PROLEGOMENA

TO

AN IDEALIST THEORY
OF KNOVVLEDGE)
•

BY

NORMAN KEMP SMITH

D PHIL. LL D • ,
PROFESSOR OF LOGIC AND METAPHYSICS IN THE UNIVERSITY OF EDINBURGH

MACMILLAN AND CO., LIMITED

ST. MARTIN'S STREET, LONDON
19 2 4-
 COPYRIGHT

PRIN rED IN GREAT BRITAIN

 TO
S. ALEXANDER
AND

G. F. STOUT
IN

GRATEFUL INDEBTEDNESS
 • PREFACE
THIS volume is the outcome of material which I pre-
pared for ase as Mill's Lecturer in Philosophy at the
University of California, January to May, 1923. In it
I have endeavoured to carry through an enterprise
which I have long had 111 mmd, namely, the formula-
tion of an Idealist theory of knowledge on reahst
lines.
In the late 'olDeties I had come to be lllterested in
Malebranche's philosophy, and thereby was fortunate
in findmg a bond of common 1l1terest wIth Mr. S.
Alexander, to whom the realist features 1Il Malebranche's
teaching had made specIal appeal. Mr. Alexander
then, happIly, directed my attentIOn to the WrItings of
AvenarlUs. I had also become acquainted wIth M.
Bergson's Les Donnees tmmedtates de la Consctence and
Mattere et Memotre; and at that tIme I belIeved myself
able to trace certa1l1 reahst tendencies common to him
and to A venanus. Some paragr.l phs from artIcles III
the Phtlosophtcal Revtew (190B) and Journal of Phtlo-
/ophy (1912), expressive of my attitude in these years,
I have, by permission of the editors, 1I1corporated,
with a few changes, 111 the present volume. Since
1912, however, my views have undergone very radical
alteration, though still in the dIrection of realism and
without departure from the ideahst standpoint. In
IX
x THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE
this recasting of my views I have been greatly aided by
study of the works of Baron von Hugel
Though I cannot follow on the lmes travelled by
M. Bergson, his writlllgs have left their influence, and I
have especially profited by hIs analysIs of tIme, and by
the somewhat kindred teaching of Mr. Whitehead in
this regard. Otherwise, among present-day wnters, my
chief debts, 111 questIOns bearmg directly on the tlieory
of knowledge, are to Mr. Alexander and to Mr. Stout.
Mr. Broad's Sctenttfic Thought (1923) only came
lIlto my hands whtle I was makmg a final revisIOn of
these pages In Chapters IV. and V. I have taken
account of some of his discussions.
I am also under many person,tl obltgatlOns in the
actual preparatlOn of this volume. Mr Stout has read
through my manuscript, 1Il ItS earher form; and I have
Immensely benefited by his cntlclsms, perhaps not least
111 those cases 111 which I have still ventured to differ
from him. My fnend, Mr. A. A. Bowman of Princeton
Umverslty, has done me a similar service. My
colleague, Mr. John Anderson, has read the entire
proofs. Owmg to his watchful care and very search-
mg cntlclsms, the volume IS much less imperfect than
it would otherwise have been.

NORMAN KEMP SMITH.

EDINBURGH,
February 1914.
 CONTENTS
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTOR Y
PAGS
(1.) IDEALISM AND NATURALISM I ..
(n.) IDEALISM AND SUBJECTIVISM
(111.) THE REQUIREMENTS OF IDEALISM
+"
8~

(IV.) OUTLINE OF ARGUMENT 10 ,

CHAPTER II
THE DOCTRINE OF REPRESENTATIVE
PERCEPTION
(I) THE ATTITUDE OF ORDINARY CONSCIOUSNESS 16
(u.) DESCARTES' ALTERNATIVE 18
(m) GALILEO AND DESCARTI<S zo

CHAPTER III
ARGUMENT IN SUPPORT OF THE DOCTRINE ...
OF REPRESENTATIVE PERCEPTION
(1.) THE ADVANTAGES OF THE DOCTRINE z6
~11.) OBJECTIONS MET BY A BIOLOGICAL RESTATEMENT OF THE
DOCTRINE •
fa)Descartes' Ratlonahsm
(6) Sense-Perception not Primarily a Form of
Knowledge. 3Z
(c) The Functions of the Second.IfY Qualities 33
1:1
X11 THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE
nHAPTER IV
I
ARGUMENT IN CRITICISM OF THE DOCTRINE

OF REPRESENTATIVE PERCEPTION
PAGE
(L) PHILOSOPHy'S PRFSENT QUANDARY 39
(IL) THE ALTERNATION BETWEEN REALISM AND SUBJECTIVISM +1
(IIi) THE ARGUMENT FROM RELATIVITY IN ITS PHYSIOLOGICAL
FORM +1
(IV.) THE ARGUMENT FROM RELATIVITY IN ITS NON-PHYSIO
LOGJCAL FORMS +3
(a) Failure to distingUish between Scnslllg and Sensa ++
(h) Illegitimate Assumption that Sense-Ptrceptlon
must be Identical wah Absolute Knowledge. +8
(v.) THE ARGU'dENT FROM IMMEDIATE EXPERIENCE. 50
(VI) THE DETERMINING SOURCE OF SUBJECTIVISM 51
(VII.) BI!RKELt.Y'S PERVERSE PROCEDURE 5+
(vIIi) FURTHER CRITICISM OF THE SUBJECTIVIST POSITION 58
(IX) A TWOFOLD CONCLUSION 65

1VCHAPTER V
THE NATURE AND FUNCTIONS OF THE SENSA

~I.) 'THE ONTOLOGICAL STATUS OF THE SECONDARY QUALITII!S 68

(II.) TIME, SPACE, AND THE SENSA 80
ApPENDIX -MR. BROAD'S DISCUSSION OF THE ALTERNA-
TIVE THEORIES REGARDING THE PRODUCTION OF SENSA 89

CHAPTER VI
THE PRESENTATIONAL CONTINUUM

(1.) A RESTATEMENT OF MR WARD'S DOCTRINE OF A ./

PRESLNTATIONAL CONTINUUM. 95
(u.) AN EXAMINATION OF MR. WAllO'S AND ML STOUT'S
DOCTRINt. OF SENSORY EXTENSITY 100
(III.) MR. ALEXANDER'S DISTINCTION BETWEEN SENSING AND
INTUITING 113
(IV.) MR. RANDLE'S ANALYSIS OF SIZE-DISTANCE PERCEPTION. 114
 CONTENTS xiii

CHAPTER VII
THE CATEGORIES
PAGE
(I.) THE SUBJECTIVIST ACCOUNT OF THE NATUllE AND
FUNCTIONS OF THE CATEGORIES 12]
(n.) A REALIST VIEW OF THE NATURE AND FUNCTIONS OF
THEC;TE~;IES 130'
(a) The Categories as mvolved m the Apprehension
of Time and Space • 134
(h) The Formal Problematic Character of the
Categortes IH
(c) The Relations holdmg between Sensmg, Cate-
gonal Thmkmg, and IntUlting 15 6
(d) The Categories of Substance and Causality 161
(e) The Limits wlthm which Immediate Experience
IS enclosed 166
(f) Further Consideration of the Categones of
Substance and Causality 17 0

~ ,CHAPTER VIII
SENSE AND INTUITION
(I) PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS
(a) The ASSOCiationIst HypothesIs
(b) The Structure and Complex Constitution of the
Psychoplasm
(c) AntiCipation ln Pictorial Terms of Later Argument
(d) The Nature of • Mental Images'
(e) Intultion a Mode of Direct Contemplation
f) The Evolution of Sense-Experience. the Possible
Alternative Views 200
(u.) THE MAIN ISSUE 20 5

