The Human Science of Somatics and Transcendental

Phenomenology
Žmogaus somatikos mokslas ir transcendentali
fenomenologija

The Human Science of

Somatics and Transcendental
Phenomenology*

Žmogaus somatikos mokslas ir

transcendentali fenomenologija

Elizabeth A. Behnke
Study Project in Phenomenology of the Body
PO Box 66
Ferndale, WA 98248
USA
[email protected]

Santrauka
Straipsnyje pristatomas žmogaus somatikos Straipsnnis užbaigiamas fenomenologine kinestetinių
mokslas, kuris pirmiausia susiejamas su anksty- sistemų analize susiejant somatikos tyrinėjimus su
vaja Husserlio somatologijos samprata, o vėliau įsikūnijimo etika bei pagarbos kinestetika.
pasiūloma transcendentali šio mokslo pagrindinių Esminiai žodžiai: fenomenologija, Husserlis,
prielaidų kritika. Kritiškai nagrinėjama psichofizinė transcendentalumas, somatika, psichofiziologija,
apercepcija ir jos nuoroda į išgyvenamą mirties gyvenamas kūnas, kinestetinė sąmonė, kinestetinės
patirtį. Tada kaip alternatyvi somatikos prielaida sistemos, įsikūnijimo etika.
pateikiama Husserlio kinestetinės sąmonės samprata.

Summary
After introducing the field of somatics as a human with some contributions to a phenomenology of ki-
science, I first link it with Husserl’s earlier notion of naesthetic systems as well as some suggestions for
somatology, then offer a transcendental critique of approaching somatic work in the spirit of embodied
the root assumption of such a science – the psycho- ethics and the kinaesthetics of respect.
physical apperception – and trace the origin of the Key words: phenomenology, Husserl, tran-
latter to the lived experience of death. Next I present scendental, somatics, psychophysical, lived body,
Husserl’s notion of kinaesthetic consciousness as kinaesthetic consciousness, kinaesthetic systems,
an alternative assumption for somatics, concluding embodied ethics

Prelude: The human science of 1) The first-generation pioneers in the field are
somatics roughly contemporaneous with the pioneers of the
phenomenological tradition; as in phenomenology,
What is somatics? Although a detailed description however, new figures continue to emerge, with some
of the field is not possible here, I will offer some brief
indications by way of orientation. 
Key somatics pioneers include (among others) F. Matthias
Alexander (1869–1955), Elsa Gindler (1885–1961), Heinrich
Elizabeth A. Behnke

Jacoby (1889–1964), Ida Rolf (1896–1979), Moshe Feldenkrais

(1904–1984), Gerda Alexander (1908–1994), and Milton Trager
(1908–1997); compare the lifespans of such phenomenologists as
* This essay was initially presented at the Nordic Society for Edmund Husserl (1859–1938), Martin Heidegger (1889–1976),
Phenomenology meeting in Kaunas (April 2008); I would like to Jean-Paul Sartre (1905–1980), Emmanuel Levinas (1906–1995),
thank my Lithuanian colleagues for our memorable evenings of and Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908–1961). For further parallels
conviviality and phenomenological dialogue. between phenomenology and somatics, see Behnke, 1997b.

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carrying on the work of the initial pioneers and oth- of Somatics congratulates Hanna on recognizing “a
ers developing new approaches. 2) Although it does generalized professional field that deals holistically
include a theoretical component, somatics is above with the body,” beyond the fragmentation of differ-
all a practical discipline, including many kinds of ent schools or approaches. Meanwhile, Johnson’s
hands-on “body work” approaches in which a prac- 1977 book The Protean Body (which I assume was
titioner touches and moves a client’s body in various already in production when the first issue of Hanna’s
ways, as well as many “body awareness” approaches Somatics came out in the fall of 1976) included the
in which, for example, a teacher leads a group of following statement:
students in experiential experiments focusing on I envision the development of a new science
various aspects of movement, breath, sensing, and whose researchers would be educated in both struc-
so on (see, e.g., Johnson, 1995, 1997). 3) Somatic tural anthropology and the sophisticated notions
practice is transformative insofar as it can produce of body structure and kinesiology inspired by the
“deep change” (Behnke, 1982, 46) in our habitual work of Ida Rolf. The goal of this science would be
style of embodiment (and thereby in our corporeal an accurate understanding of the interrelationships
and intercorporeal life as a whole); for example, the between patterns of body structure in a given culture
Australian F. M. Alexander identified a global bodily and the larger social forms of the culture. The practi-
pattern that has since come to be termed the “startle cal goal would be to provide more clarity and power
response,” teaching himself (and others) not only for those attempting to transform the culture by work
to be aware of this pattern, but to inhibit it and to on the body …. (Johnson, 1977, 125)
reverse its effects, a practice termed the “Alexander There are currently numerous training programs
Technique” (see, e.g., Alexander, 2001; Tinbergen, in somatics (including graduate programs), as well
1974). And 4) while transformative somatic practice as a growing literature in the field.
can indeed be employed as therapy when things go But can we speak in any sense of a crisis of this
wrong, it can also be used by people who are healthy new science – and more specifically, of a crisis
in order to enhance their skills and their quality of to which phenomenology might respond? Hanna
life – for example, Gerda Alexander (no relation to defines the “soma” of “somatics” as “the body
F. M. Alexander) worked not only with paralyzed experienced from within,” and in elaborating his
patients, but also with actors, dancers, and the “somatology,” he emphasizes the possibility in prin-
members of Denmark’s Radio Symphony Orchestra ciple of a genuine integration of “first person” and
(Alexander 1985). “third person” perspectives on the soma, as in, for
Yet if the field of somatics basically consists of a example, psychoneuroimmunology (see, e.g., Hanna,
collection of transformative body-oriented practices, 1987–88/2004–05). We are nevertheless still living
why am I calling it a human science? Although the in a culture whose inherited categories leave little
practices I have alluded to so far have their roots in room for something that is neither sheerly physical
the late 19th and early 20th century, somatics actu- nor sheerly psychological. Perhaps it is symptomatic
ally became a “field” in the 1970s, largely through that Johnson speaks, on the one hand, of physicians
the efforts of two men. Thomas Hanna called for a referring patients to him for hands-on somatic work
new “somatic viewpoint” in 1970, and founded a because the patients were not responding to medi-
periodical called Somatics whose first issue appeared cal treatment and “therefore” their problems must
in Autumn 1976; a letter to the editor from Don be “psychological” rather than “physical,” while on
Hanlon Johnson published in the Spring 1978 issue the other hand, he also speaks of psychotherapists
referring clients to him for the same hands-on work

Somatic work is not only used to address “bodily” problems because psychotherapy – which assumed that the
such as chronic tensions or postural imbalances, but can also problems were “mental” – was not fully alleviat-
be employed in conjunction with psychological work; see, e.g.,
ing their condition, and “therefore” there must be
Johnson and Grand, 1998.

Thomas Hanna (1928–1990) was an existential philosopher who
became a Feldenkrais practitioner, eventually going on to develop Edward S. Casey at Yale, eventually writing a doctoral dissertation
his own “Hanna Somatic Education,” now taught by his widow, on the relation between the body and the body politic and leaving
Eleanor Criswell Hanna. His other philosophical influences inclu- the Jesuits to become a Rolfer (i.e., a practitioner of the “Structural
ded the American pragmatists and the process philosophers—see Integration” developed by Ida Rolf). Johnson has explicitly em-
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Hanna, 2007, 5f., and cf. also Hanna, 1969. braced a kinship between phenomenology and somatics – cf., e.g.,

See Hanna, 1970, 73 for a convergence of method with pheno- Johnson, 1994, 119, 184; Johnson and Grand, 1998, 3, 10.
menology, and 196ff. for Hanna’s remarks on Merleau-Ponty; see 
This definition has appeared in Somatics ever since the Au-
also Hanna, 1973, 1975. tumn/Winter 1988–89 issue; see also Hanna, 1970, 35, and cf.

Don Hanlon Johnson (b. 1934) studied Merleau-Ponty with the emphasis on awareness in Hanna, 2007–08.

