THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 173138. December 1, 2010.]

NOEL B. BACCAY , petitioner, vs . MARIBEL C. BACCAY and REPUBLIC

OF THE PHILIPPINES , respondents.

DECISION

VILLARAMA, JR. , J : p

This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended, assails the Decision 1 dated August 26, 2005 and Resolution 2
dated June 13, 2006 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 74581. The CA
reversed the February 5, 2002 Decision 3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila,
Branch 38, which declared the marriage of petitioner Noel B. Baccay (Noel) and Maribel
Calderon-Baccay (Maribel) void on the ground of psychological incapacity under Article
36 4 of the Family Code of the Philippines.
The undisputed factual antecedents of the case are as follows:
Noel and Maribel were schoolmates at the Mapua Institute of Technology where
both took up Electronics and Communications Engineering. Sometime in 1990, they
were introduced by a mutual friend and became close to one another. Noel courted
Maribel, but it was only after years of continuous pursuit that Maribel accepted Noel's
proposal and the two became sweethearts. Noel considered Maribel as the snobbish
and hard-to-get type, which traits he found attractive. 5
Noel's family was aware of their relationship for he used to bring Maribel to their
house. Noel observed that Maribel was inordinately shy when around his family so to
bring her closer to them, he always invited Maribel to attend family gatherings and
other festive occasions like birthdays, Christmas, and esta celebrations. Maribel,
however, would try to avoid Noel's invitations and whenever she attended those
occasions with Noel's family, he observed that Maribel was invariably aloof or
snobbish. Not once did she try to get close to any of his family members. Noel would
talk to Maribel about her attitude towards his family and she would promise to change,
but she never did.
Around 1997, Noel decided to break up with Maribel because he was already
involved with another woman. He tried to break up with Maribel, but Maribel refused
and offered to accept Noel's relationship with the other woman so long as they would
not sever their ties. To give Maribel some time to get over their relationship, they still
continued to see each other albeit on a friendly basis.
Despite their efforts to keep their meetings strictly friendly, however, Noel and
Maribel had several romantic moments together. Noel took these episodes of sexual
contact casually since Maribel never demanded anything from him except his company.
Then, sometime in November 1998, Maribel informed Noel that she was pregnant with
his child. Upon advice of his mother, Noel grudgingly agreed to marry Maribel. Noel and
Maribel were immediately wed on November 23, 1998 before Judge Gregorio Dayrit,
the Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City. CTIDcA

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 After the marriage ceremony, Noel and Maribel agreed to live with Noel's family in
their house at Rosal, Pag-asa, Quezon City. During all the time she lived with Noel's
family, Maribel remained aloof and did not go out of her way to endear herself to them.
She would just come and go from the house as she pleased. Maribel never contributed
to the family's coffer leaving Noel to shoulder all expenses for their support. Also, she
refused to have any sexual contact with Noel.
Surprisingly, despite Maribel's claim of being pregnant, Noel never observed any
symptoms of pregnancy in her. He asked Maribel's o ce mates whether she
manifested any signs of pregnancy and they con rmed that she showed no such signs.
Then, sometime in January 1999, Maribel did not go home for a day, and when she
came home she announced to Noel and his family that she had a miscarriage and was
confined at the Chinese General Hospital where her sister worked as a nurse.
Noel confronted her about her alleged miscarriage sometime in February 1999.
The discussion escalated into an intense quarrel which woke up the whole household.
Noel's mother tried to intervene but Maribel shouted "Putang ina nyo, wag kayo
makialam" at her. Because of this, Noel's mother asked them to leave her house.
Around 2:30 a.m., Maribel called her parents and asked them to pick her up. Maribel left
Noel's house and did not come back anymore. Noel tried to communicate with Maribel
but when he went to see her at her house nobody wanted to talk to him and she
rejected his phone calls. 6
On September 11, 2000 or after less than two years of marriage, Noel led a
petition 7 for declaration of nullity of marriage with the RTC of Manila. Despite
summons, Maribel did not participate in the proceedings. The trial proceeded after the
public prosecutor manifested that no collusion existed between the parties. Despite a
directive from the RTC, the O ce of the Solicitor General (OSG) also did not submit a
certification manifesting its agreement or opposition to the case. 8
On February 5, 2002, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of Noel. The
dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the marriage of the parties
hereto celebrated on November 23, 1998 at the sala of Judge Gregorio Dayrit of
the Metropolitan Trial Court in Quezon City as NULL and VOID.

The Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City and the Chief of the National Statistics
Office are hereby directed to record and enter this decree into the marriage records
of the parties in their respective marriage registers.

The absolute community property of the parties is hereby dissolved and,

henceforth, they shall be governed by the property regime of complete separation
of property.

With costs against respondent.

SO ORDERED. 9

The RTC found that Maribel failed to perform the essential marital obligations of
marriage, and such failure was due to a personality disorder called Narcissistic
Personality Disorder characterized by juridical antecedence, gravity and incurability as
determined by a clinical psychologist. The RTC cited the ndings of Nedy L. Tayag, a
clinical psychologist presented as witness by Noel, that Maribel was a very insecure
person. She entered into the marriage not because of emotional desire for marriage but
to prove something, and her attitude was exploitative particularly in terms of nancial
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 rewards. She was emotionally immature, and viewed marriage as a piece of paper and
that she can easily get rid of her husband without any provocation. 1 0
On appeal by the OSG, the CA reversed the decision of the RTC, thus:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila Branch 38 declaring as null and void the marriage between petitioner-
appellee and respondent is hereby REVERSED. Accordingly, the instant Petition
for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage is hereby DENIED.
aTADCE