CHAPTER IX
CONCLUSIONS 224

INDEX • 2]9
 CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTORY

<1.) IDEALISM AND NATURALISM

THE meamngs attached to the term • Ideahsm • are so

numerous and so conflictmg that I have found it
convement to use It m a very wIde sense, as covenng
all those phtlosophles whlch agree in maintaming that
, spiritual values have a determinmg voice in the ordering
of the U mverse. The alternatIve posItion, as repre-
sented by what IS now most usually entItled • natural~
ism,' IS that these values emerge, and begm to vmdlcate
theIr reahty, only at some late stage m a process of 1

evolutlOn. ThIS may not, perhaps, be a wholly

satisfactory method of dlstmgUlshmg between these
OpposIte types of phllosophy, but wlll at least suffice
to indIcate the very general meamng in whIch I shall
employ the two terms.
On first thoughts, the possIble methods of uphold-
ing ideahsm may well appear, broadly stated, to be
-only two in number. EIther we may strive to demon-
strate that matter IS so OppOSIte m nature to mind that
it -is patently mcapable of generatmg or of account-
ing for It; or we may profess to demonstrate that
matter, as dependent on consciousness, itself bears
witness to the reality of mmd. The history of philo-
sophy would seem, however, to show that the former
B
2 THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE CHAP

method, while pO<;<;lbly tenable 10 some other formula-

tion than any whIch has hitherto been gIven of It,
presupposes a more complete knowledge both of mind
and of matter than we can yet rightly claIm to possess,
and that the latter method, though representing the
standpoint of so acute and dIst10gUlshed a thmker as
Berkeley, and in some degree also of Kant, has falled
to make good Its fundamental contention, that Matter
IS mind-dependent.
The hmitatlOns of these two methods crop out m the
very unsatisfactory mterpretatlOns of Nature to which
they respectively commIt us. On the one View, Nature
is supposed to be adequately envIsaged m terms of I
CartesIan principles, as revIsed by Newton. Its com-
ponents, It IS asserted, are as mcapable of hfe as of
consciousness, and are therefore exhaustIvely known
in terms of those mechanical propertIes whIch In all
their reactIOns, even 10 those that are SImplest, they
unvarymgly display. Nature, thus regarded, IS In ItS
fundamentals non-mysterIOus; It can conceal no un-
dIsclosed secrets, save only in regard to the special
detaIl of ItS mechamcal compleXIties. Berkeley, though
arguing on the OppOSIte, alternatIve lines, arrIves at a
somewhat SImilar conclusIon. On his VIew, also, the
natural world is deprived of all that IS mysterious to
the human understanding. Sense-experIence, Berkeley
teaches, has the mtelhgIbIhty of a language whose con-
ventions are one and all determmed by a Spirit akin
to our own, and It dIscourses, not of the splendours
and dynamic potencles of an mdependent Order, but
solely of the decisions of God in the arranging of the
components of Immediate experience. The surface of
Nature is, so to speak, ItS whole reahty. For though
Nature is always prolonged, alIke as regards outer
 INTRODUCTORY 3
shapes and so-called mner parts, m other actual or
possible expenences, It consists exhaustively m that as
which It IS directly apprehended, namely, m sensatIOns.
The more general laws of their fundamental coexistences
and sequences remam for discovery through sCientific
inqUiry; but to the end It IS m sensatlOns, externally
and arbltranly conjomed, that Nature consists.
One mam thesIs of this volume wtll be that Ideahsm
is mdeed precanously founded, If It seeks to estabhsh
Itself by either of the above methods. Nature has a
stubborn l!Jdependence and an adaptlveness of be-
havIOur whIch rule out any descnptlOn of It eIther, on
the one hand, as the creature, or, on the other hand,
as the opposite of mmd; It exhibits an efficacy and
an inItIatIve, a resourcefulness and, m the organIc
realm, a wtlfulness not wholly without analogy to the
actIvities of the self. And If we further recognIse, as
seemmgly we must, that among Nature's constltuen(s
are those qualitatIvely varymg entIties, sound, colour,
and the like, which hItherto, owmg to lack of ~ny
discoverable connectIOn between them and theIr
phYSical basIs, have usually been classed as mental m
ongm, we should be under no misapprehensIOn as to
the extent to which Nature stIll withholds Itself from
our grasp; even as regards ultimate constituents, it
must, we may presume, con tam very much more than
it has yet revealed to us. If spintual values, as
interpreted In terms of Idealist phtlosophy, have so
little hold on reality as to be threatened by a Nature
thus envisaged, naturalism, I should feel constramed
to believe, is not unhkely to prove their more helpful
ally, and to be alone worthy of our allegiance.
Accordmgly I shall mamtam that what is most I

truly distmctlve in idealism is Its central contention,

4 THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE CHAP

that spmtual values can be credited as operatmg on a

more than planetary, that IS, on a COSfmc scale. Should
this contention have to be given up, the only sort of
, IdealI')m ' which would then rem am would no longer
be dlstmgUlshable from some at least of the naturalIstic
philosophIes. For these are certaInly no less InSistent in
mamtaIn1l1g that the cntena Yielded by spintual values
exercise a predommatmg 1I1fluence m human affairs.
If we hold at all to the OpposItion between IdealIsm and
naturalIsm, we must recogmse It as bemg the distinction
between a rehgLOus and a seculanst view of hfe; and the
consequences which follow, whether practical or con-
templative, according as the one or the other is adopted,
wIll be of the kmd which these terms suggest.

(Ii.) IDEALISM AND SUBJECTIVISM

< I further dlstmgUlsh between subJectlVlsm and

Ideahsm. Subjectivism and reahsm are, I should
holp, methods and points of view to which both
IdealIsm and naturalIsm may, as seems good, find
reason to resort Certamly, In the past, neither Ideal-
Ism nor naturalIsm has exclusively committed Itself,
save 111 this or that mdlvldual representatIve, either to
subjectivist or to realIst prInciples. Frequently the
two types of prmclple supplement one another-
whether consistently or not IS a further question-
wlthm the same philosophy.
Subjectivism IS Itself, of course, a term which can
be employed m a great vanety of qUite legitImat~
meamngs. I prefer to employ It, save where indica-
tion is given to the contrary, in its widest possible
connotation. I shall mean by it any view which either,
as With Descartes, advocates a doctnne of representa-
 INTRODUCTORY 5
tlve perceptlon, or, as w1th Berkeley and h1s followers,
endeavours to mterpret • real' objects as bemg mmd-
dependent. For, however widely Descartes and
Berkeley may d1verge m the1r ult1mate results, yet
common to both, as I shall endeavour to show, are
certam fundamental assumptlOns, incons1stent w1th
any genumely reahst mterpretation of human expen-
ence. That, for mstance, Berkeley's • real' objects
are not the objects beheved m by ordmary consclOUS-
ness, but are s1mply Descartes' representat1ve 1deas
masqueradltlg m place of the1r betters, would, as
already suggested, seem to be shown by the1r adm1tted
causal mefficacy, and by the1r consequent mcapac1ty
to const1tute any other Order than that of a body of
conventlOnally agreed symbols, analogous to those of
human speech.
So deeply, however, have subJect1v1st ways of
thmkmg entrenched themselves m general thought,
ever smce the seventeenth century, that the naturahst1c
pos1tlOn has h1therto, almost mvanably, been made
to rest upon similar foundatlOns. For though; of
course, mamly based upon data accumulated m the
speCial SCiences, It has, as regards ItS modes of ~tate­
ment, and many of ItS chIef arguments, been reached
through Hume, by way of Berkeley, and has therefore
cons1sted-Herbert Spencer and Huxley are here
typical protagonlsts of nmeteenth-century naturahsm
-m a very strange amalgam of subJect1v1sm plus
mechal11sm. The world 1S represented as bemg made
up of two parallel but independent senes, states of
immediate experIence on the one hand, mechanical
processes on the other. The position may be supple-
mented by certain agnostIC pronouncements regardmg
an unknowable reality underlymg and presumably
6 THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE CHAP

