterized as progressive for that historical
era.
Analyzing the main military conflicts and clashes of the period of
development from capitalism to imperialism , Lenin established that the
radical change in objective historical conditions of development of the
capitalist society engendered an entire era of unjust, predatory , reactionary
world imperialist wars .
In Leninist logical the concept of the era of imperialism constituted a
central scientific concept in determining the true substance of numerous
wars of varying scale which were waged in that most contradictory and
conflictfull period of history . Lenin stated that both economics and political
literature " of the old and new world more and more frequently employ
the term ' imperialism ' to describe the age through which we are passing." 4
Without a thorough understanding of its substance it is impossible to
determine with precision the initial cause of each war . Precisely a specific,
comprhensive knowledge of the age of imperialism enabled Lenin to
elucidate the genuine essence of wars which were engendered by the high
est stage in the development of capitalism .
The former is naturally of primary significance in the interrelationship
between the historical era and a war. “ One cannot comprehend a given
war," taughtLenin , " without an understanding of the era .” 5 For this rea
son Lenin comprehensively studied the organic unity of war and the age
of imperialism , precisely determining the true essence of the numerous
wars which this era engendered .
Lenin taught that to be a Marxist means to evaluate each individual
war in concrete terms. In order to understand why an imperialist, most
reactionary war could and must occur between the great powers , in order
to understand this it is necessary to bear in mind the general conditions
of the imperialist era, that is the period of transition of capitalism of the
leading nations into imperialism .
Lenin 's thesis on the correlation between a war and its era is of funda
mental methodological significance for analysis of the genuine substance
and political content of each war in any historical period.
Dialectical materialism proceeds from a gnoseologically correct sci
entific appraisal of the correlation between the content of a war and its
historical era , subjecting to criticism and exposing erroneous, abstract
arguments on the nature of interrelationship between them . Wemust state
that bourgeois chauvinists and eclectics abused the device of arbitrary
interpretation of the content of the era even during Lenin 's life. At the
present time anti-Marxian, stereotyped arguments on the era are charac
teristic in general of rightist and “ leftist" revisionists.
A scientific, concretely historical approach to analysis of the content
of war and character of the historical era enabled Lenin precisely and
comprehensively to define the imperialistic essence of World War I. He
saw its organic link with the new age of bourgeois society , emphasizing
that this “war possesses an imperialist character. This war has been
created by the conditions of the era, in which capitalism has reached its
highest stage of development. .." ?
In Lenin 's opinion only Sophists “ in a totally different, imperialist
age” 8 can consider this predatory war a defensive and national war, can
arbitrarily proceed from the slogan of defense of the fatherland. In con
nection with this their " phrases about defense of the fatherland, about
resistance to a hostile invasion , about a defensive war, etc ., constitute on
both sides outright deception of the people.” 9
The fundamental sophistry in the arguments of Kautsky, Potresov,
Trotsky, Martov, and Plekhanov consisted in the fact that they arbitrarily
manipulated the term “historical era ,” mechanically transported the wars
of one age into another, and failed to examine the objective historical
interrelationships between wars and the new imperialist age. Such an
anti-scientific, vulgar approach to the term era of imperialism engendered
distorted , philistine concepts which concealed the true essence of new
types of wars.
Revealing the profoundly anti-scientific nature of the sophistic ap
proach toward appraising the new type of war employing the social
measuring sticks of the past, premonopolist era of the rising bourgeois
society, Lenin demonstrated that although international military conflicts
even in the era of imperialism have in many respects retained the same
form , their social and class content has radically changed, for the ob
jective historical circumstances have become quite different. “ The struggle
of an upward- rising national-liberation capital against feudalism has been
replaced by the struggle of reactionary, outmoded financial capital, which
is sliding into a decline, against new forces." 10
A comprehensive analysis of the relationship between war and the
historical era enabled Lenin to discover for the first time a number of
new types of wars under conditions of imperialism .
In contrast to the metaphysicians, Vladimir Il'ich viewed the concept
of historical era as an integral concept. Revealing the unity of the multi
form in the concept of historical era, he noted : “ An era is called era
because it embraces a sum total of diverse phenomena and wars, both
typical and atypical, both large and small, both characteristic of advanced
and characteristic of backward countries.” 11
Lenin 's definition of the term historical era of imperialism differed
radically from all abstract concepts of era characteristic of various dog
matists and eclectics who began frequently, to quite Vladimir Il’ich ,
misusing the term “ era,” 12 using it as a stereotype. Some of them at
tempted to prove that only imperialist wars are possible at the imperialist
stage of capitalism , that in the era of unbridled imperialism there can be
no more national wars and wars of liberation . Lenin assessed such argu
ments as “ an example of caricature use of the term “ imperialist era.” 13
since it quite incorrectly views the relationship between the given era and
the new types of wars engendered by it.
World War I, emphasized Lenin , “ has been engendered and is fed by
the totality of relations of the imperialist era. But this same era must
necessarily engender and nourish a policy of struggle against national
oppression and a struggle by the proletariat against the bourgeoisie , and
therefore the possibility and inevitability of, in the first place, revolutionary
national uprisings and wars, in the second place wars and rebellions by the
proletariat against the bourgeoisie, and in the third place unification of
both types of revolutionary wars, etc.” 14
Attacking the rigid, dogmatic stereotype regarding the character and
type of wars in the era of imperialism , the substance of which consisted
in claims that only imperialist wars can occur in the era of imperialism ,
Lenin emphasized that “ this is an obvious historical, political, and
logical error (for the era is the sum total of diverse phenomena in which ,
in addition to the typical, there is always something else as well) .” 16
10
 In defining the basic features and traits of the era of imperialism ,
Leninist philosophy strictly takes into account that the general exists
inseparably linked with the specific. Theoretical knowledge consequently
must reveal the totality of fundamental indicators of the era of im
perialism , proceeding from the fact that it is a sum total of diverse
phenomena, that “ the typical is not the sole thing.” 16
Thus at the basis of the Leninist definition of the term era of im
perialism lies a concrete examination of the entire system of contradictions
and conflicts of modern capitalism , an integral study of the qualitative
diversity of the politics of various classes, nations and states in this era.
The Leninist theory of imperialism , the doctrine of the diversity of
types of wars in this era possesses enormous theoretical and practical
significance even under present-day conditions.
Lenin saw in a concrete -historical, scientific approach to an analysis
of the era an essential prerequisite for a correct understanding of complex
and contradictory social processes, ways of solving major theoretical and
practical problems. In 1915 he wrote in the article “ Under a Foreign
Flag" : " . . . In every era there occur and will continue to occur separate,
partial movements back and forth ; there occur and will continue to occur
various deviations from the mean type and from the mean type of move
ment. We cannot know the rapidity of and the success with which the
separate historical movements of a given era will develop. But we can
know and we do know what class stands at the center of a given era,
defining its principal content, the main direction of its development, the
principal features of the historical conditions of a given era, etc. Only on
this basis, that is taking into consideration first and foremost the funda
mental features of difference between different 'eras' (and not separate
episodes in the history of individual countries), can we correctly construct
our tactics; only a knowledge of the fundamental features of a given era
can serve as a basis for taking into consideration the more detailed
peculiarities of a given country.” 17
Relying on the dialectical method, Lenin formulated the concept of
transition era . This era possesses its distinguishing features and indicators.
A precise and comprehensive knowledge of these features makes it possi
ble to comprehend to the deepest possible degree the economic, class
political differentiation of the line of demarcation between two different
eras, to reveal the fluidity , the relative nature and transition of historical
phenomena into their opposites. Lenin pointed out that " the most im
portant historical events taking place before our eyes can be compre
hended only with an analysis first and foremost of the objective conditions
of transition from one era to the next.” 18 We are dealing with a deep
penetration into the fundamental class, historical events and contradictions
which determine movement and transition from one historical era to the
next. This important Leninist thesis in the area of dialectics has made it
possible to determine the content and basic trends of the entire period
of transition from capitalism to socialism .
 A thorough analysis of the many-sided content of the transitional
revolutionary era has made it possible to establish that specific wars are
characteristics of it. Inevitable are civil war between the proletariat and
the bourgeoisie in a number of advanced nations and a number of
democratic , just wars of national liberation in underdeveloped nations
and by the oppressed peoples of colonies and dependent countries.
“ An imperialist-bourgeois war, a war of highly developed capitalism ,”
wrote Lenin , “ objectively can be contrasted, from the viewpointof forward
development, from the viewpoint of an advanced class, only with a war
against the bourgeoisie , that is primarily a civil war by the proletariat
against the bourgeoisie for power, a war without which there can be no
real movement forward. . . " 19 Proceeding on this basis, Lenin elaborated
in detail a theory of transition of an unjust imperialist war into a just,
revolutionary, civil war against the landed gentry and the bourgeoisie. In
examining the fluidity and variability of these historical boundaries , Lenin
took into consideration the fundamental features of the era, the fact that
the transition of capitalism into imperialism inevitably engendered a
predatory imperialist war, which had pushed mankind to the edge of the
abyss. Further development of the class struggle under such conditions
leads to civil war between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie. Lenin noted
thereby that the transformation of an imperialist war into a civil war
cannot be “made,” just as it is impossible to “make” a revolution , that
it is not a random but rather logical phenomenon conforming to certain
laws of development, a phenomenon which develops from a number of
diverse phenomena, aspects, features, characteristics, and consequences
of an imperialist war.20
Consequently the essence of all wars of the transition era must be
examined comprehensively and in an organic link with the development
of the root antagonisms and conflicts between the basic opposing classes
and diametrically opposed social systems.
From the standpoint of dialecticalmaterialism , theoretical knowledge of
the root contradictions and antagonisms of a specific historical era con
stitutes knowledge of the essence of its imminentmovement and develop
ment. Therefore in the Leninist logic of examination of the substance of
the present historical era principal attention is focused precisely on
cognition of its internal socioeconomic antagonisms and class conflicts
in the international arena.
The fundamental conflict of the present era is the antagonistic conflict
between socialism and capitalism . It conditions the entire historical
process of world development. The mutural relations of peoples and the
entire world system of states, Lenin stressed, are determined by the
struggle of a small group of imperialist nations against the Soviet move
ment and Soviet states, at the head of which stands Soviet Russia. If we
lose sight of this fact we shall be unable to formulate correctly a single
national or colonial question.
Lenin accomplished a great scientific feat: situated at the very head
12
waters of revolutionary events, he was able to assess with exceptional
precision and insight the Great October Socialist Revolution as the
beginning of a new age.
The leader of our party also revealed the fundamental direction of
societal development and the main content of the new , incipient era. He
pointed out that " the destruction of capitalism and all its traces, the
introduction of the fundamentals of a Communist order comprises the
content of the now -beginning new era in world history ." 21 Such a defini
tion of two root, essential processes , trends of social changes in our time
is of exceptionally important, fundamental scientific and practical sig
nificance. It enables one to specify the fundamental combatant forces of
the era, their relationship , to assess the diversity of forms of their struggle
and the possibility of its aggravation to extremes, to reveal the main con
flict of the era and the ways, means of and prospects for its development.
Lenin always proceeded from the leading and growing role of the
masses in history, from the fact that the worker class stands at the center
of our era , a class which is uniting, consolidating and leading other
revolutionary and democratic forces. The worker class, effecting the
transition to socialism , is compelled to resort both to peaceful and non
peacefulmeans of struggle.
In order to defend the revolutionary conquests, the nation of the
dictatorship of the proletariat creates its own armed forces and, when
circumstances dictate, wages revolutionary, just wars against reactionary
forces.
A profound tendency toward armed violence is characteristic of the
present era of imperialism : militarization of the economy and a military
mode of action in politics, the establishment of international aggressive
military alliances and a headlong arms race in the principal capitalist
nations, the ignition of local and small-scale aggressive wars with vigorous
preparations for unleashing a world missile -nuclear war at the appropriate
moment. “Capitalism ,” warned Lenin , “ has transitioned from progressive
to reactionary and has developed productive resources to the extent that
mankind must either transition to socialism or experience for years or
even decades armed conflicts among the 'great powers for the artificial
preservation of capitalism by means of colonies, monopolies, privileges,
and national oppressions of various types.” 22
Following the Leninist methodology in examination of each historical
era , the International Conference of Communists held in Moscow in 1969
made a thorough analysis of the present international situation and
pointed out specific paths of struggle against imperialism and its aggressive
policies.

2. The Problem of War and Peace in the Present Era

The Leninist methodology of approach to elucidation of the most im
portant features of an era and a scientific definition of the term war is of

13
inestimable importance under present-day conditions as well. In the first
place it makes it possible to reveal the main content, the principal direc
tion and features of world development, to evaluate correctly the diversity
of phenomena of present-day life, the role and place of classes in solving
the root problems of our era. In the second place, Leninist methodology
constitutes an essential condition for elaboration of a scientifically sub
stantiated policy, strategy and tactics of today's revolutionary forces and
their vanguard — the Communist and worker parties ; it helps in correctly
stating and successfully solving under specific historical conditions the
burning problems of today, including the problems of war and peace and
defense of the revolutionary conquests of peoples. In the third place ,
Marxist-Leninist understanding of an era makes it possible resolutely to
expose anti-Marxian fabrications pertaining to the content and character
of the various wars of the present era.
Wars are a historically transient phenomenon. They are linked only
with the period of existence of an exploiter society. They are based on
private ownership and the division of society into classes. Liquidation of
the exploitation system and transition of all mankind to socialism and
Communism will eliminate the causes of wars, with the disappearance of
military conflicts themselves. But this is a thing of the future, the ground
work for which is being laid by the present struggle of revolutionary
forces.
The most important point of departure for awareness of and scien
tifically substantiated solution to current problems of the present day,
including the problem of war and peace, is Lenin 's assessment of our
era as a protracted period “ during which socialist and capitalist states
will exist side by side." 28 Lenin taught that our era is a long period of
diversified, stubborn struggle between the two camps. He therefore
focused particular attention on the necessity of further deepening and
development of the revolutionary conquests of peoples, on improving
their preparedness and capability to withstand and repulse a military
invasion by reactionary imperialist forces.
" The transition from capitalism to Communism ,” stressed Lenin , " is
an entire historical era . Until this era comes to an end the exploiters will
inevitably retain the hope of restoration , and this hope is transformed
into attempts at restoration .24 Consequently , armed defense of the con
quests of the revolution constitutes an objective necessity and a logical
element of the building of socialism and Communism .
These conclusions by Lenin are becoming particularly important now
when , alongside the growth of possibilities for new advances by revolu
tionary and progressive forces, there are also growing dangers engendered
by imperialism . Imperialism , the general crisis of which is continuing to
deepen , remains a source of constant threat to peace and social progress.
" The foreign policy of imperialism ,” states the Central Committee
Report to the 24th CPSU Congress, " during the last 5 years has offered
new proof of the inalterability of its reactionary , aggressive nature.” 26
14
 The imperialist camp is making preparations for the most awful crime
against mankind — a world thermonuclear war. This war can lead to
unprecedented devastation of entire countries and can destory entire
peoples. " The problem of peace and war has become a problem of life
and death for hundreds of millions of persons." 26
The question of war and peace, which more than 50 years ago Lenin
characterized as the burning question of the present day, is still the most
critical problem for mankind. And it is becoming increasingly critical, for
the imperialist reactionaries and their paid ideologues, contrary to the root
aspirations of peoples , are pushing the world toward war with increasing
vigor, are appealing for the destruction of Communism at all cost. Militant
American anti-Communists R . Straus-Hupe, W . Kintner, and S. Possony
state : " The primary and most important task of future American strategy
in the broad sense of the word is preservation and strengthening of our
political system , and this task is more important than preservation of
peace . . . . Wecannot tolerate the survival of a political system which is
in opposition to ours .” .
The antihumanism and political irresponsibility of such statements
borders upon recklessness. These traits, inherent in the ideologues of the
imperialist bourgeoisie, who have lost a sense of reality in a situation
where history has pushed the old system to the edge of the abyss, were
exposed and branded by Lenin .Noting the sharp increase in militarization
of society in the era of monopoly capitalism , Lenin pointed out that
" capitalist society always was and always is limitless terror” 27 and that
by means of its wars it is preparing for itself “ a horrible end. . ." 28
In the era of imperialism the bourgeoisie of all great imperialist powers
has become " so permeated with the aspiration to achieve world hegemony
that any war on the part of the bourgeoisie of these countries can be only
reactionary.” 29
This conclusion has remained totally valid to the present day.
Our party 's leader taught us to appraise in a politically correct manner
the to-and- fro dashings of imperialism , and particularly those of its
extreme-rightist circles; he demanded that the revolutionary vigilance of
peoples be increased , that defense of the socialist state be strengthened .
Unswerving adherence to the precepts of Lenin constitutes a fundamental
principle for all foreign policy activity by our party and state and pre
determines the function of the Soviet Armed Forces and the armies of
the brother socialist nations.
Revealing the genuine causes of the wars prepared for and unleashed
by the capitalists, Lenin pointed to the unrestrained thirst for enrichment
which motivates them under conditions of private ownership . Today arms
manufacturers and monopolies are gleaning ever larger profits from
militarism and the arms race. Their profits are growing in proportion to
the arms race. And this arms race is justified by the notorious “ Com
munist threat.” “ In order for a country to continue spending mountains
ofmoney on arms,” wrote American liberal political commentator Sidney
15
Lens, exposing the schemes of the monopolies, “ it is important for the
Communist threat to occupy the forefront in the consciousness of the
Americans.”
The consolidation of Communism , a life worthy of man on this earth is
a highly complex matter. The exploiters, the ruling classes of the bourgeois
state , as history attests, have never voluntarily given up power and will
never do so . " A long, stubborn, desperate resistance by the exploiters.”
Lenin noted , " is a rule in any profound revolution. . . ." 30
Of course general prospects for world development in the present era
are connected with a gradual strengthening of the positions of socialism
and increasing success by revolutionary forces. In developing the views of
Marx and Engels, Lenin pointed to the complexity and lengthiness of this
process . He noted that the world socialist revolution " will consist of many
years of fighting, several periods of pressure , with intervals of counter
revolutionary spasms of the bourgeois system .” 31
The imperialist bourgeoisie did not wish in the past and does not want
now voluntarily to accept its defeat; it has not abandoned and is not
abandoning hopes for the restoration of its lost positions. Lenin taught
us to see that such plans are revived and nourished by existing inter
national ties with the forces of world reaction , still preserved by the
capitalist system . He emphasized that “ capitalism is an international
force. . ." ; 32 “ The capitalists of the entire world are hastening to unite
in fear and animosity . . . " 33 ; they are establishing " a holy alliance” 34
with the aim of toppling the socialist system .
Endeavoring at all costs to preserve an obsolete social system , the
imperialists are endeavoring to strengthen the world counterrevolutionary
alliance . With this aim they have established and are doing everything
possible to further consolidate a number of aggressive blocs — NATO ,
SEATO , CENTO , ASPAC and others. The calamity and suffering which
peoples will suffer as a consequence of a missile-nuclear war, if such a
war is started by the imperialists, will be great indeed . Such a war can
cause substantial detriment to the development of world civilization ,
inhibiting the advance of the revolutionary process. This is why Com
munists consider defense of socialist conquests and the prevention of a
nuclear war to be the most vital task of the present day.
Noting the existence of a threat of a new world war, L . I. Brezhnev
emphasized in the Central Committee Report to the 24th CPSU Congress :
" It is the vital concern of all peace -loving nations, of all peoples to
prevent this threat from becoming reality.” 35
Genuine revolutionaries do not fall into a state of despair and pes
simism in the struggle to prevent war. While aware of the inprecedented
destructive force of the new weapons, they nevertheless optimistically
appraise the prospects for peace. “. . . Regardless of the degree of de
struction of civilization ,” wrote Lenin , " it cannot be erased from history;
it will be difficult to restore, but no devastation will be sufficient to make
this civilization and culture disappear entirely.” 36
16
 There is profound error and harm in the disorienting claims of
bourgeois ideologues that there will be no victor in a thermonuclear
world war. The peoples of the world will put an end to imperialism , which
is causing mankind incalculable suffering.
The founders of Marxism -Leninism directed attention time and again
to the fact that under conditions of a sharp conflict, crisis situation which
war engenders, the proletariat and all revolutionary elements in society
have the particularly responsible duty to carry out a revolution, to over
throw the bourgeoisie, to take power into their own hands.
Lenin compared the creation of a new society in the course of a difficult,
worldwide war to a particularly difficult instance of childbirth . “ Difficult
childbirths,” he emphasized, “ increase manyfold the danger of a fatal
disease or fatal outcome. But while individuals die in childbirth , a new
society born from the old structure cannot perish ; its birth will be
come only .more painful, more protracted, its growth and development
slower." 37
If the imperialists unleash a new world war, the toilers will no longer
tolerate a system which subjects people to devastating wars. They will
mercilessly and irrevocably sweep capitalism from the face of the earth .
Of course losses may be extremely high in this decisive clash between two
opposing forces. Much, however, depends on the activeness of the masses.
The more vigorously and resolutely they oppose the actions of the ag
gressor, the less damage will be inflicted on world civilization.
The conclusion that imperialism will suffer defeat if it forces a new
world war on mankind does not in any way signify that we should strive
toward a military confrontation . Precisely this position is taken by today's
" leftist" revisionists. They claim that the absolute majority of the world 's
population has become ready for revolution, and therefore it is essential to
instigate armed uprisings everywhere, to encourage revolutions from
without, to heighten tension throughout the world and even to take the
risk of engaging in a world war.
Half a century ago Lenin shattered such theories of " leftist” ad
venturers and Trotskyites. Experience has convincingly confirmed the
correctness of Lenin 's thesis that "peace . . . will advance the cause to
an infinitely greater extent than war . . . peace will open up the road to
our influence 100 times greater and broader.” 88
Marxist-Leninist parties realistically appraise the complexity and con
tradictory nature of the processes of societal development at the present
stage and are drawing well- founded conclusions from the present balance
of power. They are guided in this by Lenin 's behest pertaining to the
necessity of soberly and concretely approaching analysis of the inter
national situation, revealing and taking into account fundamental de
velopment trends and prospects .
There presently exist two opposing possibilities: on the one hand
there still exists the danger of another world war, while on the other hand
17
under conditions of radical social changes in the world there has developed
a real possibility of preventing such a war.
The time is long past when world wars caused by the existence of
imperialism were inevitable. A vivid example of this is presented by the
two world wars to which mankind has been subjected in the 20th century.
History attests that even prior to the development of socialist states there
occurred periods of peace, but they were the result of a temporary
balance of power. The uneven development of the capitalist nations in
the era of imperialism inevitably led to eruption of conflicts, to an in
evitable process of alternation between periods of peace and periods of
war.
The possibilities and prospects of struggle against imperialist aggression
became substantially greater with the establishment of a world socialist
system . Imperialism has ceased its domination in the world arena. The
process of “ transformation of the dictatorship of the proletariat from
a national (that is existing in one country and incapable of determining
world politics ) into an international ( that is dictatorship of the proletariat
in at least several advanced nations, capable of exerting decisive influence
on world politics),” 39 which Lenin predicted , has begun.
The majority ofmankind has been enjoying the benefits of peace for a
comparatively long time now . This is the result of the vigorous, correct
foreign policy of the USSR and the brother socialist nations, the result of
an intense struggle for peace, for the international security of all progres
sive forces.
CPSU documents and those of the other brother parties clearly define,
on the basis of Lenin 's teachings, the sociopolitical forces supporting the
cause of the struggle for peace and social progress. The Declaration of the
Conference of Representatives of Communist and Worker Parties in 1960
emphasizes that for the first time in history a struggle against war is being
waged by such great and well-organized forces as the mighty Soviet Union ,
which has gained world preeminence in decisive branches of science and
technology; the entire socialist camp, which has placed in the service of
the cause of peace its enormous material and political might; the increas
ing number of peace-loving nations of Asia , Africa, and Latin America,
which are vitally interested in preserving peace ; the international worker
class and its organizations, first and foremost the Communist parties;
the national liberation movement of the peoples of colonies and dependent
nations; the worldwide movement of fighters for peace; the neutral
nations, which do not share the imperialist course of aggressive war
mongering and which advocate peaceful coexistence.40
The description of the present era contained in the 1960 Declaration is
of enormous significance.
“ Our era.” states the Declaration, “ the basic content of which com
prises the transition from capitalism to socialism initiated by the Great
October Socialist Revolution, is an era of struggle between two opposing
social systems, an era of socialist revolutions and national liberation
18
revolutions, an era of the crumbling of imperialism , the collapse of the
colonial system , an era of transition to the path of socialism by more and
more peoples, the triumph of socialism and Communism on a worldwide
scale.” 41
The events of the last decade, it was noted in the proceedings of the
1960 International Conference of Communist and Worker Parties, have
confirmed the correctness of the Marxist-Leninist appraisal of the charac
ter of the present era, its content and fundamental trends.42
The balance of power in the world arena is continuing to change in
favor of socialism , the worker and national liberation movement. At the
same time Lenin taught us that the achieved successes of the revolutionary
forces and a consolidation of their positions do not per se offer an
absolute guarantee that imperialism will definitely proceed in consonance
with the legitimate demands of peoples for peace, justice, progress, etc.
Facts convince us of this. Following World War II alone the imperialist
powers unleashed more than 30 aggressive wars and military conflicts of
various scale .
History has confirmed the correctness of the methodological position
taken by Lenin , based on analysis of the class struggle with imperialism :
“ . . . The force of the revolution , the force of the impact, the energy ,
decisiveness and triumph of its victory at the same time heighten the
force of resistance by the bourgeoisie. The greater our victory , the greater
the extent to which the capitalist exploiters learn to unite and shift to
more resolute attacks." 48
International reaction inalterably focuses its principal efforts on the
struggle against the Soviet Union and the other nations of the socialist
commonwealth . Its principal aims are to weaken the unity of the socialist
nations, to disunite today's progressive forces, to undermine the socialist
society from within . An example of such a savage attempt to inflict dam
age on socialism was the failure by international reactionary forces and
internal antisocialist, counterrevolutionary elements in Czechoslovakia in
their 1968 intrigue .
Of course the adventurism of the world bourgeoisie has its historical
limits. Two factors occupy a particularly important position among the
array of factors opposing bourgeois adventurism . They were noted by
Lenin . These factors are , first of all, the growth of world socialism in
general and a strengthening of its influence on international politics; the
second factor is the increasing influence of the military strength possessed
by world socialism on world development for the benefit of the root
interests and aspirations of peoples .
Under the present-day conditions of increasing aggressiveness of im
perialism , the CPSU and the Soviet government are firmly guided by
Lenin 's behests on defense of the conquests of our revolution and the
socialist system . As is well known, Lenin never ceased emphasizing the
importance of maintaining this country 's defense capability and its pre
paredness effectively to defend its interests and those of world socialism ,
to oppose the schemes and adventures of imperialism . “. . . The only
thing they understand is an increase in defensive capability ,” 44 he
pointed out.
The leader of the revolution clearly saw that no talks, arguments,
appeals, or imprecations would stop the enemy if he was not faced by
substantial military force, a strong army, preparedness by the entire
nation to fight. Lenin repeated the statement by Engels that for the
revolution it is essential to maintain supremacy “by means of that fear
instilled in the reactionaries by the arms of the revolution.” 48
Lenin emphasized time and again that a powerful revolutionary army
was essential in order to resist imperialist attempts to strangle the worker
peasant government and to defeat its enemies. Our party, under the
direction of its founder and leader, worked out and implemented a com
prehensive national defense program , organizing the Soviet Armed Forces.
Throughout their entire existence our army and navy have honorably
fulfilled their historic mission, firmly ensuring the security of the socialist
homeland .
" Following Lenin 's behests,” stated L. I. Brezhnev in his address
dedicated to the Lenin Centennial, " we shall continue to strengthen our
country's defense , to furnish our army with the most sophisticated
weapons. Our army has been, is now and will continue to be an army of
peace, a dependable bulwark of security for all peoples." 46
The military might of the world socialist commonwealth together with
the Soviet Union is strengthened by the peoples of the brother socialist
nations. The Marxist-Leninist parties view as an urgent need of our
time a strengthening of the fighting alliance and development of military
cooperation among the socialist nations, further streamlining of the War
saw Pact edifice. In all these activities they are guided by Lenin 's state
ment that “ in standing against the enormous front of the imperialist
powers, we who are struggling against imperialism comprise an alliance
which requires close military consolidation ; we view any and all attempts
to hinder or disrupt this unity as absolutely impermissible , as betrayal
of the interests of the struggle against international imperialism .” 47
The comprehensive increase in the economic and defense might of the
USSR and the brother socialist nations, strengthening of the Armed
Forces, collective defense of the revolutionary conquests of peoples, con
solidation and development of the fighting alliance of the armies of the
Warsaw Pact nations constitute a model of execution of the highest
international duty not only to present but future generations as well. This
constitutes consolidation of the bulwark and base of the world socialist
revolution, concern for a bright future for all mankind, a solid guarantee
of the victory of socialism and Communism throughout the world .
Thus a concrete, historical approach to appraisal of the present era is
the most important condition for successfully solving the complex prob
lems of military theory and practice and a sociological analysis of wars.
20
Lenin has equipped our military cadres with the methodology of such an
analysis in the specific conditions of the present historical era.

Footnotes
1. V . I. Lenin : Poln . Sobr. Soch . (Complete Works) , Volume 26 , pp 139 –140.
2. Ibid ., Volume 32, page 77.
3 . Ibid ., Volume 26 , pp 311-312.
4 . Ibid ., Volume 27, page 309.
5. Ibid ., Volume 49, page 287.
6 . Ibid ., Volume 30 , page 86 .
7. Ibid ., Volume 26, page 161.
8. Ibid ., pp 162 – 163.
9. Ibid., page 162.
10. Ibid., page 145.
11. Ibid., Volume 30, pp 86 – 87.
12 . Ibid ., page 87.
13. Ibid ., page 88 .
14 . Ibid ., pp 134 - 135.
15 . Ibid ., Volume 49, page 287.
16 . Ibid .
17 . Ibid ., Volume 26, page 142.
18 . Ibid ., page 141.
19 . Ibid., Volume 30 , page 13.
20 . Ibid., Volume 26 , page 289.
21. Ibid ., Volume 41, page 425.
22. Ibid ., Volume 26 , page 314.
23. Ibid ., Volume 39, page 197.
24 . Ibid ., Volume 37, page 264.
25. Materialy XXIV s"yezda KPSS (Proceedings of the 24th CPSU Congress ),
page 15.
26. Programma Kommunisticheskoy partii Sovetskogo Soyuza (Program of the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union ), Moscow , Politizdat, 1971, page 57.
27 . V. I. Lenin, op.cit., Volume 30, page 136 .
28 . Ibid .
29. Ibid., Page 140.
30. Ibid., Volume 37, page 263.
31. Ibid ., Volume 27, page 57.
32. Ibid ., Volume 37, page 73.
33. Ibid ., page 171.
34. Ibid ., page 30.
35. Materialy . . . , op.cit., page 29.
36 . V . I. Lenin , op.ct., Volume 36, page 46 .
37 . Ibid ., page 477.
38 . Ibid ., Volume 40, page 247.
39. Ibid ., Volume 41, page 165.
40. See Programmyye dokumenty bor'by za mir, demokratiyu i sotsializm (Pro
gram Documents of the Struggle for Peace, Democracy and Socialism ), Mos
cow , Politizdat, 1964, page 57.
41. Ibid ., page 39.
42. See Mezhdunarodnoye Soveshchaniye kommunisticheskikh i rabochikh partiy .
Dogumenty i materialy ( International Conference of Communist and Worker
Parties. Documents and Materials ), Moscow , Politizdat, 1969, page 286.
43. V . I. Lenin , op.cit., Volume 40, page 244.
44. Ibid ., Volume 53, page 298.
45. Ibid., Volume 37, page 261.
46. L. I. Brezhnev: Delo Lenina zhivet i pobezhdayet (Lenin 's Cause Is Alive
and Is Triumphing ), Moscow , Politizdat, 1970, page 21.
47. V . I. Lenin , op.cit., Volume 40, pp 98 - 99.
Chapter II. ‘Leninist Principles of Sociological
Analysis ofWars and Contemporary
Problems

A Marxist-Leninist sociological analysis of wars signifies first and

foremost a study of the causes of wars, their social character and sub
stance, a study of their effect on society and on various social processes.
These problems have always been central ones within the system of
scientific analysis of wars and have served as a basis for determining the
attitude of Marxist parties toward each specific war.
The sociological aspect of the study of war has become particularly
important under present-day conditions.

1. Content and Tasks of Sociological Analysis of Wars: Category of the Substance

of Wars
Lenin 's elaboration of the methodological foundations and principles
of sociological analysis of wars was based on the rich theoretical legacy of
Marx and Engels. The founders of scientific Communism devoted enor
mous attention to an examination of the substance of wars contemporary
to them and a philosophical analysis of the role of violence in history.
Lenin , the ingenious continuer of their work, not only thoroughly
mastered his teachers' ideas on the essence of wars but also made an
inestimable contribution to their further development. He deserves emi
nent credit for scientific elaboration of the dialectical principles of analysis
of wars. He demonstrated that in order to achieve a correct understanding
of the essence of a war one must have a scientific interpretation of the
substance of policy, discovery of its class, socioeconomic roots, and a
thorough analysis of the policies which engendered a given war.
Lenin continued the job of examining the effect of wars on social
processes, taking into consideration new historical changes. He en
countered circumstances which Marx and Engels had merely predicted .
Wars in the era of imperialism had assumed a vast scale ; their influence
on social processes greatly expanded and deepened in comparison with
the preceding era.
War is a continuation of politics of classes and states by violent
23
means. Lenin invests great meaning in this definition. In his opinion war
is a major test of the economic , organizational and moral forces of nations
and thus develops into a study of politics, a summing-up of politics.1
Lenin 's definition of war constitutes an initial thesis of a sociological
analysis of wars. It gathers into a focal point all major links and relations
of the process of war; the deep roots which nourish wars, and their
maturation in the depths of socioeconomic life lead to this “ focal point.”
From here proceed all subsequent links determining the meaning, course ,
and development of a war.
The formula “war is a continuation of politics by violent means" and
particularly the sometimes-employed even more laconic formula "war is
a continuation ( or instrument) of politics,” however, cannot be employed
in isolation from the aggregate of theoretical views on war. The fact is
that both formulas constitute merely the most common definition of this
phenomenon . It is important to elucidate what content is invested in the
terms “ politics” or “ policy," " continuation of politics,” and “ violent
means (methods).”
Lenin employed the general definition of war with a number of addi
tional explanations, pertaining primarily to the essence of politics as a
special type of relations between classes, nations and states.
The leading role of class relations in politics proceeds from the social
foundation of these relations — from an economic basis.
" . . . The deepest roots of both the domestic and foreign policy of our
state,” stated Lenin , “ are determined by economic interests, the economic
status of the ruling classes. . .” 2. Politics in this sense is the concentrated
expression of economics.
Politics with its class, economic foundations constitutes so to speak
a " generic” element in the term essence of war. This concept also includes
a somewhat particular, so to speak “ specific ” element. The “specific"
element of the essence of war is armed violence , warfare. Both these
elements constitute two inseparably linked aspects of the essence of war,
in a certain subordination . The principal, determining aspect of the
essence of war is politics, and the subordinated aspect is armed violence.
Between politics and armed violence there are regular interrelation
ships which are necessarily inherent in any war. They have been noted
and thoroughly investigated by Lenin . Armed combat, and the entire
aggregate of the processes of war of a material and spiritual order are
engendered by politics. Armed violence begins when aggressive policies
engender a military conflict in one form or another, when other political
forces are unable to prevent such a conflict. Politics, to quote Lenin ,
engenders war.3
Politics determines the social character, the historical significance of
war - progressive or reactionary. This is a central, principal law which
expresses the essence of war. It underpins Marxist-Leninist doctrine on
just and unjust wars. The criterion for appraising a war is its relationship
to the aims of progressive development of society, to the interests of the
24
masses. Therefore , states Lenin , “ it is necessary in each specific instance,
for each specific war, to define its political content.” 4 .
Politics guides both warfare proper, directing military strategy, and
the nation 's life as a whole , focusing all manpower and resources toward
achieving victory . The nature of the political aim , Lenin reaches, is of
decisive influence on the conduct of war.
When war begins, the subsequent destiny of policy is in an inverse
relationship to victory or defeat in the course of armed conflict. War
serves as a tool of politics, but it can effectively carry out its role only
if victory is achieved .
Finally, politics is in an inverse relationship to the spontaneous effect
of armed conflict on society as a whole. Armed struggle puts society into
a special state, sharply aggravates all processes inherent in that society
and produces victims and destruction , which as a rule have a negative
effect on historical progress.
The inner structure of the essence of war is revealed precisely in these
patterns, which are of a universal character.
In his definition of war as a continuation of politics by violent means,
Lenin saw themost general point of departure essential in order to reveal
the entire complexity of each specific war and to isolate the fundamental,
principal elements within it. This definition is not the culmination point
of the investigation of a war but on the contrary is an initiation, a
theoreticalbasis.
Referring to the well-known Clausewitz formula in his “ Socialism and
War," Lenin writes that the thesis of war as a continuation of politics
constituted for Marxists a “ theoretical basis of views on the significance
of each given war.” 5 In his article “ A Caricature of Marxism and Im
perialist Economism ” he states that an understanding of war as a con
tinuation of politics is a basis for determining the true substance of war.
Using the category of essence or substance, it is necessary to see within
it the inner dialectic of the general, particular , and individual.
Determination of the essence of war as a sociohistorical phenomenon
reflects only the most general features of all wars. This general feature is
inherent in all wars of all times. Knowledge of war, however, as of any
other phenomenon , cannot be limited to determining only the most general
properties of the object of scrutiny. Precisely because all wars are, and
each given war is, a continuation of politics, they are essentially not only
identical but are also profoundly disparate from one another, and fre
quently complete opposites. This occurs because the political content of
a war is determined by the social character of the classes waging it, their
political goals and a number of other concretely historical conditions.
As we know , the general does not exist separately. It is incorporated
in the specific, the individual. In addition to the general, the particular
is also represented in the separate. This also applies to war. There is no
war in general, and there is no politics in general. Both constitute a
scientific abstraction reflecting that general element which is inherent in

25
all phenomena of the given class. But there objectively exist wars of a
narrower class as well — given types of wars of different eras. These types
include wars possessing common sociopolitical features, such as imperialist
wars, national liberation wars, wars in defense of the socialist homeland ,
etc. In addition to features common to all wars , their essence contains
specific features which sharply demarcate these types of war.
Therefore the terms " essence of war as a sociohistorical phenomenon,"
" essence of civil or any other types of wars " and " essence of a given ,
specific war" are nonidentical; they contain the dialectic of the general,
particular, and individual. Therefore a study of any war should consist in
moving upward from the abstract to the concrete, that is from a general
(abstract) concept of war as a continuation of politics to revelation of the
specific and individual features of the given war, effected by means of
analysis of its sociopolitical content.
"How is the 'genuine essence of war to be found, how is it to be.
defined ?” Lenin writes in his “ A Caricature of Marxism and Imperialist
Economism .” “ War is a continuation of politics. One must study policies
pursued before the war, policies conducting the war and policies which
led to war. If the policies were imperialist, that is defending the interests
of financial capital, robbing and oppressing colonies and other countries,
then a war which proceeds from these policies is an imperialistic war. If
the policies were of a national liberation type, that is expressing a move
ment of the masses against national oppression , then a war proceeding
from such policies is a war of national liberation .”
Thus the essence of each specific war is expressed not only in inter
relations between political struggle and armed conflict common to all
wars , but also in specific features determined by the conditions of the
era and the specific policies of given classes and states. Thus the essence
of war, like the essence of other social phenomena, is complex and
multifaceted.
In Lenin 's philosophical writings we find many statements substantiat
ing the dialectical combination of such properties of essence or substance ,
including the essence of war , as stability and fluidity . Persistent and in a
certain sense invariable in wars of all eras is the presence of a political
basis and violent methods of struggle, as well as essential, strictly defined
interrelations between them , as discussed above. But this stability is
relative. “ . . . Not only phenomena are transitory, fluid . . . but the
essence of things as well.” ?
Lenin particularly emphasized that an understanding of the essence of
phenomena as complex, fluid , internally contradictory or conflictive is the
main element which separates dialectics from metaphysics. “ Acknowledge
ment of invariable elements, ‘an immutable essence of things,' etc,” he
wrote, “ is not materialism but rather is metaphysical, that is anti
dialectical materialism .” 8
There are no dead, congealed phenomena. Sooner or later every given
substance is transformed into something different, into another substance.
26
It is important to bear in mind thereby that even in a period when a given
substance remains within the bounds of measure and a phenomenon
preserves its given qualitative definiteness , it is also changing, moving,
developing. But in this period its changes are of a partial character. Only
individual, although at times very important aspects of a phenomenon
can change substantially .
The variability of the essence of war consists primarily in the fact
that war arose as a result of a qualitative transformation of armed con
flicts of primitive society — “ the ancient war of tribes," to quote Friedrich
Engels, and will end its existence with the elimination of antagonistic
sociopolitical relations. The mutability of the essence of war further
consists in the fact that, as stated above, the nature of relationship of
the age, the political aims of the warring classes and states, as a rule
differ substantially from preceding ones, altering the specific and individ
ual features of the essence of a given war in comparison with past wars.
The theorists of the Second International proved unable to solve this
problem , for they occupied a metaphysical position . In criticizing them
Lenin stated that “ to compare 'continuation of the politics' of struggle
with feudalism and absolutism , the politics of a bourgeoisie which is
gaining liberation, with continuation of outmoded , that is imperialist
politics, that is reactionary politics hallmarked by robbery and looting, a
proletariat-suppressing bourgeoisie in alliance with feudal lords— is the
same as comparing yards with pounds."
But changes in the essence of war are expressed not only in the ap
pearance of new types and kinds of wars in connection with the develop
ment of socioeconomic and political conditions. The process of such
development, exceptionally aggravated by war itself, can lead to a change
in essence of one and the same war. Thus there took place a substantial
change in the character of the war between Prussia and France following
the surrender of the French Army at Sedan in 1870 : it was transformed
from a just to an unjust war. The reverse process of transformation of
an unjust war into a just war on the part of Britain and France took place
in connection with entry into the war by the USSR and the establishment
of an anti-Hitler coalition in World War II .
The concept of a universal, well-formed link between war and politics
serves not only as a theoretical basis for understanding the essence of
different wars but also as a basis for elucidating the differences between
one war and the other. Predicting the basic features of a potential world
nuclear war, we can state in advance that it would be a serious mistake
to assume that the substance of such a war is “ immutable,” unalterable
in comparison with that of past wars.
Thus the Leninist understanding of war categorically warns that the
essence or substance of each war cannot be reduced to a general claim
that it constitutes a continuation of the politics of classes and states. Such
a statement is merely a point of departure for the investigation . One
should distinguish from the essence of war in general the essence of war
27
of each historical type and kind, as well as specific wars, which in many
ways differ from one another both in political content and character of
armed violence involved. War possesses a complex inner structure charac
terized by stability and changeability . The essence of war changes in
relation to change in the conditions engendering it, the nature of policy
and the violentmeans employed by it.

2. Leninist Doctrine on the Causes, Social Character and Types of Wars

Lenin considered the task of sociological analysis of war to be the
study of war as a factor of a social order, that is from the standpoint of
that role which a given war can play or has played in the case of a war
which has ended ) in society . He pointed out that the initial principle in a
dialectical analysis of the social character of war is the rule : first of all
examine "what are the causes of the war, the aims of the war, and the
classes which are waging it.” 10
In spite of the substantial changes which have taken place in the
world , the root causes of wars have not changed. As Lenin stated, they
lie in the economic foundation of an antagonistic society . “War," he
wrote, “ is not a contradiction to the principles of private ownership but
rather is a direct and inevitable development of these principles.” 11 The
economic basis of wars is to be found wherever there prevails private
ownership of the means of production. But in every age and under
specific historical conditions, specific fundamental sources of military
threat have formed. Today imperialism is this source. It is therefore
essential to determine the mechanism of action of the root causes and to
reveal their link with policy (domestic and foreign ) proceeding from
the economics of imperialism .
An important demand in analysis of the origin of war is a study of the
foreign policy of a state in close link with the domestic policy. In studying
civil wars, conducted within the bounds of a single state, this matter of
course does not constitute a complex problem , for such a war is a direct
act of domestic policy. Constituting a direct clash between class forces, it
in a rather clearly -defined manner reveals its character from both aspects .
Analysis of wars between nations is another thing altogether, that is wars
which constitute acts of a foreign -policy character. Relations between
warring classes in each such conflict are implemented through the
mediation of the relations between the two or more nations involved in
the war. For the masses, inexperienced in matters of theoretical analysis
of politics, this circumstance is usually a serious obstacle in the way of
comprehending the historical significance of a war.
The character of a nation's foreign policy can be correctly evaluated
only with an understanding of its internal relations. “ Each war is in
separably linked with that political structure from which it derives,"
stated Lenin . “ That same policy which a certain power or a certain class
within that power pursued for a long period of time prior to the war will
28
inevitably and inalterably be pursued by that same class during the war,
with only the form of action being changed." 12
A major contribution to development of the methodology of soci
ological analysis of wars is Lenin 's introduction of concepts of genus,
kind and type of war. Without this a correct classification of wars would
be impossible.
War is an act of combat in which the combatants pursue specific aims.
In examining the social character of a war it is necessary to consider it
separately from each side. With this approach all the wars in history
break down into two “ genera ” : progressive (just ) and reactionary (un
just ) . Just and unjust wars can always be subdivided into specific types.
In the era of feudalism , for example, one can specify such types of just
war as peasant rebellions, uprisings by the incipient urban bourgeoisie
against the feudal lords, etc . Quite different types of just wars have
developed in our era. Lenin specified the following types: " revolutionary
national rebellions and wars,” “ wars of the proletariat against the
bourgeoisie," etc.
The term type of war is used to classify wars on the basis of those
conflicts which are resolved in these wars, whereby the war is considered
as an act of bilateral conflict, which is expressed also in the designation
of the war (for example: “ war between imperialist countries,” “ war
between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat," " war between the socialist
and imperialist camps,” etc ) .
Lenin gives the following basis for classification of types of relations
and corresponding types of wars between nations and states :
" (I ) Three main types: relationship between an oppressed nation and
an oppressing nation ( every war is a continuation of politics; politics is
the relationship between nations, classes, etc ) . According to the general
rule a war is legitimate from the standpoint of the oppressed party
( regardless of whether it is an offensive or defensive war in a military
sense ) .
" ( II ) Relationship between two oppressing nations. A struggle for
colonies, markets, etc (Rome and Carthage; England and Germany,
1914– 1917). According to the general rule a war of this type constitutes
plunder on both sides; the attitude of democracy (and socialism ) toward
such a war is defined as follows: "Two thieves are fighting with each
other; let them kill each other'. . .
“ ( III) Third type. A system of equal nations. An extremely complex
matter ! Particularly if Tsarism stands side by side with civilized , compara
tively democratic nations. This was the case (approximately ) in Europe
between 1815 and 1905.” 18
In the era of imperialism the second relationship was dominant,
engendering World War I and several regional imperialist wars. An
increasingly important role was played by the first relationship , engender
ing wars of national liberation . In addition there existed and developed
conflicts between the bourgeoisie and proletariat, constituting the basis
29
for the third type of war characteristic of the era of imperialism - civil
wars between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat.
In 1915 – 1916 Lenin came to the conclusion that a new type of war
was possible - between the first socialist states and bourgeois states .
Such are the types of war which were characteristic of the beginning
of the era of imperialism . The entire system of types of war has undergone
changes with the development of sociohistorical processes.
An important trend in the present-day international situation, as noted
at the 24th CPSU Congress, is the immutability of the reactionary,
aggressive nature of imperialism . The congress exposed the criminal
actions of the imperialists in various parts of the world and pointed out
the most dangerous forces of imperialist reaction , which are endeavoring
to hold back the progress of history, to rescue or reestablish their rule
over peoples by means of wars and intervention .
On the basis of consideration of the diversity of political relations
in the present era we can isolate the basic types of contradictions and
conflicts of the era . A particular type of war corresponds to each of these
types of conflicts.
As we know , imperialism is the source of all antagonistic conflicts
of the present-day world , the source of war danger. The struggle of the
imperialist bourgeoisie against the fundamental line of social progress
the movement of society toward socialism , engenders three major con
flicts of a class nature : between socialist and imperialist countries ; between
bourgeoisie and proletariat; between the extremely reactionary regime of
the monopolist leaders and the people as a whole .
The foundamental conflict of the present era is that between socialism
and imperialism . It appears in the form of governmental and ideological
relations between socialist and imperialist countries.
Another one of the most important conflicts of our era is the conflict
between imperialism and the national liberation movement.
An important role is played by conflicts between individual imperialist
nations, as well as the diversified and socially complex conflicts between
young, emerging nations. Thus we can name several groups of important
although not equal-value antagonistic conflicts of this era.
The aggressive policies of imperialism can also constitute an immediate
cause of war between the imperialist and socialist nations. Such a war,
involving the threat of nuclear weapons, contains an enormous danger ,
and the effort to avoid such a war comprises the most important task of
the foreign policy of the Soviet Union and its allies. The imperialists have
long dreamed of destroying the socialist nations, and particularly the
Soviet Union, but the prospect of a powerful response noticeably cools
their ardor.
The policy and military ideology of imperialist nations today view a
total world war against the USSR as an extreme measure. The militarists
are arguing new and more flexible doctrines which provide for the
conduct of " small” wars while maintaining readiness for total war. An
30
example of such a " small” war was the war in Korea. Later American
imperialism undertook a new local war in Indochina, aimed not only
against the liberation movement in South Vietnam but also against the
DRV, a socialist nation .
Experience shows that the imperialists have initiated and may in the
future again initiate “ small” wars and provoke various conflicts. This
emphasizes the particular need to study the causes of and conditions for
such conflicts and elaboration of methods of vigorous and effective rebuff
to reactionary intrigues of this kind.
Lenin also thoroughly exposed the essence of such a type of war of the
present era as the civil war between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie.
" . . . Civil war," he stated, “ is the most aggravated form of class
struggle, when a series of economic and political clashes, following one
upon the other, accumulating, expanding, and becoming increasingly
acute, reaches the point of transformation of the clashes into an armed
struggle between one class and another." 14
Thus a civil war is an open clash between classes, when the matter of
rule is being decided, the question of replacement of the dictatorship of
one class by the dictatorship of another. A civil war waged by the
proletariat during the course of a socialist revolution poses and achieves
progressive aims, gaining total suppression of the exploiters.
Although Marxist-Leninists consider civil wars by the worker class
against the bourgeoisie to be just, and contrasting wars waged by the
counterrevolutionary bourgeoisie to be reactionary and unjust, they by
no means call for revolution to be carried out at all times and in all
places by means of civil war. The question of whether one should resort to
civil war to gain power or whether this objective should be reached by
peaceful means is always determined on the basis of the specific situation .
This is reemphasized in the proceedings of the 1969 International
Conference of Communist and Worker Parties. “ The Communist and
worker parties,” states the Conference Declaration, " are conducting their
activities under extremely diverse , specific conditions, which require the
appropriate approach to solving specific problems. Each party, guided
by the principles of Marxism - Leninism and taking into consideration
specific national conditions, is independently elaborating its own policy,
determining the directions, forms and methods of struggle , choosing a
peaceful or nonpeaceful path of transition to socialism , depending on
circumstances. . ." 15
One should distinguish from civil wars between proletariat and bour
geoisie during the course of a socialist revolution civil wars which are
waged by the masses with general democratic aims, where the task is not
establishment of or defense of the dictatorship of the proletariat. These
wars are based on conflicts between the people and the reactionaries in
power. Such wars are waged either for the purpose of democratic revolu
tion or with antifascist aims, pursuing repulsion of attacks by reactionary
forces and preservation of bourgeois democracy. They are waged on the
31
one hand by the toiler classes, in some cases allied with a segment of the
bourgeoisie, and in other cases by a reactionary segment of the bour
geoisie , supported either by the partially -deceived petite bourgeoisie or
by foreign imperialists. In this struggle the proletariat shares leadership
with other classes, although it does constitute the most active revolu
tionary force. The political content and results of such wars can be
extremely varied — from preservation of a bourgeois democratic republic
to the creation of conditions for transition of a democratic revolution into
a socialist one.
Wars of this type constitute a specific type of just war and differ
materially from civil wars of the proletariat in the course of a socialist
revolution . Pointing to the possibility of such wars , Lenin wrote: “Wars
are a continuation of politics ; therefore , since a struggle for democracy
is taking place, a war because of democracy is also possible. . ." 16
The present era knows of numerous examples of such wars. They
include, for example, the antifascist rebellion in Bulgaria in 1923, the
1936– 1939 war in Spain , the civil wars in Greece in "1946 – 1949 and in
Cuba in 1956 – 1959, the. 1958 revolutionary uprising in Iraq, and the
struggle presently being waged in Northern Ireland. This type of war also
applies to a number of otherminormilitary conflicts which have occurred
in recent years.
Today the most common type of war is the war between an oppressed
and an oppressing nation.
The essence of relations between imperialist (oppressor) and non
imperialist (oppressed ) nations of the capitalist world consists in a clash
between predatory and liberation aims. This also determines the essence
of wars between them .
To Lenin belongs the credit for a comprehensive elaboration of the
Marxist-Leninist theory of national liberation wars in the era of im
perialism and proletarian revolutions. At the outset of World War I he
resolutely spoke out not only against rightist-opportunist national
chauvinistic concepts which justified the predatory imperialist war but
also against a leftist concept which denied the possibility of wars of
national liberation in the era of imperialism . Lenin pointed to the absolute
justice of inevitable uprisings by the then still enslaved peoples of Asia .
and Africa against their oppressors . He foresaw the upswelling of a
series of such uprisings and viewed the peoples of these countries as
natural allies of the proletariat. In addition he considered that under
certain conditions there was a possibility of wars of national liberation
even in Europe.
In wars of this kind we also encounter specific types of just and un
just wars. In describing such a type of just war as a war of national
liberation , one should emphasize that its political contentis:expressed in a
struggle for national independence, for the emancipation of colonies and
semi-colonies, or in a struggle against attempts by the imperialists to stall
the economic development of an already liberated nation , to infringe upon

32
its political rights and even to deprive it of its sovereignty . Difference in
the content of the aims of war also defines different forms of waging such
wars on the part of oppressed peoples. The first form is the popular
uprising, that is a war which breaks out at the initiative of the oppressed
masses, most frequently spontaneously, but subsequently assuming the
form of a guerrilla and sometimes regular-army war. A second form is a
war between an imperialist nation and a former colony which has become
an independent state , which is endeavoring to pursue an independent
policy, to free itself of vestiges of colonial oppression , inequality of
rights, etc.
The CPSU and other Marxist-Leninist parties resolutely support the
national liberation wars of oppressed peoples lending them assistance by
all means possible under the given circumstances. “We,” stated L . I.
Brezhnev in the Central Committee Report to the 24th CPSU Congress,
" as in the past, shall continue unswervingly in our support of the struggle
of peoples for democracy, national liberation and socialism ." 17 A vivid
example of our party's dedication to its international duty is the resolute
support and comprehensive assistance to the Arab nations in their struggle
against Israeli aggression which is being encouraged by the American
imperialists.
A special type of relations between nations are relations between two
oppressor nations, between two imperialist powers. This of course also
applies to wars between such nations. These wars are engendered by
interimperialist conflicts, due to the competition between monopolies and
as a rule are of a mutually unjust nature. These wars are incapable of
resolving the conflicts which produce them ; on the contrary, they in fact
only further aggravate these conflicts . Victory by either one of the sides
in such a war can lead only to intensified reaction. And yet as a rule
these wars serve to accelerate the revolutionary situation .
The essence of such wars was exceptionally profoundly disclosed by
Lenin during World War I. Lenin 's conclusions and theses have been
extremely helpful to Marxists in making a scientific appraisal of World
War II and subsequentmilitary conflicts .
An analysis of wars of the contemporary era from the standpoint of
Leninist methodology would be incomplete if we failed to discuss eval
uation of military conflicts which for a number of reasons cannot be
assigned to one of the above types.
The collapse of colonial empires and the establishment of a large num
ber of young national states has led to the forming of an entire sphere of
special societal development, a distinctive feature of which is an unusual
diversity of social relations. Over a vast part of Asia , Africa, and Latin
America the elements of past eras and socioeconomic systems have
bizarrely intertwined. In these areas there are individual foci of socialism ,
attempts at forced -march noncapitalist development from a level of in
credible backwardness, elements of " genuine” capitalism , feudal absolut
ism , and the dominance of peasant-patriarchal relations, right down to
33
for the third type of war characteristic of the era of imperialism - civil
wars between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat.
In 1915– 1916 Lenin came to the conclusion that a new type of war
was possible — between the first socialist states and bourgeois states.
Such are the types of war which were characteristic of the beginning
of the era of imperialism . The entire system of types of war has undergone
changes with the development of sociohistorical processes.
An important trend in the present-day international situation , as noted
at the 24th CPSU Congress, is the immutability of the reactionary ,
aggressive nature of imperialism . The congress exposed the criminal
actions of the imperialists in various parts of the world and pointed out
the most dangerous forces of imperialist reaction, which are endeavoring
to hold back the progress of history , to rescue or reestablish their rule
over peoples by means of wars and intervention .
On the basis of consideration of the diversity of political relations
in the present era we can isolate the basic types of contradictions and
conflicts of the era . A particular type of war corresponds to each of these
types of conflicts.
As we know , imperialism is the source of all antagonistic conflicts
of the present-day world , the source of war danger. The struggle of the
imperialist bourgeoisie against the fundamental line of social progress
the movement of society toward socialism , engenders three major con
flicts of a class nature : between socialist and imperialist countries; between
bourgeoisie and proletariat; between the extremely reactionary regime of
the monopolist leaders and the people as a whole.
The foundamental conflict of the present era is that between socialism
and imperialism . It appears in the form of governmental and ideological
relations between socialist and imperialist countries.
Another one of the most important conflicts of our era is the conflict
between imperialism and the national liberation movement.
An important role is played by conflicts between individual imperialist
nations, as well as the diversified and socially complex conflicts between
young, emerging nations. Thus we can name several groups of important
although not equal-value antagonistic conflicts of this era .
The aggressive policies of imperialism can also constitute an immediate
cause of war between the imperialist and socialist nations. Such a war,
involving the threat of nuclear weapons, contains an enormous danger,
and the effort to avoid such a war comprises the most important task of
the foreign policy of the Soviet Union and its allies. The imperialists have
long dreamed of destroying the socialist nations, and particularly the
Soviet Union, but the prospect of a powerful response noticeably cools
their ardor.
The policy and military ideology of imperialist nations today view a
totalworld war against the USSR as an extrememeasure. The militarists
are arguing new and more flexible doctrines which provide for the
conduct of "small” wars while maintaining readiness for total war. An
30
example of such a " small” war was the war in Korea. Later American
imperialism undertook a new local war in Indochina, aimed not only
against the liberation movement in South Vietnam but also against the
DRV , a socialist nation.
Experience shows that the imperialists have initiated and may in the
future again initiate “ small” wars and provoke various conflicts. This
emphasizes the particular need to study the causes of and conditions for
such conflicts and elaboration of methods of vigorous and effective rebuff
to reactionary intrigues of this kind.
Lenin also thoroughly exposed the essence of such a type of war of the
present era as the civil war between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie.
". . . Civil war," he stated, “ is the most aggravated form of class
struggle , when a series of economic and political clashes, following one
upon the other, accumulating, expanding, and becoming increasingly
acute , reaches the point of transformation of the clashes into an armed
struggle between one class and another.” 14
Thus a civil war is an open clash between classes, when the matter of
rule is being decided , the question of replacement of the dictatorship of
one class by the dictatorship of another . A civil war waged by the
proletariat during the course of a socialist revolution poses and achieves
progressive aims, gaining total suppression of the exploiters.
Although Marxist-Leninists consider civil wars by the worker class
against the bourgeoisie to be just, and contrasting wars waged by the
counterrevolutionary bourgeoisie to be reactionary and unjust, they by
no means call for revolution to be carried out at all times and in all
places by means of civil war. The question ofwhether one should resort to
civil war to gain power or whether this objective should be reached by
peaceful means is always determined on the basis of the specific situation .
This is reemphasized in the proceedings of the 1969 International
Conference of Communist and Worker Parties. " The Communist and
worker parties,” states the Conference Declaration , “ are conducting their
activities under extremely diverse, specific conditions, which require the
appropriate approach to solving specific problems. Each party , guided
by the principles of Marxism -Leninism and taking into consideration
specific national conditions, is independently elaborating its own policy,
determining the directions, forms and methods of struggle, choosing a
peaceful or nonpeaceful path of transition to socialism , depending on
circumstances. . ." 16
One should distinguish from civil wars between proletariat and bour
geoisie during the course of a socialist revolution civil wars which are
waged by the masses with general democratic aims, where the task is not
establishment of or defense of the dictatorship of the proletariat. These
wars are based on conflicts between the people and the reactionaries in
power . Such wars are waged either for the purpose of democratic revolu
tion or with antifascist aims, pursuing repulsion of attacks by reactionary
forces and preservation of bourgeois democracy. They are waged on the
vestiges of slave society and primitive aboriginal existence. Various
groups, some progressive and others reactionary, replace one another in
power in many countries as in a kaleidoscope. There occur clashes be
tween tribes and tribal nations, classes and social groups. Large and
small military conflicts are continuously in progress, with the majority
inspired by imperialists but also containing their own native soil as well.
The character of all these military conflicts is exceptionally complex
and multiform . It would be a useless exercise to attempt to assign them to
known types of wars. Each of such clashes requires a special specific
class analysis provided by Marxist-Leninistmethodology . Let us take, for
example, present-day sharp -conflict clashes between underdeveloped
capitalist, nonimperialist nations, represented on both sides by a national
bourgeoisie. They are somewhat reminiscent in sociohistorical character
to the wars of the European bourgeois states of the 19th century, but
they are far from identical. The war between Saudi Arabia and Yemen
in 1962 – 1963 was a typical conflict between a reactionary feudal
absolutist monarchy and a young national bourgeois state ; for the latter
the war was of a just character. As we see, this war is a far from complete
analogue to past wars — wars of the era of revolutionary struggle by the
bourgeoisie against feudalism . It seems to be a great anachronism , but
nevertheless it essentially expresses a bourgeois-antifeudal character.
Civil wars are also quite unique in the given case , not to speak of
military coups and rebellions. The war in Nigeria , for example, is unlike
the civil wars of the era of feudalism and capitalism , and it certainly was
not a typical civil war. The civil war in Nigeria was waged by dominant
tribal groupings which upon liberation found themselves " in the same
house," demarcated by the boundaries of the former colonial possession .
One is hard put to reconcile separatists and advocates of a single cen
tralized state under conditions where there is no unified nation , no unified
classes, where there is no stable economic edifice. It is also important to
consider the fact that these wars cannot be examined without taking into
account the insidious schemes of imperialism aimed at preserving positions
of preeminence in former colonial possessions.
The social character of these wars as well should be examined on the
basis of Leninist principles of class analysis. Only under these conditions
is it possible to make a correct appraisal of each such war.

3. Lenin on the Social Consequences of Wars

Lenin devoted considerable attention to an analysis of the effect of
variouskinds of wars on social processes. He wrote indignantly about that
fearful suffering wreaked upon mankind by imperialist wars. But at the
same time he noted that the effect of wars on societal affairs is not
reduced solely to victims and physical destruction. War, which constitutes
an acute crisis in the development of society , presents it with a serious

34
test and compels it to mobilize all resources to overcome destructive
processes.
War is a crisis which , to quote Lenin , breaks some and toughens
others . . . "War-great crisis. Any crisis signifies (with the possibility of
temporary delay and regression )
(a ) acceleration of development
( Y) (8) aggravation of conflicts
( y) (B) their discovery
(8 ) collapse of the rotten , etc.” 18
The general consequences of war are characterized by three types of
phenomena :
1 ) peace terms dictated by the victors, which achieve the stated aims;
2 ) aggravation of those societal processes characteristic of a given society ;
3 ) destruction of productive resources, cultural achievements, as well as
human casualties, which under conditions of antagonistic relations
heightens the crisis of the social system and makes further development of
society difficult. Society emerges from a war with results which sum up
the changes introduced by the processes of all three above types.
“ War is a continuation by violent means of that policy ," wrote Lenin,
" which was pursued by the ruling classes of the warring powers long
before the war. Peace is a continuation of those same policies, with the
addition of those changes in the relationship between the opposing forces
which were created by the military actions. War per se does not alter
the direction in which policy was developing prior to the war but merely
accelerates this development.” 19 Therefore the causes and social essence
of a war are directly linked with its consequences.
If victory is won by the side which was waging a just war, the changes
which have taken place serve the aims of social progress. If the victor is
that side which initiated an unjust, predatory war, the war achieved
reactionary aims. The nature of the peace (de facto and de jure ) which
ensues usually corresponds to the policies of the triumphant class and
reflects its needs and goals.
But the overall results of a war are cot restricted to this, for the
spontaneous effect of the war on social processes tells in the forming of
conditions of the postwar peace . World War I accelerated the develop
mentof all phenomena characteristic of the imperialist stage of capitalism ,
accelerated them contrary to the will of the belligerent nations and in
conformity with the objective laws of development of an antagonistic
society .
At the same time, contrary to the aims and desires of the imperialist
bourgeoisie , intensification of the unevenness of development of capitalism
naturally led to facilitating a breaching of the front of imperialism by the
socialist revolution, the maturation of which was accelerated by the war.
The revolution was a natural way out of that blind alley in which
capitalism found itself, where the world war caught up with it. Lenin
focused particular attention on the fact that war brings into motion forces
35
which act independently of the will of the ruling circles and the wishes of
parties and governments.
In conformity with the basic principles of Marxism , Lenin viewed war
as " a barbarous and beastly affair.” He emphatically set himself apart
from pacifists, however, demanding that one differentiate between just
and unjust wars. If a just war becomes inevitable , stated Lenin , there
should be a single slogan — everything for the war, everything for victory .
In supporting just wars Communists stress that this in no way signifies
that such a war must be staged, forced , initiated prematurely. Communists
prefer to struggle for power by peaceful means, although they are per
fectly well aware that civil war on the part of the proletariat is the most
just, legitimate revolutionary war. But Communists take to arms only if
they are compelled to do so by the exploiter classes.
The question of use of armed force also depends on other conditions.
A war may be just and legitimate, but one must take into account its
negative consequences. Characteristic is Lenin 's stand taken in the period
of preparations for the Brest Peace in 1918. He insisted on obtaining
peace — no matter how hard and disgraceful the terms— since peace was
the only possible solution for the young, unconsolidated Soviet republic.
In another instance there may be a situation where an armed uprising
is just and holds promise of success at a given time within a certain
country but may result in substantial negative consequences for the world
revolutionary process .
The question of consequences of war is being restated in our time due
to the possibility of employment ofnuclear weapons. “ . . . Under present
day conditions,” stated Brezhnev, " a nuclear world war could result in
hundreds of millions of deaths, in the destruction of entire countries, in
contamination of the earth 's surface and atmosphere . Communists must
draw from this the most serious political conclusions. The struggle to
prevent the threat of a new world war has now become one of the most
important conditions for successfully fulfilling the tasks of building
socialism and Communism , and development of the entire world revolu
tionary process.” 20
The employment of nuclear weapons in a war will lead to certain
changes in the interrelationship between war and politics, which along
with altered sociopolitical conditions of the era may impart special features
to a potential nuclear war and will substantially differentiate it from any
other war in history.
Such a war would in essence be on the one hand the outcome and con
tinuation of the reactionary policies of imperialism and on the other hand
a continuation of the policy of defense of the cause of socialism , progress,
and justice. At the same time the qualitatively new consequences caused
by mutual utilization of the most advanced weapons substantially limit
the capability of a nuclear war to be a means of achieving the political
objectives of imperialism . This lies behind the important conclusion

36
stated in the CPSU program that nuclear war “ cannot and shall not
serve as a means of settling international disputes.” 21
A cardinal change in the correlation between war and politics at the
present time is the fact that the growth in the might of socialism and other
peace- loving forces, as well as the fact that the USSR wields a mighty
“ nuclear sword,” make it possible to check the forces of aggression :
world war has ceased to be an inevitability . But this does not mean that
nuclear war, due to change in the effect of the above-mentioned and
given patterns, has ceased to be an instrument of politics, as is claimed
by the overwhelming majority of representatives of pacifist, anti-war
movements in the bourgeois world . This is a subjective judgment. It
expresses merely protest against nuclear war. It objectively , however,
even against the volition of its authors, understates the danger of a
nuclear war and in many cases gives rise to illusions about the “ automatic
destruction ,” the “ self-negation” of nuclear war, and dulls the vigilance of
peoples. The imperialists are attempting to make capital of this, utilizing
a formula to the effect that nuclear war has allegedly ceased to be an
instrument of politics. While supporting pacifist, anti-war movements on
the part of sincere advocates of peace, Marxists should see and explain
the harmfulness of their theoretical (and in many cases political as well )
positions, the one-sidedness and vulnerability of their understanding of
the essence of nuclear war.
With all the inconsistency of the pacifists , their campaign against
nuclear war constitutes an important social factor which cannot be dis
counted .
In preparing for the Genoa Conference, Lenin wrote in a draft Central
Committee directive for the Soviet delegation that they should approach
bourgeois pacifist slogan in a sober manner.22 “ Both you and I,” Lenin
reminded Chicherin, “have fought against pacifism as a program for a
revolutionary proletarian party. This is obvious. But where, when and
who denied utilization of pacifists by this party in order to demoralize
the enemy, the bourgeoisie ?” 23
This comment is of enormous significance in defining the tactics of
Communist parties in the struggle for peace and socialism , in the cause of
building a broad front of democratic forces around the Communists for
the struggle against imperialist reactionary forces.
Lenin's doctrine on the essence and social role of wars, the principles
of sociological analysis of wars formulated by him , based on the Marx
ian dialectical materialist method, constitute the basis for innovative
solution to questions connected with the problem of war and peace, the
correlation between politics and war.

Footnotes
1. See V . I. Lenin : Poln . Sobr. Soch. (Complete Works), Volume 39 , pp 321,
426 .
 2. Ibid., Volume 36 , page 327.
3. See Leninskiy sbornik (Lenin Collection ), XII, page 437.
4 . V . I. Lenin , op.cit., Volume 30, page 262.
5. Ibid ., Volume 26, page 316 .
6. Ibid ., Volume 30, pp 82 –83.
7. Ibid ., Volume 29, page 227.
8. Ibid., Volume 18, pp 275–276.
9. Ibid., Volume 26 , page 226.
10. Ibid ., Volume 30 , page 265.
11. Ibid., Volume 26 , page 353.
12. Ibid ., Volume 32, page 79.
13. Ibid ., Volume 49, pp 369– 370.
14. Ibid ., Volume 34, page 215.
15. Mezhdunarodnoye Soveshchaniye kommunisticheskikh i rabochikh partiy.
Dokumenty i materialy ( International Conference of Communist and Worker
Parties. Documents and Materials ), page 327.
16. Lenin , op.cit., Volume 30, page 85 .
17. Materialy XXIV s"yezda KPSS (Proceedings of the 24th CPSU Congress ),
page 31.
18. Lenin, op.cit., Volume 26, page 372.
19. Ibid., Volume 27, page 269.
20. L . I. Brezhnev: 50 Let velikikh pobed sotsializma ( 50 Years of Great Victories
of Socialism ) ,Moscow , Politizdat, 1967, page 57.
21. Programma Kommunisticheskoy partii Sovetskogo Soyuza (Program of the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union ) , page 59.
22. See Lenin , op.cit., Volume 44, page 382.
23. Ibid ., Volume 54, page 171.

38
Chapter III. AgainstFalsification of the Leninist
Conception of the Essence and Nature
of War

A dialectical-materialist, class analysis of the essence of war and it

relationship to the fundamental areas of societal relations comprises the
heart of the Lenin theory heritage and the ideological foundation of
Soviet military theory and practice. It embodies the finest achievements
of human thought and vast experience in the utilization of revolutionary
coercion in the interests of the toilers. A Leninist sociological analysis
of war helps in promptly revealing and thoroughly cognizing new elements
in the essence and nature of contemporary wars, produced by radical
transformations in military affairs.
Bourgeois ideologues and revisionists of every ilk distort and falsify
Lenin 's doctrine on war, proceeding from antiscientific philosophic
methodological positions.

1. Critique ofBourgeois Concepts of the Sources of Leninist Doctrine on War

The Leninist doctrine on war and its link with politics has long since
been the object of unceasing attacks by the ideologues of imperialism
and militarism . They employ the most varied techniques in this effort.
Perhaps the most widespread is deliberately one-sided , boundless praise
for 19th century German military theorist Clausewitz and exaggeration
of his contribution to elaboration of the problems of war. Clausewitz is
portrayed as the founder of the theory of major war as well as of the
theory of the "small” war.
Western investigators utilize the favorable appraisal of his writings
by the founders of Marxism -Leninism to achieve greater popularization
of Clausewitz . Lenin 's interest in the writings of Clausewitz is emphasized
in particular. West German historian and philosopher W . Hahlweg writes
that Lenin 's analysis of the writings of Clausewitz constitutes a "most
important stage" in the history of the study of Clausewitz.? They of course
fail to add that Lenin voiced critical comments on the erroneous idealistic
concepts of this German military theorist.
This one-sided presentation of the role of Clausewitz reflects on the
one hand the extreme subjectivism and class tendentiousness of con
temporary military ideologues of the bourgeoisie, and on the other — a
vicious attempt on their part to cloud the qualitative distinction between
Marxist-Leninist doctrine on politics and war and that of Clausewitz, to
place between them an equal sign , and in this manner to attack the
prestige of Marxist-Leninist ideology as a whole .
Raising Clausewitz on a pedestal, bourgeois ideologues endeavor to
belittle Lenin 's role in elaboration of the problems of the correlation
between politics and war, to cast doubt on the originality of his views.
Statements by American sociologist R . Kolkowicz are an example of this .
“ Lenin ,” he writes, “ repeated approvingly the aphorism of Clausewitz that
war is simply a continuation of politics by other (namely violent) means,
adding that this had always been the view of Marx and Engels.” 3
West German ideologues are particularly active in this regard. They
make every attempt to affirm the “ priority” of Clausewitz , placing him
equal to the founders of Marxism -Leninism . For example , West German
ideologue Adm F . Ruge writes that “ while the exile Lenin carefully
studied the teachings of Clausewitz and then practically applied them to
the Civil War.” Herein lies, in the opinion of Ruge, the source of the
“multiple successes of Communism ” 4 in the area of the military.
But no matter how sophisticated the devices employed by the ideologues
of imperialism to slander the military theory legacy of V . I. Lenin , they
are unable to budge historical truth. In actual fact Lenin did not borrow
mechanically but critically reworked earlier theories and created on the
basis of dialectical and historical materialism a totally new doctrine on
war, which differs radically from the teachings of Clausewitz and other
bourgeois theorists .
As is well known, it is to the credit of Clausewitz that he, applying
the Hegelian dialectic to the cognition of war, overcame the metaphysical
separation between war and politics which was characteristic of military
theorists of the time and established an inseparable connection between
them . But the method of thinking and philosophy of Clausewitz were
idealistic. This placed an imprinton his views on this matter. Clausewitz,
just as Hegel, assumed the intellect, the spirit as primary in examining
social phenomena; he also idealistically interpreted politics, of which war
is the result and continuation . As he conceived it, policy is the “ intel
ligence of the embodied state," "representative of the interests of all of
society," an expression of the universal will of the monarchic state. In
addition, he reduced the content of politics to the external relations
between states. With this interpretation of politics war was the continua
tion of the will, the wishes, the aspirations of the rulers — the king, the
monarch, of their foreign policy activity, allegedly carried out in the
interest of thenation.
The Leninist interpretation of the question of the link between war
and politics, as was emphasized above, rests on a scientific definition of
the essence of politics proper. Lenin stated that Marxists proceed from
40
“materialist theory of politics. . ," 5 The essence of politics consists in
the fact that it expresses in a concentrated form the economic interests of
a given class and represents the relationship and struggle between classes,
nations and states. War is inseparably linked to that sociopolitical system
from which it derives, to that policy pursued by classes and states long
before a war.
The dialectical materialist, class approach to politics served as a key
to disclose the essence , the class content and character of war. Thanks
to this the thesis of war as a continuation of politics by violent means,
formulated by Clausewitz on an idealistic foundation , acquired dialectical
materialistic content, took on a qualitatively different, class significance ,
and became an effective means of cognizing the nature of the armed
conflicts of various eras.
Present-day bourgeois ideologues do not want to see this fundamental
distinction in the definition of politics. They either fail to mention or
deny the link between the aggressive aspirations of the NATO member
nations and other military blocs on the one hand and their material
foundation on the other — an economic system based on state monopoly
capital. French sociologist R . Aron, agreeing essentially with the views
of Clausewitz on politics as “ the embodied intelligence of the state,"
changed this thesis only slightly and couched it in more modern terms.
In his formulation " politics is a global examination of all circumstances
by statesmen." 8
An idealist definition of politics is also typical of H . Speidel, a former
Nazi general who has occupied high command positions in NATO .
" . . . Politics in the age of struggle between ideologies,” he writes,
“ strongly depends on ideological, philosophic and religious foundations,
as was the case in the age of 'wars of religion.'Matters of economics and
politics of nations, on the other hand, very frequently withdraw to the
background, or (wherever they are decisive ) assume the garb of problems
of an ideological type and with this are 'sublimated or transformed'.” ?
We should also point out such a form of falsification of the Leninist
definition of war as an artificial opposition of foreign policy to domestic,
declaration of the " primacy” of the former over the latter. This is done
in order , following the example of Clausewitz , to prove that war is the
continuation only of foreign policy , that it is not linked to domestic
policy, that foreign policy has now become equivalent to war. If Clause
witz "were living today," writes American theorist A . Rappoport in his
book Strategy and Conscience , " he would conclude that foreign policy
today is a continuation of war by other means."
This placing of foreign policy in opposition to domestic policy is of
a definite class significance. With this bourgeois theorists endeavor to
present the policies of the ruling class as “ supraclass," " supranational,”
pursued allegedly in the interest of society as a whole . This is also
manifested in the military theories of imperialism . U .S . Political and
military leaders make every attempt to make it look like the aggressive
41
wars of American imperialism are waged in the interest of the entire
people, in the interest of the “ nation as a whole .” Precisely in this manner
American military theorists attempt to justify the disgraceful U .S. aggres
sive war in Indochina.
The most vicious form of distortion of the essence of politics is the
attempt by bourgeois ideologues to prove that there are no particular
differences between the foreign policy of socialist nations and modern
imperialist states. In this kind of fabrication is manifested first and fore
most the class hatred of our enemies toward socialism , an attempt to
discredit the peaceful nature of the policies of the socialist nations, to
falsify the essence of wars in defense of the socialist homeland , to place
them side by side with the unjust, predatory wars of imperialist states.
Lenin vigorously exposed bourgeois ideologues .who specialized in
falsification in Soviet foreign policy . " . . . Our foreign policy,” he stated ,
“ has nothing in common with Tsarist foreign policy, with the policies of
the Russian capitalists or the Russian bourgeoisie. . . Our foreign policy
has nothing in common with that which is constantly being ascribed to
us by the bourgeois newspapers.” 8
The Soviet Union counters the aggressive policies of imperialism with
a policy of active defense of the peace and strengthening of international
security . This policy serves as one of the instruments of revolutionary
transformation of society and defense of the conquests of the revolution .
It is permeated with a spirit of internationalism and solidarity with
revolutionary, progressive forces throughout the world ; it is characterized
by genuine democracy and a profoundly peaceful nature . The aims of
Soviet foreign policy are “ to secure together with the other socialist
nations favorable international conditions for building socialism and
communism ; to strengthen the unity and solidarity of the socialist nations,
their friendship and brotherhood; to support the national liberation
movement and to effect comprehensive collaboration with the young
developing nations, consistently to defend the principle of peaceful co
existence of nations with differing social systems, to offer decisive
resistance to the aggressive forces of imperialism , and to spare mankind
from another world war.” 9
- Distortion of the essence of war was also linked with absolutization
of the role of politics, the means and methods of political struggle . In
connection with this, “ political warfare ” is widely publicized in the West
as bearing all the attributes of genuine warfare and is viewed as a category
equivalent to war.
While some bourgeois ideologues openly attack Marxist-Leninist doc
trine on politics and war, not hesitating to use any and all devices, others
do not come right out and deny its originality, but they do present in
distorted form all those new elements introduced by Lenin to the defini
tion of the correlation of politics and war as well as their essence.
West German sociologist W . R . Schramm , a zealous apologist of
Clausewitz, formulated 10 points or “ principles” which in his opinion
42
summarize the new elements introduced by Lenin into the definition of
the correlation between politics and war. A careful examination of these
" principles ” shows that they have nothing in common with an objective
treatment of this question and comprise a sophisticated form of distortion
of the Leninistmilitary theory legacy. The first point, for example, states:
" Clausewitz wrote that'war is the continuation of politics by other means';
Lenin formulated this thesis differently — 'politics is the continuation of
war by other means'.” 10 Lenin is credited with the doubtful service of
allegedly switching the places of war and politics in the Clausewitz
formula, placing politics in first position, thus exaggerating the role of
the coercive element in it.
The following nine “principles " abound with similar fantasies and
juggling acts. This bourgeois writer reproaches Lenin for removing
" chivalry” from war, for justifying partisan methods of warfare , etc .
Attempts to ascribe to Lenin an exaggeration of the role of armed
violence for the achievement of political ends— an exaggeration which is
alien to him — are ineffectual. In actual fact Clausewitz exaggerated the
role of armed coercion in the implementation of policy and spoke in
favor of its unrestricted utilization in the so-called " absolute war.”
Clausewitz claimed that “ war is an act of violence, and there is no limit
to its application. . ." 11 In his words, introduction into the philosophy
of war of the " principle of limitation and moderation is completely
absurd .” 12
Even bourgeois writers point to the erroneous aspects of the Clausewitz
theory. British military theorist Liddell Hart, criticizing Clausewitz for
making a fetish of armed violence, wrote that he inflamed the blood and
poisoned the brain with constant repetition of his assertions about war
as an act of violence taken to an extreme degree. “ The philosophy of
Clausewitz,” Hart continues, “became a doctrine suited for training
corporals but not generals. His doctrine, according to which combat is
the sole genuine form of military activity, deprives strategy of its laurels
and reduces the art of warfare to techniques of mass slaughter.” 18
Statements by Clausewitz on the employment of unlimited force in war
exerted some influence on the forming of the military theory of im
perialism . The most shameless ideologues of American imperialism ,
grasping at erroneous, contradictory statements by Clausewitz, hyperbolize
armed coercion, depicting it as the sole effective means of policy , its
foundation; in their statements they endeavor to find arguments to justify
the aggressive military - political doctrines and strategic concepts of im
perialism .
Fetishization of armed violence , the equating of war with armed com
bat and thesetting apart ofwar from other forms of struggle, its portrayal
as a purely military act, today constitutes a widespread technique of
falsification of the essence ofwar. While the proponents of absolutization
of politics, following the example ofGeorges Clemenceau, French Premier
during World War I, claimed that "war is too serious an affair to be
43
entrusted entirely to the generals,” 14 the proponents of fetishization of
armed violence claim just the opposite , namely: “War is too serious a
business to be given over to the politicians and diplomats.” 15 For ex
ample, General E . D . Wheeler, former chairman of the U .S . Joint Chiefs
of Staff, expressed in particular the views of the apologists of armed
violence. For them the ideal is the “ absolute war,” in which armed
violence is carried to an extreme degree , utilized to implement policy
without any restrictions in forces and means.
War, as defined by the supporters of its narrow , professional definition ,
constitutes bankruptcy of uncontrolled policy, a process of destruction and
annihilation , the totally unrestricted element of armed violence . In their
opinion politics ends at that moment when war begins. This view is sub
stantiated by the assertion that politics and armed violence should con
stitute independent, mutually unlinked areas of activity.
In contrast to Clausewitz, who displayed an inclination to absolutize
armed violence , and those bourgeois ideologues who make parasitic
capital of this tendency, the founders of Marxism -Leninism approached
an assessment of armed violence in a rigorously scientific, concretely
historical manner. This enabled them to draw a clear-cut line between
reactionary and revolutionary violence, to demonstrate the totally differ
ent historical role of the two - regressive and progressive. Lenin demon
strated that progressive classes utilize revolutionary force for the purpose
of self-protection and struggle against counterrevolution. Reactionary
classes usually are the first to resort to violence, to war, endeavoring to
maintain their supremacy. Hence only revolutionary violence is legitimate
and justified. At the same time even revolutionary violence, according to
Lenin , is historically transient, for it should disappear from the arena of
history with the destruction of class and national antagonisms.
Thus these facts persuasively attest that attempts by bourgeois ide
ologues to portray the forming of Leninist doctrine on war as a repetition
of what Clausewitz had already stated, with “slight additions," are totally
without substance, fundamentally antiscientific . In actual fact, Lenin
did not repeat the formulas of Clausewitz but, supported by the theory
ofMarxism , gave a genuinely scientific definition of war, thus completing
the revolution in views on this social phenomenon.
Distortions in regard to the forming of the Leninist doctrine of war also
proceed along the line of exaggeration by bourgeois propaganda of
Trotsky's role in the theoretical elaboration and practical implementation
of military problems. Contrasting Lenin to Trotsky, bourgeois ideologues
endeavor to portray the latter as a major military theorist, founder of the
Soviet Armed Forces, and organizer of their victories during the years of
Civil War and foreign military intervention .
Contrary to historical facts, the writings of Trotsky are practically
presented as themain source of the military theoretical views of Leninism .
“ Soviet general strategy,” declares West German sociologist F. Ruge,
44
"proceeds from Lenin , who in turn relied on Marx, Engels, Clausewitz ,
and later borrowed substantially from the ideas of Trotsky.” 16
Attempts by bourgeois ideologues to make substitution for Marxist
Leninist views on the essence of war and army contradict historical facts.
It is well known that Trotsky not only had no understanding of military
theory but did not even recognize it. He argued that military affairs are
identical for all states, that they are neutral in regard to the sociopolitical
nature of the state and to its societal structure. It allegedly contains no
place for ideology . Hence Trotsky drew the opportunistic conclusion that
there is no place for Marxism in the area of the military. And they are
placing this “ theorist" on a pedestal!
It was Vladimir Il'ich Lenin who provided scientific substantiation
of views on politics, war and army under the new historical conditions.
To him goes the historical credit for substantiation of the military pro
gram of the proletarian revolution and the doctrine on defense of the
socialist homeland. The founder of our party and the Soviet state was also
the founder of the Soviet Armed Forces, the organizer and inspirational
force behind all their victories over the enemies of the world 's first
socialist country.

