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Panaguiton Vs DOJ

The petitioner filed a complaint against Cawili and Tongson in 1995 for issuing bounced checks in 1993 in violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22. The city prosecutor initially dismissed the case. On appeal, the DOJ found it was possible for Tongson to co-sign the checks. In 1999, the case against Tongson was dismissed on grounds that the violation had prescribed under Act No. 3326, which provides a 4-year prescription period from the date of the offense. However, the court ruled that the filing of the complaint in 1995 interrupted the running of the prescription period, citing precedents that preliminary investigation proceedings also toll prescription. Therefore, the violation had not yet prescribed against Tongson.

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261 views1 page

Panaguiton Vs DOJ

The petitioner filed a complaint against Cawili and Tongson in 1995 for issuing bounced checks in 1993 in violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22. The city prosecutor initially dismissed the case. On appeal, the DOJ found it was possible for Tongson to co-sign the checks. In 1999, the case against Tongson was dismissed on grounds that the violation had prescribed under Act No. 3326, which provides a 4-year prescription period from the date of the offense. However, the court ruled that the filing of the complaint in 1995 interrupted the running of the prescription period, citing precedents that preliminary investigation proceedings also toll prescription. Therefore, the violation had not yet prescribed against Tongson.

Uploaded by

Jelaine Añides
Copyright
© © All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
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Download as DOCX, PDF, TXT or read online on Scribd
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Panaguiton vs DOJ

Facts: On 1993, Cawili and his business associate, Ramon C. Tongson, jointly issued in favor of petitioner three (3)
checks in payment of the said loans. Significantly, all three (3) checks bore the signatures of both Cawili and
Tongson however, upon presentment, the checks were dishonored, either for insufficiency of funds or by the
closure of the account. Petitioner made formal demands to pay the amounts of the checks upon Cawili and
Tongson, but to no avail. On 24 August 1995, petitioner filed a complaint against Cawili and Tongson for violating
Batas Pambansa Bilang 22.

Tongson denied that he had issued the bounced checks. The City Prosecutor dismissed the case however, upon
appeal of the petitioner to the DOJ, the latter found out that it was possible for Tongson to co-sign the bounced
checks and that he had deliberately altered his signature in the pleadings submitted during the preliminary
investigation.

On March 1999, the Assistant Prosecutor dismissed the case against Tongson without referring the matter to the
NBI per the Chief State Prosecutor’s resolution. In her resolution, ACP Sampaga held that the case had already
prescribed pursuant to Act No. 3326, as amended, which provides that violations penalized by B.P. Blg. 22 shall
prescribe after four (4) years. In this case, the four (4)-year period started on the date the checks were dishonored,
or on 20 January 1993 and 18 March 1993. The filing of the complaint before the Quezon City Prosecutor on 24
August 1995 did not interrupt the running of the prescriptive period, as the law contemplates judicial, and not
administrative proceedings. Thus, considering that from 1993 to 1998, more than four (4) years had already
elapsed and no information had as yet been filed against Tongson, the alleged violation of B.P. Blg. 22 imputed to
him had already prescribed.

Issue: Whether or not the violations penalized by BP Blg 22 already prescribed?

Ruling: No. The court agrees that RA No. 3326 is applicable to BP Blg 22 whereby a violation of B.P. Blg. 22
prescribes in four (4) years from the commission of the offense or, if the same be not known at the time, from the
discovery thereof. Nevertheless, the court cannot uphold the position that only the filing of a case in court can toll
the running of the prescriptive period.

In Ingco v. Sandiganbayan and Sanrio Company Limited v. Lim, which involved violations of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. No. 3019) and the Intellectual Property Code (R.A. No. 8293), which are both special
laws, the Court ruled that the prescriptive period is interrupted by the institution of proceedings for preliminary
investigation against the accused. In the more recent case of Securities and Exchange Commission v. Interport
Resources Corporation, et al., the Court ruled that the nature and purpose of the investigation conducted by the
Securities and Exchange Commission on violations of the Revised Securities Act, another special law, is equivalent
to the preliminary investigation conducted by the DOJ in criminal cases, and thus effectively interrupts the
prescriptive period.

In the case at bar, petitioner’s filing of his complaint–affidavit before the Office of the City Prosecutor on 24 August
1995 signified the commencement of the proceedings for the prosecution of the accused and thus effectively
interrupted the prescriptive period for the offenses they had been charged under B.P. Blg. 22. Moreover, since
there is a definite finding of probable cause, with the debunking of the claim of prescription there is no longer any
impediment to the filing of the information against petitioner.

Note: RA No. 3326, appropriately entitled an Act to Establish Prescription for Violations of Special Acts and
Municipal Ordinances and to Provide When Prescription Shall Begin, is the law applicable to offenses under special
laws which do not provide their own prescriptive periods.

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