co-ordinatmg the separate senes; but on the specIfic

teachmg, and the prevaIlmg temper of tht:1>e phIlo-
sophIes, such supplementary dIcta are almost entIrely
wIthout effect.
The assertIon that the two senes run theIr courses
in complete mdependence, WIthout discermble con-
nectlOn, save only that of temporal comcidence, IS
plamly mcompatIble WIth our havmg knowledg-e of
them both. For all the knowledge there IS must, It
IS alleged, be conveyed, not by any process outsIde
the two senes, and postulated ad lzoc-t~lat, m the
VIew of these thmkers, would be to nval IdealIsm at
ItS worst-but by that one of the two senes whIch IS
made up of the Immediate expenences. ThIS, how-
ever, IS preCIsely what, on the prmcipies mamtallled
by Spencer and Huxley, cannot, conSIstently, be
allowed as pOSSIble. For they would then be POS-
tulating a type of transcendence - the ImmedIate
expenences YIeldmg knowledge of the mechamcal
processes-whIch would contrast WIth the only forms
of phYSIcal happemng that they are wIlhng to recog-
mse, and whIch could not, therefore, be harmomsed
- so, In other connectlOns, they have themselves
argued-WIth any strIctly naturalIstIC scheme.
Recently, however, thIS long-accepted assumptIon
has been boldly challenged, and a massive body of
non-sUbjectIVIst teachmg erected, most notably by
Mr S. Alexander, and m some degree also by Mr.
¥lhitehead, upon genumely naturahstic foundatIons.
V\Thy, they ask, thIS refusal to accept, as compatIble
WIth naturalistic categories, any mode or form of
transcendence? Is not transcendence a process which
m general type is co-extensive WIth physical nature?
What IS causal actIon if not transcendence by the
 INTRODUCTORY 7
agent of its own private hmIts; and what IS causal
affection If not response by the patIent to what lIes
beyond itself? 1 If causal actIOn be first Interpreted,
in terms of a sUbjectIvIst phIlosophy, In the manner
of Hume, It WIll, of course, yIeld no analogy In support
of a self-transcending awareness; but If It be mter-
preted realIstically, the sItuation IS qUIte otherwise,
and new pOSSIbIlIties open to our VIew. ThIS IS a
lesso~ by whIch Idealtsts may well profit; and I have
sought to do so In the present volume. I have been
greatly ass¥)ted by many of the new doctrInes whIch
Mr. Alexander has developed WIth strIking orIgmalIty,
especially as regards our apprehenSIOn of space and of
past tIme. TheIr author must, however, I fear, deplore
what he may well regard as my perverse tWIstmg of
correct arguments to wrong conclUSIOns.
1 Cf Alexander, Space, Tune and Detty, vol 11 pp 81-2 .. The first and
simplest relation bet\\een finite eXistences IS their compresence '~Ithlll o'.je
Space-Time of '" hlch all alike are dlfferentmtlons The behavIOur of finites
to one another In thiS relation of com presence IS determined by the character
of the finites The plant lives, gro\\s, and breathes, and tWines around .1
stick The material body reSists, or falls, or sounds", hen struck, or ~mlts
light when touched by the sun The mind knows Mind IS for us the
highest order of finite empirical eXistent CognitIOn, then, Instead of
being a unique relatIOn, IS nothing but an Instance of the Simplest and most
Universal of all relations" .. Colour IS revealed to me because I have eyes,
while It IS not revealed to the plant as colour but only as something which
affects the chlorophyll In the plant Or I hear the sound of the tUning-fork,
but the sound may be revealed to a tuning-fork which It sets ID sympathetiC
VibratIOn only as a Vibratory material affection of the source In question ..
(op CIt II P 100) Cf also Whitehead, The Concept of Nature, p 145
.. SCience and philosophy have been apt to entangle themselves In a slmple- ,
minded theory that an object IS at one place at any definite time, and IS In
no sense anywhere else ThiS IS III fact the attitude of commonsense thou~ht,
though It IS not the attitude of language which IS naively expressing the facts
of experience Every other sentence ID a work of hterature which IS en-
deavourmg truly to mterpret the facts of experience expresses differences In
surroundmg events due to the presence of some object An object IS
mgredlent throughout Its neighbourhood, and Its neighbourhood IS ID-
definite ..
8 THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE CHAP

(iii.) THE REQUIREMENTS OF IDEALISM

Idealists, as the reading of history would seem to
show, have been apt to overreach themselves, and to
weaken the force of their own better arguments, by
attempting to prove very much more than the avail-
able data can justly be expected to Yield. Smce the
time of Kant, and largely through his influence, the
uncompromlsmg Berkelelan thesIs, that 'material'
Nature IS mmd-dependent, has, Indeed, been displaced
by what, mltlally at least, IS the more mod1!st, though
also usually much less defimte, claim that Mind and
Nature stand in relatIOns of mutual ImphcatlOn. But
even thIS claim has frequently been urged, especIally
by thmkers of the Hegehan type, m forms much more
ambitIOus than the needs of an IdealIst onentatlon
towards life and towards the U l11verse would seem to
demand. ,-
Thus Mr. F. H. Bradley and Mr. Bernard
Bosanquet have mamtamed that everythmg IS expert-
encc. When this useful term, with ItS twofold mean-
mg-experiencmg and the expenenced-Is thus em-
ployed in thIs very wide sense, these wnters are, It is
true, enabled to evade many of the chief controversies
which centre round the names of Descartes, Berkeley,
Hume, and Kant; but they are in position to do so
only because they have restncted themselves to those
consideratIOns of logual implIcation whereby self and
not-self, subject and object, Mind and Nature are
supposed to demonstrate their inseparable, mutual
interconnection. But by such methods they have
never yet succeeded in giving, in terms of their own
standpoint, any really satisfactory account of that other
very different, and yet surely no less lmportant type
 INTRODUCTORY 9
of connectlOn In whlch physical existences exhlbit
, causal efficacy, and 111 whlch physlcal and physlOlogical
processes actzvely condltlOn our Inner expenences and
the apprehenslOn of the outer world that goes there-
wlth. Such a standpoint also constrainS its adherents
to the acceptance of an Absolute, and thls Absolute
is so far from yieldmg-so at least It would seem to
those who are unable to follow on these lmes-a satls-
• synoptlc outlook, that, on the contrary, ahke as
factory
regards Nature and as regards the facts of human
expenence, It blurs the slgmficance and dlmlmshes
the lmportance of Just those dlstmctlOns and values
which are of chief concern to us, and whlch It itself
professes to have safeguarded and upheld.
May not, then, the analYSIS of expenence and its
phtlosophical mterpretatlOn carry us sufficlently far to
discern certam ultimate alternatives, bearmg upon the
meanmg of hfe and of the U mverse, and even perhaps
to find grounds adequate for decldmg between these
alternatlves, and yet not enable us to have understand-
ing, say, in the difficult Issue as to the relatlOn of mind
and matter, how the chosen alternatlve works ltself
out il May we not be m poslhon to give an answer
deClSlve of our attitude towards naturalism and ldeahsm
respectively, and yet not be called upon to determine
more than a few main consequences that follow from
this choice? The many other possible questlOns, If
really relevant to human reqUlrements, presumably
await answer, either through the advance of scientific
inqUlry or, when that remams impracticable, by the
less strictly theoretical, and for that reason so much
more adventurous and immensely more costly methods
of human trial and failure.
These introductory remarks are perhaps in some
10 THEORY OF KNO\VLEDGE CHAP

degree misleadmg, m that they suggest a larger canvas

than I have attempted to hanJ.le 111 thIS volume. They
may, however, be helpful as mdicatmg the kmd of
positlon towards which I have belIeved myself to be
working.
(IV.) OUTLINE OF ARGUMENT

