LEGAL ETHICS CASE DIGESTS

Assignment No. 1 (Practice of Law)

A. CONCEPT

Cayetano v. Monsod (G.R. No. 100113, 3 September 1991)

FACTS: Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C.

Aquino to the position of chairman of the COMELEC. Petitioner opposed the
nomination because allegedly Monsod does not possess required qualification of
having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. The 1987
constitution provides in Section 1, Article IX-C: There shall be a Commission on
Elections composed of a Chairman and six Commissioners who shall be natural-
born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-
five years of age, holders of a college degree, and must not have been candidates
for any elective position in the immediately preceding elections. However, a majority
thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have
been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.

ISSUE: Whether the respondent does not possess the required qualification of
having engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.

RULING: In the case of Philippine Lawyers Association vs. Agrava, stated: The
practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces
the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special
proceeding, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients
before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients,
and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law incorporation
services, assessment and condemnation services, contemplating an appearance
before judicial body, the foreclosure of mortgage, enforcement of a creditor’s claim in
bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment,
and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice.
Practice of law means any activity, in or out court, which requires the application of
law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience.

The contention that Atty. Monsod does not possess the required qualification of
having engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years is incorrect since Atty.
Monsod’s past work experience as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-
entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of
both rich and the poor – verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement for the
position of COMELEC chairman, The respondent has been engaged in the practice
of law for at least ten years does In the view of the foregoing, the petition is
DISMISSED.

Philippines Lawyer's Association v. Agrava (G.R. No. L-12426, 16 February

1959)

FACTS: A petition was filed by the petitioner for prohibition and injunction against
Celedonio Agrava, in his capacity as Director of the Philippines Patent Office. On

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May 27, 1957, respondent Director issued a circular announcing that he had
scheduled for June 27, 1957 an examination for the purpose of determining who are
qualified to practice as patent attorneys before the Philippines Patent Office. The
petitioner contends that one who has passed the bar examinations and is licensed
by the Supreme Court to practice law in the Philippines and who is in good standing,
is duly qualified to practice before the Philippines Patent Office and that the
respondent Director’s holding an examination for the purpose is in excess of his
jurisdiction and is in violation of the law.The respondent, in reply, maintains the
prosecution of patent cases ― does not involve entirely or purely the practice of law
but includes the application of scientific and technical knowledge and training as a
matter of actual practice so as to include engineers and other individuals who
passed the examination can practice before the Patent office. Furthermore, he
stressed that for the long time he is holding tests, this is the first time that his right
has been questioned formally.

ISSUE: Whether or not the appearance before the patent Office and the preparation
and the prosecution of patent application, etc., constitutes or is included in the
practice of law.

RULING: The Supreme Court held that the practice of law includes such appearance
before the Patent Office, the representation of applicants, oppositors, and other
persons, and the prosecution of their applications for patent, their opposition thereto,
or the enforcement of their rights in patent cases. Moreover, the practice before the
patent Office involves the interpretation and application of other laws and legal
principles, as well as the existence of facts to be established in accordance with the
law of evidence and procedure. The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of
cases or litigation in court but also embraces all other matters connected with the law
and any work involving the determination by the legal mind of the legal effects of
facts and conditions. Furthermore, the law provides that any party may appeal to the
Supreme Court from any final order or decision of the director. Thus, if the
transactions of business in the Patent Office involved exclusively or mostly technical
and scientific knowledge and training, then logically, the appeal should be taken not
to a court or judicial body, but rather to a board of scientists, engineers or technical
men, which is not the case.

Re: Letter of the UP Faculty (A.M. No. 10-10-4-SC, 8 March 2011)

FACTS: On 28 April 2010, the decision of the case Vinuya v Executive Secretary
was promulgated with Justice Mariano del Castillo as its ponente. Motion for
reconsideration was filed by the petitioner’s counsel on various grounds but most
notably on the ground that not only did the ponente of the case plagiarised at least 3
books and articles in discussing the principles of jus cogens and erga omnes, but
have also twisted such quotations making it appear contrary to the intent of the
original works. The authors and their purportedly plagiarized articles are: 1) Evan J
Criddle and Evan Fox-Decent’s A Fiduciary Theory of Jus Cogens published in 2009
in the Yale Journal of International Law; 2) Christian J. Tams’ Enforcing Erga Omnes
Obligations in Internation Law published by the Cambridge University Press in 2005;
and 3) Mark Ellis’ Breaking the Silence: On Rape as an International
Crime published in the Case Western Reserve Journal of Internation Law in

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2006. Thereafter, news regarding the plagiarism by the Supreme Court spread over
the media and the original authors wrote letters to the Chief Justice expressing
discontent by the questioned act of Justice del Castillo.

On 27 July 2010, the UP College of Law faculty members gave their opinion on the
matter of plagiarism by issuing an article titled ―Restoring Integrity: A statement by
the Faculty of the University of the Philippines College of Law on the Allegations of
Plagiarism and Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court‖ signed overall 37 faculty
members. In said article, the faculty expressly gave their dismay saying that the
court had the hopes of relief from those ―comfort women‖ during the war ―crushed by
a singularly reprehensible act of dishonesty and misrepresentation by the Highest
Court of the Land.‖

In the article, it was stated that plagiarism, as appropriation and misrepresentation of

another person’s work as one’s own, is considered as ―dishonesty, pure and
simple.‖ Hence, it was argued that since the decision in the Vinuya case form part of
the Philippine judicial system, the Court, in fine, is allowing dishonesty to be
promulgated. Furthermore, the plagiarism and misrepresentation in the Vinuya case
undermines the judicial system of our country and is a dirt on the honor and dignity
of the Supreme Court, the article sought for the resignation of Associate Justice
Mariano del Castillo.

In response to the said article, the Court issued a resolution stating that the remarks
and choice of words used were such a great insult to the members of the Court and
a threat to the independence of the judiciary, a clear violation of Canons 1, 11 and
13 and the Rules 1.02 and 11.05 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Thereafter, the Court ordered the signatories to show cause on why
they should not be disciplined as members of the Bar for such alleged violations.

In fulfillment of the directive by the Court, the signatories passed a Common

Compliance stating therein that their intention in issuing the article in question ―was
not to malign the Court but rather to defend its integrity and credibility and to ensure
continued confidence in the legal system‖ by the words used therein as ―focusing on
constructive action.‖ Also, it was alleged that the respondents are correct in seeking
responsibility from Justice del Castillo for he, indeed, committed plagiarism thus,
rectifying their issuance of the article. Furthermore, the respondents argued that the
article in question is a valid exercise of the freedom of expression as citizens of a
democracy, and an exercise of academic freedom.

ISSUE: W/N the UP Law Faculty’s actions constitute violation of various Canons and
Rules of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

RULING: Yes. The Court ruled that the Common Compliance given by the
respondent-signatories in the questioned article is not sufficient in reasoning why
they should not be disciplined as members of the Bar.

―…the adversarial nature of our legal system has tempted members of the bar to use
strong language in pursuit of their duty to advance the interests of their clients.
―However, while a lawyer is entitled to present his case with vigor and courage, such
enthusiasm does not justify the use of offensive and abusive language. Language

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abounds with countless possibilities for one to be emphatic but respectful, convincing
but not derogatory, illuminating but not offensive.

―On many occasions, the Court has reminded members of the Bar to abstain from all
offensive personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of
a party or witness, unless required by the justice of the cause with which he is
charged. In keeping with the dignity of the legal profession, a lawyer’s language even
in his pleadings must be dignified.

―Verily, the accusatory and vilifying nature of certain portions of the Statement
exceeded the limits of fair comment and cannot be deemed as protected free
speech.‖

―In a democracy, members of the legal community are hardly expected to have
monolithic views on any subject, be it a legal, political or social issue. Even as
lawyers passionately and vigorously propound their points of view they are bound by
certain rules of conduct for the legal profession. This Court is certainly not claiming
that it should be shielded from criticism. All the Court demands is the same respect
and courtesy that one lawyer owes to another under established ethical standards.
All lawyers, whether they are judges, court employees, professors or private
practitioners, are officers of the Court and have voluntarily taken an oath, as an
indispensable qualification for admission to the Bar, to conduct themselves with good
fidelity towards the courts. There is no exemption from this sworn duty for law
professors, regardless of their status in the academic community or the law school to
which they belong.‖

The Court further reminded the respondent law professors ―of their lawyerly duty,
under Canons 1, 11 and 13 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, to give due
respect to the Court and to refrain from intemperate and offensive language tending
to influence the Court on pending matters or to denigrate the Court and the
administration of justice and warned that the same or similar act in the future shall be
dealt with more severely.‖

DISSENTING OPINION:
Sereno, J.: The Court’s act in directing the law professors to furnish the Show Cause
Resolution is like the little boy who exclaimed that the emperor has no clothes in the
Danish story be made to explain why he should not be punished for his keen
observation which is an act of prematurely judging them guilty. The Court’s act of
labelling Justice del Castillo’s act as not plagiarism is what makes this contempt
case grave. It should not be the place of the Court to seek revenge against those
who have the courage to say what is wrong with it.

The Resolution requiring the Show Cause Resolution demonstrates nothing but an
abrasive flexing of the judicial muscle that could hardly be characterized as
judicious. This knee-jerk response from the Court stares back at its own face, since
this judicial act is the one that is totally unnecessary, uncalled for and a rash act of
misplaced vigilance.