2. Principal Methods of Distortion of Lenin's Views on the Essence and Nature of

War
Aggravation of the ideological struggle between two systems— socialist
and imperialist — which is characteristic of the present period, also finds
expression in intensification of attacks on Marxism -Leninism and an
inseparable component of Marxism -Leninism - doctrine on war, in em
ployment of increasingly sophisticated techniques and methods of its
"refutation .”
Techniques and methods of falsification of the essence of war, couched
in “ nuclear ” terms, have become quite widespread. They are permeated
with the spirit of relativism and sophistry, a pseudoinnovative approach
to this problem . Manifested in them is a nihilistic attitude toward theory
and past experience , an anarchistic rejection of theses and conclusions
reached in the prenuclear age, as well as an inability to interpret new
phenomena from the standpoint of genuine science.
Lenin wrote that flexibility of concepts, employed objectively — that
is reflecting the comprehensive nature of the material process and its
unity - constitutes dialectics, a correct reflection of the world 's continuous
evolution . Flexibility of concepts applied subjectively is equivalent to
eclecticism and sophistry. It is precisely the latter which is typical of
contemporary bourgeois ideologues.
Referring to the development of nuclear missile weapons, the ideologues
of imperialism are attempting to torpedo Marxist-Leninist theses which
reveal the link between politics and war, to belittle their cognitive value
for the “nuclear age.” They declare that the new weapon has radically
45
and fundamentally altered the relationship between politics and war, has
disrupted the correlation between them which has developed over many
centuries, and has made obsolete the formula of war as a continuation of
politics by violentmeans. This formula , valid when applied to past wars,
allegedly becomes invalid for revealing the essence of contemporary wars
on a world and limited scale. “ Nuclear weapons,” states American
sociologist T . W . Wolfe, “have helped shake traditional Marxist-Leninist
doctrine on the link between war and politics and have generated the
painful question of the political expediency of employing nuclear force or
the threat of its employment in the age of the nuclear missile weapon .” 17
Like viewsare being disseminated by many other bourgeois ideologues.
The nuclear age, they declare, advances new principles and theses, pushing
to the side former views on war and its relationship to politics. American
military theorist Henry Kissinger claims that in the nuclear age, “ the
traditional method of military analysis, which viewed war as a continua
tion of politics by other means, is no longer valid .” 18 Another author,
G . A . Craig, also emphasizes that the war of today assumes an " absolute
aspect" and " can no longer be viewed as a continuation of politics by
other means.” 18
There is certainly no question about the fact that nuclear missile
weapons have introduced substantial changes in the relationship between
politics and war. This new and ominous weapon has transformed war
into an exceptionally dangerous and destructive means of implementing
policy. It is precisely for this reason that thermonuclear war cannot serve
as an implement to achieve political goals. It promises militarist circles
nothing more than destruction and death . This truth is reaching even the
hotheaded servants of imperialism . For example , American military
writer M . H . Halperin acknowledges : “ The central paradox of the nuclear
age is total ideological conflict plus totalmeans of destruction,which have
engendered a situation in which a total solution is impossible.” 20
Although the development of this new weapon does introduce sub
stantial changes into the correlation between politics and war, it does not
eliminate the relationship between them . Nuclear missile weapons proper
do not constitute a pure result of rapid scientific and technological ad
vances, as bourgeois ideologues would like us to believe, but rather
constitute the monster -child of state monopoly capital, which is striving
to achieve world supremacy. The aggressive policy of force of the United
States and its allies finds material embodiment in it. Scientific and tech
nological advances created the potential to develop nuclear missile
weapons. But the decisive role in transformation of this potential into
reality was played by the aggressive policies of the American imperialists,
who were the first to develop this weapon and to employ it against a
civilian population in the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
This is also attested by U .S . military doctrine. It is based on a strategy
of “ realistic deterrence,” which provides both for a thermonuclear and
nonnuclear world war, as well as various types of local wars with the
46
employment of conventional and nuclear weapons. One of its elements is
the " forward lines" strategy advanced by the revenge-seekers in Bonn.
According to the plans of its authors, the armed forces of the NATO
aggressive bloc would be moved as close as possible to the borders of
the socialist nations, so that in case of an outbreak of war they could
immediately move combat operations to their soil. A decisive role in
this strategy is assigned to NATO nuclear forces.
In their words, the ideologues of imperialism are striving for " new
forms of thinking,” “ new principles and concepts” in the approach to
modern warfare . In their deeds, however, they do not reject aggressive
policies or thermonuclear war as a means of achieving political goals in
such a war, nor do they reject the production of weapons of mass destruc
tion . On the contrary, these weapons are occupying an increasingly
important place alongside conventional weapons in the arsenal of the
military strategy of American imperialism and that of its accomplices in
NATO and other blocs.
In contrast to the aggressive policies of imperialism , the Soviet Union
pursues a consistent policy of peace and security of peoples. The develop
ment of nuclear missile weapons in the USSR and the equipping of the
army and navy with these weapons was not caused by the internal develop
ment requirements of our society but rather by external necessity , dictated
by the urgent need of self-defense against imperialist aggression. The
CPSU and Soviet government, in reaching the decision to develop these
new weapons and equip the Armed Forces with them , were guided by
Lenin 's statement that the sole means of defense against the horrors of
the military hardware of the aggressors “ is that same technology.” 21 The
Soviet nuclear missile shield is restraining the aggressive aspirations of
militant imperialist circles and is serving the cause of peace and security
of peoples .
Thus the relationship between politics and war , thoroughly revealed
in the writings of Lenin , not only remains valid in the Nuclear Age, but
acquires even greater significance. It is quite obvious that if a thermo
nuclear war is initiated it will possess its social causes, its class essence
and character. It can arise only as a result of the deliberate, sinister policies
of aggressive imperialist circles. Like the two world wars, which were
engendered by and were a continuation of the predatory policies of
imperialist states, and like the numerous limited , local wars initiated by
the imperialists since the collapse of Nazi Germany and militarist Japan ,
a thermonuclear world war, if it cannot be prevented , will constitute the
result of the aggressive policies of imperialism .
A nuclear missile war consequently cannot go beyond the bounds of
politics, lose contact with it, lose its class-political content and social
character. At the same time it will unquestionably be in many ways
different in comparison with past wars, particularly as regards its concrete
political, class content and character, in means and methods of warfare,
as well as in its social, psychological, moral and other consequences.
 The bourgeois ideologues distort the class-political countenance of a
potential thermonuclear war, endeavoring to present it in the form of a
giant class of machines, separate from the predatory policies of im
perialism and lacking political content. For example , American theorist
G . Wheeler writes that the employment of electronic computers in warfare
allegedly " eliminates politics and diplomacy from it.” 22 British professor
Mr. Tring writes: ''In future wars man will become a helpless spectator
to combat which will take place between army and navy robots, air force
and missile force robots.” 23
A common technique in falsification of the class-political essence of
nuclear war is its equating with a natural disaster. West German sociologist
R . Mattfeldt claims, for example, that war with the employment of the
most advanced weapons is equivalent to explosions on the sun, earth
quakes, etc. In his opinion such a war is no longer a struggle in which
one group of people battles against another. In connection with this, he
emphasizes, “we should change our historical definition of war." 24
Imperialist circles and their ideologues are counting on deluding the
masses with such arguments in respect to the class political essence of a
future war, on morally and politically disarming them , on depriving them
of valid orientation and a clear line of behavior, and on instilling false
ideas to the effect that in case of a world war the civilian population and
military forces of the NATO nations will not be fighting for political
interests and the aims of monopoly capital but rather for their own lives ,
for salvation from physical annihilation .
The exceptional danger of a thermonuclear war compels aggressive im
perialist circles to resort to limited, local wars as a less risky means of
implementing aggressive policy. The doctrine of limited wars , which is
officially recognized in the NATO nations, is on the one hand a result of
the imperialists ' fear of a possible thermonuclear war, and on the other
hand constitutes an attempt to adapt this type of war to the needs of
aggressive policy.
In limited wars their instigators endeavor to achieve their aims
gradually , in stages, without subjecting themselves to great risk , and
frequently through third parties. These wars are not the opposite of a
world nuclear conflict but rather a unique rehearsal for such a conflict,
one of the possible ways of unleashing such a war . There exists no
insurmountable barrier or solid wall between a limited war and a world
war. Each local adventure contrived by the imperialists in some part of
the world carries within itself the danger of escalation into a world
conflagration , becoming as it were the detonator of a world war.
Limited wars are aimed primarily against the socialist nations. At
the same time they constitute an instrument of struggle by imperialist
circles against the developing revolutionary and national liberation move
ment, a means of strengthening the position of imperialism in the most
important regions of the world .
Bourgeois ideologues perceive the essence and character of limited
wars only in quantitative descriptions : in limited employment of military
forces, in the limited spatial scope of military operations, in limited
political and strategic objectives, etc. .
Leninist methodology rejects the abstract, bourgeois-objectivist ap
proach to every war, including the limited war, and emphasizes rather
their sociopolitical, class analysis, determination of their economic origin .
Indicative in this respect is Lenin 's approach to the “minor” wars which
were waged on the eve of World War I. “ . . . Take the history," he wrote ,
"of those small wars which they ( the imperialists — Ed.) waged prior to
the Great War — 'small' because few Europeans were killed in them , and
yet hundreds of thousands of persons perished from among those people
who were being strangled , who from their point of view were not even
considered people (can Asians and Africans be considered people ) ?;
they waged the following kind of war against these people : the latter
were unarmed, and they were mowed down with machineguns. . .
“ This was constitutes continuation of that policy of robbery and
murder of entire nationalities, of the unprecedented acts of atrocity com
mitted by the Germans and British in Africa, by the British and Russians
in Persia . . . This is the key to an understanding of the motives behind
the war.” 25
Thus Lenin 's definition of the essence of " small” war is based first
of all on a dialectical materialist, class analysis of the predatory policies
of imperialism , which pave the way for and initiate such wars on the one
hand, and disclosure of the just nature of the policies of the people of
the colonial and dependent nations who have become the victims of ag
gression on the other; in the second place, on exposure and condemnation
of barbaric means and cruel methods employed by the imperialists to
achieve their political ends; thirdly , on determination of an extreme in
equality of forces between the warring sides; fourthly, on total support of
the liberation struggle of oppressed people . The Leninist analysis still
preserves today its inestimable significance, as it offers a solid foundation
for a correct understanding of the essence of local wars of the present era.
Consequently, in their class essence, local wars comprise one of the
forms of continuation of the aggressive policies of imperialism by violent
means, employed on a limited scale, in comparatively small areas. The
small spatial framework and the limited employment ofmilitary forces do
not alter the class essence of such wars .
The bourgeois ideologues also distort the social character of con
temporary wars , their division into just and unjust, declaring such a
division to be " obsolete.” They endeavor to remove moral and legal
restrictions from armed violence, to justify arbitrariness in political rela
tions. For example, American military theorist S. T . Possony states that
" the difference between a just and unjust war is an artificial one,” and that
the question of which war is just is settled in the final analysis “by the
tribunal of arms." .He claims that armed force constitutes “ a substantial
element of national ethics.” 26 These arguments are without foundation :
49
they pursue the aim of discrediting the concept of just war and giving
equal rights to criminal aggression and legitimate self-defense.
The social, class character of war embodies three elements : a moral
legal appraisal of the policy, political content and aims pursued in the
war; a moral-legal appraisal of the means and methods of achieving
political aims, for the unjust character of a war is determined both by
predatory policy and by barbaric means and methods, incompatible with
the principles of human morality, humanitarianism , and international law ;
the sociohistorical role of a war, for a war which is just and legitimate in
its social character is at the same time a progressive war of liberation. Of
course , the degree of justice and progressiveness of wars of different eras
also differ. At the same time an unjust war plays a reactionary role .
Social character , just as the essence and content of war, is a variable
category . The character ofwar is transformed in connection with changes
in the essence of war and its political content: a just war can become an
unjust war and vice versa. Elucidation of the character of a given war
makes it possible to determine the attitude of the masses, both civilian
and military , toward it.
Marxist-Leninists are waging a campaign on two fronts as regards
the question of the essence of politics and war, their content and charac
ter: both against the insouciant dogmatic approach and against relativism
and revisionism in any form . They condemn absolutization of theses and
formulas which have been elaborated in the past and which have become
customary , their transformation into self-contained abstractions separated
from real conditions, from the needs of evolving practice. At the same
time they do not permit revision and rejection of fundamental views on
the relationship between politics and war which retain their philosophic
methodological significance in the present day .
Marxist-Leninists do not confuse the problem of the essence, the class
content and character of war and the forms of its link to politics with
another, close , but not identical problem of the admissibility or inadmissi
bility of a given, specific war as a means of policy. Communists resolutely
condemn nuclear war, view it as the greatest crime against mankind, and
are in favor of total prohibition and destruction of nuclear, chemical and
biological weapons, as well as securing a solid , universal peace.
The peace program proposed by the 24th CPSU Congress is a concrete
expression of the campaign against the threat of war. It provides for the
active defense of peace and strengthening of international security. The
program is realistic in character, for it is based on consideration of the
interests of the people of all nations and is secured by the enormous
prestige and influence of the socialist nations and all progressive anti
imperialist forces. Since the Congress, the party has undertaken extensive
and vigorous foreign policy activity to implement this program . The
November (1971) Central Committee CPSU Plenum unanimously ap
proved and offered total support for the work done in this area by the
Central Committee Politburo .

50
 The principle of peaceful coexistence of nations, regardless of their
social system , a principle advanced by Lenin , constitutes the basis of the
foreign policy of the Soviet state and its relations with the nations of the
capitalist world. After World War I Lenin stated that the question of
preventing another and even more destructive world war “has become
the cornerstone political question for all the nations of the world.” 27
Today this principle has been transformed into a realistic force of inter
national development.
The experience of recent years has confirmed the correctness of the
conclusion drawn by the CPSU and other fraternal parties that there
exists no fatal inevitability of another world war. There exists a realistic
potential to prevent such a war, the powerful forces represented by the
world system of socialism , bulwark of the revolutionary and anti
imperialist movement, by the international worker class , the national
liberation movement and millions of fighters for peace in every corner of
the earth . One must bear in mind, however, that although the area of
imperialist supremacy is shrinking, imperialism is not becoming less
aggressive. There still exists the threat that it will unleash another world
war. " It is in the vital interest of all peace -loving nations, all people to
prevent this threat from becoming reality .” 28
The Leninist foreign policy of the CPSU and the fraternal parties con
stitutes a most important factor for peace and social progress. It creates
favorable conditions for building socialism and communism , for further
development of the revolutionary liberation movement.
A continuation and expression of the peaceful policy of the CPSU and
the fraternal parties is their constant concern for the steady growth of the
defense might of the socialist nations, for equipping the armed forces with
the most advanced types of combat equipment and weapons, for improve
ment in control and moral-political training of personnel. This transforms
the Armed Forces of the USSR and the armies of the Warsaw Pact mem
ber nations into a mighty shield of socialist states, a bulwark of all
freedom - loving peoples.

3. Critique of an Opportunistic and Revisionist Interpretation of the Essence of War

Also in opposition to the Leninist definition of the essence of war
stands opportunism , represented by rightist socialists, plus rightist and
" leftist” revisionism .
The leader of the revolution resolutely opposed an opportunistic dis
tortion of the essence and character of war, and particularly distortion of
its class nature. “ The class character of a war is the fundamental question
facing the socialist (unless he is a renegade ),” 29 wrote Lenin . Oppor
tunism begins wherever conscious distortion of this truth takes place,
wherever “ all devices, sophisms and swindling falsifications” are employed
to “ conceal . . . one's shift . . . to the side of the bourgeoisie.” 30
In our time, just as during the life of Lenin , opportunists are directing
their main efforts toward portraying in a warped mirror the policies of
the bourgeois states , and through these policies the essence of the wars
which these states are waging or preparing to wage.
Rightist opportunists proclaim their devotion to peace, but in their
deeds they totally support the aggressive policies of “ their ” bourgeoisie
and frequently themselves implement these policies. It is a well-known
fact that following World War II there was practically no country in
Western Europe where rightist socialists were not in power at one time
or another. But they took no real steps to ease world tensions, to disband
aggressive imperialist military blocs such as NATO , to put an end to the
arms race, or to take steps toward universal disarmament. Today the
Laborites of Great Britain and Australia are actively supporting the
imperialist aggression against the people of Indochina and the aggressive
policy of British imperialism “ east of Suez.” It was none other than
Laborite Minister Khili [transliteration ] who initiated elaboration of
various plans for putting nuclear weapons in the hands of the West
German revenge-seekers. All this was couched in sophisms about “ defense
of the free world ,” “ defense,” “ security,” etc . This totally confirms Lenin 's
statement that rightist opportunism “ has merged with the national bour
geoisie,” that the latter " has fully assessed and 'adapted ' " 31 it.
A basic technique long in use by the opportunists in obfuscation and
distortion, with the aid of sophistry, of the concrete situations, the con
crete policies of parties and classes which lead to war and to the threat
of war. Eclecticism and sophistry , wrote Lenin , “ to the advantage of the
bourgeoisie, obscure all specific and precise elements in the class strug
gle. . ." 32 This is displayed most graphically in determining the causes
of wars and the parties to blame for the outbreak of wars in our time.
Distorting all obvious facts, opportunists proclaim in a slanderous and
provocational manner the socialist countries to be the bearers of blame
for wars. At the First Congress of the Socialist International (Frankfurt/
Main , July 1951) the Soviet Union was declared to be the enemy of
peace, while the aggressive actions of the imperialists were described as
“ defensive” and even “forced upon them .” The Congress gave full support
to the establishment of NATO and plans for a " European Defense Com
munity.”
The Council of the Socialist International, meeting in Oslo in July
1962, adopted a declaration which slanderously asserted that the Soviet
Union constitutes the main source of international tension , that it allegedly
utilizes its preeminence in nuclear and conventional weapons for " pur
poses of expasion "; this declaration was in essence a demand that the
imperialist nations step up the arms race.
Rejection of a class analysis of the sources of the wars of the present
era, camouflaged and concealed by sophisms, is inherent both in the
rightist opportunist leaders of the Socialist International and the re
visionists, who totally ignore Lenin 's thesis that the essence of any war
52
can be correctly understood only from the position of the present era
the era of transition from capitalism to socialism .
An abstract general condemnation of war made by the opportunists,
without a clear -cut class approach to a specific war, was most vividly
manifested in regard to the aggressive Israeli adventure against the Arab
nations. In a declaration on the events in the Near East, the Office of
P .elations Between the Socialist Parties of the European Community as
much as expressed its solidarity with Israel, although it " regretted” the
conflict and even verbally demanded that " peace be reestablished.” A
like position was taken bymany revisionists,who abstractly “ condemned"
this war but who failed to state clearly and definitely who was the ag
gressor and sometimes resorted to preaching a theory of " equal blame”
for the war on the part of both the aggressors and their victims.
Contemporary "social pacifists, that is socialists in word and im
plementers of bourgeois pacifist hypocrisy in deed. . . ,” 33 as Lenin
characterized them , also extensively utilize all kinds of sophisms to dis
tort the essence of wars. Rightist socialists, having rejected Marxism ,
replacing it with “ democratic,” “ ethical” and even religious socialism ,
also resolves the question of the essence of war solely as a moral-ethical
question, always proceeding in word from a bourgeois pacifist standpoint,
appealing for " peace no matter what the cost,” for " peace at any price.”
They proceed from the position that the threat of nuclear war has made
armed struggle for political purposes impossible. Former British Laborite
Secretary of State for Defense Strachey, for example, called for a " pro
found change in views on the use of force.” 34 Opposing war under
pressure of the toilers, rightist opportunists all upon the worker class and
those persons struggling for national and social liberation to refrain from
any attempts to employ armed force. The threat of nuclear war has be
come for them a means of justifying a policy of preservation of the
capitalist order on earth , an instrument for intimidating the world libera
tion movement, and to achieve the spiritual disarmament of anti-im
perialist forces.
Abstract pacifist slogans aimed at spiritually disarming the toilers
are also employed by the rightist revisionists. This was particularly
vividly revealed in Czechoslovakia during the events of 1968, when
revisionists demagogically asserted that " the danger of war presents no
threat to Europe. . . ," 35 spoke out in favor of Czechoslovakia leaving the
community of socialist nations, and demanded that it withdraw from the
Warsaw Pact system . As subsequent events showed , the imperialist bour
geoisie were hoping to utilize such revisionist demands as an extremely
important means of preparing the ground for armed intervention, with
the aim of destroying the socialist gains of the peoples of that country .
While social pacifists are against every war, " leftist” opportunists
constantly call for war, push people toward unjustified suffering and
deprivations. This adventuristic line is manifested in the policies of the
Mao Tse -tung clique. Essentially an anti-Leninist doctrine, Maoism
53
preaches antiscientific views on the essence of war. A specific feature of
these views is an extensive utilization of Marxist terminology and quota
tions from Lenin taken out of context. Lenin called this type of oppor
tunism the worst of all, as it utilizes the arguments of the “ sophist, that
is, to put it more simply, the swindler, who swindles with the aid of
quotations and references.” 36
The contrast between the Leninist definition of the essence of war
and the correlation of war and politics and the leftist opportunist view is
revealed in its very foundations. Emphasizing that war is the continuation
of politics, Lenin at the same time never considered war to be the sole
instrument of policy. He characterized as foolish or even criminal the
behavior of those political parties which did not recognize other forms of
struggle and did not wish to master these forms.37
The behavior of revisionists of the Maoist ilk is precisely of this charac
ter. Not wishing to acknowledge nonmilitary forms of political struggle,
they blindly adhere to the slogans: “War Is Politics” and “ The Rifle
Engenders Power.” Rehashing the bourgeois theory of violence , the
Maoists claim that war plays the role of principal motive force of the
historical process.
“ Leftists” particularly extensively propagandize the view of war as
the principal means of transition to socialism . They counter Lenin 's
statement that communism is not adopted by force,38 that it is criminal to
force peasants and workers into war,39 with the statement that war is a
bridge across which mankind will pass into a new historical era.
" Leftist” opportunists, armed with the Trotskyite thesis of export of
revolution , deliberately and maliciously ignore Lenin 's statement that this
signifies " a total break with Marxism , which has always condemned the
'coaxing of revolutions which mature as class conflicts become more
acute . . ." 40 Their orientation toward armed violence as the principal
means of the revolutionary transformation of society constitutes a total
negation of Marxism . It is a well-known fact that Marx , Engels, and
Lenin resolutely opposed theories claiming that violence is a determining
factor in the historical process. They did not deny, however, that during
certain periods of historical development revolutionary violence plays a
significant role, but in the final analysis it is always produced by economic
causes. “ Violence can be employed without economic roots, but then it is
doomed by history to failure,” 41 stated Lenin .
The “ leftists” advance and intensively propagandize the thesis of the
primacy of war over politics. Evidence of this is the thesis that the army
is allegedly themain implement of political power. This thesis comprises
the foundation of their entire domestic policy.
The “ leftists” in China are trying hard to force on other people
anti-Marxist views on the correlation between politics and war. Wemust
admit that the propaganda of their adventuristic views on war as the
principal means of implementing policy is not always without result. To
day certain leaders of the student and black power movement in the
54
capitalist nations share these leftist opportunist views. Viewing as the
main revolutionary force of today not the worker class but rather youth ,
the peasantry, and the population of colonial nations, they declare partisan
warfare, including urban warfare, to be the principal method of struggle.
The “ leftist” opportunists in China are attempting with pseudorevolu
tionary slogans to conceal their great-power aspirations and their ter
ritorial claims on other countries. The slogan “Go Hungry and Prepare
for War" has been advanced in China; comprehensive militarization is
under way; feverish war preparations are being conducted, which is
attested to by the practical intentions of the Chinese leaders to utilize
war as the principal means of implementing their antipopular policy.
While issuing ultrarevolutionary slogans and appeals, the “ leftist”
opportunists in actual fact express the interests of world imperialism . It
is not mere happenstance that at moments of acute international crisis
they invariably take the side of imperialism , attacking peace- loving forces,
playing the role of instigator, and splitting the anti-imperialist front.
This time and time again confirms the validity of Lenin 's thesis that both
" leftist” and rightist opportunism objectively constitute a weapon in the
hands of the bourgeoisie.
The Chinese population is being intensively brainwashed into a state
of animosity toward the Soviet Union and the other socialist nations. The
policies of the CPSU and the Soviet government are presented in a
distorted light.
Bearing these facts in mind, the 24th CPSU Congress stated in its
resolution : " This congress vigorously rejects the slanderous lies of Chinese
propaganda pertaining to the policies of our party and government. At
the same time our party is in favor of normalizing relations between the
USSR and the PRC as well as reestablishing good-neighbor relations of
friendship between the Soviet and Chinese peoples. Improvement of rela
tions between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China would
be in conformity with the root, long-term interests of both countries , the
interests of world socialism , and the interests of stepping up the struggle
against imperialism ." 42
Thus the distortion and falsification of the concept of the essence and
character of war, to which bourgeois ideologues and opportunists of
rightist and “ leftist” persuasion are resorting, are essentially anti-scientific .
Wemust be thoroughly familiar with the schemes and techniques of our
ideological adversaries in order promptly and vigorously to expose them
from the position of a scientific philosophy and methodology.

Footnotes
1. See W . Hahlweg : Lehrmeister des kleinen Krieges (Author of the Doctrine
of Small War), Darmstadt, 1968, pp 4 – 54.
2. See Carl von Clausewitz : Schriften -Aufsaetze-Studien -Briefe (Writings, Essays,
Studies, Letters ), Volume I, Introduction, Goettingen , 1966 , page 213.
55
 3. R . Kolkowicz: The Soviet Military and the Communist Party, Princeton, 1967,
page 23.
4. F . Ruge: Politik und Strategie ( Politics and Strategy) , Frankfurt am Main ,
1967, page 97.
5 . V. I. Lenin : Poln . Sobr. Soch . (Complete Works), Volume 21, page 223.
6 . R . Aron : Peace and War, New York , 1966 , page 23.
7 . H . Speidel: Zeitbetrachtungen. Ausgewaehlte Reden (Reminiscences. Selected
Speeches), Mainz, 1969, page 83.
8. Lenin, op.cit., Volume 41, page 115.
9. Materialy XXIV sºyezda KPSS (Proceedings of the 24th CPSU Congress ),
page 5 .
10. W . R . Schramm : Staatkunst und bewaffnete Macht (Statecraft and Military
Power), Munich, 1957, page 117.
11. K. Klauzevits: 0 voyne (On War ), Volume 1, Moscow , Voyenizdat, 1941,
page 28.
12 . Ibid ., page 27.
13. B. Kh. Liddel Gart : Strategiya nepryamykh deystviy (Strategy of Indirect
Action ), translated from English , Moscow , Izd -vo inostrannoy literatury,
1957, page 468.
14 . Quoted from M . Schiff: Das grosse Handbuch der modernen Zitate des XX
Jahrhunderts (The Great Handbook of Modern Quotations of the 20th Cen
tury ), Munich, 1968, page 780.
15. See Komsomolskaya Pravda, 2 December 1969.
16 . F . Ruge, op.cit., page 93.
17 . Th . W . Wolfe: Soviet Strategy at the Crossroads, Cambridge, Massachusetts,
1969, pp 4 , 70, 71.
18 . H . Kissenger (ed.) : Problems of National Strategy, New York , Praeger, 1965,
page 447.
19 . G . A . Craig : Krieg , Politik und Diplomatie (War, Politics and Diplomacy) ,
Vienna-Hamburg, 1968, pp 83, 316 .
20. M . H . Halperin : Contemporary Military Strategy, Boston, 1967, page 12.
21. Lenin , op.cit., Volume 37, page 358.
22. Eskalation der neuen Waffen . Friede oder Untergang (New Arms Escalation .
Peace or Doom ), Munich -Vienna-Basel, 1969, page 107.
23. Ibid ., page 188.
24. R . Mattfeldt: Politik im Schatten der Bombe (Politics in the Shadow of the
Bomb), Munich and Vienna, 1963, page 13.
25. Lenin, op.cit., Volume 32, pp 86 –87.
26 . S . T . Possony: Zur Bewaeltigung der Kriegsschuldfrage ( Settling the Question
of War Blame), Cologne and Oplanden , 1968, pp 38 , 40, 45.
27. Lenin, op .cit., Volume 44, page 148.
28. Materialy . . . , op.cit., page 29.
29. Lenin, op.cit., Volume 37, page 296 .
30. Ibid., page 247.
31. Ibid., Volume 26 , page 255.
32. Ibid ., Volume 37, page 336.
33. Ibid ., Volume 30 , page 277.
34. J. Strachey: On the Prevention of War, London, 1962, page 5.
56
35. K . sobytiyam v Chekhoslovakii (The Events in Czechoslovakia ), Moscow ,
1968, page 89.
36 . Lenin , op.cit., Volume 37, page 104.
37. Ibid ., Volume 41, page 81.
38. Ibid., Volume 38, page 162.
39. See Ibid ., Volume42, page 99.
40. Ibid ., Volume 35, page 403.
41. Ibid ., Volume 38 , page 369.
42. Materialy . . . , op .cit., page 192.
Chapter IV. Leninist Critique of Bourgeois
Militarism and the Contemporary
World

An important place in Lenin 's theoretical and political activities was

occupied by an analysis of the essence of materialism and an implacable
struggle against this reactionary phenomenon of capitalism in the final
stage of its development. In his writings the great leader of the proletariat
gave a profound, comprehensive description of militarism , revealed its
class roots, demonstrated its purpose and role , exposed the devices with
which the ideologues of the bourgeoisie " substantiated ” its inevitability ,
and pointed out the principal areas of the struggle against this phe
nomenon.
Lenin 's description of militarism is highly significant today. It gives
us a key to an understanding of the features of cortemporary militarism
and serves as a sharp weapon in the struggle against all its manifestations
in societal affairs and the international relations of our era .

1. V. I. Lenin on the Origin and Basic Features of Militarism

Imperialist militarism is a complex social phenomenon which comprises
a system of economic , political, ideological and directly military measures
taken by aggressive capitalist nations and directed toward preparing for
and conducting imperialist wars. It is utilized by the finance oligarchy to
consolidate and expand its domination, to preserve the capitalist system
on the one hand and to generate big profits on the other.
Militarism as a social phenomenon was born with the split of society
into classes, with the appearance of the exploiter state. Inheriting mili
tarism from other class-antagonistic societies, the bourgeoisie took over
the most reactionary elements in it and adapted them to its interests and
needs. Under capitalism , particularly at its monopolist, imperialist stage ,
militarism has reached an unprecedented scale and has assumed a truly
ominous character.
KarlMarx and Friedrich Engels, the founders of scientific communism ,
were the first to reveal the essence of militarism as a social phenomenon
and to point out its class roots .
58
 Marx devoted considerable attention to exposing Prusso -German mili
tarism , which embodied themost reactionary and antidemocratic features
existing in Europe in the 17th through 19th centuries. Marx viewed
militarism , bourgeois violence and contemporary wars as phenomena
internally inherent in capitalism but historically transient.
Friedrich Engels, a major expert in military affairs, in his writings also
pointed to the intensified growth of militarism in the age of capitalism .
He noted as early as 1878 that “ the army has become the principal aim
of the state ; it has become an end in itself; peoples exist only for the
purpose of supplying and feeding soldiers. Militarism dominates Europe
and is devouring it."
Developing and creatively enriching Marxism under new historical
conditions, Lenin made an eminent contribution toward analysis of
militarism , toward disclosing its features and new manifestations. Em
phasizing the further intensification of militarism in the new historical era,
he revealed the particular causes of this phenomenon, which are found in
the monopolistic nature of the economic system . “ . . . Imperialism , that
is monopoly capitalism ,” wrote Lenin , “which did not reach full maturity
until the 20th century, in its basic economic properties is distinguished
by the least love of peace and freedom and a maximum and universal
development of the military .” 2 Under conditions of premonopoly cap
italism , when free competition reigned supreme, there was no need for
universal and comprehensive militarization . Characteristic of premonopoly
capitalism were national wars, which is a rule encompassed a small
number of countries and which were of comparatively brief duration .
Lenin stated that at the imperialist stage of development of capitalism ,
the productive forces and dimensions of capital in the highly -developed
capitalist countries by the beginning of the 20th century had grown
beyond the narrow framework of separate national states. This produced
an endeavor on the part of the major capitalist powers to enslave other
nations, to seize colonies, and to gain control of all sources of raw
materials and markets.3
The monopoly nature of capitalist ownership engendered an aspiration
toward increasing monopolization of all sources of wealth . A total and
absolute monopoly can be established only by physical seizure and
national domination of sources of raw materials and markets as well as
domination over competing monopoly groups. Lenin stressed that under
these conditions a struggle for world domination becomes the basic con
tent of the policies of imperialist nations. The achievement of such a
goal demands preparation for and initiation of a world war. Victory in
such a war can be secured only when all the resources of the belligerent
nations are utilized . Therefore in the age of imperialism , stated Lenin ,
" militarization permeates all societal affairs. Imperialism constitutes a
savage struggle among great powers to divide and redivide the world
it therefore must inevitably lead to further militarization in all coun
tries. . ." 4
59
 The era of premonopoly capitalism was an era of free competition, free
play of prices in the marketplace. The transition to monopoly capitalism ,
concentration and centralization of production lead to the establishment
of monopoly prices. Competition is transformed into its opposite . Mo
nopolized production seeks to secure for itself a mass and monopolized
market which is not dependent on a free movement of prices, on supply
and demand. The ideal object of monopolized production is a commodity
which by its very nature is destined not for personal consumption but
rather for consumption by the state. Arms constitute such a commodity.
“When capitalists work for defense, that is for the state exchequer,"
wrote Lenin , “ this is clearly no longer 'pure capitalism but rather a
special type of economy. Pure capitalism is commodity production. Com
modity production is work for an unknown and free market. But the
capitalist who is 'working for defense 'works' not for the market but
rather on the order of the state , and frequently he is even financed by
money received in loan from the state.” 5
The striving toward a mass, stable market for the goods of monopoly
production also serves as one of the economic causes of the genesis and
the development of militarism .
Characteristic of imperialism is an intensive merging of monopolies
with the state , the development of a state monopoly economy. Militarism
and war greatly accelerate this process. Monopolies universally strive
toward militarism , while militarism rests on the monopolies as its eco
nomic base .
Militarism produces new opportunities for the capitalists to intensify
exploitation of the toilers. The imperialist bourgeoisie, having exhausted
the economic means provided by the capitalist system of economy,
frequently resorts to noneconomic measures of compulsion , to direct
coercion, camouflaging these measures with “ considerations of defense,”
" the laws of wartime,” etc.
These are the principal causes of militarism , which are rooted in the
economic system and policies of imperialism .
Emphasizing that it is precisely during the era of imperialism that
one observes universal and comprehensive militarization of the capitalist
nations, Lenin frequently cites as the most illustrative example the mili
tarization of the United States. For a long period of time, right up to the
end of the 19th century , the United States was one of few nations with
a comparatively weak military -bureaucracy edifice. As capitalism de
veloped into imperialism , the situation changed abruptly. The wave of
militarization also engulfed the United States. It was precisely the United
States which initiated in 1898 the latest series of imperialist wars . Lenin
called American imperialism the freshest, the strongest, and the last to
participate in the world slaughter of people for the sake of division of
capitalist profits. By 1917, as Lenin pointed out, "both Britain and
America, the greatest and last — throughout the world — representatives
of Anglo -Saxon 'freedom ,' in the sense of absence of a military machine
60
and bureaucracy, tumbled down into the dirty , bloody general European
swamp of bureaucratic-military institutions, which subordinate and crush
all else.” ? By their participation in the military campaign against the
young Soviet republic, the American imperialists " wrote a particularly
tragic page in the bloody history of bloody imperialism . . . ." 8
World War I was for American imperialism a dress rehearsal for the
total militarization we today see in that country. Even then the American
military became, as Lenin put it, the principal edifice of the bourgeois
machine of state .
Analyzing the development of capitalism in those years, Lenin par
ticularly emphasized the tendency toward strengthening of militarism , the
possibility of the outbreak of new wars. “ . . . Following a given war," he
wrote during World War I, “ if there do not occur a series of successful
revolutions, there will soon follow other wars. . .” 10 History has cor
roborated this prediction .
Since the war the growth of militarism in the capitalist countries has
been occurring on an unprecedented scale. “ This tendency," one reads
in the Central Committee Report to the 24th CPSU Congress, “has be
come even more intensified in recent years. In 1970 alone the NATO
nations spent 103 billion dollars on war preparations." 11
Today militarism permeates the entire sociopolitical life of imperialist
countries; the higher the level of economic development of the imperialist
nation, the further the extent of its militarization. .
Lenin noted that militarization embraces first of all the economic
life of imperialist countries; production assumes a one-sided character ,
while military expenditures dominate government budgets : hundreds of
millions and billions of rubles are being spent . . . on war prepara
tions. . ." 12 The present situation in the United States serves as a graphic
example of this. One ninth of the work force in that country is presently
employed in military industry, while military production comprises 15
percent of total industrial output. In the last 5 years alone (1966 – 1970 )
this country has spent approximately 400 billion dollars for military
purposes.
Lenin considered increase in arms or, as he put it, " arms fever,” to
be one of the main signs of militarism . This phenomenon attends im
perialism throughout its entire existence. Today arms production is grow
ing at a particularly rapid rate . It has been reported in the American
press that the U .S . military has stockpiled 30,000 nuclear warheads,
representing a total of 25,000 megatons, as well as 1054 Titan and
Minuteman ICBMs. The United States possesses 41 nuclear-powered
submarines armed with Polaris missiles, plus 555 strategic bombers.
American realities fully confirm Lenin 's statement that contemporary
capitalists are utilizing heavy industry " to build cannons. . ." 18
Militarization of the economy inevitably leads to militarization of
all societal affairs in imperialist countries. Lenin wrote : “ Today the im
perialist bourgeoisie is militarizing not only the entire people but youth
as well. Tomorrow it will perhaps proceed to militarization of women.” 14
We can see how rapidly militarization of all segments of the population of
capitalist countries, all aspects of their lives is proceeding today. The
Israeli military clique, for example, has already introduced universal
military training for young single women . Other capitalist countries are
effecting similar militarization on a " volunteer" basis . All kinds of mili
taristic organizations of a fascist and semifascist type, numerous armed
forces, branch and unit organizations are being established on an ,ex
tensive basis.
The ruling circles of the imperialist nations are increasingly replacing
the rule of law by direct and immediate coercion. And since “ violence in
the 20th century , as in general in the civilized age, is not the fist or club
but rather the military,” 15 militarization is manifested first and foremost
in an increasing influence of the military on all aspects of societal affairs
in capitalist countries. The bourgeoisie places on the military its main
hopes in the struggle for the preservation of capitalism , " convulsively
grasps the military and reaction out of fear of the labor movement.” 16
Today even bourgeois authors are compelled to acknowledge the un
precedented strengthening of the military in many imperialist countries .
Bourgeois sociologists note that the military elite in some countries, the
United States in particular, has become the most influential element in
the " ruling elite.” Of course it is dominant, since today the Pentagon has
under its control property with an estimated total value of 180 billion
dollars, which is twice the total assets of the 100 largest U . S. corpora
tions,17 and the Pentagon receives more than 50 percent of total budget
appropriations.
Distributing military contracts, which represent the enormous annual
figure of approximately 40 billion dollars, the U . S. military practically
subordinates all economic life to militarist aims. Three thousand U . S.
companies are involved in military production and are dependent on it to
one degree or another . It is therefore not surprising, many bourgeois
authors note , that an alliance of arms manufacturers and the military
clique is dominant in the U .S . economy.
Lenin once noted that in the imperialist nations “ officers and general
officers for the most part either are members of the capitalist class or
defend its interests. . ." 18 These words of Lenin are as valid today as
then . The military, and particularly its top circles, in the United States
is recruited almost entirely from bourgeois elements : 90 percent of U .S .
generals are from the monopoly and middle bourgeoisie . The bourgeoisie
generously rewards the military for loyal service. Top positions are held
by 186 former generals and colonels at General Dynamics alone. 19
Even such a loyal servant of the imperialist bourgeoisie as former U .S .
President Eisenhower,who himself did much toward the militarization of
his country, felt compelled upon stepping down from the presidency to
warn that the American people should "beware of the establishment in
top government agencies of excessive influence on the part of the military
62
industrial complex .” But this has taken place , and it could not have been
otherwise. The U .S. military has built a vast propaganda edifice to in
fluence the U .S . Congress and the nation's entire political life.
An out-and-out military dictatorship has been established in a number
of countries (Greece, Spain , a number of Latin American countries ) .
Militarist conspiracies against democratic regimes have also become more
frequent in other countries ( Italy, France).
Militarism is also embracing to an increasing degree intellectual life
in the bourgeois society . A vivid example of this is the militarization of
science. In recent years there has also occurred stepped-up militarization
of sociopolitical doctrine. An increasing number of bourgeois theorists
who work on social problems are shifting to military topics. In the United
States, for example , there has developed a rather extensive group of
so -called “ civilian strategists,” who elaborate and substantiate military
doctrines (H . Kahn , T. Schelling, B . Brodie and others).
Three hundred and fifty scientific research corporations in the United
States have to one degree or another been drawn by the government
into the solution of military theoretical problems, while approximately
300 such centers attached to universities and colleges are involved in
government projects dealing with research on special problems, many of
which have strategic applications. In 1966 , colleges and universities re
ceived 385 million dollars from the Pentagon for work on various military
problems.20 ,
All this convincingly confirms the statement made by L. I. Brezhnev
at the International Conference of Communist and Worker Parties, held
in Moscow in 1969, that " militarism has always been an inseparable
feature of imperialism . But today it has reached a truly massive scale .
Imperialism is to blame for the fact that the labor of millions of persons,
brilliant achievements of the human intellect, the talents of scientists,
researchers and engineers are being used not for the benefit of mankind,
not for progress and the transformation of life on earth , but are rather
being utilized for barbaric, reactionary purposes, for the requirements of
war, that greatest calamity for peoples.” 21
The genesis and strengthening of militarization is an expression of
the general crisis of capitalism , Lenin , analyzing the historic place of the
era of world wars, which began in 1914, stated: “ The objective conditions
of socialism have fully matured, and the great powers are fighting in
this present war for an artificial postponement of the collapse of
capitalism . . .” 22 This applies to an even greater extent today. Capitalism
has outlived itself. It has been replaced by socialism , which is growing
steadily larger and stronger. Aware of this fact, imperialist reaction is
undertaking spasmodic efforts to preserve the rotten capitalist system .
Imperialism initiated the development of nuclear weapons, which con
stitute a lethal threat to the very existence of life on earth . While feudal
lords during the general crisis of the feudal system adhreed to the slogan
“ Après moi, le déluge,” the imperialist bourgeoisie has advanced an
even more misanthropic concept: “ If capitalism must perish, then let
mankind perish .”
Militarization of the economy of the imperialist nations, testifying
to the fact that capitalism cannot function today without senselessly
destroying the fruits of the labor of millions upon millions of individuals,
is first and foremost a manifestation of the general crisis of capitalism .
The development of productive resources has gone beyond the framework
of capitalist production relations; productive capacity is producing more
goods than can be acquired by the toilers, due to the fact that their pur
chasing power is limited by the established standard of their exploitation.
Monopoly capitalism cannot function without keeping monopoly prices
at the requisite height, without destroying some portion of the product
produced, in order to maintain in the toilers motivation to labor in the
form of need, hunger, by means of a low level of material and spiritual
consumption. This law of functioning of monopoly capitalism finds spon
taneous expression in economic crises. “ The United States, for example,”
states the Central Committee Report to the 24th CPSU Congress, "has
been unable to emerge from its present economic crisis for about 2
years now . Recent years have also been hallmarked by a serious crisis of
the currency and financial system of capitalism .” 28
Crises revolutionize the toiler masses, shake the entire system of
capitalism , and are fraught with revolutionary cataclysms. This compels
the monopolist bourgeoisie to seek methods of destroying produced ma
terial goods which will not revolutionize the masses. It sees this method
primarily in wars and in preparations for wars. For war, asMarx stated,
" in a directly economic respect is the same as if the nation threw a portion
of its capital into the sea. . ." 24
The imperialist bourgeoisie, lacking the support of the masses, is
becoming increasingly unable to control them , to rule with utilization of
past “ democratic ” means. Therefore it sees in militarization a fundamental
means of strangling the revolutionary struggle of the toilers. Lenin
emphasized that imperialism in general is a negation of democracy, while
the imperialist war, to which militarism leads in the final analysis, totally
equates republics to monarchies 25 and presents the opportunity to “ re
place law with direct and immediate coercion . . ." 26
Militarization of political life , restriction and total destruction of
democracy serve as major indices of the aggravation of the general crisis
of capitalism . The cult of violence, political gangsterism and the assassina
tion of aggressive political leaders constitute a typical feature of political
life in the capitalist nations. Armed violence is becoming the basis of the
domestic and foreign policy of imperialism .
The same can be said about militarization of spiritual and intellectual
life in the capitalist countries, which is a manifestation of the general
crisis of the bourgeois consciousness. Lenin stated that war as a con
sequence ofmilitarization " remakes morals and ethics and teaches people
to settle problemswith the use of military force. . ." 27 Today even bour
64
geois theorists are compelled more and more frequently to admit that the
sermon of violence is exerting an unprecedented corrupting effect on
large segments of the population , constituting an indicator of the moral
degradation of capitalism and aggravating that degradation .
These are the principal Leninist theses on the origin and main features
of militarism , as confirmed by history. They ideologically arm Marxist
Leninist parties in the struggle against imperialism , for the peace and
security of peoples.

2. V. I. Lenin on Two Functions ofMilitarism

Defining the essence of militarism , Lenin wrote: “ Contemporary mili
tarism is the result of capitalism . In both its forms it is a 'vital mani
festation of capitalism : as a military force utilized by capitalist states
in their external clashes . . . and as a weapon serving in the hands of the
ruling classes to crush all ( economic and political) proletarian move
ments. . ." 28 This emphasizes the two basic functions of militarism
internal and external, its two principal forms — " external militarism ” and
" internalmilitarism .”
Militarism was extensively utilized in all its manifestations in the
past, and is today so utilized in the domestic policy of imperialist nations.
Lenin emphasized first and foremost its internal function of utilization
of war and preparation for war in order for the capitalists to acquire
massive profits from arms manufacture. Proceeding along the path of
militarism , the monopoly bourgeoisie is creating, as Lenin put it, military
penal servitude for the workers and peasants and paradise for itself.29
Our time fully corroborates Lenin 's appraisal of this function of mili
tarism . Militarization of the economy is generating, for example , fabulous
profits for the American monopolists, totaling 51 billion dollars a year.
It is characteristic that in recent years there has formed and con
solidated in the United States and other imperialist countries a reactionary
political and economic bloc of monopolies engaged in military business
and the top -level generals and their henchmen in the government. This
coalition of imperialist politicians, big businessmen in the military in
dustry and the militarists is exerting increasing influence on all aspects of
life in these countries.
The basic, internal function of militarism is the crushing of the
revolutionary movement within capitalist countries. Toward this end the
bourgeoisie has built a large, extensive edifice of coercion and is constantly
strengthening it. The army constitutes the main instrument of coercion.
Lenin stressed that even in the most democratic nation, let alone openly
reactionary and militaristic regimes, the bourgeoisie always has the " op
portunity to move troops against the workers, to introduce martial law ,
etc 'in case of disturbance of the peace' — that is in case of 'disturbance'
of its slave position by the exploited class and attempts to behave in an
unslavelike way.” 30 Extensive employment of armed forces against the
65
 toilers in Spain , Portugal, and Greece, the use of troops on an unprece
dented scale in putting down strikes, demonstrations, antiracist demon
strations and student “ rebellions” in the United States constitute the most
graphic confirmation of these words of Lenin .
Performance of these disgraceful functions by imperialist armies has
been formalized by corresponding legislative enactments, as well as by
military regulations and field manuals. The British law on the army obliges
troops to intervene vigorously " on the side of the authorities in trade
union conflicts and worker disturbances,” while U . S. armed forces training
manuals discuss in detail methods of punitive operations to crush demo
cratic movements.
Lenin also pointed to such a domestic function of militarism as “ di
version of the attention of the toiler masses from internal political
crises . . . disunification and nationalistic deception of the workers , as
well as annihilation of their vanguard with the aim of weakening the
revolutionary movement of the proletariat. . .” 31 Contemporary mo
nopolists, as the facts attest, extensively utilize militarism , supported by
nationalism , chauvinism , and racism , in order to weaken and nullify the
revolutionary movement of the toilers in the capitalist countries.
Of the two basic functions of militarism noted by Lenin , its external
function has become the more important. This is due to efforts by im
perialism to consolidate and expand its domination by resolving through
war the fundamental conflict of the modern world to its own advantage.
Militarism , war and the threat of war have been extensively utilized
in the competition between imperialist nations. “ . . . The entire history of
capital,” wrote Lenin , “ is a history of coercion and robbery, blood and
filth .” 32 It was precisely the competitive struggle among the major im
perialist powers , the struggle for world supremacy , for markets for capital
that led to both world wars.
With the victory of the world's first socialist revolution , however,
the struggle against socialism acquires primary importance in the foreign
policy functions of militarism . In discussing the development of militarism
following the Great October Socialist Revolution, Lenin particularly
emphasized its antisocialist orientation .
Militarism in our time is also acquiring other new traits. It is becoming
extremely brazen , truly “ total,” all-encompassing. It encompasses all
imperialist nations without exception and to an ever- increasing degree
pursues resolution of the general class problems of the imperialist bour
geoisie . The 1969, the International Conference of Communist and
Worker Parties emphasized in its summary document that " in a situation
of aggravation of the struggle between two world systems, the capitalist
powers, in spite of the growing conflicts which divide them , are endeavor
ing to unite their efforts in order to preserve and strengthen the system
of exploitation and oppression , to regain their lost ground. American
imperialism is endeavoring to hold under its influence the other capitalist

66
nations and to pursue a common policy with them in the fundamental
areas of the class struggle.” 38
Militarism ties all imperialist countries into a common knot and makes
it possible for the principal imperialist country, the United States, to
dictate its will to the other countries. There are 250,000 American
soldiers stationed in Europe alone. The United States presently maintains
429 large and approximately 3000 other military bases on the territories
of 30 foreign countries. Bourgeois authors have acknowledged that mili
tarism has enabled the United States to create a genuine " anti-Communist
empire .”
Imperialist politicians and ideologues do not hide the fact that the
principal goal of militarism today is destruction of the world socialist
system , the international labor and liberation movement, and reestablish
ment of the domination of capital throughout the world . Calling for an
unlimited nuclear world war against the socialist nations, the militarists
declare that the aim of such a war should be victory at any price over
the nations of the socialist community .
Bourgeois theorists believe that in order to achieve victory the im - .
perialist nations should right now secure military superiority over the
socialist community . Securement of such a superiority , as some U .S .
military ideologues admit, for many years constituted the main problem
of American strategy. Toward this end various reactionary doctrines have
been elaborated and adopted, particularly doctrines such as the “massive
strike strategy,” the “ nuclear deterrence ” strategy, and the strategy of
" flexible response." History has shown the worthlessness of these doc
trines and theories.
An increasing number of sometimes highly- placed officials in the
Western nations are reaching the conclusion that the strength and power
of the socialist nations render worthless plans to achieve victory in an
open nuclear conflict with the Soviet Union . “ The fact that the Soviet
Union possesses invulnerable second strike forces places in doubt the
very concept of 'superiority',” 34 acknowledge Rand experts A . Horelick
and M . Rush. Proceeding from this, the theorists of militarism are chang
ing their tactics, advancing and propagandizing plans for the imperialists
to achieve their aims by means of maneuver, extensive utilization of the
threat of war, without going as far as open conflict. Bourgeois politicians
bear in mind thereby that openly misanthropic statements by brazen
militarists constitute a kind of self-indictment on the part of certain
segments of the imperialist bourgeoisie and cannot ensure support of the
population of the capitalist nations. But the imperialist bourgeoisie would
no longer be the imperialistbourgeoisie if it totally rejected militarism and
war as a policy instrument. “ War was and remains a conceivable and
possible instrument of policy” 35 ; this view on war is predominant among
bourgeois ideologues.
Bourgeois theorists are inclined to view war and peace solely as " a
differing combination of the instruments of power.” 36 In recent years the
62
most prominent military theorists and “civilian strategists” in the im
perialist nations have been engaged in the elaboration of a military policy
calculated for extensive employment of the threat of war. Widely known,
for example , is a book by Thomas Schelling entitled Arms and Influence,
in which the author indicates specific techniques of nuclear blackmail as a
political method. “Military strategy has today become the diplomacy of
force,” 87 he writes. “War and brinkmanship have approached a contest
of nerves and risk .” 38 Schelling suggests employment of the " rocking the
boat" method, that is creation of a degree of risk which under the threat
of a nuclear world war would present the opportunity to impose the will
of the imperialists on the entire world. The same end is served by the
writings of H . Kahn , who is constantly elaborating new " scenarios” of
nuclear war, calculated to a large degree to intimate anti-imperialist forces
with the horrors of nuclear war.
Forced to admit that under present conditions the imperialist nations
are unable to secure military superiority over the socialist community , the
strategists of imperialism have advanced and are preaching the concept of
" sufficiency” and “ assured destruction.” It boils down to the amassing
and maintenance in a state of continuous combat readiness of a sufficient
quantity of nuclear arms and means of delivery to ensure the imperialists
the " assured destruction ” of the socialist nations, that is annihilation of
their civilian population and destruction of their industrial potential.
The elaboration and dissemination of this strategy attests to the fact
that militarization has reached a very dangerous degree in a number of
imperialist countries. This is why the Soviet Union and the other socialist
nations are vigorously and persistently working to bring the arms race to
an end, not only for nuclear missile arms but nonnuclear arms as well.
Militarism promotes preservation of the domination of imperialism
over colonial peoples. V . I. Lenin noted that imperialism extensively
utilizes the " troops of 'free' republicans, French and Americans, in the
role of gendarme and butcher, strangler of the independence and freedom
of small and weak nations.” 89
Today war and the threat of war constitute one of the principal devices
of neocolonialist policy by imperialist nations. The imperialists would be
willing to commit any crime in the attempt to hold or reestablish their
domination over the peoples of former colonies or other countries
struggling to escape from the grasp of capitalist exploitation. Military
adventures by the imperialist military clique are constantly occurring.
Former U . S . Secretary of Defense McNamara has calculated that the
American armed forces in an 8 -year period took part in " controlling” or
in other words in suppressing at least 157 “ violent eruptions of inter
national significance,” 40 that is rebellions against imperialism . Since
World War II the U .S . Navy has been involved in 30 major and a great
many minor armed incidents.41
The events of recent years indicate that militarism is suffering increas
ing setbacks, fulfilling to an increasingly smaller degree the hopes of the
68
imperialist bourgeoisie. Bourgeois ideologues themselves are compelled
to admit this, noting that militarization cannot infinitely stimulate the
economy,42 that the arms race aggravates the economic and social diffi
culties of the capitalist nations.43 It is stressed in particular that military
might is unable to secure attainment of the goals of imperialist politicians.
Even such a jealous advocate of militarism as Maxwell Taylor urges U . S .
ruling circles to curtail their appetite and to select more realistic foreign
policy goals.
Militarism is encountering increasing opposition on the part of the
masses. In the front ranks of the antimilitarist struggle stands the in
ternational worker class and its vanguard, the Communist parties. Their
representatives solemnly declared at the 1969 International Conference:
“We Communists have in all times of trial and stress maintained total
dedication to the Leninist ideals of peace and friendship among peoples.
Today as in the past we shall fight for these lofty goals of humanity
together with all those who oppose a policy of militarism , aggression and
war." 44
The anti-imperialist struggle of peace- loving forces is producing results.
It is exerting a restraining influence on the militaristic policies and
ideology of the imperialist bourgeoisie and is tying the hands of the
war mongers . Thanks to the growing economic , political and military
strength as well as the peaceful foreign policy of the Soviet Union and the
other socialist nations, thanks to the vigorous stand of the international
proletariat and all strugglers against imperialism for national liberation,
as well as the large- scale movement to defend the peace, we have suc
ceeded in preventing the outbreak of a new world war.
The imperialist bourgeoisie is drafting and implementing plans for
the further militarization of the capitalist society , employing demagoguery
and deception. Bourgeois ideologues are trying to instill into people the
idea that a nuclear world war controls societal processes just as the law
of gravity controls all physical phenomena. Since this is the case, they
reason, all societal affairs should be subordinated to war and preparations
for war, and war should be viewed as an inevitable and essential element
in societal affairs .
A greatmanybooks have been published in the West which present the
demand that greater power be given to the reactionary military , that it be
empowered directly to determine the state's military policy. In the writings
of some bourgeois authors, such as Janovits , the military is declared to
be a special social stratum , the existence of which is dictated by the
fact that war is allegedly becoming, to an increasing degree, a constant
phenomenon. The present international situation is frequently described
as something intermediate between war and peace. Noting that there
were 34 military conflicts from the end of World War II to 1958 and
58 up to 1965,45 some authors predict such an aggravation of the situation
in the future that the fifties and sixties will appear to have been quite
peaceful.46
 Bourgeois authors do not hide the fact that one of the aims of mili
tarization of the economies of the imperialist countries is to intimidate
the world liberation movement with the inevitable threat of another world
war, to force an arms race on the peoples of the socialist nations, to
exhaust their resources, to make it more difficult for them to accomplish
the task of improving worker living standards and in the final analysis to
prevent them from utilizing all the advantages of socialism .47
The failure of these insidious plans of imperialist reaction was demon
strated by L . I. Brezhnev in a speech to his constituents on 11 June
1971. “ A few years ago, " he stated ,” the imperialists, and particularly
the Americans, entertained serious hopes of strengthening their position
in the world arena with the assistance of the arms race , simultaneously
weakening the economy of the USSR and that of the other socialist nations
and frustrating our plans for peaceful development. Today the failure of
these plans of our enemies has become quite obvious. Today everybody
sees that socialism is powerful enough to ensure both a reliable defense
as well as economic development, although of course withoutmassive de
fense expenditures we would be advancing our economy much faster.” 48
The socialist nations, the international worker class and all peace
loving forces are called upon to step up the struggle against imperialism
and war. One of the most important areas of this struggle is exposure of
the apologia of militarism in contemporary bourgeois ideology.

3. Ideological Apologia of Militarism

Engaged in militarizing all societal affairs in its own interests, the
imperialist bourgeoisie is encountering growing resistance on the part
of the masses as well as increasing toiler indignation over policies of
militarism and aggression. In the United States the antiwar movement at
times assumes a mass character and exerts serious pressure on the govern
ment. Resistance to increased military expenditures is also growing in the
other nations of the aggressive NATO bloc. As a result, the arms race is
no longer being viewed as an unconditional benefit, even among a seg
ment of the ruling circles of the Western powers. All this of course
facilitates the struggle of the socialist and other peace-loving countries
against the arms race. This situation makes intensive militarist brain
washing of the toilers and theoretical " justification" of militarism par
ticularly essential for the imperialist bourgeoisie .
V . I. Lenin devoted great attention to the exposure of “ arguments”
utilized for the ideological justification of militarism . Lenin 's critique
of these " arguments" serves as a potent weapon in the struggle against
the contemporary ideologues of militarism as well.
Bourgeois ideologues are today making a great effort toward further
" perfecting" the system of arguments which justify and substantiate mili
tarism , utilizing for militarist brainwashing a gigantic edifice of lies and
70
deceit,mass swindling and stupefaction of the workers and peasants, etc.49
The ideological apologia of militarism essentially boils down to "sub
stantiation" of the idea of the eternal nature and inevitability of war. In
the preaching of this idea one sees "a most characteristic feature of
bourgeois philosophers — to accept the categories of the bourgeois regime
as eternal and natural. . .” 50 Mankind has been unable to become free
of war throughout the tenure of private -ownership , antagonistic systems.
Wars also inevitably accompany capitalism by its very economic nature.
It has become possible to prevent war only with the appearance of such
powerful restraining factors as today's world socialist system , the inter
national labor movement, and the popular peace struggle .
Bourgeois theorists, endeavoring to conceal the fact that imperialism
is to blame for the wars of our time, claim as the causes of wars “ natural”
factors — the innate aggressiveness of man, population dynamics, racial
peculiarities, geographic conditions, etc.51 Thus they resort to antisci
entific devices described by Lenin as "empty phrases” and “ a meaningless
scholastic exercise.” “ In fact,” wrote Lenin , “ there can be no investiga
tion of social phenomena and there can be no comprehension of the social
sciences method with the aid of these concepts.” 52
One should state , however, that theories justifying militarism and
wars with references to the aggressive nature ofman, to population growth
and geographic factors are losing their effectiveness. Therefore bourgeois
theorists are compelled to turn to " social" and historical factors. They
attempt to derive the inevitability of militarism in particular from the
development of culture, science and technology . But the most charac
teristic feature of bourgeois ideology is retained — “ a fear of science , a
fear of scientific analysis. . ." 53
Bourgeois theorists declare war to be an inevitable and essential
companion to the genesis and development of culture , one of its ele
ments.54 They consider the struggle between cultures, civilizations, the
clash of “ spiritual values” to be the major source of wars in our time.65
Their writings contain assertions that militarism and wars are an integral
property of the modern " industrial” civilization. Theorists of the socalled
" unified industrial society” ( R . Aron , W . Rostow , J. Galbraith , etc .)
derive the inevitability of wars from the fact that different countries are
at different " stages of economic growth .” The aspiration of formally
backward peoples to establish their own economic system , to secure
broader access to the " sources of economic growth ” and to develop science
and culture is declared to be a particular, specific reason for the in
evitability ofwars and militarism in our time.56 Such theories are directed
primarily at justifying extensive utilization by the imperialists of armed
forces against peoples in the process of liberation.
References to science constitute one of the most recent techniques
for justifying an apologia of militarism and wars. Our age is declared to
be the age of scientism , the age of the domination of science in all areas
of societalaffairs . But the development of science is quite often announced
71
to be a spontaneous process, allegedly directly and indirectly influencing
all societal affairs. The inevitability of wars allegedly serves as one of
the manifestations of this. Herman Kahn, one of the most prominent
theorists of American militarism , asserts in his book Thinking About the
Unthinkable that science has led to the development of nuclear weapons,
while the very existence of these weapons allegedly inevitably and irre
versibly is leading to their utilization , that is to nuclear war.57
Of course all these attempts to justify militarism are without founda
tion. The founders of scientific communism irrefutably demonstrated that
the roots of war lie not in the natural factors of the development of
mankind, not in culture per se , not in the struggle of civilization and not
in the development of science and technology, but rather in private
ownership . War is a method of resolving antagonistic conflicts based on
private ownership relations. Private ownership in the final analysis also
dictates the aggressive nature of the culture of antagonistic systems, to
which bourgeois theorists like to refer; it compels science and technology
to serve the aggressive aims of the exploiter classes.
The social foundations of wars will disappear with the liquidation of
private ownership , and mankind will become free forever from the horrors
of war. Socialism , said Lenin , “ having done away with the division of
mankind into classes, having eliminated all exploitation of man by man
and one nation by other nations, will inevitably eliminate all possibility
of war.” 58
The preconditions for elimination ofwar from the experience of society
are engendered under capitalism . Investing production with a social
character, capitalism creates conditions for the elimination of private
ownership , antagonistic conflicts and wars . Under capitalism the pro
letariat appears to be a force capable of eliminating wars. “ The worker
class,” it was stated at the Stuttgart Congress, “ which is the principal
supplier of soldiers and which bears themain burden of material sacrifices,
is in particular a natural enemy of wars, since wars are in conflict with
the goals it pursues: creation of an economic system based on the socialist
principle, a system which will achieve solidarity of peoples. . ." 59
Having created in the person of the proletariaî the gravedigger of
the exploiter, antagonistic society, capitalism has produced a social force
which is capable of putting an end to wars and their accompanying
militarism . “ . . . Militarism ,” noted Friedrich Engels, “ just as any other
historical phenomenon , perishes from the consequences of its own de
velopment.” 60 During the course of the historical process “ a people
becomes capable at a certain moment of exercising its own will contrary
to the commanding military authority . . . At this stage the monarch's
army is transformed into a popular army, the machine refuses to serve ,
and militarism dies through the dialectic of its own development.” 61
A Marxist-Leninist analysis of the world power balance and war in our
time leads to the conclusion that such a moment is approaching. Never
before hasmankind possessed such a will to achieve peace, such a resolute

72
desire not to permit the outbreak of another world war; never before has
it possessed such a powerful vanguard in the person of the international
communist and labor movement and the peoples of the socialist nations.
All this does away with the fatal inevitability of another world war and
creates a real possibility to achieve the peace aspirations of peoples.
Anticommunism , the slanderous myth of the “ Soviet threat,” con
stitutes the principal means of justifying militarism and war. Militarization
of the capitalist countries is claimed to be forced, allegedly dictated by
the endeavor to " survive.” Exposing this myth , L . I. Brezhnev stated at
the 24th CPSU Congress : “ . . . Wehave no territorial claims on anybody;
we threaten nobody, nor do we intend to attack anybody; we stand for
the free and independent development of all peoples. But let nobody try
to speak to us in the language of ultimatums and force.” 62
We should discuss in particular the fantasies of the apologists of
militarism in regard to armed violence, which allegedly serves as the
principal means of implementing revolutionary socialist reforms. This is
the most unpardonable slander. “ Communism is not introduced by
force.” 63 stressed Lenin . Even where the proletarian revolution has
assumed acutely violent forms, the cause of this has been the reactionary ,
exploiter classes. “ The reactionary classes themselves usually are the
first to resort to violence, to civil war, 'placing the bayonet on the
agenda'. . .” 64 The theory of the “export of revolution " signifies “ a
total departure from Marxism , which always negated the “ pushing” of rev
olutions, which develop as the acuteness of class conflicts matures. . ." 65
Communism is the most humane social doctrine in history, according
to which people, the toiler masses, constitute the most precious thing in
the world. War and armed violence bring suffering to the toiler masses.
This is why, as Lenin stated, " all our policies and propaganda are directed
not toward pushing peoples into war but rather toward putting an end to
war. ” 66
Historically , militarism always serves reactionary, antipopular forces,
which have endeavored with the aid of war to stop or at least slow the
course of history, to prevent the demise of social orders which have out
lived their time. Socialism as a new and advanced social system is sup
ported by the action of the objective laws and development of mankind,
which dictate the necessity of the triumph of communism throughout the
world . It does not need to resort to militarism and war, to impose armed
violence. " The domination of capitalism is not undermined because
somebody wants to seize power,” stated Lenin . “ The ‘seizure of power
would be senseless. It would be impossible to put an end to the rule of
capitalism if the entire economic development of the capitalist nations
did not lead to this. . . No force would destroy capitalism if it were not
undermined and eroded by history." 67
The favorite method of bourgeois ideologues to justify militarism is
attempts to instill in people the idea that war and militarism have played
and do play a beneficent role. To war is ascribed the principal role in the
historical process; it is declared to be practically the main factor in the
genesis of mankind . Therefore , if there is no war society will allegedly
break down into an aggregate of “ atom -like individuals” and will cease to
exist.
All these arguments are based on an extraclass approach to war. And
yet history demonstrates that wars are not eternal, that, arising together
with the split of society into classes, they have played a subordinate role
to the principal factors of societal development, have accomplished and
do accomplish tasks dictated by the course of history and, in the final
analysis, by the development of productive forces and the productive
relations of society . This role of war has always depended on what classes
have conducted it, and in whose interests it was undertaken. War, if
waged in the name of social liberation, in the interests of securing the
freedom and independence of people, could and did play a progressive
role, could and did serve as an accelerator of the social process. “War
per se," emphasized Lenin , “ does not alter that direction in which policy
was developing before the war but rather accelerates that development,” 68
aggravating social conflicts, influencing the disclosure of these conflicts
and engendering the collapse of everything rotten and reactionary which
inhibits development.69
In defense of militarism , bourgeois theorists frequently advance the
assertion that the elimination of wars from human experience would lead
to general anarchy or a petrified , static world, since " the dynamic motive
forces of history ” would allegedly disappear together with war. Nations
and states will allegedly be bound by today's political boundaries , which
are random in many respects, and instead of changing the world in con
formity with their " dynamic power,” they will be compelled to restrain
this power, to squeeze it into the narrow confines of their political
boundaries.
In actual fact, as history demonstrates, it is precisely wars which
engender anarchy, chaotic change in the order and rhythm of societal
affairs. War leads to the disruption of established economic proportions,
to collapse, to catastrophic consequences for the population of the warring
nations, to a substantial change in the natural process of population . One
cannot help but see rationalization for the predatory aspirations of im
perialist aggressors in the view of war as a principal means of altering
" chance" boundaries. As Friedrich Engels noted, " the most perfect
boundary has its weak points, which can be corrected and improved, and
if there is no need for restraint, such annexations can continue ad
infinitum ." 70
Bourgeois ideologues try hard to make the population accept the in
evitability of militarization. One of the most recent attempts of this type
is the theory of “ rationalization of war.” It boils down to the claim that
one should treat war not as something extraordinary , tragic, but rather as
an ordinary, routine phenomenon . The whole point is that there are two
kinds of war - rational and irrational. Irrational wars are allegedly not
74
even wars, but rather " acts of blind passion, controlled by dark, demonic
forces ; they are incapable of serving any rational or useful forces.” 71 On
the other hand, rational war is a quite legitimate , permissible and even
desirable instrument of policy. It suffices merely to amplify the intelligent,
rational elements in war, and it becomes quite acceptable not only for
today but forever.
Any wars can be " rational,” in the opinion of one American , Col R .
Selton [ transliteration ]: “ tactical nuclear wars," " limited strategic nuclear
wars," "controlled wars,” etc. Primarily wars which aim at overthrowing
capitalism are called " irrational.” They are viewed by bourgeois ideologues
as “ an act of blind passion,” as an action aimed at “ the collapse of all
order." One can clearly see in this the genuine class character of the
theory of “ rationalization of war.”
The military operations in South Vietnam are called a highly “ ir
rational” war where, to quote Herman Kahn, it is necessary to wage “ 240 .
wars in 240 regions.” 72
Attempts by the imperialist bourgeoisie to " rationalize" war are
doomed to failure , for they contradict the objective course of history. The
imperialist bourgeoisie are attempting to halt the process of history and to
preserve capitalism by force of nuclear arms. The “ rationalization ” of
nuclear war, as it is conceived by bourgeois military theorists, aims at
giving the military a free hand. Declaring war to be a " rational” instru
ment of policy, imperialist ideologues are attempting to legitimize it, to
create the ideological prerequisites for an unprecedented growth of mili
tarism in all areas of societal affairs in the capitalist nations, to make
war the principalmeans of implementing domestic and particularly foreign
policy.
No matter what ingenious devices the apologists of materialism may
employ, nothing can hide the true face of this monstrous offspring of
imperialism . Today's realities confirm with new emphasis Lenin 's assess
ment of militarism as the worst enemy of progress , an instrument to
strengthen the power of the monopolists and the further enslavement and
robbery of the toilers. Militarism constitutes a lethal threat to mankind.
Therefore the struggle against militarism and against imperialism con
stitutes the most important task of all progressive forces. A decisive
condition for the success of this struggle is further strengthening of the
unity and might of the socialist community and its military might— the
principal bastion of peace and security of peoples.

