Jade Cahucom

LLB-WSP

Statutory Construction Final Written Exam:

(1)

G.R. No. 221029

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner

Facts of the Case:

Marelyn Tanedo Manalo was married to a Japanese national, Yoshino Minoro. Manalo filed a case for divorce in
Japan and after due proceedings, a divorce decree dated December 6, 2011, was granted. Manalo now wants to
cancel the entry of marriage between her and Minoro from the Civil Registry and to be allowed to reuse her maiden
surname, Manalo.

According to Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code,

Issues:
1. Under Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code, can the Filipino spouse initiate the divorce instead of the
foreign spouse?
2. Was the divorce obtained by Marelyn Manalo from Japan valid here in the Philippines?

Ruling:
1. Yes. The Court ruled that in interpreting the law, the intent should be taken into consideration. According to
Justice Alicia Sempio-Dy, a member of the Civil Code Revision Committee, the aim of the amendment is to avoid
the absurd situation of having the Filipino deemed still married to a foreign spouse even though the latter is no
longer married to the former. According to the Supreme Court, the wording of Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family
Code requires only that there be a valid divorce obtained abroad and does not discriminate as to who should file the
divorce, i.e., whether it is the Filipino spouse or the foreign spouse. Also, even if assuming arguendo that the
provision should be interpreted that the divorce proceeding should be initiated by the foreign spouse, the Court will
not follow such interpretation since doing so would be contrary to the legislative intent of the law. In the issue of the
application of Article 15 of the Civil Code in this case, the Court ruled that even if Manalo should be bound by the
nationality principle, blind adherence to it should not be allowed if it will cause unjust discrimination and oppression
to certain classes of individuals whose rights are equally protected by the law.

The Court also ruled that Article 26 of the Family Code is in violation of the equal protection clause. They said that
the limitation provided by Article 26 is based on a superficial, arbitrary, and whimsical classification. The violation
of the equal protection clause in this case is shown by the discrimination against Filipino spouses who initiated a
foreign divorce proceeding and Filipinos who obtained a divorce decree because the foreign spouse had initiated the
divorce proceedings. Their circumstances are alike, and making a distinction between them as regards to the validity
of the divorce decree obtained would give one undue favor and unjustly discriminate against the other.
The Court also said that it is the State’s duty not only to strengthen the solidarity of the Filipino family but also to
defend, among others, the right of children to special protection from all forms of neglect abuse, cruelty, and other
conditions prejudicial to their development. The State cannot do this if the application of paragraph 2 of Article 26
of the Family Code is limited to only those foreign divorces initiated by the foreign spouse.

2. The Court cannot determine due to insufficient evidence.

It has been ruled that foreign laws must be proven. There are two basic types of divorces: (1) absolute divorce or a
vinculo matrimonii, which terminates the marriage, and (2) limited divorce or a mensa et thoro, which suspends it
and leaves the bond in full force.

The presentation solely of the divorce decree will not suffice to lead the Court to believe that the decree is valid or
constitutes absolute divorce. The fact of divorce must still be proven. Therefore, the Japanese law on divorce must
still be proved.

In this case, the Court remanded the case to the court of origin for further proceedings and reception of evidence as
to the relevant Japanese law on divorce.

Writer’s Counter Argument:

The constitutional construction underlying the principle of Verba legis expressly provides that wherever possible,
the words use in the constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed.

Article 26 (2) Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and divorce is
thereafter validly obtain by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have the
capacity to remarry under the Philippine Law.

In this case it has been established that (i) the respondent is a Filipino citizen who married a japanese national; and
(ii) it was respondent who subsequently obtained a divorced decree against her Japanese husband from a Japanese
court. Thus, it is clear that the respondent is and has always been a Filipino citizen. Pursuant to the Nationality
Principle, respondents personal status is subject to Philippine law which, in turn, prohibits absolute divorce, Hence,
by the footing of verba legis application of Article 26(2), the divorce decree which respondent obtained under
Japanese law cannot be given effect, as she is, without dispute, a national not of Japan, but of the Philippines. Thus,
the prohibition must remain and must be faithfully applied.