Carpio, J.: The Show Cause Resolution by the respondents is sufficient and there is
no need to admonish or warn them of the use of disrespectful language. The Court

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adheres to the clear and present danger test and it appears that the evil
consequences of the statements are absent and it does not exhibit that irrational
obsession to demean, ridicule, degrade and even destroy the courts and their
members. There is only contempt when the article is taken apart, contrary to the
practice of the Court which is to read with contextual care making sure that
disparaging statements are not taken out of context.

Pacao v. Limos (A.C. No. 11246, 14 June 2016)

FACTS: Arnold’s wife, Mariadel, was charged for qualified theft before the
Mandaluyong City Prosecutor’s Office by BHF Pawnshop. During the preliminary
investigation, Atty. Sinamar Limos appeared as counsel for BHF. To buy peace, the
complainant initiated negotiation with BHF, through Atty. Limos, for a
possible settlement.

After a series of negotiation, Atty. Limos relayed that BHF is willing to accept
payment of P530,000, to be paid in four installments. Later, Atty. Limos accepted the
amount of P200,000.00 as partial payment, in behalf of BHF, with an
undertaking to provide a signed affidavit of desistance, and a joint motion to
compromise agreement.

Despite receipt of the amount, however, Atty. Limos failed to deliver on her
promise; she even tried to collect the next installment but complainant
refused. Arnold was informed by Camille Bonifacio, BHF’s representative, that
Atty. Limos was no longer BHF’s counsel and was not authorized to negotiate
any settlement nor receive any money in behalf go BHF. She also told him that
BHF did not receive the money given to Atty. Limos.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Limos should be held administratively liable.

RULING: Atty. Limos was previously suspended twice by the Supreme

Court and was warned that repetition of the same or similar acts will merit a more
severe penalty.

―[T]he practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by the State upon those
who show that they possess, and continue to possess, the qualifications
required by law for the conferment of such privilege. Membership in the bar is a
privilege burdened with conditions.‖

―Of all classes and professions, the lawyer is most sacredly bound to uphold the
laws. He is their sworn servant; and for him, of all men in the world, to repudiate
and override the laws, to trample the murder foot and to ignore the very bonds
of society, argues recreancy to his position and office, and sets a
pernicious example to the insubordinate and dangerous elements of the
body politic.‖

Atty. Limos failed to demonstrate that she still possessed the integrity and morality
demanded of a member of the Bar. Her seeming indifference to the
complaint brought against her was made obvious by her unreasonable absence

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from the proceedings before the IBP. Her disobedience to the
IBP is, in fact, agross and blatant disrespect for the authority of the Court.

Ulep v. The Legal Clinic, Inc. (Bar Matter No. 553, 17 June 1993)

FACTS: Mauricio C. Ulep, petitioner, prays this Court "to order the respondent, The
Legal Clinic, Inc., to cease and desist from issuing advertisements similar to or of the
same tenor as that of Annexes `A' and `B' (of said petition) and to perpetually
prohibit persons or entities from making advertisements pertaining to the exercise of
the law profession other than those allowed by law.‖ The advertisements complained
of by herein petitioner are as follows:

Annex A
SECRET MARRIAGE?
P560.00 for a valid marriage.
Info on DIVORCE. ABSENCE.
ANNULMENT. VISA.
Please call: 521-0767,
LEGAL5217232, 5222041
CLINIC, INC.8:30 am-6:00 pm
7-Flr. Victoria Bldg. UN Ave., Mla.

Annex B
GUAM DIVORCE
DON PARKINSON
an Attorney in Guam, is giving FREE BOOKS on Guam Divorce through The Legal
Clinic beginning Monday to Friday during office hours.
Guam divorce. Annulment of Marriage. Immigration Problems, Visa Ext.
Quota/Non-quota Res. & Special Retiree's Visa. Declaration of Absence.
Remarriage to Filipina Fiancees. Adoption. Investment in the Phil. US/Foreign
Visa for Filipina Spouse/Children. Call Marivic.
THE 7 F Victoria Bldg. 429 UN Ave.
LEGALErmita, Manila nr. US Embassy
CLINIC, INC. Tel. 521-7232521-7251522-2041; 521-0767

It is the submission of petitioner that the advertisements above reproduced are

champertous, unethical, demeaning of the law profession, and destructive of the
confidence of the community in the integrity of the members of the bar and that, as a
member of the legal profession, he is ashamed and offended by the said
advertisements, hence the reliefs sought in his petition as herein before quoted.

In its answer to the petition, respondent admits the fact of publication of said
advertisements at its instance, but claims that it is not engaged in the practice of law
but in the rendering of "legal support services" through paralegals with the use of
modern computers and electronic machines. Respondent further argues that
assuming that the services advertised are legal services, the act of advertising these
services should be allowed supposedly in the light of the caseof John R. Bates and
Van O'Steen vs. State Bar of Arizona, reportedly decidedby the United States
Supreme Court on June 7, 1977.

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ISSUE: Whether or not the services offered by respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc., as
advertised by it constitutes practice of law and, in either case, whether the same can
properly be the subject of the advertisements herein complained of.

RULING: Yes. The Supreme Court held that the services offered by the respondent
constitute practice of law. The definition of ―practice of law‖ is laid down in the case
of Cayetano vs. Monsod, as defined: Black defines "practice of law" as: "The
rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal principles
and technique to serve the interest of another with his consent. It is not limited to
appearing in court, or advising and assisting in the conduct of litigation, but
embraces the preparation of pleadings, and other papers incident to actions and
special proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation of legal instruments of all kinds,
and the giving of all legal advice to clients. It embraces all advice to clients and all
actions taken for them in matters connected with the law."

The contention of respondent that it merely offers legal support services can neither
be seriously considered nor sustained. Said proposition is belied by respondent's
own description of the services it has been offering. While some of the services
being offered by respondent corporation merely involve mechanical and technical
know-how, such as the installation of computer systems and programs for the
efficient management of law offices, or the computerization of research aids and
materials, these will not suffice to justify an exception to the general rule. What is
palpably clear is that respondent corporation gives out legal information to laymen
and lawyers. Its contention that such function is non-advisory and non-diagnostic is
more apparent than real. In providing information, for example, about foreign laws on
marriage, divorce and adoption, it strains the credulity of this Court that all that
respondent corporation will simply do is look for the law, furnish a copy thereof to the
client, and stop there as if it were merely a bookstore. With its attorneys and so
called paralegals, it will necessarily have to explain to the client the intricacies of the
law and advise him or her on the proper course of action to be taken as may be
provided for by said law. That is what its advertisements represent and for which
services it will consequently charge and be paid. That activity falls squarely within
the jurisprudential definition of "practice of law." Such a conclusion will not be altered
by the fact that respondent corporation does not represent clients in court since law
practice, as the weight of authority holds, is not limited merely to court appearances
but extends to legal research, giving legal advice, contract drafting, and so forth.

That fact that the corporation employs paralegals to carry out its services is not
controlling. What is important is that it is engaged in the practice of law by virtue of
the nature of the services it renders which thereby brings it within the ambit of the
statutory prohibitions against the advertisements which it has caused to be published
and are now assailed in this proceeding. The standards of the legal profession
condemn the lawyer's advertisement of his talents. (SEE CANON 2) A lawyer
cannot, without violating the ethics of his profession, advertise his talents or skills as
in a manner similar to a merchant advertising his goods. The proscription against
advertising of legal services or solicitation of legal business rests on the fundamental
postulate that the practice of law is a profession. The canons of the profession tell us
that the best advertising possible for a lawyer is a well-merited reputation for
professional capacity and fidelity to trust, which must be earned as the outcome of
character and conduct. Good and efficient service to a client as well as to the

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community has a way of publicizing itself and catching public attention. That publicity
is a normal by-product of effective service which is rightand proper. A good and
reputable lawyer needs no artificial stimulus to generate it and to magnify his
success. He easily sees the difference between a normal by-product of able service
and the unwholesome result of propaganda.

B. QUALIFICATIONS

In the Matter of the Disqualification of the Bar Examinee Haron S. Meling in the
2002 Bar Examinations (B.M. No. 1154, 8 June 2004)

FACTS: On October 14, 2002, Atty. Froilan R. Melendrez (Melendrez) filed with the
Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) a Petition to disqualify Haron S. Meling (Meling)
from taking the 2002 Bar Examinations and to impose on him the appropriate
disciplinary penalty as a member of the Philippine Shari’a Bar. In the Petition,
Melendrez alleges that Meling did not disclose in his Petition to take the 2002 Bar
Examinations that he has three (3) pending criminal cases before the Municipal Trial
Court in Cities (MTCC), Cotabato City, namely: Criminal Cases Noa. 15685 and
15686, both for Grave Oral Defamation, and Criminal Case No. 15687 for Less
Serious Physical Injuries.

The above-mentioned cases arose from an incident which occurred on May 21,
2001, when Meling allegedly uttered defamatory words against Melendrez and his
wife in front of media practitioners and other people. Meling also purportedly
attacked and hit the face of Melendrez’ wife causing the injuries to the latter.
Furthermore, Melendrez alleges that Meling has been using the title ―Attorney‖ in his
communications, as Secretary to the Mayor of Cotabato City, despite the fact that he
is not a member of the Bar. Attached to the Petition is an indorsement letter which
shows that Meling used the appellation and appears on its face to have been
received by the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Cotabato City on November 27, 2001.

