JACKSON P. HERSHBELL and STEPHEN A.

NIMIS

NIETZSCHE AND HERACLITUS

Heraclitus' influence on Nietzsche has often been recognized. According

to W. Nestle, for example, Heraclitus and Democritus are the two Presocra-
dcs who influenced Nietzsche most strongly ("die auf Nietzsche am stärksten
eingewirkt haben"),1 and general works on Nietzsche's philosophy invariably
make some reference to the similarity of his thought and that of Heraclitus;
but seldom has the relationship been examined in any detail. Thus, although
Nestle, E. Fink, W. Kaufmann, A. H. J. Knight, M. A. Mügge, and
R. Pfeffer, all refer briefly to some basic points of contact,2 none of them
gives an adequate account, including the Nachklänge of Heraclitus' sayings in
many of Nietzsche's expression.3 Moreover, except for A. H. J. Knight's
discussion of Nietzsche's doctrine of Eternal Recurrence of the Same, there
have been few critical attempts to evaluate Nietzsche's understanding of
Heraclitus. Oehler's sections on Heraclitus in his Nietzsche und die Vorso-
kratiker were an attempt to be more exhaustive.4 But although Oehler saw
several major connections between Nietzsche and Heraclitus, his study is still
inadequate for several reasons. First, Oehler disregarded the development of
Nietzsche's philosophy; second, he had a predilection for quoting
indiscriminately from Nietzsche's notes rather than from his finished works,
1
W. Ncsde, „Friedrich Nietzsche und die griechische Philosophie", Neue Jahrbücher für
Pädagogik 30 (1912), p. 568.
2
See E. Fink, Nietzsche* Philosophie (Stuttgart, t960); W. Kaufmann, Nietzsche: Philosopher,
Psychologist, Antichrist (New York, 3rd cdition, 1968); A. H. J. Knight, Some Aspects ofthe
Life and Work of Nietzsche^ and Particularly of his Connection with Greek Literaturc and
Thought (New York, repr. 1967), esp. pp. lOOff.j . A. Mügge, Friedrich Nietzsche: his Life
and hu Works (London, 1911); R. Pfeffer, Nietzsche: DisapU of Dionysus (Lewisberg, 1972),
csp. pp. 170ff. Hie List could no doubt be iengthened.
3
Ncsde, Neue Jahrbücher 30 (1912), p, 568, che$ the following examples: "ihr hattet euch
noch nicht gesucht,** Nietzsches Werke (C G. Naumann Taschenausgabe, Leipzig: 1906)t
VII, US: cf, DK 101; "ich peitsche euch mit der Gcissel Gott*s" (VH, 346): cf. DK 11; Hdcr
Mcnsdi .Affc Gottes'" (IV, 199): cf. DK 83. R. Oehler, Friedrich Nietzsche und die Vor-
sokratikcr (Leipzig, 1904), also lists others»
4
R^Öchlcr, Nietzscbt, c$p. pp, 62-72 and 123-131. We concur wich W. Kaufmann'*
assessmcnt of this wurk in his Nietzschet p* 402 n. 14. According to Kaufmann, Oehlcr's
work Mdepend$ on a tendentious icleaion of fragmcntary quotations, tom from thcir
18 Jackson P. Hershbcil and Stephen A. Nimis

thus obviating any sort of context within which one could unterstand the
influence of Hcraclitus. For example, Oehler's Suggestion that "das ewige
Werden" was a pari of Nietzsche's thought in 1862, "in einer Zeit wo ihn die
Aussprüche des ephesinischen Philosophen vielleicht noch unbekannt
waren,"5 is misleading in view of the metaphysics of Die Geburt der
Tragödie (1870—71). Although Oehler's work is valuable for the many
references and word echoes he lists, it is neither complete nor wholly
accurate. Oehler also does not deal with the importance of mid-nineteenth
Century philology and Nietzsche's understanding of Heraclitus.6 Thus a re-
examination of Nietzsche and Heraclitus is needed.
Such an undertaking is, of course, difficult owing to the obscurity of
Heraclitus* own thought which is known to us,only through fragments of his
work, the Interpretation of which often involves considerable disagreement
among scholars. Yet recent studies seem to provide a more solid basis for
understanding the "riddler" of antiquity, and for determining the extent to
which Nietzsche seems to have understood Heraclitus.7 The subtle, often
cryptic, writings of Nietzsche also offer no small amount of difficulties, and
the temptation to make an oversimplified or overly systematic comparison
must be avoided. One specific problem in Interpretation arises from the fact
that most of Nietzsche's explicit references to Heraclitus come from his early
philological work. In the deveiopment of Nietzsche's thought this is an early
stage, before the Will to Power, the Übermensch and the Eternal Recurrence
of the Same. These references, therefore, do not always represent the
enduring significance of Heraclitus for Nietzsche's writings. In this study/
Heraclitus' thought will be compared with Nietzsche's ripe philosophy, and
note will be taken of the earlier references and of how Nietzsche's attitudes
changed.
Nietzsche's admiration for Heraclitus is well attested in his lectures on
the "dark" philosopher äs well äs in books and notes. At about the same time
äs Also sprach Zarathustra, Nietzsche jotted down: "Meine Vorfahren:
Heraklit, Empedocles, Spinoza, Goethe."8 In his lectures Nietzsche
designates Heraclitus äs one of the three pre-Platonic philosophers
embodying the "reinsten Typen." Pythagoras was "der Weise als religiöser

5
Oehler, Nietzsche, p. 130.
6
A good survey and discussion of nineteenth Century scholarship on Heraclitus can be found
in G. T. W. Patrick, The Fragments ofthe Work of Heraclittts of Ephestts (Baltimore, 1889),
pp. 1-55.
7
Some of the more important recent studies are those of W. K. C. Guthrie, A History of
Greek Philosophy, I ' (Cambridge, repr. with corrections 1962); and M. Marcovich,
Heraclitus: Greek Text with a short Commentary (Merida, Venezuela, 1967), For other
publications on Heraclitus, see E. Roussos, Heraklit-Bibliographie (Darmstadt, 1971).
6
MusA XIV, 109.
 Nietzsche ami Hcraditus 19

Reformator,*' Socrates "der Weise als der ewig und überall Suchende/1 and
Heraclitus was "der Weise als stolfc-einsamer Wahrhcitsfmder" (MusA IV.
296), In view of Nietzsche's own life and interests, it can be suspected that Kc
feit a special affinity to the "proud and loneiy truth finden"
The tradition about Heraclitus consistently represents him äs a haughty
misanthrope who kept to himself "iiving in mountains feeding on grass and
piants" (Diog. L. * 3), Although much of his biography is probabiy
apocryphal, many fragments reveal a general contempt fot the :
Of this Truth, real äs tt is, men ahvays prove to be unconiprchending, both
before they have heard it and whcn once they have heard it; for, althoxigh
all thmgs come to pass in acconlance with this Truth^ inen belicvc äs if
Ignorant (or unexperienced) each time they undertakc (or cxperiencc) eithcr
speech or dccds, ^4iereas I, for my part, expUin such wonls and thinps
taking apan each of them according to its real construction and thcn
shoxving how it is; äs for the rest of men, they remain unaware of whnt they
do after they vt^ake up just äs they forget what they do while a$Ieep
(DK t « M 1).»
Nietxsche's similar contempt for the **herd** is a major rnotif of hLs
philosophy. His repudiation of Democracy and Christianity is based on their
glorificadon of the "herd" instinct and on Nietxsche*s beiief that uwas
gemein sein kann, hat immer nur wenig Werth" (MusA XV. 58). Nietzsche
himself chose the "gute Einsamkeit, die freie muthwillige leichte Einsamkeit"
(MusA XV. 39) äs a requisite for phüosophifcing: ''Philosophie, wie ich sie
bisher verstanden und gelebt habe» ist das freiwillige Leben in Eis und Hoch-
gebirge — das Aufsuchen alles Fremden und Fragwürdigen im Dasein"
(MusA XXL 168). Oehler has pointed out the similarity between the
"orakelähnliche Sprüche0 of Heraclitus and the aphoristic style of the
"Dichter des Zarathustra."10 In fact, Zarathustra himself is not unlike Hera*
clttus, an interesting fact in view of the speculation by several prominent
nineteenth Century philologists on the influcncc of Zoroastrianism on Hera-