Footnotes
1. K . Marx and F . Engel's: Soch . (Works) , Volume 20, page 175.
2. V . I. Lenin : Poln . Sobr. Soch. (Complete Works), Volume 37, page 248.
3. Ibid ., Volume 26 , page 282.
4. Ibid ., Volume 30 , pp 155 – 156 .
5. Ibid ., Volume 32, pp 318 , 319.
75
6. Ibid., Volume 37, page 48.
7. Ibid., Volume 33, page 38 .
8. Ibid ., Volume 37 , page 48.
9 . Ibid., page 104.
10. Ibid., Volume 26 , page 41.
11. Materialy XXIV syezda KPSS (Proceedings of the 24th CPSU Congress),
page 16 .
12. Lenin , op.cit., Volume 23, page 175.
13. Ibid ., Volume 44, page 307.
14. Ibid ., Volume 30 , page 155.
15. Ibid ., page 152.
16. Ibid ., Volume 23, page 144.
17. See S. W . Borklund: The Department of Defense, New York, 1968, page 96 .
18. Lenin , op.cit., Volume 31, page 459 .
19. See B. A . Shabad and I. S. Artsis: Kritika sotsiologicheskikh teoriy militarizma
i agressii (Critique of the Sociological Theories of Militarism and Aggression ) ,
Moscow , 1968, page 26 .
20. See R . Ginsburgh: U.S. Military Strategy in the Sixties, New York, 1965,
page 55.
21. Mezhdunarodnoye Soveshchaniye kommunisticheskikh i rabochikh partiy .
Dokumenty i materialy (International Conference of Communist and Worker
Parties. Documents and Proceedings ) , page 47.
22. Lenin , op.cit., Volume 26 , page 383.
23. Materially . . . , op.cit., page 15.
24. Arkhiv Marksa i Engelsa (Marx and Engels Archives ), Volume IV , Moscow ,
1935, page 29.
25. See Lenin , op.cit., Volume 30 , page 71.
26. Ibid ., page 69.
27. Ibid ., Volume 36 , page 416 .
28 . Ibid ., Volume 17 , page 187.
29. Ibid., Volume 34 , page 166.
30. Ibid ., Volume 37, page 253.
31. Ibid., Volume 26, page 15 .
32. Ibid ., page 109.
33. Mezhdunarodnoye . . . , op.cit., page 287.
34. A . Horelick and M . Rush : Strategic Power and Soviet Foreign Policy,
Chicago, 1966, page 164.
35. M . H . Halperin : Contemporary Military Strategy, Boston , 1967, page 3.
36 . C . W . Koburger: “ Lower Spectrum of War,” Military Review , July 1968,
page 4 .
37. T . Schelling: Arms and Influence, New Haven, 1966, page 34.
38. Ibid., page 33.
39. Lenin , op.cit., Volume 37, page 199.
40. A . Yarmolinsky; U .S. Military Power and Foreign Policy, Chicago, 1967,
page 14.
41. See U .S . Navy Keeping Peace, Washington, 1968, page 1.
42. See E . Janeway: Economics of Crisis, New York, 1968, page 252.
43. Ibid ., page 280.
76
44. Mezhdunarodnoye . . ., op.cit., pp 254– 255.
45. See R. S. McNamara : The Essence of Security, New York, 1968, page 145.
46 . See Defence. A New Setting, London, 1968, page 4 .
47. A . Wolfers et. al.: The U .S. in a Disarmed World , Baltimore, 1960, page 7.
48. Pravda, 12 June 1971.
49. See Lenin , op.cit., Volume 40, page 15.
50. Ibid ., Volume 1, page 222.
51. See C. Jost; The Insecurity of Nations, New York, 1968; L . Bramson and G .
W . Goethals ( eds): War: Studies from Psychology, Sociology, Anthropology,
New York, 1964.
52. Lenin , op.cit., Volume 18 , page 348.
53. Lenin , Ibid ., Volume 25, page 42.
54. See L . White : The Science of Culture, New York, 1949, page 126 ; R . Z .
Wicks: Man and Modern Society, New York , 1958, page 565.
55. A . J. Toynbee: Civilization on Trial, the World and the West, Cleveland,
1968, pp 235 -236.
56. See R . Aron (ed ): World Technology and Human Destiny, Ann Arbor, 1968,
pp 62 –63.
57. See H . Kahn : Thinking About the Unthinkable, London, 1962.
58. Lenin , op.cit., Volume 32, page 78 .
59. Ibid ., Volume 17 , page 188.
60. Marx and Engel's, op.cit., Volume 20, page 178.
61. Ibid ., page 175.
62. Materialy . . . , op.cit., page 28.
63. Lenin, op.cit., Volume 38, page 162.
64. Ibid ., Volume 41, page 375.
65. Ibid ., Volume 35, page 403.
66. Ibid ., Volume42, page 99 .
67. Ibid ., Volume 32, pp 98– 99.
68. Ibid ., Volume 27, page 269.
69. Ibid ., Volume 26, page 372.
70. Marx and Engel's op.cit., Volume 13, page 606 .
71. U .S . Naval Institute Proceedings, July 1968, page 28 .
72. F . E . Armbruster et al: Can We Win in Vietnam ?, New York, 1968, page 179.
Chapter V . V . I. Lenin on the Socialist Army and
the Laws Governing Its Development

Revealing the essence of war as a societal phenomenon, Lenin devoted

considerable attention to the army— the fundamental means of waging
war. He deserves particular credit for substantiating the necessity for the
army of the socialist state, for revealing its fundamentally new social
nature, its historical mission, and its new development features. Lenin 's
ideas on organizational development of the socialist army are of enormous
importance even today.

1. The Essence of Lenin 's Concept of the Socialist Army

V . I. Lenin very scrupulously studied and synthesized all statements
made by the founders of Marxism on the army and developed their ideas
further, enriching them with new theses and conclusions. Thanks to this
a new category appeared in Marxism as a scientific theory — “ the socialist
army.” 1 It expressed the fact that at a certain stage in history there occurs
the necessity for the creation of a qualitatively different military organiza
tion, radically differing from prior existing ones. This was an important
discovery, a new development in Marxism .
What is the essence of the discovery made by Lenin ?
Prior to Lenin there was a prevalent view that the socialist state will
not need an army as a permanent military force. It was believed that
in the process of socialist revolution the bourgeois army would be replaced
by universal arming of the people, a socialist militia. This conclusion was
made proceeding from the possibility, in the era of premonopoly cap
italism , of a simultaneous, victorious, socialist revolution in all, or the
majority, of developed capitalist countries, from an analysis of the state
of armed forces and military affairs in the latter half of the 19th century.
Comprehensive consideration of all these circumstances made it possible
to assume that the armed masses, having accomplished the socialist
revolution , would be superior in strength to the military force of domestic
and external counterrevolution , including the permanent armed forces of
the bourgeois and prebourgeois states. It was for this reason that the
program included a thesis calling for a militia form of military organization
78
of the victorious proletariat. It expressed the ideals and aspirations of the
worker class and other toiler strata which bear the entire burden and yoke
of militarism .
In the age of imperialism , proceeding from the new theory of socialist
revolution and the synthesized experience of the October Revolution of
1917 in Russia, Lenin reformulated the question on forms of military
organization of the victorious proletariat. He was the first Marxist to ad
vance and theoretically substantiate the idea of creating a socialist regular
army. He proceeded thereby from the objective laws of the class struggle
of the proletariat against the bourgeoisie both on the domestic front and
in the international arena during the era of imperialism . He taught that
themonopoly bourgeoisie will stop at nothing, even naked armed violence,
in the struggle against the forces of socialism . Therefore, in order to stand
firm the proletariat must be prepared to respond to reactionary force with
revolutionary force. The victorious proletariat needs a powerful regular
army for defense of the socialist homeland and for the conduct of a revolu
tionary war against imperialist aggression.
Under conditions of a direct threat of military attack , a permanent,
regular army possesses undisputed advantages over a militia organization .
A regular army achieves a much higher level of tactical training and per
sonnel mastery of complex military hardware; under conditions of direct
threat of a military attack regular troops are capable of immediately
engaging, without preliminary mobilization , and of repelling an enemy
sneak attack.
The experience of history has demonstrated that a regular cadre army
is essential to the socialist state for accomplishing both domestic policy
and foreign policy tasks. With the aid of a regular army, the state of the
dictatorship of the proletariat, born in the course of revolution , crushes
armed counterrevolution and consolidates the new system , particularly
since in some countries even internal counterrevolution may have regular
troops at its disposal. For example, in the summer of 1918 the White
Guard forces in this country totalled approximately 700,000 men. The
Russian counterrevolutionaries possessed experience and cadres; their
army was well equipped, well trained and organized with the aid of the
forces of international reaction .
The enemy's regular army had to be countered with a regular army of
the socialist revolution . In connection with this the resolution of the
8th Party Congress on the question of the military read as follows: "When
the class struggle is transformed into an open civil war . . . the slogan
'Popular Militia ' loses its meaning. . . The conquest of political power
gave the proletariat the capability of utilizing the edifice of government
for planned organizational development of a centralized army, unity of
organization and control of which is essential for ensuring achievement of
maximum results with minimum casualties.” 2
Organizational development of a regular army can be effected both in
" pure" form and in combination with elements of a militia system

79
(universal military training, worker's militia , etc ) or can even adopt the
form of a territorial-cadre system , as was the case in this country. But in
all instances a deciding role is played by cadre units.
A regular army is " inherent in the consolidated power of any class,
including the proletariat.” 3 This Leninist thesis was fully confirmed by
history; the military organizational development of the socialist nations
is based on it.
Elaborating the theory of the socialist army and creating the Soviet
Armed Forces in a practical way, Lenin proceeded from an organic unity
in the societal development of the general and the particular. The army
as a specific social institution of course possesses a relative independence
of development and is distinguished by specific features characteristic of
the army alone and proceeding from its purpose. The army is “ an
organized unification of armed individuals, maintained by the state for
the purpose of offensive or defensive warfare." 4 Under all historical con
ditions this fundamental, essential feature is inherent in the army and
determines the patterns of its development. At the same time concrete
historical conditions give an army a specific sociohistorical countenance.
There is no army " in general.” What exists is a specific army, belonging
to a state of a given type and possessing a specific character, purpose ,
serving specific classes and possessing a certain level of combat strength.
History knows of four types of army: the slave society , feudal, bour
geois, and socialist type. The highest of these, the socialist type of army,
has been in existence now for more than 50 years. It first arose in this
country. Today a number of countries possess armies of this type. They
are maintained by the nations of the socialist community in the interest
of defense of the conquests of socialism , just as the Soviet Armed Forces,
and in their sociopolitical essence differ radically from the armies of all
previous types.
The army is the bulwark of what political power ? This main feature
defines the social essence of each army, for each state creates a military
organization " in its own image and likeness .” The bourgeois army is an
instrument of reaction , a servant of capital in the struggle against labor,
an executioner of the people's freedom . The socialist army is a defender
of the toilers and their power, an army of the people .
From this main feature proceed all the other features of the army,
the entire content of its vital activity. If an army is an instrument of the
socialist state, it is an active political force in the cause of defense of
the interests of the toilers ; the principles of socialism are dominant in it;
relations to other peoples and countries are determined by the principles
of proletarian internationalism .
Inherent in the socialist army, as in any other, is the existence of a
specific military -technical foundation, specially trained individuals, a
specific organization of these individuals, the existence of military theory,
that is everything which as an aggregate comprises the combat power
of an army.
80
 The new social nature of the socialist army and its class function
affect all these elements, particularly personnel. But in all these elements
there may be a number of factors which are common in form with the
bourgeois armies.We are speaking in particular of certain items connected
with the development of military equipment and weapons, troop organiza
tion , military professional training of personnel, methods and forms of
combat operations, etc. An army of the preceding type may possess
superiority in a number of elements of combat might. It is not surprising
that when establishing the Red Army Lenin posed the question of utiliza
tion from the military heritage of the past of all things useful to the
proletariat.? This question is just as significant today, with the simul
taneous existence of bourgeois and socialist armies. It is an indisputable
conclusion from Lenin 's legacy of theory that we should carefully observe
the development of bourgeois armies, studying their strategic and tactical
principles, their weapons, equipment, and adopting all useful elements.
Lenin drew attention to the great complexity of this process and its
inner conflictive nature. “ . . . Build from an oppressed class, which had
been transformed into a somber beast, an army, full of enthusiasm , and
compel this army to utilize the most violent, the most repulsive of all that
we have inherited from capitalism .
" This is the contradiction facing us in the question of the Red
Army. . .”
Our party was compelled to build the army of the new type to a con
siderable degree with the hands of military specialists many of whom were
" totally permeated by bourgeois psychology and who have betrayed
us. . ." ! At first glance this contradiction could seem insurmountable .
But only in this way was it possible to resolve the important problem of
establishment and defense of the new system . Lenin taught us that we
must build communism in an acute class struggle from that which cap
italism has left behind .10
The leader of the revolution not only discovered these contradictions
but also outlined specific ways and methods of resolving them . Under his
guidance the Communist Party accomplished a great ideological and
organizational task connected with establishing a permanent army for
defense of the conquest of socialism , with establishment of the material
base required to supply the army with all requisite items, and with
elaboration of Soviet military science. The recruitment of old -regime
military specialists was placed under the strict supervision of party and
government. Command, political and technical cadres from the masses
were trained through an extensive network of military training establish
ments. All this promoted the creation and consolidation of a powerful,
monolithic army to defend the revolutionary conquests of the toilers.
Of course the above-mentioned conflicts in establishing a socialist
army no longer are so acute under contemporary conditions in other
countries.One should not ignore them , however; one should bear in mind
that the present stage of the contemporary era is presenting a number of
81
new questions in connection with solving military problems. Exceptionally
important are problems connected with combining the national and in
ternational in socialist military organizational development, a steady
improvement in living standards in the socialist society and the con
comitantnecessity of ensuring a constant increase in the army's strength ,
scientific -technological advances and their utilization for defense needs,
etc.
Of inestimable importance for an understanding of the nature of the
socialist army are Lenin 's theses on the dialectic of transition from a
military organization of the bourgeois type to a military organization of
the socialist type. Lenin notes the principal means of this transition in his
“ The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky” : “ The new
social class, rising to domination, never could and cannot now achieve this
hegemony and consolidate it other than by totally demoralizing the old
army . . . other than by passing through a most difficult, painful period
without any army . . . other than gradually elaborating, in a difficult civil
war elaborating a new army, a new discipline, a new military organization
of the new class.” 11
Supported by its dictatorship , the worker class completes the destruction
of the old army as an instrument of bourgeois-landlord rule' and creates
an army which defends its class interests, with a qualitatively new dis
cipline, a new character of relationships between military personnel and
the entire people , an army indoctrinated in the spirit of the ideas of
scientific communism .
Destruction of the old army, disarming of the propertied classes and
the establishment of the socialist army essentially constitute a single
interlinked process. A text written by Lenin entitled “Declaration of
Rights of the Toiler and Exploited People” on 3 ( 16 ) January 1918
reads: " . . . In the interest of securing the entirety of power for the toiler
masses and elimination of all possibilities of reestablishment of the power
of the exploiters, arming of the toilers is hereby decreed , as well as
establishment of a socialist Red Army of workers and peasants, and total
disarming of the propertied classes.” 12
Destruction of the old military edifice in each country proceeds in a
unique manner, with different methods and techniques, due to particular
historical and national conditions. In this country the process of destruc
tion of the old bourgeois- gentry army and creation of an army of a
socialist type took place simultaneously . Creation of the new army oc
curred in three fundamental ways. 18 First of all, by forming totally new
units of volunteers and subsequently from persons inducted on the basis
of universal military service obligation . Secondly, on the basis of Red
Guard detachments , which at the end of April 1918, totaling 100 , 000
men, were incorporated in their entirety into the Red Army. Thirdly , by
transforming units and entire large units of the revolutionary army into
units and large units of the Red Army. This process was particularly
82
indicative in the navy, especially in the Baltic Fleet, which was sub
stantially of working-class origin .
The principal means of establishing the Red Army was that of forming
anew units and large units.
In some countries, such as in Bulgaria , establishment of an army of a
new type took place under conditions of retention and utilization of the
organizational forms and basic contingents of the old army, without its
disbandment, by means of renewal and renovation . This was promoted by
outstanding victories by the Soviet Army over the fascist invaders.
A number of specific features in establishing the army of the new type
were manifested in the Hungarian People's Republic, in the Democratic
People's Republic of Korea and in the German Democratic Republic. In
some of these countries no bourgeois-landowner armies existed (DPRK )
or had been demolished during the course of the country 's liberation (the
Nazi German Army, the Hungarian fascist army). Therefore armies of
the new type were created from the ground up by the popular democratic
states. The People's National Army of the GDR was born when the
socialist revolution gained victory ; therefore from the very beginning it
constituted an army of the socialist type. The armies of the Hungarian
People's Republic and Democratic People's Republic of Korea became
such following the transition of a general democratic revolution into a
socialist revolution.
These are some of the features of the process of establishing socialist
armies in various countries of the world socialist system . Common to
all of them , however, is the necessity of destroying the old state and its
army and the creation of a qualitatively new army, an army of a socialist
type.
Our picture of the essence of the socialist army will be incomplete
if we do not discuss the Leninist approach to the determination of the
place of the new -type army within the system of the socialist society . The
immediate methodological basis for an understanding of the place and role
of the army in the socialist society is the Marxist-Leninist doctrine on the
foundation and superstructure, which reflects the real connection, the
relationship between the economic structure of society and its ideals,
various establishments and organizations.
Lenin proceeded from the position that the army is a superstructural
element of societal affairs, which arises under specific social and economic
conditions. Emphasizing this fact, he wrote that " in France at the end of
the 18th century there was created initially an economic basis for a new ,
higher mode of production , and a powerful revolutionary army con
stituted a result, a superstructure." 14
As a superstructure phenomenon, the army is subjected to the effect
of laws inherent in the development of the superstructure . At the same
time the army — an element of a particular part of the superstructure of
society — is a political agency of the state. In connection with this we
should note that in the course of the struggle for socialism there may
83
develop several armed organizations (partisan detachments, popular
militia , worker militia , etc.) which do not constitute an agency of the
state, which are of a transient, temporary nature and are produced by
specific , concrete historical conditions. These armed organizations, how
ever, are elements of the political superstructure, and their functions are
close to the functions of the army.
The socialist state possesses many different agencies which are vitally
essential to it and objectively, dictated by it. These include the rep
resentative organs of governmental authority, agencies of governmental
administration , justice, prosecution , volunteer inspection, and agencies to
protect the socialist society against the intrigues of the imperialist camp
(army and intelligence). They are all socialist in character, popular in
composition , while their organization and activities are based on Leninist
principles of socialist organizational development. At the same time each
of these agencies occupies a special position within the system of govern
ment and possesses its own specific features.
A special place within this system is occupied by the agency of armed
defense of the socialist homeland — the army. It is not only an armed
force but also an important instrument of governmental policy. Lenin
resolutely exposed the lies of the ideologues of the bourgeoisie , who
claimed that the army should stand outside of politics. “ Keep the army
out of politics is a slogan of the hypocritical servants of the bourgeoisie
and tsarism , who in fact have always drawn the army into reactionary
politics. . ." 15 stated Lenin . The army cannot and should not be neutral.
It always has been and remains a most important political instrument.
Many prominent Soviet military commanders particularly emphasize
Lenin 's services in creating our army as an implement of the proletarian
dictatorship , as an instrument of policy.
" Vladimir Il'ich,” wrote S . S . Kamenev, commander in chief of the
Armed Forces of the Republic, “ gave us an example , unsurpassed in
military history, of the creation of an army as an instrument of policy.
. . . Under the political guidance of Vladimir Il'ich , the Red Army became
an additional instrument of policy of the worker class and became the
bearer of the great tasks of the proletarian revolution .” 18
The objective process of the socialist revolution is occurring in such
a manner that socialism must rely on military strength in the struggle
against the forces of reaction and for its affirmation. This comprises the
basis of genuinely scientific Leninist views on the Soviet Army as an
instrument of the Soviet socialist state which is of exceptional importance
and is extremely necessary during the entire period of struggle between
capitalism and socialism in the international arena.
On the question of the role and place of the army in the socialist
society, we have recently encountered a distortion , a deviation from
Marxist-Leninist doctrine in the theory and practice of " leftist" revision
ists, who equate the army with governmental authority, who transform it
from an adjunct into the deciding and essentially sole means of policy.
84
The leadership role of the worker class and its party in society is replaced
by the army. To it is assigned the performance of economic and cultural
tasks. Consequently the army functions not as an agency of political
authority of the worker class but rather as a self-contained force utilized
in the selfish interests of a clique of adventurers against the people and
party. The lack of substance behind this theoretical principle involves an
iguoring of the objective laws of societal development, exaggeration of
the role of political coercion, and voluntarism . Its embodiment is fraught
with the danger of degeneration of the army and loss of its socialist
character .
Contemporary rightist revisionists, viewing military organizational de
velopment in the socialist society from abstract, essentially extraclass
positions, failing to consider the actual demands of modern warfare and
the level of technological sophistication of armies, entertain doubts as to
the advisability of a centralized cadre army. They have proposed that it
be replaced by a system of military organization based on a universal
army of the people and its defensive self -organization . In their opinion it
is more stable against all types of aggression . This, of course , is a
misapprehension. Under present-day conditions, when there exists a
constant threat of sudden imperialist aggression with the employment of
nuclear missile weapons, not a territorial-militia defense system but rather
a cadre army is objectively essential and acceptable for socialist nations.
The cadre army alone is capable of quickly and thoroughly mastering
complex combat equipment and of constant readiness to resist and destroy
the aggressor. Such an army is necessary to the contemporary socialist
society as never before. To deny or doubt thismeans to make concessions
to contemporary imperialism , to place the gains of world socialism under
threat of attack .
Thus the creation of socialist armies is the highest qualitative level
in the existence of this social institution. Inestimable credit for the
elaboration of theory in this matter and its practical embodiment goes to
V . I. Lenin . In spite of the fact that he dealt with limited historical
experience of military organizational development, his theoretical concept
of the socialist army is exceptionally rich in content. It not only provides
an extremely detailed description of the distinctive features of the army of
the new type, the ways, forms and methods of its establishment, but also
states the fundamental ideas on the prospects and dialectic of its genesis
and the most important laws governing its development.

2. V. I. Lenin on the Laws Governing the Development of the Socialist Army

The creation and development of a socialist army is a process of con
scious and deliberate productive activity by the people, guided by a
Marxist-Leninist party . It is carried out on the basis of objective natural
laws, knowledge and consideration of which is an essential condition for
scientific guidance of military organizational development.
85
 The theoretical content of this problem was first revealed in the writings
of V. I. Lenin , as well as in resolutions by the CPSU and Soviet govern
ment on the basis of synthesis of practical experience. Subsequently
scientific views on military organizational development were concretized
in resolutions of the Communist parties of the socialist nations and, taking
into consideration the particular features of these nations, received prac
tical embodiment in the course of building and strengthening the fraternal
armies.
At one time Friedrich Engels wrote, pertaining to the essence of
bourgeois and prebourgeois armies, that the entire history of civilian
society is summarized in their history, that they constitute a reflection in
military affairs of either social reforms generated by bourgeois revolutions
or a reflection of absolutism . 17 Socialist armies constitute a reflection ,
a copy of the socialist system and of socialist societal relations. The
fundamental processes which take place in the social system , in organiza
tional development of party and state, are of necessity reflected in the
army as well. Its entire life and activities constitute indoctrination and
training, military discipline, relations between command personnel and
the rank and file, relations between army and people, the attitude of
other countries toward the toilers and their armed forces, and are based
on the fundamental principles of this society, that is on the principles of
socialism . Herein lies its specificity. It is socialistic because it reflects the
content and form of socialist societal relations. In speaking of this es
sential, logical process , Lenin emphasized the necessity of strengthening
socialism in the army. In this he saw the source of its invincibility .18 He
stressed that “ organizational development of our army was able to achieve
successful results only because it was established in a spirit of overall
Soviet organizational development. . .” 19
The consolidation and affirmation of socialism in the army constitutes
a fundamental trend of development of the army of the socialist state, the
main condition for successful accomplishment of that army's historical
missions.
Affirmation and improvement of socialist societal relations which
directly affect the army takes place in a unique manner at different stages
in the building of socialism and communism .
In the transition period from capitalism to socialism , particularly at
the initial stages, the state of the dictatorship of the proletariat wages a
struggle against the overthrown but as yet undefeated exploiter classes and
against their ideology, which in one way or another penetrates into the
army as well.
In some countries, where the class struggle in this period was par
ticularly acute , such as in the USSR , consolidation of the new relations
on the basis of special legislative enactments was ensured by preventing
representatives of the exploiter classes from entering the army. In a
number of other countries, such as in the socialist nations of Eastern and
86
Southeastern Europe, this extrememeasure was not employed, since this
process took place under different historical conditions.
In the society of victorious socialism , particularly under conditions
of a popular state, there are no longer class forces which could hinder the
establishment of new relations in the army.
With transition to the accelerated building of communism , the prin
ciples of socialism are perfected in society and the army, and communist
principles are gradually consolidated . There takes place a strengthening
of the role of conviction of the soldier masses, military personnelbecome
more active in patriotic undertakings, the role and influence of party
organizations and public- spirited citizens increase in the military , etc.
Consolidation and improvement of all relations of the socialist society
within the Armed Forces constitutes a natural law in the organizational
development of the socialist army. Of course we are speaking of de
termining development trends. Some aspects of socialist relations, taking
into account the specific features of the army, may be restricted or limited
in the army, such as extensive democracy, while others on the contrary
will be manifested more broadly in comparison with other entities of
society and state , such as discipline, centralism , utilization of moral
incentives, etc.
All attempts'to ignore or distort the principles proceeding from this
natural law in organizational development of the socialist army lead to its
isolation from society , to its transformation into an antipopular, anti
socialist force.
The most important law governing development of the socialist army
and expressing its special historical function is the gradual withering
away of the internal function , which it performs for a specific period of
time.
Since in the struggle for consolidation of the new social system it
is necessary to defend against enemies both domestic (counterrevolu
tionary forces within the socialist country ) and foreign (the forces of
international imperialism ) , the army is compelled to perform two func
tions: internal and external.
The internal function of the socialist army exists when the country
still contains remnants of the exploiter classes, which are waging a struggle
against the new system . This struggle takes place in all areas - economic,
political, and ideological. At certain times it may become extraordinarily
aggravated and involve armed clashes. In order to overcome the resistance
of hostile forces within the country , the worker class establishes its dic
tatorship and utilizes the army in the class struggle . Thus during this
period the army constitutes an instrument of the dictatorship of the
proletariat and support of the worker class in solving social problems and
in implementing domestic policy. The Soviet Armed Forces performed a
domestic function during the entire period of dictatorship of the pro
letariat. Today this function of the army is still retained in other socialist
nations.
 The internal function of the socialist army is in essence fundamentally
different from the corresponding function of the armies of capitalist
nations. This proceeds from the character of these armies. The armed
forces of capitalist nations are employed to crush demonstrations and
uprisings by the toilers, who comprise the majority of the population ,
against the small explojter clique. The armies of the socialist nations on
the contrary are employed against the exploiter minority, to crush its
counterrevolutionary insurrections and thus defend the interests of the
toilers, that is the majority of the population .
Depending on specific historical conditions, the socialist army can
perform its internal function in various forms and with various methods.
In this country the Red Army was compelled to wage a long and bloody
war against the overthrown exploiters and foreign interventionists , who
attacked the Soviet regime in a united front.
In the European people's democracies counterrevolutionary forces
did not succeed in initiating a civil war in the course of the socialist
revolution. This was hindered primarily by the presence of Soviet troops
in a number of Soviet-liberated countries of Central and Southeastern
Europe. Therefore the internal function of the armies of these countries
was expressed in preventing civil war and in restraining the forces of
counterrevolution .
The internal function of the socialist army is comparatively short in
duration. It gradually disappears as increasing success is achieved in
building socialism and in liquidating the country's exploiter classes. This
has already taken place in the USSR , on the basis of the total, final victory
of socialism . Reflecting this fact, the CPSU Program states : “ The Soviet
Union does not need an army from the standpoint of internal conditions.
But as long as there continues to exist a military threat emanating from
the imperialist camp, as long as a total and universal disarmament has
not been achieved , the CPSU considers it essential to maintain the de
fensive might of the Soviet state and the combat readiness of its Armed
Forces at a level ensuring the decisive and total defeat of any enemy who
dares attack the Soviet homeland.” 20
The withering away of the internal function of our army does not
signify a diminution of its role in accomplishing the tasks of building
communism and in the nation 's sociopolitical life. On the contrary, this
role has become even greater.
The external function of the socialist army today consists in defending
the nation from attack by international imperialism . With the emergence
of socialism beyond the boundaries of a single country and the establish
ment of a world socialist system , the external function of defense of the
socialist homeland for each of these armies has ceased to be a purely
national affair. Every socialist army objectively accomplishes the mission
of defense of the entire socialist camp in cooperation with the other
fraternal armies. It essentially functions as a constituent part of the inter
national armed forces of socialism . A special role is played here by the
88
Soviet Army and Navy, which constitute the principal, most powerful
force of the military might of the nations of the socialist community.
Another general law governing the development of socialist armies is
a gradual strengthening of ties between army and people, their inde
structible unity . The action of this law is based on a community of
interests between people and army. There is no such community of
interests nor can there be in a capitalist society. Therefore, although there
do exist certain ties and relations between army and people in capitalist
countries, they are quite frequently permeated with antagonistic conflicts .
The socialist army, stated Lenin , “ is not detached from the people, such
as the force of the old regular army, but is closely linked to it. . ." 21
This organic feature of the socialist army was once again stressed by
the 24th CPSU Congress, with the comment that “ the Soviet Army is a
part of our people , living a common experience with it.” 22
In the capitalist countries the people fear the army, because the
bourgeois government frequently employs troops against the people and
compels soldiers to crush strikes and revolutionary demonstrations by
workers and farm laborers.
In socialist countries the people have an attitude of affection and
concern for the army, since they see and recognize that the army reflects
the interests of the people , unselfishly serves the people, and constitutes
its offspring.
The unity of army and people in the socialist nations is manifested
in various forms. It is expressed first of all in the direct participation of
the people in armed forces organizational development. Workers and
peasants , all toilers serve in the army and navy, either on a cadre or
induction basis. With their selfless labor they create all the requisite
conditions for supplying and supporting the army both in peacetime and
in time of war. When necessary the toilers take active part in establishing,
to assist the armed forces, local defense forces and various worker class
combat detachments (the people's militia in Czechoslovakia , the worker
militia in Hungary and Poland , combat groups in the GDR , etc. ) .
Unity of army and people is also manifested in mass heroism and
self-sacrifice on the part of fighting men in combat for the freedom and
independence of their homeland. A vivid manifestation of this unity was
the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet people against the Nazi German
invaders. This unity served as one of the decisive sources for our victory
over our sworn enemy.
The men of the Soviet Armed Forces, as those of the other armies of
the socialist nations, take active part in economic, political and cultural
development and during their service receive a thorough education in the
area of ideological conditioning, technical training and culture. All this
helps successfully accomplish the tasks facing society .
The unity between army and people is not formed spontaneously. It is
the result of purposeful efforts on the part of Marxist-Leninist parties,
other public organizations, the government, and the toilers.
89
 *Particular significance under present-day conditions has been acquired
by such a pattern of development of the socialist army as the fighting
alliance and cooperation with the other fraternal armies of the socialist
nations. This is a new trend, unprecedented in the history of mankind . Of
course it could develop only following establishment of a world socialist
system , as an objective necessity of its defense against the threat of
attack by imperialist aggressors and attempts to reestablish capitalism in
any of the countries comprising this system . The fighting alliance of
socialist armies is based on the time-tested principle of proletarian
internationalism .
The preconditions for a fighting alliance first appeared during the
civil war in Russia , when the international proletariat defended the world's
first socialist state , with weapon in hand, shoulder to shoulder with the
men of the Red Army. “ Hungarians, Poles, Serbs, Bulgarians, Czechs,
Slovaks, Germans, Finns, Chinese, Koreans, and representative of other
peoples fought in the ranks of the Red Army on the civil war fronts.
Toiler international solidarity withstood a historic test in the flame of
socialist revolution.” 28
The Soviet people in turn offered fraternal aid in those years to the
toilers of other countries in their revolutionary struggle . Many Russians
fought in the ranks of the Hungarian Red Army in 1919. The Soviet
Union offered assistance to the Mongolian people in its struggle for free
dom and independence, and in 1939 the Soviet Army helped rout the
Japanese militarists.
Soviet internationalists took part, together with the Chinese people,
in the war against Japan in the twenties. Civil War hero V . K . Blyukher
was the principal military adviser to the Chinese revolutionary armed
forces. Soviet volunteer pilots fought bravely in the skies over China.
Our country extended a large line of credit to China, for the acquisition
of tanks, airplanes, artillery, and other military equipment.
Soviet volunteers honorably fulfilled their international duty at the
fronts of the Spanish Civil War in 1936 – 1938.
Our fighting cooperation was manifested particularly vividly during
World War II againstGerman Nazism . Outstanding victories by the Soviet
Armed Forces and their liberation of brother peoples created the founda
tion for an international front of struggle against counterrevolution in a
number of countries. Polish and Czechoslovak units formed in the USSR
foughtbravely, shoulder to shoulder with the Soviet Army, against hated
fascism . In the final phase of the war Bulgarian , Yugoslav and Romanian
units made their contribution toward the victory over fascism .
The fighting alliance and cooperation among the socialist armies in
the postwar years grew and became stronger, as an expression of the
necessity to defend the gains of socialism against the intrigues of inter
national reaction. Only a powerful front of socialist nations and armies
is able successfully to stand up against the imperialist bloc. This has been
demonstrated by the experience of recent years .
90
 Bearing in mind the vital necessity of defending socialism , the Com
munist parties of the fraternal nations are implementing in a practical
way, the fighting alliance and cooperation in various forms, on the basis
of the principles of internationalism , a unity of economic , political and
ideological interests, equal rights and mutual assistance . One of themain
forms is the system of collective security of the socialist nations, embodied
in the Warsaw Pact. Lenin's ideas on the military unity of fraternal coun
tries have found vivid embodiment and development in this organization .
Lenin taught that people who have embarked upon the socialist path
of development "must have a close military and economic alliance, for
otherwise the capitalists . . . will crush and strangle us one after the
other ." 24 He resolutely opposed those who during the civil war years
a
attempted to disrupt this alliance .ad“a. . . SStanding up against the vast front
N
of imperialist powers,” stated Vladimir Il'ich, “ we who are struggling
Cute an alliance which demands close military
against imperialism constitute
unity, and we view all attempts to disrupt this solidarity as totally im
permissible , as betrayal of the interests of the struggle against international
imperialism . . . We state: a unity of military forces is essential; we
cannot permit a departure from this unity . . . division constitutes a
crime. " 25
Lenin 's formulation of the necessity of unifying military efforts and
organizing close cooperation and unity in directing the armed forces of
the socialist republics for strengthening peace, ensuring security and
independence of peoples which have taken the path of socialism is of
importance today as never before, with aggravation of the historical
antagonism between the forces of progress and reaction , socialism and
imperialism .
Bourgeois propaganda and contemporary revisionists endeavor to
demonstrate that the Warsaw Pact and NATO are military blocs of one
and the sametype. The Warsaw Pact, however, as a military and political
organization of socialist nations, has nothing in common with the ag
gressive blocs of the imperialist states . It is based on totally different
political relations. It is a defensive alliance created in response to a direct
military threat on the part of the imperialist nations 6 years after estab
lishment of the aggressive NATO bloc. The Warsaw Pact is based on the
principle of equal rights of its members, mutual respect for their inde
pendence and sovereignty, and is of a progressive nature.
The essence and content of the Warsaw Pact also define such forms of
strengthening of the fighting alliance and cooperation of the fraternal
armies as exchange of combat know -how and experience by command
and political personnel, mutual assistance in training specialists, joint
exercises and maneuvers, the manufacture and supply of combat equip
ment, weapons and other items.
“ As a result of collective measures,” states the Resolution of the
24th CPSU Congress on the Central Committee Report, “ the military
organization of the Warsaw Pact nations has become stronger. The

91
armed forces of the allied nations are at a high state of preparedness and
constitute a reliable guarantee of the peaceful labor of the fraternal
people." *
Things have historically evolved so that the Soviet state and its Armed
Forces play a leading role in strengthening the fighting alliance of
fraternal armies. The Soviet Union is the world 's first socialist state and
is the most powerful both economically and militarily . The Soviet Armed
Forces possess a wealth of experience in defending revolutionary con
quests, are armed with first -class combat equipment and possess highly
qualified military cadres. One can therefore understand the attentive
attitude on the part of the military leaders of the fraternal armies toward
Soviet experience and know -how in military organizational development,
troop training and indoctrination .
The Communist parties of the fraternal nations view a strengthening of
the military unity and fighting alliance of the armies as a mandatory
condition for development of the world socialist system . A totally different
position is taken by " leftist” revisioninsts. They extend their nationalistic
thesis of " reliance on one's own resources” to the army as well, which
leads to self-imposed isolation and to a weakening of the united front
of the socialist nations.
V . I. Lenin constantly emphasized that improvement and increase in
the might of the socialist army are inseparably linked with the correct
military policy of the Communist Party , with its organizational and
indoctrinational efforts in the troops, that is with party supervision of
the armed forces. Experience in military organizational development in
the USSR and the other socialist nations has demonstrated that Com
munist Party direction constitutes a principal source of the might of
armies of the socialist type, a most important pattern in their develop
ment. This proceeds from the role and place of the Marxist-Leninist party
in the socialist society . The party exercises political leadership over all
areas of societal affairs, all establishments and organizations, and the
edifice of state as a whole, including the army.
Emphasizing our party's leadership role in military organizational
development, the party Central Committee stated in December 1918 in a
decree entitled “ On War Ministry Policy" that " the policy of the War
Ministry , as that of all other ministries and establishments, is carried out
in precise conformity with the general directives issued by the party in the
person of its Central Committee and under its direct supervision .” 27 The
party's leadership role in military organizational development was thor
oughly substantiated in the Party Program adopted at the 8th Party
Congress and in the congress resolutions pertaining to the military.
This thesis has always been emphasized in other party documents as
well. The CPSU Program adopted at the 22nd Party Congress states that
“ Communist Party supervision of the Armed Forces constitutes the
foundation and basis of military organizational development. . ." 28 The
new program comprehensively and profoundly defined the party 's prac
92
tical tasks in the matter of strengthening the army and navy . “ The CPSU ,”
it states, “ is doing everything necessary in order for the Soviet Armed
Forces to be a precisely and smoothly functioning organism , to possess
a high degree of organization and discipline, to accomplish the missions
assigned to it by the party, government and people in an exemplary
manner, and to be prepared at all times to offer devastating response to
the imperialist aggressors.” 29
The party 's leadership role in regard to the Armed Forces in the other
nations of the socialist community as well is viewed in the same aspect.
Bourgeois ideologues are making a great effort to distort the character
of relations between the army and party , to present in a false light the
activities of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union as regards super
vision of the Soviet Armed Forces. They attempt to demonstrate that
Communist Party leadership of the Soviet Army allegedly contradicts the
character and function of the armed forces, that the latter should always
be “ independent" and develop only according to the laws inherent in
them . For example , British historian D . M . Macintosh, an “ expert on
East European affairs," claims that Communist Party direction of the
armed forces “ has always been an artificial process.” 30 West German
historian Jurgen Rower, whose revenge-seeking aspirations are quite
obvious, states without any proof whatsoever that Communist Party
leadership over the army and navy “ has always led to serious complica
tions in Soviet military command.” 31
AU these and similar slanderous statements originate from political
objectives; they are completely without foundation and are designed for
the simpleminded.
Communist Party direction of the army is a general law of socialist
military organizational development, discovered by Lenin and confirmed
by history. This law can be manifested in various forms, due to the
uniqueness and national features of each country and army. Butwhatever
the forms and methods, they should always express one essential point:
they should secure the absolute guidance of the armed forces by the
Marxist-Leninist Party .
To ignore this natural law means to distort the social nature of the
army, to cause its degeneration. The theory and practice of "leftist” and
rightist opportunists attest precisely to this.
Thus Leninism always has been and remains the scientific foundation
of Soviet military organizational development. The profound theoretical
theses of Lenin on the necessity and ways to destroy the old and build
thenew , socialist army, on the organic relationship between the process of
military organizational development and all Soviet organizational develop
ment, on the political functions and social role of the socialist army, on
the unity between army and people , on party direction of the army and
others have found embodiment in the practical building and development
of the Soviet Armed Forces. Reflecting the general laws governing the
93
creation and development of an army of the new type, they serve as a
guide to action for all socialist nations.

Footnotes
1. See V. I. Lenin : Poln. Sobr. Soch. (Complete Works), Volume 35, pp 216,
224.
2 . KPSS v rezolyutsiyakh i resheniyakh s" yezdov, konferentsiy i plenumov TsK
( The CPSU in Resolutions and Decisions of Congresses, Conferences and
Central Committee Plenary Sessions) , Part I, 7th edition, Moscow , Gos
politizdat, 1963, pp 431, 432- 433.
3. Lenin , op.cit., Volume 38, page 287.
4 . K .Marx and F . Engel's: Soch. (Works), Volume 14 , page 5 .
5. Lenin , op.cit., Volume 12, page 113.
6 . Ibid., Volume 34 , page 304; Volume 36 , pp 485-486 .
7. Ibid ., Volume 38, page 139.
8 . Ibid ., page 140 .
9 . Ibid ., page 142 .
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid., Volume 37, page 295.
12. Ibid ., Volume 35, page 222.
13 . For greater detail see: V . I. Lenin i Sovetskiye Vooruzhennyye Sily (V . I.
Lenin and the Soviet Armed Forces ), Chapter II,Moscow , Voyenizdat, 1969.
14. Lenin, op.cit., Volume 35, pp 345– 346 .
15. Ibid ., Volume 12, page 113.
16 . Lenin i Krasnaya Armiya (Lenin and the Red Army) , Moscow , Gospolitizdat,
1958 , pp 49 , 50 .
17. See Marx and Engel's, op.cit., Volume 20, pp 173, 177.
18. See Lenin, op.cit, Address on Red Officer Day, 24 November 1918, Volume
37, page 200 ; Krasnaya Zvezda , 24 November 1968 (newly -discovered manu
script of this Lenin speech ) .
19. Lenin , op.cit., Volume 40, pp 76 – 77.
20. Programma Kommunisticheskoy partii Sovetskogo Soyuza (Program of the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union ), page 111.
21. Lenin, op.cit., Volume 34, page 304.
22. Materialy XXIV s" yezda KPSS (Proceedings of the 24th CPSU Congress),
page 81.
23. 50 let Velikoy Oktyabr'skoy sotsialisticheskoy revolyutsii. Tezisy Tsk KPSS
Fiftieth Anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution. Theses of
the Central Committee CPSU ) , Moscow , Politizdat, 1967, page 11.
24. Lenin , op.cit., Volume 40, page 46 .
25. Ibid., pp 98– 99, 100.
26. Materialy . . . , op.cit., page 191.
27. KPSS O Vooruzhennykh Silakh Sovetskogo Soyuza ( The CPSU on the Armed
Forces of the Soviet Union ),-Moscow , Voyenizdat, 1969, page 35.
28. Programma . . . , op.cit., page 112.
29. Ibid ., page 111.
30. Cited in Yu. P . Petrov: Protiv falsifikatsii voyennoy politiki Kommunistichekoy
partii (Against Falsification of Communist Party Military Policy) , Izd VPA
im . V . I. Lenina, 1965, page 9.
31. Ibid .
94
Chapter VI. TheMilitary -PhilosophicalIdeas of
Lenin and SovietMilitary Science

V . I. Lenin is by rights the founder of Soviet military science . To him

goes the historical credit for substantiating the military program of the
proletarian revolution , the doctrine of defense of socialist homeland, the
significance of scientific military theory for the socialist state, for creating
its foundations and revealing its characteristic traits and features. In
solving these important problems of scientific theory the ingenious
theorist of Marxism proceeded from dialectical materialist methodology,
expertly applying its principles to the statement and analysis of specific
problems of military theory and practice.
Lenin's military philosophical ideas pertaining to Soviet military science
are of equal importance today. They servemilitary cadres as an important
means of gaining knowledge of the laws governing the development of
military science under conditions of the present scientific and technological
revolution.

1. Lenin and the Creation of Soviet Military Science

Lenin emphasized time and again the enormous importance of a scien
tific philosophy for development of the individual scientist. “ Every
science," he commented, “ is applied logic,” 1 since the general laws of
the abstracting process, examined by dialectical logic, are applied in
science to a specific area and consequently assume specific form . But
logical forms and laws do not constitute an empty shell but rather are
the reflection of objective reality.
Applied to military science this signifies that it studies not that which
in the dialectic of war is common with all other natural and social
processes but only the specific aspects of the objective logic of war which
are characteristic specifically of a given social phenomenon .
A very important conclusion is drawn from this : military science can
successfully develop if it is based on the one hand on scientific meth
odology and on the other hand on practical activity . The latter nourishes
military thought with concrete material on links and relations, features
and characteristic traits of military affairs, the conduct of war and
military operations. Practical military activity alone can give and does
give military science that which makes it what it is, that is fills it with
specific content.
Marxist-Leninist methodology in turn makes it possible to reveal and
clarify the logic of the phenomena of war and to create a well-constructed
theory of conduct of combat operations. Study of the process of genesis
and development of new methods of combat acquires in Soviet military
science a purposeful character thanks to the fact that it is based on a
rigorous and comprehensive consideration of their relationship to " eco
nomic . . . conditions: to human material and weapons, and consequently
- to population quality, quantity, and technology.” 2
Military knowledge did not rise above the empirical level and did not
constitute any coherent scientific theory until it began to be based on a
deliberately and consciously employed philosophic method. The birth of
military science as a more or less balanced and theoretically substantiated
system of knowledge took place in the 18th - 19th centuries, when military
theorists began constructing military scientific views on the basis of
philosophic theories. But these theories.proceeded in large measure from
vulgar materialism , idealist dialectics and therefore were not consistently
scientific .
Creation of a consistent scientific military theory which gave a true
reflection of the multiform interrelations in military affairs, and con
sequently making it possible to exercise effective direction of practical
military activity, became possible with the development of Marxism and
its philosophy. Scientific Marxian philosophy constituted a solid theo
retical base for correct, dialecticalmaterialist solution to problems of war
and military affairs — both sociopolitical and military- technical. Its ap
plication in military affairs makes it possible to avoid dogmatism , which
absolutizes the nature of things and leads to the demise of concepts and
theories, and creeping empiricism , which ignores the general natural laws
of development.
Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels did a considerable job of revising
many concepts and theses of military theory from the standpoint of
dialectical materialist philosophy. Engels made a particularly great con
tribution in this area; Engels, in the words of Marx, “made the study of
military matters his specialty .” 3 He investigated a number of the most
important general and special problems of military affairs and revealed
the fundamental patterns of their development.
Military science , based on scientific philosophic ideology and method,
was born in the world 's first socialist state in connection with the require
ments of its military defense against domestic counterrevolution and
imperialist aggression. The cornerstone in its foundation was laid by
Lenin . The leader of the revolution carefully studied the theory and
practice ofwarfare long before the Great October Revolution , synthesizing
and appraising all phenomena from the standpoint of the dialectical
materialist philosophy. The result was the creation of military theory
96
which was dialectical materialist in character, which comprehensively
reflected the laws of development of military affairs and the vital needs
of military defense of the socialist homeland.
Basing his work on the ideas of Marx and Engels on the role of
revolutionary violence, Lenin stressed the necessity of utilizing violent
means for defense of the revolutionary conquests of the toilers. This is
due to the fact that obsolescent classes do not give up their power volun
tarily, without attempts to crush by force of arms the struggle of progres
sive elements for power. In order to employ force successfully against the
tyrants, the toiler masses must " seriously study military affairs,” 4 utilizing
to the maximum degree in the interests of the revolution the store of
bourgeois science and technology of militarism , without which it is im
possible to master the modern techniques of waging war."
Lenin , a Marxist dialectician, pointed out that the military science of
a socialist state should not be elaborated on barren ground but rather on
the basis of critical reworking and utilization of the achievements of
bourgeois military science.
Utilization of bourgeois military science alone, however, could not
guarantee solution to the military problems of the socialist state. New
social conditions demanded comprehensive consideration of qualitative
changes in military theory connected both with the development of
productive resources and with change in social relations. The military
theory of each era possesses not only its own material foundations but
also its own class roots. This determines the substantial difference in the
nature of military science created under various societal conditions.
With the victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution in this
country there appeared conditions for the creation of a qualitatively new
military science, the class foundations of which were the interests of the
proletariat. Its victory led to a radical change in the contentof the military
tasks of the socialist state in comparison with the military tasks of the
ruling exploiter classes. The socialist revolution engendered a new type
of army and a new soldier, a new attitude of the toilers toward per
formance of the soldier's duty . Military theory was now able to find solid
support in its conclusions and solutions by the high degree of conscious
ness, self-sacrifice and creative initiative of Red Army personnel, on the
development of which the Communist Party , political officers and party
organizations in the troops worked tirelessly.
The development of military science as a well-proportioned and well
substantiated theory required determination of its specific field of en
compassment and definition of its subject. In Lenin 's writings we find
starting point ideas on these topics. First of all he emphasizes the excep
tional complexity of war as a sociopolitical phenomenon. “War is a most
diverse , complex , multiform thing." 6' Essentially constituting a means of
politics, a summation and continuation of politics by other, violent means,
war, and modern war in particular, possesses multiform content and
interrelationships.
97
 Analyzing the wars of the era of imperialism , Lenin established that
" the connection between the military organization of a country and its
entire economic and cultural structure has never in the past been as close
and intimate as at the present time.” ? For this reason wars are waged
not only by armed forces but by an entire people: not only the front lines
participate in war but the rear areas as well. War has been transformed
into a comprehensive test of a nation's resources. Wars today are waged
by nations.
Since there has taken place a broadening of the scientific concept of
war, which today encompasses all types of all areas of organizational
development, and not only the engagement of armed forces in a theater
of military operations, there has also taken place a broadening of the
subject of military science. Military science now deals not only with
matters pertaining to the conduct of military operations, their methods
and forms, as was the case in the past, when wars, to quote Lenin , were
waged by mercenaries or members of a caste which was semidetached
from the people . Today military science deals, in addition to problems
pertaining to combat operations, with problems relating to the rear
services, economic, morale -political and other factors.
Lenin pointed to a substantial difference between directly military
and “not directly military activity.” The former comprises the principal
specifics of war and is studied in particular detail by military science. It
examines the laws which determine the course of war and military opera
tions, and on the basis of these patterns formulates the principles the
fulfillment of which constitutes an immutable condition for readying a
country and its armed forces for war and the successful conduct ofmilitary
operations. Thus the heart of the subject of Soviet military science
comprises a study of the laws governing preparations and application of
violent means that is army and navy) to achieve the political objective
facing the socialist state in connection with imperialist aggression .
From a Leninist comprehension of war proceeds the organic link be
tween military science, the direction and content of its problem area on
the one hand and government policy on the other. This link finds ex
pression in military doctrine, which comprises a system of substantiated
views adopted by the Soviet state on the character of a potential future
war and the fundamental methods of waging it, on the resolution of root
problems of preparing the nation and its Armed Forces to repulse im
perialist aggression. The doctrine encompasses an appraisal of the socio
political essence and character of a potential future war, as well as the
methods of waging it and corresponding demands on military organiza
tional development. Essentially military doctrine constitutes theoretical
expression of the basic directions and tasks of military policy of the
Soviet state.
M . V . Frunze noted that Lenin made a substantial personal contribution
toward elaboration of the bases of Soviet military doctrine. At the same
time he oriented military cadres in this direction . Vladimir Il'ich did
98
everything in his power to support the effort to elaborate unified views on
root problems of military affairs, and he considered the slogan of military
doctrine, as A. S . Bubnov notes in his memoirs, “ vital, expedient,
progressive, and profoundly correct." 9
The party was compelled to engage in a major struggle with Trotsky
and his cohorts, who categorically denied the need of a Soviet military
doctrine and elaboration of problems connected therewith . Trotsky re
fused to acknowledge the very existence of military science and denied
the significance ofMarxist-Leninist theory for military affairs, as if they
were neutral toward the sociopolitical nature of the state and its social
structure; Trotsky insisted that ideology has no place in military science.
The party organized a debate on problems of Soviet military doctrine.
Lenin closely watched the progress of this debate, offering guideline
instructions on the methodological foundations of military science and
on a number of specific problems of military theory and practice. An
important role in defending Lenin 's stand on these matters and in defining
the substance of Soviet military doctrine was played by Lenin 's pupil
and comrade in arms, the eminent proletarian field general M . V . Frunze.
The debate ended with a total defeat for Trotsky and his supporters. The
party demonstrated that there does exist Soviet military doctrine and a
Soviet military science, which radically differ in their ideological and
sociopolitical foundations from the military theories and military doctrines
of the imperialist states.
Developing and becoming enriched , Soviet military doctrine always
proceeded from and still proceeds from Lenin 's ideas, is based on the
data of Marxian science of society and military science. It is permeated by
ideas on the decisive role of the masses in a just war, on the irrecon
cilability of the class interests of the exploiters and exploited , on the
leadership role of the Communist Party in resolving military tasks of the
socialist state , on the unity of the international interests of the socialist
countries. The radical theses of this military doctrine and Lenin 's behests
in the area of strengthening of national defense capability withstood the
stern test of the Great Patriotic War.
Since the war Soviet military doctrine has taken on new content,
reflecting the altered balance of power in the world, the experience of
World War II and the achievements of the scientific and technological
revolution, which have produced radical changes in military affairs.
In recent years a new and significant step forward has been taken in
the area of development of military theory. “ Soviet military science,”
notes Mar SU A . A . Grechko, “has become enriched with new theses and
conclusions on the potential character of a contemporary war, has defined
recommendations on the refinement of themilitary doctrine of the socialist
state, as well as means of economic and mobilizational preparing of the
nation for defense .” 10
Soviet military doctrine proceeds from the fact that a savage struggle
is being waged in the international arena between two social systems

99
socialism and imperialism . The internal antagonisms of imperialism
engender its aggressive policies. There exist elements in imperialist
countries who have not given up hopes of turning back or halting by
means of armed force the process of progressive development. The Soviet
Union is compelled to take this into consideration and undertake the
requisite measures to respond to force with overwhelming force in case
the imperialists unleash a war against the nations of the socialist com
monwealth .
The foundation of a scientific solution to the problem of the character
and features of a potential future war is knowledge from the positions of
Marxism -Leninism of the laws of societal activity and the laws of war,
which makes it possible to take into consideration comprehensively
changes both in the system of political relations in the world arena and
in the material base for waging war — particularly in weapons and military
equipment. A thorough analysis of the direction and trends followed by
these changes offers the opportunity to present with a high degree of
conditions combat operations by units and elements may involve only
conventional weapons.
Soviet military doctrine proceeds from the standpoint that if the
imperialists unleash ancther world war, it may begin with a surprise
nuclear attack by the imperialist powers against the socialist nations or
may escalate from a local conflict. Such a war will constitute a decisive
clash between the two social systems. It will be a coalition war with a
sharply-marked class character and resolute political and military objec
tives. Nuclear-warhead missiles will constitute the decisive means of
warfare. Conventional weapons will also be employed, and under certain
conditions combat operations by units and elements [chast and pod
razdeleniye ] may involve only conventional weapons.
Soviet military policy and its theoretical segment - military doctrine
exert enormous influence of Soviet military science and its development.
They determine the nature ofmilitary research, the selection of problems
to study, concentration of efforts by military scientific and command
cadres on those problems which are at the given moment of the greatest
importance in order to achieve further strengthening of the nation's
defense capability .
An organic link between Soviet military science and the societal
structure of socialism , scientific methodology and advanced military
doctrine gives the military science of the socialist state special qualitative
features and determines its superiority over bourgeois military science .
We shall discuss some of these features.
In the first place Soviet military science is distinguished by open and
consistent partisanship, which is vividly manifested in a class approach
to solution of all problems of war. The partisanship of Soviet military
science is defined by the military policy of the Soviet state as elaborated
by the Communist Party. Lenin sharply opposed all attempts to represent
the policy of theMinistry of Defense as the product of the personal views
100
of individuals. A Central Committee decree entitled “ On Defense Ministry
Policy ” stated that " responsibility for the policies of the Ministry of
Defense as a whole is borne by the party . . .” 11 Not a single important
problem of military organizational development of national defense was
settled or is settled without guideline instructions by the CC CPSU , based
on a careful appraisal of the prospects for development of the socialist
state .
The class character of military theory of the socialist state is not in
contradition to its objective truthfulness but on the contrary serves as a
condition for attaining a high degree of scientific content, for it cor
responds to the interests of the principal revolutionary forces of the
present day, the tasks and aims of their struggle against imperialism and
reaction .
In the second place, a spirit of optimism , resoluteness and vigor, pro
ceeding from the just nature of wars, is inherent in military science of
the socialist state.
In the third place, a characteristic feature of the military science of
socialism is proletarian internationalism . No matter what tasks it may be
engaged in resolving, they will never be counter to the root interests of
the worker class and the toilers of the world . The liberation mission of the
Soviet Armed Forces was manifested exceptionally vividly in the Soviet
Union 's Great Patriotic War against Nazi Germany. A vivid expression
of internationalism is the fighting alliance of the armies of the socialist
states, which has received organizational embodiment in the Warsaw
Pact.
As a reflection of the objective logic of modern warfare, Soviet military
science includes a system of laws of military science as one of its most
important aspects. “ The laws of the external world ,” wrote Lenin ,
“ . . . constitute the foundations of purposeful human activity.” 12 Such
laws are particularly important in the military sphere. Without them
military science could not be a full-valued guide for the conduct of war.
In the philosophic works of Lenin a number of laws of war have been
extensively discussed. In particular, as has been indicated above, the law
of relationship between war and politics and the consequent demand of a
political approach to the investigation of and solution to problems of
contemporary warfare have been thoroughly substantiated .
The law of relationship between victory and defeat in war on the one
hand and the ratio of military might of the combatant parties on the other,
discovered by Lenin , has also entered the depository of Soviet military
thought.
Our party 's leader devoted considerable attention to examination and
consideration of balance of military force; he saw in this an important
factor in national defense. “When we became the representatives of a
ruling class which had begun organizing socialism , we began demanding
of everyone a serious attitude toward national defense . A serious attitude
101
toward national defense means thorough preparation and rigorous con
sideration of balance of forces.” 18
Lenin subjected " leftist” Communists to merciless criticism for their
inability to comprehend the importance of the question of relationship of
forces.
The category of relationship of forces in the Leninist interpretation
is unusually flexible and rich in content. It demands precise calculation
and comparison of forces not only from a quantitative but also from a
qualitative standpoint. Relationship of forces has both political and
economic content. But when the subject is war, of primary importance is
the relationship of military forces, the availability of troops which are
trained and capable of conducting military operations. “ It is a crime from
the standpoint of defense of the homeland,” wrote Lenin , “ to undertake
a military clash with an infinitely more powerful and prepared opponent
when you patently have no army.” 14 Armed forces constitute a unity
of material and spiritual factors; they are notmerely a specific number of
“ bayonets” and “ sabers ,” but in addition the morale of the troops, their
degree of training and the skill of command personnel. Relationship of
forces is not something rigid and fatally predetermining the result of
combat operations. It changes in relation to the economic , political, and
ideological activity of the participants in the war and in relation to the
course of military events.
The dialectical materialist analysis of war, the laws and pattern of
its progress and outcome effected by Lenin helped make it possible for
such military science terms as strategy and tactics, battle , operation ,
engagement, and others to acquire new , much deeper content. Basing
their efforts on Lenin 's methodology , M . V . Frunze, B . M . Shaposhnikov ,
M . N . Tukhachevskiy , and other military leaders and theorists made an
important contribution to the development of Soviet military science.
The importance of Leninist methodology was displayed particularly
vividly in the postwar period , when, under the effect of revolutionary
transformations in military affairs , a radical revision of the former
precepts of military theory and its further development became necessary.
Soviet military science was able to cope with the situation precisely
because it has always relied on Lenin 's legacy ofmilitary theory .
Thus under new historical conditions, when the world 's first socialist
state arose and the task of its military defense against imperialist aggres
sion became the order of the day, Lenin did the enormous job of re
evaluating all basic tenets of the old military theory and of elaborating a
system of categories, laws and principles of Soviet military science. His
methodological weapon was materialist dialectics. An expert application
of its tenets and conclusions to solution of the problems of waging war
and conducting military operations led to the creation of the fundamentals
of a military science which correctly reflects important aspects and trends,
the multiform and complex interrelation of military affairs.
102
2. Leninist Methodology of Solving Problemsof Military Science
Lenin played an important part in the establishment and development
of theory of military art, which comprises a fundamental component of
Soviet military science. On the basis of Marxian dialectics and practical
experience of directing the political struggle of the proletarian masses, the
leader of the revolution innovatively solved problems of Soviet military
strategy , “ operational art” and tactics. In connection with this, Mar SU
A . A . Grechko emphasizes : “ Brilliantly mastering the art of political and
military -strategic leadership, Vladimir Il'ich left us many thoroughly
elaborated theoretical tenets pertaining to the problems of organization
and conduct of military operations and engagements. He isolated many
important principles of military operationswhich were of great importance
for the establishment and development of Soviet military art. Such , for
example , are Lenin 's demands pertaining to determination of the principal
threat, main axes of attack , concentration of personnel and weapons at
the decisive point at the decisive moment, application of various forms
and methods of combat operations, depending on the situation , on seizing
and holding the initiative, boldness and resoluteness of attack, the element
of offensive surprise, consolidating and exploiting success, and pursuit of
the enemy until he has been totally destroyed .” 15
Let us examine in somewhat more detail Lenin 's approach to solving
some key problems of military art, taking into consideration the features
of contemporary development ofmilitary science.
Lenin attached prime significance to determination of the major threat,
main axis of attack, concentration of men and weapons at the decisive
point and at the decisive moment. In “ Advice from an Outsider ," he
wrote : “ . . . It is essential to concentrate a great superiority of forces at a
decisive point, at a decisive moment. . . To encircle and cut off Saint
Petersburg , to take it with a combined assault by the navy, army and
workers is a task which demands skill and triple boldness.” 16 These
statements vividly express the logic of Lenin 's approach to one of the
root problems of military art — a dialectical combination of the objective
and the subjective in the process of analyzing the complex phenomena of
military response .
The principle of concentration of men and weapons on a decisive axis
has been known since the time of Epaminondas. But the revolutionary
proletariat, thanks to its enthusiasm and its organization, possesses
greater capability to take into account objective patterns and to act in
conformity with these patterns. It is not surprising that Soviet military
organization during the years of foreign military intervention provided
models of an ability to concentrate forces, to launch increasing-intensity
attacks precisely at the proper moment and at the proper point. Lenin
stated with full justification : “ . . . We have indeed succeeded in the mili
tary area in achieving a concentration of forees and in achieving successful
results which not only our enemies, not only waverers , but even the
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majority of our own people would have in the past probably considered
impossible.” 17
Our great leader precisely determined , proceeding from political aims
and economic capabilities, the main axis of the struggle, the principal
link in the chain of military events which made it possible to concentrate
the efforts of party and army in a timely manner in the most important
sectors of armed resistance against the interventionists and White Guard
ists. S. I. Aralov, head of the Operations Division of the People's Com
missariat for Military and Naval Affairs and member of the Republic
Revolutionary Military Council, recalled that Lenin always focused at
tention on those fronts which at a given moment were of prime importance
to the Soviet Republic. He resolved complex military problems on a
day-to -day basis and in a flexible manner, and ordered the transfer of
troops from one front to another for purposes of reinforcement, depending
on the situation. 18
The advantages of the Soviet system , the selfless efforts of the toilers
and the enormous organizational effort by the Communist Party made it
possible , under conditions of unbelievable difficulties, consistently to beat
back enemy attacks and to achieve victory .
The history of warfare teaches us that in order to achieve success in
a battle and engagement, to launch a devastating blow on enemy troops,
it is necessary to be as powerful as possible in general, and particularly
along the decisive axes at the decisive moment. At the same time one
must be able to disperse one's forces, in order to reduce losses in men
and equipment. The skilled military leader endeavors to achieve the most
expedient combination of these opposing aspects and to overcome the
conflict which arises between them .
The development of nuclear weapons caused qualitative changes in the
methods and forms of combat operations and introduced many new
factors into the principle of concentration . In the past, massing was
expressed in a physical concentration of men and weapons along narrow
axes. This created the requisite superiority over the enemy and ensured
successful execution of the combat mission in the selected sector. Now
it has become very dangerous to effect a large concentration of men and
equipment in a small area . At the same time it has become possible to
apply the massed efforts of heavy firepower scattered over a large area.
The great effective range of missiles makes it possible to concentrate
missile strikes even with a substantial distance between the site of one
missile launcher and another. Heavy, surprise, simultaneous strikes make
it possible to destroy manpower and equipment over a considerably larger
area than was the case in the past.
Thus the old principle of concentration of men and weapons on a
decisive axis still applies, but the method of its application is drastically
changing
Nuclear weapons will be of determining significance in establishing a
superiority in men and firepower. An important role is now played by
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swift maneuver and concentration of airstrikes and tank attacks on the
critical axis, as well as air power, submarine and fast surface forces in a
naval engagement.
The massed employment of nuclear weapons and other firepower , as
well as the high density of tanks and other combat vehicles in combined
armsmajor units produce sharp changes in the situation . Troops should
be able to concentrate rapidly in order to launch a powerful attack on
the enemy, and they must be able to disperse just as swiftly , in order not
to present a convenient target for a nuclear strike . This requires flexibility ,
a skillful combination of the two opposites .
When advancing along separate axes it is obviously not advisable to
splinter up forces excessively . On each axis there should be a specific
quantity of forces capable of carrying out the assigned missions; otherwise
the advancing force will scatter its troops and firepower and will be unable
to establish the requisite overall force to defeat the enemy. Harmless pin
pricks will result in place of heavy blows. A scattering of effort in defense
also has certain limits. If these limits are ignored , it is possible that the
enemy will be able fairly easily to breach the defensive lines even without
the use of nuclear weapons.
The conflict between concentration and dispersal of forces is resolved
by increasing force mobility, extensive utilization of military transport
aircraft, helicopters, cross-country vehicles, etc. New means of displace
ment enable troops to effect rapid regroupings both parallel and perpen
dicular to the front under difficult conditions of terrain and weather, at
considerable distances from bases of supply .
The massing of men and equipment on major axes will constitute a
complex problem in operations conducted in a modern war. It will not be
the same as in the last war, for the threat of enemy nuclear strike at any
moment will make it necessary to effect concentration of troops with this
threat taken into account.
In this writings Lenin discusses the significance of the principle of
application of various forms and methods of combat in relation to the
situation . In 1906 he emphasized in an article entitled “Guerrilla War
fare ” : “ . . . Marxism differs from all primitive forms of socialism in that
it does not link movement with any one specific form of combat. It
recognizes the most diverse forms of combat. . .” 19 In this same article
he notes that, depending on specific conditions, various forms of combat
are emphasized, and in connection with this secondary forms of combat
are also modified .
Lenin taught that we shall inevitably triumph if we have a mastery of
all means and techniques of combat. He also pointed to the necessity of
altering methods of " combat against the enemy . . . when circumstances
change” 20 ; he formulated a thesis which is very important for military
science, that in order to achieve victory it is essential to have a mastery of
all forms of combat, to learn to supplement one form of combat with
another with maximum swiftness.21 Lenin thus directed military cadres

105
toward the necessity of skilled practical application of the dialectic, of
taking into consideration a possible sharp change in forms, rapid addition
of new content to old forms; he demanded that troops be trained on this
basis for combat, that they be prepared to destroy an aggressor in case
ofwar. It is in this spirit that our party directs the organizational develop
ment and training of the Armed Forces, providing them with the capability
of conducting successful operations under all conditions and in all forms.
Lenin focused attention on the interrelation between offense and
defense and pointed to the specific features of both types of combat op
erations.
The offensive character of Soviet strategy is explained in large degree
by the very nature of organization of the revolutionary proletariat and its
army, by the active nature of Communist ideology, with which the political
and military leaders of the proletarian masses are armed. Frunze stated in
connection with this that the features of maneuverability , resoluteness and
aggressiveness which are inherent in the Red Army " were connected not
only with the objective conditions of military operations, a fact which
nobody denies, but also with the fact that at the head of the Red Army
stood elements permeated with the vigorous, aggressive ideology of the
worker class." 22
Marxists have always noted that the primacy of the offensive type of
military operations over defense is due to the objective requirements of
waging war. The offensive is the basic type of military operation, and its
goal is total destruction of the enemy. Lenin stated that in conducting
combat " we must not 'knock down' but rather destroy the enemy. . ." 28
The content of the offensive action is attack with various types of
weapons. The offensive action necessarily assumes vigorous actions, move
ment forward toward the enemy.24
Today the content of the category “ offense ” has become enriched with
a number of new elements. The principal means of conducting present-day
offensive operations will evidently be the launching of nuclear strikes on
the enemy and swift advance with the aim of total defeat of the enemy.
The most diversified forms of maneuver will be extensively employed in
an offensive operation : frontal attacks, attacks along converging axes,
deep envelopments and turning movements into the enemy's flanks, etc.
Under certain circumstances defense is also an expedient type of com
bat operation . Its aim is to repulse an attack by a superior force, to inflict
substantial losses, to hold important ground, and by this to create favor
able conditions for shifting to a vigorous attack. Defensive actions enable
one to gain time, to economize in manpower and equipment on certain
axes and to create conditions for an offensive on other, more important
axes.
In connection with advances in military hardware, the content of the
term “ defense” also encompasses a number of new elements. Employment
of nuclear weapons in the defensive operation and engagement increases
the stability of defense and enables the defending force to mount heavy
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strikes against the opposing enemy force even before the attack begins .
There is now greater potential for stopping an offensive in its tracks or
substantially weakening the attack and destroying the attacking force in
the course of defensive operations.
Military operations, as other phenomena, are of a conflictive nature.
As long as war exists, two basic types of operation will be characteristic
of warfare offense and defense. The art of waging war demands a
harmonious combination of these elements. “ No war has ever begun or
ended with a single victorious offensive; if such has occurred at any
time in the history of the world , it has been an exception .” 26
Offense and defense are interlinked. Offense always contains elements
of defense, just as defense is impossible without offensive actions. The
conduct of an offensive operation proper cannot but contain elements of
defense ( air defense, antitank defense, defense against mass destruction
weapons, etc ). Defense, in turn, contains elements of offense (counter
attacks, counterthrusts ). “ . . . A good defense,” wrote Engels, “ should
always be conducted offensively .” 26
Today the relationship between offense and defense has become deeper
and more complex. Defense contains counterblows to an increasing degree
and is frequently conducted with utilization of the samemeans employed
by attacking forces. Major changes are taking place in the very character
of the interrelation , in a convergence between troop offensive and de
fensive capabilities. The shift from one type of combat operation to
another is becoming substantially faster and more resolute than was the
case in any pastwar.
Lenin attached enormous importance to gaining and holding the stra
tegic initiative. He considered the possession of strategic initiative and
suppression of enemy freedom of action to be one of the most important
conditions for success in combat. Lenin demonstrated that the initiative
character of armed combat by the proletariat is objectively conditioned by
the fact that it is a class which is conducting a historic offensive against
the old system .
According to Lenin the strategic initiative is inseparably linked with
securing maximum aggressiveness , with hegemony in warfare. “ From the
proletarian viewpoint hegemony in war belongs to he,” he wrote, “who
fights more energetically than all others, who makes use of every oppor
tunity to attack the enemy. . ." 27 Lenin 's orders to the troops were
always permeated with an appeal to initiative. For example , at the time
of the rout of Yudenich our party 's leader demanded : “Make every effort !
At all costs pursue the retreating troops. Hit them ! Give them not an
hour, not a minute of respite.” 28 He pointed out time and again that if
we gave our solemn promise, while faced with the hostile forces of im
perialism arrayed against us, never again to resort to active military op
erations " which might be offensive from the standpoint of military
strategy, we would be not only stupid , but criminals as well.” 29
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 The idea of vigorous offensive actions acquires exceptional significance
under present-day conditions.
The seizure and holding of strategic initiative in war are inconceivable
without a high degree of organizational and mobilizational readiness.
In his writings and military directives Lenin pointed time and again
to the necessity of adhering strictly to the principle of stepping up the
force of blows dealt the enemy in offensive and defensive operations.
" The victory at Orel and Voronezh . . . demonstrated ,” he stated, “ that
a turning point has occurred both here and at Petrograd. But we need
our offensive to be transformed from a small-scale and partial offensive
into a mass, massive offensive , leading to final victory.” 30 Lenin cited
Marx's statement that “ it is necessary to win the first success and to
proceed from success to success, without ceasing advances on the enemy,
exploiting his confusion, etc . . ." 31 In his telegrams Lenin demanded :
" Try to hold the units together and at all costs continue the initiated
offensive in a more vigorous manner " 32; " . . . We cannot let up on the
offensive in the Urals; it must be intensified, accelerated , reinforced .
Report by cable what measures you are taking." 33
In the modern offensive operation troops will even more frequently
encounter the tendency toward slackening of the force of attack and the
necessity of increasing it, retaining the advantage of momentum . In every
war military science has approached this problem differently . In World
War I no solution was found , and a stalemate developed. The offensive
operations of the Great Patriotic War demonstrated that the solution
lies in deepecheloning troops and in sequential commitment of support
echelons, mobile major units and reserves.
Under the conditions of a nuclear war a buildup of forces can be
effected primarily by means of massed nuclear strikes on the most im
portant enemy objectives and on advancing reserves which could de
cisively influence the course and outcome of the operation, by reinforcing
troops, by committing reserves and support echelons on the selected axis.
In the conduct of combat operationswithout nuclear weapons by elements
and units along separate axes, it will be effected by committing to battle
support echelons and reserves.
The necessity of building up efforts is an objective requirement not
only for offensive but for defensive operations as well. Solution to this
problem in defense is complicated by a shortage of troops on the part of
the defending force and numerical superiority on the part of the advancing
troops. The principal device to employ here is again the timely nuclear
strike against advancing enemy troops, maneuver of forces from sectors
not under attack , and commitment of support echelons and reserves.
The importance of the principle of the optimal and of effectiveness in
troop operations is revealed in Lenin 's writings, particularly his war cor
respondence . This principle constitutes integration of the above-examined
and other demands of military science.
To achieve maximum effectiveness with maximum economy of men

108
and materiel, to hit the enemy as quickly and advantageously as possible,
constitute an essential condition for success in an engagement, operation,
and war as a whole . During the years of foreign military intervention and
civil war, Lenin carefully took into account optimal variants of utilization
of men and equipment on secondary and principal axes, assigning all
requisite capability to achieve victory on those fronts which were of
primary significance.34
Lenin 's precepts on economy ofmen and equipment on secondary axes
are just as applicable today, although the development of nuclear weapons
does introduce new elements, creating the capability for rapid concentra
tion of troop efforts without displacing them to the main axes.
Lenin considered coordinated troop action to be an important principle
of the art of war. He attached great importance to the organization of
coordinated action between fronts, branches and arms. This is attested
by the numerous documents in his military correspondence. Assigning an
important role to the Red Navy and inland waterways flotillas, and
emphasizing the need of coordination between the navy and ground
troops, he wrote the following on 12 November 1918 to the Council of
People's Commissars representative in Astrakhan ': “ . . . Apply yourselves
to the military effort and conquest of the Caspian , and giving assistance
at the same time to the Army of the Northern Caucasus." 36 A note
addressed to the deputy chairman of the Republic Revolutionary Military
Council dated 15 March 1920 discusses the need for coordinated action
by ground and naval forces in operations to liberate the Crimea from
Wrangel'.36
Victory in the modern operation or engagement is impossible without
well-organized troop coordination, coordination of their combat efforts in
regard to objective, place and time. The front and army encompasses the
various branches and arms, and the various combat hardware, each of
which can perform a particular mission. In an operation they perform
not merely as missiles, artillery, infantry , and tanks, but as aggregate
systems. In this way they acquire new qualities. Coordination should en
sure the unification and agreement of all system in achieving victory
over the enemy with minimum losses in men and equipment.
The nature of modern operations creates major difficulties for coordi
nating combat operations within a given branch or arm . In a future war
combat operations may be conducted along separate axes, for this offers
a better opportunity to maneuver, to achieve more effective protection of
troops against nuclear weapons, etc . But the problem of securing exposed
ilanks does arise thereby.
An essential condition for successful organization of coordinated action
is thorough knowledge on the part of the military commander of the
properties of nuclear and conventional weapons, the capabilities of the
branches and arms, the commander's ability to emphasize, depending on
the situation , on major unit or higher formation a given combination of
efforts by his subordinate troops.
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 Coordination between forces takes place under conditions of active
enemy countereffort. Each side endeavors to ensure that the actions of its
troops incorporate smoothness, good planning, unity, solidity , stability of
operational structure and combat formations. At the same time the two
belligerents endeavor to disrupt the operational structure and combat
formations of the enemy as well as his troop control. We know from
history that disruption of a hostile combat formation even at one echelon
frequently leads to success. Modern Warfare is no exception in this
respect.
Such are the fundamental Leninist precepts on certain problems of
Soviet military science in light of the demands of modern warfare.
Lenin 's philosophical heritage in the area of military science is an
inexhaustible source of innovative development of our strategy, opera
tional art, and tactics. Relying on Marxist-Leninist methodology, army
and navy cadres have achieved brilliant combat success in the stern tests
of the Civil War and Great Patriotic War, and are now productively
carrying out the tasks of indoctrination and training of personnel, compre
hensive personnel preparation for defense of the homeland , taking into
account the demands of modern warfare.