SO ORDERED. 1 1

The appellate court held that Noel failed to establish that Maribel's supposed
Narcissistic Personality Disorder was the psychological incapacity contemplated by
law and that it was permanent and incurable. Maribel's attitudes were merely mild
peculiarities in character or signs of ill-will and refusal or neglect to perform marital
obligations which did not amount to psychological incapacity, said the appellate court.
The CA noted that Maribel may have failed or refused to perform her marital obligations
but such did not indicate incapacity. The CA stressed that the law requires nothing
short of mental illness su cient to render a person incapable of knowing the essential
marital obligations. 1 2
The CA further held that Maribel's refusal to have sexual intercourse with Noel did
not constitute a ground to nd her psychologically incapacitated under Article 36 of the
Family Code. As Noel admitted, he had numerous sexual relations with Maribel before
their marriage. Maribel therefore cannot be said to be incapacitated to perform this
particular obligation and that such incapacity existed at the time of marriage. 1 3
Incidentally, the CA held that the OSG erred in saying that what Noel should have
led was an action to annul the marriage under Article 45 (3) 1 4 of the Family Code.
According to the CA, Article 45 (3) involving consent to marriage vitiated by fraud is
limited to the instances enumerated under Article 46 1 5 of the Family Code. Maribel's
misrepresentation that she was pregnant to induce Noel to marry her was not the fraud
contemplated under Article 45 (3) as it was not among the instances enumerated under
Article 46. 1 6
On June 13, 2006, the CA denied Noel's motion for reconsideration. It held that
Maribel's personality disorder is not the psychological incapacity contemplated by law.
Her refusal to perform the essential marital obligations may be attributed merely to her
stubborn refusal to do so. Also, the manifestations of the Narcissistic Personality
Disorder had no connection with Maribel's failure to perform her marital obligations.
Noel having failed to prove Maribel's alleged psychological incapacity, any doubts
should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and
against its dissolution and nullity. 1 7
Hence, the present petition raising the following assignment of errors:
I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION IN HOLDING THAT THE CASE OF CHI MING TSOI vs. COURT
OF APPEALS DOES NOT FIND APPLICATION IN THE INSTANT CASE.
II. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION IN HOLDING THAT THE RESPONDENT IS NOT SUFFERING
FROM NARCISSISTIC PERSONALITY DISORDER; AND THAT HER FAILURE
TO PERFORM HER ESSENTIAL MARITAL OBLIGATIONS DOES NOT
CONSTITUTE PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY. 1 8
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 The issue to be resolved is whether the marriage between the parties is null and
void under Article 36 of the Family Code.
Petitioner Noel contends that the CA failed to consider Maribel's refusal to
procreate as psychological incapacity. Insofar as he was concerned, the last time he
had sexual intercourse with Maribel was before the marriage when she was drunk. They
never had any sexual intimacy during their marriage. Noel claims that if a spouse
senselessly and constantly refuses to perform his or her marital obligations, Catholic
marriage tribunals attribute the causes to psychological incapacity rather than to
stubborn refusal. He insists that the CA should not have considered the pre-marital
sexual encounters between him and Maribel in nding that the latter was not
psychologically incapacitated to procreate through marital sexual cooperation. He
argues that making love for procreation and consummation of the marriage for the
start of family life is different from "plain, simple and casual sex." He further stresses
that Maribel railroaded him into marrying her by seducing him and later claiming that
she was pregnant with his child. But after their marriage, Maribel refused to
consummate their marriage as she would not be sexually intimate with him. 1 9 HEIcDT

Noel further claims that there were other indicia of Maribel's psychological
incapacity and that she consistently exhibited several traits typical of a person
suffering from Narcissistic Personality Disorder before and during their marriage. He
points out that Maribel would only mingle with a few individuals and never with Noel's
family even if they lived under one (1) roof. Maribel was also arrogant and haughty. She
was rude and disrespectful to his mother and was also "interpersonally exploitative" as
shown by her misrepresentation of pregnancy to force Noel to marry her. After
marriage, Maribel never showed respect and love to Noel and his family. She displayed
indifference to his emotional and sexual needs, but before the marriage she would
display unfounded jealousy when Noel was visited by his friends. This same jealousy
motivated her to deceive him into marrying her.
Lastly, he points out that Maribel's psychological incapacity was proven to be
permanent and incurable with the root cause existing before the marriage. The
psychologist testi ed that persons suffering from Narcissistic Personality Disorder
were unmotivated to participate in therapy session and would reject any form of
psychological help rendering their condition long lasting if not incurable. Such persons
would not admit that their behavioral manifestations connote pathology or abnormality.
The psychologist added that Maribel's psychological incapacity was deeply rooted
within her adaptive system since early childhood and manifested during adult life.
Maribel was closely attached to her parents and mingled with only a few close
individuals. Her close attachment to her parents and their over-protection of her turned
her into a self-centered, self-absorbed individual who was insensitive to the needs of
others. She developed the tendency not to accept rejection or failure. 2 0
On the other hand, the OSG maintains that Maribel's refusal to have sexual
intercourse with Noel did not constitute psychological incapacity under Article 36 of
the Family Code as her traits were merely mild peculiarities in her character or signs of
ill-will and refusal or neglect to perform her marital obligations. The psychologist even
admitted that Maribel was capable of entering into marriage except that it would be
di cult for her to sustain one. Also, it was established that Noel and Maribel had sexual
relations prior to their marriage. The OSG further pointed out that the psychologist was
vague as to how Maribel's refusal to have sexual intercourse with Noel constituted
Narcissistic Personality Disorder.
The petition lacks merit.
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 Article 36 of the Family Code provides:
ART. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity
becomes manifest only after its solemnization.

The Court held in Santos v. Court of Appeals 2 1 that the phrase "psychological
incapacity" is not meant to comprehend all possible cases of psychoses. It refers to no
less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly noncognitive
of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by
the parties to the marriage which, as expressed by Article 68 2 2 of the Family Code,
include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and delity and
render help and support. The intendment of the law has been to con ne it to the most
serious of cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity
or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.
In Republic of the Phils. v. Court of Appeals , 2 3 the Court laid down the guidelines
in resolving petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage, based on Article 36 of the
Family Code, to wit:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs
to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence
and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and
nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish
the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an
entire Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It
decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution at
the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the
state.