Commg now to the specIal, more detailed, character

of my argument, It may be outlmed as follows. Smce
tIme and space are as real as the revolutlOns of the
planets and the growth of trees, to regaro them as
bemg subjectIve IS to reduce external Nature to the
level of an Illusory appearance. In order, therefore,
to uphold a realIst VIew of Nature, I shall contend that
tIme and space are mdependently real, that as such
they dIsclose themselves directly to the mmd, that in
so doing they prescribe certam categories WhICh are
involved in theIr apprehenSIon, and that these categories
equip the mind for dlscernmg those Ideals which con-
stram It to the purSUit of science and plulosophy.
TIme and space do not, however, reveal themselves
to us save in terms of sensa. Consequently, In the
development of a realtst VIew of Nature we are faced,
at the start, by a cholCe of routes. EIther we may
proceed by regardmg the sensuous features-colour,
sound, heat and cold, etc.-as bemg qualIties inherent
in the mdependently eXIsting physical bodIes, or we
may interpret them as bemg events which demand for
their occurrence supplementary condItIons of a phYSIO-
logical character.
Each view has its own difficulties; and each, on
the other hand, has certam inttial advantages. My
choice is for the latter alternative. The sensa, I shall
argue, first emerge together WIth lIfe and consciousness,
 INTRODUCTORY II

as necessary for the effective functioning of animal

organisms. The physical world is, a~ tht: positIve
sciences demonstrate, so extraordmarily comphcated
that anything approachIng complete experience of
it, or even at any moment of anyone part of it,
far exceeds the utmost capacIties of the human,
no less than of the animal, mInd. Indeed, since
Natllre, and each object m Nature, contains so
many features whIch from the point of VIew of our
practical needs are entIrely Irrelevant, such exhaust-
Ive experi~ce, even if pOSSIble, would so bewilder
and distract the mInd that ItS primary function, VIZ.
the InitiatIng and directIng of bodily movements, could
not be effiCiently exerCised. Such conSClOusness would
be self-defeatIng. If, therefore, practical adaptatlOn
IS to be achieved, Nature, In the processes which con-
dltlOn its being expenenced, must be adjusted to
the dimenslOns of the ammal and human consciou~­
ness And in this reductlOn there are three main re-
quirements which have to be fulfilled: first, that the
world be sImphfied by omission of all but a small
selectlOn of ItS multitudinous detail, secondly, that
nothing directly relevant to the InstInctive and other
practical needs of the ammal concerned be left out of
account; and, thirdly, that the features retaIned be
apprehended with all the defintteness and preCIsion
required for Inttiating, and on the higher levels for
controllIng, the necessary mantpulative and defenSive
movements. These reqUlrements have been success-
fully met by Nature's Ingenious deVice of the' secondary
qualities.' How complete, for instance, is the trans-
formation when the millions of VIolently energetic,
discrete entities which compose a drop of water are
apprehended as a uniform whItish-coloured globule of
12 THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE CHAP

seemtngly contmuous and qUlescent matter, and yet

for the purposes of practlcal hfe how wnvelllent, and
how entirely adequate 1 There IS omiSSion, but no
lack of definiteness; there are qUIte radical alteratlOns,
but none which do not contnbute to rapidity and
effectiveness of mental and bodily response. How
otherwise, m the human domam, could the manual
and the fine arts, wh1ch demand the apprehensi~n of
large-scale but none the less subtle and dehcate
differences of texture and design, ever have become
poss1ble~ All art IS at once select1ve a:Hd creative,
employing the methods of omission tn the attainment I
of new and qUlte positive ends. For such creat1ve
rendenngs of the otherwise eX1stent, Nature has set
the pattern m ItS manner of disclos1l1g Itself to the
ammal and human mtnd.
Objects, as thus sensuously apprehended, are pubhc
ex1stences. For though the sensory perspective tn
which they are experienced is peculiar to each observer,
we do not have to regard It as subJective, but only as
pnvate. The umqueness does not come about through
relation to • mtnd " It 1S determined by the temporal
and spatial standpomt of the 1l1dlvidual and by the
physical and physlOlog1cal complexltles thereby brought
into play. By discounting the Illusions thus generated
-and the illusIOns, OW1l1g to the exclus1vely objective
character of their conditions, themselves supply the
data adequate for the1r correction-we can arnve at
a fuller knowledge of the tndependently real. Even
the sensa themselves, tnasmuch as they are pnvate
without being subjective, can be defined in non-
personal terms, namely, as items integral to an Order
which is much too enigmatic in character, and too
varied in the types of its manifold constituents, to be
I • INTRODUCTORY 13
adequately envisaged in any purely mechantcal terms.
The absence of any dIscoverable connectIon, save that
of a quantitative concomItance, between the sensa on
the one hand and theIr physical and physlOlogIcal
condItions on the other, po1Ots, we may presume, to
interven10g reaches and types of eXIstence to which
we have no present means of penetratlon. Inde-
pendent Nature IS not less, but more, than it IS I
experIenced as be1Og.
As we shall find, this VIew of the sensa IS defensible
only If It t!an be ma1Ota1Oed that 10 theIr intrInsic
nature they do not involve what It IS now usual to
entItle • extensIty.' AccordIngly, one of my chief
dIfficultIes wIll be to JustIfy the contention that space
is not apprehended througll sensa, but tn terms of them.
My general thesis IS thus twofold: first, that time,
space, and the categorIes are dIrectly apprehended as
constItuent of the natural world, and, secondly, that
the sensa eXist not as ' qualItIes • but as ' events,' and
have a quite defintte btologtcal functIon, that of defintng
the perspectlve necessary for the purposes of practICal
adaptatlOn. These posItIons I endeavour to combme
-a dIfficult task, and how far I am successful the
reader must Judge-wIth an entIre rejectlOn of the
doctr1Oe of representatIve perception, alIke 10 Its earher,
historical, and 10 its present-day forms. This IS why
I prepare the ground for the constructive part of my
argument by devoting the next three chapters to
exam1OatlOn and CrItICIsm of that doctrine. WhIle so
do1Og, I also find the opportunity of defining the
essentially practical, non-theoretical character of sense-
perception, and so of present10g the data upon which
my view of the sensa IS chIefly based.
The two fundamental tenets, which thus together
 THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE CHAP