Pursuant to this Court’s Resolution dated December 3, 2002, Meling filed his Answer
with the OBC. In his Answer, Meling explains that he did not disclose the criminal
cases filed against him by Melendrez because retired Judge Corocoy Moson, their
former professor, advised him to settle his misunderstanding with
Melendrez. Believing in good faith that the case would be settled because the said
Judge has moral ascendancy over them, he being their former professor in the
College of Law, Meling considered the three cases that actually arose from a single
incident and involving the same parties as ―closed and terminated.‖ Moreover,
Meling denies the charges and adds that the acts complained of do not involve moral
turpitude.

As regards the use of the title ―Attorney,‖ Meling admits that some of his
communications really contained the word ―Attorney‖ as they were, according to him,
typed by the office clerk. In its Report and Recommendation dated December 8,
2003, the OBC disposed of the charge of non-disclosure against Meling in this wise:
The reasons of Meling in not disclosing the criminal cases filed against him in his
petition to take the Bar Examinations are ludicrous. He should have known that only
the court of competent jurisdiction can dismiss cases, not a retired judge nor a law

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professor. In fact, the cases filed against Meling are still pending. Furthermore,
granting arguendo that these cases were already dismissed, he is still required to
disclose the same for the Court to ascertain his good moral character. Petitions to
take the Bar Examinations are made under oath, and should not be taken lightly by
an applicant.

ISSUE: WON the imposition of appropriate sanctions upon Haron S. Meling is proper
and shall subsequently barred him from taking his lawyer’s oath and signing on the
Roll of Attorneys

RULING: The Petition is GRANTED insofar as it seeks the imposition of appropriate

sanctions upon Haron S. Meling as a member of the Philippine Shari’a
Bar. Accordingly, the membership of Haron S. Meling in the Philippine Shari’a Bar is
hereby SUSPENDED until further orders from the Court, the suspension to take
effect immediately. Insofar as the Petition seeks to prevent Haron S. Meling from
taking the Lawyer’s Oath and signing the Roll of Attorneys as a member of the
Philippine Bar, the same is DISMISSED for having become moot and academic.

Practice of law, whether under the regular or the Shari’a Court, is not a matter of
right but merely a privilege bestowed upon individuals who are not only learned in
the law but who are also known to possess good moral character. The requirement
of good moral character is not only a condition precedent to admission to the
practice of law, its continued possession is also essential for remaining in the
practice of law.

The disclosure requirement is imposed by the Court to determine whether there is

satisfactory evidence of good moral character of the applicant. The nature of
whatever cases are pending against the applicant would aid the Court in determining
whether he is endowed with the moral fitness demanded of a lawyer. By concealing
the existence of such cases, the applicant then flunks the test of fitness even if the
cases are ultimately proven to be unwarranted or insufficient to impugn or affect the
good moral character of the applicant.

Ui v. Bonifacio (Adm. Case No. 3319, 8 June 2000)

FACTS: Complainant Lesli Ui found out that her husband Carlos Ui was carrying out
an illicit relationship with respondent Atty. Iris Bonifacio with whom he begot two
children. Hence, a complaint for disbarment was filed by complainant against
respondent before the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines on the ground of immorality, more particularly, for carrying on an illicit
relationship with the complainant’s husband. It is respondent’s contention that her
relationship with Carlos Ui is not illicit because they were married abroad and that
after June 1988, when respondent discovered Carlos Ui’s true civil status, she cut off
all her ties with him. Respondent averred that Carlos Ui never lived with her.

ISSUE: Whether or not she has conducted herself in an immoral manner for which
she deserves to be barred from the practice of law.

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RULING: The complaint for disbarment against respondent Atty. Iris L. Bonifacio, for
alleged immorality, was dismissed. All the facts taken together leads to the
inescapable conclusion that respondent was imprudent in managing her personal
affairs. However, the fact remains that her relationship with Carlos Ui, clothed as it
was with what respondent believed was a valid marriage, cannot be considered
immoral. For immorality connotes conduct that shows indifference to the moral
norms of society and the opinion of good and respectable members of the
community. Moreover, for such conduct to warrant disciplinary action, the same must
be ―grossly immoral,‖ that is, it must be so corrupt and false as to constitute a
criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree.

In the Matter of the Admission to the Bar and Oath-Taking of Successful Bar
Applicant Al C. Argosino (B.M. No. 712, 13 July 1995)

FACTS: Al Argosino along with thirteen (13) other individuals were charged with the
crime of homicide in connection with the death of Raul Camaligan, which stemmed
from the infliction of severe physical injuries upon him in the course of ―hazing‖
conducted as part of university fraternity initiation rites.

Argosino and his co-accused then entered into plea bargaining with the prosecution
and as a result of such bargaining, pleaded guilty to the lesser offense of homicide
through reckless imprudence. This plea was accepted by the trial court, and hence
were sentenced to suffer imprisonment. Argosino and his co-accused filed an
application for probation with the lower court. The application for probation was
granted.

Argosino then filed a Petition for Admission to Take the 1993 Bar Examinations. In
this Petition, he disclosed the fact of his criminal conviction and his then probation
status. He was allowed to take the 1993 Bar Examinations and passed the said Bar
Examination. He was not, however, allowed to take the lawyer’s oath of office.
Argosino filed a Petition to allow him to take the attorney’s oath of office and to admit
him to the practice of law.

ISSUE: Whether or not Argosino should be admitted to the practice of law.

RULING: No, Argosino should not be admitted to the practice of law. The essentiality
of good moral character in those who would be lawyers is stressed in cases decided
by the Court. It is settled that the practice of law is not a natural, absolute or
constitutional right to be granted to everyone who demands it. Rather, it is a high
personal privilege limited to citizens of good moral character, with special
educational qualifications, duly ascertained and certified.

Argosino’s participation in the deplorable ―hazing‖ activities certainly fell far short of
the required standard of good moral character. The deliberate (rather than merely
accidental or inadvertent) infliction of severe physical injuries which proximately led
to the death of Camaligan, certainly indicated serious character flaws on the part of
those who inflicted such injuries. Argosino and his co-accused had failed to
discharge their moral duty to protect the life and well-being of a ―neophyte‖ who had,
by seeking admission to the fraternity involved, reposed trust and confidence in all of

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them that, at the very least, he would not be beaten to death. Thus, participation in
the prolonged and mindless physical beatings inflicted upon Camaligan constituted
evident rejection of that moral duty and was totally irresponsible behavior, which
makes impossible a finding that the participant was then possessed of good moral
character. Hence, Argosino should not be admitted to the practice of law lacking the
requirement of good moral character.

In re: Dacanay (B.M. No. 1678, 17 December 2007)

FACTS: Petitioner was admitted to the Philippine bar in March 1960. He practiced
law until he migrated to Canada in December 1998 to seek medical attention for
hisailments. He subsequently applied for Canadian citizenship to avail of
Canada’sfree medical aid program. His application was approved and he became a
Canadian citizen in May 2004.On July 14, 2006, pursuant to Republic Act (RA) 9225
(Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003), petitioner reacquired his
Philippine citizenship.On that day, he took his oath of allegiance as a Filipino citizen
before the Philippine Consulate General in Toronto, Canada. Thereafter, he returned
to the Philippines and now intends to resume his law practice.

ISSUE: WON petitioner may still resume practice? YES

RULING: Section 2, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides an applicant for
admission to the bar be a citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-one years of age,
of good moral character and a resident of the Philippines.5 He must also produce
before this Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character and that no charges
against him, involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any court in
the Philippines.Since Filipino citizenship is a requirement for admission to the bar,
loss thereof terminates membership in the Philippine bar and, consequently, the
privilege to engage in the practice of law. In other words, the loss of Filipino
citizenship ipsojure terminates the privilege to practice law in the Philippines.

The practice of law is a privilege denied to foreigners.The exception is when Filipino

citizenship is lost by reason of naturalization as a citizen of another country but
subsequently reacquiredpursuant to RA 9225. This is because ―all Philippine citizens
who become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost their
Philippine citizenship under the conditions of [RA 9225].‖ Therefore, a Filipino lawyer
who becomes a citizen of another country is deemed never to have lost his
Philippine citizenship if he reacquires it in accordance with RA 9225.Before he can
can resume his law practice, he must first secure from this Court the authority to do
so, conditioned on:o the updating and payment of of IBP membership dues;o the
payment of professional tax;o the completion of at least 36 credit hours of mandatory
continuing legal education; this is especially significant to refresh the
applicant/petitioner’s knowledge of Philippine laws and update him of legal
developments ando the retaking of the lawyer’s oath.

11 | P a g e
In re: Muneses (B.M. No. 2112, 24 July 2012)

FACTS: On June 8, 2009, a petition was filed by Epifanio B. Muneses with the Office
of the Bar Confidant praying that he be granted the privilege to practice law in the
Philippines. The petitioner alleged that he became a member of the IBP on March
21, 1966; that he lost his privilege to practice law when he became a citizen of the
USA on August 28, 1981; that on September 15, 2006, he re-acquired his Philippine
citizenship pursuant to R.A. No. 9225 or the "Citizenship Retention and Re-
Acquisition Act of 2003" by taking his oath of allegiance as a Filipino citizen before
the Philippine Consulate General in Washington, D.C., USA; that he intends to retire
in the Philippines and if granted, to resume the practice of law.