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 The Human Science of Somatics and Transcendental
Phenomenology
Žmogaus somatikos mokslas ir transcendentali
fenomenologija

a problem “in the body” somewhere (Johnson and bodily feelings or sensations (Empfindnisse), along
Grand, 1998, 6f.). It is as if the official map of reality with, for example, investigations of such matters
has only two regions, and somatics isn’t even on the as the use of tools to extend the capabilities of free
map – even though it seems to share a border with volitional movement (5/5–10, 18f.).10 In other words,
each of these regions. Can phenomenology be of any Husserl identifies sensing/sensitive, freely moving
help here? There are at least two ways in which to bodies as a specific region of reality, with a specific
approach this question within a Husserlian context. science corresponding to this region, and thereby
makes space within the received topology for a new
Part One: Husserlian reflections on region and its a priori (cf. 8/227; 32/225).
the theoretical roots of a science of And with this, Husserlian somatology carries out a
double retrieval. Not only is the experiential retrieved
the soma from the naturalized in general, but the specifically
A. Saving a space for somatology within the lived-bodily experiential register is retrieved in its
received topology of regional ontology own right and made available for an eidetic soma-
tology (HM4/212) that would complement (but not
The theme of somatology appears to have entered duplicate) the eidetic psychology that Husserl also
Husserl’s repertoire around 1912 (see 5/5ff.), but calls for (cf., e.g., 9/221). There are several positive
surfaces from time to time, like a recurring Lei- points about this move. First of all, the retrieval of
tmotiv, for years to come. Somatology first comes the experiential from the hegemony of the naturalistic
to the fore in Husserl’s critique of science in Ideen prejudice (cf., e.g., 9/142f.) opens up the possibility
III, and provides an excellent example of the way of a new human science that would study the lived
in which he appropriates and shifts the terminology body as experienced within the personalistic attitu-
of his time. The term “somatology” had already de. Moreover, Husserl’s subsequent suggestion of a
emerged by the late 16th century, when the study of specifically somatological empathy that is already
the human being was divided between somatology at work prior to the level of the “psyche” per se
and psychology; by the time of the positivism of the has important implications for a phenomenology of
late 19th century, somatology was itself subdivided interspecies experience encompassing all animate
into anatomy and physiology. Husserl’s proposed beings (13/70; cf. 13/475, 14/116). And a somatology
somatology, however, is organized in a radically that embraces first-person experience of the body
different way, for although it too has two branches, alongside objective research into “physio-somatic
one is devoted to a material-causal approach to the causal relations” (5/18) not only makes genuine
body as a physical reality, while the other is based on 
Husserl acknowledges that the somatology he proposes had
“the direct somatic perception” of one’s own lived never actually emerged historically, and suggests that the rea-
body (5/8), including an “aesthesiology” of localized son is because it not only requires “unusual phenomenological
analyses” that can consider such somatological sensitivities in
abstraction from the “apprehensional texture” into which they

All references to Husserl, 1950ff. will take the form: volume are woven (5/10; cf. HM8/134, 207, 352), but also presupposes
number/page number(s); references to Husserl, 2001ff. will a radical alteration of “our natural directions of regard” (5/10).
use the abbreviation HM, followed by the volume number/ However, the 20th century field of somatics provides some
page number(s); Husserl, 1940–41 will be cited as NR/page excellent resources for these tasks, and the possible connection
number(s). My references to these sources are illustrative rather between Husserlian “somatology” and contemporary “somatics”
than exhaustive. is indeed recognized by some figures in the latter field – see, e.g.,

A preliminary survey of materials currently available to me Johnson, 1995, xv; 1997, 10.
indicates that the term “somatology,” along with the related terms 10
Here it is not possible to trace the vacillation of terminology
“soma,” “somatic,” and “somatological,” appear in Husserl’s wri- that led Husserl to speak both of “somatology” and of “aesthe-
tings from 1912 to 1927. Significant mention occurs in the 1912 siology” – see, e.g., HM4/212, and cf. van Kerckhoven, 1980,
draft of Ideen III (5/5–19, and cf. also 4/65); in the Summer Semes- xvi. Some of the tensions that the terminological variations
ter 1919 lecture course on “Natur und Geist” (HM4/185, 212, and hint at emerge when Husserl is attempting to reconcile 1) the
cf. 217f. on the “aesthesiological”); and in the Summer Semester delineation of a new region that is simply “located,” as it were,
1925 lecture course on “Phänomenologische Psychologie” and between Natur and Geist – a region that is descriptively charac-
related materials (see 9/131f., 143, 198, 217, 220, 228, 390, 392f., terized both in terms of sensitivity and in terms of free motility
Elizabeth A. Behnke

501, 505), as well as in the research manuscripts collected in Part (see, e.g., HM4/186, 212; cf. 30/281), and is the province of
One (1905–1920) and Part Two (1921–1928) of the intersubjecti- “somatology” – with 2) an account that attempts to show how
vity volumes (Husserliana 13 and 14), with the earliest of some the lived body mediates between “nature” and “spirit,” linking
three dozen instances apparently stemming from 1914 or 1915 and the “aesthesiological” Leib with its natural, “material” basis on
the latest dated 30.I.27. and Jan.-Feb. 1927. However, see also the one hand, while on the other hand linking the “freely moving”
37/305, 357 (1920); 8/226 (1923); 39/146 (1925); 32/188 (1925 Leib with the will, i.e., with the “freely active spirit” holding sway
at the earliest – probably 1926); 39/272 (1926). in it; see, e.g., 4/284, and cf. 9/131f.

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convergent measures possible, but can also suggest

fresh possibilities for rethinking existing disciplines If the theme of somatology entered Husserl’s
such as psychosomatic medicine (cf. Johnson and repertoire around 1912, a new theme – that of the
Grand, 1998, 9f.). possibility of a transcendental critique of the psy-
Yet there are difficulties here as well. First of all, chophysical apperception – appears to receive its
no matter how helpful it is to retrieve “the direct first explicit statement around twenty years later.13
somatic perception” that the experiencing investi- Husserl himself does not develop this theme at
gator can carry out only in the case of his/her own length. But there is enough material for us to work
lived body (5/8), we cannot make it the basis of our it out for ourselves, and I shall sketch one possible
contemporary discipline of somatics without auto- line of development here.
matically (or inadvertently) accepting the received One of Husserl’s problems in general is that he
topology of the pregiven regional ontologies, for cannot clarify everything all at once. Thus he cannot
although we are indeed free to focus on this particu- simultaneously carry out a critique of every presup-
lar stratum while disregarding other strata (34/49), position, or immediately give voice to each and every
the stratum in question is still only an abstract mo- moment of the initial and, so to speak, “mute” concre-
ment of a concrete whole that remains implicitly tion that he is investigating; instead, as he himself
in play (34/393). But this means that the retrieval points out, we find ourselves explicating this whole
of the specifically somatological does nothing to step by step and stratum by stratum, guided by this
alter the inherited stratification that presupposes the mute horizon even before we know exactly what we
physical body as a thing as the lowest stratum upon are going to say about it.14 For Husserl, then, phenom-
which the somatological, the psychological, and enological work on any particular topic presupposes
the higher, “mental” functions (and cultural achie- a more encompassing whole. And as he continues to
vements) are all founded (I will say more about all penetrate, year after year, ever more deeply into “the
this below).11 Thus although Husserl enriches the vast system of constitutive subjectivity” (17/277), his
received framework by making room for somatolo- methods mature; the terms in which he is conducting
gy, he fails to question the inherited conception of the investigations are altered; and the wholes into
the human-being12 as a psychophysical unity, or the which the analyses of particular topics fit begin to
division of the sciences based on this conception. shift as well.15
Instead, he continues to rely upon the notion of the For example, taken as a theme for scientific re-
psychophysical in spite of the fact that we do not search, the world as a whole includes various regions
actually have a direct experience of ourselves – or of reality (cf., e.g., 34/266f.); the positive sciences
others – as being composed of two separate strata (cf.
13
There are nevertheless earlier anticipations of this theme,
Landgrebe, 1984, 67ff.). But retaining the category
perhaps beginning in Autumn 1926 – see, e.g., 34/79 – and cf.
of the “psychophysical” leads to serious difficulties, 9/394 n. 1 (1925), where Husserl indicates that the apperception
both in Husserl’s accounts of intersubjectivity and in question is lacking in the sheerly egological sphere. However,
in his theory of phenomenological reduction (issues such passages as 8/410 (1924) merely attempt to inhibit the natural
apperception of oneself as a “human-being” without questioning
I cannot go into here). Such difficulties highlight
the terms in which this apperception is effected, and are ultimately
the necessity of supplementing a phenomenological only a matter of carrying out a “psychological reduction” to a pure
clarification (and enrichment) of a received tradition psychological consciousness (see 8/442f.).
“as is” with a critique of its deeper, generatively 14
“Jede Methode, die erste, sozusagen stumme Konkretion in
eine theoretisch ausgelegte zu verwandeln, bewegt sich eben
sedimented presuppositions. And this leads to a
als auslegende und beschreibende in ‘Abstraktionen’; das im
second way in which Husserlian phenomenology Explizieren im Konkreten Herausgefasste hat seinen noch stumm
might address the “soma” of somatics. verbleibenden Horizont, von dem nicht eigentlich abstrahiert ist
und gegen den man im Willen, die Konkretion auszulegen, nichts
weniger als blind ist, von dem man aber noch nichts in Sonderheit
hat und weiß, weil man nur in Schritten und in Schichten auslegen
B. The possibility of a transcendental critique und Kenntnis nehmen kann” – 34/296.
of the psychophysical apperception 15
In what follows, I will move from an ontology meant to ground
the sciences as a whole to a more explicit consideration of the
11
For a Heideggerian critique of the body-soul-spirit model, see, lifeworld as a whole, and finally to an approach based on the cor-
e.g., Ciocan, 2001a, 64ff., 86 n. 72, 89; 2001b, 154, 156f., 172f., relational a priori as a whole. The order of presentation implies
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179ff., 186; 2008, 83f. a historical development in Husserl’s thought – but each of these
12
I am using the hyphenated term “human-being” to highlight “phases” explicates something already implicit in the Ideen.
Husserl’s distinctive use of the term Mensch, which – especially For the plans and transformation of the latter, see, e.g., Marly
in his later work – typically connotes a mundane reality constituted Biemel’s editorial introduction to Husserliana 4, as well as van
through an “anthropological apperception” (34/474f.). Kerckhoven, 1980.