form my main thesis, rest on very different considera-

tions, and each calls for separate proof. None the
less, they themselves agree in two respects. In the
first place, both postulate the possIbIlIty of dIrect,
face-to-face apprehensIon. For though I allege that
space is apprehended only in terms of sensa, not
through them, I desire to maintam that both space
and colour are immediately apprehended. Any other
view is surely untenable 1 How could we hope to
odva//Ce to a knowledge of eIther In the absence of
direct acquallltance? Then, secondly, both tenets rest
on the assumptlOn-borne out, I should contend, by
all that is most fundamental in our expenence-that
from start to fimsh, alIke in sense-expenence and in
knowledge generally, the imtlatlve, and the really
controlllllg forces, come from wIthout. ConsIder, for
instance, Nature's mode of reveahng to us the quah-
tatively varying !1ensa-ln all regards the most en-
chanting, in some regards the most enigmatic, of its
mamfold aspects. How exuberant the creatIveness,
and how elaborate the tndtrectness, wIth which Nature
has proceeded in preparing for us the physlOloglcal
condItions of such sensory expenence! And yet
how dIrect, how immediately face-to-face a mode of
apprehension this type of sensory experience proves
Itself to be! As I shall endeavour to show, Nature is
no less contllluoysly self-reveallllg m our other modes
of apprehension. Through ItS temporal and spatial
features it imposes upon the mind the use of certain
categories, and through these categories the recognition
of certain intellectual ideals; in our scientific pursuits
we are still the children of Nature, acting under its
tutelage and inspired by itS communications.
These positions, I need hardly say, do not diffe)."
 INTRODUCTORY IS
from other methods of dealmg w1th the problems of
knowledge m bemg free from difficulties. But, as I
shall contend, they harmonise better with what must
be a first requirement m any satisfactory philosophy
which 1S not avowedly sceptical and wh1ch 1S also
realist m intentlOn, namely, that they justify us m
believmg that Nature is an mdependent Order, and
that ",hke through the seemmg contingencies of sense-
experience and through the purpos1ve aChvities of our
d1scurS1ve thmkmg, 1t is educatmg us into an ever-
fuller knovrledge of itself. Already it has contnved
to secure for us the emergence of sC1enhfic ins1ght,
and that out of a type of sensory experience which, in
its b1ological origins, is determined in all its features
by pract1cal needs. In the realm of knowledge, Nature
has thus proved to be a very sufficient Providence, a
veritable Fa1ry Godmother w1th magical powers; our
task is to follow on the lines whicb she prescribes.'·
 CHAPTER II

THE DOCTRINE OF REPRESENTATIVE PERCEPTION

THE doctrine of representative perception as formulated

by Descartes has exercised, from the 'seventeenth
century onwards, so overwhelming an mfluence upon
all subsequent philosophIcal thmking, and in one form
or another shll has so many adherents, that it is
advIsable that we should consIder It before proceedmg.
Indeed, so universal has been Its influence, m Kant and
hIS successors, hardly lese; than m Berkeley and Hume,
In Spmoza and LeIbDlz, that present-day wnters almost
mvanably define theIr respective pOSItions m terms
eIther of theIr partIal agreement, or of theIr total
dIsagreement, WIth It. The doctnne Itself, m turn,
can best be understood by contrast WIth the standpomt
of ordmary conSClOusness.

(1.) THE ATTITUDE OF ORDINARY CONSCIOUSNESS

The attitude of the man in the street, and of all of
us m our unsophIsticated moments, would probably
not be misrepresented If stated somewhat as follows.
We seem to ourselves to look out through our eyes,
and to have an immedIate face-to-face apprehension of
objects and other selves outside and around us. Just
as we can look out through a window, and see the
landscape as It lies there outside the wmdow, so we
16
eH II REPRESENTA TIVE PERCEPTION 17
seem to look out through the eyes, and to have direct
experIence of an mdependently eXlstmg world. But
certam qUIte elementary facts, brought to lIght by the
sCiences of phySICS and physIOlogy, suffice to show
that m adoptmg thIS attitude we are suffering from an
IllUSIOn. The eyes are not eXits, but always only
entrances. They are not wmdows through which the
mmd.can look out, but channels through which nerve-
currents pass mto the bram. It is no more pOSSIble
to look through the eyes than It IS to look through a
stone wall. • The front of the eye, the pupil, IS, It is
true, transparent; but the most essential part of the
eye, the retina, IS opaque. ~That really happens would
seem, mdeed, to be directly contrary to what IS bemg
assumed. Light fallIng upon the object IS reflected
to the eye. Passmg m through the pupIl, and focussed
by the lens, It causes chemical changes III the retma.
These chemical changes, In turn, stimulate the Optic·
nerve, and so give rIse to nerve-currents which pass to
the 'visual area' m the occipital lobes of the cerebral
hemispheres. In connectIOn With the brain-processes
thus aroused there emerge those experIences for which
we are seekmg to account.
So far there IS general agreement. No one ques-
tions that these facts, bearing on the processes mvolved
m viSIOn, have been more or less conclUSively estab-
ltshed. But how they are to be interpreted in their
bearmg on the nature of sense-experIence IS a questIon
to which neither ordmary conSCIOusness nor the positive
sCiences can give any satisfactory answer, and which
on philosophical mvesttgation has proved su.rprisingly
difficult and proportionately contentious.

c
I8 THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE CHAP

(iI.) DESCARTES' ALTERNATIVE

There is, however, one answer whIch has such

initial plausibIltty that untIl It had been trIed and found
wanting, no other could at all hope to receIve a hearmg;
and It was upon thIS mIsleadIng scent that Descartes
and all hIS dIscIples hurried off In full cry. Only one
conclusIon can seemmgly be drawn. The proc~esses,
phYSIcal and physlOloglcal, above enumerated, must
have as theIr ultimate functIOn the brmgIng Into
eXIstence, or at least the occaSlOntng so to eXist, of
certaIn entItIes, VIZ. those whIch we are now accus~
tamed to entltle sensattons of Irght and colour. These
entItles, Descartes further argues, differ In qUIte radical
fashlOn from the antecedents whIch generate them.
For whereas these antecedents are mechamcal pro-
cesses, occurring In pu bIrc space, the resultmg sensa-
'tions are, he contends, not so describable, and occur
In what may be entItled the field of conscIOusness.
If, then, we picture the self, as Descartes vIrtually did,
as standIng over agaInst the sensatlOns and as appre-
hendIng them, the follOWIng dIagram, In whIch the self,
as befits a self-centred existence, is pIctorIally repre-
sented by a Circle, WIll Illustrate crudely, but not
altogether mcorrectly, the cogmtlve SItuatIon, as
Descartes thus conceIved It. In ordmary conscious-
ness the self seems to Itself to look out through the
eye at Xl; what alone It dIrectly experIences IS X2;
and X2 is a copy, Image, or representatlOn of XI,
constructed by the self, In the ltght of past experience,
out of the sensations that Xl arouses by actIng on the
eye, and through the eye, on the brain. Xl is inviSIble.
What alone can be seen IS X2; and It is not a material
body, but a mental image in the field of conSCIousness.
II REPRESENTATIVE PERCEPTION
It may be called a representation; It represents, as
by deputy, the outer, independently existing material
body.

Xl •
--~---,lr-
r
~
Eye
Braln

Thus if ten people, standing m a circle, look at an

orange which one of the ten holds up to view, there
wtll then exist eleven oranges-one separate orange in
each of the ten separate fields of conSClOusness, and m
addition the mVlsible orange which one of the ten IS
holding In hiS hand. Material bodies, by the mert!'
fact of being external, are, on this View, necessarily
inviSible. Not only is the mind of each individual
mcapable of directly experiencing anything non-mental;
It cannot transcend the field of ItS own private con-
SClOusness. Objects, m order to be apprehended,
must be reduplIcated m a private mental form, that
IS, as Images; and these, It is alleged, are as dependent
upon the mdlvldual's mmd as reflections are upon the
mirror m which they appear. We cannot see one
another's bodies any more than we can see one
another's mmds. Nothing penetrates Into any con-
SClOusness save in the shadowy form of a mental
duplicate.
Descartes adopts a simIlar attitude in regard to the
sense of touch. If I place my hand upon a desk, I
seem to myself to have an immediate apprehenSion of
'20 THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE CHAP

the cool hard surface of the desk as It presses against

the palm of my hand. But here again sCientific re-
flection would seem to show that In adoptmg this
attJtude we are subject to an IllusIOn. The surface of
the hand IS not Itself any more sensitive than IS the
surface of the desk. \Vhat happens IS that the desk
acts chemically on certain temperature - organs and
mechamcally upon certam pressure-organs In the .mner
skin of the hand. In both cases nerve-vibrations are
aroused, and the two types of VibratIOns pass severally
to the sensory regIOns of temperature anti of contact
m the hemispheres. In connectlOn therewith there
arIse 111 the percipIent's field of conscIOusness sensatIOns
of temperature and contact; and out of these sensa-
tions, uSing them as data, he constructs for hImself,
as best he can-with the aid of past experiences SimIlarly
aroused and now recalled-a mental pIcture or copy
'of the surface which IS acting on the end-organs.
Just as materIal bodies are inVISible, so hkewise they
are intangible.