(2)

PHILIPPINE INTERNATIONAL TRADING CORP. v. COA, GR No. 183517, June 22, 2010
Facts:

On December 31, 1983, Eligia Romero, an officer of petitioner, opted to retire under Republic Act No. 1616 and
received a total of P286,780.00 as gratuity benefits for services rendered from 1955 to 1983.  Immediately re-hired
on contractual basis, it appears that said employee remained in the service of petitioner until her compulsory
retirement.  In receipt of retirement benefits in the total sum of P1,013,952.00 for the period July 1, 1955 to April
27, 2000, net of the P286,70.00 gratuity benefits she received in 1983, Ms. Romero filed a request, seeking from
petitioner payment of retirement differentials on the strength of Section 6 of Executive Order No. 756.  Said
provision states that “any officer or employee who retires, resigns, or is separated from the service shall be entitled
to one month pay for every year of service computed at highest salary received including allowances, in addition to
the other benefits provided by law, regardless of any provision of law or regulations to the contrary.”
Confronted with the question of whether the computation of Ms. Romero’s retirement benefits should include the
allowances she had received while under its employ, petitioner sent queries to respondent and the Office of the
Government Corporate Counsel regarding the application of Section 6 of Executive Order No. 756. , 2002 on July 4,
2003, COA Assistant Commissioner and General Counsel Raquel R. Habitan issued the first assailed ruling, finding
the denial of Ms. Romero’s claim for retirement differentials in order.  Taking appropriate note of the fact that the
Reserve for Retirement Gratuity and Commutation of Leave Credits of petitioner’s employees did not include
allowances outside of the basic salary, said officer ruled that Executive Order No. 756 was a special law issued only
for the specific purpose of reorganizing petitioner corporation.  Although it was subsequently adverted to in
Executive Order No. 877, Section 6 of Executive Order No. 756 was determined to be intended for employees
retired, separated or resigned in connection with petitioner’s reorganization and was not meant to be a permanent
retirement scheme for its employees.

Issue(s):
Respondent Commission gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the
assailed rulings which is contrary to settled jurisprudence.

Ruling: 
It is a rule in statutory construction that every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the context 
that every part of the statute must be considered together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general
intent of the whole enactment.) Because the law must not be read in truncated parts, its provisions must be read in
relation to the whole law.  The statute’s clauses and phrases must not, consequently, be taken as detached and
isolated expressions, but the whole and every part thereof must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its
parts in order to produce a harmonious whole. Consistent with the fundamentals of statutory construction, all the
words in the statute must be taken into consideration in order to ascertain its meaning. Applying the foregoing
principles to the case at bench, we find it well worth emphasizing at the outset that Executive Order No. 756 was
meant to reorganize petitioner’s corporate set-up.  Section 4 (1) of Executive Order No. 756 specifically authorized
petitioner’s Board of Directors to “reorganize the structure of the Corporation, in accordance with its expanded role
in the development of Philippine trade, with such officers and employees as may be needed and determine their
competitive salaries and reasonable allowances and other benefits to effectively carry out its powers and functions.”
As an adjunct to the reorganization mandated under Executive Order No. 756, we find that the foregoing provision
cannot be interpreted independent of the purpose or intent of the law.  Rather than the permanent retirement law for
its employees that petitioner now characterizes it to be, we find that the provision of gratuities equivalent to “one
month pay for every year of service computed at highest salary received including all allowances” was clearly meant
as an incentive for employees who retire, resign or are separated from service during or as a consequence of the
reorganization petitioner’s Board of Directors was tasked to implement.  As a temporary measure, it cannot be
interpreted as an exception to the general prohibition against separate or supplementary insurance and/or retirement
or pension plans under Section 28, Subsection (b) of Commonwealth Act No. 186, as amended. 

In reconciling Section 6 of Executive Order No. 756 with Section 28, Subsection (b) of Commonwealth Act No.
186, as amended, uppermost in the mind of the Court is the fact that the best method of interpretation is that which
makes laws consistent with other laws which are to be harmonized rather than having one considered repealed in
favor of the other.  Time and again, it has been held that every statute must be so interpreted and brought in accord
with other laws as to form a uniform system of jurisprudence – interpretere et concordare legibus est optimus
interpretendi. Thus, if diverse statutes relate to the same thing, they ought to be taken into consideration in
construing any one of them, as it is an established rule of law that all acts in pari materia are to be taken together, as
if they were one law.  We find that a temporary and limited application of the more beneficent gratuities provided
under Section 6 of Executive Order No. 756 is in accord with the pre-existing and general prohibition against
separate or supplementary insurance retirement and/or pension plans under Section 28, Subsection (b) of
Commonwealth Act No. 186.
In the absence of a manifest and specific intent from which the same may be gleaned, moreover, Section 6 of
Executive Order No. 756 cannot be construed as an additional alternative to existing general retirement laws and/or
an exception to the prohibition against separate or supplementary insurance retirement or pension plans as
aforesaid.  Aside from the fact that a meaning that does not appear nor is intended or reflected in the very language
of the statute cannot be placed therein by construction, petitioner would likewise do well to remember that repeal of
laws should be made clear and express.  Repeals by implication are not favored as laws are presumed to be passed
with deliberation and full knowledge of all laws existing on the subject, the congruent application of which the
courts must generally presume. For this reason, it has been held that the failure to add a specific repealing clause
particularly mentioning the statute to be repealed indicates that the intent was not to repeal any existing law on the
matter, unless an irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy exists in the terms of the new and old laws.