13
 The Human Science of Somatics and Transcendental
Phenomenology
Žmogaus somatikos mokslas ir transcendentali
fenomenologija

as a whole will accordingly require the ontological physical” reality is (as I have indicated) that the body
clarification not only of their respective regions, but is most fundamentally a thing, even though it is a
also of the system of all such ontologies as a whole thing of a very special kind.20
(cf. 5/104f.; 8/457). Thus the material ontology During the ensuing years, Husserl continues to
that Husserl was working on around the time of the rely upon the notion of the psychophysical while
Ideen16 is not composed of a set of mutually exclusive developing a lifeworld ontology whose two main
regions standing side by side, but is a complex whole categories are “Natur” and “Geist,”21 each of which
consisting of a hierarchy of strata governed by one- can become the province of a science through an
sided founding relations.17 Here we may speak of the abstraction that sets the other out of play: one abstrac-
physical, the psychophysical, and the mental, or in tion yields sheer nature, while the counter-abstraction
Husserl’s own language, Ding – Leib/Seele – Geist.18 yields the pure psyche (cf., e.g., 6/229ff.; 34/125ff.).
According to this “layered” ontology, higher mental Thus I am free, for example, to direct my interest
functions are irreducible to but one-sidedly founded toward the personal I while setting aside any ques-
in psychophysical existence; within the latter, the tions pertaining to naturalistic explanation (see, e.g.,
psyche is one-sidedly founded in the animate or- 9/227ff.; 32/129, 188). Nevertheless, the abstraction
ganism, so that everything pertaining to the psyche in question still stands on the ground of the pregiven
is provided with a location within the natural, spa- world (cf., e.g., 34/3, 49, 137), which means that the
tiotemporal world (cf., e.g., 3-1/116). And because psyche reached in this way (including the mental life
of the psyche that animates it, this organism in turn of the scientist who is carrying out the abstraction)
is irreducible to but inseparable from the sheerly remains mundane (see, e.g., 8/361; 9/471; 34/465). In
physical thing-stratum furnishing the self-sufficient other words, even if the corporeality that is necessar-
basis upon which the entire hierarchical formation is ily united with such a psyche is extra-thematic within
founded.19 Thus even if we identify, within the region the context of a purely psychological investigation,
of the psychophysical, an experiential, first-person this mundane, natural body is still in co-acceptance
somatology, such a science still depends upon a in advance: its ontic validity is still tacitly in effect,
particular abstraction that ultimately keeps a whole along with that of the world as the concrete whole
of a specific kind in play: sustaining the abstractions.22 Thus even if I set aside
Ein Abstraktes ist von vornherein relativ, sofern both the naturalized body and the pure psyche per se
die Abstraktion dem Abstrakten Geltungsbeziehung in order to pursue – within the personalistic attitude
auf den umfassenderen Horizont verleiht, der also, (cf. 9/228) – an eidetic somatology on the basis of
obschon nicht spezial-thematisch, jederzeit in Mit- “the direct somatic perception” of my own body, I
geltung ist, mitthematisch, und es in der Einstellung am ultimately still numbered among the things of
auf das entsprechende Konkretum vom thematischen the world (cf. 34/434), and I already know, prior to
Interesse mitumspannt wird. (34/54) any disciplinary divisions, that my body is simul-
Somatology accordingly remains nested within the taneously a real thing and a lived body with which
framework of the psychophysical, and the founding
20
Cf., e.g., 4/152, 37/296, 39/615.
premise of the very notion of a region of “psycho- 21
See Michael Weiler’s editorial introduction, 32/xviii ff., for
a chronological overview of the “Natur und Geist” theme in
16
Although Husserl does mention material ontology in Ideen I, at Husserl, and cf. 32/xxxix on the emergence of the notion of the
this point he is more concerned to establish the relation between Lebenswelt from the “Natur und Geist” context. The term Leb-
formal ontology and the material ontologies (see, e.g., 3-1/25f., enswelt is usually associated with the Crisis (see, e.g., 6/105ff.),
36f.), and he explicitly defers any further investigation of specific but appears in earlier writings as well. See, e.g., 4/375 (late
regional ontologies until his projected “next book” of the Ideen 1916?); HM4/18 n., 187, 223, 227f. (Summer Semester 1919,
(see 3-1/355f.). repeated Winter Semester 1921/22); 37/307 (June 1920); 9/496
17
Here we should recall that the notion of “stratification” plays a (1925); 32/198, 201, 240f., and cf. 277 (Summer Semester 1927).
key role in Husserl’s static phenomenology in general, such that For a detailed account of the development of the concept of the
sheer “sense objects” are taken as the “primal objects” (4/17) Lebenswelt even prior to the emergence of the term, see Rochus
founding further strata of valuing and of willing (or carrying out Sowa’s editorial introduction, 39/xxv ff.
practical actions). However, the stratification model is placed 22
For a particularly strong statement, see 34/392f., where Husserl
in question by Husserl’s later work; for some indication of an concludes (34/393): “Ist Psychisches in seiner Sonderuniversalität
Elizabeth A. Behnke

alternative, see Behnke, 2007b. Sonderthema, so ist Natur ausgeschlossen – aus der Sonder-
18
In some writings, Husserl also adds a further stratum of Ge- thema. Aber in weiterem Sinne ist doch Welt das Totalthema,
meinschaften (see 3-1/354, 27/22, 8/446, but cf. also 4/316, 5/20f.) … so bestimmt sich in allen thematischen Betrachtungen und
or Gemeingeist (4/199, 243; 30/282ff., and cf. also 14/165ff., Erkenntnissen von Weltregionen, von einzelnen Weltobjekten,
192ff.). Objektzusammenhängen etc. immerzu die Welt, die dabei immerzu
19
See, e.g., 5/14; 30/280f.; 37/146, 295f., but cf., e.g., das sozusagen stillschweigende, aber gemeint Totalsubstrat aller
HM8/345. Thematik ist.”