9
MarcovichV iransUtions of the fngmcnis of Hcraclitus arc uscd in thts Müdy. Tlic fra^tncni
numbcrs of Diels* cdition arc given Rrst. Thus DK » the fragmcnt numbcr in H. Dirk" Dir
Fragmente Jtr Vonokraukfr, cd. W, Kranz, I (ninth rdiüun, Bctliti, i960); M «* the
correspondiog fragmcnt numbcr in Marcovkh's cdition.
* Ochlcr, Nict&cht, p. 124. Oehler notes that the grcat classicat scholar, H, DicKf had
renurkcd on ihc similarity in hi$ Heraklatoi von Ephno* (Berlin, 1901), viii f- Diclü wrotc:
Hcraklit eröffnet also die Reihe der einsamen Menschen, welche ihre grübelnden,
wehverachtenden, sclbuhcwusstsn Gedanken in der dafür allein passenden Form dti.
Aphommus niedergelegt hjdxn. „Also sprach HcrakJcito&" begann aller Wahr^ihcui»
hchkett nach dieses Buch» „AUo sprach Zarathimra" ist der jüngste Spru&« dieser
viel gq*flcgun Gattung, dk mit dem Pcssimismu* eine innere VcrwandtKhait /dgt,
Oehkr notei, faowcver, that DicJs made an unfavorablc judgement o« Niei/^chcS phiJulopCÄl
^ility in h>s h%tredc> M%1svcnjdtait und Romantik/' to the Akademie der WtooucWttn /u
ikrfin on Januar)· 23, 19C2,
 20 Jackson P. Hershbell and Stephen A. Nimis

clitus.11 Nietzsche was probably aware of these speculations, though they are
not referred to in bis philological material on Heraclitus. Perhaps Heraclitus,
for whom "one man is worth a thousand if he is best" (DK 49 =M 98), is the
link between Nietzsche and Zarathustra.
A corollary to Heraclitus' view of the πολλοί is bis contempt for
πολυμαθία, "learning of many things" (i. e. collection of disparate and
unrelated facts), which he says "does not teach intelligence; if so it would
have taught Hesiod and Pythagoras" (DK 40 =M 16). Not πολυμαθία, but
"to know the thought by which all things are steered through all (ways)"
(DK 10 = M 25), is the one wise thing. In bis first polemic against "modern
culture" Nietzsche, too, states that "vieles Wissen und Gelernthaben ist aber
weder ein nothwendiges Mittel der Kultur, noch ein Zeichen derselben und
vertr gt sich n thigenfalls auf das beste mit dem Gegensatze der Kultur, der
Barbarei, das heisst: der Stillosigkeit oder dem chaotischen Durcheinander
aller Stile" (MusA VI. 135). In Die Philosophie im tragischen Zeitalter der
Griechen, philosophy is distinguished from science "durch dieses Ausw hlen
und Ausscheiden des Ungew hnlichen Erstaunlichen Schwierigen G tt-
lichen . .. ebenso wie sie durch das Hervorheben des Unn tzen sich gegen
die Klugheit abgrenzt/' Philosophy strives for "die gr sste Erkenntniss, vom
Wesen und Kern der Dinge" (MusA IV. 167).
In comparing what these two philosophers came to believe the "Wesen
und Kern der Dinge" is, it is necessary to investigate the relationship on the
lines Nietzsche himself suggested in his last completed work, Ecce homo:
Vor mir giebt es diese Umsetzung des Dionysischen in ein philosophisches"
Pathos nicht: es fehlt die tragische Weisheit, — ich habe vergebens nach An-
zeichen davon selbst bei den grossen Griechen der Philosophie, deiieii der
zwei Jahrhunderte vor Sokrates, gesucht. Ein Zweifel bleib mir zur ck bei
Heraklit, in dessen N he berhaupt mir w rmer, mir wohler zu Muthe
wird als irgendwo sonst. Die Bejahung des Vergehens und Vernichten*, das
Entscheidende in einer dionysischen Philosophie, das Jasagen zu Gegensatz
und Krieg, das Werden, mit radikaler Ablehnung auch selbst des Begriffs
„Sein" — darin muss ich unter allen Umst nden das mir Verwandteste aner-
kennen, was bisher gedacht worden ist. Die Lehre von der „ewigen
Wiederkunft", das heisst vom unbedingten und unendlich wiederholten
Kreislauf aller Dinge — diese Lehre Zarathustra's k nnte zuletzt auch schon
von Heraklit gelehrt worden sein. Zum Mindesten hat die Stoa, die fast alle
ihre grunds tzlichen Vorstellungen von Heraklit geerbt hat, Spuren
davon.12

11
See the discussion in M. L. West, Early Greek Philosophy and the Orient (Oxford, 1971),
esp. pp. 166—168. August Gladisch, for example, published Herakleitos und Zoroaster: eine
historische Untersuchung (Leipzig, 1859). West reviews the speculation in his chapter on
"Heraclitus und Persian Religion," pp. 165-202.
12
SA II, 1111 = MusA XXI, 227.
 Nietzsche and Heraclitus 21

This passage names four major points of contact in Nietzsche's perception of

the relationship: first, affirmation of passing away and destruction, second,
saying yes to war and Opposition, third, a radical repudiation of the very
concept of being, and lasdy, the eternal recurrence of all things. These four
points will be inspected within the context of the thought f each
philosopher, with attention given to Nietzsche's understanding of Heraclitus.
Heraclitus distinguishes himself from the Milesian philosophers by
refining their material monism* Although they differed on its exact nature,
Thaies, Anaximander, and Anaximenes, all seem to have believed in the
existence of a primary, originative "stuff" or substance which is the basis for
everything that exists. While keeping the idea of a single material constituent,
fire, Heraclitus discovered a unity in the structure and arrangement of things:
things whole and things not whole, something which is being brought to-
gether, something which is being brought apart, something which is in
tune, something which is out of tune; out of every thing there can be made
a unity, and out of this unity all things are made (DK 10 = M 25).

The formula of arrangement, the ordering principle of this unity is the

λόγος.13 As Kirk and Raven point out, before Plato no firm distinctions were
made between different modes of existence.14 An arrangement would not be
fully distinguished from the things arranged, but would be thought to possess
the same concreteness and reality s the things themselves. Thus Heraclitus'
λόγος was perhaps not distinguished existentially from fire, and was
probably considered an actual constituent of things. The revolution r^
insight of Heraclitus was to conceive of his monism not merely s material,
but also s a dynamic ordering principle. The effect of arrangement according
to a single common principle is that all things, although apparently plural and
disparate, are really united in a coherent complex:
If you have heard (and understood) not me but the Logos, it is wise to agree
that all things are one (DK 50 =M 26).

u
The meaning of λόγος in Heraclitus' fragmcnts has becn much discusscd. Λόγος has, of
cour&e, some eleven differem meanings in fifth Century Greek (see Guthriet Hutory, I, 419f.),
and M. L. Wcsi has reccntly challengcd the nodon that λόγος in Heraclitus refers to a cosmic
priocipie. FoUowiug H. W, j. Surig, he <rf>serves di t "ncithcr Plato nor Aristotle breathes a
word about a 'logos-doctrine;* and that therc is no mcntion of it either in the long or short
accouni of Hjeraclitus* teaching thai Diogenes derivcd from Theophrastus . . /* Early Grcek
Pbtlw&phy, pp. 124-25. But his argumcnt is not whoUy convincing when he ukes is$uc with
Kirk's Interpretation of DK 50 » M 26. His conclusion that "Herach'tu* is iclling men that
they should be pcrsuadcd not by his personal authorithy, but by the autonomous authoriry of
his argument" (tbid, pp. 125) sugge&ts dut he himself thinks λόγος means more lhan sirnply
Hcraditus* discounc,
14
See G. S. Kirk and J, E. Raven, The Prctocrttit Philowpben (Cambridge, 1957),
pp. 188 -89,
22 Jackson P. Hershbell *nd Stephcn A. Nimii