(111) GALILEO AND DESCARTES

ThIS doctrine of representative perception was, in

Descartes' own phIlosophy, supplemented by a doctnne
of pure thought, according to which we have direct,
purely conceptual, apprehension of the mdependently
rea1. But subject to this Important quahficatlon, WIth
which, smce we are at present deahng With scnsc-
experIence, we need not here concern ourselves, l the
above statement of the doctrine emphasises what was
mainly influentIal In determining Descartes' attitude
to hIS metaphysical problems, and especially to the
1 Cf below, PP 30-3z.
Il REPRESENTATIVE PERCEPTION 21

problem of the relatlOn of mmd and body He was,

he believed, constr,uned to acceptance of the doctrme
by the phYSIcal teachmg of his younger contemporary,
Gahleo, and by the necessity, as he hImself contended,
of employing simllar methods m the blOlogical SCIences.
In Descartes' tIme phllosophy and SCIence were not
dIstinguished from one another; and the doctnne of
repr"sentatlve perceptIOn was therefore in hIS eyes as
much the dIrect outcome of sCIentific mqUlry as any
of the more specific conclusIOns to whIch It had led. 1
As we shafl find, much of the mIschIef whIch the
doctrme has caused m phIlosophy, and its perSIstence
m face of crItICIsm, are due to thIS behef that no other
mterpretation of sense - expenence IS conSIstent with
the teachmg of the pOSItive sClences, and that It alone,
therefore, has the prestIge of these SCIences behmd It.
ThIS behef has mdeed conSIderable seemmg jUStl-
ficatlOn. The distinctlOn drawn by Gahleo m hIS II
Saggtatore between the mechamcal propertIes by which
objects causally 111fiuence one another, and the other
seemmgly otlOse 2 qualitIes by whIch they are sensu-
1 In my StudIes ItI the CalleS/an Phtlosoplzy I have tl'led to show that the

dualIsm between mmd and matter, m which the doctrine of representative

perceptIOn has Its roots, IS not to be understood In the manner In which
Descartes has himself expounded It, namely, as being the final outcome of
hiS phIlosophlsmg As mvolved In the general and SCientific thought of hiS
time, the dualism constituted hiS Inltlal problem, and predetermined many
of the conclUSIOns at which he believed himself to have arrived by mdependent
argument
a The behaViour of billiard balls IS not affected by their colours, a red
ball acts on a green ball 10 the same manner In which It acts on a \\ hlte one
That 15 to say, the colours play no part 10 the mteractlons the effects are
constant even when the colours vary Only so IS the game fair and squue,
as between the players Though Gahleo does not so express himself, hiS
reason for holdmg that the mechanical properties of shape and motion have
to be ascribed to bodies while the other qualities cannot be so ascribed, has
Its source III thiS difference between effiCIency and non-efficlency, as I
proceed to lOdlcate, on pp 23-5
22 THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE CHAP

ously differentiated, led hIm at once to the conclusion

that the secondary 1 qualItIes have .. theIr resIdence
exclusIvely m the sensItIve [ammatedJ body," and
.. would all be removed and anl11hllated were the animal
removed."
Gahleo does not here go the length of saymg that
the secondary quahtles are mental, but he qUite de-
fil11tely holds that they have no eXIstence in the st;.nctly
phYSIcal realm. The sole reason whIch he aSSIgns for
thIS VIew IS the fact that they are not m thought
bound up WIth the concept of phYSical ex'tstence; and
thIS of course means that they are not among the
properties which are reqUIred to account for the be-
haVIOur of material bodIes. A feather, applIed lIghtly
to some part of the body, causes tlcklmg. By general
admiSSion thiS does not Justify us, Gahleo pomts out,
m ascrIbmg the tlcklmg to the feather, as an lllherent
quality. The feather can do no more than move and
touch the skm. The tlcklll1g depends entirely upon
us (e tutla dt not), and must cease With the removal of
the al11mated and senSItIve body. .. I believe that
many qualIties which are attnbuted to natural bodies,
tastes, odours, colours, and others have to be regarded
as of SImilar, and not greater, eXIstence." 2
The character of phYSIcal explanatIOn, as stIll
usually conceIved m the sIxteenth and seventeenth
1 Though the terms primary and secondary were first mtroduced by
Locke, It IS convenient to employ them m defining the distinctIOn as drawn
by Gahleo The primary qualities are usually described as being those
qualities which are apprehended both by touch and by Sight, VIZ extensIOn
or spatial Size, shape, and motion The secondary qualities, Similarly de-
scrIbed, are those whIch are apprehended only by a smgle sense, as sweet
and sour by tdste, the odours by smell, heat and cold by the temperature
senses, sound by hearmg, and colour by Sight Difficulties arise m regard
to the quality of' solidity,' and Its relatIon to motor sense
2 Il SaggtatQre, § 48, Opere (1844), tomo IV p 334
II REPRESENTATIVE PERCEPTION 23
centuries, must have had considerable influence in
determimng GalIleo's position. The Anstotelian
physics, in opposItion to which Galileo was formulating
his own standpoint, had accepted qualItatIVe change
as the physical occurrence par excellence. Hot bodies
become cold; white objects become black. Gahleo,
conceiving physical fire and physIcal colour as forms
of I1latter and motlOn, was constramed to hold that If
heat and colour in their vanous Cjualltatzve modes are
physical eXIstences, they are eXistences In regard to
which the ~clence of physics can have noth1Og to say.
They do not need to be taken mto account in ex-
plamIng the behavIOur and causal agency of matenal
bodies; and accord1Ogly If physIcal are otiose, or to
use an equivalent techmcal term, epiphenomenal.
For these reasons GalIleo, wIthout further or special
argument, at once adopts the view that these qualita-
tIvely varying expenences are to be conceived on the
analogy of the organIc sensatIOns and feelIngs, and
therefore as falling outSide the physical domam. If
strictly physIcal, qualitatIve changes would, it would
seem, have to be conceived as inVOlVIng annIhilation
and creatlOn, wIth the added ddficulty that we should
be unable to assIgn any causes for their productlOn
save the strictly physical, non-qualitatIVe differences
of motion, size, etc., with which they appear 10
correlation. That even on the VIew adopted they
st111 (hke tickling and the organic sensatIOns generally)
have to be conceived as being creatively brought Into
eXIstence, IS Indeed true. But the causes whIch, on
the new view, can be alleged as creatively producing
them, involving, as they do, all the complex factors
that go to make lIfe and consciousness possible, are
not so patently insuffiCient. And what IS more
 THEORY OF KNO~TLEDGE CHAP