ISSUE: Whether or not to grant the petition to resume the privilege to practice law in
the Philippines

RULING: The Court reiterates that Filipino citizenship is a requirement for admission
to the bar and is, in fact, a continuing requirement for the practice of law. The loss
thereof means termination of the petitioner’s membership in the bar;ipso jure the
privilege to engage in the practice of law. Under R.A. No. 9225, natural-born citizens
who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens
of a foreign country are deemed to have re-acquired their Philippine citizenship upon
taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic. Thus, a Filipino lawyer who becomes a
citizen of another country and later re-acquires his Philippine citizenship under R.A.
No. 9225, remains to be a member of the Philippine Bar. However, as stated in
Dacanay, the right to resume the practice of law is not automatic. R.A. No. 9225
provides that a person who intends to practice his profession in the Philippines must
apply with the proper authority for a license or permit to engage in such practice.

Thus, in pursuance to the qualifications laid down by the Court for the practice of
law, the OBC required the herein petitioner to submit the original or certified true
copies of the following documents in relation to his petition:
1. Petition for Re-Acquisition of Philippine Citizenship;
2. Order (for Re-Acquisition of Philippine citizenship);
3. Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines;
4. Identification Certificate (IC) issued by the Bureau of Immigration;
5. Certificate of Good Standing issued by the IBP;
6. Certification from the IBP indicating updated payments of annual membership
dues;
7. Proof of payment of professional tax; and
8. Certificate of compliance issued by the MCLE Office.

The OBC further required the petitioner to update his compliance, particularly with
the MCLE. After all the requirements were satisfactorily complied with and finding
that the petitioner has met all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications for
membership in the bar, the OBC recommended that the petitioner be allowed to
resume his practice of law.

In re: Distrito (B.M. No. 1209, 1 July 2003)

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Caronan v. Caronan (A.C. No. 11316, 12 July 2003)

A college undergraduate who became a lawyer by stealing the identity of his brother
was disbarred by the Supreme Court. In a per curiam decision in Administrative
Case No. 11316 promulgated July 12, 2016, the court ordered that the name ―Patrick
A. Caronon with Roll of Attorneys No. 49069‖ dropped and stricken off the Roll of
Attorneys.

The high court also barred Richard A. Caronan or ―Atty. Patrick A. Caronan‖ from
being admitted as a member of the Bar. The high court also cancelled and revoked
the identification cards issued to Richard Caronan under the name ―Atty. Patrick A.
Caronan‖ issued by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) as well as the
certificates issued to the same by the Mandatory Continuing Legal Education
(MCLE). Likewise, the high court also ordered the Office of the Court Administrator
to circulate in all courts nationwide a photograph of Richard Caronan and a warning
of his false assumption of the name and identity of ―Patrick A. Caronan.‖

―[R]espondent made a mockery of the legal profession by pretending to have the

necessary qualifications to be a lawyer. He also tarnished the image of lawyers with
his alleged unscrupulous activities, which resulted in the filing of several criminal
cases against him. Certainly, respondent and his acts do not have a place in the
legal profession where one of the primary duties of its members is to uphold its
integrity and dignity,‖ the court held.

Richard is the older brother of the real Patrick Caronan, who, in 2013 filed a
complaint before the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP. The real Patrick
Caronan graduated from college with a degree in Business Administration at the
University of Makati (UM). He worked his way up until he was promoted as branch
manager of a convenience store in Muntinlupa. His brother Richard studied at the
Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Maynila (PLM). He later transferred to the Philippine
Military Academy (PMA). A year later, he was discharged from PMA and focused on
helping their father in a car rental business. In 1997, he moved to Nueva Vizcaya
with his wife and three children and never went back to school. Two years later, he
told his brother that he enrolled at a law school in Nueva Vizcaya.

In 2004, their mother informed Patrick that his brother passed the Bar examination.
Their mother also told him that Richard used his name and college records from UM
to enroll at St. Mary’s University College of Law. Patrick brushed aside what his
brother did. He said he did not anticipate any adverse consequences to him until he
was summoned by his office in 2009 informing him that the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) requested his presence for an investigation against ―Atty. Patrick
A. Caronan‖ for qualified theft and estafa.

Patrick also learned that his brother was arrested for gun-running activities, illegal
possession of explosives and violation of the Bouncing Checks Law. Patrick said for
fear of his own safety and because he became the subject of talk in his office, he
was forced to resign from his work. He eventually filed a complaint against his
brother. In his defense, Richard denied all allegations and maintained that his
identity can no longer be raised as an issue as it had already been resolved in an
earlier administrative case declared closed and terminated by this court in AC No.

13 | P a g e
10074. But the high court said Patrick ―clearly and overwhelmingly‖ established that
he is the real ―Patrick A. Caronan.‖ The IBP also noted that since Richard never
completed his college degree, he has not completed the required pre-law degree.

The court held that respondent exhibited his dishonesty and utter lack of moral
fitness to be a member of the Bar when he assumed the name, identity and school
records of his own brother and dragged the latter into controversies which eventually
caused him to fear for his safety and to resign from PSC where he had been working
for years. ―Good moral character is essential in those who would be lawyers. This is
imperative in the nature of the office of a lawyer, the trust relation which exists
between him and his client, as well as between him and the court,‖ the court said.

Pimentel v. Legal Education Board (G.R. No. 230642, 10 September 2019)

The Supreme Court (SC) has declared unconstitutional a requirement of the Legal
Education Board (LEB) for students to pass the Philippine Law School Admission
Test (PhiLSAT) for enrolment in law schools in the country. LEB’s PhiLSAT
requirement was declared by the SC as ―an act and practice of excluding, restricting
and qualifying admissions to law schools in violation of the institutional academic
freedom on who to admit.‖

Specifically, declared unconstitutional was paragraph 9 of LEB’s Memorandum

Order No. 7-2016 which provides that ―all college graduates or graduating students
applying for admission to the basic law course shall be required to pass the PhiLSAT
as a requirement for admission to any law school in the Philippines and that no
applicant shall be admitted for enrolment as a first year student in the basic law
courses leading to a degree of either Bachelor of Laws of Juris Doctor unless he/she
has passed the PhiLSAT taken within two years before the start of studies for the
basic law course.‖

With the full court decision written by Associate Justice Jose C. Reyes Jr., the SC
made permanent its temporary restraining order (TRO) issued last March against the
implementation of PhiLSAT. ―The regular admission of students who were
conditionally admitted and enrolled is left to the discretion of the law schools in the
exercise of their academic freedom,‖ the SC declared. Also declared unconstitutional
were:
1. ―The act and practice of the LEB of dictating the qualifications and
classifications of faculty members, dean, and dean of graduate schools of law
in violation of institutional academic freedom on who may teach.
2. ―The act and practice of the LEB of dictating the policies on the
establishment of legal apprenticeship and legal internship programs in
violation of the institutional academic freedom on what to teach.‖

The 107-page SC decision partially granted the petitions filed a group led by former
Makati City regional trial court (RTC) Judge Oscar B. Pimentel and group of
intervenors led by April D. Caballero. PhiLSAT examinations were conducted by LEB
in April 2017, September 2017, April 2018, and September 2018. Based on LEB’s
Memorandum No. 7, schoolyear 2017-2018 was the pilot year for PhiLSAT but law
schools were allowed to enroll students who took the examinations but did not pass

14 | P a g e
the tests. The memorandum issued in 2016 provided for mechanisms to a day’s
aptitude test to gauge the academic potentials of an examinee who wants to enroll in
law schools. On top of the abolition of LEB and PhiLSAT, Pimentel’s group also
sought the transfer of the regulation of law schools to the SC.

The LEB was created under Republic Act No. 7662, known as the Legal Education
Reform Act of 1993, as an agency separate from the Department of Education, but
attached to it only for budgetary purposes and administrative support. Among the
powers vested in the LEB by the law were the administration of legal education
system in the country, supervision of law schools, setting of standards for
accreditation of law schools, prescription of minimum standards for law admission
and minimum qualifications and compensation to faculty members.

Days before the conduct of the first PhiLSAT in 2017, Pimentel’s group filed a
petition with the SC seeking to declare unconstitutional the creation of the LEB and
to invalidate all the issuances of the board, particularly the admission test for law
students. The group said the functions of the LEB under the law that created it are
encroachments on the rule-making power of the SC concerning admissions to the
practice of law. On March 12, 2019, the SC issued a TRO pleaded by Pimentel’s
group on the issue on PhiLSAT. Among other things, the SC ruled that:
1. ―The PhiLSAT presently operates not only as a measure of an applicant’s
aptitude for law school. The PhiLSAT, as a pass or fail exam, dictates upon
the law schools who among the examinees are to be admitted to any law
program.
2. ―When the PhiLSAT is used to exclude, qualify, and restrict admissions to
law schools, as its present design mandates, the PhiLSAT goes beyond mere
supervision and regulation, violates institutional academic freedom, becomes
unreasonable and therefore, unconstitutional.‖

Also declared unconstitutional for encroaching on the power of the SC were:

1. Section 2, paragraph 2 of RA 7662 insofar as it unduly includes ―continuing
legal education‖ as an aspect of legal education which is made subject to
executive supervision and control.
2. Section 3(a)(2) of RA 7662 and Section 7(2) of LEBMO No. 1-2011 on the
objective of legal education to increase awareness among members of the
legal profession of the needs of the poor, deprived and oppressed sectors of
society.
3. Section 7(g) of RA 7662 and Section 11(g) of LEBMO No. 1-2011 insofar as it
gives the LEB the power to establish a law practice internship as a
requirement for taking the bar.
4. Section 7(h) of RA 7662 and Section 11 (h) LEBMO No. 1-2011 insofar as it
gives the LEB the power to adopt a system of mandatory continuing legal
education and to provide for the mandatory attendance of practicing lawyers
in such courses and for such duration as it may deem necessary.