Hcraclitus puls forth empirical observations to support this proposition, and

hc is really the first Greek philosopher to give great attention to tbe relation-
ship of the "one" to the "many/'15
Fragment 61 represents an attempt to show that opposites are the same
relatively, since from different perspectives opposite valuations can be made
of the same object:
The sea is the most pure and the most polluted water: for fishes it is
drinkable and salutary, but for men it is undrinkable and destructive
(DK 61 » M 35).
Heraclitus apparently deduced from this a "connection," a "unity" between
pollution and cleanliness.16 He also argues that conditions Kke health and rest
are possible only in terms of their complemeptary opposites:
It is disease that makes health pleasant and good, hunger satiety, weariness
rest (DK 111=M44).
Thus in each category there are opposites that complement each other to
form a continuum which is at pnce a unity and a plurality:
As (one) and the same thing there exists in us living and dead, and the
waking and the sleeping, and young and old: for these things having
changed round are those, and those things having changed round are these
ones (DK 88 = M 41).
As a result of these and other observations, Heraclitus became convinced
that there is never any real division of opposites. Instead, .there is a "back
stretched connexion, s in the bow and the lyre" (DK 51 = M 27). This
image of the παλίντονος άρμονίη signifies how each pair of opposites is at,
the same time a unity and a plurality, tending together and apart, and how
the underlying unity is maintained by a tension which exists s a result of
their inevitable change from one extreme to the other. For this "change,"
which is the action and reaction between opposed substances, Heraclitus used
the metaphor of strife or war:
War is the father of all (beings) and king of all (DK 53 = M 29).
The immediate significance of this saying is unclear. According to
Marcovich, it is a social Illustration of the universality of war or πόλεμος, and
of the necessary differentiation of the Greek πόλις.17 But although
Marcovich sees it s a "social Illustration," he admits the fragment probably
has cosmic significance, that is, war is universal, operating in all things and
events. Indeed, a continuing strife is an essential aspect of the common
"arrangement," the λόγος, in all things. Certainly, DK 80,

15
See M. C. Stokes* excellem discussion of the one and the many in Heraclitus in his One
and Many in Presocratic Philosophy (Cambridge, Mass. 1971), pp. 86-108.
16
Gf. DK 9 = M 37, DK 13 = M 36, DK 58 = M 46, and DK 60' = M 33.
17
Marcovich, Heraclitus, p. 148.
 Nietzsche and Heraclitus 23

One must know that war is common and strife is justice and that all things
come to pass by strife and necessity (M 28),
is evidence that die end of strife would involve the surrender of unity and the
destruction of the cosmos (see Aristotle, Eth. Eud. 1235a 25). Here Hera-
clitus states that not only is strife necessary, but is also , the right way,
normal and just.18
This Interpretation is very significant for Nietzsche since it throws much
light on his use of die war metaphor. A movement in Nietzsche's philosophy
parallel to that of Heraclitus will now be traced, and it will be shown that
Nietxsche's emphasis on strife> far from being a political construction, is
similar to and no doubt influenced by Heraclitus* conception.
Like Heraclitus, Nietzsche believed that "all is one." He, too, saw a
basic unity in all things and posited a single directive, dynamic principle: der
Wille zur Macht:
Gesetzt endlich, dass es gelänge, unser gesammtes Triebleben als die Ausge-
staltung und Verzweigung Einer Grundform des Willens zu erklären —
nämlich des Willens zur Macht, wie es mein Satz ist —; gesetzt, dass man
alle organischen Funktionen auf diesen Willen zur Macht zurückführen
könnte und in ihm auch die Lösung des Problems der Zeugung und Er-
nährung — es ist Ein Problem — fände, so hätte man damit sich das Recht
verschafft, alle wirkende Kraft eindeutig zu bestimmen als: Wille zur
Macht. Die Welt von innen gesehen, die Welt auf ihren „intelligiblen
Charakter" hin bestimmt und bezeichnet - sie wäre eben „Wille zur
Macht" und nichts ausserdem. - (MusA XV. 52-3).
This monistic principle is envisaged äs the single connecting principle of
all things, making the cosmos a unity. Thus for Nietzsche the denial of an
absolute diviston of opposites is a significant motif. This motif is presaged in
the title of Jenseits von Gut und Böse where he wams against the seduction of
a language that continues "von Gegensätzen zu reden, wo es nur Grade und
mancherlei Feinheit der Stufen giebt" (MusA XV. 37). Paralleling Heraclitus'
perspectivism, Nietzsche suggests:
Man darf nämlich zweifeln, erstens, ob es Gegensätze überhaupt giebt, und
^weitcns, ob jene volkstümlichen Wertschätzungen und Werth-Gegen-
satze, auf welche die Mcuphysiker ihr Siegel gedruckt haben, nicht viel*
leicht nur Vordergrunds-Schätzungen sind» nur vorläufige Perspektiven»
vielleicht noch dazu aus einem Winkel heraus, vielleicht von Unten hinauf,
Frosch-Perspektiven gleichsam, um einen Ausdruck zu borgen, der den
Malern geläufig ist? ... Es wäre sogar noch möglich, dass was den Werth
jener guten und verehrten Dinge ausmacht, gerade darin bestünde, mit
jenen schlimmen, scheinbar entgegengesetzten Dingen auf verfängliche

** Marcovich thinks the reiercncc to i$ a poicmic with Mefiod« but hi$ dismissai of Kirk's
Interpretation of ("ehe right way" or "normal coursc 0i cvents") äs 44vaj;üc*f and
" scetro unju^dficd.
24 Jackson P. Hershbell and Stephen A. Nimis

Weise verwandt, verknüpft, verhäkelt, vielleicht gar wesensgleich zu sein.

Vielleicht! (MusA XV. 5-6).
These representative passages from Jenseits von Gut und Böse show that
Nietzsche conceived of the plurality of things äs a dynatnic unity. The
underlying principle is the Will to Power. The dynamic process is designated
by the not always clear notion of self-overcoming:
Und diess Geheimniss redete das Leben selber zu mir: „Siehe, sprach es, ich
bin Das, was sich immer selber überwinden muss .. . und wahrlich, wo es
Untergang giebt und Blätterfallen, siehe, da opfert sich Leben — um Macht!
Dass ich Kampf sein muss und Werden und Zweck und der Zwecke Wider-
spruch: ach, wer meinen Willen erräth, erräth wohl auch, auf welchen
krummen Wegen er gehen muss!" (MusA XIII. 148).
Without going into detail about the natur^/of these problemätic concepts
which Nietzsche never clearly defined, it is possible to abstract the essential
feature of self-overcoming, which is pointed to in the passage above: strife
and Opposition.
Nietzsche's emphasis on the negative is ä distinguishing feature of his
philosophy from the very beginning. In Die Geburt der Tragödie the great
achievements of the Greeks are attributed to their ability to turn obstacles to
their advantage: "wie viel musste dies Volk leiden, um so schön werden zu
können" (MusA III. 165). Homers Wettkampf, a fragment from about the
same time, is the beginning of a project that would have pursued even further
the importance of the in Greek life. This project along with some of the
conceptions developed in Die Geburt der Tragödie were later abandoned, but
the importance of Opposition and strife remained.
In a note of 1888 Nietzsche asserts that "es sind die Ausnahme-Zu-
stände, die den Künstler bedingen: alle, die mit kränkhaften Erscheinungen
tief verwandt und verwachsen sind: so dass es nicht möglich scheint, Künstler
zu sein und nicht krank zu sein" (MusA XIX. 220). Here again Nietzsche
sees achievement in terms of what must be overcome. This idea is given
precise formulation in Götzendämmerung:
Erster Grundsatz: man muss es iiöthig haben, stark zu sein: sonst wird
man's nie (MusA XVII. 138).
Nietzsche's writings are filled with similar sentiments, but one note is
particularly relevant in this connection since it casts the conception in a
peculiarly Heraclitean image:
Was ist eine Lust anderes als: eine Reizung des Machtgefühls durch ein
Hemmniss (noch stärker durch rhythmische Hemmungen und Wider-
stände) - so dass es dadurch anschwillt. Also in aller Lust ist Schmerz inbe-
griffen. — Wenn die Lust sehr gross werden soll, müssen die Schmerzen
sehr lange und die Spannung des Bogens ungeheuer werden (MusA XIX.
116).
 Nietzsche and Heraclitus 25

