VIRGINES CALVO doing business under the name and style TRANSORIENT CONTAINER TERMINAL SERVICES, INC.
,
petitioner, vs. UCPB GENERAL INSURANCE CO., INC. (formerly Allied Guarantee Ins. Co., Inc.) respondent.
G.R. No. 148496; March 19, 2002; MENDOZA, J.:
TOPIC: Obligations of the common carrier in a contract of carriage of goods
FACTS: Petitioner Virgines Calvo, a customs broker, entered into a contract with San Miguel Corporation (SMC) for
the transfer of 114 reels of semi-chemical fluting paper and 124 reels of kraft liner board from the Port Area in Manila
to SMCs warehouse in Ermita, Manila. The cargo was insured by respondent UCPB General Insurance Co., Inc. The
shipment in question, contained in 30 metal vans, arrived in Manila on board M/V Hayakawa Maru and, after 24 hours,
were unloaded from the vessel to the custody of the arrastre operator. Petitioner, pursuant to her contract with SMC,
withdrew the cargo from the arrastre operator and delivered it to SMCs warehouse in Ermita, Manila. Upon inspection
by Marine Cargo Surveyors, it found that 15 reels of the semi-chemical fluting paper were wet/stained/torn and 3
reels of kraft liner board were likewise torn.
SMC collected payment from respondent UCPB under its insurance contract for the aforementioned amount. In
turn, respondent, as subrogee of SMC, brought suit against petitioner before the RTC where it rendered judgment
finding petitioner liable to respondent for the damage to the shipment. As stated in the surveyor’s report “damages
sustained by shipment is attributable to improper handling in transit presumably whilst in the custody of the broker”.
The court ruled that, being a customs brother, warehouseman and at the same time a common carrier, petitioner is
supposed to exercise the extraordinary diligence required by law. The decision was affirmed by the CA.
Hence, the present petition. Petitioner contends that she is not a common carrier but a private carrier
because, as a customs broker and warehouseman, she does not indiscriminately hold her services out to the public
but only offers the same to select parties with whom she may contract in the conduct of her business.
ISSUE: WON petitioner was a common carrier.
RULING: The Court ruled in the affirmative.
Citing De Guzman v. Court of Appeals, the court ruled: Article 1732, NCC makes no distinction between one
whose principal business activity is the carrying of persons or goods or both, and one who does such carrying only as
an ancillary activity . . . Article 1732 also carefully avoids making any distinction between a person or enterprise
offering transportation service on a regular or scheduled basis and one offering such service on an occasional,
episodic or unscheduled basis. Neither does Article 1732 distinguish between a carrier offering its services to
the general public, i.e., the general community or population, and one who offers services or solicits business only
from a narrow segment of the general population. We think that Article 1732 deliberately refrained from making such
distinctions. There is a greater reason for holding petitioner to be a common carrier because the transportation of
goods is an integral part of her business.
As to petitioner’s liability, Art. 1733, NCC provides: Common carriers, from the nature of their business
and for reasons of public policy, are bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods and for
the safety of the passengers transported by them, according to all the circumstances of each case. Contrary to
petitioner’s claim that the damage took place while the goods were in the custody of either the carrying vessel M/V
Hayakawa Maru or the arrastre operator, the Survey Report of the Marine Cargo Surveyors indicates that when the
shipper transferred the cargo in question to the arrastre operator, these were covered by clean Equipment
Interchange Report (EIR) and, when petitioner’s employees withdrew the cargo from the arrastre operator, they did
so without exception or protest either with regard to the condition of container vans or their contents. As found by the
CA: “Surely, if the container vans were damaged, petitioner would report it immediately to the consignee or make an
exception on the delivery receipt or note the same in the Warehouse Entry Slip (WES). None of these took
place. Thus, petitioner received the shipment in good order and condition and delivered the same to the consignee
damaged. We can only conclude that the damages to the cargo occurred while it was in the possession of the
petitioner”.
To prove the exercise of extraordinary diligence, petitioner must do more than merely show the possibility
that some other party could be responsible for the damage. It must prove that it used all reasonable means to
ascertain the nature and characteristic of goods tendered for transport and that it exercised due care in the handling
thereof. Petitioner failed to do this.