C. AUTHORITY OF ATTORNEY TO APPEAR

Villahermosa v. Caracol (A.C. No. 7325, 21 January 2015)

15 | P a g e
D. APPEARANCE OF NON-LAWYERS

Bulacan v. Torcino (G.R. No. L-144388, 30 January 1985)

FACTS: A complaint for forcible entry and damages with preliminary mandatory
injunction was filed with the Municipal Court of Baybay, Leyte by Victoriano Bulacan
against Faustino Torcino and Felipa Torcino. The complaint was signed by Nicolas
Nuñes, Jr., "Friend counsel for the Plaintiff". Due to the failure of the parties to settle
their case amicably, the court rendered a decision ordering the Torcinos to demolish
and remove the portion of their house which was illegally constructed on the land of
the plaintiff. The Torcinos appealed the decision to the Court of First Instance of
Leyte.

On September 18, 1973, the appellants Torcinos filed a motion to dismiss the
complaint on the ground that the complaint was not signed by the plaintiff or by an
admitted attorney, and therefore must be considered as sham and false. The Court
of First Instance of Leyte denied the motion to dismiss. A motion for reconsideration
was denied for lack of merit. The Court of Appeals sustained the decision on the
ground that no testimonial or oral evidence was presented by the parties and,
therefore, no factual matters are in issue in the appeal.

ISSUE: Whether a non-member of the BAR, a friend of the plaintiff, can be

designated to prepare and sign a complaint for the plaintiff.

RULING:

Cruz v. Mina (G.R. No. 154207, 27 April 2007)

FACTS: Ferdinand A. Cruz filed before the MeTC a formal Entry of Appearance, as
private prosecutor, where his father, Mariano Cruz, is the complaining witness. The
petitioner, describing himself as a third year law student, justifies his appearance as
private prosecutor on the bases of Section 34 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court and
the ruling of the Court En Banc in Cantimbuhan v. Judge Cruz, Jr. that a non-lawyer
may appear before the inferior courts as an agent or friend of a party litigant. The
petitioner furthermore avers that his appearance was with the prior conformity of the
public prosecutor and a written authority of Mariano Cruz appointing him to be his
agent in the prosecution of the said criminal case.

However, in an Order dated February 1, 2002, the MeTC denied permission for
petitioner to appear as private prosecutor on the ground that Circular No. 19
governing limited law student practice in conjunction with Rule 138-A of the Rules of
Court (Law Student Practice Rule) should take precedence over the ruling of the
Court laid down in Cantimbuhan; and set the case for continuation of trial.

ISSUE: Whether the petitioner, a law student, may appear before an inferior court as
an agent or friend of a party litigant

RULING: The rule, however, is different if the law student appears before an inferior
court, where the issues and procedure are relatively simple. In inferior courts, a law

16 | P a g e
student may appear in his personal capacity without the supervision of a lawyer.
Section 34, Rule 138 provides:

Sec. 34. By whom litigation is conducted. — In the court of a justice of the peace, a
party may conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed
by him for that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In any other court, a party may
conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an attorney, and his appearance must be
either personal or by a duly authorized member of the bar.

Thus, a law student may appear before an inferior court as an agent or friend of a
party without the supervision of a member of the bar. (Emphasis supplied)

Kanlaon Construction Enterprises, Co. v. NLRC (G.R. No. 126625, 18

September 1997)

FACTS: Petitioner is a domestic corporation engaged in the construction business

nationwide with principal office at No. 11 Yakan St., La Vista Subdivision, Quezon
City. In 1988, petitioner was contracted by the National Steel Corporation to
construct residential houses for its plant employees in Steeltown, Sta. Elena, Iligan
City. Private respondents were hired by petitioner as laborers in the project and
worked under the supervision of Engineers Paulino Estacio and Mario Dulatre. In
1989, the project neared its completion and petitioner started terminating the
services of private respondents and its other employees.

In 1990, private respondents filed separate complaints against petitioner before Sub-
Regional Arbitration Branch XII, Iligan City. Numbering forty-one (41) in all, they
claimed that petitioner paid them wages below the minimum and sought payment of
their salary differentials and thirteenth-month pay. Engineers Estacio and Dulatre
were named co-respondents.

The preliminary conferences before the labor arbiters were attended by Engineers
Estacio and Dulatre and private respondents. At the conference of June 11, 1990
before Arbiter Siao, Engineer Estacio admitted petitioner’s liability to private
respondents and agreed to pay their wage differentials and thirteenth-month pay on
June 19, 1990. As a result of this agreement, Engineer Estacio allegedly waived
petitioner’s right to file its position paper. 1 Private respondents declared that they,
too, were dispensing with their position papers and were adopting their complaints
as their position paper.

Extension was denied by the LA Siao and ordered the employer company to pay the
employees. Petitioner appealed to respondent National Labor Relations
Commission. It alleged that it was denied due process and that Engineers Estacio
and Dulatre had no authority to represent and bind petitioner. NLRC affirmed the
decisions of the Labor Arbiters.

ISSUE: Whether Engineer Estacio was an agent and authorized representative of

petitioner.

17 | P a g e
RULING: It has been established that petitioner is a private domestic corporation
with principal address in Quezon City. The complaints against petitioner were filed in
Iligan City and summons served on Engineer Estacio in Iligan City. The question
now is whether Engineer Estacio was an agent and authorized representative of
petitioner.

Under the Revised Rules of Court, 7 service upon a private domestic corporation or
partnership must be made upon its officers, such as the president, manager,
secretary, cashier, agent, or any of its directors. These persons are deemed so
integrated with the corporation that they know their responsibilities and immediately
discern what to do with any legal papers served on them.

In the case at bar, Engineer Estacio, assisted by Engineer Dulatre, managed and
supervised the construction project. 9 According to the Solicitor General and private
respondents, Engineer Estacio attended to the project in Iligan City and supervised
the work of the employees thereat. As manager, he had sufficient responsibility and
discretion to realize the importance of the legal papers served on him and to relay
the same to the president or other responsible officer of petitioner. Summons for
petitioner was therefore validly served on him.

Engineer Estacio’s appearance before the labor arbiters and his promise to settle the
claims of private respondents is another matter. The general rule is that only lawyers
are allowed to appear before the labor arbiter and respondent Commission in cases
before them. The Labor Code and the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC,
nonetheless, lists three (3) exceptions to the rule, viz:

Sec. 6. Appearances. — . . . .
A non-lawyer may appear before the Commission or any Labor Arbiter only if:
(a) he represents himself as party to the case;
(b) he represents the organization or its members, provided that he shall be
made to present written proof that he is properly authorized; or
(c) he is a duly-accredited member of any legal aid office duly recognized by the
Department of Justice or the Integrated Bar of the Philippines in cases
referred thereto by the latter. . . .

A non-lawyer may appear before the labor arbiters and the NLRC only if: (a) he
represents himself as a party to the case; (b) he represents an organization or its
members, with written authorization from them: or (c) he is a duly-accredited
member of any legal aid office duly recognized by the Department of Justice or the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines in cases referred to by the latter.

Engineers Estacio and Dulatre were not lawyers. Neither were they duly-accredited
members of a legal aid office. Their appearance before the labor arbiters in their
capacity as parties to the cases was authorized under the first exception to the rule.
However, their appearance on behalf of petitioner required written proof of
authorization. It was incumbent upon the arbiters to ascertain this authority
especially since both engineers were named co-respondents in the cases before the
arbiters. Absent this authority, whatever statements and declarations Engineer
Estacio made before the arbiters could not bind petitioner.

18 | P a g e
Nevertheless, even assuming that Engineer Estacio and Atty. Abundiente were
authorized to appear as representatives of petitioner, they could bind the latter only
in procedural matters before the arbiters and respondent Commission. Petitioner’s
liability arose from Engineer Estacio’s alleged promise to pay. A promise to pay
amounts to an offer to compromise and requires a special power of attorney or the
express consent of petitioner. The authority to compromise cannot be lightly
presumed and should be duly established by evidence.

Sec. 7. Authority to bind party. — Attorneys and other representatives of parties shall
have authority to bind their clients in all matters of procedure; but they cannot,
without a special power of attorney or express consent, enter into a compromise
agreement with the opposing party in full or partial discharge of a client’s claim.

After petitioner’s alleged representative failed to pay the workers’ claims as

promised, Labor Arbiters Siao and Palangan did not order the parties to file their
respective position papers. The arbiters forthwith rendered a decision on the merits
without at least requiring private respondents to substantiate their complaints. The
parties may have earlier waived their right to file position papers but petitioner’s
waiver was made by Engineer Estacio on the premise that petitioner shall have paid
and settled the claims of private respondents at the scheduled conference. Since
petitioner reneged on its ―promise,‖ there was a failure to settle the case amicably.
This should have prompted the arbiters to order the parties to file their position
papers.