The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and
emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or
clinically identi ed, (b) alleged in the complaint , (c) su ciently proven by
experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code
requires that the incapacity must be psychological — not physical, although its
manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince
the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such
an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was
assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption
thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to
limit the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis,
nevertheless such root cause must be identi ed as a psychological illness and its
incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by quali ed
psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.ESDcIA

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the

celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was
existing when the parties exchanged their "I do's." The manifestation of the illness
need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at
such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically
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 permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative
only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of
the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the
assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not
related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a
job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children
and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be psychologically
capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential
obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the
party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild
characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts"
cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright
incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or di culty, much less ill will. In other
words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse
integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the
person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential
to marriage.

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68

up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles
220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such
non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by
evidence and included in the text of the decision.

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of

the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be
given great respect by our courts. . . .
xxx xxx xxx

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or scal and the
Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed
down unless the Solicitor General issues a certi cation, which will be quoted in
the decision, brie y stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as
the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting
attorney, shall submit to the court such certi cation within fteen (15) days from
the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor
General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi
contemplated under Canon 1095. (Emphasis ours.)

In this case, the totality of evidence presented by Noel was not su cient to
sustain a nding that Maribel was psychologically incapacitated. Noel's evidence
merely established that Maribel refused to have sexual intercourse with him after their
marriage, and that she left him after their quarrel when he confronted her about her
alleged miscarriage. He failed to prove the root cause of the alleged psychological
incapacity and establish the requirements of gravity, juridical antecedence, and
incurability. As correctly observed by the CA, the report of the psychologist, who
concluded that Maribel was suffering from Narcissistic Personality Disorder traceable
to her experiences during childhood, did not establish how the personality disorder
incapacitated Maribel from validly assuming the essential obligations of the marriage.
Indeed, the same psychologist even testi ed that Maribel was capable of entering into
a marriage except that it would be di cult for her to sustain one. 2 4 Mere di culty, it
must be stressed, is not the incapacity contemplated by law. aETASc

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 The Court emphasizes that the burden falls upon petitioner, not just to prove that
private respondent suffers from a psychological disorder, but also that such
psychological disorder renders her "truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage." 2 5
Psychological incapacity must be more than just a "di culty," a "refusal," or a "neglect"
in the performance of some marital obligations. An unsatisfactory marriage is not a null
and void marriage. As we stated in Marcos v. Marcos: 2 6
Article 36 of the Family Code, we stress, is not to be confused with a divorce law
that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefor manifest themselves. It
refers to a serious psychological illness a icting a party even before the
celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to
deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial
bond one is about to assume. . . .

WHEREFORE , the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in

CA-G.R. CV No. 74581 is AFFIRMED and UPHELD .
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio Morales and Bersamin, JJ., concur.
Brion and Sereno, JJ., see concurring opinion.
Separate Opinions
BRION , J., concurring :

I agree with the ponencia that the totality of evidence presented by the petitioner
Noel Baccay was not su cient to sustain a nding that his wife, respondent Maribel
Baccay, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations, and, thus, there was no basis to declare their marriage a nullity.
Noel primarily contended that Maribel failed to comply with her marital obligation
to consummate their marriage. While admitting that he and Maribel had several sexual
encounters before their marriage, Noel narrated that after getting married, Maribel
senselessly and constantly refused to have any sexual relations with him. He asserted
that Maribel's unreasonable refusal amounted to a psychological incapacity to comply
with the essential marital obligations.
Noel further pointed to several traits of Maribel that negatively affected their
marital relationship. Maribel was described as arrogant, haughty, rude, and
disrespectful; she mingled only with a few individuals and failed to endear herself to
Noel's family, even if they lived with them under the same roof. She was also
"interpersonally exploitative," as shown by her misrepresentation of pregnancy to force
Noel to marry her. All of these, Noel contended, are manifestations of a Narcissistic
Personality Disorder (NPD), which clinical psychologist Nedy Tayag diagnosed Maribel
to be suffering from. Accordingly, Noel petitioned the Court to review the Court of
Appeals' decision that reversed and set aside the Regional Trial Court's decision
granting his petition for declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family
Code. ICDSca

Article 36 refers to the Incapacity to

Fulfill Essential Marital Obligations
due to a Psychological Condition
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 Article 36 of the Family Code states that —
A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of
marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only
after its solemnization.

Dissecting the terms of the provision, we list down its elements:

1. a celebration of marriage;
2. non-performance of marital obligations;
3. the marital obligations which are not performed are essential
obligations;
4. non-performance is due to causes psychological in nature and it
is chronic: constant and habitual;
5. the cause/s are present during the celebration of marriage although they
may not be manifest or evident at that point; and
6. the cause/s surface after the celebration of marriage. 1

Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the psychological incapacity relate to the
essential obligations of marriage, i.e., "it is the non-performance of this class of
obligations which will lead to a declaration of nullity of marriage due to psychological
incapacity." 2 Corollarily, "the non-compliance with these non-essential marital
obligations has no effect on the validity of the marriage." 3
The essential marital obligations under the Family Code are found in Articles 68
to 71, 4 220, 221, and 225. 5 Notably, these essential marital obligations refer primarily
to obligations of spouses towards each other a n d towards their children. While a
harmonious relationship with the in-laws is ideal, particularly in this country's cultural
set-up, it appears that the law does not consider it an essential obligation of either
spouse to maintain one. The "incapacity should make the party disabled from rendering
what is due in the marriage, within the context of justice, not merely in the sphere of
good will." 6 Maribel's failure to socialize, interact, and endear herself to Noel's family,
as far as our family laws are concerned, is, thus, not considered a non-ful llment of an
essential marital obligation. If at all, Maribel has failed to meet her husband Noel's
expectations of how she should conduct herself with and relate to his family, a matter
not dealt with by Article 36.
The consummation of the marriage, on the other hand, is an essential marital
obligation. Marriage is entered into for the establishment of conjugal and family life; 7
its consummation is not only an expression of the couple's love for each other, 8 but is
also a means for procreation. 9 That the Court nulli ed a marriage due to the husband's
obstinate and unjusti ed refusal to have intimate sexual relations with his wife
indicates that the consummation of the marriage is considered an essential marital
obligation. 1 0
The failure to consummate the marriage by itself, however, does not constitute
as a ground to nullify the marriage. The spouse's refusal to have intimate sexual
relations must be due to causes psychological in nature, i.e ., the psychological
condition of the spouse renders him/her incapable of having intimate sexual relations
with the other. This crucial nexus between the non-ful lled essential marital obligation
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 and the psychological condition was what Noel failed to allege and prove; Maribel's
refusal to satisfy Noel's sexual needs during their marriage was never proven to have
been due to some psychological condition. The evidence did not rule out the possibility
that the refusal could be caused by other factors not related to Maribel's psychological
make-up; the refusal could very well be attributed to Maribel's pregnancy and her
subsequent miscarriage (assuming these were true). That Maribel's refusal to have
intimate sexual relations with Noel had more to do with the stresses brought on by
married life than her actual psychological condition is validated by Noel's statement
that prior to marriage, they have had several sexual encounters. The connection
between the psychologist's nding that Maribel was supposedly suffering from NPD
and her refusal to have intimate sexual relations was similarly not established.
Even supposing that a spouse's refusal to have intimate sexual relations with the
other spouse may be reasonably inferred from or connected with the traditional signs
and symptoms associated with NPD, 1 1 I have di culty nding credible the
psychologist's diagnosis of Maribel's psychological condition.
The narration of facts declared that Maribel never participated in the
proceedings below, and indicated that the psychologist's evaluation of Maribel was
based mainly on Noel's testimony. As the petitioning spouse, Noel's description of
Maribel's nature would certainly be biased, and a psychological evaluation based on
this one-sided description can hardly be considered as credible. In Suazo v. Suazo , 1 2
the Court declared that —
Based on her declarations in open court, the psychologist [Nedy Tayag, who
incidentally is the same psychologist in the present case] evaluated [the
husband's] psychological condition only in an indirect manner — she derived all
her conclusions from information coming from [the wife] whose bias for her
cause cannot of course be doubted. Given the source of the information upon
which the psychologist heavily relied upon, the court must evaluate the
evidentiary worth of the opinion with due care and with the application of the
more rigid and stringent set of standards outlined above, i.e., that there must be a
thorough and in-depth assessment of the parties by the psychologist or expert, for
a conclusive diagnosis of a psychological incapacity that is grave, severe and
incurable. cCDAHE

The Court's statement above should not be read as making mandatory the
personal examination by the psychologist or expert of the spouse alleged to be
psychologically incapacitated. We have already stated in Marcos v. Marcos 1 3 that
there is no requirement that the defendant/respondent spouse should be personally
examined by a physician or psychologist to establish the former's psychological
incapacity. Subsequently after the Marcos case, the Court promulgated the Rule on
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages, which stated that "[t]he complete facts should allege the physical
manifestations, if any, as are indicative of psychological incapacity at the time of the
celebration of the marriage but expert opinion need not be alleged." 1 4
To balance, however, the need for an objective evaluation of the psychological
condition of the spouses alleged to be psychologically incapacitated and the non-
necessity of an expert's opinion, we refer again to the Court's ruling in Suazo, which
declared that —
[F]or a determination . . . of a party's complete personality pro le,
information coming from persons intimately related to [him/her] (such
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 as the party's close relatives and friends) may be helpful. This is an
approach in the application of Article 36 that allows exibility, at the same time
that it avoids, if not totally obliterate, the credibility gaps spawned by supposedly
expert opinion based entirely on doubtful sources of information. 1 5

It did not help that Noel's case was based entirely on his testimony and that of the
psychologist, whose ndings, in turn, were also based on Noel's description of Maribel.
Apart from these biased testimonies, there was no other evidence presented by which
the Court could objectively evaluate Maribel's psychological condition.
Psychological incapacity, by its
nature, refers only to the most
serious cases and is the root cause of
the failure to fulfill the essential
marital obligations
Noel enumerated other negative traits of Maribel 1 6 that he claimed were
indicative of a psychological illness, speci cally, that of NPD. But not all negative traits
exhibited by a person are rooted in some psychological illness or disorder; these may
simply be a character aw or a bad habit that the person has developed over the years.
It has been said that "[a] deeply ingrained bad habit does not qualify as a source of . . .
incapacity." 1 7 Slight character aws also do not make a person incapable of marriage.
18

Assuming that these negative traits were indeed manifestations of NPD or some
other psychological illness, jurisprudence has declared that not every psychological
illness/disorder/condition is a ground for declaring the marriage a nullity under Article
36. "[T]he meaning of 'psychological incapacity' [is con ned] to the most serious
cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability
to give meaning and signi cance to the marriage." 1 9 The psychologist testi ed that
persons suffering from NPD were unmotivated to participate in therapy sessions and
would reject any form of psychological help, rendering their condition long lasting, if not
incurable, perhaps in an attempt to de ne the gravity and extent of Maribel's NPD. This,
however, is but a general description of persons with personality disorders, 2 0 as the
term is clinically de ned; NPD is just one of the kinds of personality disorders. 2 1 The
testimony did not speci cally refer to Maribel and did not paint a clear picture of the
seriousness of her NPD.
Furthermore, the petitioning spouse must also allege and prove that the
psychological illness/disorder/condition is the root cause of the respondent spouse's
incapacity or inability to ful ll any, some, or all of the essential obligations of marriage.
Noel attempted to establish this link by alleging that Maribel's NPD has made her view
marriage simply as a piece of paper and made her believe that she can easily get rid of
her husband without any provocation. He claimed that she entered marriage not
because of an emotional desire for it, but to prove something. 2 2 TaDSHC