Here Nietzsche suggests a Heraclitean "connection" between pain and

pleasure.19 All pleasure includes pain and their interdependence is compared
to <cdie Spannung des Bogens" (cf. DK 51 == M 27). This tension is produced
by a struggle — by "rhythmische Hemmungen und Widerstände." Nietzsche
perhaps had the dark philosopher's "back-stretched connection" in mind
when he wrote this note*
Having recognized the role of the negative äs an indispensible part of
things, Nietzsche goes on to declare, like Heraclitus, that strife is "father and
king of all."
Die Werthung, mit der heute die verschiedenen Formen der Societät
beurtheilt werden, ist ganz und gar Eins mit jener, welche dem Frieden
einen höheren Werth zxiertheilt als dem Krieg: aber dies Urtheil ist anti-
biologisch, ist selbst eine Ausgeburt der decadence des Lebens... Das
Leben ist eine Folge des Kriegs, die Gesellschaft selbst ein Mittel zum
Krieg... (MusA XIX. 43).
An earlier note also strikes this chord:
"Alles Geschehen, alle Bewegung, alles Werden als ein Feststellen von
Grad - und Kraftverhaltnissen, als ein Kampf" (MusA XIX. 54).
Having recognized strife äs the touchstone for iife, Nietzsche affirms
strife äs , just äs Heraclitus did.
"Euren Feind sollt ihr suchen, euren Krieg sollt ihr führen und für eure
Gedanken!.. Ihr sollt den Frieden lieben als Mittel zu neuen Kriegen .. Ihr
sagt, die gute Sache sei es, die sogar den Krieg heilige? Ich sage euch: der
gute Krieg ist es, der jede Sache heiligt" (MusA VIII. 55-66).
This praise of war can only be understood properly in the context
developed above. Like Heraclitus, Nietzsche developed an ethical basis for
rnen that springs from bis basic perception of the . Life is "was sich
immer selber überwinden muss." Nietzsche subsequently sees the Übermensch
äs one who has overcome himself. The process of overcoming has äs its basis
strife and Opposition. It is in this sense that a warlike nature is characteristic of
the man who is seeking to overcome himself. Chrisrianity with its preaching
of Submission and acquiescense naturally becomes anathema:
Die Kriegerischen und die Friedlichen. — Bist du ein Mensch, der die
Instinkte des Kriegers im Leibe hat? Und in diesem Falle bliebe noch eine
zweite Frage: bist du ein Angriffskricger oder ein Widerstandskrieger von
Instinkt? Der Rest von Menschen, Alles» was nicht kriegerisch von Instinkt
ist, will Frieden, will Eintracht* will „Freiheit", will „gleiche Rechte*4 -:
das sind nur Namen und Stufen für Ein und Dasselbe. Dorthin gehn, wo
man nicht nöthig hat, sich zu wehren, - solche Menschen werden unzu-
frieden mit sich, wenn sie genöthigt sind, Widerstand zu leisten: sie wollen
Zustände schaffen, wo es überhaupt keinen Krieg mehr gicbt. Schlimmsten

** O. Der WtUf zur Macht, 699 {MusA XIX, 146): "Der Schmerz ist etwas anderes;» als die
Lust, - ich will sagen, er ist nicht deren Gegenteil/*
26 Jackson P. Hershbell and Stephen A* Nimis

Falls sich unterwerfen, gehorchen, einordnen: immer noch besser als Krieg
führen, — so räch es z. B. dem Christen sein Instinkt. Bei den geborenen
Kriegern giebt es Etwas wie Bewaffnung in Charakter, in Wahl der
Zustände, in der Ausbildung jeder Eigenschaft: die „Waffe** ist im ersten
Typus, die Wehr im zweiten am besten entwickelt (MusA XIX. 296—7).
This note of 1888 shows that Nietzsche's "war" is related to political warfare
only äs an analogy and that his "weapons" are "Charakter, Ausbildung jeder
Eigenschaft." The fact that this is always the substance of Nietzsche's strife
imagery is clearly shown when Zarathustra proclaims that "in seinem
Freunde soll man seinen besten Feind haben" und "denn du soUste ihm ein
Pfeil und eine Sehnsucht nach dem Übermenschen sein" (MusA XIII. 69).
Nietzsche's warlike man is one who has taken it upon himself to grow and
overcome himself. This is plainly the case in7 the aphorism:
"Unter friedlichen Umständen fällt der Kriegerische Mensch über sich
selber her" (MusA XV. 91).
Finally, to elucidate Nietzsche's doctrine of war it is instructive to note
his description of his own warrior traits in Ecce homo (MusA XXL 186—87).
There he sums up his "Kriegs-Praxis" in four propositions:
Erstens: ich greife nur Sachen an, die siegreich sind, — ich warte unter Um-
ständen, bis sie siegreich sind. Zweitens: ich greife nur Sachen an, wo ich
keine Bundesgenossen finden würde, wo ich allein stehe, — wo ich mich
allein compromittire . . . Drittens: ich greife nie Personen an, — ich bediene
mich der Person nur wie eines starken Vefgrösserungsglases, mit dem man
einen allgemeinen, aber schleichenden, aber wenig greifbaren Nothstand
sichtbar machen kann . . . Viertens: ich greife nur Dinge an, wo jedwede
Personen-Differenz ausgeschlossen ist, wo jeder Hintergrund schlimmer
Erfahrungen fehlt. Im Gegentheil, angreifen ist bei mir ein Beweis des
Wohlwollens, unter Umständen der Dankbarkeit.
Such a practice of war that seeks put only "siegreiche Sachen," that never
attacks persons and furthermore attacks only "wo jedwede Person-Differenz
ausgeschlossen ist, wo jeder Hintergrund schlimmer Erfahrungen fehlt," is
exemplary of Nietzsche's conquest over ressentiment, the revenge and rancor
of the weak. Its only end is self-overcoming and, like Heraclitus' ,
can only be understood in the appropriate philosophical context which has
been sketched here.20 ·
20
Two references explicitly connect Heraclitus' and Nietzsche's Krieg:
Heraklitismus.
Alles Glück auf Erden,
Freunde, giebt der Kampf!
Ja, um Freund zu werden -,
Braucht es Pulverdampf!
Eins in Drei'n sind Freunde:
Brüder vor der Noth,
Gleiche vor dem Feinde,
Freie - vor dem Tod! (MusA XII. 23)
 Nietzsche and Heraclitus 27

One significant<lifference between die two philosophers should be noted

t this point. The general meaning of Heraclitus* λόγος has been taken to
mean "formula of anangement." The technical sense of λόγος equally
suggests "measure" and Heraclitus* cosmology is based on a balance and
Proportion. The contrast is already suggested by the section from
Zaratbustra quoted above (page 24): "Wer meinen Willen err th, err th wohl
auch, auf weichen krummen Wegen er gehen muss/* Measure was not seen
by Nietzsche s an immanent quality in nature. This distinction will be
discussed below in relationship to the next major link between Heraclitus and
NienLSche: "das Werden, mit radikaler Ablehnung auch selbst des Begriffs
,Sein<" (MusA XXL 227),
The classical attribution to Heraclitus of the preposition that "all is in
flux" stems from his use of a river analogy. What seems to be the original
form of the saying is found in Eus. praep. XV, 20,2:
Upon those who stepping into the same rivers, differetu and again different
waters flow (DK 12 « M 40).
As early s Plato who probably refers to this saying or paraphrases it (see
Cratylus 402 A, Tbeaet. 156 A and 160 D), the river analogy was taken to
signify the conunuous change and becoming of everything in the world. That
this Interpretation is shared by Nietzsche is shown in his philological
writings. In Die Philosophie im tragischen Zeitalter der Griechen, Nietzsche
has Heraclitus proclaim that he sees "nichts als Werden;" that it is the fault
of myopia if any one sees permanence and "gebraucht Namen der Dinge, als
ob sie eine starre Dauer hatten: aber selbst der Strom, in den ihr zum zweiten
Male steigt, ist nicht derselbe als bei dem ersten Male" (MusA IV. 174).21
Here Nietzsche follows, of course, a very ancient Interpretation of Heraclitus.
That this ancient Interpretation is correct, however, has been chailenged by
Kirk.12 He has argucd strongly that the river Image was cited by Heraclitus
to eniphasize the preservation of measure and balance in change. He thus
rejects the extreme flux proposition s an un-Heraclitean notion that resulted
from Heraclitus' emphasis on eventual change. Kirk's opinion, however, has
not been accepted by W. K. C. Guthrie who believes that the doctrine of the
continuous change of physical things is what Heraclitus wished to affirm.
According to Guthrie, "the extant fragnients offer no challenge to the

and Der Krieg hl der Vater aller guten Dinge, der Krieg ist auch der Vaur der guten Prosa!
(MuiA XII. 12€).
OdhJcrt Ntftzttke, pp. 12S^30ches rnany of the relevant passages» although un$y$tematica y.
See aho P, Heller, ''Qicmie der Begriffe und Empfindungen,*' Nietziche Studien l (1972),
pp. 210-3}. Heller tcrms Niciatichc's phik>w>phy of becoming hi* ^HcrakUtUmus/*
See Rirk, The Cosmts Fragments, pp. >96f. and "Naninl Change in Heraclitus/* Mind $0
(1951). pp. 35-42.
 28 Jackson P. Hershbdl and Stephwi A.