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I am inseparably one.23 I take myself, in short, as a way the psychophysical apperception is seen for
“human-being,” which means that I am pregiven to what it is, rather than simply being automatically
myself as a psychophysical reality – and this once swung into play, and it can now be thematized as a
again entails the root assumption of the body as a moment within a “hidden apperceptive traditional-
thing. ity” (34/363) whose “universal constitutive history”
Yet for Husserl, there is also the possibility of (34/363) can be brought to light.28 In other words, my
approaching these matters in terms of an even more theoretical interest within the transcendental attitude
encompassing whole than the lifeworld: namely, is directed not only to the world as a phenomenon
constituting transcendental life24 along with its holding good for me, but also to the history of the
transcendental apperceptive formations, including acceptances through which this world holds good,
“body,” “psyche,” “human-being-in-the-world,” and in its being and being-thus – which is nothing other
so on.25 Husserl had already recognized as early as than the history of the apperceptive life of generative
June 1920 that the notion of the sheer physical nature transcendental intersubjectivity itself.29
that functions as the ultimate self-sufficient stratum Husserl was not able to give a complete historical
within the received topology of the regional ontolo- account of the sedimented “network of appercep-
gies can be seen in generative terms as a historical tions” (34/156) whose correlate is the pregiven world.
achievement (37/297; cf. 6/20ff.). And in a key text But he does link the psychophysical apperception in
of July 22, 1932 (34/391–99), he brings the theme of particular to the externally experienced body (see
a transcendental critique of the psychophysical ap- 34/79, 185), and even suggests that there may be an
perception per se to unequivocal expression. Rather instinctual basis for the habitual apperceptive style
than naively accepting the regional articulation of that focuses on things of the external world,30 leading
the pregiven world, Husserl now wants to retrieve us to become things for ourselves:
the “pregiving” subjective life26 from its anonymity Dabei ist zu bemerken, dass die habituelle thema-
and highlight the performance of the psychophysi- tische Richtung auf Gegenstände äußerer Apperzep-
cal apperception itself as an ongoing achievement tion auch … den Gang weiterer Apperzeptionsbildung
of this streaming, world-constituting life.27 In this bestimmt, derart, dass auch die “bloß subjektiven”
Erscheinungsweisen, die subjektiven Tätigkeiten des
23
See, e.g., 8/491f.; 9/197, 392; 34/112. Denkens, Wertens etc. und ihre Gebilde, objektiv
24
Husserl points out (34/446–51) that for me as a human-being,
apperzipiert werden, also in der sie umspannenden
living along in the naiveté of the natural attitude, the world is
constantly pregiven as the anonymous substratum and support of Apperzeption zu Bestandstücken der Welt, näher zu
all my actions and affections, constantly presupposed and accepted
prior to any attempt to determine myself in my being-thus or to
thematize the specific ways in which the world holds good for me ‘Verseelung’ sozusagen oder die psychische Realisierung, wie
(or for us). Thus if we reflect on natural mundane life, we are only sonstige Realisierung, fungierenden apperzeptiven Erlebnisse
halfway there (34/450), for the pregivenness of the world is but an sind noch nicht die realisierten, sondern die realisierenden (Reales
abstraction (34/447; cf. 485): the return to the “pregiven” lifeworld konstituierenden). … Das Leben, dessen Fungieren Vorgegeben-
must be complemented by an inquiry into the “pregiving” transcen- heit und jede Gegebenheit apperzipierende Erfahrung macht,
dental life (see 34/449, 582f.). Hence not only is the transcendental ist nicht selbst vorgegeben und apperzipiert” (34/251). Husserl
dimension of inquiry “more concrete” than any positive scientific goes on (34/252f.) to point out that the reflection disclosing such
interest (34/121; cf. 459), but the universal a priori of correlation apperceptive performances can itself undergo a psychologizing
per se (6/161ff.) becomes the most encompassing whole insofar apperception—but the latter can always be placed in brackets each
as it is the concretion encompassing both “constituting” and time I return to a phenomenological attitude.
“constituted,” both “pregiving” and “pregiven.” Cf. Kačerauskas, 28
Here Husserl is speaking of “traditionality” in a broadened
2007, 345, on the performance of the transcendental reduction sense; see, e.g., 34/302, 441ff., and cf. 159f. For a brief example
as an “act of stepping into a new whole” – one that for Husserl of tracing the psychophysical apperception to an intersubjective
(8/269f.; 15/105) is the truly genuine concretion. experience of “objective” or “external” nature prior to the natu-
25
See, e.g., 8/290, 418, 492; 34/50, 316, 474. ral-scientific sense of the “psychophysical,” see, e.g., HM8/14ff.,
26
For Husserl, the “pregiving” consciousness (37/287) or expe- esp. 15 n. 2.
rience (34/70) ultimately turns out to be that of pregiving trans- 29
See, e.g., 34/476f., 479, and note that the ultimate concretion
cendental life (34/319); when the latter is brought to light, we accordingly turns out to be transcendental life as historical,
are accordingly led to a radical shift in our research focus: “Die intersubjective life, rather than the situated life of the individual
Vorgegebenheit der Welt ‘wendet sich um’ in die Vorgegebenheit phenomenologizing researcher (see, e.g., 34/199f.; cf. 15/109f.).
der Konstitution der Welt” (34/452), leading to an epochē of all 30
Here we might consider Husserl’s notion of an original objec-
pregiving acceptances as such (34/483) – including pregiving tivating instinct linked with self-preservation – see, e.g., 39/17;
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passivity (1/112) – in order to make them available for radical HM8/258, 331, and cf. the treatment of this theme in Lee, 1993.
reflection (34/451; cf. 299f.). On the ubiquity of the basic category of the “thing,” see, e.g.,
27
34/398. Here and elsewhere (see, e.g., 34/290, 399), Husserl is 22/275; 16/passim; 3-1/25; 4/53f.; 6/141, 145, 383. And on the
concerned with the mundanization of functioning transcendental difficulty of shifting out of an attitude directed to the “external,”
life: “Das fungierende Ich [fungierendes Leben] und seine für die cf. 9/193f.

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Phenomenology
Žmogaus somatikos mokslas ir transcendentali
fenomenologija

Psychologischem und Psychophysischem verflochten be used in carrying out an archaeology of experience

innerhalb der Welt werden. (34/64f.) (HM8/356f.), so I will venture some remarks on the
Thus the founding assumption that my own body inaugural experience of death.
is a thing may have very deep roots indeed. Can we In the first place, what is at stake here is the death
pursue the archaeology of this assumption further? of the other: death and the dead are experienced from
And can we do so in such a way as to bring to light the standpoint of the living.34 And in the second place,
an alternative apperception that could serve as the the founding moment sedimented in the “psycho-
founding presupposition31 for the discipline of somat- physical apperception” is the moment when the one
ics? Let us begin with the question of the Urstiftung who is dying stops breathing: when breath (psychē,
of the received assumption. What sort of directly anima) leaves, all we have left is the “remains”
lived experience could motivate the apperception of (which explains the logic of the one-sided founding
the body not only as a thing, but as an animated thing? relation); the person him/herself is out of reach,35
I suggest that the founding experience in this regard and is nowhere to be found on our shared earth or
is the experience of the freshly dead. And I shall ac- beneath our common sky. Thus the figure of the
cordingly pause here to consider not the biological “psychophysical” is not first inscribed in the register
fact of death, but the emergence of the very sense, of human history by Descartes, or by Christianity,
“death” as a lived meaning.32 or by the Greeks, but appears as soon as “humans”
are seen as the ones whose lifeless bodies return to
Interlude: The origin of death the humus, to the fertile realm of earth nurtured by
The notion of “the origin of death” is, of course, decay. And if we accept, on the basis of this deeply
an echo of Husserl’s own approach to a reconstruc- sedimented sense, the thesis that the essential feature
tive generative history in “The Origin of Geometry” defining the ontological region of the human-being is
(6/365–86; cf. 20). And just as Husserl imagines his that we are “psychophysical,” then we are character-
way into the “first geometers” (6/383) whose inau- ized in advance as what we will become – a lifeless
gural labors have come down to us as sedimented body from which the animating breath or spirit has
acquisitions, I want to trace the psychophysical departed, so that being-a-human-being is being-to-
apperception, as a received formation, back to its ward-death from the beginning, and our mortality is
inaugural occasion. Where is the first human experi- our defining ontological characteristic.36
ence of death to be located?33 Funerary rites in which But think back to that key moment of experienc-
the dead are honored in some way would seem to ing the freshly dead: they not only stop breathing,
provide one clue, and these lie far deeper in the past but also stop moving, and breath itself is something
than do the splendid tombs of kings; when we come we accomplish by moving.37 In other words, what
upon these earliest burial sites, the flesh and the
flowers are gone, but in the conjunction of bones and 34
See, e.g., 34/427; cf. 433. Thus the very fact of death is a remar-
pollen we find at least some indication of the special kable kind of “fact,” since it is not “directly” itself-given for the
recognition shown to the body of the departed. It is one most concerned (HM8/427), but is witnessed and confirmed
by others: although there is no personal immortality for human
true that bones and pollen provide evidence only for
and non-human animals (see 9/106; cf. 109), the immortality of
archaeological reconstruction, rather than Evidenz in the intermonadic community is the presupposition for the lived
the Husserlian phenomenological sense. Yet Husserl experience of any personal death (34/471; cf. 473ff.). Husserl
does acknowledge a certain type of reconstruction to does nevertheless offer a description of the effect of one’s own
expected death on the lived experience of an open practical ho-
rizon – see 8/351f.
31
Husserl’s detailed discussions in the 1927 Natur und Geist 35
Husserl emphasizes (13/399) that even if the stream of cons-
lecture course demonstrate that the celebrated appeal to “pre- ciousness of the dying person continues after death, the dead are
suppositionlessness” is most fundamentally a call for critique of excluded from the world that communicating subjects hold in
presuppositions (cf., e.g., not only the crucial early statement in common; cf. also HM8/102f., 445.
19-1/24, but also the later formulations in, e.g., 34/66, 176); in 36
On this well-known Heideggerian theme, see, e.g., Ciocan,
other words, the task of overcoming naive “prejudices” (HM8/41) 2001a, 89ff.; 2001b, 165ff.; 2008, 85. For alternative approaches
does not preclude identifying (and justifying) founding “precon- to mortality, see, e.g., Cohen, 2007; Lingis 1998, 151ff., 159ff.
victions” that allow sciences to proceed—see esp. 32/130ff. 37
For Husserl, the kinaestheses of breathing do indeed belong to
Elizabeth A. Behnke

32
Here I can only make a small start on a very deep question. For the realm of the “I can,” even when I am not voluntarily altering
a more formal discussion, see, e.g., Nuki, 1989 (and cf. HM8/xvii my breathing but simply allowing it to proceed freely (14/447);
n. 11 to trace the published version of the texts he draws on). such “involuntary” kinaestheses thereby belong to the realm of
33
A fuller treatment of this theme would have to consider ins- the I in the broad sense even if the active, awake I is not explicitly
tances of mourning among non-human animals (and presumably involved (14/447 n. 1, 450, 452 n. 1; cf. 89, and see also HM8/336,
pre-human animals as well), something that cannot be undertaken 39/629f.). Note also that the living are warm and the dead grow
here. cold (cf. Two A.8 below).