immedIately important, the task of accounting for

I their occurrence no longer falls to the phYSICIst. He
is released from all obltgatlOn In the matter, beyond
showmg that when the secondary 'quahtles' are
conceIved as bemg in theIr physical nature modes of
matter and motton, the stimulI supplIed to the senses
are such as wIll suffice, as phYSIcal 'occasIons,' to
start off' the complex physiological processes ypon
whIch the qualztatzve dIfferences, dIrectly experienced,
are now supposed to depend.
The next step was taken by Descartes .... Generalis-
ing Galileo's phYSical pnnciples, he treated them as
bemg hkewise apphcable to bIOlogical occurrences and
as capable of YIeldmg an explanatiOn no less exhaustive
than that which they Yield of events m the morganic
realm. But when phYSIOlogICal phenomena are Viewed
In thiS manner as a subspeCies Within the stnctly
phYSical, the secondary qualIties have to be extruded
from the entire material world, and have to be regarded
as modificatIOns of the only other type of eXistence
which then remams, namely, the mental. And thus
arose what Whitehead 1 has so feliCitously entitled that
fatal doctnne of 'bifurcatIOn,' whereby Descartes
distingUIshed between the psychical, conceived as
comprehendmg all the secondary 'quahttes' and
phYSical entitles conceived as endowed WIth merely
me cham cal properties.
It IS not suffiCient to say that these two realms
are charactensed by opposite types of predicates, and
are therefore dualIstically conceIved. They constitute
a contrast of the most amazing and incredible kind.
Whereas withm the physical domain creation and
annihilation can never be found to occur, these are
1 The Concept of Nature, PP 30, 18S, 187
II REPRESENTATIVE PERCEPTION
the most usual occurrences of the mental realm.
CreatlOn, It is asserted, 1S the prerogatlve of fin1te no
less than infinIte mmd. The secondary 'quahties'
are psychlc addltlOns whlch each finIte mmd lS com-
petent, when occaslOned thereto by physical stlmuh,
to add to the sum of the pre-exlstent. And when
these ' quahties • cease to be thus creatlvely supported
m e~stence by some one indlvldual, they pass into
nothmgness. Even the ' memory' of them, as Des-
cartes held, lS a chapter In physlOlogy. They do not
m passing l&ve mental vestlgla of any kInd. In beIng
, recalled' they have to be recreated upon the occasion
of brain-processes whlch follow the paths mechanIcally
formed by the onglnal boddy processes.
When the alms of the posltlve SClences are thus
interpreted In stnctly mechamcal terms, all quahtatlve
changes are shouldered off Into the mental realm.
The physlclst lS well satisfied to be thus able to expel
them from hls terntory; and when the physlOloglst,
following hIS example, does so lIkewlse, they fall to
be treated by the psychologIst. And SInce there IS no
further domam Into whlch they can be ejected, the
psychologIst has to come to terms wIth the many
puzzhng problems whlch they Involve, elther by some
such type of epiphenomenalism as the physicIst has
been so careful to avoid, or, upon the bankruptcy of
this way of thinking, by means of parallelism, or,
when this likewise proves untenable, by falling back
upon that biological restatement of nmeteenth-century
epiphenomenahsm whlch IS now current under the
title behaviourism.
 CHAPTER III
ARGUMENT IN SUPPORT OF THE DOCTRINE. OF
REPRESENTATIVE PERCEPTION

IN addltion to the immense boon which'the doctrine

of representative perceptlOn affords to the physiclst
and physiologist, in removmg from their domains
the seemmgly msoluble problems mvolved in quali-
tative change, there are certain other advantages
which are so obvious and, as It would seem, so little
capable of bemg dIspensed with, that the doctrme has,
"Up till a few decades ago, met with almost umversal
acceptance among sCIentists and psychologists, and
until Kant with well-mgh universal acceptance among
specialists m philosophy.

(1.) THE ADVANTAGES OF THE DOCTRINE

What other theory, It may be saId, can offer so

simple and obviOus an explanatiOn of colour-bhndness,
of variations in our experience of heat according to
the temperature of the skin, of the variations in sound,
colour, Size, etc., with distance, and indeed of the
entire arrangement of the visual field accordlng to
perspective? If each individual is constrained to rely
entIrely upon his own private sensations for knowledge
of the public world, are not those variations just such
as we should expect to occur? The advance of
26
eH III REPRESENTATIVE PERCEPTION 27
psychology, so far from rendenng the theory less easy
of apphcatlOn, appears rather to enforce ltS cogency.
Do not the explanatIOns glven by the psychologlst of
the many new types of dluslQn, whlch he has himself
discovered, or to whlch at least he has drawn special
attentlon (such as m the estllnatlQn of Slze by touch,
accordmg to the sensltlveness of the portions of the
skin. brought mto actIOn, and m the estlmation of
solidlty by the eye in monocular and bmocular vlSlon),
lmply the essential truth of the doctnne?
Agam, «rhat other doctnne wdl suffice to account
for the well-mgh complete dlfferences which we find
to exist between objects as sensuously apprehended
and the actual nature of these objects as determmed
through sClentific mveStlgatlOn? A drop of water
appears to the eye to be a whltIsh-coloured plece of
contmuous matter, the parts of whlch are at rest.
Yet, as the physlclst mforms us, when more correctly
apprehended, It IS found to consIst of dIscrete molecules
whlch are not at rest, and which, If coloured, can be
coloured only In mmute spots and not as wholes.
For, as the physlclst demonstrates, the term molecule
-so far as shape and Slze are referred to-stands
only for the space wlthm whlch a certam number of
atoms (m the case of a molecule of water, two of
hydrogen and one of oxygen) confine thelr vlbratory
motions. As Lord Kelvm has calculated, these atoms
are m size, relatively to the volume of the molecule, as
three footballs would be to the space occupied by St.
Paul's Cathedral; they occupy the molecule very much
in the manner in which a small military force may
occupy an extensive territory, not by bulk but by
mobility. Even, therefore, if the molecules are at
rest, their constituents are in constant motion; and
28 THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE CHAP

if they he coloured, the colour can be located (so long

at least as we keep to usual ways of thinking) only
in the atoms, not m the' empty,' and relatively vast,
molecular spaces withm which they he.
But present-day SCIence, revlsmg the Views which
It held untIl recently, mtervenes to mterdict even these
conclusiOns. The atom, as regards SIze and shape, IS
viewed not as solId and contmuous, but as a ,name
only for the space withm which sttll smaller bodIes
move and mteract. Each atom reduces WIthout re-
mainder to a set of spatially ordered electrons. To
extend Lord KeIvm's calculatiOn 1 If the SIze of each
atom be conceived as yet further magnified to the SIze
of a parish church, the electrons composmg It WIll then
be about the SIze of full stops III ordmary pnnt, each
m constant motIOn wlthm the lImIts of the church.
The inadequaCIes of our orIgmal sense - perceptIOn
are thus agam demonstrated, m a still more stnkmg
manner.
There IS, mdeed, a qUIte definite sense In whIch
the drop of water as a whole IS at rest, relatIvely to
Its surroundmgs. So far our sense-perceptIOn YIelds
correct knowledge. SImIlarly, If we mSIst upon takmg
a naIvely reahstic view of colour, we can argue that the
colour of the drop of water may, m some manner
not yet definable, correlate wlth the drop as a whole.
Just as there IS a surface tensIOn over the whole
surface of the drop, generated by the proxImIty of the
molecules to one another, so, It can be contended,
there may be a state of tensIon over the entire surface