universal ancient view."23 But whether Heraclitus believed in continuous or

eventual change, it seems clear that he had no coneept of a fixed and static
Being, and nowhere is there mention of an unchanging metaphysical reality
which lies behind the world of becoming. Even the seems at best to be
a principle operative in and regulative of the change of things, It is by no
means a "thing in itseif" or a substratum from which things come to be.
A similar rejection of the "peculiar origin" of the world of becoming
"im Schosse des Sein's, im Unvergänglichen, im verborgenen Gotte, im
,Ding an sich'" (MusA XV. 8)24 is basic to Nietzsche's thought. Although in
Die Geburt der Tragödie^ Nietzsche has the satyr chorus proclaiming
"jenes Urverhältniss zwischen Ding an sich und Erscheinung" (MusA III.
58), this "artist's metaphysics" was later abandoned and in Menschliches,
Allzumenschliches almost everywhere "erfriert das Ding an sich" (MusA
XXI. 236). Repudiation of the dualities of appearance and thing-in-itself, the
apparent world and the true world, becoming and being, is part of Nietzsche's
repudiation of idealistic, unconditional epistemology, which in his eyes
meant the falsification of the testimony of the senses: "Das ,Ding an sich*
widersinnig" (MusA XIX. 58). A thorough investigation of this fascinating
aspect of Nietzsche's philosophy would be beyond the scope of this paper,
but one passage from Götzen-Dämmerung (Die „Vernunft", in der Philo-
sophie, 2) is particularly relevant because of its mention of Heraclitus:
Ich nehme, mit hoher Ehrerbietung, den Namen Heraklit's bei Seite. Wenn
das andre Philosophen-Volk das Zeugniss der Sinne verwarf, weil dieselben
Vielheit und Veränderung zeigten, verwarf er deren Zeugniss, weil sie die
Dinge zeigten, als ob sie Dauer und Einheit hätten. Auch Heraklit that den
Sinnen Unrecht. Dieselben lügen weder in der Art, wie die Eleaten es
glauben, noch wie er es glaubte, — sie lügen überhaupt nicht. Was wir aus
ihrem Zeugniss machen, das legt erst die Lüge hinein, zum Beispiel die
Lüge der Einheit, die Lüge der Dinglichkeit, der Substanz, der Dauer. ..
Die „Vernunft" ist die Ursache, dass wir das Zeugniss der Sinne fälschen.
Sofern die Sinne das Werden, das Vergehn, den Wechsel zeigen, lügen sie
nicht. . .Aber damit wird Heraklit ewig Recht behalten, dass das Sein eine
leere Fiktion ist. Die „scheinbare" Welt ist die einzige: die „wahre Wellt"
ist nur hinzugelogen . . .
So far it seems clear that both Nietzsche and Heraclitus b'elieved in an
essential unity in things in the sense that they are "connected" by a dynamic,
directive principle. We have further seen that for both philosophers the
natural process of their principle was a strife or tension. Finally, this process
is the only real constitution of things. There is no "being," only the
continuing processes of becoming, passing away and change. Having noted

23
Guthrie, History I, 452.
24
SA II, 568.
 Nietzsche and Heraclitus 29

diese striking similarities, it is now necessary to point out an essential

divergente between these two thinkers.
As noted above, the effect of die λόγος is a μέτρον, a regularity of
change. The cosmos is an "everliving fire, kindling in measures and going out
in measures" (DK 30 — M 51). A good contrast between Heraclitus5
conception and Nietzsche's is provided by the criticism of the Stoic idea of
living "according to nature" in Jenseits von Cut und B se. The Stoics claimed
Heraclitus s their ancient authority and derived many of their doctrines
from him. Although they revised and distorted many of his sayings, the ideal
pf ομολογουμένως ζην is entirely in the spirit of Heraclitus (cf.
DK 2 = M 23). Nietzsche's vision of seif-overcoming takes a different view
of the relationship of "man" and "living" to nature:
„Gem ss der Natur" wollt ihr leben? Oh ihr edlen Stoiker, welche Be-
tr gerei der Worte! Denkt euch ein Wesen, wie es die Natur ist, ver-
schwenderisch ohne Maass, gleichg ltig ohne Maass, ohne Absichten und
Rucksichten, ohne Erbarmen und Gerechtigkeit, fruchtbar und de und
ungewiss zugleich, denkt euch die Indifferenz selbst als Macht — wie
k nntet ihr gem ss dieser Indifferenz leben? Leben — ist das nicht gerade
ein Anders-sein-wollen, als diese Natur ist? Ist Leben nicht Absch tzen,
Vorziehn, Ungerecht-sein, Begrenzt-sein, Different-sein-wollen? ... Euer
Stolz will der Natur, sogar der Natur, eure Moral, euer Ideal vorschreiben
und einverleiben, ihr verlangt, dass sie „der Stoa gem ss" Natur sei (MusA
XV. 14).
In this passage Nietzsche characterizes nature s wasteful and indifferent
ohne Maass and defines living s ein Anders-sein-wollen. This criticism of the
Stoics can be extended to Heraclitus himself on the basis of the importance of
μέτρον for his cosmology. This criticism is further pointed to by Nietzsche
in a note of 1888:
Seit Plato ist die Philosophie unter der Herrschaft der Moral. Auch bei
seinen Vorg ngern spielen moralische Interpretationen entscheidend hinein
(bei Anaximander das Zu-Grunde-gehn aller Dinge als Strafe f r ihre
Emancipation vom reinen Sein; bei Heraklit die Regelm ssigkeit der Er-
scheinungen als Zeugni&s f r den sittlichrechtlichen Charakter des
gesamraten Werdern) (MusA XVIIL 288).
This is a very important point* Both philosophers reduce all phenomena to a
stnglc basic principle. In Heraclitus* casc this principle is the "law" of na«
ture - "Gesetzmassigkeit des Nanirproaesses" s Nietzsche calls it in his
lecture on Heraclitus (MusA IV. 296). Basic to its conception is the idea of
mcasurc and regularity and these notions are implicit in the word Gesetz-
m ssigkeu. But to apply the word Gesetz to Nietzscbe's Will to Power
would necessitate a radical re-definition of this word. That all ihings occur by
die Will to Power is a sott of "regularity/* but not in Heraclitus* sense.
Nietzsche's somewhar paradoxical position can be clucidatcd by quoting
30 Jackson P. Hcrshbell and Stcphcn A. Nirnis

further from Jenseits von Gut und Böse where modern sciencc is being
criticised for a similar reason:
Man vergebe es mir als einem alten Philologen, der von der Bosheit nicht
lassen kann, auf schlechte Imerpretationskünste den Finger zu legen: aber
jene „Gesetzmässigkeit der Natur**, von der ihr Physiker so stolz redet, wie
als ob — — besteht nur Dank eurer Ausdeutung und schlechten „Philo-
logie", — sie ist kein Thatbestand, kein „Text", vielmehr nur eine naiv-
humanitäre Zurechtmachung und Sinnverdrehung, mit der ihr den
demokratischen Instinkten der modernen Seele sattsam entgegenkommt!
„Ueberall Gleichheit vor dem Gesetz, — die Natur hat es darin nicht anders
und nicht besser als wir": ein artiger Hintergedanke, in dem noch einmal
die pöbelmännische Feindschaft gegen alles Bevorrechtete und Selbstherr-
liche, insgleichen ein zweiter und feinerer Atheismus verkleidet liegt. „Ni
dieu, ni maitre" — so wollt auch ihr's: und darum „hoch das Naturgesetz!"
— nicht wahr? Aber, wie gesagt, das ist Interpretation, nicht Text; und es
könnte Jemand kommen, der, mit der entgegengesetzten Absicht und
Interpretationskunst, aus der gleichen Natur und im Hinblick auf die
gleichen Erscheinungen, gerade die tyrannisch-rücksichtenlose und uner-
bittliche Durchsetzung von Machtansprüchen herauszulesen verstünde, -
ein Interpret, der die Ausnahmslosigkeit und Unbedingtheit in allem
„Willen zur Macht" dermaassen euch vor Augen stellte, dass fast jedes
Wort und selbst das Wort „Tyrannei" schliesslich unbrauchbar oder schon
als schwächende und mildernde Metapher — als zu menschlich — erschiene;
und der dennoch damit endete* das Gleiche von dieser Welt zu behaupten,
was ihr behauptet, nämlich dass sie einen „noth wendigen" und
„berechenbaren" Verlauf habe, aber nicht, weil Gesetze in ihr herrschen,
sondern weil absolut die Gesetze fehlen, und jede Macht in jedem
Augenblicke ihre letzte Consequenz zieht. Gesetzt, dass auch dies nur*
Interpretation ist — und ihr werdet eifrig genug sein, dies einzuwenden? —
nun, um so besser. — (MusA XV. 30—31).