Rather than establishing Maribel's incapacity to ful ll the essential marital

obligations, Noel's contentions seem to indicate that Maribel was utterly unaware of
the nature of marriage and its consequent obligations. There is, however, a signi cant
difference between lack of awareness or understanding of marriage and its obligations,
and lack of capacity to ful ll these marital obligations. A spouse's lack of awareness or
understanding of marriage and its obligation is an irrelevant consideration for a petition
filed under Article 36 of the Family Code.
Article 36 of the Family Code refers
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 to psychological incapacity to fulfill
essential marital obligations, not to
understand or appreciate what these
essential marital obligations are
Article 36 of the Family Code was based on Canon 1095 of the New Canon Law
of the Catholic Church. 2 3 Canon 1095 states that —
[t]he following are incapable of contracting marriage:
1. Those who lack sufficient use of reason;
2. Those who suffer from a grave lack of discretionary judgment concerning
the essential matrimonial rights and obligations to be mutually given and
accepted;
3. Those who, because of causes of a psychological nature, are
unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage .

Speci cally, it is the third paragraph of Canon 1095 that provided for the model for
what is now Article 36 of the Family Code. 2 4
The third paragraph of Canon 1095 does not refer to a defect in the consent of
one of the contracting parties to the marriage; in fact, it recognizes the existence of a
valid consent. Rather, the third paragraph of Canon 1095 refers to the incapacity to
assume essential marital obligations. Church decisions "held that a person may appear
to enjoy full use of his faculties, but because of some psychiatric defect, he/she may be
incapable of assuming the obligations of marriage, although he/she may have a
conceptual understanding of such obligation." 2 5 Thus, a person's ability to give a
valid consent can be equated to his/her ability to know and understand the
essential marital obligations, but this does not necessarily equate to a
similar ability or capacity to actually ful ll them . The spouse "may very well know
what are the substantive imperatives of marriage, and [he/she] may also very much
want to observe these unconditionally, but at the same time [he/she] simply cannot do
so for a given psychical causal factor that gravely lessens or seriously undermines their
self-dominion in terms of dysfunctional volitive faculty." 2 6 This situation was
exemplified by Adolfo Dacanay, S.J., in the following manner:
The evidence from the empirical sciences is abundant that there are certain
anomalies of a sexual nature which may impel a person towards sexual activities
which are not normal, either with respect to its frequency [nymphomania,
satyriasis] or to the nature of the activity itself [sadism, masochism,
homosexuality]. However, these anomalies notwithstanding, it is altogether
possible that the higher faculties remain intact such that a person so
a icted continues to have an adequate understanding of what
marriage is and of the gravity of its responsibilities. In fact, he can choose
marriage freely. The question though is whether such a person can
assume those responsibilities which he cannot ful ll, although he may
be able to understand them. In this latter hypothesis, the incapacity to
assume the essential obligations of marriage issues from the incapacity to posit
the object of consent, rather than the incapacity to posit consent itself. 2 7

In the same manner that the Church has limited the third paragraph of Canon
1095 to refer only to lack of capacity to ful ll essential marital obligations (lack of due
capacity), Article 36 of the Family Code should also be interpreted as limited only to
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 this kind of incapacity. The framers of Article 36 of the Family Code intended that
"jurisprudence under Canon Law prevailing at the time of the code's enactment . . .
cannot be dismissed as impertinent for its value as an aid . . . to the interpretation and
construction of the codal provision." 2 8
Accordingly, the incapacity that Article 36 speaks of is not the incapacity to know
and understand marriage and its concomitant obligations (lack of due discretion), but
the incapacity to ful ll these obligations for some psychological reason (lack of due
capacity). A party may be considered as incapable of assuming the essential
obligations of marriage even though he may have su cient use of reason plus due
discretion in judgment. The lack of due discretion, on the other hand, may be indicative
of vitiated consent, but this is not the concern of Article 36 of the Family Code. Noel's
assertion of Maribel's failure to appreciate marriage and its obligations was, therefore,
an irrelevant allegation insofar as his Article 36 petition was concerned.
Republic v. CA and Molina did
not set forth guidelines beyond
those contemplated by the framers
of Article 36 of the Family Code
Lately, the Molina case has been receiving aks because, apparently, the
guidelines it has established created a straitjacket that unduly limited the application of
Article 36 of the Family Code. The case of Ngo-Te v. Te said that "[t]he resiliency with
which the concept [of psychological incapacity] should be applied and the case-to-case
basis by which the provision should be interpreted, as so intended by its framers, had,
somehow, been rendered ineffectual by the imposition of a set of strict standards in
Molina." 2 9 Ngo-Te v. Te found it erroneous for courts to apply the rigid set of rules laid
down by Molina, without regard to the law's clear intent to treat each Article 36 case
separately. As a consequence, "the Court, in conveniently applying Molina, has allowed
diagnosed sociopaths, schizophrenics, nymphomaniacs, narcissists and the like, to
continuously debase and pervert the sanctity of marriage. Ironically, the Roman Rota
has annulled marriages on account of the personality disorders of the said individuals."
30 EICScD