3. Critique of the Methodological Foundations of Bourgeois Military Theory

An important contribution by Lenin to the forming of the military
science of socialism in his unmasking of the aggressive, reactionary sub
stance of the military ideology of imperialism , a critique of bourgeois
military theory and its methodology .
Lenin noted that “ the commanding bourgeoisie , out of fear of a growing
and strengthening proletariat, preserves the backward, the obsolescent,
the medieval.” 37 This thesis also directly applies to the philosophic and
methodological foundations of bourgeois military theory . The military
theory of imperialism is based as a whole on extremely reactionary , anti
scientific philosophic concepts, while metaphysics has been and remains
its predominant method.
Military theorists in the West deny the link between their investiga
tions and bourgeois philosophy. They do not want to admit that they
rely on scholasticism , idealism or an eclectic mixture of different anti
scientific philosophic doctrines. Perhaps that which Engels wrote about
bourgeois scientists applies to an even greater degree to bourgeois military
theorists: " They imagine that they have become free of philosophy when
they ignore or inveigh against it. But since they cannot move a single
step without thinking, and logical categories are essential for thinking . . .
in the final analysis they are captive to philosophy, but unfortunately in
the majority of cases it is the very worst philosophy. . ." 88
Realities indicate that bourgeois philosophy and sociology constitute
the theoretical and methodological foundation of imperialist military
theory on the substance and causes of the origin of wars, on the nature of
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wars of the present era, on their role and place in society , on the factors
which determine the course and outcome of war. It is true that idealism
is frequently interwoven here with vulgar materialism expressed in neo
Malthusian , social-Darwinian , geopolitical and other theories, but it is
just as antiscientific as is idealism .
In the book Materialism and Empiriocriticism , in Philosophical Note
books and a number of other writings, Lenin thoroughly exposed the
social stipulatedness of the antiscientific methodology of bourgeois scien
tists. Philosophic idealism ( just as metaphysics, ecclecticism , sophistry )
possesses gnoseologic roots, but it “ is consolidated by the class interest
of the ruling classes. . .” 39 For this reason “ when the subject is philosophy
we cannot believe a single word of these professors, who are capable of
producing the most valuable efforts in special areas of chemistry, history ,
and physics. Why is this ? It is for the same reason why when the subject
is general theory of political economy we cannot believe a single word
spoken by a professor of political economy, who is capable of producing
the most valuable efforts in the area of specific, special research, for
political economy is just as partisan a science in today's society as is
gnoseology . In general and on the whole economics professors are nothing
more than learned salesmen of the capitalist class, while philosophy
professors are the learned salesmen of theologians.” 40
Contemporary bourgeois military ideologists are the henchmen of the
monopoly bourgeoisie and are frequently direct representatives of the
military- industrial complex. Herman Kahn, a top American military
theorist and director of the Hudson Institute , frankly acknowledges in the
preface of his book On Escalation that elaboration of the notorious
" theory of escalation ” was subsidized by the Martin Company, a big
military - industrial monopoly which seeks a continuing escalation of the
arms race.
Contemporary bourgeois military ideologists elaborate theories of war
and military science from the standpoint of anti-Communism , substan
tiations of and justifications for aggressive wars against the USSR and
the world system of socialism , against socialist and national liberation
revolutions. The class interest of the monopolist bourgeoisie today not
only is consolidating the antiscientific methodology of bourgeois military
theory but is predetermining it.
Deliberate deception and falsification of facts in the interests of the
exploiter classes are thus a principal component part of the methodology
of bourgeois military history and theory of military science. Lenin em
phasized this fact time and again . In his " Socialism and War" ( 1915 ) he
wrote : “ In one respect the Russian government has kept up with its
European brothers : just as they, it has succeeded in deceiving 'it's people
on a grandiose scale . A vast, monstrous edifice of lies and deception has
been put into motion in Russia as well, in order to infect the masses with
chauvinism , in order to produce the impression that the Tsarist govern
ment is waging a 'just war. . .” 41
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 At the same time Lenin emphasized the contradictory nature of bour
geois military theory and also saw its correct reflection of certain aspects
of military affairs, particularly in the area of military technology and in
methods of conducting military operations. With the aim of creating Soviet
military science and forming cadres of military leaders and theorists of a
socialist army, he advocated learning military science from bourgeois
military specialists,42 explaining that without utilization of "bourgeois
science and the technology of militarism ” 43 the proletariat would be
unable to master modern military hardware and modern techniques of
warfare.
The monopoly bourgeoisie endeavors to gain victory in those wars it
undertakes. Therefore subjectively it is interested in correct, scientific
cognition of the laws governing warfare , an elaboration of scientifically
substantiated methods of preparing for and conducting war. To a certain
degree bourgeois military theory is capable of performing this task , par
ticularly as regards knowledge of war from a technical military standpoint.
When a bourgeois military theorist analyzes the relationship of military
technical and military -economic resources and capabilities of opposing
sides, he can, from the positions of elemental materialism , more or less
correctly take into account the role and significance of industrial potential,
weapons, combat equipment, the relationship between change in forms
and methods of conducting combat operations on the end hand and
changes in weapons, combat equipment, means of transportation , troop
control, etc., on the other. These elementally-materialistic concepts are
formed in him primarily as empirical knowledge, as a reflection of
multiple-repeating experience.
However , as Lenin stated in Materialism and Empiriocriticism , ele
mentalmaterialism is not a scientific methodology, since in addition to a
correct reflection of reality it may contain elements of metaphysics and
open up a loophole for vulgar materialism or idealism . Many scientists at
the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th century , taking the position
of elemental materialism , were unable to offer a scientific explanation of
totally new phenomena and discoveries which did not fit within the
framework of past concepts of the world , and they consequently slipped
into the quagmire of subjective idealism .
Something similar to this is happenening rightnow with bourgeois mili
tary theorists. As long as war was waged between bourgeois states and
armies of the same type, they were to a certain degree capable of correctly
understanding and predicting the course and outcome of war, of syn
thesizing new forms and methods of conducting military operations. A
crisis of bourgeois military theory became evident when it became neces
sary to analyze a totally new phenomenon — the laws governing wars
between imperialist and socialist states and armies, as well as revolu
tionary wars by toiler masses for their liberation from national and social
oppression.
Lenin revealed and substantiated the fundamental cause of the crisis
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of bourgeois military theory. ". . . It is impossible to think lucidly when
you are standing on the brink of oblivion ,” 44 he emphasized, having in
mind the politics and ideology of imperialism in the present era.
The root weakness of bourgeois military theory consists, in the first
place, in the fact that the military theorists of imperialism metaphysically
approach an appraisal of the military might of the socialist state and are
unable to comprehend its new sources, which constitute advantages of the
socialist social system over the capitalist — the social and ideological
political unity of the people , mass creativity , initiative and heroism in
struggle for defense of socialist conquests.
The metaphysical concept of bourgeois military theory in the process
of cognition finds expression either in absolutization of various relative
truths or in absolutization of relativism , that is, in denial or negation of
objective truth.45 These features are manifested particularly vividly and
coexist as two aspects of a false methodology with the forming of two
opposing social systems and armies.
During the Civil War and years of foreign military intervention , Lenin ,
discussing our victories, pointed out that “ both Wrangel and France fail to
understand what is happenening here. They are unable to digest the
miracle that war-destroyed Soviet Russia is defeating civilized nations
which are more powerful than it. They are unable to comprehend that
the entire strength of these victories is the fundamental doctrine of Com
munists, which states that ownership disunites, while labor unites.” 46
The political and military leaders as well as military theorists of Nazi
Germany, England, France, the United States and other imperialist na
tions during World War II were also unable to comprehend the military
economic , moral-political and specifically military factors of the socialist
state .
The failure of all plans to achieve military victory over the Soviet
Union by international imperialism in these two wars , change in the
balance of power in favor of the Soviet Union and the world socialist
system following World War II, and failure of the strategy of “mass
nuclear retaliation " and subsequently the strategy of " flexible response"
led to dissemination of elements of agnosticism in bourgeois military
theory . Lenin persuasively demonstrated that the crisis of a given theory
or philosophic system is inseparably linked with negation of the objective
laws governing nature and societal affairs, and consequently war as well.
“ Desperation about the possibility of scientifically comprehending the
present, rejection of science, the attempt to sneer at all generalizations
and syntheses, to hide from all 'laws' of historical development, to hide
the forest with trees — this is the class significance of that popular bour
geois skepticism , that dead and dying scholasticism . . ." 47 which are
typical of bourgeois sociology in the era of imperialism and which find
expression in bourgeois military theory.
When the military theorists of imperialism prove unable to understand
and acknowledge the logical nature of the victories of the Soviet people
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over the imperialist aggressors, they begin to speak of " miracles ,"
" sorcery" or the fundamental impossibility of cognizing the course and
outcome of war. It is not surprising that Col Gen Guderian , former chief
of Hitler's General Staff, stated that was a rule it is impossible to predict
in advance the outcome of any combat operations, and particularly in
Russia ." 48
In the second place, the fact that the political and military leaders
of imperialism count on “ supernatural intuition” and the special role of
the individual in history and war is a sign of crisis in bourgeois military
theory . This explains the adventurism and the fact of counting on propi
tious chance circumstances. U . S. General Omar Bradley writes that
" normally the course of history is determined by outstanding individuals
who through their stubborness, stamina and courage change events in
the desired direction. . ." 49 But the idealist reliance on the “ decisive role
of the individual” was particularly vividly manifested in the conception
which initially ascribed to Hitler the capability of assuring German
imperialism world domination and later began to give errors by the
Führer as the sole reason for the aggressor's defeat in the war against the
Soviet Union .
In “ Who Are the People 's Friends' and How Are They Fighting the
Social Democrats ?” Lenin leveled devastating criticism at subjective
sociology and demonstrated its total lack of substance. The fact that
bourgeois military theorists continue to cling to it merely confirms that
they are unable or unwilling to face up to the realities of history , to
genuinely scientific sociology.
At the dawn of imperialism Lenin revealed one of the most important
laws governing modern warfare. It consists in the fact that wars are now
waged by the people . But these wars possess the property of exposure of
the root opposition between the interests of the worker class, the masses
as a whole on the one hand, and the interests of the imperialist bour
geoisie and its governments on the other. At the same time Vladimir
Il’ich pointed to a new law and conflict which consist in the fact that
without a conscientious soldier and sailor with initiative, success in the
war of today is impossible ,50 while the imperialists, due to their class
essence, fear above all else an increase in the sociopolitical awareness of
the toilers.
History has compelled the politicians and military leaders of the im
perialist countries to acknowledge the objective reality of the decisive role
of the masses in the war of today. But fear of a popular army open to
peasants and workers has compelled them more and more frequently
" secretly to shift to various techniques and devices of selective assembly
ofmilitary units specially put together of bourgeois elements and specially
equipped with highly-sophisticated hardware.” 51
Bourgeois military science has to an increasing degree begun seeking
a way out of this conflict in antiscientific theories based on an idealistic
and metaphysical foundation .
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 Following defeat by the Soviet people of the domestic counterrevolu
tionaries and imperialist aggressors, as well as following revolutionary
battles in many countries in the period 1918- 1923, Col Gen Von Sekt
formulated the main direction of development of imperialist military
theory : “ The aim of modern military strategy will be to seek solution
with the aid of mobile , high -quality forces capable of conducting a mili
tary operation without themasses orbefore themasses go into motion.” 52
In the period between the two world wars Guderian, Fuller and other
Western military leaders elaborated theories of attainment of victory in
war against a socialist state with professional tank or air armies divorced
from the people, by means of mass utilization of chemical agents , etc .
World War II thoroughly demonstrated their bankruptcy and put to rest
views on the possibility of waging wars with small mercenary armies.
History has fully confirmed the dialectical materialist solution to the
question by Lenin and Society military science on the necessity of mass
armies , comprehensive development and interaction among all branches
and arms in order to gain victory in today's war.
Following World War II the fundamentally false idea of opposition of
the deciding role of weapons in war to the deciding role of the masses was
again revived . This time the atomic bomb was raised to the status of " the
absolute weapon.” This new metaphysical conception was toppled by
practical societal realities, after the Soviet people not only built its own
nuclear weapon in short order but subsequently ensured its superiority
over the imperialist states in missile and nuclear power. Bourgeois military
theorists were compelled to acknowledge the failure not only of the
military -political strategy of "mass nuclear retaliation” but also of the
methodological foundations upon which it was based .
The class narrowness and antiscientific , theoretical and methodological
foundations of bourgeois political and military theory constitute a nutrient
medium for extreme manifestations of subjectivism and adventurism .
“ There is no doubt whatsoever,” stated Lenin , “ that themen at the head
of the Entente are extraordinarily intelligent individuals, excellent politi
cians, and yet these people are committing one stupid act after another.” 53
During the first years of existence of the Soviet socialist state, the im
perialists were counting on the enormous economic and military super
iority of capitalism over socialism . Today every potential aggressor knows
full well that in the case of an attempted nuclear-missile attack on our
country he will receive a devastating return blow . “ However," states the
Central Committee Report to the 24th CPSU Congress, “ although the
forces of aggression and militarism have been pushed into a corner , they
have not been disarmed. Since World War II they have started more
than 30 wars and military conflicts of various scale . Nor can the threat
of another world war be considered totally eliminated.” 54 This is why
matters of military organizational development and comprehensive im
provement in our homeland's defensive capability constantly occupy the
attention focus of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union .
115
 Lenin demonstrated with the example of the Civil War in the USSR
that “ it is precisely those countries which considered themselves and now
consider themselves the most democratic, civilized and cultured that are
waging war against Russia with the most brutal means, without the
slightest thread of legality.” 55 In war against the socialist state, against
the masses which have risen up in struggle for victory of the socialist
revolution , the imperialist political leaders and military theorists then
considered and now consider it essential to employ weapons of mass
destruction, to wage war with terror methods, methods of physical an
nihilation of the entire population.
The Nazi regime and the army of Hitler's Germany drew up and
attempted to carry out a program of physical destruction of the bulk of
the Soviet population. More than 70 percent of the Soviet fighting men
taken prisoner during the first 6 months of the war were brutally tortured
and murdered in Nazi prison camps.56 The part being played by the
American Army in the disgraceful war against the peace-loving peoples
of Indochina is marked by monstrous crimes.
Subjecting the philosophic vagaries and distortions of bourgeois scien
tists to withering criticism , Lenin called for a critical reworking of the
national element contained in their theoretical investigations. The founder
of the Soviet Armed Forces himself comprehensively considered and
demanded that military cadres consider within military science the laws
and principles common to capitalist and socialist armies, even if certain
patterns and principles had also been investigated and formulated by
bourgeois military theorists. But a mandatory requirement is a critical
attitude toward these theses and principles from the standpoint of dialec
tical materialist methodology.
A critical study of bourgeois military theory by military cadres of the
socialist state is dictated by the objective necessity of knowing the enemy,
his actual strength and capabilities, his plans to utilize his forces in war.
As for an analysis of modern warfare as a sociopolitical phenomenon ,
bourgeois military theorists, due to their class limitedness and the bank
ruptcy of the methodological foundations of their thinking, show a total
inability to comprehend and explain its objective laws. They are compre
hensively and correctly revealed only by the military theory of the socialist
state, based on dialectical materialist methodology
Soviet military science, the foundations of which were laid by V . I.
Lenin , is immeasurably superior to bourgeois military theory . A mastery
of this science and the Leninist philosophical legacy armsmilitary cadres
of the socialist state with a scientific methodology for successfully solving
all problems of contemporary military affairs and for critique of bourgeois
military theory and its methodological foundations.

Footnotes
1. V . I. Lenin : Poln . Sobr. Soch. (Complete Works), Volume 29, page 183.

116
 2. K . Marx and F . Engel's: Soch . (Works), Volume 20, page 175.
3. F . Engel's: Izbrannyye:voyennyye proizvedeniya (Selected Military Writings),
Moscow , Voyenizdat, 1956 , page 651.
4. Lenin , op .cit., Volume 39, page 58.
5 . Ibid ., Volume 38 , page 139.
5 . Ibid ., Volume 49, page 369.
3. Ibid ., Volume 9, page 156 .
8 . Ibid., Volume 40, page 76 .
9 . Krasnaya Zvezda, 17 February 1927.
10. Kommunist, No 4, 1971, page 46 .
11. KPSS o Vooruzhennykh Silakh Sovetskogo Soyuza (The CPSU on the Armed
Forces of the Soviet Union ), page 35.
12. Lenin , op.cit., Volume 29, page 169.
13. Ibid ., Volume 36 , page 292.
14. Ibid ., Volume 35, page 395.
15 . Kommunist, No 3, 1970, page 55.
16 . Lenin , op.cit., Volume 34 , pp 383– 384.
17. Ibid ., Volume 39, page 343.
18 . See S. I. Aralov: “ Lenin and Organization of the Red Army," in : Vospomina
niya o Vladimire Iliche Lenine (Reminiscences of Vladimir Il'ich Lenin ) ,
Part 2, Moscow , Gospolitizdat, 1957, pp 267 –268; Aralov : Lenin vel nas k
pobede (Lenin Led Us to Victory ), Moscow , Gospolitizdat, 1962, pp 40 -41.
19 . Lenin , op.cit., Volume 14 , page 1.
20. Ibid ., Volume 36 , page 178.
21. Ibid ., Volume 41, page 89.
22. M . V . Frunze: Izbrannyye proizvedeniya (Selected Writings) , Moscow , Voyen
izdat, 1965, page 92.
23. V . I. Lenin : Voyennaya perepiska 1917– 1922 88 (Military Correspondence,
1917 – 1922) , Moscow , Voyenizdat, 1966 , page 184.
24 . Friedrich Engels stated : “ . . . An offensive constitutes a movement forward ,
and its culmination point is the clash of steel against steel” (Marx and
Engel's, op.cit., Volume 14, page 217) .
25. Lenin , op.cit., Volume 44, page 209.
26 . Marx and Engel's, op.cit., Volume 15, page 260.
27 . Lenin , op.cit., Volume 9, page 186 .
28 . Ibid., Volume 39 , pp 283– 284.
29. Ibid ., Volume 42, page 173.
30. Ibid ., Volume 39, page 245.
31 . Ibid., Volume 34 , page 242.
32. Ibid., Volume 51, page 205.
33. Ibid ., Volume 50, page 355.
34. Ibid ., Volume 51, pp 51, 53.
35. Ibid., Volume 50, page 205.
36 . Ibid ., Volume 51, page 162.
37. Ibid ., Volume 23, page 166.
38 . Marx and Engel's, op.cit., Volume 20, pp 524-525.
39 . Lenin , op.cit., Volume 29, page 322.
117
40. Ibid., Volume 18, pp 363– 364.
41. Ibid ., Volume 26, page 329.
42. Ibid., Volume 40, pp 182, 183.
43. Ibid ., Volume 38, page 139.
44. Ibid., Volume 44, page 303.
45. Ibid., Volume 18 , page 139.
46. Ibid ., Volume 41, page 352.
47. Ibid ., Volume 25, page 44 .
48. Itogi vtoroy mirovoy voyny. Sbornik statey (Results of World War II.
Collection of Articles), translated from German , Moscow , Publishing House
of Foreign Literature, 1957, page 133.
49 . O . Bredli: Zapiski soldata (Notes of a Soldier), translated from English ,
Moscow , Publishing House of Foreign Literature, 1957, page 229.
50 . Lenin , op.cit., Volume 9, pp 154– 156 .
51. Ibid., Volume 41, page 195 .
52. Von Sekt: Oborona strany (National Defense ), Moscow , Gospolitizdat, 1931,
page 43.
53. Lenin , op.cit., Volume 41, page 141.
54. Materialy XXIV s"yezda KPSS (Proceedings of the 24th CPSU Congress ),
page 29.
55. Lenin, op .cit., Volume 39, page 345.
56 . See Sovershenno sekretno! Tolko dlya komandovaniya! (Top Secret; for
Command Only !), Moscow , Izd-vo Nauka, 1967, pp 102- 103.

118
Chapter VII. SocialActivity of theMasses and the
Defense of Socialism

Organization of defense of the socialist homeland is one of the most

complex and at the same time vitally important tasks of the socialist
revolution , the building of socialism and communism . Its successful ac
complishmentdepends in large measure on how intelligently and promptly
the advantages of socialism as a social system of a new , higher type are
utilized for this purpose.
Lenin considered an upsurge in toiler activity, an unprecedented scope
in toiler initiative and creativity to be a vivid expression of the advantages
of socialism . In the constant development of the revolutionary creativity
of the masses he saw a special method of strengthening the economic
and military might of the socialist state .

1. V: I. Lenin on the Advantages of Socialism as a Source of Social Activeness of the

Masses
Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels posed the question of the advantages
of socialism and their utilization in organizing defense of the nation of
the victorious proletariat. Proceeding from a materialist interpretation of
history, they proved that the superiority of the new social system over the
old is a general law of societal development. The founders of Marxism
predicted that this law would be revealed with particular clarity during
the course of building socialism , as well as during the armed defense of
its conquests. They pointed out that socialist reforms will create a solid
foundation for ensuring a moral superiority over the armies of the ex
ploiter states, for a substantial increase in troop mobility , for achieving a
higher level of culture and intellectual ability on the part of military
personnel, and for ultimately elaborating a new military method and a
new system of waging war.
Relying on the practical experience of armed defense of the Soviet
state, Lenin comprehensively developed the theses of Marx and Engels.
He demonstrated that the entire aggregate of tasks connected with or
ganizing the nation's defense and with creating the economic, moral
political and military prerequisites essential for this is based on a totally

119
new foundation. This foundation consists of the socialist societal and
governmental system , socialist transformations of various aspects of
societal affairs, and the conformity of these transformations with the
root interests of the toiler masses.
Socialist reforms create the most favorable opportunities for imple
menting the demands of the objective laws of warfare. Since every war
is a two-way process, the laws which determine its course and outcome
apply to both belligerents. But the capabilities of implementing the de
mands of the laws of warfare are not the same for the socialist state and
for its adversaries. The advantages of socialism , the just, liberation nature
of the goals of a war in defense of the socialist homeland create the op
portunity for more successful implementation of the demands of the
objective laws of warfare. For example, Lenin views the relationship
between the course and outcome of war on the one hand and the correla
tion of moral resources on the other as a general law which operates in
all wars. At the same time he points out that the possibilities of imple
menting the demands of this law in a just war in defense of the socialist
homeland are incomparably greater than in an unjust war.
Lenin also convincingly revealed the influence of the advantages of
socialism in analyzing the law of the dependence of the course and out
come of a contemporary war on the organized efforts of entire peoples.
Noting that “ victory in war is won by he who has greater reserves, greater
sources of strength , and greater staying power in the masses,” Lenin
stresses: “We have more of all this than do the Whites, more than the
'world -omnipotent' Anglo - French imperialism , that colossus with feet of
clay. Wehave more of this for we can draw and shall continue to draw
increasingly deeply from the worker and toiling peasant masses, from
those classes which were oppressed by capitalism and which everywhere
comprise the overwhelming bulk of the population .” 2
From this Lenin drew an extremely important conclusion : that the
proper method of organizing a defense of the socialist state should cor
respond to the nature of socialism and should be aimed at maximum
utilization of the advantages of the socialist system in the interest of
victorious conduct of a war in defense of the conquests of socialism . The
essence of Lenin 's idea on the necessity of conducting a war in a revolu
tionary manner lies precisely in this.
In order to utilize the advantages of the new social system for the
purpose of national defense, they must first and foremost be noted and
assessed correctly from a theoretical standpoint. This is why Lenin
devoted special attention to prompt scientific elucidation of those new
capabilities for accomplishing military missions which are formed as a
result of a victorious socialist revolution. He warned time and again that
one should not use old measuring sticks to assess the potential of so
cialism , including its military capabilities. That which in the past was
truly impossible, infeasible in practice, today becomes quite possible and
achievable due to socialist organization of production and management,
120
thanks to an unprecedented upsurge in the energy and initiative of the
masses, thanks to the fact that the entire might of the state for the first
time begins to serve the cause of organization and enlightenment of the
toilers as well as development of their creative resources and activity .
At the same time Lenin insistently demanded a realistic approach to
assessment of the military advantages of socialism . For this they should
be considered not in an isolated manner but in comparison with the
concrete capabilities possessed by the potential adversary . Any advantage
is corelative by nature; that is, it presumes an obligatory comparison
between the forces and capabilities of the opposing sides. Acknowledge
ment of our advantages has nothing in common with arrogance, com
placency, and underrating of the enemy's forces. Lenin stressed that " the
most dangerous thing is underestimation of the enemy and complacency
inspired by the fact that we are stronger.” 3
The potential within the socialist system must not only be revealed
but, most importantly, must be practically implemented. This requires
purposeful organizational activity on the part of the Communist Party , its
ability to mobilize millions of toilers to action , to develop their initiative
and productive potential. A guarantee of victory over the enemy lies in
development of the creativity of the masses, in their mobilization for the
struggle for a just cause .
Discussing the sources of the victory by our people in the Civil War,
Lenin wrote: “ The cause of our victory : a direct appeal by our party and
the Soviet government to the toiler masses, pointing out each difficulty
and each task as they came up ; the ability to explain to the masses why
it is necessary to apply all resources to one and then to another aspect of
Soviet activity at a given moment; the ability to raise the energy, heroism ,
and enthusiasm of the masses , concentrating revolutionary-intense efforts
on the most important task at the moment.” 4
Revealing the importance of independent action and initiative on the
part of the masses for realizing the potential of socialism , our party 's
leader pointed out that the creativity of the masses can elucidate them
and can find the most expedient ways and forms of practical solution of
current problems. He extended this thesis to the area of military organiza
tional development as well. He stated, for example, that the most ex
pedient forms and methods of organizational development of the army of
the socialist state can be elaborated through the practical experience of
the masses .
Attaching decisive importance to the energy and creativity of the
toiler masses, their initiative in building socialism and in organizing
defense of the Soviet Republic , Lenin proceeded from a Marxist inter
pretation of the role of the masses in history . Since the masses constitute
a decisive force of societal development, enhancement of their energy and
activity constitutes a principal condition for accomplishing all tasks, in
cluding tasks of military organizational development.
Lenin 's emphasis on an all-out upsurge in toiler initiative also takes
121
into consideration the logical growth in the role of the masses in con- ·
temporary wars, that indisputable fact that “ wars are now waged by
people . . . ," 5 as well as the relationship between the depth and scope of
historical missions and the number of persons actively and consciously
participating in their accomplishment. Lenin demonstrated how this law
is manifested and utilized in defense of the socialist homeland.
Lenin devoted attention to elucidation of the specific features of activity
of the masses. He demonstrated that the number of persons participating
in war sharply increases in the defense of socialism ; the character of
their activity changes qualitatively, becoming fundamentally different
activity of a new , socialist type.
Toiler social activity is not only mass and revolutionary , but conscious
as well. The masses, defending their state , display a political conscious
ness which is unprecedented in history, a clear understanding of the aims
of the war. “ In order that each and every individual have sympathy with
the war,” 6 stated Lenin, " for party -member and party -unaffiliated work
ers and party -unaffiliated peasants to understand it . . . this has never
been accomplished under any political regime to one tenth the degree
accomplished under Soviet rule.” 7 This is based on a coinciding of the
just, liberation goals of defense of the socialist homeland and the root
class and national interests of the toilers.
Exploiter classes can draw peoples into unjust wars which are inimical
to the interests of the toilers only by deceiving the masses, by obscuring
their political consciousness. On the other hand, in just wars every effort
is made to develop the political awareness of the masses, and this serves
as one of the most important conditions for success in battle . Noting this
fact, Lenin wrote : “ An 18th century Prussian monarch made a very
intelligent statement: 'If our soldiers understood what we are fighting
for, we could not wage a single war'. . . We are now prepared to state,
comparing our situation with that of the monarch : we can wage war
because the masses know what they are fighting for and they want to
fight, in spite of unprecedented hardships. . . They know that they are
making desperate, incredibly heavy sacrifices in defense of their socialist
cause. . ." 8
Another feature of the new type of mass activeness is its organized
nature. Millions of toilers participating in building socialism and in the
armed defense of their homeland are acting in unison , with a solidarity, in
a planned manner, concentrating their efforts on accomplishing the most
important tasks. All this is unattainable under conditions of the domina
tion of private ownership and man's exploitation by man. The private
ownership system disunites people; the ruling, exploiter classes utilize all
economic and political means at their disposal to oppose unification of
the toilers, to hinder unity of the various classes and social groups which
comprise the masses.
Lenin explained this qualitatively new level of organization in the
activities of the Soviet people by the socialist nature of our societal
122
system , by the existence of political power in the hands of the worker
class — the most advanced class, whose interests coincide with the interests
of all toilers and are expressed in the organizational and indoctrinational
activities of its vanguard , the Communist Party.
Lenin considered one of the most important features of toiler social
activeness to be its creative and productive nature. The revolutionary
efforts of the masses are aimed at creating prior unknown forms of re
organizing society, at seeking and finding new ways to defend it, etc. The
very first years of existence of the Soviet state were a period of “ un
precedented achievements in the area of proletarian military, administra
tive, and general political accomplishment. . ." 9 Lenin demonstrated that
in the area of the military the creative accomplishments of the masses
found expression in elaboration of the most expedient forms of military
organization of the socialist state , in finding new ways to strengthen
military discipline and methods of training command cadres, in develop
ment of mass patriotic movements to aid the troops at the front, and in
an unprecedented scale of partisan effort behind enemy lines.
The military efforts of the masses are characterized by features which
had not and could not occur under conditions of an exploiter system .
For example, an important role in establishment of the Red Army was
played by local soviets and the work forces of the enterprises of Petrograd,
Moscow and other proletarian centers. The toilers took active part in
training military cadres for the new army. During the civil war years the
overwhelming majority of these cadres were Red commanders of worker
peasant origin . In 1920, for example,more than four fifths of all graduates
of military schools and training establishments were of worker and
peasant origin ,10 while old -regime military specialists comprised approxi
mately one third of total command personnel.11
Communist unpaid mass-work days, which were highly praised by
Lenin , constituted a new form of productive participation by the people
in strengthening the home front and stepping up assistance to the front.
Such an unprecedented expansion of the sphere of productive mass
activity and the comprehensive nature of their efforts are dictated by the
socialist nature of our system , by the transformation of toilers into the
genuine masters of production , bearers of government authority , by the
new social nature of our army.
A characteristic trait of mass activity is its unprecedented interna
tional scope. Activity of the toilers of the socialist state merges with
the revolutionary activity of the masses of other countries, who offer all
out support to the socialist nation. The exploiter states, which organize
predatory wars, inevitably encounter the resistance of peoples. On the
other hand socialist states receive the support of the toilers of the entire
world, including the toilers of those imperialist nations which are waging
war against them . This was the case , for example , in 1918 -1920, when
the toilers of England, France and other imperialist states warring against
the Soviet Republic initiated a mass movement under the slogan “Hands
123
Off Soviet Russia ! Approximately 300,000 internationalist ugnung mtu
from various countries fought in the ranks of the Red Army.
Analyzing the diversified forms of international assistance lent to the
Soviet state during the years of foreign military intervention and civil
war, Lenin stated : “ . . . We possess a worldwide base, which is infinitely
broader than in any revolutions of the past,” 12 for "we have an ally in
every country — the worker and toiler. . . " 18
The initiative and productive activity of the masses, guided by the
Communist Party and supported by socialist organization of production
and management, make it possible to mobilize to a maximum degree all
available resources for the needs of national defense, to secure an un
precedented growth rate in the might of the socialist state and combat
efficiency of its armed forces. Characterizing these important advantages
of socialism , Lenin stated that in the struggle against the interventionists
and the White Guardists we succeeded in achieving a most rigorous
centralization , a maximum concentration of all available resources for
the accomplishment of the tasks of war.14 At the same time we were able
to achieve for our forces a growth rate which is impossible for any ex
ploiter state.
Lenin foresaw that due to such an accelerated growth of our military
might,we would emerge stronger from each new attempt to attack initi
ated by the enemies of the Soviet state . These conclusions by Lenin were
fully corroborated by the historical experience of the Great Patriotic War
of 1941-1945. During its stern years our party skillfully utilized the
advantages of socialism and raised to a new and even higher level the
patriotic activity of the masses, their initiative and productive efforts in
accomplishing the tasks of the nation 's military defense.
On the home front the patriotic enthusiasm of the masses was vividly
manifested in an extensive scope of competition . More than 85 percent of
workers employed in industry took part in the All-Union Socialist Com
petition for Best Fulfillment of Orders from the Front. Approximately 1
million boys and girls were members of Komsomol-youth shockworker
brigades.15 Such forms of aid to the front as the “ 200," " 500,” and
“ 1000” movements, the members of which overfulfilled planned targets
many times over, also were a mass phenomenon . The creative efforts of
Soviet scientists, engineers and technicians, efficiency innovators and
inventors resulted in the manufacture of first-class tanks, airplanes, artil
lery systems and other types of armswhich were superior in quality to the
arms of Nazi Germany.
Our officers, general officers, and field marshals, men of toiler origin ,
displayed an excellent ability to control troops on the field of battle and
carried out brilliant operations, which became a model of the art of war
fare. The creative efforts of Soviet fighting men , who battled heroically
on numerous fronts, produced effective methods of engaging enemy tanks
and aircraft, the most expedient forms and methods of house-to-house
fighting in built-up areas, various techniques of crossing rivers, etc. The
124
initiative and intelligence of Soviet fighting men also introduced many
new elements into the organization of the offensive engagement. Mar
SU K . K . Rokossovskiy recalled in his memoirs : “ It was noted that the
enemy was utilizing our lengthy artillery preparation to bring up reserves
to the site of the anticipated attack , after which they would repel our
attack with fire and counterattacks. We received a great many suggestions
on how to outfox the enemy. This was how the method of sequential
capture of individual enemy objectives originated. Well- trained units
reinforced by artillery and tanks were assigned to this task. The assault
would be swift, without artillery preparation, both day and night, in order
to preserve the element of surprise.” 16
Such popular forms of military effort against the invaders as the
establishment of home guard detachments, commando battalions, and
mass participation by the civilian population in constructing fortifications
received extensive development. Just in the summer and fall of 1941, for
example, approximately 60 home guard divisions and 200 separate regi
ments were formed. More than 4 million persons nationwide expressed
the desire to enter a home guard unit. Approximately 700,000 men
joined volunteer cammando battalions and assistance groups. Approxi
mately 10 million toilers took part in building fortifications in the sum
mer and fall of 1941. 17
The partisan movement assumed an unparalleled , truly nationwide,
popular scope during the Great Patriotic War. By 1943 approximately
360, 000 armed partisans, possessing reserves in the form of assistance
groups, self-defense groups, and agents totaling as many as 500, 000 ,
were operating in enemy-occupied territory. Almost 1 million Soviet
patriots were involved actively against the occupation troops in the
Ukraine and Belorussia alone.18
The heroism of the toiler masses rose to a new level. This is graphically
attested by figures on decorations awarded to Soviet citizens for combat
and labor deeds in the Great Patriotic War. More than 7 million persons
were decorated for courage and bravery in combat. More than 11,000
fighting men were named Hero of the Soviet Union. Soviet Army regi
ments and divisions received for mass heroism a total of more than 10 ,900
unit citations.19 The deed of Pvt Aleksandr Matrosov, who blocked with
his body a gun port in an enemy earth -and- timber pillbox, was repeated
more than 200 times during the course of the war. Soviet pilots repeated
more than 70 times the feat of Nikolay Gastello, who flew his burning
aircraft into an enemy motorized column.
The advantages of the socialist system and the self-sacrifice of the
toilers on the home front made it possible to surpass the enemy in effec
tiveness of utilization of all available means and resources in the interests
of defense.
Today the nation 's capabilities have increased immeasurably. We are
speaking not only of quantitative but also of qualitative indices, of the
appearance of new , unprecedented sources, dictated by the establishment
125
 in the USSR of a highly-developed socialist society, by the successes of
socialist reforms in the fraternal socialist nations. The world ,socialist
system is growing steadily more powerful; there is occurring further
development of cooperation and mutual assistance among the fraternal
countries . Adoption of a comprehensive program of further deepening
and improvement of cooperation and the development of socialist eco
nomic integration of the CEMA member nations will make it possible
more fully to utilize the advantages of the socialist economic system in
the interest of strengthening the economic and defense might of the
brother nations.
The urgency of the matter of utilizing the advantages of socialism in
the interest of strengthening defense of the socialist nations is also dic
tated by a stepped -up threat of imperialist aggression.
The 24th CPSU Congress focused attention on the unprecedented
scale of militarization in the capitalist nations, and the United States in
NYIL
1100267

particular, on the aggressiveness of imperialism , the cutting edge of which

is aimed primarily at the USSR .
The urgency of this problem is also determined by a radical change in
the very conditions of defense against aggression in connection with the
present revolution in military affairs. The development of new weapons is
Matin

creating the necessity of corresponding changes in the forms and methods

of conducting this struggle , but it does not automatically change them .
Broad initiative on the part of armed forces personnel as well as the entire
civilian population is of great importance, alongside the productive activi
ties of statesmen , scientists, and military experts, in elaborating new
forms and methods and in solving other urgent problems.
Modern war immeasurably increases the importance of mass energy
!

and initiative in the prewar period . If principal nuclear forces are em

ployed, the major strategic objectives may be attained at the very be
V

ginning of a war, that is events may occur which will foreordain not only
INA

the course but the outcome of the war as well. This demands a new
approach to the problem of prewar preparedness of the armed forces
and a country's overall defense system . The level of this preparedness
should be high enough to ensure all prerequisites for accomplishing the
principalmissions of the war.
Securement of constant troop combat readiness, a readiness measured
not in months or weeks, but in hours,minutes and even seconds, attain
ment of the requisite level of prewar preparedness of the economy, estab
lishment of a reliable system of defending major centers and regions,
securement of the requisite moral-political and psychological training of
the army and the entire population — all these are tasks of unprecedented
scope and complexity . This is why their solution requires an upsurge to
a new and even higher level of organization , energy and activity on the
part of the masses.
Finally, military operations under conditions of the employment or
threat of employment of nuclear weapons are inconceivable without the
126
highest degree of self-sacrifice and initiative on the part of the masses.
Sharp, abrupt changes in the combat situation , unprecedented intensive
ness of military operations and an enormous increase in their spatial
scope will demand of armed forces personnel and the entire civilian
population particular tenacity, organization and at the same time an
innovative approach toward solving new problems.
In this connection, it is important to focus attention on the necessity
of overcoming fatalistic views which reject the very possibility of mass
productive effort under conditions of war with the employment of nuclear
weapons. In the opinion of bourgeois ideologues, a nuclear war, if such a
war arises , will deprive the masses of any possibility of influencing its
outcome and may have only one result — the physical annihilation of
mankind .
One of course should not underrate the danger connected with the
employment of nuclear weapons. Soberly considering this danger, the
CPSU and Soviet government are persistently working to prevent a
nuclear war. The problems of nuclear disarmament and prohibition of all
types of weapons of mass destruction constitutes an important component
part of the program for defense of the peace and strengthening of inter
national security elaborated by the 24th CPSU Congress.
But while weapons of mass destruction should not be underrated ,
neither should they be overrated , viewed as some kind of mystical force
detached from society . This approach forms the basis of the concept of
nuclear fatalism . This concept is based on three main premises: a ) recog
nition of the enormous destructive force of modern weapons; b ) the
idea of unlimited employment of modern weapons in a nuclear war; c )
acknowledgement of the overwhelming superiority of modern offensive
weapons over defensive weapons.
The first of these premises is self-evident. The others are open to
serious question . As has been stated , nuclear weapons, just as other
weapons, constitute a means of implementing policy. Of course this is
not a conventional means of policy, but nevertheless it is dependent on
politics. The very nature of this weapon presupposes particularly rigid
control by political means over its development and utilization . A serious
restraining influence is exercised on the policies of the imperialist states
by the masses, and particularly the peoples of the socialist nations, which
possess modern weapons, including the nuclearweapons in the possession
of the USSR .
Nor should one dogmatically absolutize the correlation between of
fensive and defensive weapons which prevailed at the initial stage of the
present military technological revolution. History attests to the fact that
there are no offensive weapons which cannot in time be countered with
effective defensive weapons. The correlation between offensive and de
fensive weapons changes and will continue to change along with develop
ment of the military. This is attested , for example, by extensive efforts
in the area of developing latest -generation air defense systems, improve

127
ment of civil defense , etc . An improvement in the effectiveness of means
of defense may substantially reduce the scale of casualties and destruction
connected with the employment of nuclear weapons.
Consequently , the existence of sophisticated hardware making possible
the annihilation of hundreds of millions of persons by no means signifies
the irrevocable doom of mankind if a nuclear war erupts. The concept of
nuclear fatalism is fundamentally faulty because it fails to take into
account the entire diversified aggregate of factors influencing the course
and outcome of war. These factors substantially complicate the activities
of the masses but do not at all exclude the possibility of their active in
fluence on the course of a war.
The concept of “ omnipotence of nuclear violence” is of a metaphysical,
one-sided character . It views the diversified factors affecting the course
and outcome of modern war separately from one another, failing to take
into consideration their vital links, development, and interaction, and
failing to pinpoint the principal, determining aspect of this interaction .
The concept of nuclear fatalism breaks with the Leninist concept of the
essence of war and metaphysically detaches armed struggle from politics .
This concept diminishes the role of themasses, viewing them as a passive
object of weapons of mass destruction. It is harmful in that it promotes
an attitude of defeatism and doom and hinders the development of mass
activeness under conditions where maximum concentration of the energy
and efforts ofmillions of individuals in the struggle for social progress is
required.

2. Means of Developing Activity Among the Masses in the Defense of Socialism

In his writings, Lenin consistently pursues the idea that the level of
development of energy and mass activity essential for building and de
fending socialism and communism cannot be achieved spontaneously .
The initiative and productive efforts of the people must be developed
under the guidance of the Communist Party. “ Indoctrinating the worker
party," wrote Vladimir Il’ich, “Marxism indoctrinates the vanguard of
the proletariat, which is capable of seizing power and leading the entire
people toward socialism , of guiding and organizing the new system , of
being teacher, mentor and leader of all toilers and the exploited in the
business of arranging their societal affairs without and against the bour
geoisie.” 20 Accomplishment of the historic missions of the dictatorship
of the proletariat requires a long and stubborn struggle against the forces
and traditions of the old society , a struggle which is both peaceful and
military. “ Without the party being strong as steel and conditioned in
struggle, without the party enjoying the confidence of all honest and
honorable elements within a given class , without the party being able to
follow and influence the mood of the masses,” stated Lenin , “ it is im
possible successfully to direct such a struggle.” 21
Both objective and subjective prerequisites are required in order to
128
enhance the activity of the masses. As has already been noted , the very
nature of socialism and the character of war in its defense create a firm
foundation for raising the productive resources of the people. Essential,
however , is purposeful organizational and indoctrinational activity by the
Communist Party. The importance and complexity of such an effort is
connected with a greatmany circumstances. First of all, the people consist
of various classes, strata and social groups. All possess their own specific
interests and differ substantially from one another in the level of political
conciousness , activity , and organization . In order for all strata of the
people genuinely to perceive the new class nature of the homeland , to
become convinced of the liberation character of a war in its defense , what
is essentialis skilled and far-sighted Communist Party policy and extensive
explanatory effort which takes into account the features of the various
strata of the population.
In the second place, the victory of the socialist revolution cannot
immediately and radically alter the consciousness of the masses, par
ticularly their habits and traditions. Millions and tens ofmillions of toilers,
who have grown up under conditions of an exploiter society and therefore
are naturally not free of the influence of its forces and traditions, proceed
to perform the tasks of building a socialist society and defending it against
aggression . Even workers, who constitute the progressive segment of the
toilers, preserve traces of old ways and habits, becoming free of them
" not immediately, not through some miracle, not at the bidding of a
wonder-working icon , not on the command of a slogan , resolution, or
decree, but rather as a result of a long and difficult mass struggle against
mass petit-bourgeois influences.” 22 All this seriously complicates the
development of revolutionary energy and initiative of the masses and
demands of the Communist Party long and painstaking indoctrinational
effort.
Thirdly , serious difficulties are encountered , deficiencies and some
times errors revealed, in the course of building and defending the socialist
society alongside major success and achievements. These phenomena are
variously reflected in the consciousness of various toiler strata and
variously affect their behavior. In some difficulties engender lack of
confidence and various vacillations. Lenin did not consider such facts
to be random . By their objective status the masses are always interested
in progress, in a vigorous struggle against the old . But the dialectics of
history are such that under certain conditions a certain segment of the
people , individual social groups may succumb to reactionary influences
and even support patently antipopular elements for a certain period of
time.
Constant Communist Party concern for the indoctrination and organi
zation of the masses is essential in order successfully to oppose the
vacillations of the other elements and to raise the level of activity and
develop the initiative of the masses.
Revealing the content of party guidance of the masses, Lenin focused
129
special attention on the necessity of a sober, rigorously scientific ap
proach to the masses proper. This means that the party must definitely
take into consideration the specific features of the interests of various
classes and social groups, the character of relationships between them ,
carefully taking into account the actual level of their consciousness ,
activity, organization , etc. For successful guidance of the masses and
development of their activity it is important “ to be able to determine
unerringly the attitude of the masses on any matter, at all times, to
determine their actual needs, aspirations, thoughts, to be able to de
termine, without the least false idealization , the degree of their conscious
ness and the power exercised by the influence of various prejudices and
carryovers from the past. . ." 23
A sober scientific appraisal of the true state of the masses is an
essential prerequisite for development of their activity and initiative. The
forms and methods employed in the socialist nations to develop these
qualities differ radically from the practices followed in the exploiter
nations.
It is well known that under the conditions of modern war imperialist
governments must also develop activity of the masses within certain
limits. Two opposing aims, however, are competing in the policies of the
ruling classes of these countries. On the one hand, they are interested in
elevating the energy and activity of the masses in order to achieve victory
over the enemy. On the other hand , they fear this activity and endeavor
to restrict it, to force it into certain bounds, to prevent any manifestations
which could create a threat to their hegemony. Extremely typical in this
respect, for example, was an effort by U .S . and British ruling circles to
weaken and undermine at all costs the antifascist resistance movement
which had developed in the German -occupied nations of Europe during
World War II .
The imperialists resort to methods of developing mass activity which
serve not to elevate but rather to obscure people's political consciousness,
to fan the flames of chauvinism , racial animosity , religious fanaticism ,
etc . They also seek to profit from the patriotic feelings of the masses,
from their democratic aspirations. For example, endeavoring to secure
mass support for their adventure in Indochina, American imperialists are
making every effort to instill feelings of nationalism and frantic anti
communism , and are making an all-out effort to encourage the profit
motive and greed among military personnel. They make intensive use of
democratic phraseology, hypocritical talk about defending " freedom ,”
“ democracy,” etc.
The socialist state employs totally different, scientific forms and
methods of developing the energy and productive efforts of the masses.
One fundamental method consists in maximum satisfaction of the root
interests of the toilers on the basis of socialist reforms in the economy
and other areas of societal affairs, and in raising material and cultural
living standards.

130
 Securement of the leadership role of the worker class in accomplishing
this task is an essential condition for developing the energy and productive
efforts of the masses both in building socialism and in defense of the
socialist homeland. Lenin stated that only leadership by the proletariat,
as a progressive and unified class , capable of leading the other toiler
strata , makes it possible to mobilize for defense of the socialist homeland
the overwhelming majority of the population. But certain conditions are
essential in order for the worker class to perform its role successfully .
First of all, a solid alliance with the toiling peasantry is necessary . Lenin
stated that precisely such an alliance gave us victory over the White
Guardists and interventionists.24 Secondly , the worker class must be well
organized, unified, and must carry out a correct political line. For this
it requires an entire system of organizations, and particularly the highest
form of organization — the Communist Party. Only under party guidance
is the proletariat “ capable of deploying its entire strength , which is
incalculably greater than its share of the population . . .” 25
Lenin considered an increase in the political awareness of the masses
to be a decisive condition for development of their energy and productive
efforts . “Power according to the bourgeois definition,” stated Lenin , “ is
when the masses march blindly to the slaughter, obedient to the behest of
imperialist governments. . . We have a different concept of power. As we
see it, the state is strong due to the consciousness of the masses. It is
strong when the masses are aware of everything, can form a judgment on
everything, and at all time proceed in an aware manner." 26
The socialist state expresses the root interests of the toilers and there
fore is able to draw upon millions of persons to carry out all their
functions, including military. But a condition for realization of this
capability is awareness by the masses of their interests and practical tasks.
This is why the strength of the socialist state is directly dependent on the
degree of development of political awareness of the masses.
Lenin stated that an organic combination of extensive ideological
work on a nationwide scale with organizational effort, with prompt and
active support of competition , communist unpaid mass work days and
other manifestations of productive efforts by the masses, and with im
provement in technique of guiding the masses is essential in this entire
effort.
Our party is unswervingly guided even today by Lenin 's theses and
conclusions on ways to develop initiative and productive effort on the
part of the masses. Employment and development of these theses and
conclusions by the Communist Party is expressed in an innovative solution
to a number of urgent problems connected with a further upsurge in the
energy and activity of the masses in building and defending communism .
In order successfully to guide themasses and to develop their activity ,
: it is essential rigorously to take into account changes in the object of
guidance proper, that is the Soviet people. The 24th CPSU Congress
provided a comprehensive analysis of changes in the social structure of
131
our society. The congress pointed out a further enhancement in the role
of the worker class, the most advanced and organized segment of the
Soviet people . Today workers constitute the most numerous class in our
society , comprising more than 55 percent of the work force. The share
of the intelligentsia , particularly the scientific -technical intelligentsia , is
growing rapidly . The 24th CPSU Congress drew attention to an increase
in the professional training and skills of workers and peasants, their
education and culture. In 1959, 386 out of every thousand workers
possessed higher and secondary education , while today the figure is more
than 550. By the end of 1970 more than half of the rural population
possessed higher and secondary education.27
The process of rapprochement of all classes and social groups in
Soviet society, the prosperity and drawing together of the socialist nations
has advanced further. “ A new historical community of people — the Soviet
people— has formed in the process of building socialism .” 28
Great changes have also taken place in the personnel of the Soviet
Armed Forces. The level of general education and technical training of
youth, its moral and physical conditioning have improved substantially . It
is precisely for this reason that it became possible to reduce the length
of active military service.
Certain differences between individual toiler strata and categories
become evident, with an overall rapid growth in level of education , con
sciousness and social activeness of the masses. The party takes this into
account, seeking to raise the activity of all toilers to the level of their
most advanced segment.
The 24th CPSU Congress noted the uniqueness of the age structure of
our country's population, which lies in the fact that more than half the
population is under the age of 30. Youth is playing an increasingly im
portant role in material production , scientific research and other areas
which are also of paramount importance for the nation 's defense. And
yet the present younger generation has not experienced that stern school
of combat and toughening which fell to the lot of the older generation .
This is why ideological conditioning of youth and its training to defend
the homeland are acquiring particular significance.
It is also important to take into account the situation of unrelenting
ideological warfare which is being waged against our country and against
the socialist world by imperialist propaganda, employing the most so
phisticated techniques and high-power equipment. In their ideological and
political sabotage the imperialists devote particular attention to youth . The
ideologues of imperialism openly declare their intention of ensuring that
in a future war we shall have “ no Matrosovs or Kosmodem 'yanskayas.”
Our party scientifically approaches determination of the ways and
means of developing mass social activity . All measures are based on the
Leninist idea of the inseparable relationship between the economic, socio
political, ideological and organizational prerequisites for elevating the
initiative and productive efforts of the masses.

132
 Mass activity in productive labor and in the defense of socialism
possesses its objective foundation, which is developing and improving
together with the development of the socialist society proper. At the
present time this important quality is based on the established and con
solidated socialist societal and governmental system , on a high level of
development of socialist production and culture , which makes it possible
more and more extensively to reveal the great potential and historical
advantages of socialism , more fully to satisfy the growing demands of the
toilers.
In order to ensure a further upsurge in mass activity in building
communism and defending this nation , it is necessary to develop as well
that base upon which this activity rests. The 24th CPSU Congress pointed
out ways to accomplish this task. The congress specified a program of a
substantial rise in material and cultural living standards on the basis of a
high growth rate of socialist production and improved production effi
ciency. The party elaborated concrete measures to improve socialist
societal relations in urban and rural areas, for the development of socialist
democracy and consolidation of sociopolitical unity within Soviet society .
It was emphasized at the congress that the course taken toward sub
stantial improvement in toiler living standards is a long-range effort, since
it corresponds to the higher goal of party economic policy, makes it
possible to realize the increased potential of our economy and at the
same time creates conditions promoting comprehensive development of
the capabilities and productive activity of Soviet citizens.
The anti-Leninist essence of the line of the " leftist” revisionists, who
claim that only poverty and indigence are capable of stimulating revolu
tionary activity among the masses, stands out particularly clearly in light
of the resolutions of the 24th CPSU Congress. These fabrications ignore
the multiplicity of stimuli promoting growth in activity of the masses as
well as its new sources under the conditions of socialism . The goal of such
propaganda is obvious: to slander the policies of the CPSU and other
Marxist-Leninist parties and to cast off responsibility for the penurious
state of the toilers in their country.
Activity of the casses in building and defending socialism depends
not only on the objective conditions, on the degree of satisfaction of their
growing needs and interests, but also on the level of perception of these
interests, on ideological preconditions. Such prerequisites are created by
diversified ideological-indoctrinational effort by the Communist Party,
which enables the toilers more deeply to perceive their needs and ways
of satisfying these needs, gaining a correct understanding of the entire
aggregate of their interests — permanent and temporary , root and current,
general and group, etc.
Seeking a further increase in toiler activity in defense of the conquests
of socialism , the Communist Party proceeds from the standpoint that
this activity depends in large measure on realization by themasses of the
threat presented by imperialist reaction to the socialist state.
133
 The forming of such awareness occurs today under specific conditions.
The peoples of our country have enjoyed the benefits of peace for more
than a quarter of a century now . Today's younger generation is acquainted
with the last war only from books and tales told by army and navy
veterans. The imperialists, who are preparing for a new armed attack on
the USSR and the other socialist nations, are presently resorting to
particularly painstaking camouflage of their aggressive schemes. One
must also take into account the provocation activities of present-day
rightist and “ leftist" revisionists, who are fanning the flames of nationalism
and are slandering our country, its system , its domestic and foreign policy,
and thus are playing into the hands of imperialism .
Under these conditions the Communist Party considers increased politi
cal awareness, development of class hatred toward the imperialist ag
gressors and development of the ability to assess all phenomena pertaining
to societal affairs from a class, Marxist-Leninist position to be a funda
mental element in ideological indoctrination of Soviet citizens and the
fighting men of our army and navy. “ The principal element in party
ideological effort,” states the Resolution of the 24th CPSU Congress on
the Central Committee Report, “ is dissemination of the ideas ofMarxism
Leninism and an unrelenting offensive struggle against bourgeois and
revisionist ideology.” 29
The interests of ideological-political indoctrination of the toilers de
mand that one overcome the erroneous idea that a rise in the general
educational level of our people, particularly youth , at the same time
signifies an increase in their political consciousness. This idea is both
oversimplified and erroneous. It fails to consider the specific features of
various elements of social consciousness and the complex , dialectical
nature of the link between them . Of course, a high educational and
cultural level creates more favorable preconditions for growth of political
awareness. But if these preconditions are not promptly utilized, if political
indoctrination is allowed to drift or is organized unintelligently, there may
occur a gap between one's level of knowledge and political consciousness.
In order to prevent such a gap from forming, it is essential intelligently
to effect political indoctrination, constantly improving its forms and
methods.
Organizing and conducting political indoctrination of the masses , the
Communist Party focuses special attention on comprehensive resolution
of the tasks of ideologically preparing the army and the entire people to
resist imperialist aggression. A number of measures are being taken which
are directed at intensifying military -patriotic indoctrination of Soviet
citizens, particularly the younger generation , at developing in the entire
population the requisite moral and psychological qualities which make it
possible to stand up under the stern trials of the war of today.
The Communist Party organically combines concern about the ideologi
cal prerequisites for development of activity by the masses in defense of
the socialist homeland with creation of corresponding organizational pre
134
requisites. The latter include, for example , introduction of a new system
of preparation of youth , including students, for service in the Armed
Forces, organization on a nationwide scale of a centralized civil defense
system , improvement of DOSAAF activities, strengthening of patronage
relations between the work forces of enterprises and organizations on the
one hand and military units on the other, etc .
Our party attaches special importance to socialist competition. A vivid
manifestation of this is the Central Committee CPSU decree entitled
"On Further Improvement of the Organization of Socialist Competition "
(1971) , which emphasizes that competition has been and still is a power
ful means of developing creative initiative in the masses. The decree
specifices concrete measures to improve supervision of competition and
enhancement of its role in accomplishing the tasks of building communism .
Competition has also been extensively developed in the Armed Forces.
Since the 24th CPSU Congress it has been run under the slogan “ Defend
reliably , vigilantly and steadfastly everything the people has created !”
New forms of increasing troop combat readiness such as campaigns to
increase the operating speed of combat vehicles, to reduce the time
required to make equipment combat ready, to hit targets on the first
attack , with the first round fired , in all weather, day or night have been
elaborated during the course of competition by the productive efforts of
Soviet fighting men . The higher level of education and technical training
of Soviet military personnel has been vividly manifested in such specific
forms of productive activity as the campaign to earn a higher performance
rating, to reduce the time required to master a military occupational
specialty , as well as interchangeability among weapon and vehicle crews;
for excellent subunits and units.
These are fundamental party measures to create the economic , political
and organizational prerequisites for a further upsurge in the energy and
productive efforts of the masses in defense of the socialist homeland.
These measures are inseparably interlinked. They form as an aggregate an
integral and well-balanced system , the elaboration of which constitutes
further creative development of Leninist principles of guidance of the
masses.

Footnotes
1. See K . Marx and F. Engel's : Soch. (Works), Volume 2, page 539; Volume 7,
pp 509 -513.
2. V . I. Lenin : Poln . Sobr. Soch. (Complete Works) , Volume 39, page 237.
3. Ibid ., Volume 41, page 144.
4 . Ibid ., Volume 39, page 305.
5. Ibid ., Volume 9, page 154.
6. Marx and Engel's, op.cit., Volume 2 , page 90 .
7. Lenin , op.cit., Volume 42, page 140.
8. Ibid ., Volume 38, page 50.
135
 9 . Ibid ., Volume 44, page 108.
10. See V . I. Lenin i Sovetskiye Vooruzhennyye Sily (V . I. Lenin and the Soviet
Armed Forces), page 245.
See V. Antonov-Ovseyenko : Stroiteľstvo Krasnoy Armii v revolyutsii (Organi
zational Development of the Red Army in the Revolution ), Moscow , 1923,
page 31.
12. Lenin , op.cit., Volume 40, page 243.
13. Ibid ., Volume 41, page 855.
14 . See Ibid., Volume 39, page 305; Volume 40, page 241.
15. See Velikaya Otechestvennaya voyna Sovetskogo Soyuza 1941-1945. Kratkaya
istoriya (Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union 1941- 1945. Concise His
tory) , Second Edition, Moscow , Voyenizdat, 1970, page 439.
16 . K . K . Rokossovskiy : Soldatskiy dolg (Soldier's Duty ), Moscow , Voyenizdat,
1968, page 163.
17. See Istoriya Kommunisticheskoy partii Sovetskogo Soyuza (History of the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union ) , Volume 5, Book 1,Moscow , Politizdat,
1970, pp 178, 180, 183.
18 . See P . P . Vershigora : Voyennoye tvorchestvo narodnykh mass (Military

68 ,page 468."niversary of the's pp 816-817.

Productive Activity of the Masses ) , Moscow , Voyenizdat, 1961, pp 816- 817.
19 . See 50 let Vooruzhennykh Sil SSSR (Fiftieth Anniversary of the Soviet Armed
Forces), Moscow , Voyenizdat, 1968, page 468.
20. Lenin , op.cit., Volume 33, page 26.
21. Ibid ., Volume 41, page 27.
22. Ibid ., page 101.
23. Ibid ., Volume44, page 348.
24. See Ibid., Volume 39 , pp 158– 159; Volume 45, page 58.
25. Ibid., Volume 41, page 187.
26 . Ibid., Volume 35, page 21.
27. See Materialy XXIV s”yezda KPSS (Proceedings of the 24th CPSU Congress ),
pp 73, 74.
28. Ibid ., page 203.
29. Ibid ., page 205.

136
Chapter VIII. V . I. Lenin on the Material
Prerequisites for theMilitary Power
of the Socialist State

An important place in Lenin 's military -philosophical heritage is oc

cupied by an analysis of the material sources of our country's defense
capability and the combat might of the Armed Forces, as well as ways of
utilizing them . Lenin 's theses and conclusions on this problem retain their
fundamental importance for a theoretical understanding of contemporary
tasks of increasing the nation's defense capability . They comprise one of
the scientific foundations of forming party military technical policy in
organizational development and strengthening of the Soviet Armed Forces .

1. Leninist Methodology of Investigating the Material Foundations of the Military

Power of the State
Examining the probiem of securing our nation's defense capability as
an objective necessity, Lenin emphasized that this requires constant
strengthening and improvement of its material foundation. The leader of
the revolution pointed to the importance of a dialectical approach in
revealing the mechanism of effect of material prerequisites for the nation's
military might and taught us to see here the most important relations and
to assess phenomena in development and in concrete forms.
Lenin viewed the material prerequisites of national defense capability
as a complex structure ,one of themost important elements of which is the
mode of production , and particularly the economic system . Therefore he
linked a substantial increase in the nation 's defense capability with a new
and higher mode of production . This was persuasively demonstrated in
particular by Vladimir Il’ich in his “ On the Revolutionary Phrase ,” in
revealing the material prerequisites for the “ miracles” of the French
Revolution of 1792-1793 in the area of the military .
The great dialectical materialist saw the entire complexity and diversity
of relationships of the new mode of production and the military might
of the state. He considered a higher degree of organization of production
and labor productivity, a planned character of economic upswing, a
higher economic growth rate, increased productive activity and energy
137
by the broad masses, and development of socialist competition to be a
most important manifestation of the advantages of the new economic
system . Herein are rooted the advantages of socialism over capitalism in
general and in strengthening defense capability in particular.
The economic system is the principal material prerequisite for the
military strength of the state and its success in the conduct of war. Lenin
noted that the decisive role of the economy in war is a well-known and
essentially undisputed fact." But he did not stop with this general state
ment; he proceeded further, further disclosing and concretizing this thesis.
He stressed the role and significance of the character of economic organi
zation , which substantially determine the degree of realization of the
economic potential of society for war needs. “ Economic organization is
of deciding significance," wrote Lenin , “ in modern war. . ." 2
The economic relations of socialism to a substantial degree enhance
the military - economic capabilities of the socialist state above those of the
capitalist state, which is based on private ownership . The advantages of
socialism , as Lenin emphasized, derive from the unity of the people's goals
to strengthen the nation 's defense capability , goals which express the
interests of all of society, all its groups. Socialism does away with social
antagonisms and eliminates the social barriers which are engendered by
the private -ownership system of societal relations, which hinder the
development of productive resources. The socialist economic system en
sures a higher concentration and specialization of production .
Due to its specific features the defense industry presupposes centralized ,
scientifically -substantiated planning. But under capitalism planning bears
a limited, one-sided and conflictive character of state regulation and
control, which frequently fails to produce the desired effect. For example ,
Nazi Germany, possessing three times as much steel and four times as
much coal as the USSR , produced slightly more than half as much combat
equipment during World War II as the USSR .
Today imperialism , creating the material basis for another world war,
is applying greater effort to overcome the obstacles engendered by private
ownership relations. “In order to pursue an aggressive policy in the inter
national arena and to strengthen class hegemony in their countries,” states
the Resolution of the 24th CPSU Congress on the Central Committee
Report, " the imperialists are utilizing growth of state monopoly forms of
capitalism , international economic integration , as well as scientific and
technological advances.” 3 But measures taken by imperialist governments
to diminish negative consequences of capitalist social relations in the
economic system are frequently unsuccessful. State monopoly control
exercised in forms and on a scale corresponding to the interests of
monopoly capital and directed at preserving its domination are unable
to restrain the spontaneous forces of the capitalist market. Even the most
highly developed capitalist nations are not free of serious economic crises.
The element of spontaneity which prevails in the economic area is not
abating; the competition struggle in the capitalist world is becoming more
138
intensified . This aggravates crisis phenomena to an even greater extent
and makes it more difficult to recover from economic crises.
Production anarchy, crises, and unemployment, which lead to enormous
losses of social labor, are under conditions of capitalism the result of the
spontaneous effect of economic laws. As was noted at the 24th CPSU
Congress, growing inflation and unemployment have become a constant
phenomenon in capitalist countries. Approximately 8 million persons are
unemployed in the highly -developed capitalist nations.4
Production under the conditions of capitalism , and military production
in particular, is also characterized by waste of national resources, by
enormous cost overruns for the development and production of military
hardware. In the United States alone losses from wasted research effort
in the missile industry have totaled approximately 7 billion dollars over
the last 10 years. Total U .S . Defense Department wastage during this
same decade was 28 -33 billion dollars , that is 15 - 20 percent of spending
on research and arms procurement. These losses are due to the fact that
both the order and its size are determined , as is acknowledged by U . S .
political commentator Daniel Lange, not so much by actual military
consumption as by available war industry production capacity which
must be utilized.
Socialism , which is free of such defects, possesses undisputed ad
vantages over capitalism in potential for maximum effective and efficient
utilization of the defense industry . Realization of these advantages, how
ever, does not occur automatically. An important condition is scientific
control of development of military-economic potential, secured by the
activities of the Communist Party and government, and by the efforts of
the entire Soviet people. “ The advantages of socialism as a social system ,”
state the Central Committee CPSU Theses “ Fiftieth Anniversary of the
Great October Socialist Revolution,” “ are realized in the degree to which
they are scientifically cognized by society and utilized in a practical
manner.” 5 It follows from this that solution to the problem of the nation's
economic preparedness for a war in defense against imperialist aggression
should be supported by study and consideration of the advantages of
socialism in military organizational development and by their intelligent
utilization in practical activities to strengthen military potential.
Revealing the content of military - economic potential, Lenin pointed
out that modern war requires for its prosecution a highly developed
economy, and particularly a giant industry capable of producing diversi
fied military hardware, military equipment and supplies on an enormous
scale . Therefore, he emphasized, without “ the most serious economic
preparation it is impossible to conduct a modern war against advanced
imperialism .” 6 Lenin noted that military policy is most closely linked to
economic policy .? Military superiority over imperialism is inconceivable
without economic superiority.
War is inexorable,wrote Lenin . It poses thenecessity of either perishing
or catching up with and surpassing the leading nations economically
139
as well.8 Carrying out Lenin 's behests, the Communist Party and Soviet
government viewed concern for the all-out development of military
economic potential in a quantitative and qualitative respect as one of the
most important and primary tasks. During the first five-year plans, thanks
to the heroic efforts of the Soviet people, guided by the Communist Party ,
the requisite economic preconditions were created for victory in one of
the most difficult wars in the history of mankind — the Great Patriotic
War. As a result of fulfilling the five-year economic development plans
we created the requisite material and technological prerequisites to defeat
any foe, and the war confirmed this fact.
Under present-day conditions, in connection with the military tech
nological revolution, it is no longer sufficient merely to possess great
production capacity; it is vitally essential to possess the most modern,
unique branches of industry — nuclear, missile, electronics, etc. Products
of a totally different quality are demanded of the traditional branches,
such as metallurgy : high -alloy steels , heat-resisting and ultrapure metals ,
etc. Today national defense capability also is vitally dependent on the
availability of special equipment, raw materials, and a large number of
skilled specialists. The development and manufacture of modern arms
presupposes an incomparably more complex and substantially developed
system of enterprise cooperative manufacture and specialization . While
in the first years following World War II as many as 300 enterprises were
involved in tank manufacture and 500 in producing naval ships and air
craft, by the beginning of the seventies production of current models of
these types of hardware involves 5 to 6 times as many enterprises in
cooperative manufacture .
Early preparation of the economy for national defense is enormously
important today as never before. Recalling Lenin 's behest to preserve
national defense capability at all costs, the party and government have
been compelled , in order to ensure a high level of military strength , to
proceed to the maintenance of a wartime economy in peacetime— a
system of defense industry branches. " The party Central Committee and
Soviet government,” stated A . N . Kosygin in his address on the Directives
of the 24th CPSU Congress on the USSR National Economy Five-Year
Development Plan for 1971- 1975, “ have devoted and constantly devote
attention toward strengthening national defense capability and develop
ment of thedefense industry.” 9
The military economic system of socialism has nothing in common
with militarization of all economic life in the imperialist nations, which
serves the selfish aims of the monopolies. In contrast to this consequence
of capitalism , the military economic system of the socialist nation is
engendered by external causes and serves exclusively the aims of protec
tion against imperialist aggression.
The level of our country 's economic development has in recent years
risen to a qualitatively new stage. As was noted at the 24th CPSU
Congress, output of social product has increased by more than 8 -fold
140
since 1940 , while the economy has become technologically reequipped.
The industrial base has developed to such an extent during the last
five-year plan that industrial growth alone during these years has increased
our nation's industrial base to practically quadruple what it was prior to
the Great Patriotic War. Expansion of this country's military-economic
capability in the new five-year plan will be achieved through further
improvement in the branch structure, development of power engineering
and the transportation system , as well as implementation of an economic
reform . “ The five-year plan,” state the Directives of the 24th CPSU
Congress on the 1971-1975 Five - Year Plan for Development of the
Soviet Economy, “ will secure further growth in the defensive might of
the Soviet Union , which will make it possible even more surely to protect
the Soviet people and all nations of the socialist community from the
threat of imperialist aggression, and will strengthen the position of peace
loving and liberation forces throughout the world.” 10
But the economic system merely creates the opportunities to secure the
requisite military strength . This potential is transformed into reality by
man. Lenin wrote in this vein : " It is impossible to make the country
defense -capable without the greatest heroism on the part of the people ,
carrying out great economic reforms in a bold and decisive fashion.” 11
One cannot conceive of an economic system without people. Manpower
resources constitute the most important physical element in the nation 's
defense capability . Lenin stressed time and again that in war, a decisive
role is played by army and navy cadres, war industry workers and
economic specialists as a whole. It is indicative that during the difficult
years of civil war and military intervention the leader of the revolution
devoted particular attention to defense industry cadres. At his initiative,
party and government executive entities discussed time and again prob
lems pertaining to the situation of the workers at the Putilov, Izhevsk ,
Tula and other war plants. Lenin was constantly concerned with satisfying
the needs of war plant workers, with providing them with an adequate
quantity of food, with improving their working and living conditions,
etc .12
The problem of manpower resources in the nuclear age has become
even more urgent. Today military technological superiority depends in
large measure on quantity and quality of manpower resources, and par
ticularly skilled specialists in decisive areas of knowledge and production .
Requirements for skilled personnel for the development, manufacture
and utilization of modern weapons increase abruptly with the increasing
complexity of military hardware. The most important expression of this
is the substantial increase in demand for research and design effort which,
for example, comprises 58 percent of overall outlays in the United States
for the development and production ofmissiles , and up to 90 percent in
the most advanced space systems. Engineer labor has increased more
than 40 - fold in aircraft manufacture in comparison with World War II.
At the present time two thirds of scientists and engineers in the United

141
 States are involved in the arms race in one way or another. One third of
all scientists and engineers employed in research and development pro
grams in industry are working in the aerospace industry alone.
The number of military occupational specialties has grown dramatically .
Just a few decades back they numbered in the dozens, while today there
are hundreds. According to figures in the foreign press the number of
military personnel who are specialists in the area of electronics alone
today is greater than the total number of infantrymen .
Today success in the development of military -economic potential and
strengthening of armed forces combat might essentially depends to a
decisive degree on cadres, particularly in occupational specialties. The
moral-political qualities of cadres and their professional training play a
decisive role in effective utilization of the material-technical base of the
military .
In this country, as a result of the cultural revolution and improved
Soviet living standards, favorable conditions were formed on the basis of
economic success for providing the requisite cadres both for the Armed
Forces and the defense industry. The population of the USSR has in
creased substantially since thewar; its cultural level has risen substantially,
and its occupational composition has improved , which cannot help but
increase the country 's capabilities to supply defense needs. “ Russia ,”
write prominent American specialists in military economics Ch. Khitch
and R . Makin ( transliteration ] , " is considerably ahead of the West as
regards . . . manpower resources, a trained labor force — and probably
will continue to maintain that lead in the future.” 18
The cultural-technical level of Soviet Armed Forces personnel has
risen substantially in recent years. To an ever-increasing extent the army
and navy are receiving inductees with higher and secondary education
and with appropriate technical training. Officer general curriculum and
special training is growing rapidly . All this makes it possible to maintain ,
even within the reduced term of active military service, the requisite level
of Armed Forces combat readiness. Bearing in mind the factor of " ob
solescence ” of cadres, including officers and particularly reserve officers ,
the law specifies a number of measures providing for their systematic
training and upgrading.
Of enomous importance for strengthening the economic base of national
defense capability is prompt and effective utilization of scientific and
technological advances. Of extremely current importance in this connec
tion is Lenin 's statement that imperialism utilizes on a large scale for war
the greatest advances in military hardware, the most marvelous inventions,
all means of production. 14 The events of recent years fully confirm the
correctness of this statement. Pursuing an arms race in the postwar years ,
the militarists of the major imperialist nations have placed science and
technology in the service of the military .
The Communist Party and Soviet government cannot help but take
into consideration this circumstance . In the interest of strengthening our
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military might we are compelled to utilize those scientific and tech
nological discoveries which are the most promising from a military point
of view . “On the basis of advances in the Soviet economy, science and
technology, as a result of the selfless labor of workers, engineers, designers
and scientists,” stated Minister of Defense Mar SU A . A . Grechko at the
24th CPSU Congress, “ the Armed Forces are being continuously supplied
with sophisticated weapons and various types of combat equipment.” 15
An important area for securing national defense capacity is continuous
improvement in the system of economic management, ensuring an efficient
system of production specialization and cooperative manufacture, as well
as coordinated functioning of all elements in the economic system . Lenin
noted that only a strengthening of the foundations of the socialist society ,
a balanced coordination of the nation's productive resources and produc-.
tion management constitute “ the way to create military strength and
socialist power.” 18
Guided by Lenin 's instructions, the 24th CPSU Congress specified that
key problems of party economic policy include improvement of com
plexes of interlinked production branches and the economic management
system . “ Improvement in the system and methods of management and
planning,” state the Directives of the 24th CPSU Congress on the
1971-1975 Five-Year Plan for Development of the Soviet Economy,
" should be directed primarily toward securing comprehensive intensifica
tion of social production and its improved effectiveness. . .” 17
Vladimir Il'ich did not reduce war merely to armed combat but rather
viewed it as a special state of society . He believed that success in
strengthening national defense is obtained by coordinating the efforts of
all components of the state directed toward Armed Forces organizational
development. In a situation of war danger, he stated , the interests of
defense of the socialist homeland should occupy the focal point of efforts
by all Soviet agencies. “No organization of Soviet Russia,” stated, “ should
stop placing primary emphasis on the problem of the army.” 18
The party leader did not limit securement of defense of the socialist
homeland merely to a strengthening of the Armed Forces but viewed the
problem considerably more broadly, urging that the nation be trans
formed , in case of a threat of aggression , into a unified military camp.
The present-day military technological character of war makes this
Leninist thesis extremely important. The threat of a sneak attack involving
weapons of mass destruction demands that the economic system be on a
continuously prepared status even in peacetime, in addition to strengthen
ing the Armed Forces.
Lenin warned time and again of the possibility that the imperialists
would unite in order “ to crush socialism in a joint effort. . .” 19 Basing its
conclusions on Lenin 's theses and an analysis of the present day, the
24th CPSU Congress noted that under conditions of rivalry with socialism
the ruling classes in the capitalist nations are endeavoring to unite their
efforts for struggle against the community of socialist nations. In this
143
situation it is important, in addition to an examination of the material
prerequisites for national defense capability , to consider the capabilities
of the socialist community as a whole .
An important source of strength and power of the socialist nations is
the establishment and consolidation of their military alliance. Lenin ,
examining capitalism as an international force, was of the opinion that
victory over capitalism requires an international alliance of workers, their
internationalbrotherhood . This brotherhood should be based on “ a close
military and economic alliance. . ." 20 Our party leader was in favor of a
military -political and economic unification of forces and considered de
parture from this plan intolerable .
International unity in defense of socialism has found embodiment in
the Warsaw Treaty organization, which was created as a counterweight to
the military blocs of the imperialist nations, directed against the socialist
countries. “ As long as the aggressive NATO bloc exists,” stressed the
International Conference of Communists, " the Warsaw Treaty Organiza
tion will play an important role in ensuring the security of the socialist
nations against military attack by the imperialist powers and in securing
peace.” 21
In creating this organization , the socialist nations proceeded from the
Leninist thesis that the defense of socialism is a common cause. This task
is not a mechanical sum of national defense measures by the socialist
nations but rather expresses a qualitatively higher degree of relations
which is inherent in the system of socialist states. Each socialist country
makes its contribution to the common cause of strengthening the military
power of the community of brother nations. “ The military organization
of the Warsaw Treaty nations has strengthened as a result of collective
measures,” states the Resolution of the 24th CPSU Congress on the
Central Committee Report. The armed forces of the allied nations are
in a high state of readiness and constitute a reliable guarantee of the
peaceful labor of the brother peoples." 22
Military unity demands a military-economic alliance. The importance
of unifying themilitary -economic efforts of the socialist nations is dictated
by the features of modern war and providing the hardware and supplies
for such a war. One must bear in mind that the economic might of a
coalition is determined not only by the size of the production edifice,
resources and finances but also by the nature of links among coalition
members. Close collaboration makes it possible to arrange cooperative
manufacture and specialization in the production of arms, to strengthen
transport links, the energy base, etc . Substantial results are achieved by
unifying the efforts of scientific research and design establishments, as
well as enterprises for the development and production of new weapons
systems. Military- economic cooperation among the socialist nations in
matters of production and supply constitutes economic support of the
Warsaw Treaty Organization .
Faced with the fact that the manufacture of certain types of equip
144
ment requires an international system of cooperative manufacture , the
imperialists are endeavoring to establish such a cooperative effort. Their
ideologues are making every effort to convince the rival monopolies in
various countries of the necessity of uniting efforts in the development
and manufacture of modern arms. Today as never before, writes British
military theorist E. Dzh. Kingston-Makklori [transliteration ], unification
ofmanpower, resources, technical knowledge and know -how is essential
on an international scale. Many scientific and technical problems of
military significance have become too large to be resolved with the efforts
of a single nation .23 But the conflicts inherent in the capitalist world can
not ensure the NATO bosses a solid and stable cooperative production
effort .
The military -economic cooperation of the socialist nations is of a
totally different sociopolitical character. It serves the interests of peace
and strengthening of the security of peoples, and is aimed against the
aggressive intrigues of imperialism . Economic cooperation among the
socialist nations is effected on the basis of full equality and respect for
sovereignty and national interests, on the basis of mutual respect and
comradely mutual assistance, which proceeds from the character of
socialist production relations and from the principles of proletarian
internationalism .
The necessity for military -economic cooperation among socialist na
tions is dictated both by the internal causes of the development of so
cialism and by external conditions. The tasks of building socialism and
communism are inseparable from the tasks of defending the conquests of
the fraternal people . This also compels the socialist nations to devote
unabating attention to problems connected with economic preparedness
for war, and in connection with this to establish close cooperation among
socialist nations in accomplishing defense tasks.
Much has been done in this area but, as was emphasized at the 24th
CPSU Congress, economic cooperation among socialist nations must be
raised to an even higher level. “ . . . It is essential to intensify specializa
tion and cooperative production, more closely to coordinate economic
plans. . . to move toward economic integration of the socialist nations.
This is an important and necessary task. . ." 24 This also applies in full
measure to military - economic cooperation by the fraternal nations.
Today, matters pertaining to strengthening the unity of the socialist
nations and their military alliance also occupy an important position
because bourgeois ideologues, followed by rightist and “ leftist" revisionists,
are savagely attacking the principle of internationalism and Leninist
doctrine on the alliance of socialist nations, in stepped -up political and
ideological sabotage by imperialism against the socialist state. They are
attempting to depict them as obsolete , unsuited for the conditions of other
countries. All these attacks pursue a single objective — to weaken the
unity of the socialist community , to undermine it from within .
The Communist Party of the Soviet Union is waging an implacable,
145
highly -principled struggle against all attempts to undermine the unity of
the socialist community and to weaken its military strength . It proceeds
from the prediction that the war for which imperialism is preparing will
be of a coalition nature. The socialist countries, defending common gains
in such a war, will conduct a joint struggle against the unified forces of
imperialism . Our party and the other fraternal parties are endeavoring to
secure in the struggle against imperialism a unity of all revolutionary and
liberation forces.
Tireless concern by the CPSU and other fraternal parties for strengthen
ing and improving the military -economic cooperation of the socialist na
tions constitutes an important precondition for further development of
the military-technological base of the armies of the socialist community .