Despite the prevarication, there is no doubt that Nietzsche is this Jemand and
that he is at variance with Heraclitus' proppsition. Not balance, but
self-overcoming is one effect of Nietzsches Will to Power. With this contrast
in mind, the repudiation of being can be seen to be an important link
between Heraclitus and Nietzsche, which brings us to the "affirmation of
passing away and destroying, the decisive feature of a Dionysian philosophy"
(MusA XXI. 227).
The meaning of this sentence is expanded in the same section of Ecce
homoy where Nietzsche quotes from Götzen-Dämmerung (MusA XVII. 159):
Das Jasagen zum Leben selbst hoch in seinen fremdesten und härtesten
Problemen; der Wille zum Leben, im Opfer seiner höchsten Typen der
eignen Unerschöpflichkeit frohwerdend — das nannte ich dionysisch . . .
um, über Schrecken und Mitleiden hinaus, die ewige Lust des Werdens
selbst zu sein, — jene Lust, die auch noch die Lust am Vernichten in sich
schliesst (MusA XXL 227).
 Nietzsche and Heraclitus 31

This attitude, characteristic of Ecce homo and indeed all of Nietzsche's

books, is formulated most precisely äs "amor fati: dass man Nichts anders
haben will, vorwärts nicht, rückwärts nicht, in alle Ewigkeit nicht. Das
Nothwendige nicht bloss ertragen, noch weniger verhehlen - aller
Idealismus ist Verlogenheit vor dem Notwendigen -~, sondern es liehen"
(MusA XXL 211). This is Nietzsche^ "Formel für die Grosse am
Menschen," the touchstone for the Dionysian man who "verneint nicht
mehr" (MusA XVIL 150),
Was Heraclitus such a "Dionysian philosopher0 who does not negate
anymore? It has been pointed out that he considered strife and Opposition to
be , normal and just, and this does in a sense constitute an affirmation of
passing away and destroying. This modest inference perhaps would have
accounted for the passage above, had not Nietzsche pointed out a different
direction in his philological material. A brief look at the relevant passages will
show that Nietzsche undoubtedly had in mind a certain misconception about
Heraclitus.
The first reference is in Die Geburt der Tragödie where Nietzsche is
discussing the peculiar nature of tragic pleasure; namely, how can the
contents of tragedy give aesthetic pleasure:
Hier nun wird es nöthig, uns mit einem kühnen Anlauf in eine Metaphysik
der Kunst hinein zu schwingen, indem ich den früheren Satz wiederhole,
dass nur als ein ästhetisches Phänomen das Dasein und die Welt
gerechtfertigt erscheint: in welchem Sinne uns gerade der tragische Mythus
zu überzeugen hat, dass selbst das Hässliche und Disharmonische ein
künstlerisches Spiel ist, welches der Wille, in der ewigen Fülle seiner Lust,
mit sich selbst spielt (MusA I.V. 61).

In tragedy, like music, Nietzsche recognizes a Dionysian phenomenon

which reveals
das immer von Neuem wieder das spielende Aufbauen und Zertrümmern
der Individualwelt als den Ausfluss einer Urlust offenbart, in einer
ähnlichen Weise, wie wenn von Heraklit dem Dunklen die weltbildende
Kraft einem Kinder verglichen wird, das spielend Steine hin und her setzt
und Sandhaufen aufbaut und wieder einwirft (MusA IV. 62).

This mention of Heraclitus apparendy alludes to fragment DK 52:

(Human) age ( ) is a child playing, playing dice (or draughts); a chiid
has the kingly power! (DK 52 - M 93).

A similar allusion i$ made in Die Philosophie im tragischen Zeitalter der

Griechen where the conncction with DK 52 is confirmed:
Ein Werden und Vergehen, ein Bauen und Zemören, ohne jede moralische
Zurechnung, in ewig gleicher Unschuld, hat in dieser Weh alJcin das Spiel
des Künstlers und des Kindes, Und so, wie das Kind und der Künstler
32 Jackson P, HershbelJ and Stcphcn A, Nirois

spielt, spielt das ewig lebendige Feuer, baut auf und zerst rt, in Unschuld
- und dieses Spiel spielt der Aeon mit sich (MusA IV. 183),25
This Interpretation of fragment 52 depends on the attriburion of a
"cosmic" connotation to the word αΙών. However, G. S. Kirk maintains
that "in early contexts and used by itself the word is most likely to refer to
human lifetimc, perhaps with the special connotation of the destiny which is
worked out by the individual during his lifetime. It is unlikely to mean 'time'
absolutely, while 'fate' in general is an impossible meaning and one,
furthermore, which would give the fragment a significance contrary to the
general trend of Heraclitus* thought, with its emphasis on measure/'*6
Nietzsche's Interpretation of this fragment, therefore, no longer seems
acceptable, Furthermore, his extension of the metaphor to play s "artists"
engage in s well s "children" is an obvious-littempt to read into Heraclitus
the tenet of Die Geburt der Trag die that only s an "aesthetic phenomenon"
can the world be justified.
Nietzsche, of course, was to re-evaluate these formulations of Die
Geburt der Trag die and this "metaphysics of art," finding the enduring
importance of this early effort in that it "einen Geist verr th, der sich einmal
auf jede Gefahr hin gegen die moralische Ausdeutung und Bedeutsamkeit des
Daseins zur Wehre setzen wird. Hier k ndigt sich, vielleicht zum ersten
Male, ein Pessimismus Jenseits von Gut und B se*, an" (MusA III. 10).
Similarly, the lasting importance of Heraclitus for Nietzsche's philosophy
was his rejection of any. sort of teleology. The image of Welt-Kind and Spiel
occur again and again in Nietzsche's writings s the epiphany of his rejection
of cosmic teleology. It is precisely this, in Nietzsche's mind, that separates
Heraclitus from the Stoics:
Uebrigens und trotzdem ist Heraklit den „kahlen Geistern" nicht entgan-
gen; bereits die Stoiker haben ihn in's Flache umgedeutet und seine
sthetische Grundperception vom Spiel der Welt zu der gemeinen R cksicht
auf Zweckm ssigkeiten der Welt und zwar f r die Vortheile der Menschen
herabgezogen: so dass aus seiner Physik, in jenen K pfen, ein kruder
Optimismus, mit der fortw hrenden Aufforderung an Hinz und K nz zum
plaudite amici geworden ist (MusA IV. 183).
Although the attribution of this premise to Heraclitus is based largely on
a misreading of the αιών passage, another fragment suggests that Nietzsche
was not so far off in feeling " berhaupt w rmer" in the proximity of
Heraclitus:
25
Oehler, Nietzsche, pp. 66-69 cites many other passages (e. g. MusA XIX. 209: „ ,Das Spiel',
das Unn tzliche - als Ideal des mit Kraft Ueberh uften, als ,kindlich·. Die »Kindlichkeit*
Gottes, παίς παίζων") which confirm the identification of Nietzsche's Spiel metaphor with
Heraclitus' παίς παίζων. <·
26
Kirk, The Cosmic Fragments, p. xiii.
 and Hcraclitus 33