Sec. 3. Submission of Position Papers/Memorandum. — Should the parties fail to

agree upon an amicable settlement, in whole or in part, during the conferences, the
Labor Arbiter shall issue an order stating therein the matters taken up and agreed
upon during the conferences and directing the parties to simultaneously file their
respective verified position papers.

Rule 138-A, Law Student Practice (A.M. No. 19-03-24 SC)

Whereas, pursuant to the provisions of Section 5(5), Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution, the Supreme Court has the power to adopt and promulgate rules
concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice
and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar,
and legal assistance to the underprivileged;

Whereas, there is a need to amend the provisions of Rule 138-A to ensure access to
justice of the marginalized sectors, to enhance learning opportunities of law
students, to instill among them the value of legal professional social responsibility,
and to prepare them for the practice of law;

Whereas, there is a need to institutionalize clinical legal education program in all law
schools in order to enhance, improve, and streamline law student practice, and
regulate their limited practice of law; and

19 | P a g e
Whereas, to produce practice-ready lawyers, the completion of clinical legal
education courses must be a prerequisite to take the bar examinations as provided
in Section 5 of Rule 138.

Now, therefore, the Supreme Court En Banc hereby adopts and promulgates the
Revised Law Student Practice Rule.

The Revised Rule shall take effect at the start of the Academic Year 2020-2021
following its publication in two (2) newspapers of general circulation.

A.M. NO. 19-03-24-SC

RULE 138-A
LAW STUDENT PRACTICE

Section 1. Coverage. – This rule shall cover the limited practice of law by students
certified herein. The limited practice of law covers appearances, drafting, and
submission of pleadings and documents before trial and appellate courts and quasi-
judicial and administrative bodies, assistance in mediation and other alternative
modes of dispute resolution, legal counselling and advice, and such other activities
that may be covered by the Clinical Legal Education Program of the law school as
herein provided.

Section 2. Definition of Terms. –

(a) Clinical Legal Education Program is an experiential, interactive and reflective
credit-earning teaching course with the objectives of providing law students
with practical knowledge, skills and values necessary for the application of the
law, delivery of legal services and promotion of social justice and public
interest, especially to the marginalized, while inculcating in the students the
values of ethical lawyering and public service. It consists of learning activities
covered by this Rule undertaken in either a 1) law clinic or an 2) externship,
which shall incorporate the teaching of legal theory and doctrines, practical
skills, as well as legal ethics.
(b) Externship is part of the clinical legal educational program if: (a) it allows
students to engage in legal work for the marginalized sectors or for the
promotion of social justice and public interest, and b) it is undertaken with any
of the following: i) the courts, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP),
government offices; and (ii) law school-recognized non-governmental
organizations (NGOs).
(c) Law Clinic refers to an office or center which is a component of the law
school’s clinical legal education program that renders legal assistance and
services as herein provided to eligible persons, groups, and/or communities.
(d) Law Student Practitioner is a law student certified under Section 3 of this
Rule.
(e) Supervising Lawyer refers to a member of the Philippine Bar in good standing
who is authorized by the law school to supervise the law student practitioner
under this Rule.

Section 3. Eligibility Requirements of Law Student Practitioners. – No law student

shall be permitted to engage in any of the activities under the Clinical Legal

20 | P a g e
Education Program of a law school unless the law student has applied for and
secured the following certifications:
(a) Level 1 certification, for law students who have successfully completed their
first-year law courses; and/or
(b) Level 2 certification, for law students currently enrolled for the second
semester of their third-year law courses, Provided however, where a student
fails to complete all their third-year law courses, the Level 2 certification shall
be deemed automatically revoked.

The certification issued shall be valid until the student has completed the required
number of courses in the clinical legal education program to complete the law
degree, unless sooner revoked for grounds stated herein.

Section 4. Practice Areas of Law Student Practitioners. – Subject to the supervision

and approval, of a supervising lawyer, a certified law student practitioner may:

For Level 1 certification

(1) Interview prospective clients;
(2) Give legal advice to the client;
(3) Negotiate for and on behalf of the client;
(4) Draft legal documents such as affidavits, compromise agreements, contracts,
demand letter, position papers, and the like;
(5) Represent eligible parties before quasi-judicial or administrative bodies;
(6) Provide public legal orientation; and
(7) Assist in public interest advocacies for policy formulation and implementation.

For Level 2 certification

(1) Perform all activities under Level 1 Certification;
(2) Assist in the taking of depositions and/or preparing judicial affidavits of
witnesses;
(3) Appear on behalf of the client at any stage of the proceedings or trial, before
any court, quasi-judicial or administrative body;
(4) In criminal cases, subject to the provisions of Section 5, Rule 110 of the Rules
of Court, to appear on behalf of a government agency in the prosecution of
criminal actions; and
(5) In appealed cases, to prepare the pleadings required in the case.

Section 5. Certification Application Requirements. – The law student must submit a

duly-accomplished application form under oath in three (3) copies, accompanied by
proof of payment of the necessary legal and filing fees.

The law school, through the dean or the authorized representative, shall submit to
the Office of the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) having
jurisdiction over the territory where the law school is located, the duly-accomplished
application form together with an endorsement under oath.

Level 1 Certification
The Executive Judge of the RTC shall evaluate, approve, and issue the certification
within ten (10) days from receipt of the application.

21 | P a g e
The Level 1 certification issued under this provision shall be valid before all courts,
quasi-judicial and administrative bodies within the judicial region where the school is
located.

Level 2 Certification
Within ten (10) days from receipt of the application, the Executive Judge of the RTC
shall (a) evaluate the application together with its attachments, and (b) recommend
to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) the approval and issuance of the
certification. If the Executive Judge finds the application to be incomplete, the law
school shall be notified and required to comply with the requirements within five (5)
days from receipt of notice.

The Level 2 certification issued under this provision shall be valid before all courts,
quasi-judicial, and administrative bodies.

Section 6. Duties of Law Student Practitioners. – Acting under a certification, the law
student shall:
(a) Observe the provisions of Section 24(b), Rule 130 of the Rules of Court;
(b) Be prohibited from using information acquired in one’s capacity as a law
student practitioner for personal or commercial gain;
(c) Perform the duties and responsibilities to the best of one’s abilities as a law
student practitioner; and
(d) Strictly observe the Canons of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Section 7. Use of Law Student Practitioner’s Name. – A law student practitioner may
sign briefs, pleadings, letters, and other similar documents which the student has
produced under the direction of the supervising lawyer, indicating the law student
practitioner’s certificate number as required under this Rule.

Section 8. Law Student Practitioner’s Oath/Affirmation. – A law student who has

been issued a certificate under this Rule must, before performing the activities
allowed herein, take an oath in the following form:

"I, (name), having been granted a certificate of law student practice by the Supreme
court under Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will
maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, I will support the Constitution
and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities
therein; I will do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; I will not
wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, or give aid
nor consent to the same; I will delay no man for money or malice, and will conduct
myself as a certified law student practitioner according to the best of my knowledge
and discretion, with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to the parties I represent;
and I impose upon myself these voluntary obligations without any mental reservation
or purpose of evasion. So help me God."

Section 9. Duties of Law Schools. – The law school, through its dean or authorized
representative, must:
(a) Develop and adopt a Clinical Legal Education Program;
(b) Develop and establish at least one law clinic in its school;

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 (c) Endorse qualified students for certification as law student practitioner under
this Rule. Such endorsement shall constitute as a certification that the dean or
authorized representative knows that the applicant is a student enrolled in the
Clinical Legal Education Course, possesses good moral character, and has
met the requirements of Section 3 of this Rule; and
(d) Ensure compliance by law student practitioners and supervising lawyers with
the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Section 10. Qualification of Supervising Lawyers. – A supervising lawyer under this

Rule shall be a member of the bar in good standing.

Section 11. Duties of Supervising Lawyers. – The following are the duties of a
supervising lawyer:
(a) Supervise such number of certified law student practitioners as far as
practicable;
(b) Personally appear with the law student practitioner in all cases pending before
the second-level courts and in all other cases the supervising lawyer
determines that his or her presence is required;
(c) Assume personal responsibility for any work performed by the certified law
student practitioner while under his or her supervision;
(d) Assist and advise the certified law student practitioner in the activities
authorized by these rules and review such activities with the certified law
student practitioner, all to the extent required for the proper practical training
of the certified law student practitioner and the protection of the client;
(e) Read, approve, and personally sign any pleadings, briefs or other similar
documents prepared by the certified law student practitioner prior to the filing
thereof, and read and approve any documents which shall be prepared by the
certified law student practitioner for execution by the eligible party; and
(f) Provide the level of supervision to the certified law student practitioner
required by these rules.

Section 12. Clinical Faculty. – Law schools shall have such number of faculty
members to teach clinical legal education courses as may be necessary to comply
with this Rule.

Section 13. Sanctions. – (a) Without prejudice to existing laws, rules, regulations,
and circulars, the following shall be considered as unauthorized practice of law by a
certified law student practitioner –
i. Engaging in any of the acts provided in Section 4 of this Rule without the
necessary certification or without the consent and supervision of the
supervising lawyer;
ii. Making false representations in the application for certification;
iii. Using an expired certification to engage in the limited practice of law under this
Rule;
iv. Rendering legal services outside the scope of practice areas allowed under
Section 4 of this Rule;
v. Asking for or receiving payment or compensation for services rendered under
the Clinical Legal Education Program as provided in this Rule; and
vi. Such other analogous circumstances.