I nd Ngo-Te's argument contradictory. It advocates a case-to-case approach in

resolving psychological incapacity cases, yet, at the same time, implies that since the
Church has already annulled marriages on account of the enumerated personality
disorders, the courts should declare the marriage's nullity if these were alleged and
proved in the case.
Surprisingly enough, Ngo-Te backtracked on its criticism of Molina a month later
by saying in the case of Ting v. Velez-Ting 3 1 that Ngo-Te did not abandon Molina. Far
from abandoning Molina, Ting explains the Ngo-Te simply suggested a relaxation of the
stringent requirements set forth in Molina. 3 2
At any rate, whatever con ict and confusion that might have surfaced because of
Ngo-Te's attack against Molina, the Court reconciled these in Suazo, 3 3 saying that "
[ Ngo-Te] . . . merely [stood] for a more exible approach in considering petitions for
declaration of nullity of marriages based on psychological incapacity." 3 4 It noted Ngo-
Te for the new evidentiary approach it directed the courts to adopt — to consider as
decisive evidence the expert opinion on the psychological and mental temperaments of
the parties.
The guidelines listed in Molina are but expositions of what the Court has
determined in Santos v. Bedia-Santos 3 5 as characteristics of the psychological
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 incapacity that render a marriage void under Article 36 of the Family Code; these
guidelines merely incorporated the basic requirements of gravity, juridical antecedence
and incurability. 3 6 Molina did not create new rules, but simply identi ed and
consolidated the legislative intent behind Article 36 of the Family Code. A majority of
the guidelines listed corresponds to and is consistent with the concept of
psychological incapacity that the members of the Family Code Revision Committee had
in mind, the interpretation of Canon 1095 from which the provision was modeled after,
and the existing laws, both procedural and substantive. The guidelines in Molina were
never intended to remove the resiliency and exibility envisioned by the framers in the
application and interpretation of Article 36 of the Family Code. The resiliency and
exibility, however, are not a license to interpret Article 36 of the Family Code as
allowing any and every assertion of psychological incapacity to merit a declaration of
nullity of marriage. The Court remains bound to interpret the provision in a manner
consistent with the Constitution and relevant family laws. For now, Article 36 of the
Family Code will remain to be a limited remedy, addressing only a speci c situation — a
relationship where no marriage could have been validly concluded because the parties,
or one of them, by reason of grave and incurable psychological illness existing at the
time when the marriage was celebrated, was incapacitated to ful ll the essential
marital obligations and, thus, could not have validly entered into a marriage. Outside of
this situation, the Court is powerless to provide any permanent remedy. 3 7
SERENO , J., concurring :

Justice Eduardo Caguioa, member of the Civil Code Revision Committee that
drafted the Family Code, explained that the de nition of psychological incapacity "has
been left [by the Family Code] for the determination by the judges since to de ne it in
the Code would be straight-jacketing the concept." 1 I disagree with the wisdom of
leaving to the judiciary the task of de ning psychological incapacity. The legislature
should have provided clear standards that the judiciary can apply even while the latter
takes into account the peculiar circumstances of each case brought before it. However,
I recognize that it has been twenty-two (22) years since the Family Code took effect
and so much water has passed under the bridge. It is not an ideal situation and is not
compatible with the constitutional design of the division of labor among the three great
branches of government. The situation speaks poorly of the ability of the legislature to
provide su cient legal standards for application by the judiciary of a law as important
as the law on declaration of nullity of marriages.
To clarify the meaning of Article 36, we need to look closely at its origin and the
journey it has gone through in the courts. Article 36 of the Family Code was taken from
paragraph 3 of Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law which took effect on 27
November 1983. 2 The Court at one time explained the essence of "psychological
incapacity" under the Family Code by referring to Canon Law discussions comparing
marriage in the context of the psychological incapacity of one of the parties to a
contract between the parties to sell a house, which, unknown to both, had already
burned down. In such a case, "the consent may indeed be free, but is juridically
ineffective because the party is consenting to an object that he cannot deliver. The
house he is selling was gutted down by fire." 3
Re ning the concept, we held in Santos v. Court of Appeals 4 that psychological
incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity — the incapacity must be grave or
serious, such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties
required in marriage; (b) juridical antecedence — it must be rooted in the party's history
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 antedating the marriage, although overt manifestations may emerge only after the
marriage; and (c) incurability — it must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the
cure must be beyond the means of the party involved. 5
After observing that Article 36 was being abused as a convenient divorce law, 6
the Court laid down the procedural requirements for its interpretation and application in
Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina . 7 While a majority concurred in the decision,
three justices concurred only "in the result" and another three rendered their individual
Separate Opinions. 8 Justice Padilla warned that "each case must be judged, not on the
basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its own
facts." Justice Vitug preferred the earlier simpler legal standard set in Santos v. Court
of Appeals.
In Antonio v. Reyes, 9 the Court reinstated the trial court's declaration of nullity of
the subject marriage based on "the totality of the evidence," with the caveat that " Molina
is not set in stone, and that the interpretation of Article 36 relies heavily on a case-to-
case perception." We held that granting a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage
based on Article 36 is not incompatible with the Constitution's recognition of the
sanctity of the family. Rather, it "should be deemed as an implement of this
constitutional protection of marriage. Given the avowed State interest in promoting
marriage as the foundation of the family, which in turn serves as the foundation of the
nation, there is a corresponding interest for the State to defend against marriages ill-
equipped to promote family life." caIDSH

In Ngo Te v. Yu-Te , 1 0 after tracing the origin and development of jurisprudence