To God all things are fair and just, buc tuen havc supposed somc things
unjust and sorae just (DK 102 ~ M 91).
The sentiment of this passage reflects Heraclitus' assenion that things are
"whole and not whole;" that is, things can be viewed s a unity or
analytically* The "god-Uke" or synthetic view sees all things together s
beautiful, good and just. This can be compared to Nietzsche's praise of
Goethe in G tzen-D mmerung:
Was er wollte, das war Totalit t; er bek mpfte das Auseinander von
Vernunft* Sinnlichkeit» Gef hl, Wille . , . er disciplinirte sich zur
Ganzheit» er schuf sich . , . Ein solcher freigewordener Geist steht mit
einem freudigen und vertrauenden Fatalismus mitten im All, im Glauben^
dass nur das Einzelne verwerflich ist, dass im Ganzen sich Alles erl st und
bejaht ~ er verneint nicht mehr . . . Aber ein solcher Glaube ist der h chste
aller m glichen Glauben: ich habe ihn auf den Namen des Dionysos ge-
tauft. - (MusA XVIL 149-50).
Comparing these passages, it is easy to see why Nietzsche might see in
the Ephesian philosopher a man of amor fati. It must be kept in mind that
like Nietzsche, Heraclitus denied the duality of a "true" world and an
"apparent" world. The analytic viewpoint is not for Heraclitus unreal or
illegitimate, nor is the λόγος unknowable to men (cf. DK 2). Kirk made this
point, although he admits that it is largely speculative:
The synthetic view is more admirable ccrtainly in Heraclitus' eyes, than die
anaiytical one. Yet the analytical view also is necessary: if the opposites
ceased to be in one scnsc opposed then the underlying unity would fail, just
s if strife ceased the world s we know it would die; the unity that
followed would be a unity of changelessness and death.27
Thus for Heraclitus the synthetic view will convince a man that the larger
picture is "beautiful, good and just," while at the same time noting the
diversity of things. One cannot help but recall Nietzsche'« insistence that
"ich widerspreche* wie nie widersprochen worden ist, und bin trotzdem der
Gegensatz eines neinsagenden Geistes" (MusA XXI, 277); and "das
Nothwendige verletzt mich nicht; amor fati ist meine innerste Natur. Dies
schliesst aber nicht aus* dass ich die Ironie liebe, sogar die weit-historische
Ironie" (MusA XXL 275). Thus, although Christianity, for example, was a
necessary evil, this did not prevent Nietzsche from pointing out that it was
evil, nor that it was necessary. Like Heraclitus, he saw and affirmed the unity
of things while noting the coexisting diversity in things-
It has been seen that Nietzsche considered fragment DK 52 an up~
tcleological affirrnauon of the whole world of becoming. Although he was
probably mistaken in this casc, the drift of Heraclitus* thought does not

27
Ibid., p, 181. H. !*Υ«ηΙκΙ exprew* a $imi!ar virw in ΤΑΜ W (1938), p- 243.
34 Jackson P. Hcrshbell and Stephcn A. Nimis

contradict such an affirmation and at least one Fragment, DK 102, suggests

that the notion of amor fati is implicit in his world view.
Intrinsically related to amor fati, the unconditional and total affirmation
of the whole world, is Nietzsche's doctrine of the Eternal Recurrence of the
Same, "unbedingten und unendlich wiederholten Kreislauf aller Dinge"
(MusA XXI. 227). The Eternal Recurrence is the apotheosis of the
affirmation of the whole world of becoming — wherein it appears justified at
every moment. It is the vision of the Dionysian man of amor fati:
Sagtet ihr jemals Ja zu Einer Lust? Oh, meine Freunde, so sagtet ihr Ja auch
zu allem Wehe. Alle Dinge sind verkettet, verf delt, verliebt, -
— wolltet ihr jemals Ein Mal zweimal, spracht ihr jemals „du gef llst mir,
Gl ck! Husch! Augenblick!" so wolltet ihr Alles zur ck!
- Alles von neuem, Alles ewig, Alles verkettet, verf delt, verliebt, oh so
liebtet ihr die Welt, -
— ihr Ewigen, liebt sie ewig und allezeit: und auch zum Weh sprecht ihr:
vergeh, aber komm zur ck! Denn alle Lust will — Ewigkeit! (MusA XIII.
408-9).
The Eternal Recurrence of all things is not a new idea. It is a Standard
Stoic dogma that there is a periodic έκπύρωσις in which the entire world is
consumed by fire. Since the Stoics also believed in a hard fast determinism,
the laws that brought forth the destroyed world would form another world
exactly the same. The Stoics attributed the belief in an έκπύρωσις to
Heraclitus, their ancient authority, s did Theophrastus and Aristotle.
Nietzsche agreed with. this tradition and wrote in Die Philosophie im
tragischen Zeitalter der Griechen that Heraclitus
glaubt wie jener an einen periodisch sich wiederholenden Weltuntergang
und an ein immer erneutes Hervorsteigen einer ndern Welt aus dem alles
vernichtenden Weltbrande. Die Periode, in der die Welt jenem Weltbrande
und der Aufl sung in das reine Feuer entgegeneilt, wird von ihm h chst
auffallender Weise als ein Begehren und Bed rfen charakterisirt, das volle
Verschlungensein im Feuer als die Sattheit (MusA IV. 181).
This passage is undoubtedly based on fragment 65:
He calls i t deprivation (χρησμοσύνην) and satiety (κόρον): deprivation is
the world ordering (διακόσμησις) according to him, and the consumption
by fire (έκπύρωσις) is satiety (DK 65 = M 55).
Both Kirk and Marcovich maintain that the only words in this fragment that
are Heraclitus' are "deprivation (or want) and satiety," and that the rest is an
Interpretation by Hippolytus, whose Refutatio omnium haeresium is the
source of the fragment. Kirk further observes that "in identifying 'depri-
vation' with the world-forming process, 'satiety' with the έκπύρωοις,
Hippolytus is simply following a well-known Stoic Interpretation."28 Kirk

28
Kirk, The Cosmic Fragments, p. 357.
 Niemche and Heraclitus 35

argues elsewhere that an έκπύρωσις has been falsely imputed to HeracKtus.29

Although this poirtt is still disputed, the majority of scholars now agree that
έκπύρωσις was not a Heraclitean doctrine.
Nevertheless, most of die 19th Century and Nietzsche believed the
contrary. Not only did Nietzsche believe that Heraclitus taught an έκπύρωσις
but also that Eternal Recurrence "k nnte zuletzt auch schon von Heraklit
gelehrt worden sein" (MusA XXL 227). Eternal Recurrence of the Same is
not a necessary conclusion of a periodic conflagration; nor did Nietzsche view
it s such. As noted above, the Stoics derived their doctrine of the circular
repetition of all things from the combination of the cyclical dissolution in fire
and their absolute determinism (είμαρμένη). Both of these conceptions were
attributed to Heraclitus by the Stoics, the former incorrectly. But there is
also very little evidence to support a Heraclitean είμαρμένη in the sense that
the Stoics used it. If he ever used the word, which is doubtful (cf. Kirk
303—5), it was in a different way. In DK 80 Heraclitus says that all things
happen "according to strife and necessity." Now for Heraclitus there is
"necessity" in the sense that in all things there is inevitable regularity. One
change is followed by another, but equality and Balance are always preserved
in natural processes. This is the right and proper cause of nature, and so is
necessary (χρεών). But unlike the Stoic είμαρμένη, Heraclitus' necessity
cannot be taken to mean that every individual change is determined and
inevitable. He oniy implies that change in general conforms to certain fixed
laws. Nietzsche, however, infers a necessity in Heraclitus along the lines of
the Stoics. This is alluded to in the Heraclitus lecture:
Sehr charakteristisch ist nun auch, dass Heraklit eine Ethik, mit
Imperativen, nicht kennt. Alles ist ja είμαρμένη, auch der einzelne Mensch.
(MusA IV. 313).
Since there is no explicit reference to eternal recurrence in Heraclitus'
extant fragments, Nietzsche probably noted the three c nnected doctrines in
the Stoics (έκπύρωσις, ειμαρμένη, and Eternal Recurrence), incorrectly saw
two of these in Heraclitus, and therefore suspectcd the third corollary
doctrine.
This reconstruction of Nietzsche's thought is, of course, somewhat
anificiah h may even be superfluous in the end. Nietzsche does not mention
Eternal Recurrence in the Heraclitus lectures; indeed, the quote from Ecce
bomo noted above is the only connection Nietzsche made between Heraclitus
and eiernal recurrence. It seems str nge that Nietzsche would be so modest
in poinring out this ndern corroboration arid further attribute only "traces
of it" to the Stoics. Even stranger, at first glance, is the absolute silcncc

» ibid.. 33S 38.