Writers Counter Argument:

On the given facts, the respondent can argue base on the principle that retirement laws should be liberally
construed and administered in favor of the persons intended to be benefited thereby and pursuant to the subject
provision, the basis for the computation of the retirement benefits of petitioner’s employees should be the highest
basic salary received by them, including allowances not integrated into the basic pay.

The denial of the retirements benefit would deprive the respondents of what is due to her, injustice would result
especially to a citizen aggrieved by the petitioner (PITC). When the statute is ambiguous, this is one of those
fundamentals solutions that would respond to the vehement urge of conscience.

(3)

Andres Borromeo vs Fermin Mariano

GR No. L-16808

Facts of the Case:

Andres Borromeo (Borromeo) was appointed and commissioned as Judge of the 24 th Judicial District effective July
1, 1914, on February 25th, 1920 Borromeo was appointed judge of the 21st Judicial District, and Fermin Mariano was
appointed judge on the 24th Judicial District. Borromeo has since the latter date consistently refused to accept
appointment to the 21st Judicial District.

Issue:

Whether or not Borromeo may refuse his appointment to the 21st Judicial District.

Decision.

Yes. A Judge of First instance may be made a judge of another district only with his consent.” A judge of first
instance are appointed judges of the courts of first instance of the respective judicial district of the Philippines
Island” They are not appointed judges of the first instance of the Philippine Island.
The cardinal rule of statutory construction requires the court to give effect to the general legislative intent if that can
be discovered within the four corners of the Act. When the object intended to be accomplished by the statute is
once clearly ascertained, general words may be restrained to it and those of narrower import may be
expanded to embrace it, to effectuate the intent. Along with this fundamental principle is another, equally well-
established, that such a construction is, if possible, to be adopted, as will give effect to all provision of the statute.
Thus, Judges hold these positions of judges of first instance of definite district until they resign, retire or removed
from impeachment proceedings. The intention of the law is to recognize separate and distinct judicial offices.
Writer’s Counter Argument:

The interpretation to the last clause of section 155 of the Administrative Code, in the sense that it requires the
consent of a judge of the Court of First Instance in order that he may be transferred from one judicial district to
another, is an amendment of the law, an act which should be done only by the legislative branch of the government.
According to law, the Governor-General has the discretion to make transfers of judges from one district to another,
with the consent of the Senate. Therefore, to the Governor-General and to the Senate, and not to the judges, is the
power granted to determine how such discretion should be exercise. If the consent of a judge is an essential requisite
to his transfer to another district, it must also be an essential requisite to his assignment to sit in another district to try
land registration cases or as vacation judge, for in both cases, the same reason exists, that is, the danger to the
independence of the judiciary, which is the foundation of the majority opinion. The result would be the complete
repeal of section 155 of the Administrative Code through the interpretation given by this court. And an interpretation
leading to such result should be discarded for it is contrary to the doctrines of statutory construction, to wit: that the
court should give effect to the general intention of the legislator, if it may be gathered from all the viewpoints
from which the law is examined; and that, if possible, that construction should be adopted which gives effect
to all the provisions of the law. The provisions of the law are clear and it is not necessary either to stretch the
imagination or resort to other jurisdictions, to discover the intention of the legislator. Section 155 of the
Administrative Code provides:

For the purpose of trying land registration cases only, a judge of first instance may, if the public interests so
require, be detailed by the Department Head to temporary duty in a district other than his own. Save when
so detailed or when assigned to vacation duty, no judge of first instance shall be required to do duty in any
other district than that for which he is commissioned; but nothing herein shall be construed to prevent a
judge of first instance of one district from being appointed to be judge of another district.

It is admitted by the authorities on the subject that the object of a saving clause of proviso is (1) to except something
from the legal provision in question, or (2) to restrict the provisions thereof, or (3) to exclude all possible reason for
erroneously construing such provision so as to make it applicable to cases which the legislature did not intend to
include therein.

In whatever sense the proviso in question is interpreted, there is no reason for requiring the consent of the judge for
a temporary or permanent transfer to another district. The intention of the legislature, as gathered from the
provisions of the law, is that no judge shall be required to render services in another district, except to try land
registration cases or to act as vacation judge, but without prejudice to his being appointed by the Governor-General
as judge of another district.