relating to Article 36, the Court noted that "(t)he resiliency with which the concept
should be applied and the case-to-case basis by which the provision should be
interpreted, as so intended by its framers, had, somehow, been rendered ineffectual by
the imposition of a set of strict standards in Molina. . . . Far from what was intended by
the Court, Molina has become a strait-jacket, forcing all sizes to fit into and be bound by
it. Wittingly or unwittingly, the Court, in conveniently applying Molina, has allowed
diagnosed sociopaths, schizophrenics, nymphomaniacs, narcissists and the like, to
continuously debase and pervert the sanctity of marriage. . . . The Court need not worry
about the possible abuse of the remedy provided by Article 36, for there are ample
safeguards against this contingency. . . . The Court should rather be alarmed by the
rising number of cases involving marital abuse, child abuse, domestic violence and
incestuous rape."
In Ting v. Velez-Ting , 1 1 the Court clari ed that "(f)ar from abandoning Molina, we
simply suggested the relaxation of the stringent requirements set forth therein."
Requiring petitioner to allege in the petition the particular root cause of the
psychological incapacity and to attach thereto the veri ed written report of the
accredited psychologist or psychiatrist proved to be too expensive and adversely
affected poor litigants' access to justice. This was the nding of the Committee on the
Revision of the Rules on the rationale of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of
Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC).
In Azcueta v. Republic of the Philippines and Court of Appeals, we then concluded
that "(w)ith the advent of Te v. Te, the Court encourages a reexamination of
jurisprudential trends on the interpretation of Article 36, although there has been no
major deviation or paradigm shift from the Molina doctrine." 1 2
In this instance, whether we apply the Molina standard or a more relaxed
interpretation and application of Article 36, petitioner was unable to prove his case with
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 preponderant evidence. Since the presumption in favor of the validity of marriage 1 3
was not ably rebutted, this presumption prevails. I therefore concur in the Decision
denying the Petition, but I reach this conclusion based solely on the insu ciency of the
evidence presented by petitioner. However, I disagree with the import this Decision
conveys that Molina, in its undiluted form, should be reiterated and emphasized in this
case. Had the case gone forward to a choice between the strict application of Molina
and the more recent decisions cited, I would have submitted that a second hard look at
Molina is warranted.
Footnotes
1. Rollo, pp. 6-21. Penned by Associate Justice Mari or P. Punzalan Castillo and concurred
in by Associate Justices Jose L. Sabio, Jr. and Noel G. Tijam.

2. Id. at 22-25.
3. Id. at 100-104. Penned by Judge Priscilla J. Baltazar-Padilla.
4. ART. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of
marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization. (As amended by E.O. 227.)
5. Rollo, pp. 83, 92, 100.
6. Id. at 83-87, 93-95.
7. Id. at 83-88.
8. Id. at 101-102.
9. Id. at 103-104.
10. Id. at 102.
11. Id. at 20.
12. Id. at 10-14.
13. Id. at 17.
14. ART. 45. A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes, existing at the
time of the marriage:

xxx xxx xxx

(3) That the consent of either party was obtained by fraud, unless such party
afterwards, with full knowledge of the facts constituting the fraud, freely cohabited with
the other as husband and wife;

xxx xxx xxx

15. ART. 46. Any of the following circumstances shall constitute fraud referred to in
Number 3 of the preceding Article:

(1) Nondisclosure of a previous conviction by nal judgment of the other party of a

crime involving moral turpitude;

(2) Concealment by the wife of the fact that at the time of the marriage, she was
pregnant by a man other than her husband;
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 (3) Concealment of a sexually transmissible disease, regardless of its nature, existing
at the time of the marriage; or
(4) Concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism or homosexuality or
lesbianism existing at the time of the marriage.

No other misrepresentation or deceit as to character, health, rank, fortune or chastity

shall constitute such fraud as will give grounds for action for the annulment of marriage.
(86a)

16. Rollo, pp. 18-20.

17. Id. at 22-25.
18. Id. at 41-42.
19. Id. at 42-47.
20. Id. at 48-52.
21. G.R. No. 112019, January 4, 1995, 240 SCRA 20, 34.

22. ART. 68. The husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love,
respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support.
23. 335 Phil. 664, 676-678 (1997).

24. TSN, April 24, 2001, p. 19.

25. Santos v. Court of Appeals, supra note 21.
26. 397 Phil. 840, 851 (2000).

BRION, J., concurring:

1. M. Cruz-Abrenica, Re-Examining the Concept of Psychological Incapacity: Towards a
More Accurate Re ection of Legislative Intent, 51 Ateneo Law Journal 596, 599 (2006),
citing J. Temporal, Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina: Providing De nite
Standards for the Interpretation and Application of Article 36 of the Family Code, 43
Ateneo Law Journal 384 (1998).
2. Id. at 601.
3. Ibid.
4. Art. 68. The husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect
and fidelity, and render mutual help and support. (109a)

Art. 69. The husband and wife shall x the family domicile. In case of disagreement, the
court shall decide.
The court may exempt one spouse from living with the other if the latter should live
abroad or there are other valid and compelling reasons for the exemption. However, such
exemption shall not apply if the same is not compatible with the solidarity of the family.
(110a)

Art. 70. The spouses are jointly responsible for the support of the family. The expenses for
such support and other conjugal obligations shall be paid from the community property
and, in the absence thereof, from the income or fruits of their separate properties. In case
of insu ciency or absence of said income or fruits, such obligations shall be satis ed
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 from the separate properties. (111a)

Art. 71. The management of the household shall be the right and duty of both spouses.
The expenses for such management shall be paid in accordance with the provisions of
Article 70. (115a)
5. Art. 220. The parents and those exercising parental authority shall have with respect to
their unemancipated children or wards the following rights and duties:

(1) To keep them in their company, to support, educate and instruct them by right
precept and good example, and to provide for their upbringing in keeping with their
means;

(2) To give them love and affection, advice and counsel, companionship and
understanding;
(3) To provide them with moral and spiritual guidance, inculcate in them honesty,
integrity, self-discipline, self-reliance, industry and thrift, stimulate their interest in civic
affairs, and inspire in them compliance with the duties of citizenship;

(4) To enhance, protect, preserve and maintain their physical and mental health at all
times;
(5) To furnish them with good and wholesome educational materials, supervise their
activities, recreation and association with others, protect them from bad company, and
prevent them from acquiring habits detrimental to their health, studies and morals;

(6) To represent them in all matters affecting their interests;

(7) To demand from them respect and obedience;

(8) To impose discipline on them as may be required under the circumstances; and
(9) To perform such other duties as are imposed by law upon parents and guardians.
(316a)

Art. 221. Parents and other persons exercising parental authority shall be civilly liable for
the injuries and damages caused by the acts or omissions of their unemancipated
children living in their company and under their parental authority subject to the
appropriate defenses provided by law. (2180 [2]a and [4]a)

Art. 225. The father and the mother shall jointly exercise legal guardianship over the
property of their unemancipated common child without the necessity of a court
appointment. In case of disagreement, the father's decision shall prevail, unless there is
a judicial order to the contrary.
Where the market value of the property or the annual income of the child exceeds
P50,000, the parent concerned shall be required to furnish a bond in such amount as the
court may determine, but not less than ten per centum (10%) of the value of the property
or annual income, to guarantee the performance of the obligations prescribed for general
guardians.
A veri ed petition for approval of the bond shall be led in the proper court of the
place where the child resides, or if the child resides in a foreign country, in the proper
court of the place where the property or any part thereof is situated.