 36 Jackson P. Hcrshbell and Stcphen A. Nlmis

conccrning Pythagoras1 explicit doctrinc of eternal recurrence which

Nietzsche noted in his Pre-Platonic lectures (MusA IV. 352). A. H. J. Knight
noted this puzzle and concluded that Nietzsche was being insincere in
rcfusing to acknowledge his sources.30 A more satisfactory solution, however,
is to be found by considering the doctrine in relationship to Nietzsche's
philosophy äs a whole. This doctrine is the joyful vision of the Dionysian
man, inextricably bound to his attitude of amor fati. As Kaufmann points
out:
It is plain that none of his other ideas rneant so much to him. The eternai
recurrence was to Nietzsche less an idea than an experience — the supreme
experience of a life unusually rieh in suffering, pain and agony. He made
much of the moment when he first had this experience (EH-Z) because to
him it was the moment that redeemed Jhis life.31
The passage Kaufmann refers to is from Ecce homo:
Ich erzähle nunmehr die Geschichte des Zarathustra. Die Grundconception
des Werks, der Ewige-Wiederkunfts-Gedanke, diese höchste Formel der
Bejahung, die überhaupt erreicht werden kann —, gehört in den August des
Jahres 1881: er ist auf ein Blatt hingeworfen, mit der Unterschrift: ,,6000
FUSS jenseits von Mensch und Zeit".
Again, it is noteworthy how Nietzsche emphasizes the doctrine äs the
"höchste Formel der Bejahung, die überhaupt erreicht werden kann." That
Nietzsche would not want this conception sullied by a connection with the
Pythagorean doctrine is not surprising. For the same reason Nietzsche
acknowledged only "träces of it" in the Stoics. Stoicism preached a sort of
amor fati (volentem fata ducunt, nolentem trahunt), but their deprecation of
the passions ( ) contradicted this in Nietzsche's eyes. The Dionysian
man affirms everything and is above all passionate. This is the sense of the
antithesis: "Dionysus gegen den Gekreuzigten" (MusA XXI. 286). Through-
out Nietzsche's writings the Stoics are linked with Christianity in that both
taught the extirpation of the passions. Moreover, Stoicism was "essentially
teleological," which flatly contradicts Nietzsche's viewpoint.32

30
A. H. J. Knight, Some Aspects of the Life and Work of Nietzsche, p. 111. Knight further
concludes that Nietzsche was not really a philosopher, but a Stylist. Kaufmann,. Nietzsche,
pp. 317 and 369—71 summarizes the major blunders of Knight's unreliable work.
31
Kaufmann, Nietzsche, p. 323.
32
E. Zeller, Outline of the History of Greek Philosophy (New York, repr. 1955), p. 233.
Nietzsche's understanding of the Stoics has been discussed by B. Magnus, "The Connection
between Nietzsche's Doctrine of Eternal Recurrence, Heraclitus and the Stoics," Helios
n. s. 3 (1976) 3—21. Magnus rightly observes that "there is no evidence to suggest that
Nietzsche's doctrine of eternal recurrence was influenced by Heraclitus and the Stoics in the
sense that Nietzsche discovered the doctrine there and elaborated it to suit his own
purposes." He concludes Nietzsche found orily "träces" in the Stoics because "what was
missing was the spirit from which, and the history out of which, these reflections arose." This
conclusion is basically the same äs that maintained by us.
 Nietzsche and Heraclitus 37

Only in the case of Heraclitus, in whose proximity Nietzsche "feit

altogether warmer and better than anywhere eise,** was he willing to suggest
an affinity. Of course, Nietzsche never beiieved in an έκπύρωσις s he
thought Heraclitus did. Nietzsche*s eternal recurrence was founded along
different lines altogether. Therefore, although έκπύρωσις suggests an eternal
recurrence, the real link is more likely Heraclitus* alleged amor fati. It has
been shown above that at least one fragment suggests this attitude in
Heraclitus. Nietzsche, certainly, interpreted DK 102 in this mannen In Die
Philosophie im tragischen Zeitalter der Griechen he wrote:
Giebt es Schuld Ungerechtigkeit Widerspruch Leid in dieser Welt? Ja, ruft
Heraklit, aber nur f r den beschr nkten Menschen, der auseinander und
nicht zusammen schaut, nicht f r den contuitiven Gott; f r ihn l uft alles
Widerstrebende in eine Harmonie zusammen, unsichtbar zwar f r das
gew hnliche Menschenauge, doch dem verst ndlich, der, wie Heraklit, dem
beschaulichen Gotte hnlich ist. Vor seinem Feuerblick bleibt kein Tropfen
von Ungerechtigkeit in der um ihn ausgegossnen Welt zur ck; und selbst
jener cardinale Anstoss, wie das reine Feuer in so unreine Formen einziehen
k nne, wird von ihm durch ein erhabenes Gleichniss berwunden (MusA
IV. 182).

Nietzsche goes on to explain the "game of the αΙών" metaphor which

was shown above to be misinterpreted, but the essential point was the lack of
a teleology. The significance of this is that Nietzsche recognized in Heraclitus
the prerequisites for the vision of eternal recurrence: an unteleological amor
fatiy the affirmation of passing away and destroying, saying yes to Opposition
and war, becoming, along with a radical repudiation of the very concept
being. Nietzsche undoubtedly feit that a man with such a world view would
share bis vision of eternal recurrence*
Alas, in the end one can only say that the idea of eternal recurrence
simply never suggested itself to Heraclitus. Heraclitus was one of the
φυσικοί, a group of thinkers who tried to free themselves from the
mythological world view of their predecessors and be empirical. Despite
Nietzsche's claim that Eternal Recurrence is the "most scienttfic" hypothesis,
it is unempirical and evidently not a Heraclitean notion.
This last point, however, demonstrates perhaps the most basic likeness
between Nietzsche and Heraclitus. Both men were "naturalistic" in their
approach to philosophy, That both philosophers came up with some vcry
questionable notioos does not contradict this fact. Heraclitus was mostly
intercsted in describing ehe physical world and the larger picture, whcrcas
Nictzsclic's emphasis was on psychology and the individuaL They agreed»
however, in seeing physics and ethics s a continous whole. As Nietzsche
says:
38 Jackson P. HmhbeU and Stephen A, Nimis

Um zu verstehen, was „Leben** ist, welche An Streben um! Spannung

Leben ist, rnuss die Formel so gut von Baum und Pflanze, ab vom Thier
gelten (MusA XIX, 151).
Similarly, Heraclitus' is realized not only in the larger picture but also
on smallcr scales:
All human laws are nourished by one law, divine law; for it extends its
power äs far äs it will and is sufficient for all (human laws) and still is left
over (DK 114 « M 23).
The ethical advice of Heraclitus and Nietzsche was formally interwoven
with their physical theories. Heraclitus saw nature äs the expression of lawful
order and thcrefore advised self-knowledge, modcration and understanding
of the central pattern of things. Nietzsche saw nature äs the "relentless claims
of will to power," ever transforming and overcoming itself. Thus he exhorts
men to organize the chaos of their passions and overcome themselves.
The naturalistic basis of their thought prevented these philosophers from
positing the existence of any metaphysical thing-in-itself. Instead, the cosmos
was viewed äs an ever-changing process that was likened to strife. Heraclitus
saw no empirical rcason to suspect that the cosmos had ever been any different,
so he prcsumed it was eternally an "ever-living fire." Nietzsche hypothesized
an eternal recurrence, but considered it to be "the most scientific principle."
Thus, the similarities äs well äs the differences between Heraclitus and
Nietzsche can be reduced to their common insistence on naturalistic
explanations. There is no doubt that Nietzsche feit a strong attachment to the
"riddler" äs he is known in antiquity; and that this attachment was not
merely academic. As Nietzsche said of Heraclitus:
Es ist wichtig, von solchen Menschen zu erfahren, dass sie einmal gelebt
haben. Nie würde man sich zum Beispiel den Stolz des Heraklit, als eine
müssige Möglichkeit, imaginiren können. An sich scheint jedes Streben
nach Erkenntniss, seinem Wesen nach, ewig unbefriedigt und unbefriedi-
gend. Deshalb wird niemand, wenn er nicht durch die Historie belehrt ist,
an eine so königliche Selbstachtung und Üeberzeugtheit, der einzige be-
glückte Freier der Wahrheit zu sein, glauben mögen. Solche Menschen
leben in ihrem eignen Sonnensystem; darin muss man sie aufsuchen (MusA
IV. 186-7).33

33
We are grateful to Wolfgang Taraba, Professor of German, Üniversity of Minnesota,
Mianeapolis, for bis careful criticism of this paper. Whatever faults remain are the
responsibility of the authors.