2. CPSU Concern for Development of the Military-Technological Base of the Soviet

"Armed Forces Under Present-Day Conditions
Supported by the advantages of socialism , the Communist Party and
Soviet government are doing everything possible to secure the nation's
defense capability. One area of this activity includes the establishment
and continuous improvement of a qualitatively new technological base for
the Soviet Armed Forces — the principalmaterial element of their fighting
strength . In dealing with these problems the CPSU has proceeded and
does proceed from Lenin 's important thesis which state that economic
potential should be directly embodied in the material foundation of an
army's combat power — in military equipment, for “ war is won by he who
has the greatest techniques, organization, discipline and the best hard
ware. . . Without hardware and without discipline it is impossible to live
in modern society — one must either master modern technology or be
crushed .” 25 Lenin considered these theses so important that he empha
sized them time and again in his speeches. Also well known is his warn
ing : “ The very best army and persons who are the most dedicated to the
revolution will be immediately destroyed by the enemy if they are
inadequately armed, supplied and trained.” 26
In an age of a rapid military technological revolution , when a shortage
of weapons and weakness in supply and equipment cannot be compensated
by high morale , Lenin 's theses on the determining role of military hard
ware are again confirmed by life itself.
Emphasizing the importance of military equipment, Lenin nevertheless
did not minimize man's role in war. He did not consider equipment
isolated from man , did not place them in opposition to one another, but
rather considered them in a dialectical interlink and inseparable unity .
During the initial years of Soviet rule Lenin exposed as harmful and
dangerous the " truth ” of leftist elements, which place man in opposition
to machine. He stressed that only he who has no idea about modern war
can light-heartedly swing a cardboard sword. “ It would be criminal to
146
make the people fight a regular army with modern equipment, and we
as socialists have taught this point." 27
Lenin pointed out that the economy and its direct embodiment in the
military - military equipment- constitutes the material foundation for
the conduct of war, an essential precondition for victory. Realization of
this potential depends on people , on their morale and aggressiveness, on
their ability to master weapons and combat equipment. “No stamina, no
physical strength , no gregarious instinct or solidarity of mass struggle can
provide a superiority in an age of rapid -fire small arms, automatic can
non , and complex machinery . . . " 28 wrote Lenin . Man alone, possessing
excellent moral-fighting qualities and armed with the most advanced
weapons, constitutes the deciding force in war.
From the very first days of army and navy organizational development
the CPSU has shown great concern for equipping the troops, for increasing
their firepower, for motorization and mechanization.
Profound qualitative changes have taken place since the war in the
development of the military technological foundation in the principal
imperialist nations. American imperialism , for the sake of achieving its
aggressive military-political goals, has placed its cards on totally new
weapons — weapons of mass destruction. Nuclear weapons comprise the
basis of the combat strength of the U .S . Armed Forces. The Communist
Party and Soviet government could not help but take this fact into con
sideration . They were guided by Lenin 's demands pertaining to the
necessity of soberly assessing the enemy's technical capabilities and
promptly mastering new means and forms of combat.
Due to the great threat to the peace and to socialism presented by
the imperialist nuclear arms monopoly, measures were taken to build our
own powerful nuclear weapons on a crash schedule and arm the Armed
Forces with them , thus raising their military technological base to the
level of the latest scientific and technological achievements. In carrying
out these measures the Soviet state proceeded from the increased de
pendence of the course and outcome of war on military hardware and
firepower. It was clear that in a nuclear war one cannot compensate for
a lack of nuclear armseither by numbers or excellent morale and fighting
capabilities of personnel.
Forced to develop nuclear weapons, the Soviet government realized
that the combat might of an army and navy depends to a decisive degree
not only on the availability of nuclear warheads but also on means to
deliver those warheads to the target. Therefore missiles were produced
in addition to nuclear devices; missiles have become the principal means
of delivering nuclear warheads to a target.
The development, production and mass arming with new weapons have
defined the military technological revolution, a most profound, radical
change in the entire material-technological base of the Soviet Armed
Forces. At the 24th CPSU Congress it was noted that the Soviet Armed
Forces now possess the latest, most advanced combat equipment. This
147
equipment is in the hands of skilled fighting men who are dedicated to the
homeland . “ Soviet citizens can be confident,” stated L . I. Brezhnev in the
Central Committee Report to the 24th CPSU Congress, " that our glorious
Armed Forces are prepared at all times, day and night, to repulse an
enemy attack from any quarter. Every potential aggressor knows full well
that if he attempts a nuclear missile attack on our country he will re
ceive a devastating return blow ." 29
The development of nuclear missile weapons understandably generated
a great number of contradictions between the new and old military
equipment, resolution of which led to a rapid development of the latter.
For example , development of the atomic bomb defined a contradiction
between it and the means of delivering it, which in the initial stage were
aircraft. It was necessary to build heavy, high -altitude and at the same
time high -speed aircraft capable not only of covering great distances but
also capable of successfully penetrating a hostile air defense system . The
result was missile -carrying aircraft capable of attacking a target without
entering the enemy's air defense zone. The development of missiles gen
erated a number of new contradictions between defensive and offensive
weapons. Like contradictions arose through the development of other
military equipment as well. As a result of their resolution totally new
types of equipment were developed — missile-carrying nuclear submarines,
powerful radars, computers, etc.
Extremely important was utilization of nuclear reactions for the de
velopment of propulsion plants,which promoted a rapid increase in power
output capabilities of submarines.
The development of nuclear missile weapons and large -scale arming of
troops with these weapons have generated radical qualitative changes in
all military equipment, which has produced a revolutionary change in the
military -technological base of war as a whole . A fundamental role in
determining the directions of development of the military technological
base , however , is still played by nuclear missile weapons. They constitute
the principal shield in the hands of our state for the defense of socialism ,
peace and progress.
The most advanced weapons have exerted substantial influence on
change in the ratio between Armed Forces services and arms within each
branch .
Of greatmethodological importance for understanding the character of
development of the material-technological base of the Armed Forces at
the present stage is Lenin 's thesis that “ technological progress is also
expressed in the fact that human labor increasingly retreats to the back
ground as machine labor advances.” 30 This idea applies in full measure
to military labor as well, where this tendency is also evidenced . It is ex
pressed in particular in the mass adoption of devices to automate control
of combat complexes and troops.
The new weapons have entered into sharp conflict with the achieved
level of control of combat equipment, a conflict which could be resolved
148
only on the basis of automation of control. Withoutautomation devices it
was impossible to employ nuclear missile weapons, it was impossible to
operate nuclear propulsion plants, etc. Therefore in the development of
moden combat equipment there began a transition from autoloading to
automatic small arms, to the development of complex automated systems
and complexes of powerful weapons, from equipment directly controlled
ir combat by man to equipmentwhich operates on thebasis of a computer
program .
Comprehensive utilization of nuclear energy , rocket technology and
electronics in arms development has made it possible to build powerful
long- range and automated weapons, systems and complexes capable of
launching devastating attacks on an aggressor if he should initiate a war
against the Soviet Union and the other socialist nations.
Automation is exceptionally important for stable and efficient troop
control, with the aim of maximum effective employment of troop man
power.
The employment of automated equipment and computers does not
minimize the role of man . It narrows the area of employment of physical
labor but does not eliminate it. The area of activity remaining to man is
the most responsible and productive. It demands of the fighting man
considerably higher intellectual and moral qualitites.
Man was and still is a decisive element in control. It is man who initially
adjusts , starts up and services an automated system , develops programs
for it, determines operating techniques and particularly selects the most
acceptable variants of action. Consequently the machine does not replace
the commander's creative activity but rather lightens his intellectual
work load, freeing him from the necessity of performing formal-logical
operations of a mechanical character. The decision -making process is
sharply accelerated , since the computer performs within a few minutes
work which would require tens of thousands of human computer-plotters.
Thus automation of troop control is a most importantmeans of resolv
ing conflicts which develop between the combat capabilities of advanced
weapons and the character of modern warfare on the one hand and the
capabilities of control entities to adequately handle combat operations on
the other. Thanks to automation the prerequisites have been created for
fully utilizing the combat capabilities of the most advanced weapons,
combat equipment and troops.
Today, just as in the period preceding the present military tech
nological revolution , the trend toward proportional, balanced development
ofweapons systems is an important trend in improvement of the material
technological base of the Armed Forces. The party is constantly con
cerned in order not to permit absolutization of certain types of weapon to
the detriment of others. Development of the military technological base
cannot be reduced merely to the extensive spread of nuclar missile
weapons. It is also necessary to improve traditional weapons— tanks,
artillery, surface ships, etc.
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 Of great importance in this respect is Lenin 's thesis that a dialectical
negation of the old and affirmation of the new takes place in the develop
ment of any phenomenon and consequently in the process of development
of military affairs as well. Dialectical negation, as Lenin emphasized ,
is not a hollow , useless negation but rather negation as an element of
communication, with retention of the positive.31 In addition to negation of
that which has outlived its time and does not conform to the interests o :
progressive development and inhibits it, one preserves from the old that
which has not yet exhausted its potential for development and is essential
for it.
Conventional weapons have not lost their importance; they occupy
an important place in the overall material-technological base of the
Armed Forces. Therefore they have a right to existence. But of course
they must be improved applicable to new conditions and new demands
of warfare.
Of great importance for understanding this problem is another thesis
of Lenin - on the necessity of combining various types of weapons, of
being prepared to utilize potential forms of combat. This methodological
thesis is extremely applicable today, when the question of preparedness to
repel aggression with the means at our disposal is a very crucial one.
One feature of the development of the material-technological base of
the Amed Forces consists in a sharp increase in the firepower and combat
effectiveness of conventional weapons. Military equipment has become
much more complex , its differentiation has become considerably more
extensive, while its destructive force and effectiveness have increased
sharply . All these new qualities are the result of change in the most im
portant properties of old weapons in the direction of quantitative growth :
a substantial increase in effective range, speed and rate of fire , improved
accuracy, etc . The increase in destructive force and combat effectiveness
of older weapons is also largely dictated by further motorization , mech
anization and automation .
Thus, in recent years, the military technological base of all services
and arms has radically changed . At the present time, stated Minister of
Defense USSR Mar SU A . A . Grechko at the 24th CPSU Congress,
“ the Soviet Army is equipped with weapons possessing great destructive
force and capable of reaching any point on earth , a fact which enables
the Armed Forces successfully to accomplish combat missions on land, in
the air and on the sea.” 32
Lenin emphasized that quantitative-and qualitative changes are in a
state of unity , and therefore a new quality is inseparably linked with a
new quantitative aspect.33 This thesis is of fundamental importance for
understanding the nature of development of the armed forces material
technical base . Under present-day conditions it would be dangerous for
the nation 's military strength not to take into account an important trend
in development of the material-technological base of the Soviet Armed
Forces — a substantial growth in equipping the troops with sophisticated
150
hardware and an unusually rapid pace of hardware improvement. This is
expressed first and foremost in a substantial quantitative increase in mili
tary equipment and an increase in its ratio in the troops. Never in the
past have our army and navy possessed such a great diversity of weapons
as at the present time.
In the past development of military equipment occurred slowly and
leisurely . For example, the individual weapon ( including firearms) was
dominant for thousands of years on the battlefield ; crew -served weapons
changed very slowly and far from radically , covering a span of several
centuries. Today the pace of revolutionary advances in military hardware
has not only increased to an unprecedented extent but is also continuing
to accelerate . This is evident in the example of the rapid obsolescence of
military equipment. In the past, weapons obsolescence as a rule occurred
during wars, when the belligerent sides were competing in combat. Today,
due to the rapid development of science and technology , obsolescence
occurs on a large scale in peacetime as well.
In addition to a rapid pace, development of the military -technological
base of the Soviet Army and Navy at the present stage is also characterized
by a breadth and depth of changes which is unprecedented in comparison
with the past. As a consequence of the fact that today scientific and tech
nological development is advancing on a broad front, radical changes in
the military-technological base encompass all its aspects and elements
from top to bottom . All military equipment has changed quantitatively
from hand arms and protective means employed by the individual soldier
to the most powerful types of weapons and combat support.
One important feature of the radical changes in the military -tech
nological base of modern armies is the fact that they began immediately
following World War II and have taken place in what has been essentially
a peacetime situation. It is true that local wars initiated by the imperialists
have occurred, but mass destruction weapons have not been employed
in these wars. Therefore, the problem of testing new military equipment
and methods of its employment acquires enormous significance.
In connection with this, we should note that the American military ,
violating all standards of international law and elementary concepts of
humanity, is endeavoring by various means to make up for the limited
nature of prooving-ground testing of new weapons. With this aim in mind
extensive use is being made of modern " small” wars to crush popular
liberation movements and to strengthen the political and economic he
gemony of imperialism . This is particularly clearly evident in the example
of the aggressive war being waged by American imperialism in Indochina.
Conducting a constant struggle against the aggressive actions of im
perialism , we at the same time are obliged to study carefully and con
tinuously its efforts and practical results in improving its armed forces.
This is dictated by the increased significance of the factor of surprise in
modern war as well as by the interests of securing military-technological
superiority over the enemy. It is also important because we can fully and
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correctly evaluate our military might only when we compare it not only
with our own past but also with the military power of the potential
adversary .
An examination of the features of development of the military-tech
nological base of the USSR Armed Forces at the present stage indicates
that it has undergone a radical qualitative change, which constitutes the
basis of the present military technological revolution. Efforts by the party
and people have secured a qualitative transformation of the military
technologicalbase of the Soviet Armed Forces. At the same time the party
realizes that under conditions of rapid scientific and technological ad
vances and unrelenting military provocation mounted by aggressive im
perialist circles, we must continue in the future unabating efforts to
improve the technological sophistication of the Soviet Army and Navy.
Continuation, deepening and broadening of revolutionary changes in
military affairs must be accompanied by continuous changes in the content
and material preconditions for strengthening the nation 's defense capa
bility . This demands unremitting efforts in predicting new potential and
capabilities for equipping and supplying the Armed Forces, as well as
training of engineer, technician and other cadres. Study of the influence
of science on the development of military affairs and on solving the prob
lems of strengthening the military might of the state demands particular
attention .
The Communist Party and Soviet government, guided by Leninist ideas
on the material prerequisites for strengthening the nation 's defense capa
bility , are focusing constant attention on the development and improve
ment of the material foundations of the military strength of the Soviet
Armed Forces. A new and vivid evidence of this is the 1971- 1975 Five
Year Plan for Development of the USSR National Economy. The Ninth
Five- Year Plan will constitute an important stage on the path of further
advance by Soviet society toward communism , in building its material and
technological foundation . This will greatly strengthen the material basis
of our nation's military might and will make it possible even more
reliably to guard the Soviet people and the entire socialist community of
nations from the danger of imperialist aggression.

Footnotes
1. See V. I. Lenin : Poln . Sobr. Soch. (Complete Works), Volume 34, page 41.
2. Ibid ., page 194.
3 . Materialy XXIV s”yezda KPSS (Proceedings of the 24th CPSU Congress ) ,
page 193.
4 . Ibid ., page 15 .
5. 50 let Velikoy Oktyabr'skoy sotsialisticheskoy revolyutsii. Tezisy TsK KPSS
(Fiftieth Anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution. Theses of
the Central Committee CPSU ) , page 30.
6 . Lenin , op.cit., Volume 35, page 390.

152
 7. Ibid ., Volume 38 , page 53.
8. Ibid., Volume 34 , page 198 .
9 . Materialy . . . , op. cit., page 135.
10. Ibid ., page 301.
11. Lenin, op.cit., Volume 34, page 197.
12. See V . 1. Lenin i Sovetskiye Vooruzhennyye Sily ( V . I. Lenin and the Soviet
Armed Forces), pp 210– 212.
13. Ch . Khitch and R . Makkin : Voyennaya ekonomika v yadernyy vek (Military
Economy in the Nuclear Age), translated from English , Moscow , Voyenizdat,
1964, page 152.
14. See Lenin , op.cit., Volume 36, page 396 .
15. Pravda, 3 April 1971.
16 . Lenin , op.cit., Volume 36 , page 80.
17. Materialy . .. , op.cit., page 295.
18 . Lenin , op.cit., Volume 37, page 125.
19 . Ibid ., Volume 26, page 354.
20. Ibid ., Volume 40, page 46.
21. Mezhdunarodnoye Soveshchaniye kommunisticheskikh i rabochikh parity .
Dokumenty i materialy (International Conference of Communist and Worker
Parties. Documents and Proceedings), page 304.
22. Materialy . . . , op .cit., page 191.
23. See E . Dzh. Kingston -Makklori: Aspekty strategii (Aspects of Strategy ),
translated from English , Moscow , Voyenizdat, 1966 , page 59.
24. Materialy . . ., op .cit., page 9 .
25. Lenin, op.cit., Volume 36, page 116 .
26. Ibid ., Volume 35, page 408.
27. Ibid ., Volume 36, page 116.
28. Ibid ., Volume 9, pp 155 - 156 .
29. Materialy . . ., op.cit., page 81.
30 . Lenin , op.cit., Volume 1, page 78.
31. See Ibid ., Volume 29, page 207.
32. Pravda, 3 April 1971.
33. See Lenin , op.cit., Volume 29, page 203.

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Chapter IX . V . I. Lenin on the CulturalRevolution
and Its Significance in Strengthening
the Armed Forces

Socialist reforms in the area of culture constitute an important factor

in strengthening this nation's military might. Implementing the ideas of
V . I. Lenin , the Communist Party has achieved magnificent success in the
area of our people's spiritual and intellectual life. The cultural i evolution
brought Soviet citizens education and enlightenment, a flourishing of
science, and secured the establishment of a mass popular intelligentsia ,
affirmation of the socialist ideology in all areas of intellectual activities
of society , preservation and development of the valuable items of Soviet
and world culture on a new basis. Radical reforms in the area of ideology
and culture have greatly promoted growth in the nation 's defensive might
and a strengthening of the Soviet Armed Forces .
Lenin's ideas and instructions on matters pertaining to the development of
the culture of the new society are of greatmethodological importance. The
party relies on them in building the culture of socialism and communism
and in educating the new man .

1. Lenin's Ideas on the Cultural Revolution and How to Accomplish It

The process of transition from capitalism to socialism is characterized
by radical changes in all areas of societal affairs : in politics, the economy,
and culture . This is an exceptionally complex and contradictory process,
which occurs, in an implacable struggle by revolutionary forces against
reaction and opportunism . Marxist-Leninist theory arms the toilers in this
struggle and provides a deep understanding of the laws governing societal
development.
An important place among the problems of building a new society as
elaborated by the founders of Marxism -Leninism is occupied by problems
of revolutionary change in the intellectual area . Marx and Engels did not
limit themselves merely to economic and social analysis of the inevitability
of the transition to socialism . They devoted much attention to an investi
gation and elaboration of the intellectual aspects of this transition. The
founders of scientific communism revealed deep conflicts in the develop
154
ment of culture in the class antagonistic society and demonstrated that
capital is hostile to genuine intellectual development of the toilers.
A radical change in the intellectual life of society comprises an in
separable componentpart of the socialist revolution. Its objective necessity
proceeds directly from those tasks facing society in the process of transi
tion from capitalism to socialism and communism . Marx and Engels
emphasized that communism can become a reality only during the course
of a “ revolution in which, on the one hand, the power of the former mode
of production and intercourse is overthrown, as well as the former
structure of society, and on the other hand , the universal character of
the proletariat is developed , as well as the energy it requires to achieve
its acquisition, whereby the proletariat rejects everything remaining from
its former societal position .” 1 A revolution in intellectual affairs, stated
Marx , is needed by the toilers “ not only to change existing conditions but
also for the toilers to change themselves. . ." ?
Lenin made a particularly large contribution to Marxist doctrine on
culture. He elaborated these problems prior to the overthrow of the old
system , demonstrating in particular the class nature of culture in an
antagonistic society, the presence in that society of two cultures — the
dominant culture of the exploiters and a democratic, popular culture. He
sharply opposed the leaders of the Second International and other op
portunists who claimed that without achieving a certain " level of culture "
the proletariat could not and should not take power into its own hands
and that Russia was allegedly culturally unripe for socialism . Countering
this claim , Vladimir Il’ich advanced the thesis that first and foremost it is
necessary to overthrow the rule of the capitalists and landowners “ and
then , on the basis ofworker-peasant rule and the Soviet system , to proceed
to catch up with other peoples." 3
Taking into account the importance of cultural reforms and the par
ticular acuteness of tasks connected with cultural development of the
masses under the specific conditions of our country , Lenin compre
hensively substantiated the theory of creation of a culture of the new
society and demonstrated its importance and necessity in reorganizing
our country . He first introduced the term “ cultural revolution ” in his
writings following the October Revolution ; he revealed the scientific
content of the objective processes designated by this term . Of particular
importance in this respect were his " How Should Competition Be Or
ganized ?” , “ Current Tasks of the Soviet Government," " Tasks of Youth
Alliances,” “ Pages from a Journal,” “ On Cooperation ," "On Our Revolu
tion ," etc .
The principal content of these writings consists in the fact that without
carrying out cultural reforms, without a sharp upsurge in the culture of
the masses it is impossible to accomplish the root tasks of strengthening
the new system and building socialism . This applies to the organization of
the operations of the edifice of government, development of the economic
system and economic management, socialist reforms in the village, resolu

155
tion of the nationalities question, and socialist indoctrination of the
masses.
The necessity of the toiler masses mastering cultural treasures is
particularly closely linked with the tasks of strengthening the nation ' s
defense capability and defending the conquests of the Great October
Revolution .
Cultural growth of the masses exerts direct influence on the upsurge
and strengthening of all basic factors upon which the nation 's military
strength depends - economic , scientific -technological, moral, and military .
This law was revealed with the origination of wars, but it began to be
manifested particularly vividly with the onset of the age of machine war
fare , when scientific and technological discoveries led to the arming of
troops with weapons of incredible potency. Analyzing wars of the machine
age , Lenin stated that today'swar “ requires just as necessarily high- quality
human material as does modern technology.” 4
The cultural revolution opened up extensive opportunities for establish
ing the material and spiritual foundations for the nation 's defense capa
bility . It was to play an important role in the establishment of Soviet
military science , the training of military cadres and improvement in the
quality of induction contingents. Growth in culture, education and con
sciousness of personnel ensures a firm moral-political state of the troops,
development in fighting men of such important moral-combat qualities as
dedication to the homeland and the party cause, combat skills, courage,
steadfastness, and ingenuity.
The principal goal of the cultural revolution according to Lenin is
the forming of the new man, devolpment in him of a scientific , socialist
world view , an overcoming of vestiges of the past in people 's conscious
ness and behavior.
Architect of the Soviet state , Lenin was also the architect of Soviet
socialist culture. He elaborated a clear-cut and well-balanced program of
cultural reform . “Lenin 's program of cultural revolution constituted an
important contribution to revolutionary theory and practice. Its basic
content is as follows: an upsurge in public education — creation of all
conditions for the toiler masses to acquire political awareness, knowledge ,
and aesthetic values; dissemination of a scientific socialist ideology and
organization of the people 's entire intellectual and spiritual life on its
principles ; overcoming of petit-bourgeois views and ways.” 5
The cultural revolution, to use Lenin 's definition , is “ an entire revo
lutionary upheaval, an entire period of cultural development of the
masses.” He saw the importance of this revolutionary upheaval in
elimination of the gap separating the people and culture, ensuring a rapid
improvement in the general educational and cultural level of the worker
peasant masses, opening up a broad area for development of talents and
capabilities, which are found among the people in inexhaustible quantities .
“ In the past the entire human intellect,” stated Lenin at the Third All
Russian Congress of Soviets, “man's entire genius created and produced
156
only to give all the benefits of culture and technology to the few , while
depriving the others of the most essential things— enlightenment and
development. Today all the wonders of technology , all the conquests of
culture will become available to the entire people ; from now on man's
intellect and genius will never be turned into means of violence , into
means of exploitation .” ?
The socialist economic system constitutes the material foundation of
the new culture , and Marxism -Leninism is its ideological foundation.
The cultural revolution does not take place spontaneously, auto
matically, but rather as a result of productive and purposeful activities by
the masses , with a leading role played by the worker class and its van
guard, the Communist Party . Party guidance of all processes of intellectual
and spiritual development constitutes an essential condition , a natural law
governing the formation of the culture of the new society .
The cultural revolution in its Leninist definition is mandatory for all
nations and peoples taking the path of socialist development, regardless
of national features, including the level of culture inherited from the
past. Totally without foundation in this connection are the “ arguments ” of
bourgeois falsifiers and revisionists that the cultural revolution being
carried out in this country is an allegedly “ specific national” phenomenon,
dictated by the low level of education in prerevolutionary Russia. Denying
the objective necessity and universality of the cultural revolution , they
as a rule point to the high level of mass literacy in the " civilized ”
countries, to the extensive development of motion pictures, radio and
television broadcasting. And yet they fail to mention, in the first place,
that in the course of cultural transformations, the general problem of
raising the level of public education is resolved, a problem which is not
at all limited merely to the elimination of illiteracy; secondly, they
clearly exaggerate the situation in the highly -developed capitalist coun
tries, where even today millions of persons are illiterate and semiliterate ;
in the third place, they ignore the decisive fact that under socialism there
takes place not simply an increase in the volume of knowledge and a rise
in the educational level of the masses, but that at the same time the
culture proper and its social character change radically.
Nor do the theory and practice of “ leftist” and rightist revisionists
have anything in common with genuine cultural revolution . Any rational
person can clearly see the glaring anticultural and antisocialist essence of
the intellectual and spiritual aspects proper of the so -called "cultural
revolution " forced upon the Chinese people. There are hundreds of mil
lions of illiterates in China, but no effort is being made to overcome this
heavy legacy of the past. Access to the treasures of national and world
culture is essentially closed to the Chinese people. People's spiritual and
intellectual world is limited to statements by the “ great helmsman .” A
mass brainwashing effort is under way in China, in a spirit of hegemonism ,
chauvinism , and militant anti-Sovietism . The “ cultural revolution ” in
China, dooming the people to a long intellectual and spiritual stagnation,
157
is in fundamental conflict with the tasks of advancing toward socialism .
It is utilized as a screen to demolish the party, to establish and consolidate
a military -bureaucratic dictatorship .
It was stated above that the most important feature of the transforma
tion of the spiritual and intellectual life of society is a class-proletarian
approach to accomplishing this task , securement of the guiding role of the
worker class and its advanced detachment, the Communist Party . The
concept of the so- called “ liberalized ” socialism of the rightist revisionists
ignores these principles. The recent events in Czechoslovakia demon
strated the results to which this can lead.
But let us return to the matter of how our party accomplished the
fundamental tasks of the cultural revolution in the course of building
socialism . The essence of these tasks boiled down to overcoming, on the
basis of elimination of social antagonisms, the conflictbetween intellectual
and physical labor, between city and village, the creation of a large Soviet
intelligentsia, the achievement of moral-political unity of the people, the
transformation of Marxism -Leninism into the dominant ideology of
society , and socialist culture into the dominant culture , overcoming the
former backwardness of the national culture of many peoples of the
USSR .
Accomplishment of all these tasks was dictated by the number of
specific features of our country and involves serious difficulties. In the
first place, the Soviet people as the pioneer of socialism was compelled to
proceed down an unexplored path ; it possessed no experience in creating
the culture of a new society by other peoples. In the second place, Russia
was a country of sharp contrasts in all areas. Russian culture had given
the world classic examples of literature, art, and science, and yet three
fourths of the population was illiterate . Dozens of backward nationalities
lacked a written language. In the third place, initial steps in cultural de
velopment were complicated by the country's backwardness and poverty .
In the fourth place, for a number of decades the USSR carried out
cultural development in a situation of hostile capitalist encirclement,
under conditions of unrelenting struggle against reactionary bourgeois
ideology.
The party was forced to wage a powerful struggle against tendencies
within the country which were hostile to Leninism , particularly in regard
to the question of the succession of culture. Lenin stated that socialist
culture is created on the basis of assimilation and critical reworking of
the intellectual and spiritual heritage of the past, of all the treasures of
world culture. The Trotskyites attempted to force upon the party a line
which called for unfounded , uncritical utilization of the entire heritage of
the past, declaring that there is no proletarian socialist culture nor will
there be. The ideologues of the Proletcult, on the other hand, denied any
value to the achievements of past ages for the proletariat and issued
an appeal “ vigorc isly” to break with the past and to create a purely
" proletarian culture ” on empty ground, “ autonomous” in respect to the
158
Communist Party and the Soviet state . The party shattered these petit
bourgeois, opportunistic views.
Implementing Lenin 's ideas, our party at each stage in the building
of socialism defined the main directions of this country's cultural develop
ment. During the first decade of Soviet rule fundamental efforts were
concentrated on eliminating illiteracy among the adult population . The
party proceeded from Lenin 's statement that “ it is impossible to build a
communist society in a illiterate country .” 8 Our party's leader empha
sized : “ The illiterate person stands outside of politics; he first must be
taught the alphabet. Without this there can be no politics. . ." 9
The campaign against illiteracy became the business of the party. It
was discussed at the Eighth All-Russian Party Conference, at the 12th ,
13th and other party congresses , and at a number of Central Committee
plenary sessions. The party involved in this campaign Komsomol, the
trade unions and other public organizations, the party, soviet and military
press. An important role was played by the End Illiteracy Society, the
membership of which included V . I. Lenin , A . V . Lunacharskiy , A . M .
Gor'kiy, and which was headed for many years by M . I. Kalinin .
The task of doing away with illiteracy was successfully accomplished
as a result of enormous efforts by the Communist Party, the Soviet
government, public organizations, and self-sacrificing efforts by our in
telligentsia. According to the 1897 census slightly more than 28 percent
of Russia's population was literate, while by 1939 this figure had in
creased to almost 90 percent. Particularly impressive success was achieved
in the national republics.
Lenin considered the general curriculum school to be the central
link in the cultural revolution . Thanks to reorganization of the entire
school system in conformity with the goals and tasks of building socialism ,
and thanks to the enhancement of the role of the Soviet teacher, in the
prewar years this country achieved universal elementary education and
set a goal of universal secondary education in the cities and a 7 -year
education in the village and in the national republics. The Great Patriotic
War temporarily delayed execution of these plans. Public education re
ceived further development in the postwar years.
The program of cultural reforms called for establishment of a people 's
intelligentsia . The principal role here was played by the higher educational
institution and secondary special schools, the network of which con
tinuously expanded, particularly in the national republics. New rules of
acceptance to higher educational institutions, the organization of worker 's
faculties and other measures opened up the road to higher education for
toiler youth . At the same time the party conducted a major campaign to
reeducate the old intelligentsia. The provision of cadres of scientists,
engineers, doctors, teachers, agronomists and other specialists from the
masses who are dedicated to the homeland and the cause of the party
constitutes an outstanding victory of the cultural revolution, which is also
of great significance for national defense.
159
 The entire world is familiar with the achievements of Soviet science,
to the development of which Lenin attached great importance. Our sci
entists have made a substantial contribution to the scientific and tech
nological progress of mankind. Soviet science has helped in the practical
adoption of new industrial processes, has assisted in creating a powerful
atomic industry and power engineering, in exploiting massive natural
resources, and in developing new varieties of crop plants and livestock
breeds. Our scientists have achieved outstanding success in mathematics,
physics, chemistry, biology, medicine, geology and other fields of knowl
edge . The achievements of Soviet science have found concentrated
expression in the study and exploration of space .
Socialism has opened up broad opportunities for the development of
literature and art. The party has persistently incorporated the method of
socialist realism in the creative activities of writers , artists and actors
and has vigorously combatted ultraleftist, nihilist, anarchistic views of
the development of literature and art. As a result the socialist stage of
the cultural revolution has produced many outstanding works of literature
and art, which have entered the golden fund of world culture.
The CPSU has displayed and does display constant concern for the
growth of the materialbase of culture. This country contains an extensive
network of clubs, cultural centers and public libraries. This country
publishes one fourth of all the books published in the world . Single -issue
publication figures for Soviet newspapers are 140 million copies, and for
magazines and journals — more than 150 million copies. The single -issue
press run of Pravda alone is double that of all the newspapers of Tsarist
Russia put together. Soviet television has a vast viewing audience — 70
percent of this country's population. Of course it is not merely a matter
of quantity ; the radical qualitative differences of our culture are also
important.
Our party is thus carrying out Lenin 's instructions given at the 8th
Party Congress in 1919 : “ . . . Make from an uncultured and savage
capitalist country a cultured communist country.” 10
Enormous changes in the economic , sociopolitical and cultural areas
during the years of building socialism have produced an increase in the
consciousness and awareness of Soviet citizens, their education and in
doctrination as ardent patriots dedicated to communist ideals. The mutual
influences and enrichment of national cultures have resulted in their
rapprochement and flourishing.
But in spite of the great successes of the cultural revolution , all tasks
could not be and were not accomplished at the first, socialist stage.
The fact is that this stage merely constitutes preparation for solving the
fundamental problems connected with the establishment of a communist
culture. Therefore further development and deepening of cultural trans
formations is essential.
Developing the Leninist theory of cultural revolution under new his
torical conditions, the CPSU formulated a most important thesis in its

160
new Program : “Cultural development during the period of accelerated
building of a communist society will constitute the culmination stage of
the great cultural revolution . At this stage will be created all the requisite
ideological and cultural conditions for the victory of communism ." 11
Concrete tasks of the present stage of the cultural revolution are
specified in the CPSU Program and in the resolutions of the 24th Party
Congress. The most important of these are the raising of the cultural and
technological level of the workers and peasants to the level of the intel
ligentsia ; overcoming of all forms of social inequality in the area of
culture ; liquidation of religious and other vestiges in people 's conscious
ness ; transformation of Marxist-Leninist ideology into the ideology of
each and every member of Soviet society . Accomplishment of these tasks
is inseparable from creation of the material and technological base of
communism , from further development of communist social relations and
at the same time from strengthening of the material base of culture proper.
All these tasks are being successfully accomplished. The 24th CPSU
Congress summarized this nation 's sociopolitical and cultural development
during the last 5 years. The Congress Resolution on the Central Com
mittee Report emphasizes that " important social changes are taking place
under conditions of an expanding scientific and technological revolution ,
profound changes in the economic system and the character of labor. The
occupational training and skill of workers and peasants, their educational
and cultural level are improving; working and living conditions in city
and village are gradually converging; the intelligentsia is growing, par
ticularly the scientific -technical intelligentsia.” 12
The years of the Eighth Five- Year Plan were years of a further
upswing of Soviet culture. Much was accomplished in the transition to
universal secondary education . Today approximately 80 percent of stu
dents completing their 8 -year education go on to complete their secondary
education . The number of higher educational institutions has continued to
grow . Much work has been accomplished to improve the learning process
at our schools. More than 7 million specialists with higher and secondary
education were produced during the five-year period. The number of
scientific workers has increased. These years were marked by many
new scientific discoveries. The press, radio , and television developed
further.
The 24th CPSU Congress stressed the growing role of culture in the
building of communism and the strengthening of its influence on solving
economic and sociopolitical problems. “Without a high level of culture ,
education , social consciousness and inner maturity of our citizens, com
munism is impossible , just as it is impossible without the corresponding
material-technological base ," 13 stressed the Central Committee Report to
the Congress.
The program of cultural development for the new five- year plan is
broad and diversified . It proceeds from the demands of the expanding
scientific and technological revolution, which presupposes another sub
161
stantial increase in the level of education and culture of the masses. The
new five -year plans calls for achieving a complete transition to universal
secondary education and further development of the trade school system ,
particularly schools providing secondary education ; in the area of higher
and secondary special education there is the task of more extensive
training of cadres for new and promising areas of science and technology ,
as well as improving the quality of specialist training. In the area of
development of science there is the demand for concentration of scientist
efforts on solving the most important problems, strengthening the ties
between science and the practical building of communism , as well as
speeding up the economic application of scientific advances. Another
task is that of strengthening cooperation among scientists working in the
area of the natural, applied and social sciences. The 24th CPSU Congress
stressed the increasing role of literature and art in creating the spiritual
wealth of the socialist society, our people's interest in creating works
which will truthfully reflect reality , affirming the ideals of communism
with great artistic force. Great importance is also attached to improving
the activities of the massmedia.
Successful accomplishment of all these tasks will constitute a major
contribution toward creation of the culture of communism , which " will
embody the great diversity and richness of the spiritual and intellectual
life of society, the high ideological content and humanism of the new
world . It will be the culture of a classless society , a culture of the people
as a whole , of all mankind .” 14 The foundation of this culture is being
laid today.

2. Significance of the Cultural Revolution in Strengthening the Armed Forces

The cultural revolution, a rise in the level of education and conscious
ness of the masses constitute an essential condition for increasing the
nation's defense capability and strengthening its Armed Forces.
Lenin thoroughly substantiated the relationship between the army's
combat strength and the level of development of the nation's economy
and the cultural level of the population. Analyzing the reasons for the
defeat of the Tsarist autocracy in the Russo - Japanese War, he emphasized
that this defeat was the consequence of Russia 's economic and cultural
backwardness , of mediocrity of military command , as well as the ignor
ance and downtrodden state of the enlisted personnel. “ The generals and
military commanders proved to be either mediocre or worthless. . . The
officers proved to lack close contact with the enlisted men and did not
enjoy their confidence. The ignorance, illiteracy and downtrodden state
of the peasant masses showed up glaringly in a confrontation with a
progressive people in a modern war. . ." 16
Lenin stated that success in today's war is impossible without enlisted
personnel with initiative and awareness. This requires a vigorous upsurge
in the culture of the soldier masses.
162
 The victorious October Revolution opened up great opportunities for
cultural reforms in the country and in the army. Lenin and the Com
munist Party , outlining a broad program of cultural revolution , also had
in mind a requisite upswing in the culture of Armed Forces personnel,
correctly viewing this as a most important condition for improving the
nation 's defense capability and strengthening the army and navy .
The army is a unique collection point where people from different
provinces (oblasts ) and republics congregate. This creates favorable con
ditions for their training, indoctrination, and all-around development.
The party sought to have the Red Army serve as a genuine school of
indoctrination, political and technical literacy for all those entering its
ranks. All the efforts of the war ministry, stated the resolution of the
8th Party Congress, should be aimed at making the army " a center not
only for purely military training but also general education and political
indoctrination.” 16
In those years this country was predominantly a peasant nation . This
was reflected in the social makeup of the Red Army. Special attention was
focused on reeducation of peasant youth in a socialist spirit during army
service. At the Seventh All-Russian Congress of Soviets in 1919 Lenin
stated : “ The workers have learned how to utilize political rule and how
to make . . . of this Red Army, in which the majority of personnel are
peasants, an instrument of education of the peasantry. . ." 17
It is symbolic that the first Red Army star bore a rifle , a plow , a
hammer, and a book. The book expressed the cultural role of the army
of the young worker-peasant state .
The cultural role of the army grew substantially during the years of
the first five-year plans. Our army served for hundreds of thousands of
young proletarians and peasants not only as a military school but also as
a school of culture and socialist development, which produced a great
number of organizers of collectivization, shock workers of production,
and steadfast defenders of the Soviet government.
During the years of building socialism , the nation's moral potential
rose and the political-moral state of Armed Forces personnel grew strong,
on the basis of a steady rise in the general educational, ideological and
cultural level of the people and Soviet fighting men . There developed
increased capability to fill the Armed Forces with high -quality contingents
and for training numerous qualified command, political and military
technical cadres capable of correctly carrying out the party 's military
policy.More favorable conditions were created for the development of
Soviet military science . The growth of science and culture exerted great
influence on the establishment and improvement of the material and
technological base of the nation 's defensive might and on equipping the
troops with the requisite quantity of modern combat equipment and
weapons.
Lenin stated that war constitutes a thorough test of a people's entire
material and spiritual forces. In order to win victory in today's war , a
163
country must possess not only a high economic , scientific , and military,
but also a strong moral potential, on which great influence is exerted by
the level of culture of the people and Armed Forces personnel. This was
convincingly demonstrated by the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet
people against Nazi Germany. The outstanding spiritual countenance of
the Soviet patriot-fighter, internationalist-fighter ; his high ideological
level, courage, steadfastness, collectivism , spirit of self-sacrifice, and
breadth of cultural horizons were evident to the peoples of the world
during the last war, in all his grandeur and nobility . All this is the result
of purposeful political and cultural-educational work conducted by the
party during the prewar years.
An immense job was accomplished . In the early years, as much as one
half of the personnel in some Red Army units were illiterate . The party
focused special attention toward eliminating in the army this legacy of
the past. It is interesting to note that the first primer for teaching illiter
ates was produced by the military . By 1939 our army had become 100
percent literate .
The following comparative figures attest to the enormous rise in
educational level of Soviet fighting men during the years of building
socialism . In 1939, approximately 12 percent of Soviet Armed Forces
personnel possessed higher and secondary education , more than 27 per
cent possessed incomplete secondary education, and more than 50 percent
had completed elementary schooling. Today, half of all personnel possess
higher and secondary education , while those only with elementary school
ing comprise less than 1 percent. Seventy percent of all inductees enter
military service with a technical occupational specialty . The general
educational level of our military personnel has grown particularly rapidly
during the last 10 to 15 years. The number of enlisted men and non
commissioned officers with secondary education among missile personnel,
tank and submarine crews has increased several dozenfold during this
period.
The rise in the level of education and culture on the part of our youth
has made it possible to adopt a number of fundamentally new elements in
the performance of military obligation by Soviet citizens. In particular,
the term of active military service has been reduced .
M . V . Frunze pointed to the relationship between term of service and
level of intellectual culture of the people as early as 1925 : “ At the
present moment, with the present cultural level of our population and
the present state of preinduction training, it would be extremely dangerous
to proceed in the direction of further reducing the length of service. . .
But if the process of upswing in our cultural level continuous to advance
rapidly , if preinduction training is improved — and facts indicate that
such will be the case — we can certainly consider this question in the
future.” 18
That time has come. The years which have passed since adoption of
the new Law on Universal Military Obligation have demonstrated that

164
even under the changed conditions it is possible successfully to accomplish
the tasks of training and indoctrinating personnel. In outstanding units,
the reduction in term of active service for enlisted men and noncom
missioned officers is compensated by increasing the effectiveness and
efficiency of the learning process, by developing the activeness of young
personnel in training, by equipping them with the ability to master
knowledge and skills in a shorter period of time.
A major contribution toward training young people for military service
is made by the school, by Komsomol, and by DOSAAF. Their activities
in this area are based on Lenin 's ideas pretaining to universal military
training for the people.
National industrialization , collectivization of agriculture, and the party's
social policies have led to changes in the skills and qualification makeup
of inductees. Every year more and more inductees are specialists in
industry and socialist agriculture. In the past our army was predominantly
peasant in composition , while today more than half of all military per
sonnel in active service are individuals who have worked in industry , in
transportation , and in construction .
Minister of Defense of the USSR , Mar SU A . A . Grechko, noted with
satisfaction in his address to the 24th CPSU Congress: “ A new generation
is entering the army and navy — the sons and grandsons of those who
azi GGerman
selflessly defended our homeland against the, NNazi o invaders in
Tront. IWar,who
the battles of the Great Patriotic t ist, who gave every ounce of strength
to gain victory on the labor front. It is a generation of educated, physically
healthy and intellectually strong individuals. They have inherited from
their fathers and mothers excellent moral- political qualities, total dedica
tion to and love of their socialist homeland and the Communist Party.” 19
We know what importance Lenin attached to the training and indoc
trination of military cadres, seeing in them the backbone which cements
together the strength of the military. A well-organized system of military
training establishments was established prior to our leader's death : acade
mies, service schools, training courses, and military science departments
at civilian higher schools . This task was worked on with particular
persistence in the prewar years in connection with the growing threat of
attack by the nations of the fascist bloc. The rising level of public educa
tion and science made it possible substantially to broaden the network
of military training institutions of all specializations, to improve the
learning process and to staff military academies and service schools with
well -trained faculty.
This effort assumed an even greater scale during the Great Patriotic
War. As a result of this, our army did not suffer an acute shortage of
cadres. The Soviet officer corps made a substantial contribution toward
the transformation of the Soviet Amy into a first-class modern army, to
the development of the Soviet art of war and toward gaining a historic
victory over the Nazi invaders .
In the postwar period the system of training and indoctrination of

165
military cadres was brought into conformity with new conditions en
gendered by radical changes in military affairs. The majority of service
schools were converted to higher educational institutions. New military
higher educational institutions were established for new military technical
fields and areas. Civilian educational institutions constitute an important
source for providing the army and navy with officers in a number of areas
of specialization . This has promoted a rapid rise in the level of general
and professional military education of officer personnel. In the last 5
years the number of officers with higher military and specialized education
has doubled and today comprises more than 30 percent of the entire
officer corps. In certain arms almost all officers have received the highest
general curriculum training. Evidently, in the near future this will be
characteristic of the entire Armed Forces. And yet in 1929, only 4 . 5
percent of command personnel possessed higher education !
Radical qualitative changes in the military -technological base and
structure of the Armed Forces have produced a sharp increase in the
number of engineer-technician personnel. Prior to the last war, engineer
technician cadres comprised 16 . 3 percent of the total officer corps, while
today the figure is 45 percent, and more than 70 percent in the missile
troops.
One characteristics feature of today's officer is youth . At the present
time, more than 65 percent of officers at the regimental echelon are
under 30 years of age. These young men have not experienced war, but
they are distinguished by such outstanding qualities as ebullient energy ,
fighting enthusiasm , and a solid store of knowledge. All these features
enable them successfully to train and indoctrinate the men under them .
The fusion of young officers with experienced cadres gives the requisite
strength to the complex military organism .
The sharply- improved level of education of all categories of military
personnel constitutes an important objective precondition for even more
successful solution to the problem of training, political, military and
cultural indoctrination of personnel.
It is important to note that the Soviet Armed Forces not only accept
the culture of our society but in addition exert a strong influence on its
growth and development. This is expressed in the first place in the fact
that, guarding the productive labors of the people, the Soviet Army and
Navy create the necessary prerequisites for increasing the spiritual and
intellectual values of the socialist society. In the second place , the Armed
Forces make their own direct contribution to the development of culture,
constituting an important school of professional training, political en
lightenment and ideological conditioning for military personnel. Ofcourse
the content of the term " school” has changed radically in comparison with
prewar years. Today the most important items are no longer elimination
of illiteracy or semiliteracy but rather improvement in the ideological
political level of military personnel, their moral-aesthetic , military -tech
nical and physical training.
166
 L . I. Brezhnev , in an address delivered on 8 July 1968 to graduates
of service academies, stated that almost the entire male population of this
country serves a certain term in the Armed Forces, fulfilling their military
obligation . Military service takes place in those years when one's charac
ter, philosophical outlook and conscientious attitude toward life are
being formed. The army thus becomes a major school of practical ex
perience for our young people, a component part of the entire system of
Soviet education. “ The Soviet Army is well prepared for this. It is a
genuinely socialist army; it does not and cannot contain a caste spirit;
there is no antagonism between officers and enlisted men . The Soviet
Army is a model of firm and conscious discipline. Indoctrinating new
generations of Soviet fighting men , it trains for the homeland individuals
who are morally and physically toughened , courageous, possessing firm
communist convictions and a high awareness of their obligation to society .
These qualities are necessary not only to the fighting man but also to our
nation 's citizens. One can rely on those who have gone through the
school of military service both in peacetime productive labor and , if
necessary , in the test of war." 20
Lenin , describing the tasks of communist indoctrination of the Soviet
people, formulated in a number of his speeches the demands which
directly pertain to the ideological-political and cultural development of
army and navy personnel. He considered the most important of these
to be indoctrination of the defenders of the homeland in the ideals of
socialism , in a spirit of total dedication to the Communist Party and
willingness to defend the socialist homeland to one's last breath .
The entire system of military life , the entire system of combat and
political training, party political and mass cultural effort are focused on
forming these policies. In the Soviet Armed Forces indoctrination of
personnel is based on totally different principles than in the armies of the
imperialist nations. Indoctrination of soldiers in bourgeois armies is based
on the most reactionary, the most repulsive aspects of bourgeois cul
ture and ideology. It is permeated with anticommunism , antihumanism ,
apolitical content, religious obscurantism , and the cult of violence and
profit. Literature, art, motion pictures, the press , radio , and television
all means of ideological influence on the population and military personnel
- are subordinated to preparations for an aggressive war against the
USSR and the other socialist nations. The results of this indoctrination
are evident in the example of the U .S . Army, which is committing
unprecedented crimes and acts of brutality in Indochina.
The spiritual countenance of the Soviet fighting man and his moral
combat qualities are shaped in the revolutionary and fighting traditions of
our party and people, in the succession of the finest traditions and ideals
of Soviet and world progressive culture. A determining role in the spiritual
development of our fighting men is played by Marxist-Leninist ideology .
Commanders, political officials, party and Komsomol organizations of the
Armed Forces, guided by the theses of the 24th CPSU Congress on the
167
forming of the new man, focus all means of ideological indoctrination on
strengthening in military personnel communist conviction, a feeling of
Soviet patriotism and proletarian internationalism , ideological stead
fastness, and on the comprehensive development of the individual charac
ter of each and every enlisted man, noncommissioned officer, and officer.
The aesthetic indoctrination of military personnel is becoming in
creasingly important — the forming of an ability to perceive, correctly
to comprehend and assess the beautiful in public and personal life , in
military activity , at home, in nature, in art, the aspiration to create with
one's labor beauty in our realities of life, to oppose negative, antiaesthetic
phenomena. The army and navy contain rich opportunities for the form
ing in military personnel of excellent artistic tastes and cultural habits .
These opportunities will unquestionably continue to increase in the future.
Our party shows constant concern for strengthening the material base
of culture in the Armed Forces. An extensive network of centrał cultural
establishments has been established and is in operation : the Central
Soviet Army Club named for M . V . Frunze, the Central Armed Forces
Museum , the Central Theater of the Soviet Army, and the world famous
Twice Red Banner Soviet Army Song and Dance Ensemble named after
A . V . Aleksandrov. We publish a greatmany central, district and large
edition military newspapers and magazines. The network of officers clubs
in the military is growing. At the present time, three times as many club
facilities are under construction as was the case 6 to 8 years ago. Each
year the military receives more than 100 different full-length feature
films and up to 250 documentaries. The Military Publishing House, one
of the country's biggest, each year publishes more than 350 titles — books
and pamphlets— totalling almost 17 million copies. There are now 6
times as many newspapers and magazines per thousand military personnel
as in the prewar years. The number of technical propaganda devices is
rapidly increasing. During the last 12 years the relative number of motion
picture projection units has more than doubled, the number of television
sets has increased 40 -fold , local radio broadcast facilities have more than
tripled , there are more than 9 times as many tape recorders, and almost
10 times as many club vehicles. The task is to ensure that all these
means, including amateur talent activities, military ceremonies, the routine
and facilities in our barracks and military bases, more effectively serve
the purpose of aesthetic indoctrination of military personnel.
Imaginative literature, motion pictures and the fine arts play an im
portant role in this area . From the heroes of the finest books and motion
pictures enlisted men, noncommissioned officers and officers learn to love
the homeland, to hate the enemy, and to be steadfast and courageous
defenders of the great conquests of our people. The party is constantly
concerned to ensure that the military-patriotic theme is broadly reflected
in the works of Soviet writers , motion pictures and the arts.
The spiritual and intellectual enrichment of our fighting men is sub
stantially promoted by the fine tradition of a cultural patronage relation
168
ship between the Armed Forces and the nation 's theater, music and other
artist groups.
The technical sophistication and physical condition of our fighting men
constitute important elements of cultural indoctrination .
The revolution in military affairs constitutes first and foremost radical
changes in weapons and technology. Nuclear missile weapons are power
ful and sophisticated . Conventional weapons are called conventional only
by tradition , for the combat qualities of tanks, artillery and other means
of combat have increased manyfold . Heavy arming of the troops with
themost diversified, complex equipment has predetermined a rapid growth
in the number of military occupational specialties and has led to an
abrupt change in the ratio of physical to intellectual labor in favor of the
latter.
The fact of sophisticated combat equipment and weapons is only one
element in the potential and capability to achieve victory over the enemy.
In order to transform this potential into reality it is important intelligently
to master all means of warfare.
Much is being done in the army and navy for the technical training of
personnel. Efforts include first and foremost planned exercises aimed at
gaining mastery of weapons and combat equipment in classrooms, parks,
and hangers , involving the most diversified teaching aids and simulators,
including electronic and programmed devices, as well as wired display
stands, monitoring devices, sound recording and other equipment. Con
siderable attention is devoted to efficiency innovators and inventors. An
active effort to improve technical capability and performance is being
conducted by party political and cultural- educational activities. Universi
ties of technical knowledge, technical lecture units and study groups are
operating at officer recreation centers and clubs. Military technical sub
jects are occupying an increasingly important place in the operational
plans of agitation and propaganda groups as well as lecturer groups at
tached to political bodies and party organizations.
All this is effectively helping to raise the level of personnel technical
sophistication . For example, among the Strategic Rocket Troops three
out of evey four men are class-rated specialists, while of the Air Defense
Troops almost all officers and the overwhelming majority of enlisted men
and NCOsare proficiency rated. The further equipping of the troops with
new hardware imperatively dictates the necessity of devoting even greater
attention to an improvement in the level of personnel technical sophistica
tion , with continuous improvement in the forms and methods employed
in this effort.
Lenin assigned great importance to physical culture and sports in the
overall indoctrination system . In a conversation with Klara Tsetkin he
stated : “ Young people are in particular need of buoyant spirits and en
thusiasm . Healthy sports and athletics — gymnastics, swimming, hiking,
physical exercise of all kinds— diversity of intellectual interests, the
169
exercise, the critique, research , and everything in a combined manner to
the greatest possible degree.” 21
The system of physical education under the conditions of capitalism is
aimed at replacing the strength of intellect with the strength of muscles.
But we, stated M . I. Kalinin , wish to develop man comprehensively, so
that he can run well, swim well, stride rapidly and gracefully, so that he
is a normal, healthy individual ready for labor and defense, correctly
developing his intellectual qualities in parallel with all physical qualities.22
Physical culture is particularly important in the army and navy . The
strength and power of the troops are comprised of many elements, among
which physical training is not the least important. Sometimes one hears
the statement that due to the colossal changes which have taken place in
the equipment of our army, the development of complex machines, auto
matic control and electronics, as well as a high degree of troop mobility ,
the soldier is not required , as was the case in the past, in the age of saber
attacks and marches on foot, to expend a great deal of muscular energy,
that he needs knowledge rather than strength . Yes, it is true that the
importance of a high degree of technical knowledge and skillful actions
with complex combat equipment has become immeasurably greater today.
But this does not mean that the role of physical conditioning has assumed
secondary importance. The exceptionally severe stresses of modern com
bat and the physical destruction produced on the battlefield by nuclear
weapons generate the necessity of a high degree of physical conditioning
and strength in the soldier of any military occupational specialty . Physical
conditioning will help overcome the great stresses of combat, will help
surmount obstructions and roadblocks and will help conduct combat for a
protracted period of time in protective gear. Conditioning increases the
organism 's resistance to the effects of penetrating radiation and helps in
maintaining for a longer time work capability and concentration of at
tention when standing combat watch and when operating sophisticated
equipment.
Young people have begun entering military service with excellent
health and good overall physical conditioning, thanks to the steady im
provement in the living conditions of our citizens and the mass growth
of the Soviet physicalculture movement. The following fact is noteworthy.
Young men of induction age in 1966 were an average of 8 to 10 centi
meters taller and 10 kilograms heavier than 1925 inductees. This has
made it possible to advance troop physical training to a higher level. It
is based on the “Military Sports Complex,” which more fully reflects the
features of military activity . It is more difficult to master this complex
than the Prepared for Labor and Defense complex, but nevertheless young
soldiers have been able to handle it.
Large-scale mass sports activities in military units and on board
naval ships, in which the pace is set by Komsomol organizations, are
helping produce an increase in the number of category-rated athletes and
masters of sport. Fifteen years ago there were 20-21 category -rated
170
athletes for every 100 persons in the Armed Forces, while in 1968 the
figure was 77 . Army athletes are making an increasing contribution to
this nation 's “major-league athletics” and to our athletic performances in
international competition. Excursion travel is developing rapidly in the
army.
Friedrich Engels once wrote that the victorious proletariat will be able
to create a new army, which will possess unprecedented strength, while its
soldiers will be stronger, more skillful and more intelligent than the
soldiers of the old army.23 The present state of the Soviet Armed Forces
convincingly confirms the correctness of this prediction by Engels.
Thus, embodying the ideas of Lenin , the Communist Party has achieved
magnificent success on the cultural revolution front. Ahead lie great new
tasks as formulated by the CPSU Program and resolutions of the 24th
CPSU Congress. Further growth in the culture of the Soviet people , a new
and powerful upswing in science , literature , art, public education , as well
as improvement in the system of cadre training will promote even more
successful forward movement by our country along the road toward
communism . At the same time accomplishment of these tasks will exert
a profound and comprehensive effect on strengthening the defensive might
of this country and on increasing the combat capability of the Soviet
Armed Forces.

Footnotes
1. K . Marx and F . Engel's : Soch. (Works), Volume 3, page 68.
2. Ibid ., Volume 8 , page 431.
3. V . I. Lenin : Poln . Sobr. Soch. (Complete Works) , Volume 45, page 381.
4 . Ibid ., Volume 9, page 155.
5. K 100 -letiyu so dnya rozhdeniya Vladimira Il'icha Lenina. Tezisy Tsk KPSS
( The Vladimir Il'ich Lenin Birth Centennial. Central Committee CPSU
Theses), pp 29 –30.
6 . Lenin , op.cit., Volume 45, page 372.
7. Ibid ., Volume 35, page 289.
8 . Ibid ., Volume 41, page 315.
9. Ibid ., Volume 44, page 174.
10. Ibid ., Volume 38 , page 143.
11. Programma Kommunisticheskoy partii Sovetskogo Soyuza (Program of the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union ), page 129.
12. Materialy XXIV s” yezda KPSS (Proceedings of the 24th CPSU Congress ),
page 203.
13 . Ibid ., page 83.
14 . Programma . . . , op.cit., page 130 .
15. Lenin , op.cit., Volume 9 , page 135.
16 . KPSS v rezolyutsiyakh i resheniyakh . . . (The CPSU in Resolutions and
Decisions) , Part I, page 433.
17. Lenin , op.cit., Volume 39, page 406 .
171
18 . M . V . Frunze: Izbrannyye proizvedeniya (Selected Writings) , Volume II,
Moscow , Voyenizdat, 1957, page 266.
19. Pravda, 3 April 1971.
20 . KPSS o Vooruzhennykh Silakh Sovetskogo Soyuza ( The CPSU on the Armed
Forces of the Soviet Union ), page 459.
21. K . Tsetkin : 0 Lenine. Sb. statey i vospominaniy (On Lenin . Collection of
Articles and Reminiscences), Moscow , 1933, page 78.
22. See M . I. Kalinin : 0 kommunisticheskom vospitanii i voinskom dolge (Com
munist Indoctrination and Military Duty ) , Moscow , Voyenizdat, 1967, page
294.
23. See Marx and Engel's, op.cit., Volume 7, page 512 .

172
Chapter X . Science as A Factorin Strengthening
the NationalDefense Capability

Science is an important element in the state 's military power. Lenin

comprehensively substantiated its role in the building of socialism and in
strengthening the national defense capability . He approached the problem
of the development of Soviet science not only theoretically but also
accomplished enormous practical work in this area, showing concern for
the development of a netwok of scientific establishments, and seeking an
increased contribution by science toward strengthening the combat might
of the Armed Forces.

1. V. I. Lenin on the Social Role of Science

Developing the theses of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels on the grow
ing role of science in societal development, Lenin in his writings com
prehensively substantiated the thesis of the objective necessity of the most
extensive utilization of science in the period of building a socialist
society . Socialism is in acute need of science by its very nature. It can
demonstrate its superiority only if it is supported by the most progressive
achievements of the human intellect and if these achievements are given
extensive opportunity for realization. " . . . Everything that man 's science
and technology have accomplished , all the improvements achieved, all the
knowledge of experts — should serve the unified worker," 1 wrote Lenin .
Every socioeconomic system , constituting a historical stage in the
development of society, is based on a more progressive mode of produc
tion , which corresponds to the achieved level of knowledge. In all ex
ploiter socioeconomic systems, however , the employment of science is
of a one-third character. It is subordinate to the narrow , selfish aims of
the ruling class. Only under socialism does society have a full stake in
the utilization of science . This is a vital necessity of the new social
system .
The building of socialism involves rapid development of the economy,
Lenin emphasized that the victory of socialism over capitalism is de
termined in the final analysis in the area of economic competition between
the two systems. It is possible to implement the magnificent plans of
socialist economic development only under the condition of vigorous
utilization of the latest achievements of science and technology in the
production process.
Lenin also stressed time and against the acute necessity of improving
the organization of production and its management on a scientific basis.
In the early years of Soviet rule he emphasized : " To learn to work is right
now the principal, truly nationwide task of the Soviet Republic . Our
primary and most important task is to achieve total literacy, and not
limiting ourselves to this goal, but proceeding further at all costs and
borrowing everything of value from European and American science.” 2
Utilization of science for effective development of the socialist economic
system and its management ensures increased labor productivity . “Labor
productivity ," wrote Lenin , “ is in the final analysis the most important,
the principal element for achieving the victory of the new social system .” 3
Socialism also needs the daily and extensive employment of science for
accomplishing another equally important task — the forming of the new
man . Lenin demonstrated in his writings that this task can be accom
plished only on the basis of the entire rich cultural heritage of mankind.
The forming of a communist ideological outlook constitutes the heart of
the process of educating the new man . A central position in this process
is occupied by Marxism -Leninism as an integral and well-balanced system
of philosophic, economic and sociopolitical views. While the capitalist
society utilizes scientific achievements, particularly in the area or psy
chology and educational science, to indoctrinate man in a spirit of private
ownership ideology and individualism , socialism for the first time in
history subordinates them to achieving the principal goal of the communist
society — the forming of a harmoniously developed individual.
The oganic link between science and socialism is expressed in the
fact that socialism needs science, while science receives under socialism
the optimal conditions for its development.
Science is a socially -conditioned process of cognition of the objective
world, results of which comprise a continuously -developing system of
knowledge, utilized by society to transform reality .
The social purpose, orientation and pace of development as well as the
nature of utilization of the results of scientific research are determined
not by science proper but rather by the prevailing social system .
Socialism radically changes the social purpose of science. Under the
conditions of socialism all the miracles of technology , all the achievements
of culture and science belong to the people as a whole, while man 's in
tellect and genius cannotbe turned into a means of violence and exploita
tion. Under socialism the goals of society and the goals of science are
identical, while the activities of scientists are consecrated by lofty hu
manist ideals. In our society there is no place for alienation of the results
of scientific research and their utilization to the detriment of the toilers
both of this country and mankind as a whole . Capitalism subordinates
174
the achievements of man 's genius to the selfish interests of the monopoly
bourgeoisie .
The conflict between the humanist aspirations of progressive scientists
and the character of utilization of their scientific achievements in the
interests of intensifying exploitation and making preparations for war
leads, as predicted by Lenin , to a situation whereby “ the number of
representatives of science , technology and art who become convinced of
the necessity of replacing capitalism with another socioeconomic sys
tem . . .” 4 steadily grows.
Under socialism science receives an appropriate economic foundation ,
based on public ownership of the means of production. Planned , cen
tralized development of the socialist economy and the objective interest
on the part of socialist society in the development of science creates the
possibility of raising the management of science to a level of national
policy, to unify it increasingly closely with production. The process of
rapproachement between science and production begins deep within the
capitalist system . Karl Marx wrote that " capitalist production trans
formed the material production process into the application of science to
production .” 5 This of course does not signify that science is the child of
capital. “ Capital does not create but rather exploits science.” 6 The process
of transformation of science into a direct productive force receives un
limited development in the socialist society , particularly in the period of
building communism . Precisely in the communist society " science will
become in full measure a direct productive force." ?
A distinctive feature of science under socialism is its democratic
character. This is particularly vividly manifested in the social composition
of scientific cadres. In the USSR and other socialist nations every citizen
who has the desire and ability can receive an education and can take
part in scientific work, regardless of age, sex, race or national origin .
Lenin not only theoretically substantiated the social role of science
under socialism but also was its outstanding organizer. It is well known
what great attention he devoted to scientists. During the initial years of
Soviet rule, Vladimir Il’ich fought literally for every scientist. When the
agreement of the Vice-President of the Academy of Sciences, Academician
A . V . Steklov, to collaborate with the new regime became known, Lenin
stated : “ One by one we shall win over all Russian and European
Archimedes; then the world , like it or not, will turn over!” 8
He worked hard to create the necessary conditions for the scientific
activities of Academician I. P . Pavlov, Professor N . Ye. Zhukovskiy, and
famed scientist K . E. Tsiolkovskiy .
Lenin closely linked the genesis and development of Soviet science
with solution to the pactical tasks of upsurge of the economy and culture.
He strongly attacked views of science as pure knowledge, with no con
nection to the country's vital needs. He demanded “ that science in this
country not remain a dead letter or fad phrase. . . That science genuinely
175
enter our flesh and blood, that itbe transformed into a component element
of our lives, fully and genuinely.” 9
Lenin was the first to state the need for scientific planning in this
country on a national basis. This possibility proceeded from the planned
nature of the socialist economy, from the moral-political unity of our
society and the common goals of the Soviet people. Never has any nation
taken upon itself such a task. Lenin drew up a program of scientific
research activities for the Academy of Sciences and all our country's
scientific and technical facilities, a program which was embodied in the
famous “ Draft Scientific and Technical Projects Plan.”
A most important feature of the political and military activities of
V . I. Lenin was specification of the problems of defense and of the
republic as particularly important problems, requiring the most efficient
solution . During the years of civil war, which were so difficult for the
republic, he sought priority financing and all-out support for those fields
of science and technology which were of considerable defense importance
or which would be in the future. For example , Lenin supported the idea
advanced by N . Ye. Zhukovskiy which called for establishment of a
Central Aerohydrodynamics Institute ; he wrote a special letter to the
members of the Central Committee Politburo on allocating 50,000 rubles
in gold to the Nizhniy Novgorod Radio Laboratory for research pur
poses. 10
An important role is played by the natural sciences in securing a
powerful upswing in the nation's economy, in furnishing the army and
navy with modern weapons and combat equipment. Our party leader
attached primary importance to the development of these sciences. At
his initiative such important scientific establishments were created as the
Institute of Applied Physics, the Lebedev Physics Institute, Optics and
Radium Institutes, a metals institute and others, which became the
foundation for development of the technical sciences. A number of major
scientific and technological enterprises are also connected with the name
of Lenin .
Lenin 's concern for the development of Soviet science inspired our
scientists to productive labor and daring search , helping them enhance
their role in accomplishing a historic task - transformation of the Soviet
Union into a mighty power.
Following the Leninist tradition, our party and state generously fi
nanced the development of science during the course of building socialism ,
creating for our scientists all conditions necessary for fruitful activity.
This could not help but have an effect on the level and results of scientific
research. Many outstanding achievements of Soviet science began with
discoveries made by Soviet scientists in the prewar years. It was during
these years that the foundations were laid for nuclear physics, nuclear
power engineering, physics of semiconducters, and the principles of radar
and theory of rocket design were elaborated .
Our scientists have made an enormous contribution to scientific and
176
 technological progress since the war. They were pioneers in the use of
nuclear energy for commercial purposes, they put man into space and
have carried out an extensive program of space exploration. The works of
Soviet mathematicians, physicists, biologists, doctors and representatives
of other scientists have won worldwide recognition.
A rapid growth in the scientific labor force constitutes an important
result of party efforts in the area of development of science. Before the
revolution , there were approximatelytis11,000
t scientists in Russia, while
scien iinn tthis
by 1940 a total of 98,300 were employed his country, with an increase
to 660 ,200 in 1965 and 930,000 scientists in 1970 . The total number of
of Soinviethis's ccountry
scientific workers ount has increased almost 85- fold since the
establishment of Soviet rule. At the present time, more than 3 million
persons are employed in the area of science, that is approximately 4
percent of the total number of persons employed in the economy. Two
hundred and forty thousand Soviet scientists are candidates and doctors
of science. A considerable job has been accomplished in the training of
scientific cadres in the most recent five-year plan. In the period 1966
1970 the total number of scientists in this country rose by 40 percent.
Under present-day conditions an important indicator of scientific de
velopment is the financial and physical support base of science, expressed
chiefly in the financing and supply of requisite instrumentation and
equipment. In recent years allocations for science in the USSR have shown
a steady tendency to rise. In the period 1964-1971, appropriations for
science from the state budget increased by 225 percent. In 1971, govern
ment expenditures for scientific research effort will total 13 billion rubles,
an increase of 8 .3 percent, with a national income growth of 6 .1 percent.
The social role and tasks of science have grown immeasurably under
conditions of the presently -occurring scientific and technological revolu
tion. The industrial revolution in the 18th and 19th centuries took place
primarily on an empirical basis, while the present industrial revolution is
closely linked with science and is largely determined by it. The organic
bond between science, technology and production has essentially con
stituted one of the fundamental conditions of the scientific and tech
nological revolution .
In the past, only the applied sciences were as a rule connected with
production , while today this connection includes the fundamental (theo
retical) sciences, particularly mathematics, physics, and chemistry. This
change has been caused by at least two circumstances. The first is con
nected with the revolution in science proper , in its very heart— the natural
sciences, serving as a powerful impetus to deepen our knowledge of the
world and of the laws of its development. The theory of relativity , quantum
mechanics and nuclear physics, as well as cybernetics , which when it first
originated seemed devoid of any practical significance, have constituted
the theoretical foundation of the scientific and technological revolution.
The point, however, is not only the level of development of science
proper. The development of science is dictated by the needs of social

177
production. The binding element between science and production is
technology in general and industrial technology in particular. The imple
mentation of scientific knowledge, its objectification in technology and
industrial processes have become the most important elements of produc
tion. The time from scientific discovery to its practical utilization has
declined sharply.
The present scientific -technological revolution is encompassing all
areas of production, including agriculture , transportation, and communi
cations. It has affected all substantial elements of productive resources,
the implements of labor, sources of energy and objects of labor. The
fundamental areas of science's influence on modern production are total
automation, power engineering, and new materials. Of particular im
portance is total automation of production, which constitutes a qualitative
leap forward in the development of technology. It will improve the
efficiency and effectiveness of control of the production process. The
extensive adoption of automatic devices will lead to a radical change in
production and will secure a transition from machine production to totally
automated production . Of particular importance is the development of
advanced automated production control systems. During the current five
year plan, the target calls for putting into operation at least 1600 auto
mated systems by industrial and agricultural enterprises and organizations.
The achievements of scientific and technological progress should be
come a most important means of accomplishing the plans of building
communism . “ Before us . . . lies a task of historical importance: or .
ganically to unify the achievements of the scientific and technological
revolution with the advantages of the socialist economic system , to de
velop more broadly those forms of unification of science with production
which are inherent in socialism .” 11
The need for an extensive utilization of science is revealed in all areas
of socialist society. One area is not engendered by the inner need of
socialist societal relations. The reasons for its existence lie not within
but outside of socialism . This area is the military, in which the utilization
of science is dictated by the tasks of defending the conquests of the
toilers against imperialist aggression .
Basing his arguments on the ideas of Marx and Engels, Lenin demon
strated that a socialist army can be created only under the condition of
utilization of all contempoary knowledge, with mandatory utilization of
the best thatwas produced by military theory prior to the October Revolu
tion. He emphasized that it is impossible to build a modern army without
science .
In his writings and addresses delivered to the men of the Red Army,
Lenin time and again pointed to the great importance of science and
scientific knowledge for building a modern army and tirelessly instilled in
military cadres a respectful attitude toward science and an understanding
of its role in defense of the socialist homeland .
178
 It would be wrong to view the relationships between science and
military affairs in a one- sided manner . Science is not only exerting an
increasing influence in military affairs but, on the contrary, the develop
ment of military affairs, the requirements and demands of the military
substantially promote the development of science. Marxism -Leninism
proceeds from the necessity of a concrete historical approach to this
problem . The history of mankind contains many instances of utilization
of the finest achievements of the human intellect for war. One of the
darkestmetamorphoses engendered by the antagonistic society is the fact
that military requirements constitute one of the stimuli of scientific and
technological progress.
Marxism -Leninism teaches us that the character of the influence of
the military on scientific and technological progress is manifested not
directly but rather via political goals. Science cannot have service to the
military as its separate and independent goal. Its primary function pertains
to the area of cognition and transformation of the objective world . But
the sociopolitical atmosphere in which science develops exerts influence on
the orientation of scientific cognition and its rate of advance. It defines
the nature of the relationship between science and social institutions as
well as the character of utilization by society of the results of scientific
effort.

Facts of present reality attest to the decisive role of politics in this

process. The finest achievements of man 's genius in imperialist armies
are subordinate to the narrow , selfish goals of reactionary, aggressive
elements. They employ the majority of scientific discoveries for military
purposes and thus threaten the peace, freedom and independence of
peoples. This was the case with fission of the atomic nucleus and the
development of the atomic bomb, which U . S . reactionary circles at
tempted to make into a means of pressuring the Soviet Union and the
other socialist nations, in order to consolidate their world domination .
This has been the case with modern discoveries in the area of chemistry
and biology,which are today being utilized by aggressive forces to develop
bacteriological and chemical weapons. Scientific research in the capitalist
world is assuming an increasingly clearly -delineated militarist orientation .
In the United States appropriations for military research comprise more
than 60 percent of all allocations to science.
Aware of the aggressive nature of imperialism and the danger repre
sented by militarization of science in the principal capitalist countries,
the Soviet state is constantly concerned with strengthening national
defense . This concern is clearly expressed in the resolutions of the 24th
CPSU Congress. Scientific capabilities and potential are being mobilized,
just as in the other nations of the socialist community, to accomplish the
tasks of further increasing national defense capability and strengthening
the Soviet Armed Forces.
179
2. Features and Means by Which Science Influences Military Affairs
The principles of thorough and comprehensive incorporation of science
in military affairs as specified by V. I. Lenin have received additional
confirmation in our time. The rapid pace of scientific and technological
progress on the one hand and ofmilitary affairs on the other has become
a prerequisite for new elements in relationships between them . We are
dealing with a new , qualitatively different, more substantial influence of
science on development of military affairs.
Today, weapons and all basic equipment of the services and arms
cannot be developed or operated, as regards design and other charac
teristics, without the employment of the most advanced scientific achieve
ments, and not involving merely one branch of science but rather synthetic
application of the conclusions and methods of a number of scientific
disciplines. For example, development of modern nuclear warheads and
missiles became possible as a result of advances in many areas of
knowledge — from physics and mathematics to astronomy and chemistry .
While science is becoming a direct productive force when applied to
production , in the area of the military it is being increasingly transformed
into a major element which determines the development of combat
equipment and military affairs as a whole.
Today, scientific knowledge, based on the discovery of increasingly
profound objective laws of nature, no longer follows behind practical
military developments, substantiating them theoretically , but frequently
strides far ahead, outstripping practical application and opening up new
and sometimes fantastic practical potential. The development of nuclear
weapons serves as a persuasive example of this.
An extremely characteristic new element is the sharp increase in the
number of sciences employed in military affairs. Prior to World War II, it
was, as a rule, the applied sciences which influenced development in the
military. This is due to the fact that the time lag between discoveries in
the theoretical sciences and their practical application was quite large.
Today, this lag has been substantially reduced. It took more than 50
years to achieve practical realization of the principles of telephonic com
munications, 15 years for radar, 6 years for the atomic bomb , and only
3 years for integrated circuits. It took 1 year to advance from the ideas of
quantum mechanics to a working laser .
There is taking place a vigorous erosion of the boundaries between
theoretical and applied knowledge ; the entire scientific knowledge front is
being applied to the development of military affairs. Today one cannot
specify with any assurance a single branch of science in which the military
aspect would be neutral. Every scientific field is either being utilized for
the military or there exists a potential for such utilization. An example
of this is the field of zoology, which studies the structure and functions
of various animal organs. This knowledge can be applied to the design
of technical devices. In recent years a new science has arisen — bionics,
180
which studies mechanisms of self-regulation and adaption to environ
mental conditions as existing in nature for application in technology .
Knowledge of the entire complex of sciences dealing with human higher
nervous activity , pharmacology , medicine and chemistry is being ex
tensively utilized .
A special place in the system of scientific knowledge is occupied by
military science , which studies the laws of war and warfare. Based on
various achievements of scientific knowledge as a whole , it elaborates
current problems of military organizational development and reveals the
laws of warfare. Soviet military science , which was founded by Lenin , is
continuing to improve its links with other areas of knowledge , becoming
enriched by the vast variety of scientific methods on the one hand and
making its contribution to a scientific understanding of the various aspects
of societal affairs on the other.
There has been a change not only in the character and number of
sciences employed in military affairs but also the sphere of their applica
tion. One can specify three basic areas in which the achievements of
modern science are being utilized most effectively : military hardware ;
combat operations control processes; human operators .
Military hardware , and particularly weapons, constitute a traditional
area of contact between science and military affairs. This relationship has
a considerable history . A particularly extensive application of science to
military affairs was generated by the genesis and development of artillery .
The development of the steam engine and metal-hulled ships demanded
more vigorous employment of science for naval development. Motoriza
tion of the army intensified the utilization of scientific knowledge for the
development of military equipment. Some types of combat equipment,
such as in aviation , could not successfully develop without the employ
ment of the large assemblage of sciences investigation theory of flight.
Contemporary scientific and technological progress is exerting a de
termining influence on all types of military equipment.
Military equipment is a synthetic concept. It encompasses all technical
devices with which the army is equipped. But all do not play an equal
role in military operations. Combat weapons are of decisive significance
among the numerous types of military equipment. The level of weapons
development exerts substantial influences on all other types of equipment
with which troops are armed. The term “ combat weapon ” has several
meanings. In the narrow sense of the term , combat weapon is defined as
that technical device which effects direct destruction of the enemy. A
more correct term is " technical system ,” which unifies in a certain manner
all essential elements and serves as a means of affecting the enemy and
enemy installations. The basic structure of a weapon consists of three
fundamental elements (parts ) : means of destruction , means of delivery,
and means of control.
The present revolution in military affairs in characterized by qualitative
change in all three elements of the combat weapon system . The technical
foundation of the first stage was transition from employment of chemical
explosives as means of destruction to utilization of intranuclear forces.
The enormous role played by science in this area is well known. Man
was able to utilize the immense energy potential contained within the
atom only due to the appearance of two fundamental scientific theories,
which in the final analysis led to the development of a new scientific
picture of the world. We are speaking of the theory of relativity, which
became the basis of relativistic mechanics, and quantum mechanics, which
provided a scientific explanation to intra -atomic phenomena.
The technical basis of the second stage of the present revolution in
military affairs is the employment of missiles as a means of delivering
nuclear warheads. Science also played an enormous role here. Soviet
science was the first to achieve outstanding success in the practical em
ployment of long-range missiles. Our Armed Forces received a reliable
weapon of practically unlimited range. The gigantic energy potential of
nuclear devices was organically combined with the potential of missiles
as a means of delivery . Thus arose the modern system of nuclear missile
weapons.
The development of science also led to a genuine revolution in means
of control. Of decisive significance here was the birth and development of
cybernetics. We should note that the development of this science was
dictated to a certain degree by practicalmilitary needs, particularly those
of air defense troops, which at the beginning of World War II were faced
with the ineffectiveness of utilization of conventional fire control means,
due to the increased speed of aircraft.
Employment of electronic computers makes it possible to automate not
only weapon controlbut also to expand the potential for automating troop
combat operations as a whole .
The control process is connected with the performance of operations
which are varied in character. With a certain degree of arbitrariness they
can be subdivided into operations based on the creative capabilities of
man and into noncreative operations connected with the performance of
various types of calculations. Today most calculations can be performed
by computers. Naturally the demarcation line between these two groups
of control operations is extremely relative. That which yesterday was
done by man alone, on the basis of his creative thought, today is per
formed by computers on the basis of computer programs. Consequently
we cannot place any limits beyond which control automation is im
possible. The deciding word in expanding capabilities of automation goes
to man , who was and remains the main element in a control system ,
although his functions constantly change .
Computers and other means of automating the control process are
appearing at military headquarters in increasing numbers. Total automa
tion radically alters organization and methods of troop control and assists
military cadres in sharply improving its effectiveness.
It would be erroneous to assume that the influence of science on
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military technology is manifested solely bymeans of its radical transforma
tion. Technological leaps forward are connected with the discovery and
theoretical substantiation of new principles of equipment design , utilizing
newly -discovered laws of nature. Nuclear weapons, for example, de
veloped in precisely this manner. The influence of science on a discovery
made by science does not terminate . On the contrary , it creates increas
ingly sophisticated technical systems which are capable of more effectively
utilizing the principle embodied in them . This is not a simple process of
improvement and refinement. It is also linked to a great number of sci
entific discoveries. For example, if we compare the first jet-propelled
aircraft with today'smodels, it becomes quite clear how fully the principle
of jet propulsion has been utilized in the most recent types. Science con
stantly continues to improve traditional military equipment, improving its
performance characteristics and increasing its effectiveness .
The present revolution in military affairs has advanced new and higher
demands on man — the principal force in war. Today a certain pattern is
becoming increasingly obvious: the more complex military affairs become,
the greater the theoretical preparation and training needed by military
cadres. The ability to think broadly , deeply and quickly, to see the
relationship between the part and the whole , to accept high goals and to
find effective means of achieving them demand constant cadre improve
ment. This objective necessity once again confirms the correctness of
Lenin 's thesis that the very finest weapon produces no effect " in the
absence of persons capable of knowledgeably utilizing the most advanced
military hardware.” 12
Comprehensive preparation of our fighting men for combat operations
under the conditions of modern war demands mobilization of a broad
scientific knowledge front. First of all, it is essential to condition them
from a moral-political and psychological respect. The social sciences are
extremely important in forming moral-political qualities in fighting men.
They confirm Marxist-Leninist ideology and sociopolitical ideals, which
become the basis of the fighting man's ideological conviction.
Communist ideals represent an enormous force. Ideals, however ,
materialize in men's actions, in their deeds, through painstaking ideologi
cal indoctrination effort. An important function here is performed by party
political effort, educational science, psychology, and legal science. The
organization of all this effort requires a solid scientific foundation .
Modern development of military affairs dictates the necessity of a
high level ofmilitary technical knowledge and performance capability on
the part of military personnel. The demands on general education and
special military and military technical training of personnel are higher
today than ever before. There is taking place a vigorous process of in
tellectualization of military activity. In the army and navy an increasing
number of work stations require scientific training. Frequently combat
activity , operation and maintenance of equipment are of an experimental,
scientific research character.