The petition shall be docketed as a summary special proceeding in which all incidents
and issues regarding the performance of the obligations referred to in the second
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 paragraph of this Article shall be heard and resolved.
The ordinary rules on guardianship shall be merely suppletory except when the child
is under substitute parental authority, or the guardian is a stranger, or a parent has
remarried, in which case the ordinary rules on guardianship shall apply. (320a)

6. M. Cruz-Abrenica, supra note 1, at 617, citing Roman Rotal decision c. Lanversin (18
January 1995).

7. FAMILY CODE, Article 1.

8. Id., Article 68, which declares that spouses must observe mutual love.
9. See also Canon 1055 of the New Canon Law of the Catholic Church, which "describes
marriage as a partnership of a whole life which is ordered towards the well-being of the
spouses, and the procreation and upbringing of children," cited in M. Cruz-Abrenica,
supra note 1, at 614.
10. See Chi Ming Tsoi v. Court of Appeals n , G.R. No. 119190, January 16, 1997, 266 SCRA
324.

11. Persons with [NPD] have grandiose sense of self-importance; they consider themselves
special and expect special treatment. Their sense of entitlement is striking. They handle
criticism poorly and may become enraged when someone dares to criticize them, or they
may appear completely indifferent to criticism. Persons with this disorder want their own
way and are frequently ambitious to achieve fame and fortune. Their relationships are
fragile, and they can make others furious by their refusal to obey conventional rules of
behavior. Interpersonal exploitativeness is commonplace. They cannot show empathy,
and they feign sympathy only to achieve their sel sh ends. Because of their fragile self-
esteem, they are prone to depression. Interpersonal di culties, occupational problems,
rejections, and loss are among the stresses that narcissists commonly produce by their
behavior — stresses they are least able to handle. (Kaplan and Sadock, Synopsis of
Psychiatry: Behavioral Sciences/Clinical Psychiatry [9th ed.]), pp. 811-812.
12. G.R. No. 164493, March 10, 2010.

13. G.R. No. 136490, October 19, 2000, 343 SCRA 755, 764.
14. Section 2.

15. Supra note 12.

16. Noel alleged that Maribel was "interpersonally exploitative," indifferent to his needs, and
displayed unfounded jealousy. Decision, p. 7.

17. M. Cruz-Abrenica, supra note 1 at 619.

18. Id. at 621.
19. Santos v. Bedia-Santos, G.R. No. 112019, January 4, 1995, 240 SCRA 20, 34.
20. See Kaplan and Sadock, supra note 11, at 800, which states that "persons with
personality disorders are far more likely to refuse psychiatric help and to deny their
problems than persons with anxiety disorders, depressive disorders, or obsessive-
compulsive disorders. . . . Because they do not routinely acknowledge pain from what
others perceive as their symptoms, they often seem disinterested in treatment and
impervious to recovery."

21. Ibid.
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 22. See Decision, p. 4.

23. Promulgated on January 25, 1983, and took effect on November 27, 1983; see M. Cruz-
Abrenica, supra note 1, at 601-602.

24. Ngo-Te v. Te, G.R. No. 161793, February 13, 2009, 579 SCRA 193, 211.
25. M. Cruz-Abrenica, supra note 1, at 615, citing Adolfo Dacanay, Canon Law on Marriage:
Introductory Notes and Comments 3 (2000).
26. Ibid.
27. Ngo-Te v. Te, supra note 24, at 215.
28. Santos v. Bedia-Santos, supra note 19, at 32.
29. Supra note 24, at 220.
30. Id. at 224-225.
31. G.R. No. 166562, March 31, 2009, 582 SCRA 694.

32. Id. at 708-709.

33. Supra note 12.
34. Ibid.
35. Supra note 19.
36. Toring v. Toring, G.R. No. 165321, August 3, 2010.
37. See So v. Valera, G.R. No. 150677, June 5, 2009, 588 SCRA 319, 343.
SERENO, J., concurring:

1. Proceedings of the Public Hearing on the Family Code, 3 February 1988, p. 7.

2. Justice Alicia Sempio-Diy, Handbook on the Family Code of the Philippines (1997).
3. Edward Kenneth Ngo Te vs. Rowena Gutierrez Yu-Te, G.R. No. 161793, 13 February 2009,
579 SCRA 193.

4. 310 Phil. 22 (1995).

5. The Court adopted the opinion of Justice Sempio-Diy, who in turn cited the work of Dr.
Gerardo Veloso, former Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the
Catholic Archdiocese of Manila (Branch I).

6. Brenda Marcos v. Wilson Marcos, G.R. No. 136490, 19 October 2000, 343 SCRA 755.
7. G.R. No. 108763, 13 February 1997, 268 SCRA 198.

8. Edward Kenneth Ngo Te vs. Rowena Gutierrez Yu-Te, G.R. No. 161793, 13 February 2009,
579 SCRA 193.
9. G.R. No. 155800, 10 March 2006, 484 SCRA 353.

10. G.R. No. 161793, 13 February 2009, 579 SCRA 193.

11. G.R. No. 166562, 31 March 2009.

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 12. G.R. No. 180668, 26 May 2009.

13. Carating-Siayngco v. Siayngco, G.R. No. 158896, 27 October 2004, 441 SCRA 422.
n Note from the Publisher: Written as "Ching Ming Tsoi v. Court of Appeals " in the original
document.

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