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Unauthorized practice of law shall be ground for revocation of the law student
practitioner’s certification and/or disqualification for a law student from taking the bar
examination for a period to be determined by the Supreme Court.

(b) The above provisions notwithstanding, any act constituting a violation of the Code
of Professional Responsibility shall subject the supervising lawyer, Clinical Legal
Education Program head, and/or law school dean to disciplinary action, as the
circumstances may warrant.

Section 14. Effectivity. – This rule shall take effect at the start of Academic year
2020-2021 following its publication in two (2) newspapers of general circulation. The
requirements under second paragraph of Section 5, Rule 138 as amended by A.M.
No. 19-03-24-SC dated June 25, 2019 shall apply to bar examination applicants
commencing the 2023 bar examinations.

June 25, 2019, Manila, Philippines.

E. PUBLIC OFFICIALS

Fajardo v. Alvarez (A.C. No. 9018, 20 April 2016)

FACTS: Complainant Teresita P. Fajardo (Teresita) was the Municipal Treasurer of

San Leonardo, Nueva Ecija. She hired respondent Atty. Nicanor C. Alvarez (Atty.
Alvarez) to defend her in criminal and administrative cases before the Office of the
Ombudsman. Atty. Alvarez was then working in the Legal Section of the National
Center for Mental Health. He asked for P1,400,000.00 as acceptance fee. However,
Atty. Alvarez did not enter his appearance before the Office of the Ombudsman nor
sign any pleadings.

Atty. Alvarez assured Teresita that he had friends connected with the Office of the
Ombudsman who could help with dismissing her case for a certain fee. Atty. Alvarez
said that he needed to pay the amount of P500,000.00 to his friends and
acquaintances working at the Office of the Ombudsman to have the cases against
Teresita dismissed. However, just two (2) weeks after Teresita and Atty. Alvarez
talked, the Office of the Ombudsman issued a resolution and decision
recommending the filing of a criminal complaint against Teresita, and her dismissal
from service, respectively.

Teresita then demanded that Atty. Alvarez return at least a portion of the amount she
gave. Atty. Alvarez promised to return the amount to Teresita; however, he failed to
fulfill this promise.[9] Teresita sent a demand letter to Atty. Alvarez, which he failed
to heed.

ISSUES:
1. Whether respondent Atty. Nicanor C. Alvarez, as a lawyer working in the
Legal Section of the National Center for Mental Health under the Department
of Health, is authorized to engage in the private practice of law;
2. Whether the amount charged by respondent for attorney's fees is reasonable
under the principle of quantum meruit.

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RULING: We find that respondent committed unauthorized practice of his
profession. Respondent practiced law even if he did not sign any pleading. In the
context of this case, his surreptitious actuations reveal illicit intent. Not only did he do
unauthorized practice, his acts also show badges of offering to peddle influence in
the Office of the Ombudsman. In this case, respondent was given written permission
by the Head of the National Center for Mental Health, whose authority was
designated under Department of Health Administrative Order No. 21, series of 1999.
However, by assisting and representing complainant in a suit against the
Ombudsman and against government in general, respondent put himself in a
situation of conflict of interest.

Respondent's practice of profession was expressly and impliedly conditioned on the

requirement that his practice will not be "in conflict with the interest of the Center and
the Philippine government as a whole. There is basic conflict of interest here.
Respondent is a public officer, an employee of government. The Office of the
Ombudsman is part of government. By appearing against the Office of the
Ombudsman, respondent is going against the same employer he swore to serve.
Likewise, we find that respondent violated the Lawyer's Oath and the Code of
Professional Responsibility when he communicated to or, at the very least, made it
appear to complainant that he knew people from the Office of the Ombudsman who
could help them get a favorable decision in complainant's case.

Thus, respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility. Canon 1, Rules

1.01, and 1.02[78] prohibit lawyers from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or
deceitful conduct.[79] Respondent's act of ensuring that the case will be dismissed
because of his personal relationships with officers or employees in the Office of the
Ombudsman is unlawful and dishonest. Canon 7[80] of the Code of Professional
Responsibility requires lawyers to always "uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal
profession."

In relation, Canon 13[81] mandates that lawyers "shall rely upon the merits of his [or
her] cause and refrain from any impropriety which tends to influence, or gives the
appearance of influencing the court." A lawyer that approaches a judge to try to gain
influence and receive a favorable outcome for his or her client violates Canon 13 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility. Nevertheless, as found by the Investigating
Commissioner and as shown by the records, we rule that there is enough proof to
hold respondent guilty of influence peddling.

Respondent Arty. Nicanor C. Alvarez is guilty of violating the Code of Conduct and
Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees, the Lawyer's Oath, and the
Code of Professional Responsibility. He is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for
one (1) year with a WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be
dealt with more severely. Respondent is ORDERED to return the amount of
P500,000.00 with legal interest to complainant Teresita P. Fajardo.

PRINCIPLES: Lawyers are mandated to uphold, at all times, integrity and dignity in
the practice of their profession.[76] Respondent violated the oath he took when he
proposed to gain a favorable outcome for complainant's case by resorting to his
influence among staff... in the Office where the case was pending.

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Lingan v. Calubaquib (A.C. No. 5377, 30 June 2014)

FACTS: In the resolution dated June 15, 2006, this court found Attys. Romeo I.
Calubaquib and Jimmy P. Baliga guilty of violating Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and of the Lawyer’s Oath. Respondents allowed their
secretaries to notarize documents in their stead, in violation of Sections 245 and 246
of the Notarial Law. This court suspended respondents from the practice of law for
one year, revoked their notarial commissions, and disqualified them from
reappointment as notaries public for two years.

Complainant Victor C. Lingan filed his motion for reconsideration, praying that
respondents be disbarred, not merely suspended from the practice of law. In the
resolution dated September 6, 2006, this court denied complainant Lingan’s motion
for reconsideration for lack of merit.

On March 22, 2007, Atty. Baliga, also the Regional Director of the Commission on
Human Rights Regional Office for Region II, filed the undatedex parte clarificatory
pleading with leave of court. In his ex parte clarificatory pleading, Atty. Baliga alleged
that on July 14, 2006, complainant Lingan wrote the Commission on Human Rights.
Lingan requested the Commission to investigate Atty. Baliga following the latter’s
suspension from the practice of law.

After this court had suspended Atty. Baliga from the practice of law, the Commission
on Human Rights En Banc issued the resolution dated January 16, 2007,
suspending him from his position as Director/Attorney VI of the Commission on
Human Rights Regional Office for Region II. According to the Commission on
Human Rights En Banc, Atty. Baliga’s suspension from the practice of law
―prevented] [him] from assuming his post [as Regional Director] for want of eligibility
in the meantime that his authority to practice law is suspended.‖

Atty. Baliga argued that he cannot be suspended for acts not connected with his
functions as Commission on Human Rights Regional Director. According to Atty.
Baliga, his suspension from the practice of law did not include his suspension from
public office. He prayed for clarification of this court’s resolution dated June 15, 2006
―to prevent further injury and prejudice to [his] rights.‖

As to Atty. Baliga’s claim that he did not practice law while he held his position as
Regional Director and only performed generally managerial functions, complainant
Lingan countered that Atty. Baliga admitted to defying the order of suspension. Atty.
Baliga admitted to performing the functions of a ―lawyer-manager,‖ which under the
landmark case of Cayetano v. Monsod constituted practice of law. Complainant
Lingan reiterated that the position of Regional Director/Attorney VI requires the
officer ―to be a lawyer [in] good standing.‖ Moreover, as admitted by Atty. Baliga, he
had supervision and control over Attorneys III, IV, and V Being a ―lawyer-manager,‖
Atty. Baliga practiced law while he held his position as Regional Director.

The Commission on Human Rights filed its comment dated November 27, 2009. It
argued that ―the penalty imposed upon Atty. Baliga as a member of the bar is
separate and distinct from any penalty that may be imposed upon him as a public
official for the same acts.‖ According to the Commission, Atty. Baliga’s suspension

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from the practice of law is a ―bar matter‖ while the imposition of penalty upon a
Commission on Human Rights official ―is an entirely different thing, falling as it does
within the exclusive authority of the [Commission as] disciplining body.‖
Nevertheless, the Commission manifested that it would defer to this court’s
resolution of the issue and would ―abide by whatever ruling or decision [this court]
arrives at on [the] matter.‖

ISSUES:
1. WON the duties of a Regional Director of CHR constitutes practice of law.
2. WON the CHR has the power to reinstate Atty. Baliga despite the fact that he
is still suspended in the practice of law.

RULING:

(1) YES. The Commission on Human Rights is an independent office created under
the Constitution with power to investigate ―all forms of human rights violations
involving civil and political rights[.]‖ It is divided into regional offices with each office
having primary responsibility to investigate human rights violations in its territorial
jurisdiction. Each regional office is headed by the Regional Director who is given the
position of Attorney VI.