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is lacking in the dead body is primal motility – the important motifs characterizing this extraordinarily
sich bewegen können underlying the many modes rich theme.
of the “ich kann.” Moreover, primal motility is not First of all, kinaesthetic consciousness is not a
most originally something that – like death – can be consciousness that is conscious-of movement of some
observed only in the case of the other; it is something sort, but a consciousness that is capable of motility.
that we can be directly aware of, in the act, in our own This is a matter of subjective rather than mechanical
case.38 I accordingly propose that instead of assuming movement, and – as primal motility – it is not a matter
a regional ontology of the “psychophysical” as the of a change of location within an already-constituted
theoretical basis of somatology, we can set aside the space, but of primal space-constitution. Moreover, ki-
received topology – along with its root assumption naesthetic consciousness cannot be equated with the
that the body is a thing – and turn instead to the Hus- body as a constituted item in the world, but must be
serlian notion of kinaesthetic consciousness39 as the understood in terms of its transcendental constitutive
founding dimension of experience to be addressed by role (15/286); here Husserl typically highlights the
the discipline of somatics in general and by somatic kinaesthetic “circumstances” of perception such that
practice in particular.40 The task of Part Two will appearances are governed by kinaesthetic activity
therefore be to suggest some specific ways in which according to a motivational “if-then” logic.42 Under-
this dimension of experience can provide a founda- stood transcendentally, then, kinaesthetic conscious-
tion for transformative somatic practice. ness is a capability consciousness (cf. 13/422f.), and
this refers to capabilities of the I or ego in a broad
Part Two: Applying the sense embracing both “voluntary” and “involuntary”
phenomenological notion of registers.43 This emphasis on the volitional is crucial
in distinguishing kinaesthetic consciousness per se
kinaesthetic consciousness to from the “feeling” of movement that arises when
transformative somatic practice specific kinaesthetic possibilities are actualized.44
And kinaesthesis as the original form of the “I do”
The main theme to be addressed in Part Two may
(Cairns, 1976, 73) has its own developmental history,
be stated as follows: what transformative somatic
beginning with a global sich bewegen können and
practice works with is not a thing called the “body,”
gradually acquiring mastery,45 leading to a diverse
but a living kinaesthetic consciousness. I will offer
repertoire of kinaesthetic possibilities that are at my
two sets of variations on this theme. However, I will
disposal in principle – even if in practice, I tend to
begin by briefly introducing the Husserlian notion
reiterate the patterns that have become habitual for
of kinaesthetic consciousness itself,41 even though
me (cf., e.g., 15/203, 290, 330, 661). Nevertheless,
here it is only possible to identify a few of the most
this ordered system of the practical possibilities of
the “I can” is not only an ideal system irreducible to
any momentary actualization of certain possibilities,
38
Many accounts of our ability to be aware of our own experience but is always originally known as a whole, always
assume a “postfactuality” (Nachträglichkeit) necessarily pertai-
ning to reflection: we are aware of our own conscious processes
only after the fact, while the current experiencing itself remains 42
See, e.g., 16/passim. Note that Husserl even borrows the lan-
anonymous (cf., e.g., HM8/2, 7). Such a model, however, takes guage of kinaesthetic “Vordersätze” and “Nachsätze” to express
what I have termed the “separative” structure of visual experien- this “if-then” logic – see, e.g., HM8/52 (March 1931); Cairns,
ce as its tacit paradigm, and if we shift to a style of kinaesthetic 1976, 7 (Aug. 1931); 15/301, 306, 308 (Sept. 1931); 39/634 (Oct.,
awareness “lucidly lived from within” (see Behnke, 2006), we Nov. 1931); 39/617 (Dec. 1932); 15/578 (May 1933); NR/24, 29,
can indeed appreciate our own motility in the act. 30 (May 1934).
39
Here it is important to emphasize that just as the phenomeno- 43
See n. 38 above, and cf. also, e.g., 13/181, 328, 331, 362; 9/505
logical notion of “consciousness” cannot be understood either n. 1; HM4/184; HM8/53, 258.
in physical or in psychic terms (24/242), the phenomenological 44
The very term “kinaesthesis” expresses the associational fusion
approach to the lived body in general and to its free motility in of two moment, kinēsis and aisthēsis. However, what Husserl
particular must likewise refrain from thematizing these matters emphasizes under the title of “kinaesthesis” is the “quasi-voli-
in either psychological or physical terms (35/84). tional” moment of sheer motility as a non-hyletic moment that is
40
In this way I am attempting to carry out one of the tasks Husserl nevertheless accompanied by certain distinctive sorts of sensations
himself identifies for phenomenology, namely, not merely con- in what I have termed the localization of kinaesthetic capability in
serving the heritage of scientific work as it has been historically somaesthetic sensibility; see HM8/320, 326, and cf. also Cairns,
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handed down to us, but reshaping the sciences themselves, both 1976, 7, 64, 73.
by offering a radical critique of their existing foundations and by 45
See, e.g., HM8/235, 326ff. Such kinaesthetic mastery is a trans-
proposing new foundations (see 32/240f.). cendental condition of possibility for the experience of a coherent,
41
The classic introduction to kinaesthetic consciousness is Cla- explorable world whose emptily predelineated horizons “I can”
esges, 1964; see also Mickunas, 1974. bring to fulfillment (cf. HM8/443).

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 The Human Science of Somatics and Transcendental
Phenomenology
Žmogaus somatikos mokslas ir transcendentali
fenomenologija

engaged as a whole in some way, and always in be equated with anatomical or physiological systems
play even when we are “at rest.”46 All of this usually (as when we speak, for instance, of the “nervous
remains anonymous for the natural attitude, where system” or the “circulatory system”): they are not
we are typically focused on what we want to achieve structures of a physical body, but functional ways in
rather than on the kinaesthetic “how” of achieving it. which living motility can be organized.47 Moreover,
Like other performances of constituting transcenden- even though these functioning kinaesthetic systems
tal subjectivity, however, kinaesthetic consciousness are themselves disclosed by a species of kinaesthetic
too can be retrieved from its anonymity and described reduction (Behnke, 1997a, 182) highlighting certain
phenomenologically. But just as constituting con- subjective performances that typically remain anony-
sciousness in general cannot always be properly mous as we go about our business in the ready-made
described in terms drawn from the realm of consti- world of things and tasks, the kinaesthetic systems
tuted objects, the mode of givenness of kinaesthetic must ultimately be understood in terms of the cor-
consciousness itself is radically different from the relational a priori. Thus in my first set of variations
mode of givenness of externally appearing things: I will consider not only eight kinaesthetic systems,
instead of being presented through adumbrations, but also their correlative fields. And this necessary
kinaesthetic consciousness is itself-given, to and correlation between constituting and constituted is
for itself, through the actualization of “a” possibil- the theoretical principle accounting for the profound
ity within a more embracing consciousness of other difference that transformative somatic practice can
possibilities that are not currently actualized. make in our lives as a whole: if somatic practice
Within the kinaesthetic system as a whole, how- changes how a kinaesthetic system functions, then
ever, there are a number of particular kinaesthetic the correlative field of lived experience will be al-
systems, each consisting of a coherent nexus of tered as well.
possibilities, not all of which can be realized at once
(for example, I cannot simultaneously turn my head A. What is transformed in transformative
to the left and to the right). And although individual somatic practice? Contributions to a
systems can function relatively independently from phenomenology of kinaesthetic systems
one another, they can also combine vectorially (as
when, for example, eyes, head, and torso all turn Transformative somatic practice typically claims
to the left); stand in for one another (for example, to address the body – indeed, the living, moving
holding the door open with my shoulder if my hands person – as a whole. And since each particular kinaes-
are full); enable one another (as when, for example, thetic system is geared in with the total kinaesthetic
the arm reaches out to allow the fingers to grasp system, then even body work directed toward free-
something); or hinder one another (for example, it ing a particular area from chronic tension – thereby
is more difficult to run or skip or dance when one’s allowing supple, responsive movement to emerge in
back is very stiff). Thus what happens in one system place of frozen rigidity – will reverberate throughout
affects others, and there can be higher-order patterns the kinaesthetic system as a whole. However, such
governing a number of different kinaesthetic systems talk of work on a particular “area” of the body runs
at once. But the systems that are at stake here cannot the risk of reintroducing the root assumption of the
body as a “thing” with various “parts” (head, foot,
46
See, e.g., 11/15; 15/304, 621, 652; 6/108, 164. Husserl uses the arm, and so on). My aim in this section is therefore
notion of a kinaesthetic “system”—defined in Claesges, 1964,
to present an alternative root assumption by offer-
72, as “ein System der Vermöglichkeit, das jeweils aktualisiert
ist in einer ‘kinästhetischen Situation’”—as early as the 1907 ing eight variations on the theme of kinaesthetic
Dingvorlesungen (see, e.g., 16/section IV ff., esp. 200ff., as well consciousness, singling out eight sorts of kinaes-
as the 1916 elaboration, 297ff.), although the 1907 analyses rest thetic systems whose functioning can be transformed
on and carry forward work from 1893–94 (see 22/275ff., 416ff.),
through transformative somatic practice. These are
which speaks of “circumstances” but not yet of “systems.”
The language of “systems” persists into the 1930s—see, e.g.,
HM8/327ff.; NR/29f., 34f., 222ff.; 6/109. It is of course possible 47
Husserl sometimes addresses kinaesthetic systems in terms
to challenge Husserl’s terminology; however, as with many of his of specific lived-bodily “organs,” each of which governs a par-
Elizabeth A. Behnke