183
 In order for military personnel to obtain thorough and comprehensive
knowledge within a limited period of time, it is important to more
efficiently utilize traditional as well as to seek new forms and methods of
combat and political training and to improve the level of technical
knowledge of all categories of military personnel.
An extremely important task of science is elaboration of scientifically
substantiated means and methods of conducting warfare as well as
improvment in troop organizational structure. While the level of develop
ment of the natural and applied sciences is of determining significance for
military technology, and a decisive role is played by the social sciences in
elaboration of scientific methods of personnel indoctrination and training
alongside thenatural sciences, the level of development ofmilitary science
is of decisive significance for elaboration of methods of conducting war
fare. Military theory is a typical example of knowledge developing at the
juncture of many sciences.Military science is most closely linked with the
entire complex of the social sciences and with development of the theo
retical sciences. The natural sciences — physics, chemistry, and mathe

adoption of precise quantitative methods, simulation methods, and the

possibility of employing modern computer hardware makes it possible to
approach the study of methods and forms of waging warfare not em
pirically but in a scientifically substantiated manner.
It is to the credit of Soviet military theoretical thought that Leninist
ideas on science as a factor in strengthening defensive might are con
solidated and developed in the concept of the nation 's scientific potential,
which comprises one of the basic elements of the military power of the
state . Scientific potential signifies the capability of science to solve present
and future problems of the nation's social and economic development. At
the same time there exists the concept of military scientific potential,
which expresses the ability of the state, supported by the general state
of science, to solve all root problems, pertaining to strengthening national
defense. The correctness of this concept is dictated by the necessity and
particular importance of solving, by science, the specific problems per
taining to strengthening national defense and increasing the combat
strength of the Armed Forces .
Under the present-day conditions, the level of military scientific po
tential is determined by a great many circumstances. Of primary im
portance among these factors are problems of planning science taking into
consideration the demands of national defense and trends in development
of military affairs. It is important, thereby, to provide for priority financing
of those branches of science which are particularly closely linked with
military affairs, development of the experimental base ofmilitary scientific
research and training of scientific cadres of the requisite specialization .
Science as a whole should possess a flexibility of organizational structure
which will make it possible, at each moment in history , efficiently to
accomplish the tasks of ensuring the military might of the socialist state.
184
The organizational structure of science should proceed from the necessity
of taking into account the fact that theory runs ahead of production in
general and of military practice in particular. Finally , the organizational
structure of science has the task of unifying the theoretical and applied
sciences and securing rapid implementation of scientific ideas.
The level of military scientific potential is determined to a significant
degree by its quantitative indices, which are particularly important to
consider in determining the capabilities of Soviet science and the science
of the potential adversary . The need of strict consideration of quantitative
indices of military scientific potential derives from the correlative character
of the very concept of this potential. Important from the military stand
point is knowledge of the potential capabilities of our science not per se,
but in comparison with the capabilities of other countries.
The level of social responsibility of scientists and scientific teams and
their awareness of the significance of their efforts in the interest of build
ing communism constitute an important indicator of the potential of
science. An awareness of responsibility for the fate of their country and
its security is inherent in Soviet scientists. The Leninist ideal of the
necessity of defending the socialist homeland inspires them to creative
labor and scientific discovery . Outstanding Soviet scientists have always
considered participation in efforts to strengthen the defensive might of
our homeland as a sacred obligation .
The 24th CPSU Congress highly praised the contribution of Soviet
scientists toward the development of science , toward enhancement of its
role in solving economic problems and in strengthening national defense.
At the same time the congress emphasized: " . . . The Soviet people expect
them to redouble their efforts in order to accomplish the most vital tasks
connected with building communism .” 18
History has fully confirmed Lenin 's theses on the increased importance
of the social role of science and on its transformation into an important
factor of national economic and cultural upsurge and a strengthening of
national defense capability . Soviet military -philosophic thought is faced
with the task , utilizing Lenin's heritage of theory , of thoroughly studying
the relationship between science and military affairs as well as new trends
in this relationship under the conditions of the present scientific and
technological revolution .

Footnotes
1. V . I. Lenin : Poln. Sobr. Soch . (Complete Works), Volume 38, page 26.
2. Ibid ., Volume 45, page 206 .
3 . Ibid., Volume 39, page 21.
4. Ibid ., Volume 45, page 147.
5. Bolshevik, Nos 1 - 2 , 1932, page 21.
6 . Ibid .

185
 7. Programma Kommunisticheskoy partii Sovetskogo Soyuza (Program of the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union ) , page 74.
8. Cited from : M .Gorkiy: Sobr. Soch. (Collected Works), Volume 17 , page 32 .
9. Lenin , op.cit., Volume 45, page 391.
10 . See Leninskiy sbornik (Lenin Collection ) , XXXVI, page 397.
11. Materialy XXIV s" yezda KPSS (Proceedings of the 24th CPSU Congress ) ,
page 57.
12. Lenin , op.cit., Volume 9, page 156.
13. Materiały . . . , op.cit., page 87.

186
Chapter XI. Lenin ' s Ideas on Moral-Political and
Psychological Training of Troops

Lenin emphasized that “one should never forget the basic laws govern
ing every war.” 1 This of course also pertains to the law of dependence of
the course and outcome of war on the moral-political state of the popula
tion and the army. Vladimir Il’ich thoroughly demonstrated the import
ance of the moral-political factor in war and the principal means and
methods of strengthening it. His ideas and conclusions on this matter are
extremely valid even today. They comprise the basis of the moral-political
and psychological training of Soviet fighting men to withstand the un
precedentedly difficult tests of modern war.

1. Lenin's Theoretical Heritage — the Ideological Basis of Moral Political and Psycho
logical Training of Troops
Lenin noted time and again our army's enormous moral and political
superiority over the armies of bourgeois nations. Summarizing the ex
perience of military organizational development during the civil war
years, he stated that “morally - of course not defining this from the
standpoint of abstract moral philosophy but rather defining it as the
correlation of real forces of all classes in all states — we are stronger than
all the rest.” 2 This is determined by the character of the new system ,by
the qualitatively new social purpose of the army of the victorious
proletariat — a popular, international army, an army of free citizens of the
socialist Republic .
These are the main sources and objective preconditions which make it
possible successfully to form in Soviet fighting men excellent moral
political and psychological qualities, which are so important in the war
of today.
Bearing in mind the enormous role of the moral factor in war, Lenin
stated time and again that the training of “ human material” should not
reduce merely to the professional aspect. It mandatorily includes com
prehensive development of the moral forces of the worker class . They can
be developed only in struggle, which " reveals to the worker class the
measure of its strength , broadens its horizons, enhances its capabilities,
clarifies its intellect and forges its will.” 3
The essence of moral-political and psychological training as a com
ponent part of party political effort in the military consists in forming
intellectual and spiritual forces within the fighting man which , cementing
into a unified whole all his intellectual, volitional and physical capabili
ties, constitute one of the most important components of the combat
might of the Armed Forces.
Statements by Lenin on the essence of the moral factor and the moral
forces of society give reason to define them as a specific manifestation of
social consciousness expressing the spiritual and intellectual capability of
the masses to accomplish major social, economic , political and military
tasks. The moral forces of Soviet fighting men are defined as their
spiritual and intellectual capability to withstand the extremely difficult
trials of modern war without losing the will to fight and to win , the
capability under all conditions to carry out one's military duty to the end.
The degree of development of moral resources can be seen in one's
actions, one's deeds. Lenin noted that " the mood , motivation and con
viction of the masses should be and are manifested in action ." 4
Moral forces constitute a dialectical unity of the objective and sub
jective. Their objective aspect is determined by the nature of our system
and the needs of the progressive development of society . The subjective
aspect of spiritual forces consists in the ability to carry out to the end
one's military duties under the most complex situation conditions.
Describing the spiritual, moral forces of the worker class, Lenin
wrote that revolutionary deeds are performed by millions of individuals at
a moment of special upsurge and exertion of all human capabilities, when
all their consciousness, will, enthusiasm and fantasy are mobilized." Re
vealing the “ components” of the spiritual countenance of the worker
class, he noted that “ this extensive stratum possesses proletarian instinct ,
proletarian comprehension and awareness of duty .” 6 The spiritual capa
bility of revolutionary masses to stand and win in a savage clash with the
class enemy is based on the profoundly just character of the struggle
being waged by the proletariat and its army. “ . . . We can wage war
because the masses know what they are fighting for. . ." ? Imperialist
armies lack this source.
Lenin 's theses are of great methodological importance for revealing
the content and structure of the moral forces of the fighting men of
socialist armies, which encompass two groups of elements. The first
pertains to socioideological (" proletarian comprehension and awareness
of duty” according to Lenin ). These elements comprise the basic contents
ofmoral forces and define their ideological orientation . In them are most
vividly expressed the perceived class interests of the toilers, the goals and
tasks accomplished in war. This is a well-balanced system of socialist
views on war, its political goals, consequences, as well as ideas of
patriotism and internationalism , on the socialist homeland and its armed

188
defense , on the role of the masses and Communist parties in war. The
ideological elements of moral forces secure the moral-political unification
and solidarity of individuals. The socioideological aspect of moral forces
indirectly reflects the entire system of existing social relations in various
ideological forms of social consciousness, a special position among which
is occupied by the moral. It is not mere happenstance that the spiritual
ability of the Soviet people to accomplish large-scale social, economic,
as well as military -political tasks is called the moral factor.
Marxist-Leninist ideology, perceived and assimilated by the conscious
ness, constitutes the political, class content of the moral resources of the
Soviet fighting man and constitutes the basis of his strength of spirit. First
and foremost, it performs an ideological- cognitive function, enabling
one to formulate views on the world and correctly to understand the
purpose and goal of one's activity . Communist ideology is the foundation
of social optimism and confidence in the righteousness of our cause.
The 24th CPSU Congress stated in its Resolution on the Central
Committee Report that " the forming in the toilers of a Marxist-Leninist
world view , excellent ideological-political qualities and Communist moral
standards remains a central task in the ideological effort by party or
ganizations.” 8
Marxist-Leninist ideology also performs a communicative- regulating
function , with the aid of which ideological intercourse and social contacts
between people are effected. In particular, ideological traditions are trans
mitted on the basis of this function, which makes it possible to utilize
the valuable revolutionary and combat experience of the past in the
present. Lenin emphasized: “ . . . A solicitous attitude toward revolutionary
traditions is dear to us. . ." 9 He believed that the traditions of revolu
tionary struggle constitute a reliable guarantee of the succession of gen
erations, an important factor in the amassing of class, revolutionary ,moral
experience by youth .
Also of exceptional importance is the function of the social, moral
orientation of character. With its aid , real ideals “ to pattern one's life
after someone" are created for an individual. Numerous surveys and
observations indicate that the " spiritual standards” of our youth , including
army and navy , are grouped around such social types as the Communist,
revolutionary , creative and productive individual, and military hero.
Finally, Marxist-Leninist ideology performs the function of a direct
stimulus to accomplish assigned tasks. Its vitality and truth unify individ
uals and point out to them a common political goal, a scientific program
of action and methods of accomplishing it.
Sociopsychological elements comprise a second group in the structure
ofmoral resources. The elements of this group are formed to a substantial
degree under the direct influence of the environment, the social conditions
of life . Under the conditions of the army their content comprises a com
plex of vital concepts and impressions, a complex mosaic of opinions
forming in the process of daily military routine. These are fighting tradi
189
tions and customs, feelings, moods, service experience and habits. By
means of sociopsychological elements military personnel also can express
their attitude toward a war, its aims and character. Butwithout ideological
elements it cannot be profound and comprehensive, since political, moral,
legal and other concepts in sociopsychological elements are not at the level
of theory but rather in forms of mass, daily consciousness, which Lenin
called " vague ideology.”
The sociopsychological elements of moral resources perform their own
specific functions. They include cognitive (at the level of daily routine
awareness ), adaptive (adaptation to existing conditions) , control of rela
tions, and emotional- volitional functions. They all perform the role of
transformation of notions and social attitudes into concrete behavior.
The elements of social psychology are of a relatively stable character .
Emotions and moods are the mostmobile and transient. Traditions, habits
and customs are less mobile . The area of social psychology normally
contains many conservative elements of consciousness , vestiges of the
past and outdated notions. Under the conditions of a socialist army the
soil is less favorable for them . First of all, due to its nature , precise
organization and regulation of all aspects of military life; second, due to
the fact that daily routine (the most favorable environment for all carry
overs of the past) is closely and directly merged with military activity , and
the influence of the military collective is continuously directed toward
each individual.
Under the conditions of a socialist army, a collectivist character is
particularly inherent in sociopsychological elements. Here public opinion
can be revealed, the collective will tested and moods sensed more rapidly
and simply. This is due to the special function of military systems and
the enhanced social responsibility of military collectives for correct and
prompt employment of equipment and weapons of colossal force. Ideas of
defense of the homeland and the cause of communism introduced into the
individual consciousness interact with traditions, habits, with the entire
complex range of moral qualities, feelings and attitudes. Political ideas,
as it were, “ permeate” moral and psychological elements, act upon all
aspects of the human psychological makeup in a certain direction , and
concentrate ideas, will, and feelings toward the accomplishment of a
specific task .
All components of the moral resources ofmilitary personnel are closely
interlinked . The absence of or weakness of one of these inevitably affects
fighting capability and level of moral-psychological firmness of troops.
Even a strong will which is not enlighted by elevated communist ideals
may become a counterfeit jewel, for will without principles or ideals is
blind. Only a combination of passionate ideological conviction with
firmness , decisiveness and strong will produces individuals with strong
character, unbending spirit, capable of selfless deeds.
Hence derives the necessity of acting upon the entire system of ele
ments as a whole. There can be no separate troop moral or psychological
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training. This training should be both moral-political and psychological.
An analysis of the structure and content of moral resources based on
the theoretical conclusions of V . I. Lenin makes it possible to define the
essence of moral-political and psychological troop training under present
day conditions. It consists in forming in personnel communist convictions
and excellentmoral-combat and psychological qualities, ensuring constant
readiness for combat, intellectual and spiritual firmness, and an invincible
will to fight to victory.
Lenin 's theses and views on the problems of preparing man for war
constitute specific demands pertaining to moral-political and psychological
training of troops under modern conditions. The first of these demands is
indoctrination of Soviet fighting men in a spirit of communist conscious
ness and conviction. Lenin emphasized that it is necessary to accomplish
the principal task in the process of training and indoctrination — to in
doctrinate genuine fighters, individuals dedicated to the ideals of com
munism , with a highly developed sense of communist morality.10 This
process is decisively influenced by the social environment, by the circum
stances of life and daily routine, and by all the actual and vital conditions
under which the personality is formed. In the broadest sense, this can be
called influence of the Soviet way of life, which possesses a number of
specific features under army conditions. Substantial influence on the
accomplishment of indoctrination tasks is exerted by scientific organiza
tion of the system of training and indoctrination , as well as man's capa
bility of self-indoctrination and self-education. When all these factors are
focused in the same direction and are utilized in a coordinated manner,
positive results in communist forming of the individual will soon be seen .
Securement of coordination of the actions of various forming factors is
achieved by means of scientific control of the processes of indoctrination
of the new man .
One cannot overemphasize the importance of conviction ; it can weaken
the effect of the instinct of self-preservation and force one to go beyond
" I can 't.” The main feature of convictions is effectiveness. At a certain
stage they become a most important stimulus of man 's behavior, the basis
of his vital position. Achievement of interrelationship and interdependence
of convictions and behavior determines the basic content of military per
sonnel moral-political and psychological conditioning.
Another important demand on this process is securement of a unity of
ideological and psychological influence on man 's consciousness in the
process of training and combat activity. Lenin emphasized that intensifica
tion of ideological effect and party influence on the soldier masses can
secure a major " psychological shift” in the necessary direction.11
This demand presupposes influence not only on the ideological aspect
of consciousness but also on the social psychology , habits and feelings
of the fighting man . Experience indicates that the requisite moral-psy
chological qualities of the fighting man are successfuly formed only when
systematic , purposeful indoctrination of personnel is combined with crea
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tion of an appropriate " psychological climate" in the military collective.
One should also bear in mind that ideological influence on the masses is
achieved not only directly but indirectly as well, via social psychology.
Ideological influence on the consciousness of military personnel be
comes maximally effective only when it takes into consideration specific
conditions: the opinion of the collective , new influences and tendencies ,
specific conditions of the situation , etc .
The process of moral-political and psychological training aims not
only at forming unshakable conviction and willingness on the part of
military personnel to fight to victory, but also the forming of specific
feelings, habits and psychological qualities. It is important to bear in mind
thereby that in the psychological area base feelings and experiences which
hinder the development of moral resources are most easily preserved and
imparted. It is not surprising that, in the bourgeois armies, emphasis in
training the soldier of the “ nuclear war age” is placed on methods in the
area of social psychology . In the United States, a systematic campaign is
being conducted to " condition " the civilian population and military with
nuclear scares, campaigns to build atomic shelters, and various provoca
tionalmaneuvers. These pursue specific goals : to frighten the people with
a nonexistent communist threat and to inculcate a sense of inevitability
of war.
The principle of unity of ideological and psychological effect is most
fully manifested at field exercises when they maximally approximate
actual combat conditions. During practical field exercises it is advisable
to create situations which contain the element of risk and which demand
of the soldier volition , ingenuity and courage. “ It is impossible to produce
a courageous individual if he is not placed in conditions where he can
display courage. . .” 12 But in all cases the risk should be monitored by
the commander. Parachute jumping, river-crossing operations and the
simulation of “ emergency” situations on board ship are all devices which
prepare the intellectual and spiritual resources of the soldier and sailor for
heavy nervous strain and condition the will. A soldier becomes ac
customed to a sense of danger as an essential element of combat activity.
Experiments have proven that if the inevitability of a certain action which
contains considerable hazard or danger has been perceived and recog
nized, it is psychologically easier for the soldier to accept it.
Particular importance has been acquired by a demand which expresses
the objective necessity of maximum utilization of scientific advances in
the process of preparing " human material” for modern war. Lenin 's
thesis that it is impossible to build a modern army without science of
course extends to the area of troop moral-psychological training. The
following is a typical example . In September 1919, in a note sent to the
Republic Military Council, Vladimir Il’ich made a bold , concrete proposal
that the morale of the personnel in a certain military unit be boosted and
posed the question: " Perhaps this can be done scientifically ?” 18 This
emphasized the necessity of reliance on scientific criteria for achieving
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the stated objective. This is particularly important under present-day
conditions. Today it is impossible successfully to accomplish troop moral
political and psychological training without constant reliance by com
manders, political workers and engineers on Marxist-Leninist philosophy,
military educational science, general and engineering psychology , and
military ethics. It is essential for the achievements of these sciences more
deeply to penetrate the entire process of troop training and indoctrination .
In order to improve the effectiveness of this effort it is imperatively
necessary to improve, on a scientific basis, methods for selection of per
sonnel for specific military occupational specialties. Soviet and foreign
studies indicate that frequently not technical conditions but primarily
human , moral and psychological factors are the cause of equipment
failures and accidents. For example, according to the figures of U .S .
scientist Meysner [ transliteration ), 30 percent of malfunctions in rocket
systems and 66 percent of U .S . military air mishaps involve the personal
qualities of individuals. In difficult situations, some specialists become
flustered , lose self-control and balance and their rate of thought process
sharply diminishes. This is why, in determining military occupational
specialty, it is important to take into consideration the physical and
psychological features of the young soldier or sailor, his occupational
proclivities, character, temperament and other personality features. Scien
tifically substantiated selection will make it possible to man units with
persons who will operate equipment and weapons with maximum effect.
Modern teaching facilities make it possible to give an idea of what
may take place in the war of today with a high degree of adequacy. We
are speaking of special complexes of physical combatmodels and devices
in the form of special chambers, simulators , three-dimensional zones, etc.
With the aid of these facilities it is possible to verify the moral-psychologi
cal preparedness of military personnel for combat, and following multiple
repetition to develop and consolidate the requisite skills. Utilization of
such models can be viewed as a special form of practical training, as a
specific criterion of the validity of those theoretical theses which in the
past were tested only by war.
Thus Lenin 's philosophical heritage equips our cadres with a correct,
scientific comprehension of the sources, essence and structure of the moral
factor and the dialectics of the elements of its content, and points out the
most important areas of indoctrination of military personnel, constituting
a theoretical and methodological foundation for solving the problems of
troop moral-psychological training.

2. Features of the Moral-Psychological Effect of Modern War on the Moral Resources

of Military Personnel
Modern Warfare is not an impersonal clash between missiles. Just as
in past wars, man will play a decisive role in the war of tomorrow . The
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military technological revolution does not. " nullify ” , but on the contrary ,
enriches the content of one of the most important laws of warfare , ac
cording to which the moral-political state of the civilian population and
army determines not only the course and outcome of a war but also the
degree of preparedness for it. While in no way minimizing the importance
of other factors, one can assert that problems of ideological and moral
psychological training of troops for military operations are of particular
importance under conditions of employment of modern weapons. Man 's
continuous spiritual growth and improvement of his moral-psychological
qualities should correspond to dynamism in the development of weapons
and combat equipment.
A dialectical materialist approach demands that one examine both
factorsman and machine — in an organic unity , in a dialectical inter
relationship and interaction .
V . I. Lenin , criticizing the one-sidedness and absolutization of the
role of the morale factor, noted : “ They constantly refer to the heroic
patriotism and military valor of the French in 1792-1793. But they forget
about the material, historical-economic conditions which made these feats
possible.” 14 It follows from this that one cannot approach a given factor
metaphysically , one-sidedly . In practice this can lead to exaggeration or
underestimation of one's own forces and resources, those of the enemy,
and to the adoption of unwarranted decisions.
We should emphasize, however , that in the history of war there are
examples where poor technological sophistication was compensated for
by high troop morale and victory was won . In the Civil War in Russia ,
the revolutionary masses, lacking the most essential arms, equipment,
and provisions, compensated for all this with a passionate revolutionary
hatred of the class enemy and confidence in the ultimate triumph of
communist ideals. This secured victory. On the other hand, troops armed
to the teeth but with low morale ( Italy 's Ethiopian campaign of 1935
1936 ) achieved victory due to massive technological superiority . Today ,
as a result of the military technological revolution , weakness of one of
these components — morale or material- cannot be fully compensated by
anything else . This is why the socialist community, which possesses
enormous moral-political superiority over the forces of imperialism and
which is equal to imperialism in the military technological area , devotes
special attention to a harmonious development of all components of
military might.
The morale factor in modern war cannot play a decisive role by itself
alone, but only in connection with the material factor. Analyzing the
situation prior to the October armed uprising, Lenin wrote : “ The moral
preponderance is unquestioned; the moral strength is overwhelmingly
great; without it there of course can be no thought of revolution. It is an
essential condition ,but it alone is not adequate.” 15 He states that whether
or not the morale factor is embodied in victory depends on specific
objective conditions.
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 Thus the correlation between material and spiritual factors in war
also functions as a correlation between man and machine, in which
substantial qualitative changes are presently occurring. Man is increas
ingly relegating mechanical functions to machines, unprecedentedly in
creasing with the aid of machines his physical and productive capabilities.
The gigantic energy of nuclear weapons increases man's strength but does
not supplant it; diversified computers and cybernetic devices amplify his
intellect, but cannot replace his creative mind.
The military technological revolution does not simply increase man's
capabilities in war but also increases the interrelationship between the
morale factor and the technological foundation, imposing new demands on
the fighting man. Lenin believed that the development and utilization of
increasingly complex hardware is inseparable from the highest degree of
organization.16 This thought is particularly important today.Revolutionary
changes in the military have produced totally new concepts and phe
nomena- the discipline of combat watch , the discipline of operation and
maintenance of combat equipment, the discipline of interaction , the
discipline of control, etc. All these new terms emphasize that it is essential
to act in an extremely precise manner , smoothly, quickly, with initiative,
innovatively and with a higher degree of responsibility. A correct but
insufficiently prompt action may be tantamount to a serious error.
If the imperialists initiate a nuclear missile war, military leaders,
political entities and all Soviet military personnel will be faced with two
critical problems— securing during the course of the entire war firm
moral steadfastness on the part of all personnel, as well as securing the
undermining of the enemy's morale to the greatest possible extent. For
this it is essential to take into consideration all the features of moral
psychological influence on themoral resources of military personnel which
are inherent in a nuclear war. They can be arbitrarily divided into three
groups.
The first group includes the sociopolitical features of a potential nuclear
missile war. They boil down to the fact that if such a war occurs, it will
be an extremely savage, uncompromising class collision between two
systems. For the socialist nations it will constitute a sacred, profoundly
just war for freedom and independence, for the preservation of great
conquests. The exceptional resoluteness of the political and military ob
jectives of the belligerents will predetermine the unprecedently high social
and moral responsibility of each and every Soviet fighting man for main
taining a constant state of preparedness reliably to repel an enemy sneak
attack and to frustrate the enemy's aggressive schemes, and will demand
a selflessness to the pointof self-sacrifice .
Even during peacetime, training of personnel for the hardships of a
nuclear war it is essential to emphasize the social and moral responsibility
of personnel for their assigned task, because today the price of an irre
sponsible action even by a single individual is too high. The degree of
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responsibility of the individual depends on the extent to which the
individual can through his actions affect the destiny of others.
Instillment in each and every fighting man of a preparedness to
accept the highest degree of responsibility ( combat watch, acceptance of
command , display of personal initiative at a critical moment in combat,
etc ) is an exceptionally important task which is dictated by the socio
political features of modern war.
The second group of features of the effect of modern war on the moral
resources of military personnel is dictated by the character of new
weapons and military equipment. The extensive adoption of mechaniza
tion , automatic control and remote control comprises the essence of
the new stage of the military technological revolution — automation of
processes of troop control and control of their combat operations. There
is taking place a shift from muscle to brain , as a consequence of a change
in the relationship between mental and physical labor in the direction of
increasing the role of the former . The control process has become more
complex : the soldier must simultaneously perceive and evaluate con
siderable information received from various measuring instruments and
signaling devices. The load imposed on the intellectual-sensory sphere
sharply increases in connection with this.
Maintenance of a continuous state of troop combat readiness today
depends in large measure on the precision and reliability of performance
by personnel of various military occupational specialties, particularly
those connected with the most advanced hardware: radar operators, sonar
operators, radio operators, etc. Their responsible functions are monot
onous and tiring and demand extreme attention and the ability to concen
trate . There arises a vitally important problem — to be able to overcome
fatigue in all its manifestations, to achieve technical “ equalization” of
crew members. The equipment imposes essentially identical demands on
each (equal rhythm , speed, work load, etc ), while the type of nervous
activity, psychological properties, moral traits and way of thinking differ
from one person to another. It is very important to achieve total moral
psychological compatibility of all the members of a crew or unit, that is
where each understands the other without verbal communication, and
where each has a knowledge of the strong and weak points of all the
others.
The task of securing protracted flawless work capability thus is a
problem of the moral-psychological reliability of man himself. Operational
reliability involves such factors as time, information , the number of in
formation sources, degree of critical nature of the situation , interference,
etc. One must take into account the fact that the insufficiently trained
individual frequently does not act in conformity with the signal or infor
mation he has received but rather in conformity with that which he
expects or anticipates.
Higher demands on the moral-psychological qualities of the fighting
man proceed from these features, engendered by new military equipment.
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Much benefit can be provided here by military engineering psychology,
through “ adapting" machine to man. Even such “minor items” as lighting
and paint scheme, temperature, noise, etc. influence performance quality .
But the principalmeans of achieving this goal is further improvement in
the occupational performance skills of military personnel. It is not sur
prising that today the terms “ staunch” and “ courageous” are inseparably
linked with the terms “ skillful” and “knowledgeable.” An important
conclusion is derived from this : the moral qualities of the fighting man
can act as stimuli activating his know -how , skills, and knowledge. There
fore the forming of moral resources in fighting men is inseparable from
their military technical training.
Finally, the third group of specific features of influence by a modern
war on the moral resources ofmilitary personnel is dictated by the nature
of combat operations, their intensity, swiftness and other new features.
The logic of modern warfare leads to the conclusion that personnel
should be prepared for stern tests in advance, that is today. In all past
wars ultimate moral conditioning was achieved in combat. Today one
cannot count on this. Suddenness ofattack , the global nature and swiftness
of combat operations can lead to an unprecedentedly powerful “moral
blow " on the psychology of personnel. Therefore personnel must be con
ditioned in advance, developing in each individual exceptional moral
mobilization and endurance, the ability quickly to become free of moral
shock.
In the war of today a substantial percentage of the troops may not
directly face the enemy and yet at the same time will feel the danger
presented by the enemy at any point, in any area. Such a situation
produces protracted strain on nerves and morale. It is important for
commanders and political workers to find the possibility of reducing
psychological strain on the men. This may be manifested in switching
agitating, oppressive thoughts to active preparation for combat, to check
ing the readness of equipment, weapons, etc. The encouraging word and
cool, composed conduct of commanders and political workers are ex
tremely important.
The necessity of increasing personnel protection against enemy fire
and increasing troop mobility is expressed in the endeavor to place ground
troops behind armor. Autonomous operations by submarines and missile
carrying aircraft will be in widespread use. This will to a certain degree
increase in individuals a sense of partial isolation , which must be
attenuated .
Operations by individual units and detachments separated from head
quarters and main forces, without adequate information and communica
tions, will become typical. There will be a sharp increase in the possibility
of occurrence of the most varied , random events and numerous conflictive
tendencies in the course of the engagement and operation . Combat opera
tions will take place primarily under conditions of poor illumination
(night, smoke, dust ). This situation may engender in personnel a feeling
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of uncertainty and heightened alarm which always has a depressing effect.
It may be intensified , by the presence of a continuous threat of radio
logical, biological and chemical attack .
It is also necessary to be prepared from a morale standpoint for em
ployment by the enemy of totally new types of weapons. The experience
of past wars teaches us that the unexpected employment of new weapons
has always had a powerful moral- psychological effect on the enemy .
Notorious anticommunist theorist Herman Kahn states in his book On
Thermonuclear War: “We are steadily advancing toward even more
terrible weapons: neutron and cobalt bombs, guided military satellites ,
doomsday' weapons launched into orbit, control of the weather for mili
tary purposes,” 17 etc . These " predictions” border on science fiction , but
they do rest on a certain amount of solid ground. It is, therefore, so
important to foresee the morale consequences of the most unexpected
situations possible in the course of warfare.
The very picture of combat in a nuclear war will unquestionably exert
a powerful moral and psychological effect on the troops involved. They
may witness mass civilian and military casualties, enormous devastation ,
fires, experience extremely abrupt light and sound effects, sharp tempera
ture changes, they may be in an extensive flooding zone as a result of the
collapse of dams, levees, etc. A protracted period under strain will
inevitably lead to nervous exhaustion . The process of inhibition will
intensify, which can increase the danger of negative emotions and in
voluntary reactions.
Reading Napoleon's book Thoughts, Lenin copied out the following
statement: " There is a moment in every battle when the bravest soldiers,
following extreme tension , experience the desire to run ; this panic is
engendered by a lack of confidence in one's courage; the most insignificant
incident or pretext is sufficient to return this confidence : a considerable
art and skill consists in creating such incidents and grounds." 18 Only the
personal example of the commander, the ability of command personnel to
control the situation, their inexorable resolution to accomplish the combat
mission, is capable of returning to them this " confidence in their courage.”
In other words, a sharp jolt from without is necessary in order to free
one from temporary numbness and depression . The purpose of this
vigorous action by commanders and political workers to affect the
ideological and psychological elements of consciousness consists in each
member of the crew or unit focusing his entire will, thoughts, and senses
on continuous performance of his military duty. By means of this external
effect man overcomes temporary manifestations of spiritual weakness and
the social aspect of his behavior takes control over the biological, the
instinct of self-preservation.
The state of moral resources is determined to a considerable degree
by resoluteness of actions. " . . . A firm party line," noted Lenin , “ its
inflexible resoluteness also constitutes a factor of attitude, particularly
at the most acute revolutionary moments. . .” 19 Aggressive , vigorous
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actions always promote improved troop morale , the establishment of a
fighting mood, an upsurge of spirit, a burst of aggressive energy.
Essentially , resoluteness for command personnel consists in making the
most expedient decisions and persistently implementing them in any and
all circumstances, independently , swiftly , without hesitation . Degree of
resoluteness is manifested most vividly in a complex, critical situation in
which a commander retains clarity of thinking, coolness and a high sense
of responsibility for his actions. A manifestation of decisiveness is also
hindered by such negative moral and volitional qualities as fear of respon
sibility , lack of confidence, and doubt about the correctness of one's
actions. Lenin called indecisive commanders "milksops " and " dawdlers,"
who are incapable of securing successful troop actions.
" To hold out from the standpoint of morale,” stated Lenin , “means
refusing to become demoralized , disorganized , preserving a sober assess
ment of the situation, maintaining buoyancy and firmness of spirit. . ." 20
When a commander or political worker succeeds in exerting effective in
fluence on the volition, thinking and feelings of his subordinates, in focus
ing them on the flawless , continuous performance of their duties, any sense
of fear or confusion quickly passes and becomes an upsurge in morale , a
fighting, aggressive mood.
Moral resources are manifested most vividly in heroism , that is in
a deed or the conduct of an individual or group where one consiciously
accepts a higher degree of social responsibility and takes a step which
goes beyond normal, accustomed standards of behavior. Heroism is mani
fested in the form of a feat or deed .
The criterion of the heroic consists in the degree of correspondence
between subjective intension , design and actions on the one hand and the
demands of the objective laws of social progress on the other. It is not
the exceptional or unusual nature of a deed but rather its total conformity
with the main ideals of our era, with the ideals of communism which
defines the heroic. The highest form of heroism is self-sacrifice . Its sig
nificance consists in the fact that such a step usually becomes a source,
an initiation of a mass movement, making the unusual usual, as it were .
The history of our army and navy is rich in examples of conscious self
sacrifice. We all remember the deeds of thousands of Soviet fighting men
who, clutching grenades, flung themselves under enemy tanks, pilots who
rammed the enemy, and men who blocked with their bodies the death
spewing ports of enemy pillboxes.
Deeply -conscious self-sacrifice will be required to an even greater
degree in a nuclear-missile war. For example, it will frequently be neces
sary not only to cross but also to fight on ground with a high radiation
level. Certain units may be assigned the mission of destroying a hostile
missile launcher , missile storage site, etc. All this will demand of our
fighting men an extreme degree of self-sacrifice and the willingness to
achieve the goal even at the cost of their lives.
Thus modern war demands the forming in personnel of a large number
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of special moral-fighting and psychological qualities which are developed
on the firm foundation of Marxist ideology and communist ideological
conviction in hard work.

3. The Necessity of More Fully Considering Qualitative Changes in Personnel

In 1918, Chairman of the Sovnarkom , V . I. Lenin , and Chairman of
the All-Russian Central Executive Committee , Ya. M . Sverdlov, ratified
the “ Red Armyman 's Service Booklet,” put together by the Higher
Military Inspectorate . It was in essence the first Soviet code of military
ethics, code of the citizen , the patriot, the fighting man of the army of the
new world . In it we read the following proud, deeply-significant words:
" The Republic has given you a great trust: be honest, ruthless toward
our enemies , be loyal in service, firm and inflexible , be prepared to
accomplish the heroic deed , do not condone falsehood. Be aware that
behind you stand the people, the toilers of the world ; they are concerned
about you and are eternally grateful to you . Be sensitive to injustice , do
not allow the revolutionary flame in your heart to flicker out. . ." 21
These formulas and revolutionary ideals " have materialized ” and are
vividly manifested today in the moral countenance of the Soviet fighting
man. The excellentmoral- fighting qualities of the defenders of the socialist
homeland were demonstrated in the Great Patriotic War. They find their
embodiment today in the intense campaign to achieve a high degree of
troop combat readiness.
The essence of the spiritual countenance of the Soviet fighting man
and his most characteristic traits are determined by communist ideology ,
by the Soviet way of life. The sociopolitical conditions in our society are
characterized by intensification of the goal-directed influence of the com
munity at large on the development of the individual. The sphere of
influence of groups, their responsibility , potential and means of influencing
persons are expanding.
The military technological revolution has introduced many new ele
ments into the process of the forming of the Soviet fighting man. Its
influence on this process is refracted through the prism of social relations,
social conditions, and the system of indoctrination . The achievements of
science and technology, however, also directly affect the individual, his
inner world and occupational training. Certain features of army life are
changing; the pace of change in human activity has increased ; the flow of
the most varied types of information has sped up; new professions and
specialties are appearing (the number of military occupational specialties
has doubled in the last 10 years). All this cannot help but influence
change and development of the intellectual, moral and physical qualities
of military personnel.
Lenin stated that in order successfully to work with the masses, it is
essential not only to see but also to understand the changes which have
taken place in the “ human material.” Without this it is impossible

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promptly to introduce the requisite adjustments in the content, formsand
methods of ideological and psychological effect on the masses.
Substantial changes in the content of the ideological elements of the
spiritual resources of Soviet fighting men are characteristic in the new ,
present stage of Armed Forces development. A new element in the
ideological conviction of the defenders of the homeland is the fact that
this quality today is most vividly manifested in increased direct responsi
bility on the part of each for the fate of the nation , for the future . A
responsible attitude toward one's military duty makes it possible stead
fastly to withstand the trials of daily routine, which at times are more
difficult for the soldier or sailor than a brief test of spiritual resources
under exceptional conditions. The hard work performed by missile crews,
air defense troops, and naval personnel to maintain troop combat readi
ness is labor which demands " the most protracted , most persistent, most
difficult heroism of mass and routine effort.” 22 Even today the heroic does
not exclude the burst of effort, but its framework is being increasingly
determined by level of knowledge , experience and special skills.
A characteristic feature of the intellectual countenance of the fight
ing man today is a thirst for knowledge, an effort to penetrate to the very
heart of phenomena. Flexible, large -scope thinking, dictated by a high
level of education and special training fortifies moral resources. On the
other hand, a dogmatic way of thinking and attempts to bypass obstacles
with ready-made solutions weaken them . Experiments indicate that a
conservative mind, to which innovation and creativity are alien , is quickly
paralyzed by the heavy moral-psychological loads imposed by modern
combat.
An analysis of the statistical data of the forming and cultural-technical
level of military personnel makes it possible to trace an important trend
which is expressed in equalization of level of education of military per
sonnel. Under conditions of reduced term of military service, this makes
it possible more rapidly to cover specific courses of training, disciplines
which , as is well known, are organized with orientation toward the
average level of knowledge of the trainees involved . All this does not
signify, however, that moral awareness is automatically elevated with
increased education . This process is contradictory, complex and influenced
in particular by the degree of an individual's ideological conditioning, the
maturity of relationships in the collective where the personality is shaped .
A sharp increase in the volume of information received by military
personnel and certain trends toward an increasingly technical nature of
military activities and routine lead to an appreciable growth in the rational
element in consciousness. But harmonious development of the individual
is possible only with simultaneous development of the rational and emo
tional aspect of man's consciousness. All this signifies that a sharp in
crease in received volume of knowledge should be accompanied by
intensification of effort in the area of indoctrinating feelings of patriotism ,
internationalism , hatred toward the enemies of communism , etc. It is
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most successfully achieved in military labor with the aid of military
rituals, traditions, and the personal example of the indoctrinator in the
performance of military duty.
Many new elements can also be observed in strengthening of the
spiritual and ideological bond among Soviet citizens, among fighting men
of different generations. Philosophers and sociologists of the bourgeois
world frequently write about the “ generation gap,” attempting to demon
strate that this is also typical under conditions of socialism . In this country,
where all societal forces proceed from a single foundation , a unified goal,
there is no soil for such conflict. It is another matter that each new
generation, relying on the revolutionary experience of the preceding one,
advances further , further developing that which has been achieved and
dialectically negating the obsolete . Without this there is no progress.
This is not a “ social upheaval” but rather a revolutionary-critical succes
sion of generations. It is not surprising that during a mass survey recently
conducted by Komsoml'skaya Pravda with the question of whom young
people seek to emulate , 76 percent of those surveyed named representa
tives of the older generation : heroes of the Great October Socialist
Revolution , the Civil and Great Patriotic Wars , and leaders on the labor
front. A further strengthening of ties between generations in the area of
production , education , military activity, home and family is a most im
portant factor in the accumulation of moral experience by our young
people . This is particularly important if one takes into consideration that
approximately one half of our country 's population was born after the
Great Patriotic War. Fewer and fewer veterans who have experienced the
stern crucible ofwar remain in army and navy ranks.
General Secretary of the Central Committee CPSU , L . I. Brezhnev,
stated from the speaker's rostrum at the 16th Komsomol Congress :
“ Young people appreciate the deeds of their fathers. But self-sacrifice ,
enthusiasm , dedication to ideals and willingness to perform heroic deeds
are just as necessary today as in the past.” 28
Success in instilling all these qualities in military personnel is in direct
relation to how fully are taken into consideration the specific features of
youth and changes in the concrete historical conditions in which they are
manifested. Young people, stated Lenin , “must of necessity approach
socialism differently , not by that path , not in that form , and not under the
same circumstances as their fathers.” 24
The entire aggregate of political, moral and psychological qualities
is acquired by the individual as he adapts to socially useful labor and as
he acquires social experience. “ The moral-political qualities of Soviet citi
zens,” states the Central Committee Report to the 24th CPSU Congress,
" are formed and shaped by the entire socialist way of life, by the entire
course of affairs in society, but particularly by purposeful, persistent
ideological-indoctrinational effort by the party and all its organizations.” 25
Of great importance in this respect under Armed Forces conditions is
military labor combined with daily indoctrinational effort.
202
 In spite of the growth of healthy rationalism , today's army and navy
youth have preserved a romantic excitement, affirmative enthusiasm , a
desire to create and innovate, a thirst for the new . The romanticism of
the present generation of fighting men is first and foremost a romanticism
of action , of search , of accomplishment and performance .
One must also take into consideration the stronger manifestation of
such a moral feature as increased consciousness and sense of personal
dignity . Democratization of societal affairs and liberation of the con
sciousness from carryovers from the past enables one to be more fully
aware of one's own significance and value for the group and for society.
The dignity and worth of the individual comes out in various forms in
army life: strong resistance to everything false and immoral, in the form
of respect for one's comrade and one's unit. In cases where one con
sciously sacrifices one's personal interest for the sake of the interests of
others, personal worth and dignity is expressed in the form of nobility .
Sometimes, however, a false sense of personal worth and dignity on
the part of certain military personnel is also manifested in an unhealthy
reaction to critical remarks, a disrespectful attitude toward the opinions
of one's comrades, etc. These are all deficiencies of upbringing in the
family and school. On rare occasions such a reaction is due to a lack of
attention, rudeness, humiliating treatment and arrogance on the part of
indoctrinators. Lenin 's ideas dealing with self-discipline, self-organization ,
and self-indoctrination are becoming even more important today. The
trend toward self-indoctrination and self-discipline objectively proceeds
from the necessity of harmonious development of the individual.
With a growth in consciousness one becomes not only the object of
indoctrination but also the indoctrinator. This corresponds to the demands
of socialist development, where the role of independent control by the
individual of his activity and conduct is becoming steadily more important.
Essentially the ability of self-indoctrination expresses the degree of moral
freedom achieved by the individual.
A striving on the part of army and navy personnel toward self-indoctri
nation is a manifestation of an objective need to follow the communist
moral ideal. It is based on a comparative and critical analysis of one's
own deeds, as well as the behavior of those around, and is expressed in
the exercise of continuous control over one's thoughts , feelings, and
actions.More and more enlisted personnel, noncommissioned officers, and
officers are engaging in self-indoctrination . In many units, as has been
demonstrated by specific studies, approximately 80 percent of personnel
are either actively involved in this activity or are aspiring to do so .
Self-indoctrination is an important condition for forming one of the
most important moral qualities — self-discipline, which can be manifested
in various forms: in the form of self-monitoring, moral self-evaluation,
self-mastery , and self-sacrifice. It is important to strive for self- discipline
to perform not only a restraining function — to limit oneself in something,
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to overcome negative feelings, to stand up to temptation, but particularly
a positive function : to achieve, to do , to accomplish .
Military personnel self-discipline is acquiring particular importance
in connection with major technological changes in military affairs. The
fighter pilot, the combat vehicle driver and the radar operator are some
times alone with themselves for a protracted period of time. Frequently
self-discipline, that is conscientiousness of action , constitute their main
monitoring agent. Self-discipline can help a man control his own behavior
and control his feelings at moments of heavy stress. It has long been
known that inability to act emanating from within is just as dangerous as
a force from without. Every fighting man is strong to the degree to which
he can control his own weaknesses.
Of great methodological importance in troop moral-political and
psychological training is Lenin 's thesis on the necessity of carefully
developing the strong aspects and features of the military man and of
being implacably opposed to all superficial and alien elements. “ There
exists valuable military experience,” stated Lenin , “ heroism , efficiency ,
etc . There also is bad in the experience of the worst elements from the
military : bureaucracy, conceit.” 26 A resolute campaign must be waged
against this “ bad.”
One sometimes encounters young military personnel who are infected ,
for example , with skepticism . Healthy skepticism , wrote Karl Marx , exists
in all of us: it is an element of cognition, a striving toward proof, truth .
But we are speaking here of negative bourgeois skepticism , which most
frequently expresses not position but pose. Such skepticism weakens one,
makes one succumb to various random events and negative influences.
One also sometimes encounters unique instances of two-faced behavior.
Such persons say one thing and do another. They seem to be guided by
two programs of behavior: one in words, before others, and the other in
deed , alone with themselves. One also encounters certain cases of con
formism of the individual, unique complacency and timeserving. Usually
such individuals do not actively oppose the negative but accept it, and
therefore such persons adopt many far from positive manners, habits and
tastes. This is manifested , for example , in a lack of respect for one's
seniors and for order, in violation of communist moral standards and the
demands of military discipline. At times one also encounters such nega
tive phenomena as fear of difficulties, morbid pride, a certain mercenari
ness, vacillation of views and opinions, etc. It is therefore important to
help military personnel in toughening their character, in developing
volition , the ability steadfastly to surmount all difficulties of military
service. With this aim in mind, one should avoid petty tutelage, one
should increase demandingness and entrust young military personnel with
responsible unsupervised tasks.
Thus an analysis of changes in the intellectual and spiritual qualities
of the Soviet fighting man attests to a certain increasing complexity of
the individual, a broadening and deepening of his links with society , with

204
the collective, the appearance of new moral traits, habits , and features of
thinking. The increase in the complexity of the individual is expressed in
a great variety of interests and the appearance of new needs. It is im
portant continuously to bear all these factors in mind in the practical task
of indoctrination and training of personnel.
Positive changes in the social countenance of the Soviet fighting man
facilitate and accelerate accomplishment of the tasks of troop moral
political and psychological training. But these changes must be seen and
constantly taken into consideration in training and indoctrination effort.
This will foster the forming of the intellectual and spiritual capability and
willingness of military personnel to withstand the most complex trials of
modern war while not losing the will to fight and win victory over the
imperialist aggressor.

Footnotes
1. V . I. Lenin : Poln . Sobr. Soch. (Complete Works), Volume 44, page 210.
2 . Ibid ., page 300.
3 . Ibid ., Volume 30, page 314.
4 . Ibid ., Volume 11, page 58.
5. Ibid., Volume 41, page 81.
6 . Ibid ., Volume 38 , page 252.
7. Ibid ., page 50.
8. Materialy XXIV s” yezda KPSS (Proceedings of the 24th CPSU Congress ),
page 205.
9. Lenin , op.cit., Volume 16 , page 26 .
10 . Ibid ., Volume 41, pp 308 –309.
11. Ibid., Volume 38, page 36 .
12. A . S.Makarenko : Soch . (Works), Volume 5, page 424.
13, Leninskiy Sbornik (Lenin Collection ), XXXIV , page 221.
14. Lenin , op.cit., Volume 34, page 195.
15. Ibid ., Volume 11, page 367.
16 . Ibid ., Volume 36 , page 116 .
17 . H . Kahn : On Thermonuclear War, Princeton University Press, 1964, page 71.
18. Leninskiy Sbornik , op.cit., XII, page 383.
19. Lenin, op.cit., Volume 34 , pp 411-412.
20. Ibid ., Volume 44, page 229.
21. Sluzhebnaya knizhka krasnoarmeytsa (Red Armyman's Service Manual), Mos
cow , Izd. Voyennogo otdela VTSIK , 1918 .
22. Lenin , op .cit., Volume 39, pp 17 –18 .
23. Pravda, 27 May 1970.
24. Lenin, op .cit., Volume 30, page 226.
25. Materialy . . . , op.cit., page 83.
26 . Lenin , op.cit., Volume 42, page 221.

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 Chapter XII. The Role and Place of Ideological
Struggle in Modern Warfare

The 24th CPSU Congress noted that we are living under conditions of
an unabating ideological struggle which imperialist propaganda is waging
against our country and the world of socialism using the most refined
techniques and powerful technical means. After revealing profoundly the
reactionary essence of modern bourgeois ideology, the congress called
for an uncompromising offensive struggle to be waged against it. In this
regard the task of studying the specific nature of the given form of struggle
takes on special importance, including in the military sphere, where
ideology acts as a special means of warmaking.
The philosophical heritage of V . I. Lenin has longlasting importance
for a proper understanding of the place and role of ideological struggle in
modern warfare.

1. Ideological Struggle and War

War always has been a stern and cruel test of all material and spiritual
forces of the nations and states taking part. War involving the use of
nuclear weapons of unprecedented destructive force will plunge the
nations into an even more serious test. It is not only military and tech
nological, but also spiritual andmoral-political superiority over the enemy
which will be required to attain victory in such a war.
In underling the role of moral spirit in warfare, Lenin wrote that “ in
any war victory in the final account is determined by the state of morale
of those masses who are spilling their blood on the battlefield .” 1 Based
on this, with his inherent energy , Lenin sought to achieve from command
and political cadres during the years of civil war and foreign military
intervention, especially from the party members, active, purposeful po
litical work among soldiers of the Red Army to strengthen their revolu
tionary spirit and class consciousness and to instil in them courage,
steadfastness, discipline, and other important moral-combat qualities
ensuring victory over the enemy. Lenin personally took part in this work.
Meeting with Red-Army men, commanders, and political workers at
rallies and meetings, he demonstrated a brilliant example of influence
upon masses of soldiers .
206
 The stability of troop morale depends on the conviction of the rank
and - file masses as to the just nature of the war in which they sacrifice
their lives. If they recognize the cause for which they struggle to be just,
they fight with enthusiasm . Lenin pointed out that " conviction as to the
justness of war and recognition of the need to sacrifice one's life for the
good of one's brothers elevates the spirit of soldiers and forces them to
endure unheard of burdens.” 2 In contrast, an understanding of the unjust
nature of a given war gives rise to a negative attitude toward it. All this
determines the importance and need for ideological, moral, political, and
psychological influence on the masses of servicemen.
In the course of war ideological influence is directed not only within ,
at one's troops, but also without, at the troops and populace of the
enemy. The first task , of course , is the main and decisive one, but ex
perience has shown that successful accomplishment of the second task
also plays no little part in winning victory .
We know that, having unleashed an unjust war, the bourgeoisie con
ceals from the rank -and-file of soldier masses its true purposes. The
bourgeoisie attempts to pass off its own mercenary interests as the in
terests of all the people . The problem is to reveal to the soldiers and the
entire populace of a given country the criminal goals of the bourgeois
government and incite the masses to refuse to be accomplices to the
crime.
When the hordes of Kaiser Germany moved against the young Soviet
republic at the beginning of 1918 in order to crush it, Lenin declared
that “ . . . We must fight German imperialism not only through national
war, but also through propaganda and by demoralizing it from within .” 3
Advanced during a period of struggle against German imperialism , this
task remained one of the most important for the duration of the entire
Civil War and foreign military intervention .
The instances of Lenin 's personal participation in compiling agitation
and propaganda materials attest to the great significance which he at
tached to the organization of political work among the populace of
bourgeois states and among the invading troops. Il’ich expressed the idea
of returning prisoners of war to the enemy even before the end of combat
operations for the purpose of spreading the truth about the policy of the
Bolsheviks and the Soviet power. He took interest in the details of con
ducting propaganda among the invading troops and gave instructions as
to how best to organize this matter. In a message to the commander -in
chief of Sixth Army, Lenin wrote : “ I am fully in sympathy with your
plan to release the prisoners of war, but certainly only a few and ex
clusively those who have responded to propaganda really well. Telegraph
me immediately , if necessary, the number of prisoners you have, of what
nationality , and how many have responded to propaganda." 4
In a message to I. S. Unshlikht in March 1920, Vladimir Il’ich cautions
about a possible war with White Poland and at the same time stresses:
“We are doing everything possible to strengthen the defenses. We must
207
also intensify immensely the agitation in the Polish language.” 5 And then ,
in August 1920, when combat operations by the Red Army had begun
against White Polish troops, Lenin demands that the Western Front
Revvoyensovet [Revolutionary Military Council ] "multiply tenfold the
agitation from airplanes for the Polish workers and peasants, to the effect
that their 'capitalists are disrupting the peace and condemn them for
aimless bloodshed.” 6
Widespread propaganda was conducted among enemy troops using
leaflets, brochures, and posters. In all during the years of civil war the
political organs of the Red Army published and disseminated approxi
mately 20 million leaflets and brochures among enemy troops.
Our truthful agitation and propaganda weakened the troops of the
intervention and White Guards. Instances of demoralization among enemy
troops (such as the uprising of sailors of the French squadron and of
soldiers of Anglo-Franco -American troops in the Far East and in the
North ) tell convincingly of its effectiveness.
Soviet propaganda among enemy troops during the Great Patriotic War
assumed exceptionally great scope. Relying on Leninist ideas, the ideologi
cal struggle against fascist German invaders was waged under the leader
ship of the Central Committee of the party by political organs of the
Army and Navy, the All-Union Radio Committee, the Soviet Information
Bureau, and partisan detachments. This active, diversified work facilitated
the undermining of the combat effectiveness of enemy troops and achieve
ment of their total destruction . It largely aided also in profound socio
political transformations which occurred in all countries liberated by the
Soviet Army.
The political direction of our propaganda during the Great Patriotic
War stemmed from the main military mission of destroying the fascist
German invaders , defending the socialist achievements of the Soviet
people, and saving the world from fascist enslavement.
UL.

There is great importance for the successful conduct of ideological

struggle against the enemy in time of war in the correct understanding
of the place and role of ideological weapons in the overall system of
military efforts. Historical experience shows that two extreme, and
therefore erroneous, points of view existed in the understanding of this
question . One of them was expressed in an underestimation , and even an
ignoring, of the ideological method of exerting influence on the enemy.
The other lay in excessive exaggeration of the capabilities of ideological
means of struggle, which allegedly were almost capable of replacing the
means of armed warfare.
Lenin, who engaged in a great deal of study of the methods and forms
of the conduct of struggle among classes and states, provided a funda
mental solution to the question of the place of ideological influence in
wars. Extracting lessons from the revolutionary struggle of Paris Com
munards, he formulated a very important law : in wartime priority belongs
208
to the armed struggle , while all the rest of the nonmilitary means, includ
ing ideological ones, occupy a subordinate position.
In Lenin's opinion , one of the mistakes of the Paris Communards lay
in the fact that they underestimated the purely military means of struggle
and overestimated the possibilities of accomplishing the main tasks
through ideological, moral means. Here is how Lenin expressed this
thought in the article “ The Lessons of the Commune" : " . . . It was
necessary to destroy its enemies, but it (the proletariat - Ed .) attempted
to influence them morally, disregarding the significance of purely military
actions in civil war . . . ." ?
The revolutionary activity of our party was a model of harmonious
combination of all methods and forms of struggle of the proletariat to
establish their dictatorship . During preparations for the socialist revolu
tion , Lenin constantly directed the party's work , both toward organiza
tional work to create and train detachments of the revolutionary army
capable by force of arms of breaking the resistance of the autocracy and
the bourgeoisie , and toward developing systematic and purposeful agita
tion and propaganda among the broadest masses of workers to explain
the goals and missions of the struggle and to expose the despotism ,
violence , and crimes of the exploiting classes and the reactionary essence
of the entire political superstructure of the autocratic system .
During the Civil War and foreign military intervention, military opera
tions against the invaders and White Guards on the fronts were organically
combined with agitation -propaganda measures. Herein lay the charac
teristic feature of the Leninist style of military leadership .
With regard to influence on the enemy, if we compare the afore
mentioned two methods of struggle and determine the proportion of each
of them in winning victory , it is necessary to stress that tsarism and the
bourgeoisie were felled by dint of the revolutionary onslaught of workers
and peasants and by military force, and not by methods of persuasion
and agreements. Our final victory over the invades and the White Guards
was won in just the samemanner to a deciding extent by force of arms on
the battlefield .
Lenin pointed out: “ If we had attempted to act with words and per
suasion or exert influence in some other way than by terror on these
troops, who had been created by international rapaciousness and who
had become brutal from war, we would not have held out even for two
months and would have been fools." 8
However, all this does not in the least belittle the role of the ideological
weapon in warfare . Lenin himself repeatedly noted the exceptional in
fluence of agitation -propaganda work against invading soldiers on the
course and outcome of the war, which was successful for us. In analyzing
the causes for our victories over the invaders, he said at the 7th All
Russian Congress of Soviets: “We won three enormous victories over the
Entente, and they were far from being only military victories.” We
brought over to our side soldiers of countries at war with us who openly

209
refused to fight against the state of workers and peasants. “ Through
agitation and propaganda we took the Entente 's own troops away from
it.” 10
Relying on Lenin 's idea about the priority of violent means of struggle
against the enemy over nonviolent means in the process of warmaking,
the closest comrade-in -arms of Vladimir Il’ich, outstanding general and
military theoretician , M . V . Frunze, wrote: “ . . . In our calculations for
future operations and in an analysis of the character of future engage
ments we must give chief attention within our own military organization ,
not to hopes for the political demoralization of our enemy, but to the
moment of the actual possibility of actively and physically crushing
him .” 11
Subsequent military experience to an even greater degree confirmed
Lenin 's thesis that in war armed struggle plays a leading role in winning
victory. For example , no matter how significant our propaganda was
against fascist Germany during the years of the Great Patriotic War, we
won the decisive victory thanks to the successful combat operations of
the Soviet Armed Forces.
The recognition that ideological struggle can be employed in warfare
as a unique weapon demands clarification of its specifics, i.e., of what is
unique and typical and inherent only to it. In contrast to the means of
armed struggle, the ideological weapon does not slay. Acting on the
awareness and emotions of people , it causes certain changes in their views
and feelings. In changing the way of thinking and feeling, it has more or
less influence on people's work in material production and on the battle
field .
The ideological weapon is a means of persuasion , and not of physical
coercion. Herein lies its fundamental distinction . In armed struggle a
situation of hopelessness and no way out is created for one of the sides ,
and it is forced to submit to another's will by force. However, in the
process of ideological attitudes, people change their behavior merely by
rejecting their previous convictions and accepting new ones. A certain
amount of time is needed for this. In a report to the 2nd All-Russian
Congress of Political Education Administrations on 17 October 1921,
Lenin established the difference between military and cultural tasks. He
had in mind military actions when he said military tasks, and the entire
system of political education when he said cultural tasks. Vladimir Il'ich
said : “ In war it is possible to win in several months, but it is impossible
to win culturally in such a time frame. Here we need a longer period by
the very nature of things, and we must adapt to this longer period by
calculating our work and displaying the greatest persistence, insistence,
and systematic character.” 12
This thesis of Lenin 's about the specific nature of ideological work
(as a part of cultural work ) gives us an important guiding thread : to
display stubbornness , persistence and build our activity in a certain system
210
and sequence, counting on winning the awareness and feelings of people
over a more or less extended period, and not at one leap.
The ideological weapon possesses the capability of affecting the aware
ness and behavior of people a long while after its application. People
recall for a long time the statements and arguments cited in the course of
ideological struggle. This circumstance requires the display of caution
and circumspection in formulating political slogans and appeals. But one
also cannot help considering what kind of response they elicit and how
effective they are.
Just what basic goals do the combatants pursue in conducting ideologi
cal struggle ? Everything here depends on which class is waging the war
and what political goals are being pursued .
The goals in ideological struggle in warfare can be divided purely
arbitrarily into strategic and tactical goals. The strategic goal is de
termined by the political goals of warfare and is connected with the war
plan as a whole . Thus, during the years of civil war and foreign military
intervention , Lenin defined the strategy of our propaganda as a com
ponent of the struggle for a world socialist revolution, inasmuch as the
political strategy of that period had a clearly outlined goal: to expand our
revolution and spread it to other countries with a simultaneous strengthen
ing of the dictatorship of the proletariat in Russia . During the years of
the Great Patriotic War the strategy of our propaganda included mobiliz
ing the masses for defense of the first socialist state in the world , exposing
the inhuman ideology of fascism , and mobilizing all progressive forces
for the antifascist liberation struggle.
The tactical (operational) goal of agitation-propaganda work against
enemy troops and population lies in undermining or weakening the morale
of a specific group of enemy troops and the populace of the adjoining
regions, as well as stopping enemy ideological diversions directed against
our own troops and populace .
In the foreground of strategic propaganda are political and ideological
questions involving an understanding of the character of the social and
political system of states of the warring sides, the class content of the
domestic and foreign policies they conduct, the nature and political goals
of the war, etc. This propaganda is conducted primarily by statewide
political and ideological organizations.
Tactical propaganda encompasses questions of the moral-political and
psychological condition of specific groups of the populace and troops of
the enemy. The moral-political condition usually is characterized by the
ideological-political conviction of people, morality (elements of ideology ) ,
the social sentiments and feelings dominating in a given group of people
(elements of social psychology), and finally , peculiarities of behavior of
each personality in a dangerous situation (elements of individual psy
chology).
The success of ideological struggle under war conditions depends
largely on the ability to act upon the ideology , social psychology, and
211
individual psychology of those people, collectives, classes, and other
social groups which are the objects of the propaganda and agitation.
Ideological propaganda represents a system of spiritual influence on
an ideological- theoretical level. Its chief goal is to influence the ideological
persuasions of people in the necessary direction. This is achieved by
explaining the character and political goals of the war and the values of
the social and state system of the combatants, characterizing the political
countenance of parties and concrete state , party, and military figures in
power, demonstrating the historical past of peoples of the combatant
countries, their culture, everyday lives, traditions, etc. Arguments based
on political and legal teachings, ethical and esthetic views, philosophical
and religious (atheistic ) views are the basis of influence upon the ideologi
cal convictions of people.
Ideological propaganda is conducted primarily from the pages of theo
retical and sociopolitical journals, newspapers , books, and also with
leaflets, radio and television broadcasts, lectures, talks, etc. Such propa
ganda exerts influence primarily through the system of logical categories.
It stands to reason that in ideological warfare agitational techniques
are also used in addition to propaganda techniques at the ideological
theoretical level, but the chief role here belongs to propaganda.
The ideological struggle cannot be limited only to effects upon the
ideological-theoretical convictions of people , first of all, because not all
people are prepared to perceive arguments based on theoretical con
siderations; and secondly, the military situation itself places many limita
tions on propaganda. All this presumes a systematic propaganda and
agitation influence on social sentiments which are made concrete in the
class and national psychology of the populace and the troops.
Each social layer (class, nation , and even professional group, including
themilitary) has its own specific traits of psychology which have enormous
influence on the behavior, actions, and deeds of people. Therefore, in
organizing and conducting agitation and propaganda it is important to
recall the following statement by Lenin : “ . . . One must learn to approach
the masses with special patience and caution so as to be able to under
stand the peculiarities and unique psychological traits of each layer and
profession . . . ." 18
The ideological direction and goal of propaganda and agitation affect
ing the system of social sentiments are the very same as are in propaganda
at the theoretical level. The distinction lies in methods of argumentation
and proof which are drawn in the given instance from the class, national,
or professional psychology.
In the agitation and propaganda resting on arguments of social psy
chology there comes to the foreground a sharpening of such social senti
ments as patriotism , internationalism , class and national sympathies and
antipathies, national self-awareness, etc. This is achieved primarily
through mass newspapers, leaflets, radio broadcasts, loudspeaker installa
212
tions, posters, drawings , transparencies, speeches at rallies and meetings,
films, theatrical presentations, etc .
The task of propaganda and agitation lies in exerting constant and
systematic influence upon the ideological-political and sociosensual mo
tives for the actions of people in wartime. At the same time, one cannot
discount motives for actions and deeds of people based on satisfaction of
Jieir organic needs as well as needs dictated by the instinct of self
preservation .
“ The spontaneity of war is a danger . In wartime there is not a single
minute where one is not surrounded by dangers," remarked Lenin .14
The degree of influence of this spontaneity on different people under
different sociohistorical conditions is not identical. But people always
encounter serious tests under all conditions, and understand that danger
of losing their lives lies in wait for them at every step .
Different types of weapons cause a differing degree of fear in people
who are subjected to their influence. The greater the power of destructive
effects of a weapon and the more sophisticated the system ensuring a hit
on target, the greater is the probability of destruction and, consequently ,
the stronger this weapon acts upon the psychology of the individual. The
degree of psychological depression of the troops increases not only under
the influence of the destructive might of a weapon , but also under the
influence of certain other factors (lack of reliable means of protection ,
insufficient combat experience, etc. ) .
The possible broad employment of nuclear missiles for accomplishing
many combat missions by various branches of the armed forces and
target will facilitate an even more powerful effect on the morale of the
populace and troop personnel.
It is possible to intensify or weaken the moral-psychological feelings
caused by the influence of means of armed warfare by the use of ideologi
cal measures. The employment of the latest achievements of science and
technology for purposes of destroying people and enormous material
values may be reinforced by the use to an unprecedented scale of ideologi
cal and psychological means and methods of crushing the will of the
enemy to resist.
During World War II, Soviet organs engaged in political work among
the enemy populace and troops employed various methods of agitation
propaganda influence upon the psychology of the individual fascist Ger
man soldier. Special attention was given to a demonstration of the growing
combat might of the Soviet Union and its army. Soviet propaganda
inspired in the Hitlerite warriors the thought of the inevitable downfall of
fascist Germany and its war machine, and of the irrevocable retribution
for all evil deeds done by the fascists against the Soviet people. And these
were not just words, but convincing, authentic facts about the might of
Soviet military equipment, about losses by the fascist army, about the
growing combat activity of our troops, about improvements in military
art, and about the constantly growing Soviet military production. Leaflets
and radio broadcasts directed to specific units and subunits which were in
a hopeless or difficult situation had a great psychological effect on the
morale of the fascistGerman troops.
Such are the basic ways of exerting influence upon the morale of the
enemy. Their correlation varies and depends on the social-class and
military -technical conditions. Decisive importance of Soviet propaganda
is attached to arguments from the field of ideology and social psychology.
The appeal by our propaganda to the so -called " primary human senses"
always bore a subordinate character and was dictated by revolutionary
expediency.
The basis of propaganda for reactionary regimes always was and always
will remain an appeal to the base human passions, emotions, and also the
nationalistic prejudices. Contemporary bourgeois propaganda bears such
a character. The theoreticians or bourgeois ideology themselves admit
this .
The influence of military -technical conditions on the correlation of
ideological theoretical and psychological arguments in propaganda de
pends on the concrete military -political situation and the nature ofmeans
of armed conflict to be employed in warfare . In the first period of the past
war, when Hitlerite propaganda succeeded in corrupting ideological sig
nificantmasses of the populace and soldiers ofGermany, and the Hitlerite
army had very tangible military successes, Soviet propaganda was lacking
on the ideological-theoretical and social- class level. It became necessary
to make substantial adjustments in order to increase its influence on the
psychology of the fascist invaders. This heightened the effectiveness of our
influence on enemy troops.
The new destructive capabilities of weapons, incomparable with previ
ous ones, require an intensification of influence on people's psychology,
and an increase of the proportion of arguments of a psychological nature
in propaganda and agitation.
Thus, historical experience proves the currency of Lenin 's theses about
the great role of the ideological struggle in the course of war, and about
its enormous possibilities in winning victory over the enemy. Through
agitation -propaganda means it is possible to weaken considerably the
fighting spirit of enemy troops and thus facilitate their military defeat.

2. New Tactics of Bourgeois Propaganda and Lenin's Principles of Ideological Struggle

The profound sociopolitical changes in the world in favor of socialism ,
the steadily growing economic and military might of the world socialist
system , and the increasingly wide dissemination of socialist ideas are
forcing the imperialists to undertake convulsive efforts to defend a doomed
capitalism and prolong its dominance.
The imperialist bourgeoisie is not letting up on preparations to resolve
the basic contradictions of the modern world in its favor through war, and
214
is directing considerable efforts to shake the unity and monolithic nature
of the socialist camp, weaken international positions of socialism , and
undermine the ideological- political solidarity of masses within each
socialist country . To achieve these goals it employs new tactics in propa
ganda which appear as one of the manifestations of the tendency to adapt
imperialism to the new conditions. This was mentioned at the 24th
CPSU Congress. 15
A battle for the minds of people has now unfolded in the international
arena. It is a battle unprecedented in history. It intensifies and grows
steadily . Being an expression of the basic contradiction of the epoch
that between capitalism and socialism — it represents a clash of two
radically opposed ideologies — socialist and bourgeois.
As a departing class, the bourgeoisie has no ideas which would reflect
the interests of the broad masses of workers. Therefore , in the ideological
struggle the imperialists place main hopes on the enormous scope of their
propaganda and on the use therein of diverse organizations,methods, and
means. It was in 1920 that Lenin remarked that “ in all bourgeois states
the tie of the political apparatus with education is extremely firm , although
bourgeois society cannot admit this openly . Meanwhile , this society cul
tivates the masses through the church and through the entire institution of
private ownership .” 16
In recent decades the imperialists have improved and multiplied on an
enormous scale the means of spreading their ideology . Never before has
the bourgeoisie devoted such a great deal of attention to these questions.
The " psychological warfare” service against forces of socialism in a
majority of the major imperialist states, primarily the United States of
America, has been elevated to the rank of state policy. A ramified system
of organs and organizations has been created which carries out the war of
ideas directed against the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, and
against the entire world revolutionary and national liberation movement.
Control of the activity of these services is centralized on a national scale .
The bourgeoisie make wide use of the achievements of scientific and
technological progress in the field of mass information media to expand
the scope of its work of spiritual corruption of the millions of workers of
its own countries and of carrying out ideological diversions against the
socialist countries. The copying industry , television, radio , newspapers,
journals, movies, the theater; all these and other means now comprise
the arsenal of “ psychological warfare" against socialist ideology.
The aggravated struggle of two ideologies finds its manifestation also
in the military field. This is understandable. Under modern conditions, in
addition to economic, political, and strictly military preparations for war,
great importance is acquired by ideological preparations for war and for
its ideological support.
The ideologists of the imperialist bourgeoisie, as never before, are
conducting an intensive preparation for a new war against the Soviet
Union and the world socialist system in the ideological and psychological
215
sense. Following Hitler, they proceed from the assumption that “ war
against Russia is a battle of two ideologies.” As is noted in a report pre
pared in 1968 by a group of American specialists headed by former
Under Secretary of State R . Hill, the importance of psychological opera
tions in our time has risen to the level of military means of struggle. In
the textbook entitled Military Psychology published in the United States
a few years ago , it states that “ psychological warfare” is a part of psy
chological operations and is conducted in wartime or when martial law
has been declared. In the prewar period so -called psychological activity is
carried out which is calculated for ideological cultivation of the populace
in a spirit of the aggressive strategy of imperialism .
Experience shows that under modern conditions an acute ideological
struggle precedes and accompanies a war. In our time it is impossible to
begin a war or conduct it, let alone conclude it victoriously, without
careful ideological preparation of the people and the army.
The ideological struggle plays an enormous part in securing the support
of the broad popular masses for politics and for war, which is a con
tinuation of politics. Lenin stressed that “ ideas become a force when
they conquer themasses.” 17
Therefore the opposing sides strive to ensure the influence of ideas on
the widest possible masses and tear them from under the spiritual influence
of their class enemy. Without ideological conquest of the masses it is im
possible to have solidarity of forces in the struggle . At the same time,
the ideological struggle is used to undermine the ideological solidarity of
the foe.
An increase in the role of ideological struggle in modern warfare is
determined not only by sociopolitical conditions, but also by the military
technical nature of the war itself, which has changed under the effects of
the revolution in military affairs . Weapons of mass destruction present
extra-ordinarily high demands on the moral-psychological qualities both
of personnel of the armed forces of the country subject to their influence,
and to personnel of the side which employs these weapons. War will re
quire the highest extertion of all physical and spiritual forces of the fight
ing troops, and their high psychological steadfastness. The task will
consist not only of instilling a moral and psychological steadfastness
constantly in one's troops, but also of exerting corresponding influence on
enemy troops with the aim of reducing their moral-psychological stability .
Since powerful nuclear missile strikes against deep rears are possible
in a future war, there are increased demands placed upon the moral
psychological steadfastness of the population . In this regard, two problems
arise for the warring sides: to make maximum use of modern means of
influence upon the enemy's deep rears so as to deliver, simultaneously
with material destruction, the greatest loss to the state of morale of the
populace of the hostile side, and at the same time preserve the high morale
of one's own population , which is being subjected to nuclear missile
strikes by the enemy.

216
 The scientific-technological revolution has led to the outfitting of
armies with weapons of unprecedented destructive force and to the broad
influx of mechanization and automation in troops. However, even now
the armed forces represent mass armies. Man remains the chief force in
war. Moreover, the importance of his intellectual, moral-psychological,
and combat qualities has greatly increased . It follows from this that the
problem of ideological and psychological influence on man in a future war
will assume even greater importance.
A proper understanding of the place and role of the ideological weapon
in the overall system of means and methods of warmaking and mastery
of Lenin 's principles of ideological struggle have great importance for
successful resolution of all these tasks. These principles withstood a
serious test in the prolonged struggle of the Communist Party for assertion
of the Marxist-Leninist ideology . Their skillful application will ensure
further reinforcement of the effectiveness of all our ideological work.
Lenin pointed out that one of the most important principles of the
ideological struggle is the principle of irreconcilability with regard to
world outlooks hostile to the working class. This principle obligates the
party never to forego its Marxist, communist world outlook or a part of
it, and to steadfastly and opportunely expose any intrigues of a hostile
ideology. Lenin stressed that “ we must steadily fight any bourgeois ide
ology , no matter what fashionable and resplendent uniforms it may
don .” 18
Irreconcilability in ideological struggle is an objective demand , not
a subjective wish . It stems from the very essence of ideological struggle
and of its laws. The social direction of the ideological struggle is de
termined by the class interests of the proletariat. The two chief opposing
forces take part in this struggle — capitalism and socialism . Behind them
stand the two basic classes of modern times — the bourgeoisie and the
proletariat. Just as it is impossible to identify and reconcile the social
existence of the bourgeoisie and the working class and their economic
and political interests, so it is impossible to reconcile their outlooks and
their ideology. It is for this reason that Marxist-Leninists resolutely act
against the idea of the possibility of a peaceful coexistence of the bour
geois and the socialist ideologies , and against compromise in the ideologi
cal field . The principle of irreconcilability in ideological struggle obligates
the working class and its party to resolutely rebuff any attempts by the
bourgeoisie and its ideologists to impose their views and mores on the
working class.
The given principle presumes also an uncompromising struggle against
any sort of manifestations of anti-Marxist, bourgeois, or petty -bourgeois
views and ideas. The example of the Czechoslovakian events of 1968
shows the serious consequences which resulted from ignoring Lenin 's
principle of irreconcilability with regard to bourgeois ideology on the
part of the former leadership of the Czechoslovakian Communist Party .
This opened wide the expanse for the ideological diversions of imperialism
217
and the antisocialist propaganda of counterrevolutionary elements within
the country . It led to ideological disorder in the country and an under
mining of the ideological unity of the people. This development of events
in the CSSR created a direct threat to the security of the entire socialist
commonwealth .
Marxist-Leninist ideology is the ideological basis for strengthening
the world system of socialism and its military might. It is a sort of spiritual
cement holding together countries of the commonwealth , and ensuring its
invincible force. It is therefore no accident that the imperialists are under
taking furious attacks upon the ideological basis of the commonwealth ,
striving to destroy or at least weaken the union of fraternal countries. The
concluding document of the international conference of communist and
working parties held in Moscow states: “ In the face of the strengthening
international positions of socialism , imperialism is attempting to weaken
the unity of the world socialist system . It is taking advantage of the
differences in the international revolutionary movement in an attempt to
sow dissidence in its ranks and place its own ideological machinery,
including the mass information media, at the service of anticommunism
and the struggle against socialism and all progressive forces.” 19
Now it is impossible to attain further strengthening of the ideological
and political unity of our movement and of all anti-imperialist forces only
on the basis of a development of the most active offensive against bour
geois ideology .
Bourgeois propaganda is trying in every way possible to impugn the
principle of proletarian internationalism and artificially contrast it with
principles of independence, sovereignty, and equal rights. Nationalism is
one of the poisoned tools of imperialism in its attempts to undermine the
growing unity of the socialist countries and the collaboration of their
armies.
Events of recent times have shown that along with nationalism , Zionism
has become a tool in the ideological struggle of imperialist reaction against
the USSR and other socialist countries. Lenin resolutely exposed the
Zionists as direct agents of capital in the working movement, and their
chauvinistic propaganda as a means for splitting the revolutionary ranks
of the proletariat. Zionist ideology bears an even more reactionary, anti
Soviet, antisocialist character in our days. Therefore the irreconcilable
struggle against bourgeois ideology necessarily has to include the exposure
of Zionism as well.
Marxist-Leninist ideology ensures the strengthening of the spiritual
forces of Soviet soldiers, and comprises one of the most important prin
ciples of the country 's moral-political potential. On its base is formed
the ideological conviction of defenders of the Motherland, and the high
awareness of military duty and responsibility for the defnse of socialism .
High consciousness on a base of Marxist ideology is a guarantee of
successful resolution of the tasks of strengthening the combat readiness of
the Armed Forces and of victory in war. Therefore , the struggle for
218
further increasing the soldiers' political awareness and for forming in
them a scientific outlook, conviction, ideological steadfastness, and an
ability to withstand any forms of bourgeois influence comprises a most
important mission for commanders, political organs, and party organiza
tions.
The principle of irreconcilability in ideological struggle is connected
inseparably with the principle of party spirit. It signifies the consistent
and uncompromising implementation of a Marxist-Leninistworld outlook,
precision and clarity in defending the fundamental interests of the work
ing class and its party 's policy , and positiveness and uncompromising
nature in evaluations of the ideological and political positions of various
classes and parties.
The report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 24th Party Congress
states: We were , and still remain , true to the fundamental principles of
Marxism -Leninism and we will never make any concessions in ideological
questions.” 20
To implement the principle of party spirit means to adhere to precision
and positiveness in one's class ideological positions. Lenin stressed that
party spirit obligates us “ in any evaluation of an event to take the point of
view of a specific social group directly and frankly.” 21 However, as the
experience of ideological struggle shows, such positiveness is not advan
tageous for classes leaving the historical arena. Therefore, they prefer to
hide their party spirit and preach the amorphous and indefinite nature of
ideological positions. They attempt to pass their party spirit off as being
non-party . Lenin branded such tactics as bourgeois hypocrisy and a con
cealed attempt to subject the proletariat to the bourgeois ideology. Lenin
emphasized that a " non -party state is an idea of the bourgeoisie. Party
spirit is a socialist idea.” 22
Hiding behind a non-party status, the contemporary bourgeoisie strives
to " soften” socialism in the ideological struggle , disarm the working class
and peoples of socialist countries ideologically , subject them to bourgeois
ideology and politics, sow pessimism and mistrust in the principles and
ideals of communism , and in the end make it easier to restore capitalism .
The new tactics of ideological diversions of imperialism against peoples of
socialist countries serve these ends. One of the features of these tactics is
an apparent rejection of the principle of the party nature of ideology and
an invention of ideological myths about a “ uniform industrial society ," a
" hybrid society," " humane socialism ,” “ convergence," and even a " syn
thesis of ideologies.” Their basic intent is to convince people unskilled in
theory and politics that the ideal of the future social system is not socialism
or capitalism , but some kind of hybrid system .
Right revisionists repeat the elements of bourgeois propaganda about
the possibility of hybrid systems of the “ democratic ” or “ humane” so
cialism type, and about the pluralism of Marxism and Marxist philosophy.
This line of theirs signifies deception of the masses and leads to a weaken
ing of the positions of socialism and a strengthening of the positions of
219
the bourgeoisie. Lenin wrote that “ . . . a non- party nature or a lack of
party positiveness and party organization means class instability (this is
in the best case; in the worst instance this lack signifies the deception of
the masses by political charlatans — a phenomenon too well known in
parliamentary countries ).” 28
The practical realization of Lenin 's principle of party spirit is of great
importance in the matter of exposing crafty plans and new tactical tech
niques of the ideological diversionaries of every stripe. Steadfast fulfill
ment of this principle permits a profound revelation of the essence and
goals of anticommunists , exposure of their plots, and neutralization of the
pernicious influence of the ideology of anticommunism .
The principle of offensive spirit in ideological struggle stems organically
from the aforementioned principles.
The class approach to a bourgeois ideology hostile to Marxism
Leninism presumes a continuous, active offensive struggle against it. In
the spirit of this demand by Lenin our party indicates the inadmissibility
of passiveness with regard to intrigues of bourgeois ideologists and obli
gates us constantly to increase activity in the fight against the ideology of
imperialism .
Implementation of this principle signifies a decisive struggle with all
hostile phenomena in spiritual life , exposure of bourgeois theories and
views, and demonstration of the reactionary essence of the sociopolitical
system of imperialist states and their antipopular, aggressive politics di
rected toward preparing for a new world war. At the same time this
principle demands all possible build -up of efforts for disseminating and
asserting the Marxist-Leninist ideology. L . I. Brezhnev said at the inter
national conference of communist and working parties that “we have a
mighty weapon of struggle against bourgeois ideology — the ideology of
Marxism -Leninism . We know its power well. We see that our ideas are
being spread wider and wider among the masses . Today it is Marxism
Leninism which is on the offensive, and we must develop this offensive
ever wider." 24
The most important condition for strengthening the military might of
the Soviet state and the entire socialist commonwealth is the offensive
struggle against bourgeois ideology, exposure of slanderous and absurd
theoretical constructions of anticommunists, the persistent and convincing
propaganda of Marxist-Leninist ideas, and bringing up personnel of the
Armed Forces in a spirit of devotion to the ideas and cause of com
munism and of hatred for its enemies.
A Leninist irreconcilability and party spirit in the ideological struggle
also presumes the principle of scientific character. Scientific character
does not contradict party spirit, as bourgeois ideologists attempt to prove,
but to the contrary, it is unthinkable without it. Scientific character is
the expression of a profound communist party spirit, since only the
ideology of the working class, whose interests coincide with the objective
course of society's development and with the interests of the liberation
220
movement of all workers, can be a truly scientific ideology. The party
spirit of communist ideology is inseparable from the most sober, objective
comprehension of the laws of social development and from a correct
explanation of the past, the present, and foresight of the future.
Marxist -Leninist ideology is a truly scientific world outlook which
indicates the true path and means of a revolutionary transformation of
the world . There are not, nor can there be, several Marxist ideologies,
just as there cannot be several truths. Lenin remarked that “ objective
truth corresponds to any scientific ideology (in contrast, for example , to
religious ideology ) . . . ." 25 Attempts by contemporary revisionists to
substantiate the pluralism of Marxism and prove the lawfulness of the
existence of different " national versions” of Marxism are theoretically
groundless, and in practice are directed at destroying communist ideology.
The principle of scientific character presumes a decisive struggle in
ideological activity against backward manifestations, against inertness and
sluggishness, and against revisionism and dogmatism . Meanwhile , this
principle obligates us not to be silent, but to reveal in good time the
mistakes in the field of ideology and seek to overcome them .
Implementation of the principle of scientific character in military
theory signifies a sur-mounting of abstract, lifeless schemes and theoretical
constructions, the constant generalizing of the experience of military
practice, timely explanation of new phenomena, and a view into the
future .