Under the Guidelines and Procedures in the Investigation and Monitoring of Human
Rights Violations and Abuses, and the Provision of CHR Assistance, the Regional
Director has the following powers and functions:
a. To administer oaths or affirmations with respect to ―[Commission on Human
Rights] matters;‖
b. To issue mission orders in their respective regional offices;
c. To conduct preliminary evaluation or initial investigation of human rights
complaints in the absence of the legal officer or investigator;
d. To conduct dialogues or preliminary conferences among parties and discuss
―immediate courses of action and protection remedies and/or possible
submission of the matter to an alternative dispute resolution‖;
e. To issue Commission on Human Rights processes, including notices, letter-
invitations, orders, or subpoenas within the territorial jurisdiction of the
regional office; and
f. To review and approve draft resolutions of human rights cases prepared by
the legal officer.

These powers and functions are characteristics of the legal profession. Oaths and
affirmations are usually performed by members of the judiciary and notaries public —
officers who are necessarily members of the bar. Investigating human rights
complaints are performed primarily by the Commission’s legal officer. Discussing
immediate courses of action and protection remedies and reviewing and approving
draft resolutions of human rights cases prepared by the legal officer require the use
of extensive legal knowledge.

The exercise of the powers and functions of a Commission on Human Rights

Regional Director constitutes practice of law. Thus, the Regional Director must be an
attorney — a member of the bar in good standing and authorized to practice law.
When the Regional Director loses this authority, such as when he or she is disbarred

27 | P a g e
or suspended from the practice of law, the Regional Director loses a necessary
qualification to the position he or she is holding. The disbarred or suspended lawyer
must desist from holding the position of Regional Director.

(2) NO. The Commission on Human Rights erred in issuing the resolution dated April
13, 2007. This resolution caused Atty. Baliga to reassume his position as Regional
Director/Attorney VI despite lack of authority to practice law.

We remind the Commission on Human Rights that we have the exclusive jurisdiction
to regulate the practice of law. The Commission cannot, by mere resolutions and
other issuances, modify or defy this court’s orders of suspension from the practice of
law. Although the Commission on Human Rights has the power to appoint its officers
and employees, it can only retain those with the necessary qualifications in the
positions they are holding.

Javallana v. DILG (G.R. No. 102549, 10 August 1992)

FACTS: Attorney Erwin B. Javellana was an elected City Councilor of Bago City,
Negros Occidental. On October 5, 1989, City Engineer Ernesto C. Divinagracia filed
Administrative Case No. C-10-90 against Javellana for: (1) violation of Department of
Local Government (DLG) Memorandum Circular No. 80-38 dated June 10, 1980 in
relation to DLG Memorandum Circular No. 74-58 and of Section 7, paragraph b, No.
2 of Republic Act No. 6713, otherwise known as the ―Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and Employees,‖ and (2) for oppression, misconduct
and abuse of authority.

Divinagracia’s complaint alleged that Javellana, an incumbent member of the City

Council or Sanggunian Panglungsod of Bago City, and a lawyer by profession, has
continuously engaged in the practice of law without securing authority for that
purpose from the Regional Director, Department of Local Government, as required
by DLG Memorandum Circular No. 80-38 in relation to DLG Memorandum Circular
No. 74-58 of the same department; that on July 8, 1989, Javellana, as counsel for
Antonio Javiero and Rolando Catapang, filed a case against City Engineer Ernesto
C. Divinagracia of Bago City for ―Illegal Dismissal and Reinstatement with Damages‖
putting him in public ridicule; that Javellana also appeared as counsel in several
criminal and civil cases in the city, without prior authority of the DLG Regional
Director, in violation of DLG Memorandum Circular No. 80-38.

On August 13, 1990, a formal hearing of the complaint was held in Iloilo City in which
the complainant, Engineer Divinagracia, and the respondent, Councilor Javellana,
presented their respective evidence. Meanwhile, on September 10, 1990, Javellana
requested the DLG for a permit to continue his practice of law for the reasons stated
in his letter-requesT. On September 21, 1991, Secretary Luis T. Santos issued
Memorandum Circular No. 90-81 setting forth guidelines for the practice of
professions by local elective officials.

In an order dated May 2, 1991, Javellana’s motion to dismiss was denied by the
public respondents. His motion for reconsideration was likewise denied on June 20,

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1991. Five months later or on October 10, 1991, the Local Government Code of
1991 (RA 7160) was signed into law, Section 90 of which provides:

Sec. 90. Practice of Profession. —

(a) All governors, city and municipal mayors are prohibited from practicing their
profession or engaging in any occupation other than the exercise of their
functions as local chief executives.
(b) Sanggunian members may practice their professions, engage in any
occupation, or teach in schools except during session hours: Provided, That
sanggunian members who are members of the Bar shall not:
1. Appear as counsel before any court in any civil case wherein a local
government unit or any office, agency, or instrumentality of the
government is the adverse party;
2. Appear as counsel in any criminal case wherein an officer or employee of
the national or local government is accused of an offense committed in
relation to his office;
3. Collect any fee for their appearance in administrative proceedings
involving the local government unit of which he is an official; and
4. Use property and personnel of the Government except when the
sanggunian member concerned is defending the interest of the
Government.
(c) Doctors of medicine may practice their profession even during official hours
of work only on occasions of emergency: Provided, That the officials
concerned do not derive monetary compensation therefrom.

ISSUE: Whether or not DLG Memorandum Circulars Nos. 80-38 and 90-81 are
unconstitutional because the Supreme Court has the sole and exclusive authority to
regulate the practice of law

RULING: No. Petitioner’s contention that Section 90 of the Local Government Code
of 1991 and DLG Memorandum Circular No. 90-81 violate Article VIII, Section 5 of
the Constitution is completely off tangent. Neither the statute nor the circular
trenches upon the Supreme Court’s power and authority to prescribe rules on the
practice of law. The Local Government Code and DLG Memorandum Circular No.
90-81 simply prescribe rules of conduct for public officials to avoid conflicts of
interest between the discharge of their public duties and the private practice of their
profession, in those instances where the law allows it.

Spouses Eustaquio v. Navales (A.C. No. 10465, 8 June 2016)

FACTS: Complainants alleged that they are the owners of an apartment located at
4-D Cavite St., Barangay Paltok, SFDM, Quezon City, which they leased to
respondent under a Contract of Lease dated April 16, 2005. However, respondent
violated the terms and conditions of the aforesaid contract when he failed to pay
monthly rentals in the aggregate amount of P139,000.00 and to vacate the leased
premises despite repeated oral and written demands. This prompted complainants to
refer the matter to barangay conciliation, where the parties agreed on an amicable
settlement, whereby respondent promised to pay complainants the amount of
P131,000.00 on July 16, 2009 and to vacate the leased premises on July 31, 2009.

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Respondent eventually reneged on his obligations under the settlement agreement,
constraining complainants to file an ejectment case against him before the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Quezon City, Branch 40 (MeTC-Br. 40), docketed
as Civil Case No. 09-39689. Further, complainants filed the instant case before the
Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP),
contending that respondent miserably failed to exemplify honesty, integrity, and
respect for the laws when he failed and refused to fulfil his obligations to
complainants.

Despite notices, respondent failed to file his Answer, to appear in the mandatory
conference, and to file his position paper. Meanwhile, the MeTC-Br. 40 promulgated
a Decision dated December 8, 2009 in the ejectment case in favor of the
complainants and, accordingly, ordered respondent to vacate the leased premises
and to pay complainants the following amounts: (a) P139,000.00 representing
unpaid rentals as of July 2009; (b) further rental payments of P8,000.00 per month
starting August 17, 2009 until the actual surrender of said premises to complainants;
(c) attorney's fees in the amount of P20,000.00; and (d) cost of suit. During the
pendency of the case, respondent was appointed as an Assistant City Public
Prosecutor of Quezon City.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent should be held administratively liable.

RULING: In the instant case, the OBC correctly pointed out that the Court's
Resolution dated September 15, 2014 suspending respondent from the practice of
law for a period of six (6) months became final and executory fifteen (15) days after
respondent received a copy of the same on October 16, 2014. Thus, respondent
should have already commenced serving his six (6)-month suspension. However,
respondent never heeded the suspension order against him as he continued
discharging his functions as an Assistant City Prosecutor for Quezon City, as
evidenced by the Certification issued by MeTC-Br. 38 stating that respondent has
been appearing before it as an Assistant City Prosecutor since September 2014 up
to the present.

Verily, a plain reading of the foregoing provision evidently shows that the
government office of Assistant City Prosecutor requires its holder to be authorized to
practice law. Hence, respondent's continuous discharge of his functions as such
constitutes practice of law and, thus, a clear defiance of the Court's order of
suspension against him.

As a final note, it must be stressed that "[d]isbarment of lawyers is a proceeding that

aims to purge the law profession of unworthy members of the bar. It is intended to
preserve the nobility and honor of the legal profession. While the Supreme Court has
the plenary power to discipline erring lawyers through this kind of proceedings, it
does so in the most vigilant manner so as not to frustrate its preservative principle.
The Court, in the exercise of its sound judicial discretion, is inclined to impose a less
severe punishment if, through it, the end desire of reforming the errant lawyer is
possible."

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Edgar R. Navales is found GUILTY of violating

Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. Accordingly, he is SUSPENDED from the

30 | P a g e
practice of law for an additional period of six (6) months from his original six (6)-
month suspension, totalling one (1) year from service of this Decision, with a STERN
WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more
severely.

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