technical locutions, his reference to kinaesthetic systems must be ticular range of kinaesthetic possibilities (see, e.g., 9/197, 390).
understood in terms of the fulfilling experiential evidence, rather Elsewhere, however, he questions whether kinaesthetic sequences,
than in terms of the way the word is used in other theoretical considered purely phenomenologically, have to be apperceived
contexts, and we should bear in mind that the systematicity in as movements of physical “organs” (see 36/165f.; cf. Cairns,
question here is a matter of the coherent horizon of capabilities 1976, 6f.), and even wonders if kinaesthetic functioning has to
within which each current kinaesthetic actualization (or complex be localized in a body at all (14/547; cf., e.g., 13/57, 229, 256,
pattern of actualizations) stands. 285, 293).

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nevertheless only distinguishable, not separable, 2. We might also consider, for example, not only
moments in continual mutual interplay, intricately the kinaesthetic systems of the touching hands, but
implying and influencing one another within a richly also those of the grasping, shaping hands, along with
complex whole. Thus enumerating them is merely the other kinaesthetic systems whose correlate is the
a theoretical strategy designed to identify certain world as a field for practical action.49 The practical
dimensions along which transformations of our pos- kinaesthetic system is goal-directed, realizing its
sibilities can take place. possibilities “in-order-to” do something or other, and
1. Most of Husserl’s own analyses of kinaesthetic the special act of incorporating a tool into my own
systems address perceptual kinaesthetic systems, kinaesthetic system can alter the effects of my actions
inquiring, for example, into the way in which the in very significant ways. Here both the differentiation
individual kinaesthetic systems of each finger between and the coordination among kinaesthetic
function together in the touching hand, as well as systems can be quite complex (cf. 39/397f.), espe-
distinguishing the “oculomotoric” and the “cepha- cially in, for example, music, dance, and sports. But
lomotoric” systems (along with the possibilities of even the performance of a relatively simple practical
rotating the torso) in the case of vision.48 “Seeing,” gesture in one particular kinaesthetic system will
in other words, involves a lot more than just the eyes. require certain precise adjustments in other systems,
And the difference between anatomical systems and so that what is enacted “locally” entails the “global”
kinaesthetic systems stands out even more clearly participation of the kinaesthetic system as a whole.
when we note the emphasis that Husserl places on (Think, for instance, of what has to happen in the
locomotor movement – the cyclical movement of total kinaesthetic system when I am throwing or
the legs in walking – in the constitution of the visual kicking or catching a ball.) A morphological eidet-
field in terms of inner and outer horizons. On the ics of practical kinaesthetic systems has yet to be
one hand, the very fact that the “indistinct” features carried out, but might identify, for example, actions
of the façade are given in advance as predelineating carried out by paired systems working symmetrically
the possibility of further clarification has as its con- (as when, for example, we hug someone with both
stitutive condition of possibility my ability to move arms, or use two hands to push up a window) in
closer to the building. And on the other hand, that contrast to actions where there is marked asymmetry
the building I see is not only given as having other between two systems, each actualizing very differ-
sides, but also as standing within surroundings that ent kinaesthetic possibilities that must nevertheless
can be explored in many further directions points be quite precisely coordinated (as in, for instance,
back to the full range of locomotor kinaestheses that playing the violin). Or consider the kinaesthetics of
allow me to function as a moving center of orienta- appropriating an object by picking it up and carrying
tion. Thus for Husserl, the legs are effectively part of it, along with such variations as maintaining control
the kinaesthetic system of vision. Since he himself over an object while touching it only intermittently,
has already provided numerous descriptions of the as in dribbling a basketball. In general, however,
role of “kinaesthetic circumstances” in motivating just as perceptual kinaesthetic systems are guided by
perceptual appearances, I will not go into any further
detail here. In general, however, the correlate of each 49
Cf., e.g., 34/449, 465. For Husserl, perception itself is a primal
perceptual kinaesthetic system is a sensory field, and lived-bodily praxis founding all other forms of praxis (39/383; cf.
our deployment of the kinaesthetic system concerned HM8/238). However, he also distinguishes 1) world-experience
as a constant process of affection and apperception, leading to
in each case (or of several systems directed toward
bringing whatever is there to itself-givenness and determining it
the same intersensorial thing) is motivated by the in more detail, from 2) the life of action that alters what already
possibility of bringing what is perceived to optimal exists in the world (34/361). He is thereby contrasting 1) kina-
givenness (see, e.g., 14/235, HM8/52f., 39/204f.). estheses whose function is strictly perceptual and 2) practical
kinaestheses that intervene in the world in some way (39/396f.).
However, he also points out that there are not two different sets
of kinaestheses, one for perceiving and one for acting, but rather
48
See, e.g., 16/306, 15/296, NR/217; 16/200ff., 309ff. Note that two intertwined modes of functioning: “Es handelt sich nicht um
although Landgrebe 1984, 60, defines kinaesthesis as “a movement zwei getrennte Sorten von Kinästhesen, sondern um zweierlei
which is aware of itself in the process of its own execution,” he Weisen des Zusammenfungierens der in der Einheit des kinäst-
also acknowledges that we are “generally not even aware of,” hetischen Systems mannigfach sich gliedernden Kinästhesen”
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e.g., our eye movements, and even suggests that they “are only (39/397). Husserl typically mentions pushing, shoving, and lifting
accessible to us by means of external observation.” However, as examples of practical action (see, e.g., 9/197, 463; 15/299 n.
transformative somatic practice offers many ways in which to 1; 39/399, 617), and notes that such practical achievements are
cultivate our awareness of the typically unnoticed kinaesthetic correlative to one’s capabilities, e.g., the strength currently at
“how” of our perceptual commerce with the world. one’s disposal (HM8/227).

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 The Human Science of Somatics and Transcendental
Phenomenology
Žmogaus somatikos mokslas ir transcendentali
fenomenologija