(4)

People vs Tamani

GR L-22160-61

FACTS: Tamani was convicted of murder and attempted murder by the lower court on February 14, 1963. Upon
receipt of a copy of this order, his counsel subsequently filed a motion for reconsideration on March 1, 1963, which
was denied. The lower court sent a copy of the order of denial to the counsel by registered mail on July 13, 1963
through the counsel’s wife. Counsel filed his appeal only on September 10, 1963, forty-eight days from July 24th,
which is the reglementary fifteen-day period for appeal. Appellees contend that the case should be dismissed on the
ground that the appeal was forty-eight days late. They invoked Sec. 6, Rule 122 of the Rules of Court which states
that an appeal must be taken within fifteen (15) days from the promulgation or notice of the judgment or order
appealed from.

ISSUE: Whether the fifteen-day period should commence from the date of promulgation of the decision
Ruling: Yes. Using the rule of reddendo singula singulis (Referring individual or separate words to separate
subjects; making a distributive reference of words), the word “promulgation” should be construed as referring to
“judgment”, while “notice” should be construed as referring to “order”. Tamani’s appeal is therefore 58 days late,
not 47, as Appellees contend; he only had a day left from the receipt of his wife of the notice on July 13.
Nonetheless, the court decided to act upon the appeal at hand “to obviate any possible miscarriage of justice”.

Writers Counter Argument:

Dura Lex Sed Lex

Courts may not enlarge nor restricts statutes:

The law is harsh but it is the law Section 7 Rule 120 of the Rules of court provides that a judgement or conviction
may, upon the accused, be modified or set aside before it becomes final or before appeal is perfected. Except where
the death penalty is imposed, a judgement becomes final after the lapse of the period of perfecting an appeal, or
when the sentence has been partially or totally satisfied or served or when the accused has waived in writing his
right to appeal, or has applied for probation.

Based on the given facts the appeal is therefore 58 days late, thus, the appeal must be dismissed on the ground that
the judgement of the laws must become final after the lapse of the period perfecting an appeal. Courts should not, by
construction, revise even the most arbitrary and unfair action of the legislature, nor rewrite the law to conform to
what they think should be the law nor May they interpret into the law a requirement which the law does not
prescribe.

Laws are made in order not just to protect the people but also to maintain peace and order in a society. The law may
be hard to observe or difficult to obey, but it remains the law and must be therefore followed just the same.

(5)

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

G.R. No. L-22301             August 30, 1967

Facts:
The accused was convicted in violation of Sec. 878 in connection to Sec. 2692 of the Revised
Administrative Code as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 56 and further amended by R.A. 4. On
August 13, 1962, the accused was discovered to have in its possession and control a home made revolver
cal. 22 with no license permit. In the court proceeding, the accused admitted that he owns the gun and
affirmed that it has no license. The accused further stated that he is a secret agent appointed by Gov.
Leviste of Batangas and showed evidences of appointment. In his defense, the accused reiterated that he
must acquitted because he is a secret agent and which may qualify into peace officers equivalent to
municipal police which is covered by Art. 879.
Issue:
Whether or not holding a position of secret agent of the Governor is a proper defense to illegal
possession of firearms.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court in its decision affirmed the lower court’s decision. It stated that the law is explicit that
except as thereafter specifically allowed, "it shall be unlawful for any person to possess any firearm,
detached parts of firearms or ammunition therefor, or any instrument or implement used or intended to be
used in the manufacture of firearms, parts of firearms, or ammunition."The next section provides that
"firearms and ammunition regularly and lawfully issued to officers, soldiers, sailors, or marines [of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines], the Philippine Constabulary, guards in the employment of the Bureau
of Prisons, municipal police, provincial governors, lieutenant governors, provincial treasurers, municipal
treasurers, municipal mayors, and guards of provincial prisoners and jails," are not covered "when such
firearms are in possession of such officials and public servants for use in the performance of their official
duties. The Court construed that there is no provision for the secret agent; including it in the list therefore
the accused is not exempted.
Writer’s Counter Argument:
From the facts of the case, we can infer that the defendant cited the case of People vs Macarandang. In this case,
Moro Macarandang have wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously keep a one riot gun, Winchester, 12-GA ammunitions
without obtaining a proper license or permit therefore from a competent authority. Macarandang, have presented a
certification of his appointment as secret agent from Governon Dimakuta substantiating that he is exempted from
carrying a riot gun without the necessary license.
Thus, under the same circumstances and conditions, by employing the principle of stare decisis et non queta movere,
which necessitate, that once a court has laid down and principle and apply it to all future cases, where the facts are
substantially the same regardless of whether the parties and properties are the same. It follows the precedents and do
not disturb what has been settled.
Thus, the defendant should be acquitted in the same manner macarandang had been vindicated.