Such are the most important of Lenin 's principles of the ideological
struggle . Study and creative application of these principles comprise an
important guarantee of success in overcoming bourgeois ideology and in
asserting communist ideas. It is very important here to carry out all these
principles in unity . Only such an approach ensures success. The task also
consists of not only being guided by these principles, but of creatively
developing them and enriching them with new content.
Here only a few of the questions have been posed which show the
significance of ideology as a special means of waging modern warfare .
Our military cadresmust have a clear impression of the fact that now it is
impossible to win victory in war without a comprehensive ideological
preparation of the people and the army. Guided by the decisions of the
24th CPSU Congress, they must do everything necessary to bring up
Soviet soldiers in a spirit of loyalty to the great ideas of Marxism
Leninism , love for the Motherland, and hatred for its enemies.

Footnotes
1. V . I. Lenin, Polnoye sobraniye sochineniy (Complete Collected Works), XLI,
121.
2. Ibid .
3. Ibid ., XXXVII, 212.
4 . Leninskiy sbornik (Lenin Collection ), XXXIV , 52.
221
 5. Lenin , Voyennaya perepiska 1917 - 1922 88. (Military Correspondence: 1917 –
1922 ), p . 261.
6 . Leninskiy sbornik , XXXIV , 348.
7 . Lenin , Polnoye sobraniye sochineniy, XVI, 452.
8 . Ibid ., XXXIX , 404.
9. Ibid ., p . 403.
10. Ibid., XL , 125.
11. M . V. Frunze, Sobraniye sochineniy (Collected Works), Vol. 1, Moscow
Leningrad, Gosizdat, 1929, p. 247.
12. Lenin , XLIV , 175.
13. Ibid., XLI, 192.
14 . Ibid., XLIV , 210.
15. See Materialy XXIV gyezda KPSS (Materials of the 24th CPSU Congress ) ,
pp. 14 - 15.
16 . Lenin , XLI, 399 .
17. Ibid., XXXIV , 332.
18. Ibid., VI, 269.
19 . Mezhdunarodnoye Soveshchaniye kommunisticheskikh i rabochikh partiy .
Dokumenty i materialy ( International Conference of Communist and Working
Parties: Documents and Materials) , p . 288.
20. Materialy XXIV s" yezda KPSS, pp. 102– 103.
21. Lenin, I, 419.
22. Ibid., XII, 138 .
23. Ibid., XXXII, 190.
24. Mezhdunarodnoye Soveshchaniye kommunisticheskikh i rabochikh partiy.
Dokumenty imaterialy, p. 78.
25. Lenin , XVIII, 138 .

222
Chapter XIII. Lenin on Scientific Guidance of
Military OrganizationalDevelopment

Lenin attached enormous importance to scientific management both of

the socialist society as a whole and in each individual area of societal
activity. He viewed the task of organizing such control and management as
the principal, central task of all efforts to establish and consolidate new
societal relations."
Our party 's leader was firmly convinced that socialism would be able to
beat capitalism in management methods as well. Recruiting the masses to
this cause and advancing from the masses talented managers and ad
ministrators, the worker class, headed by the Communist Party, will be
able to organize efficient management of all social processes.

1. Lenin 's Ideas on Scientific Guidance of Military Organizational Development

The socialist revolution, which destroyed the domination of capitalist
private ownership and the entire system of social relations engendered by
it,marks a leap forward from spontaneous to conscious, planned societal
development. Thus are created the most important preconditions for
scientific management of all areas of society, management based on a
knowledge of the laws and trends of societal development, on the po
tential for their conscious utilization in the interests of the toiler masses.
On the basis of a thorough, comprehensive analysis of revolutionary
changes which had taken place in the country and synthesis of the prac
tical know -how in directing the building of socialism , Lenin gave an
answer to the most important problems of organization and functioning
of a socialist system of management, persuasively demonstrating its po
tential and advantages. “ Only socialism ,” wrote Lenin , “will make it
possible to effect the extensive spread and properly to subordinate social
production and distribution of products on the basis of scientific con
siderations, in relation to how we should proceed in making life easiest
for all toilers, providing them with the opportunity for prosperity.” 2
The potential to organize management of the productive activities of
the toiler masses in all areas of societal activity " according to scientific
principles ” does not automatically become reality . Such a transformation

223
depends on the conscious activities of people engaged in this area of
societal activity . The effectiveness and scientific substantiation of manage
ment activity depends in large measure on elaboration of the basic ideas
and rules pertaining to the substance of management, as well as on the
skill of the leaders.
Lenin defined both the fundamental rules or principles of scientific
management of society as a whole and of its most important areas,
particularly the military .
Today, in connection with the growth and increasing complexity of
the economy, development of the scientific and technological revolution ,
increasing sophistication of societal relations and a cultural upswing,
the problems ofmanagement are becoming increasing complex and multi
form . The requisite conditions exist for successfully solving these prob
lems. The 24th CPSU Congress, noting the great importance of a scientific
solution to the problemsofmanagement, advanced to the forefront of the
theory and practice ofbuilding Communism , directed attention in addition
to the fact that in recent years there has developed considerable potential
for improving management. “ This is connected,” stated L . I. Brezhnev
in the Central Committee Report to the 24th CPSU Congress, “with an
improvement in the level of knowledge and professional training of our
cadres and the toiler masses, as well as with the rapid development of
the science of management and computer technology .” 3
Achieved results are a logical and expected phenomenon . They express
a higher level of maturity of the socialist society, which reveals in the
process of building Communism to an increasingly full degree its rich
possibilities and advantages in all areas, including in the area of man
agement.
New management capabilities make it possible to embody with greater
completeness and effectiveness Lenin 's instructions and precepts in this
area.
Scientific management of society as an integral system presupposes sub
ordination of its individual elements to the requirements of development
of the system as a whole. From this viewpoint Lenin approached de
termination of the specific features of control of any individual area of
societal activity , including direction of military organizational develop
ment.
Characterizing military organizational development as an object of
scientific management, it is essential first of all to note that this is a
multifaceted and complex process which incorporates an entire complex
of the most diverse measures, aimed at strengthening the nation 's defense
capability , at creating means of armed combat, at increasing the combat
capability and combat readiness of the armed forces, training and in
doctrination of personnel. It encompasses the participation of military ,
political, economic, scientific research and public organizations and
establishments. Management of their activities has very much in common
with other areas of societal activity under socialism . But it also possesses
224
certain specific features. For this reason scientific management of military
organizational development should be viewed as a dialectical unity of the
general and the particular. The main role in this unity is, without ques
tion , played by the general: that which is determined by the socialist
system , by the laws governing its functioning and development, its aims
and policies, its methods of management activity .
We are familiar with the Leninist thesis that “ the building of our army
was able to produce successful results only because it was created in the
spirit of general Soviet organizational development. . . ” 4 It is of great
methodological significance also is determining the character, content and
specific features of modern scientific management of military organiza
tional development.
The features of scientific direction of military organizational develop
ment are expressed in principles elaborated by Lenin . They reflect
objective laws in effect in this area ,manifested in the process of organiza
tion of defense of the Soviet republic during the first years of its existence.
Lenin emphasized the complexity and newness of problems of military
organizational development, pointing out that in this area we were com
pelled to resolve problems which had not been posed even theoretically
by the founders of Marxism . This became possible only on the basis of
timely and correct synthesis of practical know -how in the area of organi
zational structure of the army and navy , and the efforts of establishments
and organizations exercising supervision over the various aspects of
military organizational development. The theoretical conclusions obtained
in this manner became a reliable reference point for solving new problems
and played an important methodological role in further development of
the theory and practice of military affairs.
Lenin 's views on scientific guidance of military organizational develop
ment were forged out in an intensive ideological struggle with various
kinds of opportunists, who were attempting to impose their course and
their methods on the party and the socialist state . Lenin persuasively
demonstrated the scientific flimsiness and adventuristic nature both of
Trotskyite views, which were based on attempts to isolate the area of
military organizational development from party influence, from its day
by-day supervision, as well as the views of “ leftist” Communists, which
signified disorganization in military organizational development.
The essence of Trotsky's harmful views consisted in the fact that he
denied the significance of the Marxian dialectical method in the theo
retical elaboration and practical resolution of major tasks of military
organizational development, made every attempt to enhance the role of
the old military specialists, and not only supported but implanted with
all possible measures bureaucratic methods of leadership in the army,
methods of naked administrationism . In criticizing Trotsky, Lenin wrote
that the latter was supporting "not the bestbut rather the worst in military
know -how .” 5
Our party 's leader pointed to the need of adopting and developing
225
valuable military know -how : heroism , efficiency , etc , while doing away
with the worst elements — bureaucracy and conceit, as the legacy of the
old serfdom -autocratic system . As for the old military experts, the Leninist
approach here was expressed in placing their valuable experience and
knowledge at the service of the proletariat, resolutely sweeping away
everything which is of a class -alien character in their philosophical out
look and practical activity .
Considerable danger was also presented by the views of the " leftist ”
Communists, in particular the views of the “ military opposition .” Their
objections to firm discipline and measures of compulsion , against the
recruitment of old - regime military experts for building and organizing the
Red Army, against utilization of the positive aspects of bourgeois military
science , their demands of a totally collective approach in troop control and
command personnel selection, and the replacement of political sections
with elected party committees with the latter invested with the authority
to monitor and supervise all commander and commissar activities, led to
a weakening of the Armed Forces, to the surrender of positions which had
already been won in the process of military organizational development.
At the heart of the erroneous line pursued by the "military opposition "
lay absolutization of the experience of the Civil War, inability to evaluate
this experience in a critical manner and to draw the proper conclusions.
Pointing out the errors of the “ leftist” Communists, Lenin stated the
following at the 8th Party Congress: “What is the underlying problem
here ? The point is that the old disorganized partisan attitude lives on in
you . . . It is high time to root out these vestiges on guerrilla -warfare
thinking, which were necessary during a certain period. . . The entire
error of the opposition consists in the fact that you , bound by your
experience to this partisan movement attitude with those traditions of
heroism which will be memorable, you do not wish to understand thatwe
are now in a different period.”
The party , armed with Lenin 's ideas on military organizational develop
ment, condemned the views of the “military opposition ” and pointed out
that the proletariat is compelled to employ guerrilla methods of combat
and military organization when it is in an oppressed position. Once it
has assumed authority it should utilize the edifice of state to build a
disciplined , well-equipped and trained army. Under these conditions, “ to
preach the guerrilla -warfare attitude as a military program is the same as
recommending a return from large-scale industry to cottage industry.” ?
Approaching military organizational development as a component part
of the overall building of socialism , Lenin demonstrated that successful
guidance of this program is possible only on the basis of party policy,
party leadership .
Party leadership played a decisive role in achieving victory during
the Civil War. Lenin pointed out that we were able to triumph because
“ the authority of the party united all ministries and establishments, and
226
dozens, hundreds, thousands and in the final analysis millions marched as
one man to the slogan provided by the Central Committee. . .” 8
The party, in directing military organizational development, proceeds
not only from the social aims which must be achieved but also from the
specific data possessed at the given time by military science and practice.
Lenin emphasized time and again the importance of special knowledge
for successful direction of various areas of the socialist construction effort,
including the military. “ Without the guidance of specialists in various
fields of knowledge, technology, and know -how , the transition to socialism
is impossible. . ." 9 “ We cannot get along without the advice, without the
guidance of educated persons, intellectuals, specialists,” 10 he stated .
Consistent application of the principle of taking into consideration
the data of military science and practice by the political and military
leaders , who are organizing on a national scale the multifaceted and
complex operation of strengthening the nation's defensive might, con
stitutes a most important condition for its scientific substantiation . This
has presently become extremely important in connection with the extra
ordinary complexity of the entire system of measures which military
organizational development encompasses. Radical changes in military
affairs have made necessary a reappraisal of a number of tenets of strategy
and other areas of military science . New elements in the development of
military theory are taken into consideration by political leaders in elaborat
ing military policy and determining the fundamental points of Soviet
military doctrine. In this connection there has been an increase in the
role and responsibility of military cadres to the party and people for the
level of their political and military knowledge, special training, for correct
implementation of party policy in organizing the defense of socialism .
Our party has always considered the tasks of strengthening the nation's
defense capability to be of prime importance. Problems connected with
national defense would be discussed on a priority basis, and adopted
decisions should be immediately implemented. One of the basic principles
guiding the party and the socialist state has been the principle of maximum
satisfaction of the needs and requirements of the army and navy. Lenin 's
instructions: " Not the slightest retreat from the aim of supplying 100
percent of the Red Army's needs, which should be the number one
priority in the interest of preserving the defensive capability of the Soviet
republic ” 11 became a mandatory rule which has always found ex
pression in national economic development plans, in distribution of budget
appropriations, in the creation of necessary reserves, etc.
The party hasbeen and remains true to this principle. It is not surprising
that the CPSU Program considers one of the most important areas of
development of our economy to be the target: “ Fully meet the needs of
national defense . . ." 12
The 24th CPSU Congress reemphasized in its resolutions that " the
party and its Central Committee constantly hold in the attention focus
227
problems of military organizational development, strengthening of the I
might and defense capability of the Soviet Armed Forces.” 18
Successful military organizational development, firm and stable guid - 1
ance of troop combat activities are possible only on the basis of the 1
principle of centralism . Lenin attached great importance to consistent and
correct application of this principle. The Party Central Committee Draft
Directive on Military Unity, signed by Lenin , states that an essential con
dition for a victorious outcome of the war against world imperialism
“ constitutes unified command of all Red Army detachments and strict
centralization in the allocation and use of all manpower and resources of
the socialist republics. . ." 14
The principle of centralism is dictated by the basic advantages of the
socialist system over the capitalist. It is precisely socialist public owner
ship which constitutes that objective economic basis which creates the
preconditions for unification and centralized utilization of human and
material resources of the peoples of our nation , which possess common
root interests. At the same time, centralization under conditions of the
supremacy of capitalist social relations is internally conflictive and un
stable.
The Leninist principle of centralism in managing all aspects of military
organizational development underwent a comprehensive test both during
the years of peaceful construction and during the Great Patriotic War.
Strict centralization in management and direction of the nation 's affairs in
the war yearsmade it possible quickly to mobilize the requisite manpower
and resources to repulse the enemy, to shift the economy from a peace
time to a war footing, to transform the country into a unified military
camp.
Under present-day conditions, with a great increase in the dependence
of a country's military strength on its economy, science, technology , and
culture, successful organization of military organizational development is
possible only with the most efficient, planned and comprehensive utiliza
tion of all those means and resources at the nation 's disposal and which
it can allocate for defense purposes.
The principle of centralism is becoming increasingly important in
guiding and directing troop combat activities in modern warfare. The
potential use of nuclear weapons will require careful coordination of the
operations of the different branches and arms. Success in a future war
can be achieved only if all strategic actions and all operations are rigor
ously coordinated on the basis of a unified strategic plan with unified ,
centralized direction , and if they are purposefully directed toward carry
ing out the common missions of armed conflict.
Of course , application of this principle in directing the armed forces
and their combat activities does not minimize the importance of inde
pendent actions and independent decisions by military leaders of the
various echelons. They must constantly be prepared for this.
The necessity of developing in military cadres the ability to act de
228
 cisively , independently and with initiative is taken into account in peace
time within the very structure of the system of troop control and the
nature of its functioning. Of course , strict delineation of the functions of
the central control edifice and its subordinate elements is regulated within
certain bounds by the activities of lower-echelon control elements, but
only to the extent to which this is dictated by necessity . If centralization
becomes excessive and fails to correspond to the actual needs of troop
combat and combat support, it may inevitably be transformed into its
opposite , engendering passivity on the part of lower- echelon leaders , an
attempt to settle all matters solely on the basis of preliminary instructions
" from above.” In the Leninist definition centralism is always closely
linked with initiative.
The principle of one-man command greatly promotes the attainment
of unity of actions of large-scale military endeavors. It makes it possible to
secure a rigorous unity of will, " guiding the combined efforts of hundreds,
thousands, and tens of thousands of persons.” 15 Such unity is essential in
various areas of activity , but it becomes particularly important in the
military . This is persuasively attested by the practical experience of or
ganizing armed defense of the socialist republic and direction of troops in
combat.
On the basis of analysis of experience in military organizational de
velopment, Lenin arrived at the conclusion that one-man command has an
exceptionally important function as one of the fundamental principles of
efficient and effective leadership and direction of the socialist army.
" . . . The experience of the army has shown us,” stated Lenin, " the logical
development of organization of management and control from the initial
forms of collective leadership to the principle of one-man command. . .” 18
Our party's leader stressed that one-man command is not in contradic
tion to socialist democracy and does not exclude correctly -comprehended
and applied collective leadership . Our principle of one-man command is
implemented on a party basis. It is intelligently combined with collective
forms of control. The nature of this combination depends on many con
ditions and circumstances. Under present-day conditions it is determined
by the scale of management tasks performed in the interest of strengthen
ing national defense capability. At higher echelons of control one-man
command is combined with the collective principle of leadership to a
greater degree . At a lower level collective leadership is manifested chiefly
in discussion and determination at party and service meetings and con
ferences of the most efficient means of executing commands and orders
issued by command personnel.
The feasibility of extensive application of the principle of one-man
command in leadership and control in the Armed Forces has been con
firmed by the more than 50 years of experience in military organizational
development in this country. Synthesizing this valuable experience, the
CPSU noted in its Program that this principle remains highly important
229
as before . Its correct application creates the most favorable conditions
for precise and flexible troop control.
The defense of socialism is acquiring an increasingly international
character and is becoming the cause of the entire socialist commonwealth .
The principle of international unity has been established and is being
consolidated in the direction and guidance of all aspects of socialist
military organizational development, a principle deriving from the more
general principle of proletarian internationalism in relations between
socialist nations.
A Leninist comprehension of the essence of internationalism must be
taken into consideration by each socialist nation which organizes its
defense against aggressors, of the interests of the entire socialist system ,
and the interests of the world revolutionary movement.
International unity, in carrying out the most important tasks of socialist
military organizational development, finds vivid expression in the activi
ties of the directive bodies of the Warsaw Treaty Organization — the
foundations of the military strength of the socialist nations. Key problems
of international affairs are collectively examined at meetings of this or
ganization's Political Consultative Committee - problems directly con
nected with strengthening of the peace and development of peaceful
cooperation among peoples, with the struggle against the aggressive
policies of imperialism . This joint effort has helped our countries achieve
substantial success in a number of areas, success which is strengthening
the international status of socialism and the cause of peace in Europe and
throughout the world .
Rightist and “ leftist” opportunists, who insist on a nationalistic line
in matters of military organizational development, oppose unification of
the forces of the world socialist system on the basis of the Leninist
principle of internationalism in carrying out the tasks of strengthening
defense capability . They preach the slogan of " reliance on one's own
resources" and reject the primacy of common , international interests in
organizing joint defense against imperialist aggression . In this manner,
they undermine the cooperation of the socialist nations in such an im
portantmatter as ensuring the security of the process of building socialism
and communism and place obstacles in the path of increasing the effective
ness of leadership over the joint defense of socialism .
The 24th CPSU Congress has confirmed the immutability of our party 's
course toward all-out consolidation and unification of efforts of the so
cialist nations both in the building of a new society and in its reliable
defense. “We want,” emphasized L . I. Brezhnev, “ the world socialist
system to be a friendly family of peoples, building and defending together
the new society. . ." 17
The experience gained by our country and the other socialist nations
in directing military organizational development and troop activities con
stitutes a solid foundation for continuous improvement in work style and
methods in this area . A need for such improvement is presently being felt
230
with particular acuteness. Military science is developing. Only continuous,
unceasing scientific inquiry, painstaking and comprehensive investigation
in the interests of determining the most efficient forms, methods and
means of leadership and control make it possible to organize things so
that " it truly stands at the summit ofmodern science and offers us all its
benefits.” 18
The very character of the tasks facing us in the area of management of
military organizational development and troop control is such that their
resolution demands the closest unity of theory and practice. Today science
has greatly enriched the theoretical arsenal of management. Many prob
lems both of an organizational and technical character have been solved
and are being solved with its assistance. Enriching practical achievements ,
enriching them with the information science has to offer, our military
cadres are achieving continuous success in strengthening the defensive
might of our country and the entire socialist commonwealth .

2. Significance of Lenin's Ideas for Improving Troop Control

Synthesizing the lessons of history as well as initial experience in
building the Soviet state and its Armed Forces, Lenin formulated a num
ber of theoretical principles and practical demands, implementation of
which constitutes a mandatory prerequisite for successful troop control.
The first and fundamental Leninist demand is a scientific approach to
solving the problems of management and control and to development of
management and control systems proper, as well as elaboration of the
science of control and management and its mastery by Soviet military
cadres.
Lenin warned that the appeal to achieve scientific management control
may remain nothing more than a popular phrase if it is not reinforced by
painstaking mastery of scientific knowledge and leadership know -how . At
the same time he also warned of a possible slavish following of the letter
of science, against dogmatizing scientific principles, and unproductive
application of these principles to concrete reality .
Under the conditions of the presently -occurring scientific and tech
nological revolution , when the scale and complexity of management and
control tasks have grown immeasurably, these Leninist theses have ac
quired particular importance .
According to the Leninist definition, the essence of the scientific
approach to management and control, including troop control, consists in
adopting and implementing decisionsknowledgeably and in a substantiated
manner; that is, relying on the achievements of modern science. What does
all this mean ? Management and control is an active process, which always
in one way or another intrudes into the natural course of events and
transforms the very system of control and the environment in conformity
with the stated goal of the action. This intervention of course in no way
abrogates the objectively operating laws. On the contrary , it leads to the
231
desired objective only under the condition that reforms or transforma
tion take place in conformity with the objective laws on the basis of
which both control and the environment exist and develop.
In handling daily tasks, people rely on a knowledge of laws found
empirically on the basis of personal experience and the practical experi
ence of preceding generations. But in cases where one is dealing with
control of large and increasingly complex social organisms, empirical
cognition of laws becomes both insufficient and increasingly difficult to
achieve, while spontaneous adaptation to them by the method of trial
and error involves considerable cost. It is necessary to obtain theoretical
knowledge of laws currently in effect and their conscious utilization for
management and control purposes . This comprises the first requirement
of scientific control of complex systems.
Merely knowledge of the laws governing given phenomena, however, is
insufficient for successfully solving the problems of control and manage
ment which crop up under specific situational conditions. “ The general,”
wrote Lenin , " exists only in the specific and through the specific .” 19 The
general, that is laws, are manifested in specific situations, and as long as
the entire aggregate of conditions is unknown, it is meaningless to talk
about effective utilization of cognized laws. Therefore, a detailed study
and comprehensive appraisal of a specific situation comprise the second
essential element in scientific control.
Finally , in order correctly to apply knowledge of the general to a
situation at a given moment, to effect its comprehensive analysis and to
elaborate a plan of action, it is necessary to have a mastery of scientific
methods of qualitative and quantitative evaluation of influencing factors,
to draw well-substantiated conclusions from available premises. This com
prises the third important factor in scientific solution of problems of
control.
It is important to emphasize that all these demands on scientific control
in general, and troop control in particular , were of great importance in
the past and in fact have been taken into consideration in the past. They
have assumed particular significance today, however, under conditions of
the occurring scientific and technological revolution . Radical changes in
military affairs, the essence of which consists in the development of
missiles and nuclear weapons and the operational status of these weapons,
have led to a sharp increase in the responsibility of commanders for
direction of combat actions and have made their functions more complex .
In the final analysis, tasks of troop control as a whole have becomemore
complex. Under these conditions, the role of scientifically substantiated
managementmethods based on objective laws and patterns is particularly
great.
A most important prerequisite for scientific control is competence in
the area in which control or management is effected , scientific education
in the broad sense of the word . “ . . . In order to manage,” Lenin empha
sized , “ one must be competent; one must be completely and precisely
232
 familiar with all conditions of production ; one must be familiar with the
technology of production at its contemporary level; one must have certain
scientific training.” 20
In respect to military cadres this Leninist thesis constitutes a program
of their general and special training. Troop control today demands solid ,
thorough knowledge of military affairs, the laws determining the course
of armed combat, the principles of military art, a knowledge of “ opera
tional art" and tactics, military technology, and organization both of one's
own army and the armies of the potential enemies. Lenin 's thesis also
embraces tasks of general educational level of military cadres , their study
of the natural and social sciences, and particularly Marxist-Leninist
theory, mastery of materialist dialectics, and general scientific methods of
solving cognitive and practical problems.
Lenin considers knowledge of control and management proper , of the
laws of the structure and functioning of control systems, of methods of
solving control and management problems, all thatwhich is lumped under
the term “ science of control and management” as knowledge essential for
scientific management. All persons employed in the area of management,
Lenin demanded, " should pass a test of their knowledge of the funda
mentals . . . of the science of management. . ." 21
All this has a direct relation to the military as well. In addition , the
intensifying military -technological revolution is advancing the task of
elaborating a theory of troop control as an independent branch of military
science.
Scientific and technological advances produced cybernetics, a science
of the general laws of the structure and functioning of control systems of
any nature and complexity , of the general methods of solving control
problems. But cybernetics, and military cybernetics in particular, as one
of the areas of applied cybernetics, does not exhaust theory of troop
control. The fact is that it fails to take into account a number of physical,
social, psychological, and gnoseological aspects of control, that is, all that
which pertains to the specific features of social phenomena.
Scientific cognition and utilization of the specific laws of societal
development and revolutionary practice has become possible solely on
the basis of Marxism . Marxism has become a solid base for a scientific
approach to control of social processes and creation of a theory of man
agement of society .
Military activities constitute a specific social area characterized by
a specialized control theory . It is based on the general points of the theory
of social management in its specific area , reveals the specific patterns and
elaborates methods of solving problems occurring in the process of or
ganizational development of the armed forces and their combat activities.
Theory of troop control also encompasses fundamental theses pertaining
to theory of the art of warfare, military administration, party political
work and other areas of knowledge in that segment in which they serve
this process. Dialectical and historical materialism , Marxist-Leninist doc
233
trine on war and army constitute the philosophic and methodological
foundation of theory of troop control.
Lenin not only advanced fundamental theses on a scientific approach
to management but also pointed out specific ways to improve the science
of management. He considered the most important of these to be the
selection process, training and placement of management personnel, im
provement of the structure of management entities , scientific organization
of labor in this area, and development of management techniques and
methods . All this is extremely topical today as well.
The 24th CPSU Congress focused special attention on problems of
perfecting economy management systems and emphasized the need to
raise the scientific level of planning. “ It is now essential,” states the CPSU
Central Committee Report, “ to perfect planning methods. Planning
should be based on a more precise study of social needs, on scientific
forecasts of our economic potential, on comprehensive analysis and
evaluation of different variants of solutions, their immediate and long
range consequences.” 22 These demands also apply in full to military
affairs.
We have discussed above the effect of the scientific and technological
revolution on troop control. This influence has been manifested in par
ticular in substantial changes in the objects and conditions of control. The
objects of control — troops — have become immeasurably more tech
nologically sophisticated, powerful, mobile , while control conditions,
defined by the features of modern warfare , have become more complex .
Changes in the object and conditions of control have aggravated some
of the conflicts inherent in this area. As we know , troop control en
compasses activity of two types: predominantly intellectual activity, con
nected with cognition of the combat situation and planning of combat
operations, and practical organizational effort, aimed at implementing
and executing a decision. In activity of the first type we are witnessing
an increasing deepening of the conflict between the constant increase in
volume of information required for decision -making and the inexorable
reduction of time available to process this information. Closely connected
with this is the fact that demands pertaining to decision substantiation
and effectiveness are growing to an increasing degree in parallel with
shrinking decision -making time.
Basic conflicts in practical organizational activity are also connected
with growth in the volume and complexity of measures and reduction of
time for their implementation . This applies both to military-technical and
ideological-political support in the performance of combat missions. It is
also essential to take into consideration a certain conflict between the
demand of centralization of control and the complexity of keeping the
entire domain of control tasks within the field of vision of the one-man
commander, with the resulting necessity of a certain decentralization of
control.
In connection with this , two closely interlinked tasks advance to the
234
forefront: first of all, improvement in decision-making methods, adoption
of the devices of modern logic and mathematics in the process of cognition
and planning of combat operations; in the second place, automation of
individual elements of control activities, and total automation of troop
control systems.
The increased demands on effectiveness and substantiation of adopted
decisions brings the necessity of more extensive adoption of mathematical
methods in the area of military science . This is due to the tasks of im
proving operational-tactical discussion of combat actions, new capabilities
of mathematics in this respect, as well as the development of electronic
computers , with which it is possible to effect rapid quantitative analysis of
complex phenomena connected with military affairs.
The adoption of mathematical methods not only does not negate the
necessity of a qualitative analysis of phenomena but, on the contrary, is
based on such an analysis. For a quantitative comparison it is necessary to
determine what is being compared , in what respect and with what purpose,
and this is achieved in the process of qualitative analysis. By means of
such an analysis one isolates the object of investigation , determines its
composition, the character of internal and external relations, and estab
lishes the parameters which require quantitative evaluations, and a
criterion of effectiveness, by means of which one can make the necessary
calculation and change appropriate characteristics of the phenomenon .
Quantitative analysis in turn makes it possible to gain a deeper knowledge
of quality .
Lenin pointed to the importance of combining mathematical calcula
tions in military affairs with experience, with practical know -how . " . . . It
is not difficult to see,” he wrote, “ that in solving a problem in which there
are many unknowns, it would be difficult without corresponding practical
experience to determine with an absolute or even with a sufficiently high
degree of approximation and accuracy what method can be employed
against a hostile fortress.” 28
Success in the development of mathematical methods of investigating
operations has engendered among some bourgeois scientists a unique
mathematical fetishism , the substance of which consists in a patent ex
aggeration of the capabilities of a given science. For example , some
ideologues of militarism speak of the coming of a new era in planning
political and military actions, of the possibility of making sure strategic
decisions with the aid of games theory, etc . Such statements are funda
mentally bankrupt. Mathematics cannot substitute for an entire complex
of social, economic, and ideological substantiation essential for making
crucial political and strategic decisions.
In this connection , we might mention the following example . In plan
ning their aggression in Vietnam , the U .S . militarists placed considerable
hopes on employing operations research methods. A large number of
specialists were put onto the project. Mathematical programming, game
theory, and theory of mass servicing seemed to promise success. But the
235
results were quite different. All the Pentagon's calculations and forecasts
were overturned by the unshakable steadfastness, courage and will to win
on the part of the heroic Vietnamese people , as well as the support and
assistance offered by the Soviet Union, the other socialist nations and
peace-loving forces throughout the world .
The adoption of mathematical methods enhances the degree of sub
stantiation ofdecisions. It is important, however, to do everything possible
to accelerate the process of decision-making. Along with the development
of mathematical methods of operations research, automation of calcula
tions and automation of individual elements and the control process as a
whole are essential.
At the present time, as is attested by foreign data , there exist totally
automated control systems for individual weapon and equipment units
and complexes of such units. At the same time semiautomatic (auto
mated ) troop control systems are being developed . Further progress in
this area requires solution of important methodological problems pertain
ing to the real potential of automation and the relationship between man
and machine in automated control systems.
The real potential of troop control automation is determined by the
achieved level of development of computer technology and programming
methods, the level of development of mathematics and the potential of
quantitative expression of major factors determining the course of combat
operations.
It is even more important to bear in mind the fact that warfare is a
social phenomenon , a means of resolving social conflicts. Man is the sole
subject of goal setting and social responsibility ; he cannot entirely turn
over to machines the solving of problemsaffecting the fate of individuals,
classes, nations, and states. In addition, warfare is affected not only by
military -technical and natural but also by political, economic, ideological,
and psychological factors. They can be taken into account only by a
person who is comprehensively prepared in a political and military respect.
For this reason , decisions are made and combat operations planned not
by a computer but rather by a commander and his staff with the aid of
computers.
Thus automation cannot be absolute even in planning combat opera
tions. A decisive role here has been played and still is played by the
military commander. This applies to an even greater degree to military
organizational activity and practical leading of troops. As for influence on
the spiritual resources of individuals, the moral-political and psychological
training of personnel, one can firmly state that these areas have not been
automated . What we need here is personal influence, personal example ,
an individual approach, day-by-day indoctrinational effort by com
manders, political workers, party and Komsomol organizations.
Emphasizing the importance of automation as a most important means
of resolving control conflicts engendered by the present level of develop
ment of military affairs, one should not ignore other areas. One of these
236
is improvement in troop organizational structure. Lenin considered the
best organization that one which possesses maximum flexibility and
dynamics, while preserving unity and a monolithic integrity . In his opinion
the army can serve as an example of such an organization . “ Let us take
today's army," wrote Lenin . “Here is a good example of organization .
This organization is good precisely because it is flexible, and at the same
time able to give millions of men a single will.” 24 Improvement of the
organizational structure of troops aims at ensuring maximum flexibility
and mobility of units and major units [ chast and soyedineniye) with a
maximum increase in their combat strength, the securement of de
pendability and flexibility of control.
In his last articles and letters, Lenin particularly stressed the importance
of resolving the problem of selection , training, and placement of control
and management personnel. He stated : “ . . . The problem is to know how
to control and manage, to know how to place personnel correctly . . . " 25
“ . . . Select the necessary people and verify their practical execution. . ." 26
demanded Lenin .
Selection , training and placement of personnel are matters which today
comprise a most important area in improving troop control systems. The
makeup of cadres and the maturity of the controlling entity determines
the rate of flow and processing of information , the quality of planning of
combat operations, and the effectiveness of implementing decisions. In
order to manage and control today's engagement and operation we need
commanders who possess excellent moral-political and professional quali
ties, vast knowledge and experience, the essential intellectual qualities and
firm will. Selection and training of such cadres demands a scientific
foundation , participation in this not only of experienced military specialists
but also of physicians, psychologists, and military sociologists.
One way to resolve conflicts which arise in the area of control is
scientific organization of control and management labor proper . Lenin
initiated the elaboration of theoretical foundations of scientific organiza
tion of labor and its adoption in industry, transportation, and in economic
management. He recommended “ announcing an immediate competition
for the preparation of two or more textbooks on organization of labor in
general and on management labor in particular.” 27
Lenin 's instructions on this score acquire particular importance under
the conditions of the Armed Forces. Scientific organization of control and
management effort in the army and navy encompasses solution to the
following problems:
- correct division of labor, clear -cut determination of duties of control
entity officers, elimination of duplication or parallelism of effort;
- planning of control entity internal operations, correct determination
of volume, sequence and timetable of task performance ;
- determination of volume of information requisite for handling various
control tasks, and securement of prompt acquisition of this information ;
237
 - improvement of the forms in which information can be presented ,
and the methods of its processing;
- organization of work stations, their equipping with communications
gear, computer devices and other special apparatus;
- prompt informing of control entity officers on the overall state of
affairs and verification of execution of assigned tasks.
A special place in organization of control and management activity is
occupied by problems pertaining to management and leadership style .
The concept of Leninist style of leadership has taken firm root in this
country as a highest model, toward which each and every leader and
supervisor should strive. It presupposes first and foremost partisanship ,
scientific content and concreteness in handling control and management
problems, precise organization of effort, and establishment of correct
relationships between superior and subordinate. We know that the leader
who has created a favorable psychological atmosphere in the group
achieves greater effect with the least expediture of physical and mental
effort. The Leninist leadership style presupposes cooperation on a busi
nesslike and highly -principled basis, maximum demandingness in combi
nation with respect for and confidence in people, sensitivity and attention
toward subordinates, and rigorous verification of execution of orders
and instructions.
These are some of the features of supervision and guidance of military
organizationaldevelopment and troop control in the light of Lenin 's legacy
of theory. Turning to the arsenal of Leninist thought, we find in it an
inexhaustible treasure of ideas pertaining to the control of social processes
in general, and the management of military organizational development
and troop control in particular. A thorough study and innovative applica
tion of these principles for solving specific control and management
problems constitutes a most important condition for further strengthening
the combat might of the Soviet Armed Forces.

Footnotes
1. See V . I. Lenin : Poln . Sobr. Soch. (Complete Works), Volume 36 , page 172.
2 . Ibid ., page 381.
3 . Materialy XXIV s" yezda KPSS (Proceedings of the 24th CPSU Congress ),
page 66 .
4 . Lenin , op.cit., Volume 40, pp 76 – 77.
5. Ibid ., Volume 42, page 221.
6 . Leninskiy sbornik (Lenin Collection), XXXVII, pp 138, 139.
7. KPSS v rezolyutsiyakh i resheniyakh ( The CPSU in Resolutions and De
cisions), Part 1, page 433.
8. Lenin , op.cit., Volume 40, page 240.
9. Ibid ., Volume 36, page 178.
10. Ibid ., Volume 35, page 202.
11. Ibid ., Volume 44, page 335.
238
 12. Programma Kommunisticheskoy partii Sovetskogo Soyuza ( Program of the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union ) , page 68.
13. Materialy . . . , op.cit., page 205.
14. Lenin , op.cit., Volume 38 , page 400.
15. Ibid ., Volume 40, page 271.
16. Ibid ., Volume 40, page 77 .
17. Materialy . . . , op.cit., page 14.
18. Lenin, op.cit., Volume 45, page 394.
19. Ibid ., Volume 29, page 318.
20. Ibid ., Volume 40, page 215.
21. Ibid ., Volume 45, page 394 .
22. Materialy . . . , op.cit., page 67 .
23 . Lenin , op .cit., Volume 44, page 195.
24 . Ibid ., Volume 26 , page 258.
25. Ibid ., Volume 45, page 107.
26. Ibid ., page 112.
27. Ibid ., Volume 45, page 395.

239
 Chapter XIV. Sociopolitical Substance of Civil
Defense

Scientific concepts and categories are fluid . They change and develop .
cxpressing the development of living life, as Lenin put it.' The content of
the term “ war," for example, has today become totally different, more
complex and profound. Modern war includes such an important now
element as civil defense . Today without civil defense it is impossible to
withstand the rigorous trials which are inevitable with cnemy use of
nuclear-warhead missiles, chemical and bacteriological mass destruction
weapons; it is impossible without civil dcfense to protect the population
and the nation 's economy. Civil defense is becoming a strategic factor
which is of substantial determining influence on the course and outcome
of a modern war, as well as on postwar restoration of the economy.
Bourgeois philosophy and sociology, from their standpoint of idealism ,
are unable to discern the truc sociopolitical essence of civil defense .
Marxist-Leninist philosophy alone cnables us to approach examination
of this problem from a genuinely scientific standpoint.

1. Politics,War, and Civil Defense

Of fundamental importance for clucidating the social substance of civil
war is the Leninist logic of cognition of fundamental categories of war:
its class essence , political content, and character. Since this is discussed
in detail in the carly chapters of this study, there is probably no necd to
return to this topic . We should merely emphasize that Leninist logic of
cognition unfolds in a rigorously specific scquence : from discovery of the
political content of a given , particular war to determination of its class
essence, its character. Its character — a just war of liberation or an un
just war of plunder - proceeds precisely from the political content and
aimsof the specific war. Everything depends on "what class character the
war bcars, why the war broke out, what classes are waging it, and what
historical and historical-economic conditions caused it." ?
Leninist methodology and logic of investigation of the categorics of
war are of fundamental significance as well for the sequential revelation
both of the sociopolitical substance of civil defense in general and its
political content and class character in a given, specific nation .
240
 We know that today civil defense exists in almost all countries in the
world and as a rule bears the same name. Making use of this fact, bour
geois politicians and sociologists are attempting to prove that it is in all
cases identical. They adopt some one external feature or indicator and
call it an important common feature, features which are metaphysically
removed from the dialectical interrelation of the whole and are elevated
to the rank of determinants. Such features normally include the following:
external similarity of measures; analogous techniques and means of de
fense and forms of procedures in stricken areas ; practically identical
equipping of civil defense forces, etc.
Of course the laws of nuclear physics are universal; therefore the
methods and means of protection against nuclear weapons are essentially
the same. The forms and methods of action taken by civil defense per
sonnel are determined by the physicalmeans of waging war, by the hard
ware of war, which is almost identical in today 's industrially-developed
nations, both capitalist and socialist. One should not, however, on this
basis equate the civil defense of one nation with that of another . The fact
is that this similarity is external, formal, trivial. The main thing, the
decisive element, consists of a profound, fundamental difference in the
class political aimson behalf of which civil defense facilities and resources
are being utilized, just as is the case with weapons in war. Weapons can
serve the just aims of defense against enslavers and unjust aims of en
slavement and seizure. Therefore, beyond the external, one must see the
internal, the substantial, that is the political aims for which resources and
facilities are utilized and what classes are deriving the benefits.
In capitalist countries there is a rather widespread idealistic concept
of the allegedly above -class, humane substance of civil defense. It is
fostered and propagandized by West German specialist E . Khampe
[ transliteration ), American political commentators T . Martin and D .
Latham ,' noted U .S . physicist and leading civil defense theorist U . Vigner
[transliteration ),5 and others. They see the purpose and aim of civil
defense as protection and rescue of people from the terrible nightmare
looming over all mankind, emphasizing its humanitarian role. They state
that since civil defense attacks nobody and kills nobody but merely helps
all and each survive, bourgeois ideologues are attempting to convince
public opinion that it serves the entire nation and not some class or
privileged caste . One of the myths of the 20th century has been born
precisely on this basis — the myth of the popular character of civil defense
in any country , regardless of its socioeconomic and political system .
Martin and Latham even attempt to provide a biological substantiation
of the " common -to -all-mankind character ” of civil defense. They claim
that in man's basic nature there is a defensive instinct which enables him
to spot a threat promptly, and to do away with or render harmless un
acceptable factors in the environment. They claim that this is the essence
of the human intellect, the age-old policy of mankind. They claim that
the aims and tasks of civil defense are in full conformity with this.
241
 Thus, not only man and mankind, but politics as well is abstracted
from social, specific , historical conditions. It is also viewed from an
abstract biological and idealistic standpoint. What “age-old politics of
mankind” are they talking about? Politics always is of a class nature .
Lenin wrote sarcastically that he who speaks of nonclass politics should
simply be put into a cage and put on display with the Austrailian
kangaroo .
The principal aim of bourgeois ideologues consists in ensuring for the
civil defense of their countries the cooperation of broad segments of the
population, the entire people , for without this support civil defense fails
to justify the hopes placed upon it by imperialist circles. Therefore, they
seek arguments with which they can convince and impress the average
citizen . They emphasize ideas of " the commonweal,” “ good,” “mercy,”
“ help one's neighbor," " love of mankind." West German Professor
Schweizer stated in a debate on civil defense that its aims coincide with
Christian morality and constitute love of man embodied.?
Through the writings of U .S . civil defense bourgeois ideologues runs
the idea that each and every American should take a personal interest in
civil defense, for it will preserve his life and “ democratic freedoms.” But
who is threatening the existence of the American nation ? From whom
are the learned servants of the monopolists planning to defend it ? It seems
that the culprits are the Soviet Union and the other socialist nations. The
American man in the street is intimidated with tales of “ Communist
aggression,” Soviet military might, the potential destruction of American
cities and civilian population by modern weapons of mass destruction .
These efforts pursue a far from humanitarian aim — that of sowing seeds
of hatred against our country , to present in a distorted light its genuinely
peaceful foreign policy, to justify the unbridled growth of militarism in the
United States.
Abstract humanitarianism is that horse which even the inveterate
apologists of violence , the warmongers, are attempting to saddle. H . Kahn ,
dubbed by journalists the generalissimo of nuclear war, today advocates
cooperation between U .S . and Soviet civil defense on the basis of allegedly
“ common interests” of protecting the civilian population. In a recently
published joint-authorship study entitled Guide to Defense, he and
sociologist A . Wiener advocate viewing civil defense measures in these
countries as " intelligent, humane,” and not as " strategic, aimed at
achieving specific military goals." Kahn calls himself a pragmatist, and
yet, as we know , pragmatism considers genuine that which is useful and
advantageous and which in a given situation brings success. This emphasis
on love of mankind apparently is supposed to ensure success in the
campaign against indifference and hostility on the part of broad segments
of the U .S. population toward civil defense .
Lenin noted that there is no more widespread and no more bankrupt
technique than the arbitrary snatching of certain little facts from a general,
integral and objective relation of societal phenomena.8 This technique, as
242
he graphically put it, is a “ subjective " concoction. The attempt by bour
geois sociologists,military theorists and political commentators to remove
civil defense from the specific socioeconomic conditions which have de
fined its character and in which it exists, to take it beyond the bonds of
class politics, into the sphere of abstract morality , is nothing but an
arbitrary game of intellect and a “ subjective” concoction. In an antag
onistic world , social phenomena are inevitably of a political, class charac
ter. For this reason, there is not and cannot be a politically neutral,
above -class civil defense. All attempts to conceal and to distort its social
essence and class nature pursue primarily political aims, the creation and
support of the myth of the popular nature of bourgeois civil defense .
From the standpoint of dialectical and historical materialism , civil
defense constitutes a historically transitory societal phenomenon : it arose
in connection with the fact that the political objectives of wars in the
20th century have become complex and more decisive, and weapons have
developed which correspond to these far-reaching objectives; it will be
come superfluous as soon as war is eradicated from society. Civil defense
was engendered by the specific historical conditions of a savage struggle
by the imperialist states for world hegemony, for liquidation by means of
armed violence of the world socialist system , which naturally compels the
socialist nations to take effective steps to repulse imperialist aggression
and to defend the population and economy against the effects of modern
weapons. The genesis and development of civil defense has further been
determined by radical changes in methods of warfare, caused by the
development of aerial means of attack , by the development and adoption
of missiles and nuclear weapons.
Civil defense is primarily a sociopolitical phenomenon . Defense organi
zations are always and everywhere organically linked with politics, serve
it, securing the root economic and political interests of specific classes and
states. Civil defense also performs primarily political functions, pursues
class aims. Among the substantial elements making up its content the
principal and determining one is not ethical, not moral, but rather class
political. Herein lies the basic, fundamental difference in the sociopolitical
orientation of civil defense of imperialist and socialist states.
Civil defense in all countries is organized and operates as a govern
mental organization. It performs the role of an instrument of the policies
of the given state, policy which pertains to the entire population, and
these are not thousands but rather millions of persons. Serious politics
begin , Lenin pointed out, not where thousands are involved, but where
there are millions involved.' Civil defense corresponds precisely to these
politics.
Politics directly and indirectly (through military doctrine and strategy)
specifies the objectives and missions of civil defense and determines its
place and role in achieving victory in war. For this reason , no matter
what its organizational structure , the fundamental directions of its de

243
velopment and principles of operation are elaborated by the nation ' s
political leaders.
In connection with this we should note once again the total ground
lessness of equating the terms “ war” and “ armed struggle.” This takes
beyond the framework of war other forms of struggle, including civil
defense. The latter of course does not directly conduct armed combat,
but by means of its inherentmethods it does exert effective influence on
change in the overall balance of forces of the belligerents, on the course
of the war as a whole.
The civil defense of any country constitutes a unity of two organically
interlinked aspects : sociopolitical and material-technical. The first of
these is internal, principal, determining. It comprises the class nature of
this organization , its sociopolitical essence . The second is external, de
pendent on the first and expressing its specific features. This is why
civil defense cannot be reduced to any one aspect, and in particular cannot
be equated solely with the external, material-technical aspects. It is first
and foremost a copy of the socioeconomic and political system which has
given it birth .

2. The Class Substance of CivilDefense in Capitalist States

The process of deepening of man's knowledge of things, as Lenin
noted, proceeds from phenomenon to essence, from essence of the first
order to essence of the second order. This Leninist thesis fully applies to
cognition of the essence of civil defense, which deepens when we reveal
its political content and class character under the conditions of a given
state.
The essence of civil defense is determined by the character of a coun
try 's socioeconomic and political system , by the foreign and domestic
policies of its government, by the political content and character of the
war which the state wages with the involvement of civil defense. These
are three key elements which embrace everything of importance in the
interrelations and correlations between state, politics, war and civil
defense.
Civil defense is part of the political superstructure. The economic
basis of society (capitalist, socialist ), determining the superstructure as a
whole, in the final analysis also determines the class character, the
sociopolitical essence of this organization , not only directly but indirectly
as well — through the state and its policies.
The sociopolitical essence of civil defense is objective in nature and
is directly related to the type of war (just, unjust) . For example, prepara
tion on the part of the NATO member nations for an imperialist,
predatory war against the socialist nations unquestionably deepens the
militaristic and reactionary nature of the civil defense of these bourgeois
states.
The correlation between civil defense and foreign policy becomes the
244
most strongly delineated when it is considered from the following view
point: does the civil defense of the imperialist powers present an obstacle ,
or on the contrary, does it open up the sluice gates for a thermonuclear
world war? At a certain debate , representatives of a German Lutheran
academy in the FRG stated that civil defense is associated by the West
German population with the inevitability of such a war, and therefore it
" binders the pursuit of peaceful policy and profanes it.” 10 Prominent
American physicist O . Chamberlain , responding to a question about what
effect a stepped -up civil defense effort would have on peace, stressed that
this would definitely escalate the arms race and increase international
tension . The U . S. magazine Science Newsletter noted that frequently the
person who owns a family fallout Shelter advocates the use of force to
settle international problems.
Western military leaders and bourgeois ideologues place the initiation
of an aggressive war in direct dependence on the state of civil defense.
Former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Wheeler , stated
that, “ U .S . preparedness for war is determined by what segment of the
population can survive a nuclearwar.” 11 Prominent apologists of violence,
H . Kahn and A . Wiener, are forced to admit that U .S. civil defense may
provoke a war. The U .S . President, they claim , as soon as defense of the
home front has been secured, by among others civil defense measures, will
begin making bolder foreign policy decisions, and his willingness to take
risks, to engage in threats and to use nuclear weapons will greatly increase .
The meaning of these statements is clear: effective civil defense will
provide the “ hawks” of war, nuclear intimidation and blackmail with
additional trump cards; civil defense will have a reverse influence on U . S .
foreign policy, intensifying its aggressiveness.
Life itself is convincing rank -and-file Americans of this. In 1961, in
connection with the so -called “ Berlin crisis,” a campaign to construct
atomic fallout shelters was conducted in the United States. Newspapers ,
magazines, radio , and television encouraged furious anti-Communism ,
chauvinism and militarism . They deafened Americans with hysterical
cries: “ Run from the Red missiles !" , If you want to live — build fallout
shelters!”, “ Buy radiation-protection suits!" , " Your children will die if
you do not save them from Soviet atomic bombs!" The country was
seized by panic.
As could be expected, the fallout Shelter building boom collapsed in
scandal. Sheltermania , as the American press acknowledged, had forced
many Americans to an awareness for the first time of the threat of the
cold war, with a spread of panic .
But the ultrareactionary forces of imperialism , the monopolists who
earn fat profits on military appropriations, do not want to abandon their
objectives and profits. They would like to foist upon their governments
and peoples costly plans for building new types of weapons, implementa
tion of additional programs for building various shelters, “ anti-nuclear
bunkers,” and antimissile defense systems. It is , therefore, not surprising

245
that in a number of the leading capitalist countries civil defense is con
sidered a servant of the monopolies, the military -industrial complexes ,
which have a stake in maintaining militarist tensions in the world .
The growing strength of the military-industrial complex caused concern
on the part of President Eisenhower that the United States was possibly
approaching the status of a garrison state and military dictatorship. So.de
U .S . bourgeois civil defense specialists consider the latter to be that
catalyst which is accelerating the process of total militarization of that
country, and at the same time a means of doing away with bourgeois
democratic order and the establishment of a military dictatorship .
This point of view is expounded in detail, for example, by A . Uoskou
[transliteration ) . He believes that the development of U .S . civil defense
will create a situation incompatible with the concept of freedom . Many
millions of individuals will be obligated , he writes, to make frequent and
extended practice sojourns in atomic shelters. People will begin living in
an atmosphere of nuclear fear, fear for their lives; they will become
accustomed to frequent practice alerts, to the procedure of taking to the
shelters and evacuation. The population will gradually accept the in
evitability of thermonuclear war. The government will demand for itself
" dictatorial authorities,” and every citizen can become the object of
" authoritarian ,” compulsory measures, a compliant cog in the great war
machine.12
Civil defense intensifes the reactionary nature of internal policy,
promotes the deterioration of a country to a military dictatorship and
greatly broadens the sphere of militarization .
The universality and extensive development of civil defense (it is
organized everywhere, from the remote hinterlands to the greatmetropolis,
at every factory , in every office, in every school and home) make it a
powerful weapon of imperialist policies and militarism . Thanks to civil
defense, the misanthropic spearpoint of militarism has been sheathed and
concealed by what at first glance appears to be a humanitarian aim , Ap
pealing to people with words of defense , offering them practical advice,
and relying on the latest scientific and technological advances, the ide
ologues of imperialist civil defense are attempting to unite the exploiter
and exploited , white and “ colored ,” to unite them under the pretext of
" common defense" against an “ external foe,” who stands on the far side
of the nuclear barrier. The lies and insidiousness of this policy also consist
in the fact that the “ nuclear barrier” is aimed at disuniting and separating
class brothers— the toilers of the socialist and capitalist nations. On the
domestic front, this policy is aimed at incorporation of the ideology and
practices of " social partnership " of oppressors and oppressed, establish
ment of “ class peace" in the rear areas.
In imperialist countries, civil defense is actively participating in the
anti-Communist " crusade.” Its propagandists whip up anti-Soviet fervor
in the rank-and-file citizenry, constantly drumming into their heads that
the socialist camp is enemy number one, which threatens them with death
246
or mutilation, destruction of the home and the loss of loved ones. This.
type of propaganda can act on one's innermost human feelings , and
herein lies its particular danger.
The most reliable civil defense entities in the capitalist countries are
right now preparing to put down revolutionary manifestations by toilers,
to break up demonstrations, to scatter strikers, to “ impose order” on the
home front of the warring state . At present all this is being kept secret,
concealed from the eyes of the public . It is true that West German
journalist G . Val'raf ( transliteration ), who posed as a representative of
a civil defense committee, succeeded in discovering and publishing data
on “ self -defense groups” established at factories in the FRG , which are
receiving special training in the use of weapons against “ insurgents” and
" saboteurs.” When asked by a journalist whether they were prepared to
act against insurgents, a civil defense official at the Kontinentalwerke
Plant (Hannover) replied that all steps had been taken : they had
weapons, 70 men had received training, and they could be relied upon
implicitly . According to Val'raf, “ self-defense groups” have been set up
not only at large factories but at many small enterprises as well; they
are frequently led by former Nazis. 13
British military writer Liddel Hart, in his book Intimidation or De
fense? quotes a statement by Field Marshal Montgomery that if the
security of the population in the NATO nations is not ensured, “ during
a world war the country will be faced with a catrastrophe, since the home
front will collapse.” 14 Thus it seems that bourgeois politicians and mili
tary leaders are troubled most of all by an “ insurgent home front.” The
writer speaks of forces which can be employed against the insurgent
masses: specially selected and trained motorized troops, state police units
and elements. They will be assisted by local police forces, comprising a
segment of the civil defense forces.
Bourgeois politicians consequently do not believe very strongly in the
effectiveness of the " social partnership ” and “ class peace” on the home
front during war. For this reason they do not exclude the possibility of
"barricadebattles ” on the " domestic front.” Civil defense constitutes one
of those forces which will be called upon to defend the interests of the
monopoly ruling clique, to defend the socioeconomic and political
foundations of the bourgeois system .
The conflict and contradiction in the very essence of civil defense
of imperialist states is manifested most sharply and strongly in this. On
the one hand, civil defense promises to defend " each and every person ,”
drawing the entire population into its programs, while on the other hand,
it serves the ruling cliques of the monopoly bourgeoisie, constitutes an
instrument of its aggressive and reactionary policies and has the task of
ensuring performance of political tasks in an unjust, predatory war. The
root economic and political interests of the monopolists, which are served
by civil defense, are in an irreconcilable conflict with the interests and
goals of the toiler masses.

247
 This fundamental class conflict is manifested in various forms in civil
defense. For example , its guiding nucleus is composed of government and
military officials, while the civil defense rank and file are representatives
of the toiler masses. The diametrically opposed class interests and goals
of the two cannot but weaken and in fact do weaken the civil defense of
the capitalist countries, undermindings it from within .
There also exists there a contradiction between formally declared
equality in defense and actual inequality . Industrial and financial bosses
as well as top bureaucrats can build for themselves luxurious, palatial
underground shelters with TV , refrigerators, baths and air conditioners .
The average citizen receives recommendation to dig his own “ poor man ' s
shelter,” which in the United States was aptly dubbed “molehill."
Thus the same chronic and incurable internal diseases are inherent in
civil defense of the bourgeois states as the very decaying structure of
monopoly capital.
The humanitarianism of civil defense in the imperialist countries is
merely a facade. The “ trivial, the apparent, the superficial more fre
quently disappears , does not hold as 'solidly ,' does not 'sit as firmly as
'substance'.” 15 In actuality , the civil defense of these countries is a mili
taristic, reactionary organization. The very word " humanitarianism ”
sounds blasphemous issuing from the lips of those who during the span
of a single generation have twice impelled mankind into worldwide
butchery, costing tens of millions of lives. The monopolists do not see a
human being in the simple worker, but rather an object for exploitation
and a means of obtaining profit. Therefore , even in civil defense they
value primarily the fact that its mission is to save their rule, preserve their
labor force, help them win their war and strengthen their position .
As we see it, the tie between politics and civil defense is deep and
organic ; it is not of an external but rather internal, not a transient but
permanent, not a random but essential character. Consequently this
dialectic link is substantial and logical. Civil defense reflects chiefly that
aspect of the policies of the ruling class which determine the character and
direction , volume and intensity, aims and tasks of preparing for and
waging war. Civil defense in the imperialist countries acts as a new
weapon of aggressive policy. This defines its militaristic and antipopular
character.

3. The Social Nature of Soviet Civil Defense

Only in the socialist state does civil defense in the full sense of the
word correspond to its name, serve the interests of the toiler masses and
consequently possess a genuinely popular character. The democratic and
humanitarian essence of Soviet civil defense is manifested in its purpose
and aims, its fundamental principles of operation . The principal task
among the many various ones handled by this organization consists in de
fense of the nation's entire population against mass destruction weapons.
248
Man constitutes the highest value in a socialist society. Therefore, Soviet
civil defense focuses its principal efforts on defense and rescue of people,
or in more concrete terms— on preparing for and conducting dispersal
and evacuation of the population from cities, organization of an early
warning system , and securement of group (shelters) and individual ( gas
masks, respirators, etc ) means of protection. The Soviet state and its
civil defense are religiously carrying out Lenin 's behest: " The first pro
ductive force of all mankind is the worker, the toiler. If he survives, we
shall save and rebuild everything." 16
Socialist humanitarianism permeates all Soviet civil defense activities,
comprising the most important structural element of its substance. In
our society there are no classes working to foster national animosity and
hatred , in unleashing predatory wars. Soviet foreign policy is hallmarked
by firm consistency in upholding the principles of peace and friendship
between peoples and a resolute struggle against imperialist aggressors .
The wars which our nation is compelled to fight are the most just wars of
liberation in defense of the socialist homeland.
Our socialist homeland's most progressive and genuinely popular social
and political system , its peaceful and humanitarian policy of peace and
friendship among peoples , and its just goals of defense of the socialist
homeland dictate a totally new type of civil defense- socialist, dia
metrically opposed to the imperialist type of this organization . Socialist
production relations of comradely cooperation and fraternal mutual as
sistance on the part of the toilers of city and village, and the economic
basis of our society, determining the political superstructure as a whole ,
also determine the class-political essence of Soviet civil defense .
The goals and tasks of civil defense are near and dear to Soviet citizens,
who vitally desire to prevent war and consequently are interested in
strengthening our nation 's defense capability, a constituent and important
part of which is civil defense , in timely preparation for defense against
mass destruction weapons, and securement of victory in war if the im
perialists start one. For this reason Soviet civil defense, as that of the
other socialist nations, is based on total popular support. It is cemented
by themoral-political and ideological unity of the Soviet people , powerful
in the friendship and brotherhood of all socialist nations, their patriotism
and internationalism . The main source of its strength and fortitude is the
wise leadership of the Communist Party , which directs its organizational
development and all its activities, and determines fundamental positions
pertaining to defense of the nation 's population and economy against mass
destruction weapons. In conformity with the instructions of the 23rd
CPSU Congress , party and Soviet bodies, public organizations and our
entire people have in recentyears done a large and comprehensive job of
improving Soviet civil defense. New and important tasks in this area
proceed from the resolutions of the 24th CPSU Congress. “ Everything
thathas been created by the people ,” states the Central Committee Report
249
to the 24th CPSU Congress, “ should be solidly defended.” 17 An im
portant part in this task is played by civil defense .
Constituting a part of a unified whole— the Soviet socialist society
and state - Soviet civil defense constitutes a socially homogeneous, po
litically and ideologically monolithic, morally and psychologically stable ,
dependable and powerful organism . Local civil defense bodies are headed
by the people's chosen representative - chairmen of village, urban district
( raion ) , and province (oblast) soviet executive committees , chairmen
of councils of ministers of autonomous and union republics. It is created
on the basis of the general principles of Soviet organizational development.
Collective leadership in civil defense is handled by party and soviet entities
at the local and national level, boards of ministries and ministry -status
agencies. The principle of collective leadership is organically combined
with the principle of one-man command, with personal responsibility for
the state of national defense, such as by an enterprise director,managing
director of an industrial trust, or a minister.
General supervision over Soviet civil defense is exercised by the
Council of Ministers of the USSR . Thus, the policies of the state, which
are elaborated by the Communist Party, directly determine the aims and
tasks of civil defense. In close coordination with the Soviet Armed Forces,
its job is to protect the nation 's strategic rear areas, to reduce to a mini
mum human and resource losses, thus making a major contribution
toward victory over the aggressors, if they dare start a war against the
socialist nations.
The unity of army and people finds vivid expression in the brotherly
concord and cooperation between the Soviet Armed Forces and Soviet
Civil Defense: Civil Defense elements ( in wartime they involve almost
the entire adult able-bodied population ) will operate in mass destruction
areas, working hand in hand with army and navy elements. Civil defense
in turn will give inestimable help to the army in achieving victory over
the enemy, providing, together with the PVO troops, defense of the rear
areas and ensuring stable operation of the economy. Thus, the cooperation
and coordination between our army and civil defense is profoundly
organic. Both the Armed Forces and Civil Defense are carrying out
common tasks in strengthening the nation's defense capability and de
fending the conquests of socialism .
Public ownership of the means of production and the planned system
of economic management based on this principle enable our state more
quickly and effectively to mobilize and efficiently to utilize all the nation 's
resources for protecting the population againstmass destruction weapons
and preparing the economy for dependable , stable operation under con
ditions of a nuclear-missile war. Maximum favorable conditions for
handling these and other tasks have been created by the very socialist
societal and governmental system and its superiority over the capitalist
system . Herein lies the fundamental, decisive superiority of the civil de
fense of the socialist state over the civil defense of bourgeois countries.
250
 Even prior to the victorious October Revolution, Lenin pointed out
that, “ the defense capability of a nation which has thrown off the yoke
of capital, which has given the land to the peasants, and which has placed
banks and factories under worker supervision, would be many times
greater than the defense capability of a capitalist country.” 18 The historic
conquests of socialism have made it possible to raise this nation's de
fensive strength to an unprecedentedly high level. Soviet civil defense is
also becoming stronger.
The socialist societal and governmental system presents civil defense
with much broader prospects than does the bourgeois system . Bourgeois
ideologues are compelled to acknowledge this fact. In a book by Leon
Goure entitled Civil Defense in the Soviet Union , published in the United
States in 1962, in addition to anti-Communist slander about Soviet ag
gressiveness, etc, the author states that the Soviet regime and “ the system
of centralized economic planning" make it possible to introduce and
supervise execution of any civil defense program .19
For example , we have no wealthy homeowners , to whose feelings and
reason U .S . Civil Defense Director S . Pittman appealed a few years back,
requesting them to offer their spacious basements for group atomic
shelters.We have no private owners of railroads, truck fleets and garages,
as well as steamship companies, capable at their own whims of affecting
evacuation of the population from the cities. We have no landlords, land
barons and other big landowners, on whom would depend the dispersal of
urban dwellers in the rural areas and the construction of radiation -proof
shelters in those areas.
Soviet Civil Defense does not incite, does not promote and does not
provide impetus to war. Its substance is influenced in a decisive manner
by the peaceful foreign policy of the socialist state . For this reason there
is no basis for the " forecasts” of Western experts that a strengthening of
Soviet civil defense will lead to greater " inflexibility” of Soviet foreign
policy and even to serious aggravation of international tension . Improve
ment of Soviet civil defense and an increase in its effectiveness constitutes
one more major obstacle in the way of the unleashing of a new world
war by the imperialists. Consequently , Soviet civil defense intensifies the
peaceful actions taken by our state and strengthens international security
as a whole. Herein lies one of the most important features of its socio
political essence.
The strength and firmness of Soviet civil defense are the invincible
strength and firmness of the Soviet socialist system . All this of course
does not eliminate the necessity of further strengthening this organization ,
which constitutes an important element of the nation 's defensive strength ;
it does not do away with the task of continuing to conduct extensive
moral-psychological training of the population for the hard test of a
possible nuclear-missile war.
251
Footnotes
1. See V. I. Lenin : Poln. Sobr. Soch . (Complete Works ), Volume 29, page 226 –
227.
2. Ibid ., Volume 32, page 77.
3. See E . Khampe: Strategiya grazhdanskoy oborony (Strategy of Civil Defense ) ,
Moscow , Izd -vo inostrannoy literatury, 1958.
4 . See T. Martin and D . Latham : Strategy for Survival, The University of
Arizona Press, Tucson , 1963.
5. Survival and the Bomb. Methods of Civil Defense, Indiana University Press,
1969.
6 . Lenin , op.cit., Volume 23, page 4.
7. See Ziviler Bevoelkerungsschutz , (Civil Defense ), No 12, 1967.
8. Lenin , op.cit., Volume 30, pp 350– 351.
9. Ibid., Volume 36, pp 16 – 17 .
10. Zivilschutz (Civil Defense), No 10 , 1967.
11. Allgemeine Schweizer Militaerzeitschrift (General Swiss Military Journal) ,
No 2, 1969.
12. See A . Uoskou: Predely oborony (Limits of Defense ), translated from English ,
Moscow , Voyenizdat, 1964, pp 50, 51, 126 .
13. See Za rubezhom (Abroad ) , No 43, 1967, page 11.
14. B. Kh. Liddel Gart: Ustrasheniye ili oborona? (Intimidation or Defense ?),
Moscow , Voyenizdat, 1962, page 44.
15. Lenin , op.cit., Volume 29, page 116 .
16. Ibid ., Volume 38, page 359.
17. Materialy XXIV s"yezda KPSS (Proceedings of the 24th CPSU Congress ) ,
page 81.
18 . Lenin, op .cit., Volume 34, page 331.
19. See L . Goure : Civil Defense in the Soviet Union, University of California
press, Berkeley, 1962, page IX .
Chapter XV. Methodology of Leninist Scientific
Foresight

A characteristic feature of V . I. Lenin as an ingenious theorist and

leader of the socialist revolution was his ability to see clearly into the
future, to predict the course of development of events in various areas of
societal affairs, including the military . Under present-day conditions, when
strengthening of the nation's military might demands more than ever
before precise consideration of sociopolitical phenomena and radical
changes in military affairs, mastery of the Leninist methodology of scien
tific prediction plays an exceptionally important role.
To direct means to foresee. This demand is also very important in the
area of the military. Without comprehensively substantiated predictions
and thoroughly -conceived plans, a scientific approach to solution of the
complex problems pertaining to strengthening the Armed Forces and
increasing their combat readiness is inconceivable today.

1. V. I. Lenin on the Foundations of Scientific Prediction

All the theoretical and practical activities of Vladimir Il'ich Lenin
were permeated by scientific foresight. Even when turning to the past,
he did this for the sake of the future. Lenin stated from the speaker's
rostrum at the 8th Party Congress: “ . . I have looked at the past only
from the standpoint of that which will be needed tomorrow or the day
after tomorrow for our policy.” 1
Lenin comprehensively substantiated in his writings the possibility
and necessity of scientific prediction. He proceeded from the thesis of the
cognizability of objective reality and the laws governing its development.
Since all phenomena and processes develop on the basis of laws inherent
in them , one can trace the history of their development and can predict
their future. This Leninist thesis on the cognizability of the world con
stitutes the methodological basis for proving the possibility of cognizing
the future.
Lenin emphasized that “ the laws of the external world , of nature . . .
constitute the basis ofman's purposeful activity.
"Man in his practical activities has before himself the objective world ,
is dependent on it and determines his activities by it.” 2
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 Purposeful human activity mandatorily includes prediction either of
an empirical or scientific character. Stressing the importance for man to
master such a quality as the ability mentally " to run ahead," Lenin quotes
D . I. Pisarev in his What Is to Be Done?: “ Ifman were totally deprived
of the ability to dream . . . if he could not occasionally run forward and
contemplate with his imagination in an integral and complete picture that
active creation which is just beginning to occur under his hands, I
definitely cannot imagine whatmotive cause would compelman to under
take and to complete extensive and exhausting efforts in the area of art,
science and practical affairs. .."
Prior to proceeding to a given concrete activity, man sets for himself
a goal and specifies the ways, methods and means of attaining it. This
applies in full measure to military activity as well. Prior to battle the
commander mentally pictures the course of forthcoming actions and
predicts the possible and most probable outcome of the engagement.
Proceeding on the basis of practical experience, man can anticipate
a given result of his actions. Science helps us penetrate into the essence
of those phenomena and processes which are to take place in the future.
In order to predict scientifically and then to proceed in the desired
direction, it is essential to have knowledge of objective laws. “ . . . Until
we gain knowledge of a law of nature," wrote Lenin , “ it, existing and
operating beyond our cognition , makes us slaves of 'blind necessity .' When
we gain knowledge of this law . . . we become the masters of nature.” 4
Materialist theory and the dialectical method, which were developed
and enriched by Lenin , following Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, con
stitute an important prerequisite for scientific prediction . His thesis on
the two concepts of development is an important confirmation of the fact
that it is possible scientifically to predict the future only on the basis of a
dialectical interpretation of the essense, sources and trends of develop
ment.
Lenin , an eminent dialectician, taught that phenomena should be viewed
not as fixed and unchanging but rather mandatorily taking into considera
tion the changeswhich take place in them . Phenomena should be analyzed
“ not only from the standpoint of the past but also from that of the future
as well. . . " 5 The dialectical concept of developmentmakes it possible to
effect this.
Metaphysicians deny the internal sources of development of objects
and phenomena, proceed from the existence solely of external causes of
movement, and in the final analysis focus on the search for some kind of
secret, supernatural forces, a kind of initial impetus .Such views cannot
serve as a scientific basis for prediction. In addition they essentially deny
the very possibility of scientific prediction .
The dialectical concept, in contrast to the metaphysical, demonstrates
that the source of development is contained within phenomena and
processes proper, in the form of diverse contradictions. Therefore, it alone
254
provides the key to a correct understanding of the inevitability and logical
nature of the birth of the new in the bosom of the old .
Lenin noted that development is not simple growth but rather a com
plex process of qualitative changes. Guided by this thesis, one can predict
transition from the present to the future in the area of the military, where
radical, qualitative advances periodically occur. This is served by the
thesis that development is a struggle of opposites. In the military it is
expressed in a constant struggle between the latest and most advanced
means of waging war and past, to a certain extent traditional, forms and
methods of combat operations.
Consequently , only the dialectical concept of development, which most
fully and deeply reflects actual processes in nature and society, can serve
as a methodological foundation for scientific prediction. Only by cognizing
the genuine sources of development of specific processes and phenomena
can we see how and in what direction they will develop in the future .
It was emphasized above that the Marxian theory of cognition de
veloped by Lenin constitutes the initial methodological foundation of
scientific prediction . It encompasses Lenin 's doctrine on truth , its ob
jectivity and concreteness, on absolute and relative truth , and on the
criterion of truth . Lenin 's theses on truth comprise an extremely important
contribution to the theory of knowledge. Without them , without considera
tion of the fact that practical activities serve as a criterion of the truth of
theoretical knowledge, it is impossible to penetrate the future. “ The view
point of life and practical activity should be the first and fundamental
viewpoint of the theory of knowledge." ?
Convincing evidence of the primacy of practical activity is the very
history of development of man 's cognitive activity . Prediction arose as a
consequence of practical activity and developed under its influence. In
addition, prior to the development of the sciences prediction of the future
was of a purely empirical, experimental nature .
Scientific prediction substantially differs from empirical, although it
does possess a common initial basis and a common criterion of truth
practical activity . With empirical prediction anticipation of man 's practical
actions moves to the forefront, the external appearance of things and
processes known to us, while with scientific prediction emphasis is on
the endeavor to gain knowledge of the essence of a future which is un
known to us for the sake of practical goals.
Scientific prediction of future phenomena and processes is based on
known laws and a dialectical materialist analysis of reality . Therefore , it
extends not only to those phenomena or processes which can or should
appear, but also to cognition of already existing ones which for a number
of reasons are not yet cognized.
Consequently, it is essential to differentiate between two types of
scientific prediction : one type involves knowledge of that which already
exists but which is unknown as regards experience, while the other is
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connected with knowledge about the future , that is that which does not
yet exist but which should arise .
Of exceptionally great methodological significance for scientific pre
diction is Lenin 's demand for a concretely historical approach to societal
phenomena. Only a dialectical materialistic analysis of all basic and
deciding factors as well as consideration of the great diversity of the
developing situation makes it possible scientifically and reliably to de
termine the development prospects of aspects of life under examination .
A concretely historical approach to analysis and solution of the problems
facing society protects one from subjectivism and dogmatism and makes
possible genuinely scientific prediction of societal phenomena .
An important role in ensuring such an approach to accomplishment of
the tasks of scientific prediction in societal affairs is played by socio
logical studies. Lenin attached great importance to such studies and on
numerous occasions himself conducted such investigations. An analysis of
changes in practical societal activity , carried out with the aid of socio
logical studies,makes it possible to concretize general theory, the laws and
principles of historical materialism applicable to various aspects of so
cietal affairs and vital tasks connected with building communism . Ex
tensive development and correct application of sociological investigation
constitute one of the conditions for success in the campaign against an
unscientific, incompetent approach to direction and management of gov
ernmental, economic and military organizational development.
Knowledge of the general laws governing the waging of war, of the
principles and methods of training and indoctrinating personnel does not
of itself provide an answer to a number of specific questions pertaining to
practical military affairs and does not automatically guarantee success.
In what direction and precisely how will given events and phenomena
develop in military routine and combat activities? One can obtain an
answer to these questions only on the basis of knowledge of the specific
mechanism of effect of general sociological laws. This is promoted by
military sociological studies, which are becoming increasingly widespread
in the military .
Lenin warned time and again that in the processes of societal affairs,
based on statistical laws, where an important role is played by subjective
factors in addition to objectively -operating laws, there can be no un
equivocal solution to problems of the future , with indication of all the
specific forms and a precise timetable of its manifestation . In regard , for
example , to the prospects for social reform in prerevolutionary Russia ,
Lenin emphasized : “ . . . A dual result or dual form of this transformation
may be obtained from a combination of the action of the forces effecting
this transformation. One of two possibilities: 1) either things will end in
'a decisive victory of the revolution over tsarism ' or 2 ) there will not be
sufficient forces for a decisive victory, and the matter will end with a
deal between tsarism and the most 'inconsistent and most ' selfish' ele
ments of the bourgeoisie. The entire infinite variety of details and com
256
binations, which nobody can predict, boils down in the final analysis
precisely to one or the other of these two outcomes." 8
Lenin sharply criticized those who believed that it is possible to put
together a textbook which provides for " all forms of development of
future world history.” 9
He considered impossible a detailed and absolutely accurate prediction
of social processes. “ It would be amusing to attempt,” he wrote, “ to
foresee the precise forms and dates of future steps of revolution.” 10
Lenin 's thesis on the probability nature of predicting processes of
societal affairs serves as a methodological statement for elucidation and
analysis of the specific features of scientific prediction in military affairs.
This nature of prediction shows up particularly clearly in the area
of the military. This is determined by a number of circumstances. First
of all, by the fact that one encounters in war more frequently than else
where various types of random occurrences, which cannot be predicted
in advance , and they exert substantial influence on the course and even
outcome ofwarfare. In the second place, war is a bilateral process, where
each of the belligerents consciously endeavors to conceal its actual forces
and means, intentions and aims, to delude the adversary. Thirdly , charac
teristic of the direction of combat operations is incomplete situational
data : in war it is never possible to possess exhaustive and absolutely
accurate information on the enemy.
Mar SU I. S . Konev, pointing to this feature, wrote: “War involves
such a large number of unforeseen circumstances and such a continuous
need to introduce revisions and seek new solutions that no matter how
much in advance one plans, it is impossible to provide everything or to
specify every exigency in advance.” 11
The development of nuclear missile weapons and immeasurably greater
troop mobility have made prediction in the course of warfare even more
complicated. In past wars commanders operated with a comparatively
small number of possible decision variants, while today, under conditions
of employment of nuclear missile weapons, the number has substantially
increased. It is correspondingly more difficult to select the most optimal
decision .
Lenin 's ideas on the foundations of scientific prediction of societal
phenomena also contain a critique of the unscientific , reactionary views
of the ideologues of imperialism in this area. The leader of the revolution
emphasized that their idealist philosophy and metaphysical method of
thinking makes correct prediction of future societal development im
possible . The bourgeoisie , as a class doomed by history to inevitable
collapse, is unable to comprehend the paths and character of the forward
movement of society.
Atthe same time, stated Lenin , it would be a mistake totally to exclude
the possibility of scientific prediction under conditions of capitalism . In
the area of technology and the natural sciences bourgeois scientists,
relying on the objective laws of reality, are capable of making and in fact
257
do makemajor discoveries and predict the future development of a num
ber of complex natural processes and phenomena. The situation is more
complex as regards prediction of societal phenomena. Many bourgeois
philosophers and sociologists endeavor to demonstrate the impossibility
of effective scientific prediction in the social area due to its complexity
and contradictory nature. There are those who acknowledge the possibility
of predicting social phenomena and processes. They are impelled to do
so by events taking place in the world arena and within the capitalist
countries. The monopolies cannot ignore the steadily growing endeavor
on the part of the masses in the present complex and tense situation to
peer into the future. The predictions of bourgeois scientists, however,
pursue the narrow , selfish interests of the exploiters. They are full of
pessimism and prognosticate for mankind various horrors and calamities.
Leninist prediction of future development of society differs radically
from the bourgeois. It is permeated with optimism and faith in a happy
future . Some representatives of the bourgeois world have called the leader
of the young Soviet state the “ Kremlin dreamer" and have called his
national electrification plan “ electrofiction .” They were unable to compre
hend that the optimism of Leninist prediction proceeds from scientifically
substantiated prognoses and is based on the advantages of the new social
system , on boundless faith in the labor enthusiasm of the masses, en
gendered by the October Revolution .
During World War I and the Civil War in Russia , Lenin stated a
number of fundamental theses pertaining to the prospects for their de
velopment and the consequences to which they could lead. In mid -1918
he wrote an article entitled “ Words of Prophecy,” dedicated to the pre
diction by Friedrich Engels about the potential results of a world war.
Lenin 's article begins with the portentious words: “Miraculous prophecy
is a fairy tale, but scientific prophecy is fact.” 12
In this article he discusses the amazing accuracy with which Engels
described the devastation a world war would produce and that, in the final
analysis, it would lead to the inevitable collapse of bourgeois empires and
to the inevitable victory of the proletariat.
L . I. Brezhnev stated in an address entitled “Lenin 's Cause Lives on
and Conquers” : “Maksim Gorkiy wrote that Lenin 'lived in the future
with one half of his great soul.' This is profoundly true. Lenin possessed
the rare ability to see in the present the future fate of mankind. Never
departing from reality , from practical affairs, from the actual conditions
and potential of the given period in history, Lenin 's thoughts roved far
into the future. With the light of scientific prediction he illuminated for
the working class the road ahead through many decades.” 13
More than half a century of experience in building socialism and the
armed defense of its conquests has fully confirmed the great strength and
rightness of Leninist prediction and Leninist policy pertaining to the
establishment and consolidation of the new system .
Discovery and thorough study of the most substantial aspects of the
258
mechanism of Leninist scientific prediction has today acquired excep
tionally great methodological significance for Soviet military cadres.
Herein lies the key to successfully solving the complex problems advanced
by military theory and practice.