the goal of optimal givenness, practical kinaesthetic elsewhere (Behnke, 2003, 43ff.), here too I will
systems are guided by the success or failure of the merely mention that it is not only a question of, for
action in question (cf., e.g., HM8/235). example, the degree to which I am letting my weight
3. But we must also note that practical action settle into the surface that supports me, but also of
typically requires upright posture as its practical deploying my own momentum while keeping my
presupposition. Achieving and maintaining upright balance as I move – something that involves far more
posture is one of the main functions of the kinaes- than anatomical “organs” of balance in the inner ear.
thetic system of “making a body.” The notion of For example, if I am about to fall, the kinaesthetic
“making a body” is meant to recall such phrases as system involved in regaining my balance may recruit
“making a face” or “making a fist,” but involves an appropriate kinaesthetic possibility from almost
the ongoing (and typically anonymous) kinaesthetic anywhere within the total kinaesthetic system,51
organization of the body as a whole, even prior to which demonstrates once again that the systems I am
carrying out specific acts of external perception or describing are functional rather than structural: they
performing any specific practical gestures. Else- are coherent systems of possibilities, not all of which
where I have specified various dimensions along will be actualized at any given moment, rather than
which making a body proceeds (Behnke, 1997a, extended simultaneous arrays of partes extra partes
186ff.; 2005, §2). Here, however, I would like to like the skeleton.
suggest that the correlate of this complex kinaes- 5. Breath is another important focus of many
thetic system of making a body is not merely the transformative somatic practices, and here too the
body-as-made at any given moment. Instead, one’s kinaesthetic system of breathing encompasses more
own deeply sedimented style of making a body si- than the “respiratory system” as it is typically treated
multaneously perpetuates past patterns and shapes in anatomy and physiology. Thus it is not merely a
future possibilities, opening a relational field of matter of passageways and lungs, but of the elasticity
“that to which I respond in a certain way” – think, with which the torso can respond to the movement of
for example, of a way of making a body in which the breath: just as wearing a piece of clothing that is
cringing, or bracing, or enduring, or resisting pre- too tight can impede breathing, we can also speak of
dominates, or of a body in which the startle response wearing a body that is too tight,52 and we can work
is habitually in play. Such examples remind us that toward gaining more freedom in the kinaesthetic
making a body is not merely a matter of the personal systems concerned, including the sides and the back
history of an isolated individual, but is carried out as well as the chest and the belly. The kinaesthetic
by a socially shaped kinaesthetic consciousness system of breathing is particularly interesting, not
(Behnke, 2007a; in press). only because it provides an experiential basis for
4. Many transformative somatic practices empha- the psychophysical apperception, but also because it
size our relation to gravity and to the ground. This simultaneously grounds our speaking and singing,53
goes beyond the question of upright posture per se, and works in very intimate coordination with the
and involves a kinaesthetic dialogue not only with kinaesthetic systems involved in eating and drink-
an abiding up-down axis, but also with a variety of ing, so that we can swallow without choking (and
surfaces that invite certain kinaesthetic possibilities even talk with our mouths full). If we inquire into
and discourage others – think, for example, of how the correlate of the kinaesthetic system of breathing
the surfaces on which ice hockey and basketball are
to the ground, see 13/284, NR/217.
played relate to varieties of gliding or sliding on the 51
Think, for example, of the kinds of arm gestures that may
one hand and jumping (or bouncing) on the other. spontaneously arise when you are attempting to keep your balan-
Such matters can be studied phenomenologically ce while walking across an extremely slippery surface. Balance
by turning to the kinaesthetic systems of balance can also involve prosthetic extensions of the body (e.g., the long
pole a tightrope walker may use), and there can be intercorporeal
and support, whose correlate can accordingly be
balancing acts as well, as when, for instance, a child learning to
termed the fields of balance and support (both in ride a bicycle is accompanied by an adult steadying the bicycle
order to avoid the naturalistic connotations of the with one light touch of the finger.
word “gravity,” and to recognize that we may be 52
This example is drawn from Speads, 1992, 68: when the chest
Elizabeth A. Behnke

or rib cage is too stiff, “the problem is not a piece of clothing you
supported by what we lean back against as well as
have been wearing too tightly; you have been wearing yourself
by the ground under our feet or the surface we are too tightly, if I may say so!”
sitting on).50 Since I have addressed these matters 53
See 14/337 on the role of the kinaesthetics of speaking and
singing in the constitution of another lived-bodily subjectivity.
50
For examples of Husserl’s (scarce) comments on the lived For a Merleau-Pontyan approach to a “community of respiration,”
experience of being upright in gravity while giving one’s weight see Berndtson, 2007.

20
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per se, however, we find what may be termed the next here”54). In other words, any given kinaesthetic
field of the breathable and the unbreathable. Perhaps constellation has its immediately adjacent “halo”55
the epitome of the breathable would be the fresh air of possible directions in which further kinaesthetic
of an invigorating forest; in contrast, unaccustomed movement might proceed, and every other pos-
altitude may make it harder to breathe. But the sibility (within the kinaesthetic system as a whole)
unbreathable takes many other forms as well. For lying beyond this halo of immediate adjacency can
example, the room can seem “stuffy”; we may be be actualized only through some sort of mediated,
caught in a dust storm; there may be smoke, or air path-like adjacency. This is not because I currently
pollution; or perhaps there is a very bad smell in the lack the technology for teleporting myself from
air. We also unfortunately have to consider tear gas, place to place within an already-constituted space
as well as poison gas (whether on the battlefields and reaching a new location without actually having
of World War I, in the gas chambers of World War traversed the intervening trajectory, but because it
II, or as a terrorist threat today). And since for us is once again a matter of primal space-constitution,
the very medium of the breathable is air rather than of a spatialization that proceeds at the leading edge
water, it is imperative that I mention (and condemn) of kinaesthetic enactment as well as at the leading
the use by the United States of waterboarding as edge of the living present – a matter of the space I
torture – something that may inscribe no obvious originally “make” by moving into it prior to having
wounds on the victim, but profoundly violates the a ready-made world extended before me. Thus we
kinaesthetic system of breathing. might refer to the correlate of the kinaesthetic system
6. Another extremely important kinaesthetic sys- of immediate efficacy as the primal genetic form of
tem may be termed the affective kinaesthetic system the world as a field of freedom for situated motil-
as a primal openness to the field of affective salience ity. More specifically, however, the leading edge
that is the primal genetic form of the physiognomic of whatever kinaesthetic constellation is actually
world. Since I have discussed this elsewhere as realized here and now opens both the field of habit
well (Behnke, 2008a, 2008b), here I will merely and the field of its possible transformation, for it is
emphasize that this has to do not with the kinaes- only here that I can either proceed with the reitera-
thetics of “doing,” but with the kinaesthetics of tion of a habitual kinaesthetic possibility or allow an
“undergoing,” of being-affected by something – for alternative possibility to be realized (Behnke, 2004,
example, by the subtle intercorporeal vectors of the 35ff.). The implications that all of this might have
interkinaesthetic field – and allowing ourselves to for transformative somatic practice are yet to be fully
be moved by it in the manner proper to feeling (cf. worked out. But in order to provide a more concrete
HM8/351f.), rather than closing ourselves off and example of the application of a phenomenological
refusing it our complicity. In other words, here it is theory of kinaesthetic systems to transformative
a matter of appreciating the kinaesthetic dynamics somatic practice, I will close this first set of varia-
of sensing rather than determining what is sensed in tions with a brief phenomenological description of a
the sensing – a matter of turning to the kinaesthetic complex pair of systems involving all of the systems
“how of the receivingness” rather than focusing discussed so far.
solely on the “how of the givenness” of whatever 8. The twin kinaesthetic systems I want to discuss
it is that we are experiencing. Thus in a sense this here might be termed the kinaesthetic systems of
is a meta-system informing the kinaesthetic system coping and recuperation, and their correlates are,
as a whole, yet specifying a particular moment in respectively, the field of situational demands and
the deep structure of its functioning. And here too the field of replenishment. The system of coping
such situations as war, foreign occupation, terrorist involves mobilizing one’s efforts to meet the needs
threat, or ongoing genocide not only leave their hor-
rific traces in the visible flesh of their victims, but 54
The notion of allowing “what is needed next here” to emerge
also inscribe invisible violations at very profound is an important principle in both the transformative somatic prac-
levels, uprooting us from the shared world of safety tice inaugurated by Elsa Gindler, enriched by Heinrich Jacoby,
and trust (cf. Behnke, 2002). and brought to the United States (where it is known as Sensory
Awareness) by Charlotte Selver – cf. Behnke, 2007a, 79ff., 86
7. Yet another kinaesthetic meta-system might be
n. 6 – and the Focusing practice developed by phenomenologist
ISSN 1392-8600

termed the system of immediate efficacy—of what is Eugene T. Gendlin (see www.focusing.org).
immediately possible, kinaesthetically, “from here” 55
As Claesges, 1964, 75 n. 1, remarks, “Zu jeder kinästhetischen
(and its important subsystem of “what is needed Situation gehört ein ‘Spielraum von kinästhetischen Bewegungen,
die ich von da aus vermöglichen kann’”; the quotation is from
Husserl’s Ms. D 12 I (1931), 13. Cf. Behnke, 2005, §5.

21
 The Human Science of Somatics and Transcendental
Phenomenology
Žmogaus somatikos mokslas ir transcendentali
fenomenologija