2. Some Features of Leninist Scientific Prediction and Their Application to Military

Affairs
It is important to see historical patterns which have already been
established and which have revealed themselves in many manifestations
and to construct certain predictions on the basis of these patterns. An
even more complex and exceptionally difficult task of scientific prediction
consists in promptly revealing new laws and patterns and utilizing them
as an instrument of cognition and revolutionary transformation of the
world, as an instrument of struggle with the old for the sake of the new
and promising.
Vladimir Il’ich Lenin possessed the ability to see the new " before
others,” while many sociologists not only failed to acknowledge but even
denied the advance of the new .
Many important points of revolutionary theory and practice, including
matters pertaining to defense of the socialist state, were first advanced ,
formulated , and substantiated , as is well known, by Lenin . For example ,
he was the first to elaborate a military program of the proletarian revolu
tion , which specified the necessity of armed defense of toiler conquests .
At a time when some leaders of a number of Western European Social
Democratic parties, who had gone astray and had lost hopes for the
revolutionary development of society, were calling upon the worker class
to disarm , Lenin predicted that the revolution of the proletariat would not
come to a victorious end until it was capable of defending itself and
offering resistance to all those who would attempt to restore the old
bourgeois order by means of force. He sharply criticized the “social
priests” and opportunists who dreamed of a future " peaceful socialism ."
". . . They differ from revolutionary social democrats," wrote Lenin , " in
that they do not want to consider or think about a savage class struggle
and class wars in order to attain this wonderful future.” 14
Lenin's prediction pertaining to armed defense of the revolutionary
conquests of the proletariat was based on one of the most important points
of his elaborated theory proletarian revolution on the possibility of
a victorious socialist revolution initially in one or several countries. It
was precisely Lenin who saw and substantiated prior to all others that
the actual prerequisites for such a possibility are created by imperialism
with its unequal character of economic and political development. On
the basis of a dialectical materialist analysis of current realities he pre
dicted that this would take place sooner precisely in Russia than in any
other country.
When this country's proletariat took over power in October 1917, it

259
was met by thatwhich had been predicted by Lenin - a military attack by
external and domestic counterrevolutionary forces on the young Soviet
Republic , with the aim of strangling it.
The leader of the revolution not only saw before others those phe
nomena and processes connected with war on which the fate of the Soviet
state depended , but was also frequently one of few who proved capable
of fully assessing the approaching mortal danger. He was compelled to
wage a struggle against concealed and open adversaries within the party
and even against certain deluded party leaders who had failed to compre
hend the situation .
For example, this was the case with the matter of reaching a peace
agreement with Germany in February-March 1918 . As a result of a
comprehensive scientific analysis of the domestic and international situa
tion of Soviet Russia , Lenin came to the conclusion that it was necessary
to sign the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk , in spite of its incredibly harsh and
even humiliating terms. He saw that under conditions of economic de
vastation and collapse of the old army, the sole way to save the young
Soviet Republic and its future was an immediate peace, in order " to make
use of any, even the slightest possibility of a respite. . ." 16
The “leftist Communists,” headed by Bukharin and Trotsky, opposed
this policy, the only correct one. They were in favor of a partisan “ revolu
tionary war" against imperialism , which under those conditions would
threaten the very existence of the Soviet regime. The party, headed by
Lenin, gave short shrift to their erroneous views.
It is important to emphasize that Lenin not only pointed to a correct
way outof the prevailing situation but also predicted the brief duration of
the Brest-Litovsk Peace . His amazingly accurate prediction was very
soon confirmed . In November 1918 a revolution in Germany overthrew
the government of Kaiser Wilhelm , and power was seized by councils of
worker and sailor deputies. In connection with this, the Soviet govern
ment issued a decree on 13 November 1918 which repudiated the
extortionate peace treaty with Germany.
In predicting societal phenomena Lenin proceeded from the decisive
role of the masses in history, from their practical experience . For ex
ample, he saw in the creative enthusiasm of the worker class manifested
in the course of restoration of the economy following the victorious
October Revolution and in the famous Communist unpaid mass workdays
the birth of a new , communist attitude toward labor, and called this
initiative a greatbeginning.
Lenin emphasized time and again how important it is to rely on the
knowledge of the masses in building a new society. “ We do not claim ,"
he wrote, “ that Marx or the Marxists know the road to socialism in every
detail. That is nonsense. We know the direction of this road , and we know
what class forces are leading us along this road, but this will be demon
strated concretely, in a practical manner, only by the experience of the
millions, when they set about this task.” 16
260
 Lenin 's demand that one proceed at all times and in all things from
the experience of the masses, drawing on this basis important conclusions
for the future , is also of great methodological importance for military
cadres. During the course of a war themasses create a great many diversi
fied forms and methods of conducting combat operations, which even the
most gifted military commander is unable to predict in advance. It follows
from this that our officer cadres should always carefully study and syn
thesize the experience of the masses, utilizing it intelligently and promptly
in prognoses of the future . This also applies in full measure to party
political work , where the sum total experience and know -how of the
masses serves as a mandatory prerequisite for successfully accomplishing
the missions facing political entities.
Scientific prediction in military affairs should be more prompt and
timely than in any other area . For example, in astronomy, geography and
certain other sciences the prediction of various phenomena or processes
sooner or later than a specific moment does not exert any great negative
influence on the affairs of society. The area of the military possesses its
special, specific features. In the military, one cannot be guided by the
principle of "better late than never.” Prediction in military affairs, par
ticularly when one takes into consideration a potential nuclear missile
war, should correspond in full to the principle of “ the sooner the better."
It is very important to anticipate the potential adversary in determining
the character of a possible future war, the future development of weapons
and combat equipment, the forms and methods of warfare, organizational
structure of the armed forces, and in elaboration and execution of a great
number of practicalmeasures in conformity with the conclusions of mili
tary science and military doctrine.
One distinctive feature of Leninist prediction was an ability to pene
trate more deeply than others into the essence of imminent events or
phenomena, to reveal the natural laws corresponding to them and on this
basis to determine the future prospects for development of society as a
whole or its individual aspects.
Deeply and comprehensively examining the new stage of capitalism
imperialism , the great theorist ofMarxism came to the conclusion that its
development was not uniform and pointed to an inevitable consequence
of this fact — change in the real balance of power between imperialist
states. He predicted that the change in the balance of power would lead
to conflicts which could be resolved by force alone, that is by war.
" . . . If the balance of force changes,” wrote Lenin , “ how can resolution
of this conflict be effected under capitalism other than through force?” 17
Consequently , as Lenin demonstrated, wars for the division of an
already divided world proceed from the very nature and essence of
capitalism . The imperialist predators can divide the world only from a
position of strength . “ The capitalists divide the world not due to any
particular maliciousness but because the achieved level of concentration
makes it necessary to proceed along this path in order to obtain profit;
261
they divide the world on the basis of capital,''on the basis of strength '—
there can be no other method of division in the system of commodity
production and capitalism ." 18
Proceeding from the endeavor to settle vital matters by force, which
is inherent in imperialists, Lenin pointed to the necessity that the young
Soviet state constantly increase its defensive might, which at any moment
could be faced with imperialist aggression. As early as 1920 he warned
that as long as capitalism “ is much stronger than us it will be able at any
time to send its forces against us, to wage war against us again . It is
therefore necessary that wemake ourselves stronger. . .” 19
Lenin 's formulation of this problem is very dialectical : the stronger
we are, the stronger peace is, and the greater the possibility of preventing
war. Under present-day conditions this statement by our leader has found
embodiment in the Party Program documents of the 24th CPSU Congress.
Inherent in Leninist prediction is prediction not only of the most
general problems related to war in one way or another, but also certain
specific matters, particularly in the area of the art of warfare. We might
cite the following fact as an example . In September 1919, when an
advance by the cavalry corps of White Guardist general Mamontov
threatened Moscow , Lenin predicted the possibility of effectively com
batting horse cavalry with low - flying aircraft. On 4 September he wrote
a note to the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic : “ (Horse
cavalry is defenseless against low - flying aircraft ). . . Can you not order
a response ( quickly ) to learned military man X , Y , Z : airplanes against
cavalry ? Examples. Flight extremely low . Examples. Give instructions on
the basis ? 'Of science'. . ." 20
In response to this the Revolutionary Military Council quickly estab
lished a special aviation group which soon proceeded with the practical
execution of Lenin 's directive . Aircraft mounted a number of successful
attacks on Mamontov's cavalry.
In Lenin 's writings we see the leader's truly ingenious ability correctly
to guess the enemy's intentions and to determine the future development
of military operations. For example , in his correspondence with the
Revolutionary Military Council of the Eastern Front he expressed con
cern for the consequences of an enemy attack on Glazov and warned
of the possibility of a further advance by Kolchak on the left shoulder
of the Eastern Front with the objective of assisting Yudenich in the
Petrograd area. Subsequent events confirmed the correctness of Lenin 's
prediction : the counterrevolutionaries and the Entente had precisely such
a plan .
Another characteristic feature of Leninist prediction is the excep
tional breadth of the range of predictions in time and the ability to see
far into the future.
In probability processes of warfare, one feature of scientific prediction ,
based on statisticallaws, consists in the fact that the further the presumed
event is separated from us, the less the accuracy of prediction and the
262
more difficult prediction becomes. Lenin 's perspicacity in the area of
military affairs is amazing in its vitality and current validity, including
under the conditions of a potential nuclear missile war.
On the basis of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905, Lenin perceived
and formulated a number of important theses pertaining to certain fea
tures of modern wars. He drew attention in particular to the fact that
world wars, both in objectives and scope, are characteristic of imperialism
as the highest and final stage of capitalism . “World . domination ," wrote
Lenin , “ constitutes, to put it briefly, the content of imperialist policy , of
which an imperialist war is a continuation .” 21
One feature ofmodern wars, as Lenin stated it, consists in an increase
in the role of the home front in achieving victory over the enemy. Modern
war is notonly a war of armies but also a struggle of home fronts. Victory
is forged both in engagements and battles at the front as well as in the
deep rear. It is a well-known fact that in the distant past the role of the
home front essentially boiled down to training and supplying an army for
the conduct of combat operations. During the course of a war proper ,
which would be waged by mercenaries or representatives of a caste which
was semidetached from the people, the link between front and rear was
frequently of anº incidental character. Things are different today. The
slightest disruption of the continuous link between front and rear today
has an immediate negative effect on an army's combat capability. The
rear areas have become a major target for enemy attack. The fact that
the leading imperialist powers possess nuclear missile weapons makes it
possible to predict an attempt by the aggressor to initiate a war by
launching sneak nuclear strikes against the major political and economic
centers of the countries being attacked .
Lenin pointed to the increasing role of military hardware in achieving
victory in modern war and directed the attention of the party and Soviet
people to the necessity of an all-out strengthening of the material basis of
Armed Forces might. He stated that without an adequate quantity and
excellent quality of combat equipment and weapons, even those persons
who are most dedicated to the cause of the revolution will be immediately
annihilated by the enemy.
Nuclear missile weapons possess incalculably greater destructive force
than all the weapons of the past. It is precisely for this reason that the
Communist Party and Soviet government are doing everything necessary
to equip the Armed Forces with the most advanced hardware, which will
make it possible reliably to defend our country and the socialist com
munity as a whole . “ . . . The Soviet Army,” states the Central Committee
Report to the 24th CPSU Congress, “ is today equipped with all types of
modern military hardware.” 22
Noting the increased role ofweapons and combat equipment in modern
warfare , Lenin at the same time warned against making a fetish of
modern military hardware and minimizing the role of man . We are
familiar with numerous statements by Lenin to the effect that victory, in
267
the final analysis, is secured by the morale of themasses which shed their
blood on the field of battle. This thesis serves as a methodological
foundation for critique of various kinds of unscientific bourgeois theories
of small armies and “ pushbutton" warfare .
The experience of World War II and subsequent military events have
once again persuasively demonstrated that with the development of mili
tary hardware man 's role in war and the need for mass armies not only
do not diminish but increase to an even greater extent.
Lenin 's prediction that no hardware is capable of itself, without the
conscious soldier and sailor, of ensuring success in achieving ultimate war
aims is just as valid today as in the past. This thesis serves us as a guide
in all efforts to indoctrinate Soviet fighting men in a spirit of solid
ideological conviction, consciousness, and total dedication to the Soviet
people and their socialist homeland.
Lenin 's thesis on the decisive role of the masses of course by no means
signifies that the masses are placed in opposition to the individual and
that the role of the latter in historical events is belittled. Lenin pointed
to the increased importance of the military commander in determining
the outcome of modern wars. For example, analyzing the causes of the
defeat inflicted on Tsarism in the 1904-1905 Russo- Japanese War, he
correctly pointed out as one of the basic causes the lack of conformity
between the training of officer personnel and the demands of modern
warfare 28
The organizer abilities of command personnel and the talent of the
military commander play an even greater role under present-day condi
tions. Armies which number in the millions and which are armed with the
most diversified and complex combat equipment and weapons demand
skilled leadership . This makes it essential for military commanders and all
officers to possess extensive political and military knowledge and excellent
organizer capabilities.
Today the role of collectives in scientific prediction is becoming more
important in the military as in other areas of societal affairs. The head
quarters — from General Headquarters to unit headquarters — constitutes
a typical collective body, peculiar to which , in addition to other functions,
is prediction of development of various aspects of troop activities.
All command personnel should possess the ability of scientific pre
diction . Successful performance by politicalworkers is also inconceivable
without a mastery of this art. In order correctly to direct party political
effort among personnel, it is essential constantly to rely on knowledge
of the laws governing the forming of convictions and views of military
personnel, as well as to possess a clear picture of the character and
orientation of their social conduct.
All this should be specially emphasized in connection with the fact
that even today one at times hears statements to the effect that direction
of troops on a scientific basis, including on a basis of scientific prediction ,
is the obligation and function only of the highest echelons. Criticizing
264
this erroneous point of view , Mar SU M . V. Zakharov wrote: “Some
officers are of the opinion that troop guidance proper is a matter of ex
clusively large-scale activity , an obligation of high-echelon headquarters ,
directorates, and high -level commanders. Hence matters pertaining to a
scientific approach to troop leadership and management pertain only to
high - echelon headquarters and commanders. . .
" The very expression 'scientific management indicates that we are
dealing with science, profound knowledge, on which the executive should
rely in his activities.” 24
To Lenin goes great credit not only for the fact that he developed
Marxist methodology of scientific prediction and provided us with ex
amples of social prediction of many extremely important societal phe
nomena and processes (including in the military ) , but also that he
pointed out the most important conditions for effecting cognition in
general and scientific prediction in particular.
A main condition for scientific cognition and resolution of complex
problems of the future is a mastery of materialist dialectics. Without
dialectical and historical materialism as a methodology of cognition ,
stated Lenin , scientists will be helpless in their conclusions and generali
zations.25 This, of course , also directly applies to military cadres.
At the same time, general cultural and educational level is important.
The building of the future communist society is inconceivable without a
mastery of knowledge of all those riches which mankind has created.
Defense of the homeland also demands the increasing intellectual de
velopment of military cadres, and it is essential to focus the most serious
attention on this aspect of the problem .
It is impossible successfully to direct troops and to foresee new
phenomena in military affairs without knowledge of the fundamentals of
physics, mathematics, military theory and other sciences. Commanders ,
political workers and military engineers must also thoroughly study the
fundamentals of military educational science and psychology as well as
other sciences connected with military affairs.
The fact that Lenin foresaw much in the development of military affairs
is explained to a substantial degree by his broad erudition in this area .
It is a well-known fact that he was quite familiar not only with the mili
tary writings of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels but also with the prin
cipal writings of Suvorov, Clausewitz , Napoleon , Leyer [ transliteration ) ,
Mehring and other military theorists and commanders. It is therefore not
surprising that Mar SU B . M . Shaposhnikov noted precisely this " military"
aspect of Lenin 's genius. “ Lenin was well acquainted with the funda
mentals of war," wrote Shaposhnikov. " Therefore, we see that he has a
correct orientation in regard to war , both in ‘political action and an
understanding of its purely military phenomena.” 26
Scientific prediction in military affairs is impossible without a critical
and self-critical, objective approach, based on facts, to an analysis of the
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situation developing prior to the engagement, operation, battle, or in the
course of the latter.
In societal affairs, where objective laws are manifested through the
activities of specific classes, social groups and individuals, objectivity is
inherent only in advanced , progressive classes and those who express
their interests.
In military affairs, where class contradictions are focused and aggra
vated to an extreme degree, objectivity acquires even greater importance.
Prediction from the very outset will be based on false conclusions if the
commander approaches with prejudice an evaluation of the strong and
weak points both of friendly and hostile forces.
Particularly dangerous in war are bragging, idle boasting, pernicious
deception, exaggeration of one's own forces and underrating of the enemy.
Lenin warned against precisely this.
Lenin also pointed to the necessity of studying everything which the
enemy possesses or may possess. One's attention is drawn precisely by
the latter part of this statement, that is study of that which the enemy may
posess. In this case we emphasize the importance of prediction and taking
into account the possible development of military theory and practice on
the part of the probable adversary as well as his acquisition of new
weapons.
It is extremely important in determining future prospects for combat
operations to elucidate the distinctive features of a forthcoming engage
ment or battle . In connection with this it is essential to picture the specific
details of the potential situation . “ It is impossible to understand anything
in our struggle if one does not study the specific circumstances of each and
every battle,” 27 emphasized Lenin . The situation in the past and in future
battles may be generally similar. But this by no means signifies that the
missions of each new operation should be accomplished with the same
means as were used in the past. An unspecific, superficial approach to
determination of initial data engenders a stereotyped decision , which the
enemy will figure out without much difficulty .
These are the fundamental conditions for scientific prediction in mili
tary affairs in light of Lenin 's theoretical heritage.
In conclusion, we must emphasize that each new turn in history , each
new significant event in societal affairs confirms with even greater con
viction and completeness the amazing boldness of Lenin 's thought, the
infallibility of his calculations, and his rare gift of insight in respect to
the future development of social phenomena. Leninist methodology of
scientific prediction offers Soviet military cadres extensive capability for
analysis of contemporary problems in the area of military theory and
practice.
266
Footnotes
1. V . L Lenia : Pode Soer . Soci Complex Tris Vaitume & gare 18
2. Ibid., Volume 29 . FR 101
3. Ibid., Volume 6, page 12
4. Ibid., Volume 18 Page 191_
5. Ibid., Volume 26. pag 7.
6. See Ibid , Volume 29 . page 31 .
7. Ibid ., Volume 18, page 145 .
8. Ibid., Volume 11, page 6 .
9. Ibid., Volume 45 . page 382
10. Ibid., Volume 12, page 350
11. I S. Konev: Sorok patyy ( 1945 ): Moscor . Voyenızdal 1966 page 46
12. Lenin, op.cit., Volume 36. page 472
13 . L . I Brezhnev : Delo Lening h er i poochiavet (Lenin 's Cause Lives and
Is Victorious ), PP 15 – 16.
14. Lenin, op .cit., Volume 30, page 134.
15 . KPSS » rezolyutsiyalch i resheniyath . . . ( The CPSU in Resolutions and
Decisions ) , Part I, page 404 .
16 . Lenin , op.cit., Volume 34 , page 116 .
17. Ibid., Volume 27 , page 394.
18. Ibid ., pp 372 –373.
19 . Ibid., Volume 42, page 115.
20. Lenin : Voyennaya perepiska 1917 -1922 88. (Military Correspondence, 1917
1922) , page 219 .
21. Lenin , op .cit., Volume 30 , page 85.
22. Materialy XXIV s”yezda KPSS (Proceedings of the 24th CPSU Congress ),
page 45.
23 . See Lenin , op.cit., Volume 9, page 156 .
24 . M . V . Zakharov : 0 nauchnom podkhode k rukovodstvu voyskami ( A Scientific
Approach to Troop Control), Moscow , Voyenizdat, 1967, page 7 .
25. See Lenin , op.cit., Volume 45, page 31.
26 . B . M . Shaposhnikov: Mozg armii (Brain of the Army), Book 3, Moscow
Leningrad, Gosizdat, 1929, page 280.
27. Lenin , op.cit., Volume 8, page 400.

267
Chapter XVI. The Leninist Style ofScientific
Creativity

All aspects of the theoretical and practical activities of V . I. Lenin ,

including those in military affairs, are of inestimable value. It is very
important not only to understand the essence of Lenin 's philosophical
analysis of concrete itemsbut also to penetrate into the laboratory of his
scientific creativity. This makes it possible to more deeply perceive the
creative essence of Leninism , to assimilate our leader's scientific work
methods, and to master the Leninist style of investigation of social and
military problems.

1. Leninist Criteria of Scientific Creativity

Lenin emphasized that scientific-theoretical activity should be dis
tinguished first and foremost by a clear -cut political orientation . He not
only substantiated this initial criterion of scientific creativity but also
provided classic examples of its consistent application. A class, party
approach to analysis of the phenomena of societal affairs presupposes an
inner ideological orientation and an uncompromising attitude in the
struggle to preserve the purity ofMarxist doctrine.
Definiteness of political position is the most important element for
the investigator. He whose position lacks an ideological core may proceed
along a wrong path and even , contrary to his own wishes, become a tool
in the hands of hostile forces. Departures from a political approach to
various phenomena are fraught with serious consequences. Lenin warned :
“ They say that history loves irony, loves to play jokes on people. You
enter one room and end up in another. In history this constantly happens
to individuals, groups and schools of thought, which have failed to
comprehend or be aware of their true essence, that is, aware of what
classes they in actuality (not in their imagination ) gravitate toward.” 1
The Leninist principle of political approach focuses on seeing in the
great variety of events and their manifestations an internal link , a core,
a deep-lying source. It is necessary to extract the political, class meaning
from each phenomenon .
Application of this principle is also very important in analyzing such
268
a complex social phenomenon as war. Lenin noted that the nature of the
political goal exerts a decisive influence on the conduct of a war. Not
only strategy but also the accomplishment of operational-tactical, training
indoctrinational and military-technical tasks is based on the foundation
of politics , that is, " the law of military success is also the law of political
success. . ." 2
With the existence of approximately identical means of combat
weapons and military equipment — there are many common elements in
the methods of their utilization . Methods of warfare, however, bear the
imprint of the influence of the social-class, moral-political factor. De
veloping the Leninist idea on the revolutionary enthusiasm , creativity
and initiaive of the masses in a just war, M . V . Frunze linked the de
cisiveness of Red Army operations in the civil war with its political tasks.
The heroism and willingness of the masses to endure self-sacrifice in
the Great Patriotic War , as well as unwillingness to compromise in the
struggle against fascism , exerted a profound influence on the strategy,
operational art and tactics of the Soviet troops and promoted the success
of major offensive operations.
The entire process of Lenin 's scientific creativity constitutes a classic
example of precise and accurate political orientation. For example , in
proceeding to study a book or article, he would endeavor to elucidate the
class outlook of the author and to determine what political and moral
qualities he possessed. Vladimir Il’ich prefaced an edited translation of
a book by General Klyuzere (transliteration ] entitled Street Combat with
a biographical sketch of this general of the Paris Commune. emphasizing
the characteristic aspects of his political countenance. He proceeds in
like manner in commenting on the work On War by General Clausewitz .
In a number of cases, when he considered it unnecessary to include
biographic data on the author, Lenin limited himself to laconic , but ex
tremely capacious in a political respect, descriptions, particularly in
regard to scholarly henchmen of the capitalist class. ". . . A former Ger
man chauvinist,” 3 he stated about German army captain Günther, a
doctor of philosophy and author of a book which was well known to his
contemporaries, entitled Military Affairs and the Conduct of War in Our
Time.
Lenin was inflexible in polemics with a political adversary . The
sharpness of formulation of a question proceeded organically from the
uncompromising nature of his political line and served the cause of
demarcation of political forces, clarity of political programs, and struggle
against liberalism “ in theory, in program , and in banner.” 4
N . K . Krupskaya remarked that Lenin had learned this style of com
bating ideological adversaries from Marx. Of course, the importance of
this was not in the form of the expression of thought per se, but rather
the fact that sometimes a cutting assessment of ideological adversaries
was adequately substantiated and expressed by a resolute, aggressive
political position in contrast to the pitiful mumblings of unprincipled
269
conciliators. “ The scoundrels!” commented Lenin in regard to a paragraph
in the book Klassovaya bor'ba protiv voyny! ( The Class Struggle Against
War!), which spoke of the acceptance by the majority of German social
chauvinists of the proposal to revolt, with the declaration : “ Hurrah ! For
emperor, people and fatherland." 5 " The villian!" " Idiot, coward !” 4
he verbally castigated one of the representatives of the Social Democrats
who took the side of the chauvinistic policy of the imperialist states.
Lenin called the arguments of German professor R . Heniger in favor of
the arms race as astimulus for development of the nation 's productive
resources the babbling “of a little low -life dedicated to militarism . . ." ?
This appraisal of an ideologue of militarism of the beginning of the 20th
century also applies to present-day apologists of U .S. aggression, who
have concocted a special theory to the effect that utilization of the results
of scientific research conducted on the basis of military contracts in
vigorates science.
The political aspect is clearly traced in Lenin 's notes on the military
theoretical writings of various authors. The most remarkable in this
respect are excerpts from On War by Clausewitz.8 Lenin does not re
produce the content of the entire book but underscores those places where
a dialectical approach to war is primarily expressed, revealing the cor
relation between war and politics. He particularly underscores the author's
view of war as an instrument of politics. Lenin 's summary of Volume I
contains a typical Leninist résumé: “ Very accurate on the political soul,
essence, content of war. . ."
Lenin 's analysis of each work is the great art of an outstanding and
perspicacious politician who is able to reveal in extremely complex, and
frequently artificially masked deliberations, the author's class position ,
to strip from the facts an outer cover of casuistry and evasion , to see the
most important, to extract the meaning and to formulate a political
conclusion .
Lenin 's political approach to assessment of phenomena and facts has
nothing in common with utilitarian pragmatism . He emphasized time and
again the incompatibility of the pragmatic and scientific approach to
theory. “ . . . Truth ,” wrote Lenin , “ should not depend on who it is sup
posed to serve,” ' but only from the position of communist party - minded
ness is it possible to establish the laws governing societal affairs with
scientific precision and objectivity , to overcome both a subjectivistic and
objectivistic approach to reality . The highest criterion of the correctness
of a theoretical conclusion is its correspondence to reality.
Lenin was constantly concerned about irreproachableness of scientific
investigation from a documentary, factual standpoint. He never spoke of
facts in an approximate manner; he presented them with the greatest
precision. He considered it intolerable to engage in “ party generalizing,”
speaking into the air, without substantialmaterials, concocting definitions,
and demanded "more attention to the simplest but living facts, taken
270
from and verified by actual experience. . ." 10 which lie at the foundation
of our policy.
Lenin 's very first writings attracted attention with their clarity and
depth of thought, which was always based on a thorough study of
actuality , on facts and figures, on synthesis of a vast quantity of historical
material. He adhered to such a scientific approach his entire life.
Instructive in the theoretical activities of our leader is the very process
of study of facts , their isolation , comparison , and grouping. He employed
synthesized facts for conclusions “as a strategist, as a mathematician ,
and as a chemist dealing with social elements.” 11 Lenin taught that it is
important to take not separate and random facts but the entire aggregate
of data pertaining to the question at hand. Facts, if taken separately, out
of context, if they are detached and arbitrary, constitute a plaything or
deliberate device of falsification ,a subjective concoction .
Demonstrability cannot be a synonym for factography, while scientific
research boils down to a sum total of examples. Facts , large and small,
can be selected to illustrate any thesis, but in such a case one cannot see
the forest for the trees. “ . . . In social science . . ." wrote Lenin , "we are
dealing with mass phenomena, not with isolated instances.” 12 Empiricism
is only externally linked with life but in fact is one of the forms of separa
tion of theory from practice.
The Leninist approach to evaluation of facts focuses on concrete ma
terials being subjected simultaneously to quantitative and qualitative
analysis, for actual facts not to be given a one-sided interpretation. And
yet there sometimes occur cases of one-sided evaluation of facts, when
the mathematically measured aspect of an object under study is taken
out of context with its qualitative aspect. This approach to the results of
mathematical computation of the destructive force of modern weapons
has produced skeptical conclusions on the part of some authors .
One-sidedness and rectilinearity in analyzing such a multifaceted social
phenomenon as war are impermissible. War is an area of politics, and
politics , as the most complex areas of societal affairs, cannot be reduced
to arithmetic constants. The question of victory in war does not reduce
merely to a quantitative assessment of the performance capabilities of
weapons, including nuclear missile weapons. It is necessary to take into
account the entire aggregate of relations which politics cncompasses and
which aremanifested in war.
Also meriting attention is Lenin 's approach to sources of empirical
material. He obtained a considerable part of it by means of personal
observations and conversations. He also took many facts from sources in
literature. He carefully copied data from many works, even those hostile
to Marxism , on various areas of societal affairs, figures, and diagrams.
For example , calling Egel'gaf (transliteration ), author ofModern History ,
a stupid reactionary , he nevertheless stated that his book is useful as a
“ summary of facts and a reference work .” 13 Lenin considered it possible
" to take facts and figures but not arguments. . .” from Ye. Agad, an
271
ultrabourgeois and nationalist in his political views." Of course, Lenin
interpreted all these data in his own way and frequently arrived at con
clusions differing fundamentally from those of the author of a given
source.
Lenin was also very careful in regard to syntheses of a positive nature.
His cxcerpts from a Belgian bourgeois newspaper on the fall of Port
Arthur are typical : “ There has occurred an cvent which condemns . . .
an entire political system , which puts an end to an entire series of
claims. . .” Or! " The morale of a mighty empire is collapsing: the prestigo
of a young race which has not yet had a chance to develop is tarnish
ing.” 15 He quotes these statements in his article : " The fall of Port
Arthur," in order to demonstrate how clearly is reflected here the attitude
of the European bourgcoisic, its class instinct, its uncasiness due to the
collapse of Russian military force, which was considered the hulwark of
Europcan reaction.
As has already been demonstrated, Lenin cmployed a number of
formulations on war by Clausewitz, giving them his own materialist
interpretation. Thus Lenin did not limit himself merely to criticism of
negative aspects of a given non -Marxist book but rather cffected a re
fusion of that which he read. He frequently cniployed criticism of idealist
and metaphysical views as a point of departure for a positive solution 10
current problemsofmilitary theory.
A question arises in connection with this : is it possible to find anything
positive in books written by contemporary bourgeois military theorists,
including those who specialize in anticommunism ?
The idcologues of imperialism attempt to distort and hinder the effect
of the laws of progressive development of society , which are in conflict
with the class interests of the bourgeoisic. With this aim in mind they
resort to various scholastic theories which lead away from the solution
of urgent problems of societal development. The situation is different in
the arca of military technology. Here the imperialists and their paid
ideologues are not interested in deliberate distortion of the laws governing
the process of warfare. They make every cffort to probe current trends in
this arca and to take them into account.
Bourgeois sociological theories have nothing in common with objective
investigation . Bourgeois military science occupies a special position . In
spite of its inconsistency , mcthodological flaws and contradictory naturc .
it is nevertheless a science which endeavors to penetrate into the objective
laws governing modern warfarc . It is, of course , useful to know and take
into account the data of this science . Here we should be guided by the
Leninist thesis on succession in the development of science , on the ability
to reject the rcactionary tendency, to conduct our line and to combat the
entire line of thosc forces and classes which are hostile to us."
The Leninist approach to sccuring faultlessness of scientific investiga
tion from a factual standpoint and toward substantiation of theoretical
conclusions presupposes the extensive development and application of the
272
data of concrete sociological investigations in the military. Vladimir
Il’ich demanded that a " number of social studies be made,” that surveys
be conducted, that they be joined with objective statistical data , with the
subsequent formulation of businesslike proposals for the future, with the
practical teaching that, " this should not be done . . . this should be
done . . .,” since “ failure to study practical experience and know -how . . .
is the root of all misfortunes. . .” 17
Demands on concrete sociological investigations in military science
and practice have grown immeasurably under present-day conditions. The
fact is, that today military cadres are encountering an increasing number
of input elements and constituent parts.
Lenin did not limit application of the principle of the political approach
to scientific analysis of societal phenomena and correspondence of the
theoretical conclusion of reality to the sphere of knowledge, but also
carried it over to the area of practical revolutionary action. In Leninism ,
as in Marxism , “ all living human practical activity penetrates into the
very theory of knowledge , providing an objective criterion of truth . . ." 18
Unity of theory and practice, thought and action was organically
combined in Lenin 's scientific works. Each of his writings is a vivid
document which demonstrates the coalescence and interpenetration of
word and deed , high scientific level and revolutionary nature. Theoretical
knowledge, volition and practical activity are presented as two aspects of
dialectical thinking. All this is influenced by the features of historical
development, by the appearance of new possibilities for acceleration of
the revolutionary process. “. . . We have arrived at precisely that moment
in history,” stated Lenin , “ when theory is transformed into practice, is
revitalized by practical activity, is corrected and verified by practical
activity . . .” 19
An organic combination of revolutionary theory and revolutionary
action has raised Leninism above all the ideological currents of the 20th
century . Lenin was able , better than all other contemporary thinkers, to
subordinate theoretical analysis to the interests of practical societal
activity, to utilize methodology in order to reveal the complex dynamics
of social processes. He acutely felt the beating of the pulse of life and
responded with great flexibility to the demands of societal development.
Lenin 's ingenious thoughtbecome a genuine school of dialectical thinking,
a precise method of social analysis, an effective instrument for practical
transformation of the world .
Following the example of Lenin , the Communist Party of the Soviet
Union precisely defines, at all stages of our nation 's development, the
fundamental tasks of theory and practical activity. The center of attention
is always occupied by routine matters advanced by the nation 's economic ,
sociopolitical and ideological development.
The 24th CPSU Congress onct again emphasized the necessity of
" achieving a close link between the social sciences on the one hand, and
273
practical party and government activity on the other, accomplishment of
the concrete tasks of building communism .” 20

2 . Dialectical Flexibility and the Definiteness of Lenin 's Reasoning

V . I. Lenin , the great master of revolutionary dialectics, further de
veloped the principles of ideology and the method of Marxism , dialectical
logic. His attention to these problems was attracted not by purely aca
demic interest but by the necessity of thorough analysis of new processes
ofhistorical development, by the necessity of developing a sharp weapon
of Marxist methodology and ideological struggle . Skillful and sophisticated
employment of the weapon of materialist dialectics is particularly essential
wherever vital links and contradictions are presented in the most complex
interweave.
Employment of all the facets of dialectical logic in their entirety is
manifested as the ability to employ dialectically flexible , and at the same
time definite, concepts. Flexibility and definiteness in their dialectically
contradictory unity correctly reflect scientific truth as a living process.
Thinking could not be linked with being and the laws of its motion if
it did not develop itself. Life can be reflected only in developing concepts.
" . . . Human concepts are not fixed,” stated Lenin , “ but are eternally in
movement, transitioning from one to the other , coalescing with one
another ; without this they do not reflect real life.” 21
An objectively applied flexibility of concepts reflects the actual mobility
of the boundaries of phenomena in nature and society and development
of the objects of the external world through the genesis and resolution of
conflict.
An implacable foe of inertness and dogmatism , Lenin displayed a
maximum of flexibility in approaching concrete problems, an ability to
react to changing conditions quickly and precisely.
Proceeding from acknowledgement of the social function of scientific
theory as a method of transforming reality, Lenin revealed the greatest
ability in a complex interweave of events to obtain for himself a clear
picture of political activities as a whole , to determine the uniqueness of a
given element without losing sight of the entire chain of development.
Lenin , according to eyewitness accounts, amazed his audience with the
freedom and iron logic contained in his addresses, by his unusual ability
comprehensively to encompass events and to predict their development.
A brilliant example of this is the tactics of the Bolsheviks in the period
between February and October 1917 , when Lenin , under the most com
plex and rapidly changing conditions, found the necessary forms of
struggle which most closely corresponded to the demands of the moment
and which ensured success.
Lenin considered as one of the important elements of dialectics and
flexibility of thinking “not only unity of opposites but also transition by
274
each definition, quality , feature, aspect and property into each other
(into its opposite ? ).” 22
It is precisely this principle of the dialectical logic of transition of
one into another, into its opposite , which comprised the heart and soul
of Lenin 's analysis of the historical situation of the period of World War
I. Lenin demonstrated the necessity of transformation of the imperialist
war into a civil war. Under conditions of an imperialist war between
highly -developed bourgeois nations, the party consistently implemented
the slogan of revolutionary withdrawal from the war, developing the
class consciousness of the toiler masses, supporting their revolutionary
demonstrations and exposing the social chauvinists who took the position
of defense of imperialist governments.
Lenin 's logical thought process anticipated the logic of development
of events. During the course of the defeat of tsarism and the bourgeoisie,
the imperialist war was transformed into its opposite - into a just war of
the proletariat and the toiling peasantry against the Tsar, against the
landowners and capitalists.
It is precisely Lenin 's dialectically flexible approach which enabled
our party correctly to comprehend and define the dialectic of the de
velopment of World War II. Originating as a result of acute imperialist
conflicts, it initially was an unjust, imperialist war of plunder on the part
of all the principal capitalist nations taking part in it. The nature of the
war, however, did not remain unequivocalat all stages of its development.
Events developed under conditions whereby capitalism was no longer the
exclusively dominant system . Peoples which had been the victims of
fascist aggression rose up in struggle and thus altered the very nature of
the war. Entry by the Soviet Union into the war constituted a decisive
factor in transforming it into a just, antifascist war.
Recognition of the dialectical flexibility and variability of social
processes proper presupposes acknowledgment of the same in respect to
concepts and categories. The complex development of a societal phe
nomenon has received adequate expression in the dialectically flexible
concepts of Marxist-Leninist science.
The ability to think, in adaptable and flexible concepts, is a mandatory
attribute of military cadres. Flexibility, the ability to assess a situation
quickly and soberly , to catch the essential and, in conformity with this, to
make correct decisions and follow through with these decisions are es
sential for accomplishing all practical tasks on a strategic, operational or
tactical scale.
Viewing concepts in a unity of all aspects, Lenin taught that we should
see not only their contradictory nature, fluidity, and flexibility, not only
their relativity, but also their definiteness, concreteness, and precision.
Flexibility and definiteness, as two opposing parts of a unified whole , do
not exclude one another but coalesce and interpenetrate one another.
Flexibility and definiteness in their dialectically contradictory unity cor
rectly reflect scientific truth as a living process.
275
 Lenin considered the principle of historicism as the initial prerequisite
for dialectically flexible and, at the same time, concrete reasoning, taking
into account the objective content “ of the historical process at the given ,
concrete moment, in the given , concrete situation . . ." ** * The principle of
historicism is an initial methodological point of vicw . This in no way
minimizes the role of contradictions as the nucleus of dialectics.
Lenin emphasized time and again that dialectics includes historicity .
corroborating this with a brilliant, comprehensive analysis of social
phenomena . He isolated with amazing precision the most complex prob
lem which demanded scientific investigation at the given moment. For
example, in the midst of the imperialist war and on the threshold of the
socialist revolution in Russia, the political problems of war, peace and
revolution advanced to the forcground. In this period the leader of our
party wrote classic works which we use as a guide even today, solving
contemporary problems of war and peace.
Dialectical flexibility permits no deviate interpretations. Flexibility
in considering a concrete situation in all its definitcness makes it possible
to arrive at optimal solutions. One of the most brilliant examples of
dialectically flexible and determinate reasoning was Lenin 's determination
of the precise date for the October 1917 Revolution .
At all stages the activities of our party , its founder and leader are
inalterably characterized by precision of statement of fundamental prin
ciples and consistency in their implementation . “. . . The Bolshevik party,
headed by Lenin ," emphasize the Central Committee CPSU Theses “ In
Honor of thc Lcnin Birth Centennial," "offered examples of employment
of diversified forms and methods of class struggle , their intelligent coni
bination and alternation , and selection of the most cffcctive of these at
each moment." 24
For application of the dialectics of Leninist reasoning it is important
to know not only conclusions and syntheses based on a concretc -historical
analysis of phenomena but also to tracc certain clements inherent in the
laboratory of Leninist thought. In his summary notes, in outlines of his
works and in cxcerpts from books and the periodical press .Lenin always
isolated and underscored that which characterizes a phenomenon from
the viewpoint of given concrete tasks. Allmaterials in the Lenin collected
volumes are specific to a high degree . It is quite clear even from the
rough outlines of his works that he always firmly followed a demand of
Marxian dialectics — to make a specific analysis of a specific historical
situation .
Let us turn to several examples. In studying the question of the nature
of wars under imperialism , Lenin 's attention was drawn by an assessment
by Clausewitz : “ In the 18th century, during the Silesian wars, war was
the exclusive affair of cabinets; the people took part in war only as a blind
implement" ; " . . . under the conditions of the 18th century it ( the people
- ed .) became a direct nothing and maintained an indirect influence on
a war only due to its general virtues and deficiencies.” The people de
276
veloped its resources under conditions " which the French Revolution
created within each country. . ." Lenin added his own comments: " 18th
and 19th centuries. Difference" ; "NB" ; " participation of peoples.” 25 In
his outline for the article “ The Fall of Port Arthur,” Lenin includes,
taking into account the features of the wars of the era of imperialism , the
following weighty sentence as a special point: “Wars are waged by
ſeople.” 26
In many preliminary comments and rough drafts, Lenin developed the
idea of the concrete -historical approach to the problem of defense of the
homeland under various historical conditions, utilizing materials in such
a manner as to reply with precision to the question of what class stands
in the center of a given era and what are the political objectives of a given
war.
In order to lay bare the falseness of the defensive position of the social
chauvinists of the period of World War I and to demonstrate the ground
lessness of abstract analogies with the assessments of Marx and Engels
of the progressiveness of wars which were waged under conditions of
premonopoly capitalism by the developing bourgeoisie , Lenin , for ex
ample, included the following subheadings in his draft outline of a pam
phlet to be entitled “ The European War and European Socialism ” : “ The
Homeland” ; Quotation from the Communist Manifesto ; Its Critique ;
The Workers Have no Homeland ; “ Homeland” and Proletariat; His
torical and Political View of Homeland.27
Lenin 's concrete-historical approach to individual phenomena was
contained in passing comments on items which it seemed were not very
important in the given context. For example, Lenin wrote "and now ?”
next to the Clausewitz statement " According to experience a squadron of
150 horses, a battalion of 800 men and a battery of eight 6 -pound guns
are normally approximately equal in value.” 28
Vladimir Il’ich saw with amazing acuity the beginning of the new
trends which had already been defined or were just forming in the de
velopment of scientific knowledge.
Flexibility and definiteness of thinking, as a synthetic expression of
the demands of dialectical logic, are extremely important in the area of
military theory and practice. In particular, such an approach to Soviet
military science provides the capability of correctly understanding and
determining the dialectic of development of method and forms of combat.
The determining influence of manpower and weapons on methods and
forms of combat constitutes a general law of military science, which
possessed its own specific , definite aspect at various stages in history.
Today, in contrast to past qualitative changes in military affairs, when
new weapons primarily influence tactics, and through tactics influence
operational art and strategy, the latter directly influence strategy from
" above" as well.
Lenin 's methodology of reasoning presupposes a flexible assessment of
the new qualitative definiteness of the categories of the art of warfare .
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One cannot help but see substantial changes in the character of the
dialectical interrelationship between strategy, operational art and tactics,
which have occurred under the influence of the scientific and technological
revolution . In past wars , strategic success has been achieved by means of
tactical and operational results. Modern strategic arms have not negated
this general law but have introduced a qualitatively new element. Today
strategy can achieve its objectives directly and indirectly , without definite
tactical and operational preconditions. Strategic weapons can radically
alter the general situation and create preconditions for tactical and op
erational success.
A concrete-historical analysis of the development of means and meth
ods of warfare emphasizes assessment of the character and significance of
continuous Armed Forces combat readiness as a strategic category .
Flexibility and definiteness in assessing operational and tactical categories
are as essential- operational formation , operational penetraction, com
mitment of support echelons, fire, maneuver, attack , etc.
War is not solely an object of science. War is an art, an extraordinarily
complex and multifaceted art. War is an area of variable quantities. Just
as politics as a whole , it is more like algebra than arithmetic and even
more like higher than lower mathematics.29 A flexibility is needed which
could adequately reflect the maneuverable nature and dynamism of the
course of combat operations. Lenin provided examples of flexible and
precise consideration of the concrete situation and enemy tactics, ex
amples of employment of diversified forms and methods of class struggle,
their skilled combination and substitution, and selection of the most
effective one at each moment. “ One must have the ability to change
methods of combatting the enemy,” he taught, “ when circumstances
change." 30 If I pursue an adversary who does not move along straight
paths but in zigzags, then I must also proceed in zigzags in order to
overtake the enemy." 31
Unity of flexibility and definiteness is inherent in the intellectual
activities of every commander. On the one hand, it is necessary to take
into account the entire complexity of the changing situation and to
comprehend a sometimes contradictory flow of information ; on the other
hand, it is essential precisely to spot the turning point and to make a
decision immediately — a clear, precise, and definite decision .
Flexibility and definiteness in a commander's activities presumes the
courage to innovate. Innovative search and original solutions were con
vincingly manifested at troop maneuvers in recent years,which constituted
a new stage in the training of troops to conduct modern combat opera
tions. The troops taking part in the maneuvers proceeded in conformity
with regulations and field manuals, but their actions were not a simple
illustration of points in field manuals. Field manuals are not a rigid
scheme which must be precisely followed , but rather a guide to the
performance of independent acts of thinking and performance . In this
instance as well, we are guided by Lenin 's well-known thesis that phe
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nomenon is always richer than concept, than formulated thesis, that
" every theory . . . at best only outlines the fundamental, the general,
merely approximates an encompassment of the complexity of life.” 32
Guided by Lenin 's approach to innovative effort and his demand that
one note the incipient development of the new and reveal the essence of
vital processes, each and every investigator should take into consideration
new traits, features and trends inherent in contemporary scientific cogni
tion. What are these features?
In the first place, the process of dialectical interpenetration of ex
ternally opposing trends in the development of science has today become
considerably deeper and more rapid : differentiation and specialization on
the one hand, and integration as well as interrelationship between various
branches on the other. Under these conditions, it is particularly important
to perceive philosophic meaning, that is, the root gnoseologic and logical
principles of the great diversity of data provided by military theory.
The importance of philosophy for military theory and practice has
also increased in connection with the conflicts and dynamic nature of the
contemporary era, in connection with profound changes in the military .
A further rise in the general philosophic and military-technical level of
commanders, political workers and all officers constitutes an important
feature in the present stage of Armed Forces development.
In the second place , special methods of specific sciences are finding
more extensive application. Methods of military theory and practice are
specific and relatively independent. Bilateral exercises and maneuvers ,
command- staff games, field testing of weapons and combat equipment,
the firing of missiles and conventional artillery, plus other special methods
reflect the specific features of the military . At the same time, military
scientific cognition is also utilizing, on an increasingly broad scale ,
methods of investigation which are characteristic of biology, chemistry,
physics , astronomy and other special sciences. Many important problems
of military affairs advanced by the contemporary military technological
revolution are being successfully solved with the aid of the methods of a
new science - bionics— which borrows from nature the most efficient
means of creating improved designs of equipment and technical devices.
Thirdly, sciences are acquiring increasing precision and rigorousness
as well as an increasingly broad experimental base. The scientific process
is inseparably linked with the development and utilization of mathematics
and with mathematical simulation of various phenomena. Many modern
scientific discoveries were obtained , figuratively speaking, “ on the tip of
the mathematical pen." Quite characteristic in this regard is Lenin 's con
clusion that “ the unity of nature is revealed in the 'amazing analogousness'
of differential equations pertaining to various areas of phenomena.” 88
Lenin associated the penetration of mathematics into various areas of
knowledge with the improvement of quantitative investigations, which
constitute a logical development of qualitative studies. This conclusion is
in full agreement with the idea of Marx on enhancement of the level of
mathematization of the social sciences: “ . . . Science will achieve per
fection when it succeeds in utilizing mathematics.” 34 That which in the
past was substantially a thing of the future is today becoming reality.
Extensive potential has opened up for mathematical description and
logical formalization of the laws of warfare. In spite of their complexity ,
the processesofwarfare can be described by means of a rigorousmathe
matical edifice, with a high degree of accuracy in approximating reality .
One cannot, however, absolutize mathematical formalization . Employ
ment of the edifice ofmathematics can lead to a positive result only if the
investigator relies on general dialectical materialist methodology and
does not fall prisoner to figures, symbols, and sociograms. One can drown
the political essence in a flood of endless computations and technical
details. It is , therefore, important to bear in mind Lenin 's warning about
such a danger. “ Rows of figures,” he wrote , " are captivating. I would
advise the author ( B . N . Knipovich , investigator in agrarian affairs — Ed .)
to bear this danger in mind. Our 'Katheders ' definitely strangle in this
manner the living, Marxist content of data . They drown the class struggle
in rows upon rows of figures.” 35
In the fourth place, under present-day conditions, science is developing
more rapidly and dynamically than in the past. Therefore, it is important
for the military investigator not only to amass and synthesize the practical
know -how and experience of combat training, troop training and in
doctrination, but also to solve a vital problem as quickly as possible , the
problem of how it is possible to convey the obtained conclusions to
military cadres and to implement them .
Fifthly , the danger of subjectivism in scientific investigations has be
come greater under conditions of the dynamic development of science.
" . . . Objectivity of examination . . ." 36 — this demand by Lenin focuses
not on phenomena agreeing with the principles of investigation but rather
the principles of investigation agreeing with actuality. As regards military
theoretical investigations, it is particularly important to emphasize that
subjectivism in assessing the actual processes of modern warfare, par
ticularly nuclear missile warfare, is fraught with the most serious con
sequences. Therefore, conclusions should strictly conform to the actual
situation, to the objective demands of development.
These are only a few elements which must be kept under constant
consideration in cognizing the essence and character of modern war.

3. The Ethics of Scientific Creativity

The ideas of a great theorist combined harmoniously in Lenin 's
writings with the personal qualities of Man with a capital letter. Stamina,
persistence, the willingness and ability to try hundreds of times and to
achieve the goal at all costs — all these qualities, which were developed
by the proletariat in the course of revolutionary struggle, were manifested
with amazing completeness in the diversified activities of our leader.
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 . The communist orientation of his activities, including theoretical,
appear before us as the logic of behavior, constant willingness in any and
all situations to act in conformity with one's duty to society. He had no
other interests than the interests of struggle for man's liberation from
social enslavement, the struggle to carry out communist ideals. He con
ducted research activities as if he were participating in a military battle.
Lenin 's theoretical work is a vivid manifestation of heroic enthusiasm .
Only one form of life was acceptable to him — vigorous activity. His sci
entific efforts constitute an inspiring story of great aspirations and un
bridled energy; these efforts demanded the mobilization of all physical,
intellectual and emotional forces.
Lenin 's scientific accomplishments most convincingly confirm historical
reality : strength of character and moral qualities of the individual are
important both in politics and in science. There can be no compromise
with conscience when we are dealing with the fate of truth . Truth is
obtained honestly and in intense struggle.
One characteristic feature of the ethics of Lenin 's scientific effort is
industry and an indomitable search for truth . Genius, as is well known,
is not only the highest degree of talent but also is a capability for titanic
labor. Lenin firmly believed in the premise that " he who fears work
deprives himself of the possibility of finding truth.” 37 In the opinion
of M . I. Ulyanova, Vladimir Il’ich would not have become what he did
if he had not worked so stubbornly on himself throughout his life, be
ginning in his early teens. All his achievements were the result of enor
mous labor. Each conclusion was the result of months and years of
persistent thought, mountains of studied materials, an immense number
of excerpts, notes, summaries and outlines.
As an investigator, Lenin truly raised a mountain of factual material.
It is a well-known fact that preparatory materials for his Imperializm kak
vysshaya stadiya kapitalizma ( Imperialism as the Highest Stage of Cap
italism ) totaled four finely-written large books (more than 43 printer's
sheets ) . He consulted approximately 200 books, most of which were in
foreign languages, in writing Materializm i empiriokrititsizm (Materialism
and Empiriocriticism ). Another fact is no less indicative. Even for such
a relatively modest-size article as " The Fall of Port Arthur”, he was
compelled to study numerous books on the history of warfare and the
art of war, articles in the Russian and foreign press on the Russo
Japanese War, and official documents of the political and military leaders
of the belligerents involved . The volume of primary materials published
in three collected volumes (V , XIV , XXVI) exceeds the size of the
article proper many times over .
Nor is this an exception. Lenin devoted even more time and labor
to preparation of a planned pamphlet to be entitled “ The European War
and European Socialism .” Almost half of Volume 14 of the Lenin Col
lection is taken up by a summary and outline of the pamphlet, excerpts
from the socialist and bourgeois press as well as books on war and on
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the position of the socialist parties of various countries on matters dealing
with war, plus various notes and comments. In spite of these immense
demands on his time, Lenin nevertheless found the time to read all the
most significant writings of military theorists. The Lenin Collection vol
umes (XIV , XXX, etc ) contain a list of these books. His personal library
at the Kremlin contained an extensive collection of writings of Soviet and
foreign military experts, military regulations and field manuals, pamphlets
and articles on various military matters , and reports on Red Army and
Navy operations. Typical is Lenin 's ardent interest in the three-volume
Strategy by Leyer [transliteration ), an important expert on military
problems.
Our great leader personally did a massive quantity of painstaking
spadework. He conducted scientific investigation with amazing thorough
ness, delving into all details. He himself made corrections in trans
lations. For example, he corrected numerous errors and inaccuracies in
Plekhanov's translation of the " Communist Party Manifesto.” He edited
his own articles , weighing every word . “ He did not do this,” writes N .
K . Krupskaya, “because there was nobody to proofread ( I soon mastered
this task ), but because he wanted to make sure that no error slipped
through . He first would read the proof himself, then would give it to me
to proofread, and then would read through it again himself.” 38 He even
checked, verified and performed computations on each and every table
and figure which was of considerable importance. Lenin read and wrote
very fast, but he thought long and hard, returning time and again to the
same sources, re -reading, correcting and refining his text. An analysis of
his manuscripts, particularly those on war, leads to the conclusion that
marginal notes and comments written with different pencils and ink were
made at different times. This attests to a careful, scrupulous analysis of
all materials on war, to which he would return three, four or more times .
The creative efforts of our leader went to the limits of human capabili
ties. Even when bedridden by illness he dictated to his secretary articles
which were remarkable in strength of scientific thought, articles which
were destined to be his last. Lenin 's brain knew no respite. In March
1923, a few hours before his voice went, Lenin said the following to close
friends gathered at his bed: “In 1917 . . . I was convalescing in a hut
near Sestroretsk thanks to White Guardist ensigns; in 1918 it was thanks
to Kaplan's bullet. I had not been down since then . . ." 89
To all who knew Lenin well a cessation of his mental activity, con
stantly engaged in a bold search , seemed unthinkable. As an investigator,
he was faithful from youth to the end of his days to a strong-willed , iron
discipline and acquired an incontestable scientific and moral authority .
His great demandingness on others was fortified by rigorous demanding
ness on himself.
Creative labor, in the deepest sense of the word, is possible only when
the investigator addresses his task without selfish fear of excessive ex
penditure of energy ,when he works in the Leninistmanner, with affection,
282
when he consciously sees in it the joy of carrying out his duty to society .
Execution ofduty and persistent creative, investigative effort in an ethical
respect are concretized as high -principledness, boldness, and resoluteness
in the quest for truth .
Unshakable courage and staunchness are inherent in Lenin as a politi
cal leader and as a scientist, an investigator. Confusion and panic were
alien to him , even at the most difficult moments in the revolutionary
struggle and the affairs of the Soviet Republic. For example, at the
height of the imperialist war , when the Social Democratic and Socialist
parties of Europe had succumbed to the false poison of patriotism , when
such prominent figures as Plekhanov, Kautsky and others yielded to the
wave of chauvinism , Lenin angrily condemned social chauvinism and
social pacifism , substantiated the scientific internationalist position of
the political course taken by the Marxist party and innovatively solved
many problems of military philosophy which have not lost their political
acuteness and freshness even today.
Courage and steadfastness in theoretical effort possess a clearly-marked
moral coloration . Lenin called theoretical knowledge and will, as well
as practical activity in the area of morality, two aspects, two related means
of investigation .
Lenin confirmed the positive ethical features of an independent, in
novative style of thinking with the example of his theoretical work . This
style is a factor of greatmoral significance. Individuals with undeveloped
features of independent thinking can accept even the most ridiculous state
ments as true. Lenin directed withering criticism against those who fail
to come to grips with the principles of serious science, who present in a
distorted and simplified form that which does not require any mental
effort.40 “ Without certain independent labor,” stated Lenin , “ truth is not
to be found in any serious matter. . ." 41
The leader appealed time and again to Soviet citizens to master science
in an innovative manner, not to memorize ready formulas, recipes, pre
scriptions, but critically to rework and process the knowledge accumulated
by mankind, to develop the ability to elaborate communist conviction by
themselves.
Self-criticism was basic to the nature of V . I. Lenin as a theoretician .
He never took rash steps in theory. Before entering into polemics with
an opponent, he ( speaking in his own words) " underwent an internal
struggle” , thoroughly weighing each position , subjecting his own views to
appraisal and reappraisal. In this respect his work on the versions of the
article “New Tasks and New Forces” was characteristic. He was not
convinced by the plan and outline of the article which was at first called
“News of the Day." Trying to find a concise expression of the determina
tion and foundation of new tacticalmodes of fighting, and the organiza
tional forms during the period of the intensification of revolutionary
events of 1905, he worked out seven plans, one after another, each of
which was a successive step in the scientific development of a sharp
283
political theme. Criticizing the first version of the plan and the title of
the article, Lenin , with his characteristic self-criticism and high degree
of exactingness,wrote, “ The article is not thought through, not informed.
Because of this there is not a clear development of a sharply defined
thought. It is newspaper copy, silhouettes, conversation , thoughts and
observations, and not an article ." 42 The work was published only after
the theme had received a well-rounded substantiation and an approved
form of expression.
By his example, V. I. Lenin established humility as an inalienable,
ethical characteristic of the style of theoretical writing. History has not
known a person who so " replowed ” the understanding of millions.
Nevertheless, he never emphasized his own superiority in anything. His
genuine contribution in the development of Marxism lifted him to the
very peak of science.
The requirement to be humble like Lenin has become the unalterable
ethical norm for Soviet researchers. Their nature is one of honesty ,
dutifulness, and self -criticism .
The researcher who considers himself a " pillar" of science loses interest
in the opinions of his colleagues and stops seeing his own personal fail
ings. Scientific truth never tolerates self- indulgence by the researcher and
forgives no one a disrespectful attitude toward himself.
All of Lenin 's theoretical writings were written by the hand of an
inspired scientist who was full of love for the toilers and hatred toward
the enemy. Even in his theoretical writings he “ loved his comrades with
human affection and was firmer than iron toward his enemies.” The
emotional charge is transmitted in them not only via a system of con
crete sensory images, which are organically contained within the fiber of
scientific investigation , but also by the profound thought,by the attraction
of ideas, the urgency of conclusions, the thorough grounding of argument
and the virtue of logical invulnerability.
The moral qualities of the investigator are forged out in productive
debate. Lenin valued debate in science not only from a gnoseologic but
also from a moral standpoint, for under conditions of socialism unity of
views does not fundamentally coincide with drab monotony. Competition
between points of view , the clash of opinions based on Marxist-Leninist
ideology constitutes a true sign of innovative search. A scientific debate
can be fruitful, however, only when it is subordinate to the interests of
the development of science and not to considerations of defense of the
" honor of the uniform ,” when objectivity is combined with a comradely
attitude toward one's opponents. Lenin sternly condemned manifestations
of conceit, arrogance and stupid willfulness, as well as all attempts to
settle scientific debate by administrative decree.
A striving to " rely ” on the authority of one's office, to rebuff those
who disagree with the " executive” opinion, as well as the pasting of labels,
are alien to the Leninist style of scientific investigation . Notable in this
regard is a statementby G . V . Chicherin: "He never acted on the basis
284
of naked authority but rather with arguments and convictions; he never
took advantage of the fact of his unprecedented influence in order to
overcome the resistance of dissenters, but always argued, persuaded and
never gave up until he conviced others. . . He never considered victory
over a dissenter in other terms than in the form of victory by his point of
view through argument and persuasion, within the framework of organized
debate." 48
Debates can assume ugly forms as soon as ethical norms are violated.
Scientific thought suffers damage when honest debate is replaced by the
spirit of unprincipled rivalry and ambitious striving. Lenin angrily con
demned those who created an atmosphere of petty squabbling, intrigues
and bickering both in political and in theoretical debate.
Following Lenin 's behests, the Communist Party demands wider prac
tice in the social sciences of the conduct of friendly debates on disputable
or insufficiently clear matters, with the encouragement of bold scientific
quest. The broadest opportunities have been created for this : the party
has resolutely reestablished the Leninist principle of scientific investigation
and freed science from all superficial, subjectivistic and arbitrary elements.
It was emphasized at the 24th CPSU Congress that our party is taking
all steps to " create a moral atmosphere in our society which will promote
establishment at all levels of societal affairs, at work and in the home a
respectful and concerned attitude toward man, honesty and demanding
ness on oneself and on others, trust combined with a strict sense of
responsibility and a spirit of real comradeship .” 44 All this is of particular
importance for ensuring a healthy, productive atmosphere in scientific
teams.
Thus the ethical aspect of theoretical effort is inseparable from all
other aspects of the Leninist style of scientific investigation. Study of
the Leninist heritage leads to the conclusion that the style of scientific
work is not a simple sum of separate components but rather an integral
unity of principles and standards, from which one cannot exclude a single
important element.
These are the most characteristic features of the Leninist style of
scientific accomplishment. Exercising scientific guidance of society and
the Armed Forces , and conducting comprehensive theoretical work , the
Communist Party is concerned to ensure that all our cadres thoroughly
master this style and be guided by it in their practical efforts.

Footnotes
1. V . I. Lenin : Poln . Sobr. Soch. (Complete Works), Volume 25, page 322.
2. Ibid ., Volume 40, page 6 .
3. Leninskiy Sbornik (Lenin Collection ), XIV , page 109.
4. Lenin , op. cit., Volume 2, page 450.
5. Leninskiy Sbornik , op.cit., XXX , page 153.
6 . Ibid ., XIV , pp 47– 55.
285
 7. Ibid ., XXVII, page 17 .
8. See Leninskiy Sbornik , XII. Excerpts and comments on the book by Clausewitz
entitled On War and Waging Wars, pp 389_ 442.
9. Lenin, op.cit., Volume 54, page 446.
10. Ibid., Volume 39, page 13.
11. O Lenine. Vospominaniya zarubezhnykh sovremennikov (On Lenin , Remi
niscences of Foreign Contemporaries ), Moscow , Politizdat, 1966, page 207.
12. Lenin , op.cit., Volume 26 , page 250.
13. Lenin : Tetradi po imperializmu (Rough Notes on Imperialism ) , Moscow ,
Gospolitizdat, 1939, page 615.
14. Poln . Sobr. Soch., op.cit., Volume 28, page 92.
15 . Leninskiy Sbornik , op.cit., XVI, page 37.
16 . See Poln . Sobr. Soch., op.cit., Volume 18 , page 364.
17. Ibid., Volume45, pp 45 , 47.
18 . Ibid ., Volume 18, page 198.
19. Ibid ., Volume 35, page 202.
20. Materialy XXIV s"yezda KPSS (Proceedings of the 24th CPSU Congress ),
page 103.
21. Poln . Sobr. Soch., op.cit., Volume 29, pp 226 – 227.
22. Ibid ., page 203.
23. Ibid ., Volume 26 , page 139.
24. K 100 -leriyu so dyna rozhdeniya Vladimira Ilicha Lenina. Tezisy TSK KPSS
(On the Vladimir Il'ich Lenin Birth Centennial. Theses of the Central Com
mittee CPSU ) , page 16 .
25. Leninskiy Sbornik , op.cit., XII, pp 423, 425.
26 . Ibid ., V, page 57.
27. See ibid ., XIV , pp 15, 21.
28. Ibid., XII, page 409.
29. See Poln. Sobr. Soch ., op.cit., Volume 41, page 88.
30. Ibid ., Volume 36 , page 178.
31. Ibid ., Volume 38 , pp 252 -253.
32. Ibid ., Volume 31, page 134.
33. Ibid ., Volume 18, page 306 .
34. Vospominaniya o Markse i Engel'se (Reminiscences on Marx and Engels) ,
Moscow , Gospolitizdat, 1956 , page 66.
35. Poln . Sobr. Soch ., op.cit., Volume 48, page 64.
36 . Ibid., Volume 29, page 202.
37. Ibid ., Volume 23, page 68.
38. N . K . Krupskaya: Budem uchit'sya rabota ' u Lenina (We Shall Learn to
Work from Lenin ), Moscow , Partizdat, 1933, page 9.
39. Vospominaniya o Vladimire Iliche Lenine (Reminiscences on Vladimir Il'ich
Lenin ), Volume 1, Moscow , Politizdat, 1968, page 184.
40. Poln . Sobr. Soch ., op.cit., Volume 5, page 359.
41. Ibid ., Volume 23, page 68.
42. Leninskiy Sbornik, op .cit., V, page 101.
43. Vospominaniya . .. , op.cit., Volume 2 , 1957, page 686.
· 44. Materialy . . . , op.cit., page 84.
286
Conclusion

In the opinion of the authors, the book examines, from the point of
view of the Leninist military-philosophical heritage, the most urgent
problems of modern wat and Soviet military force development. These
problems, brought forward during the entire course of development of
military affairs under the conditions of social progress and the scientific
technical revolution, are divided into three major groups. The first group
is associated with a social-political analysis of the dependence of the
nature of wars on the nature of the contemporary era ; with the charac
teristic types of wars in our era ; and with a determination of the essence
of war and the nature of its relationship to politics. A correct Marxist
Leninist appraisal of wars at each stage of the modern historical process,
taking into consideration all the social changes which have occurred in
the world , is an essential condition for successfully solving the most im
portant international problems; and particularly problems of war and
peace. This is particularly important if consideration is given to the
attempts by bourgeois military theorists to disassociate war from politics
and to make a fetish of the military -technical aspects of the new war
being prepared for by the imperialists. By their assertions that the
Leninist concept of war as an instrument of politics has supposedly
become antiquated , the learned underlings of capitalism are attempting
to erase the responsibility of the imperialists for reactionary and plunder
ing wars. The Leninist analysis of war as a social-historical phenomenon
is a powerful weapon in the struggle against distortion of interpretation
of the interrelationship of war and politics.
The second group of problems comprises questions of Soviet military
force development and the further development of military science . Here
are formulated and elaborated the Leninist principles of creating and
strengthening armed forces in socialist states. Also discussed are the
contribution of the great leader to the founding and development of
Soviet military science and the methodological foundations of creativity
and scientific prediction in military affairs. The authors have attempted
not only to reveal the basic principles, style and methods of the military
theoretical activity of V . I. Lenin , but also to adapt them to scientific
analysis of the most important contemporary problems of military theory
and practice.
287
 The important role assigned by V . I. Lenin to Party- political work
among the troops is well known . He tied it in closely with the entire
structure and morale of the armed forces and their capability to achieve
victory over an enemy. The content and tasks of morale building, political
and psychological training of the troops, taking into consideration the
requirements of modern warfare, the ideological struggle , and cultural
indoctrination as a component part of all Party -political work comprise
the third group of problems discussed in the book.
The Leninist theoretical heritage serves as the ideological basis for
strengthening the morale of the personnel, for their comprehensive train
ing for waging modern war.
The fact that it is precisely these questions which even today, a half
century after the death of the great leader, are the most topical ones in
Soviet military theory and practice emphasizes once again the power of
Leninist scientific foresight; and its capacity for determining in a complex
variety of phenomena those which are the principal and decisive ones.
The Leninist sociological analysis of military problems, his methods
and tools in military- scientific research , provide military personnel with
reliable guidance in gaining knowledge of the complex phenomena of
contemporary military affairs. But the matter is notmerely one of a simple
clarification of Leninist ideas, but rather of learning to apply them in
practice. This task has become even more acute at the present time, under
conditions of drastic changes in many concepts and ideas; of rapid de
velopment of military science; and of intensification of the process of
differentiation and integration of military knowledge.
With this in mind, it is very important to indicate the fundamental
Leninist methodological principles of approach to analysis of military
theoretical problems.
First of all, it is necessary to emphasize that unity of philosophical
and military thought is characteristic of the Leninist method of research
on all problems of war and military affairs .
V . I. Lenin considered revolutionary dialectics to be the soul of
Marxism , its decisive factor. Having absorbed in itself the creative, critical
spirit of revolutionary theory, the materialistic dialectic is based on in
disputable fundamental principles, which serve as the basis for scientific
solutions to problems arising from historical development and the rapid
process of renovation and improvement in all spheres of human activity,
including military activity.
An important general sociological principle is the principle of superi
ority of social-economic analysis in solving military problems.
Application of this principle is particularly important for a correct
understanding of the sources of modern wars. It is well known that the
causes of a particular war are dependent on many various interrelated
factors — internal and external, indirect and direct, and sometimes in
cluding accidental ones. Social- economic analysis based on a dialectical
288
materialistic approach permits the establishment of the true reasons for
a war.
With regard to the contemporary situation, as noted by the 24th
CPSU Congress, today the most profound social-economic cause of wars
is embodied in the capitalist system of production , in the strengthening of
the alliance between financial-industrial monopolies and the military
hierarchy, and the policies of imperialism .
Economics finds its concentrated expression in politics and is influenced
by it. V . I. Lenin taught that the classic , Party approach must be followed
in politics, and that all the problems of war, armed forces and military
affairs should be examined from the position of the class struggle of the
proletariat. The principle of the Party approach means that the very
method of organizing the defense of a socialist state must coincide with
the nature of socialism ; that it must be directed at maximum utilization
of the capabilities and superiority of the socialist system . It is indeed here
that the essence of the Leninist concept of the inseparable bond between
"military and socialist power" lies; as well as the necessity to work and
wage war “ in the revolutionary manner" and to heed Lenin 's behest to
" consolidate socialism in our armed forces.” 1
The highest expression of the principle of the Party approach is control
by the Communist Party over all facets of life in the socialist society,
including military force development. The collective wisdom of the Party,
its comprehensive consideration of internal conditions and international
class power and its scientificially based decisions guide the development
of the Armed Forces and their employment in the interests of the Soviet
state . They insure reliable defense of the country and of the entire socialist
community .
Minister of Defense and Marshal of the Soviet Union A . A . Grechko,
in his speech to the 24th CPSU Congress declared : " Our army, created
and trained by the Communist Party for protection of the gains of the
Great October socialist revolution, is obligated to the firm leadership of
the Party and its Central Committee for all its successes and victories over
enemies of the revolution.” 2
Also of great importance is the principle of unity of analysis of social
political and military -technical problems of war and the armed forces.
V . I. Lenin taught that the military potential of the combatant sides must
be evaluated in totality : it is essential to have a clear conception of the
moral-political condition of the armed forces and the people, as well as
their armaments .
The current military -technical revolution has imparted even greater
acuity to this Leninist tenet.
The Leninist approach to evaluating changes in the means of waging
armed warfare proceeds from the concept that these changes embody in
IV I. Lenin, Polnoye Sobraniye Sochineniy, Vol 36, p 80 ; Vol 39, p 63, Vol 37,
p 200 .
* Pravada, 3 April 1971.
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themselves not only the influence of technology , but also the moral
political potential of the country and the armed forces in their totality .
In the similarity of their military equipment and weapons, the armed
forces of states of opposing social-political systems may have much in
common in the methods of conducting combat operations. However, the
moral-political potentials of such opposing countries will be different.
Constant attention must be paid to the warning of V . I. Lenin against
placing absolute reliance either on the role of the individual and hismoral
political qualities or on that of materiel in war.
An essential prerequisite in the dialectic-materialistic approach to
evaluation of phenomena in military affairs is the Leninist principle of
unity of objective and subjective factors . While attributing the requisite
importance to the objective facet of military events, V . I. Lenin also gave
weight to the subjective activity of the popular masses,military personnel,
politicians and military leaders . Subjective factors, such as the aspira
tions of people, conscience and will, were regarded by him in two aspects :
both as the result of social development and as its motive force .
Lenin 's evaluation of the subjective factor, including the activity of
political leaders, commanders and higher military leaders is confirmed
by the course of history. The role of Soviet political and military leader
ship was particularly brilliantly manifested in the Great Patriotic War.
The courage, skill, initiative and dedication to the cause of the Party and
people of our military personnel was one of the reasons for our historic
triumph over fascist Germany.
In the offensive struggle against alien ideologies , the implementation
of the principle of unity of class and gnosiological analysis of bourgeois
conceptions is of great significance.
V . I. Lenin considered it insufficient to expose only the class goals
of false conceptions. He stressed the necessity also for theoretical analysis
of their gnosiological sources, their internal logic and methodology. Class
evaluation and gnosiological analysis must be undertaken in dialectical
unity.
Exposure of the demagoguery of class enemies and opportunists of all
stripes is an important and critical task. It is necessary to drive out the
ideological enemy from his labyrinth of dark passages, to detect his
schemes , and to reveal the social nature of his sophistic tricks. All the
sophistry of the apologists of militarism and war, wrote V . I. Lenin “must
be pursued to the very last corners.” 3 Under contemporary conditions
this requirement has attained particular urgency.
V . I. Lenin associated skillful application of methodological principles
in all fields of military theory and practice with concrete knowledge of
military affairs. He constantly reminded supervisors that it was essential
that they be competent in their work, that they have special scientific
education and knowledge of modern technology. Applying these Leninist
* V . I. Lenin , Polnoye Sobraniye Sochineniy, Vol 45, p 299.
290
tenets to military activity, M . V. Frunze said , “. . . It is possible to be a
very good Marxist but at the same time a poor commander. This is be
cause only one good quality , even if it is a good knowledge of Marxist
theory, is not sufficient to remain current in military questions, in military
theory and practice. These must be studied and understood, and if we
approach them in real earnest we will see that Marxist theory itself
demands from us careful study of military matters. . . ." 4
Marxist-Leninist methodology and military theory mutually enrich one
another. Military theory is enriched by methodological principles and
world outlook. In its turn , the methodology receives new arguments from
military theory and practice. These arguments enrich and render more
concrete the content of the general principles of the methodology .
In noting the significance of military knowledge for military personnel,
we must not belittle the role of the other elements of their spiritual culture.
In the complex and multi-faceted unity of these elements, the decisive one
is communist ideology. It is the highest regulator of the activity of a
commander, a political worker, a military engineer, and of all military
personnel.
In attaching the requisite significance to the knowledge of the individ
ual, to his business-like qualities and to his ability to organize labor, V .
I. Lenin placed the greatest emphasis on the political views of the worker.
He considered it unacceptable to restrict the rating of a man to such
characteristics as “ good” specialist or “ good ” individual. " What does
'good' have to do with it?” he remarked. “ I'd rather you tell me what his
political leanings are.” 5
Leninism is the true school of dialectical thought, a precise method
of social analysis of social phenomena, an effective weapon in practical
transformation of the world. Leninist teachings are a creative guide in
the formulation and resolution of new problems put forward by social
practice and scientific knowledge.
A remarkable example of creative application of Leninist method
ological principles is the decisions and materials of the 24th CPSU
Congress . In them may be found not only a revelation of the most com
plex mechanism of action of the social forces of the contemporary world ,
but also an outline of the scientifically based perspectives of the progres
sive movement of Soviet society, developed in the Leninist style. Particular
attention is devoted to problems of the further strengthening of the de
fensive posture of the Soviet state. Creative decisions have been reached
on questions of strengthening the military-political status of the country
and of providing the Armed Forces with the most modern and new
weapons and equipment; on questions of ideological indoctrination of
personnel; and also of military cooperation with the fraternal socialist
states .
* M . V . Frunze, Izbrannyye Proizvedeniya ( Selected Works ). Vol 11, p 57 .
* V . I. Lenin , Biografiya (Biography ) , 2d Edition ,Moscow , Politizdat, 1963, p 571.
291
 get
The Party calls for a bold, scientific campaign and for a creative
solution to urgent social problems. This increases the role of specialists
in all fields, including that of military personnel in the theoretical field .
Guided by the philosophical heritage of V . I. Lenin, Soviet officers,
generals and admirals are striving to analyzemore profoundly the peculiar
ities of modern war; to advance military theory and practice ; and to do
everything necessary in the cause of further strengthening the military
mightof our country.

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