of the occasion, and I shall take an extreme case as my cold hands to warm up, so that I may feel, for
my example – one in which “emergency” modes of example, an initial tingling, then a pulsing liquidity,
rising to the occasion and coping with its demands a vibrational “glow” of warmth gradually spreading
have become part of one’s sedimented style of kinaes- to other kinaesthetic systems, so that my breathing
thetic comportment as a whole, leading to a build- changes and I sense myself in flowing communion
up of chronic “holding patterns” in which certain with my surroundings, letting things be and simply
kinaesthetic possibilities are ongoingly actualized allowing myself to be replenished and nourished
without respite. It is as if one is constantly on alert, before returning – with more serenity and resilience
in anxious anticipation of the next demand, tensed up than before – to the world of “coping.”
to cope with whatever comes while tight with worry Now all of this can also be addressed physiologi-
about not being able to cope, thus continually braced cally, in terms of our bodily response to “stress” (in
for the worst while trying as hard as one can, giving neuromuscular as well as biochemical terms) and
it one’s best effort without let-up.56 This global or by way of the contrast between “sympathetic” and
existential kinaesthetic attitude is essentially directed “parasympathetic” dominance within the autonomic
toward the world and toward others, and its correlate nervous system. Yet current approaches to these
is everyday life in our times (graduate school, the job matters often assume a psychophysical paradigm in
market, productivity in the workplace, meeting the which these sheerly “bodily” processes are beyond
deadlines, and so on). direct “conscious” control and can only be affected
In contrast, the correlate of the kinaesthetic system indirectly – for example, by using relaxation routines
of recuperation is one’s own lived body as a flow- involving imagery, or by using biofeedback technol-
ing field of warmth and recovery. The performances ogy to bridge the gap between the “voluntary” and
serving as the constitutive condition of possibility for the “involuntary.” The advantage of the phenomeno-
this matrix of replenishment might include exercising logical approach lies in bringing the kinaesthetics of
an effective epochē that deactivates the dynamics coping and recuperation to direct awareness in their
of “coping” in order to allow some time to meet the own right, including the possibility of learning to
needs of the constitutive kinaesthetic system itself perform an inner gesture of easing constriction that
(rather than ignoring these needs completely or sub- allows us to experience our own flesh as a warm and
ordinating them to the demands of the surrounding fluid medium through which kinaesthetic impulses
situation). Thus, for example, I may place my cur- are free to move. Such a possibility can thus illustrate
rent practical projects in brackets; lie down in a safe, the relevance of a phenomenology of kinaesthetic
warm place and close my eyes; set aside the habitual consciousness for awareness practices within the field
style of experiencing in which I am directed toward of somatics in general, and for what I call restora-
the world rather than my own life; and experiment tive embodiment work in particular. But what about
with a kinaesthetic “openness” toward the affective hands-on body work practices?
saliences arising within the somaesthetic field while
allowing these saliences to motivate shifts at the B. How can hands-on body work address
leading edge of the current kinaesthetic constellation, kinaesthetic consciousness?
perhaps letting my weight settle more fully into the
surface that supports me or making room for a fuller, This question forms the basis for my second,
freer breath. In this way I am not only allowing my shorter set of variations on the theme of kinaes-
own way of making a body to come to awareness, thetic consciousness; once again there will be eight
but offering an opportunity for the kinaesthetic vec- variations, this time emphasizing various kinds of
tors in place to shift and habitual rigidities to melt. counterpoint between two kinaesthetic conscious-
In addition, however, I can perform what might be nesses. And the principle guiding this counterpoint
called an inner gesture of hospitality – for example, may be stated as follows: I cannot “grasp” another’s
an inner gesture of “spreading” in the palms of my kinaesthetic consciousness as if it were a thing, but
hands, as one would spread one’s fingers (yet without once I recognize it, I can partner it in a number of
this gesture actually “going anywhere” in space). ways. Thus the client is to be taken as a kinaesthetic
Elizabeth A. Behnke

Such an inner gesture of easing constriction can allow consciousness (rather than merely as a “body”), and
the question guiding the practitioner involves the
56
As Tinbergen 1974, 25, notes, what is at stake here is “culturally kinaesthetics of respect for such a consciousness.
determined stress,” including “the cowed posture that one assumes 1. First of all, in touching the other, we are not
when one feels that one is not quite up to one’s work, when one
making physical contact with an inert mass, but
feels insecure.”

22
žmogus ir žodis 2009 IV
fil osof in ia i t yr in ė j ima i

touching someone who is thereby touched – and who 6. An entirely different set of possibilities opens
is kinaesthetically receiving this touch in a particular up when the relation is not supporting-supported, but
way (for example, gratefully welcoming it and blos- moving-moved. This is not a matter of a displace-
soming under it, or perhaps flinching away from it, ment of a physical body in space, but of establish-
or enduring the fact of it while remaining inwardly ing a shared kinaesthetic system; respecting what is
barricaded against the feel of it, and so on). Thus the already going on in this new “member” of my own
work is not a matter of physical manipulation, but kinaesthetic system; and then informing our shared
of dialogue between one sentient/sensitive motility system with a movement style that is radically dif-
and another.57 And the practitioner who approaches ferent from the client’s own. This can then allow the
his/her work in the spirit of an embodied ethics client to have the corresponding experience of “how
or “corporeal ‘ethos’” (Mickunas, 1987, 40) must it feels to move like this” – a feeling that the client
accordingly respect what is going on in the interki- can then learn to elicit alone by adopting this new
naesthetic field, staying aware of boundaries, zones style of movement (cf. Trager, 1987, 98ff.).
of permeability and resonance, and so on. 7. A further skill on the part of the practitioner
2. We may also want to use our hands to suggest may be involved here as well, one that I call “touch-
a possible line of movement for the other, perhaps ing-through” (cf. Behnke, 2007a, 75). Of course, we
thereby retrieving kinaesthetic possibilities that have are accustomed to “feeling-through” many surfaces:
been occluded or are seldom used, but can be restored I feel the texture of the cobblestone street through
to the repertoire of the other’s I-can. Thus rather than the soles of my shoes, I feel the strings of the violin
attempting, for example, to apply physical force in through the bow, and so on. We can even feel the
order to break down adhesions in the connective movement of the tea or the coffee inside the cup we
tissue and give the physical body a greater range of are carrying when all we are actually touching is the
motion, I gently feel my way into whatever leeway handle of the cup. In somatic practice, however, it
is already there, respecting its limits and proposing is a matter of touching-through to the ongoing ef-
(rather than imposing) a possible change. ficacy of the other’s kinaesthetic consciousness. In
3. A further variation involves respecting a habitu- other words, rather than palpating the client’s flesh
al kinaesthetic vector already in place – for example, in order to determine how tense it is, or kneading
one curving the shoulder forward – as if it were a a tense muscle in order to get it to relax, I touch-
gesture that the client was making on purpose, and through to the ongoingly reiterated kinaesthetic
meeting this gesture halfway, as it were, by resisting achievement of “tensing up” in just this way. And
it with an equal and opposite gesture of exactly the this is precisely what allows me to respect the other’s
same strength, thereby retrieving this gesture from its kinaesthetic enactments by enabling me to appreci-
anonymity, restoring its halo of further possibilities ate them in the first place. Moreover, I can then
“from here” and allowing it to shift. adopt an interrogative attitude: instead of placing
4. Conversely, I can match the same shoulder- my touching-through in the service of a project of
shaping gesture by using my own hands to help knowing geared toward a more exact determination
maintain this gesture exactly as is; once the kinaes- of the features of an identical transtemporal unity
thetic system in question has been relieved of the task of a certain type (Behnke, 2005, §6), I can perform
of maintaining the habitual shape, its usual holding a radical reduction to the living present in the spirit
patterns are free to move on toward “whatever is of “not-knowing” what will happen next, simply
needed next here.” partnering the other’s ongoing kinaesthetic activity
5. A related possibility involves literally sup- by being-there with it. And instead of attempting to
porting another’s gesture – for example, by using produce a particular change that I posit in advance as
one’s own hands to take the weight of the other’s a goal, I can just allow whatever emerges to emerge,
outstretched arm – and this can similarly open up letting it happen without impeding it. Thus rather than
further possible ways for the client to accomplish the involving purposive manipulation on the part of the
same gesture alone (for instance, with the shoulder practitioner toward a known end, such interrogative
involved in a different way). touch is an open – and open-ended – invitation to
the client’s own kinaesthetic system to propose its
ISSN 1392-8600

own subtle and spontaneous shifts as the needs of

57
A similar point can be made about dance technique, which the moment dictate.
“functions not as a technical device that effects the physiological 8. Finally, a further variation moves beyond the
body …, but as a principle that effects intentionality and remakes
asymmetry of the practitioner-client model and
the human body like a catalyst”—Karoblis, 2007, 364.

23
 The Human Science of Somatics and Transcendental
Phenomenology
Žmogaus somatikos mokslas ir transcendentali
fenomenologija

explores interkinaesthetic partnering as a mutual can guide these sciences. And finally, the possibility
moving-with and being-moved-by the other – for of shifting from thinking, for example, in terms of the
example, in the dance form known as Contact Im- “psychophysical apperception” to thinking in terms
provisation, where participants create conjoined of “kinaesthetic consciousness” is a possibility that
fields of balance and support, or in much simpler can itself flow back into the lifeworld (cf. 34/475,
practices such as mirroring another’s slow, smooth 6/214), providing not only an altered theoretical
movement, taking turns leading the movement until framework, but a new style of practical comportment
it is the unfolding movement itself, rather than either as well (cf. 34/87). Thus transcendental phenomenol-
partner, that is leading the kinaesthetic flows. Thus ogy as rigorous science is not only able to thematize
the phenomenological notion of kinaesthetic con- the liminal body of transformative somatic practice
sciousness can be applied not only to transformative (as well as the routinized body of the natural attitude),
somatic practice as something carried out by a prac- but can function as a species of action research59
titioner in order to benefit a client, but also to forms whose investigations leave what is being investigated
of restorative embodiment work that are dedicated free to move forward in productive ways, blazing a
to reciprocal renewal and empowerment. moving trail into an open future.

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Elizabeth A. Behnke

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On phenomenology as transcendental critique rather than life-
58
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