1 Cf Duncan, T,~e New KnO'Wledge, p lSI PhYSIcal sCIence IS pro-

gressmg so rapIdly that thIS further calculatIon, as made by SIr OlIver
Lodge and Mr Duncan, 1& already somewhat out of date For our pur-
poses It I', however, sufficiently m keepmg WIth later results
III REPRESENTATIVE PERCEPTION 29
and throughout Its transparent 1Otenor determ1010g its
whIteness. Or agam we can argue, that If Its multI-
tudmous constituents be coloured, then even though
they may not all possess the same colour, they may
yet, owmg to theIr constant and rapId movements, lIke
a dIsk wIth varIously coloured sectIOns when set 10
rotatIon, 'appear' umformly coloured to the eye.
The~ latter posItions would, however-other obJec-
tions apart-be purely conjectural, no empmcal
eVIdence can be offered 10 theIr support. For s1Oce,
as already pd10ted out,l colours are cau,>ally mefficaclOus,
only dIrect acquamtance can YIeld knowledge of theIr
actual eXIstence. TheIr condItIOns, whether physIcal
or physIologIcal, cannot, by any 10dIrectly obtaInable
eVIdence, be shown to be themselves coloured.
Thus the drop of water, as conceIved by SCIence,
dIffers m almost every respect from the water as we
see It. Its conStituents, vIewed as formmg a SIngle
whole, can, mdeed, be at rest relatively to theIr sur-
round1Ogs. Also, the drop as seen may mdicate
roughly 111 ItS outlIne the regIOn WIth111 the lImIts of
whIch these constItuents eXIst, and from whIch they
exercise 10fluence upon outsIde bodIes. But the water
IS not a SIngle contmuous pIece of qUiescent and
umformly coloured matter. It IS a swarm of dIscrete
partIcles, whIch are Immensely far apart proportIOnately
to their SIze, and whIch are 10 contmuous motIon.
Nor as to ItS colour or lack of colour do we have
any suffiCIent eVIdence; and If we may argue from
general probabllitles, should It possess colour, there
is little hkehhood that the colouring IS uniform.
Upon the doctrme of representatIve perception
there is no difficulty in accepting the revolutionary
1 Cf above, p 21 ff
30 THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE CHAP

views to which modern phYSICS thus finds Itself com-

mitted. If our sole data for apprehendmg In sense-
perceptlOn the nature of bodIes be those sensatIons
whIch accompany processes elaborately medIated by
the sense-organs and nervous system, dIsparity be-
tween objects as ImmedIately apprehended and objects
as sCIentIfically determined IS even more easy of
acceptance than would be a proved agreement. 1 • It IS
entIrely a questIOn of what the detaIled eVIdence,
dIscoverable only by processes of elaborate 1Odirectness,
may constram us to conclude. In any Case, already
10 the tIme of GalIleo and Descartes the dispartty
was sufficIently obvious. That It IS even greater than
they had grounds for belIeVIng, makes no essentIal
dIfference.

(iI.) OBJECTIONS MET BY A BIOLOGICAL RESTATEMENT

OF THE DOCTRINE

.. (a) Descartes' Rattonaltsm ,JI

One main difficulty whIch stood 10 the way of the
doctrine of representatIve perception was that of
harmonising ItS VIew of sense - experIence as a form
of knowledge WIth the Illusory and deceptive character
of the InfOrmatIOn which sense-perceptIon YIelds. So
Impressed was Descartes by thIS feature of sense-
experience that In addItion to hIS ontologIcal dualIsm
between mInd and matter he resorted to a second I
dualIsm, WIthIn the mind Itself, between the sensuous
and the conceptual. Concepts, he maintained-It is
one of the many paradoxes whIch render his phIlosophy,
whtle seemingly so straightforward, in actual character
1 How, when the disparity IS so great, SCience can be developed out of
ordmary experience, IS a queStion which we shall conSider later
III REPRESENTATIVE PERCEPTION 31
qUIte strangely sophIsticated-are, both 10 nature and
10 ongm, mdependent of the c,ensuous embodIments in
and through whIch we appear to acqUIre knowledge of
them. Concept'l, he declared, are 10nate 10 the mmd;
It IS out of them, not out of our mislead10g senc;e-
experiences, that SCIence IS developed. These con-
cepts, so far as they bear on expenence of the outer
worlq, are few 10 number and sImple 10 composIt1On
-concepts of space, number, and motIon, or at most
of the fundamental modes thereof, together wIth the
concepts of !mbstance and causalIty; and when atten-
tively studIed 10 pure thought, they suffice to delIver
us From the Illus10ns to which we are commItted by
sense-expenence. Sensat1Ons, Descartes concludes, are
In all cases obscure and confused feelIngs, to whIch
the finite mmd IS delIvered over owmg to ItS present
connectIOn WIth the braIn. The braIn IS not the
organ of our thInkmg, though It IS the organ of our
sensuous feelIngs and memOries. Thought functIOns
qUIte mdependently of the bra1O, l unaccompanIed by
any correlatIve braIn - processes; and just for this
reason It IS capable of reveal10g the absolute nature of
the Independently real.
Descartes accordmgly condemns our sense-experi-
ence as concealIng from us the true nature of reahty,
and as not be10g what we usually 10terpret It as be1Og,
a correct apprehenSIon of the world we lIve m. We
must free the mmd from all entanglement with the
senses; we must emanCIpate our thInk10g from the
tyranny of the sensuous Imag1OatIon; we must 10 pure,
1 Accordmg to Descartes, this follows, among other reason~, from
the distinctIOn between Universals and particulars Concepts, bemg UDJ-
versals, cannot be caused by brain-processes all of which are necessarily
particular It IS noteworthy that the adherents of present-day behaVIOUrISm
strongly Inchne to nominalism
3'2 THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE CHAP

independent thought develop the content of those

ultimate concepts which, whIle they make true know-
ledge possible, and indeed even such lIttle knowledge
as sense-expenence may YIeld, have no cOlmec/ton wah
any of the expertences whtclz gam entry tlzrough the avenues
of sense. It IS Descartes' vOice that IS speaktng when
Locke, in despite of hiS professed advocacy of an
emptrlcal method, startles us by declanng that:
"General certatnty is never to be found but In our
Ideas. ¥lhenever we go to seek It elsewhere In
experiment or observatIOns Without us, olk knowledge
goes not beyond particulars. It IS the contemplation
of our own abstract Ideas that alone IS able to afford
us general knowledge." 1 "[DId we know the real
essence of gold,] It would be no more necessary that
gold should eXist, and that we should make expen-
ments upon It, than It IS necessary for the knOWIng the
properties of a tnangle, that a tnangle should eXist In
any matter; the idea In our mInds would serve for
the one as well as the other." 2

(0) Sense-perceptton not pnmartly a Form

of Knowledge
What is true and what IS false In thIS teachIng first
became clear when the bIOlogIcal SCIences, adoptIng
evolutionary hypotheses, prepared the way for a less
exclusively Intellectualist treatment of sense-perceptIOn.
For when we approach sense-expenence from the
standpOInt of biology, there is every reason for ques-
tioning the apparently obVIOUS assertion that the
function of sense-expenence IS to enable us to gain
knowledge of the world around us. The functIOn of
1 Essay IV VI I6. J Euay IV VI I I Cf II. XXXII ~4, IV XII [2,
III REPRESENTATIVE PERCEPTION 33
sen'le-perceptlOn, as of mstmct, IS not knowledge but
\ power, not mSIght but adaptatlOn; and accordingly
the qualItIes and merits of our perceptions are only
to be understood m the lIght of practical criteria
whIch determme whether the perceptlOns are or are
not sUIted to practIcal needs. Purely theoretical
Criteria are here no less madequate and misleadmg,
as gr,gunds for eulogIstic or deprecIatory Judgment,
than they would be m any attempt to estimate the
part played m an anImal's lIfe by thIS or that
sense-organ. •
For what IS It that Nature has, so to speak, in
view when It endows an anImal wIth the capacIty for
sense-expenence? That the animal may be eqUIpped
for aVOldmg its enemIes, finding Its food, and satis-
fymg Its vanous mstinctive needs. For these purposes
objects do not have to be known as they exist in
themselves. Thus a dog, m order to recognIse water
and to be able to satisfy ItS thIrst by lappmg It WIth
the tongue, does not need to apprehend ItS molecular,
atomIC, and sub-atomIC structure. That would be
a harmful complIcatlOn. The anImal would be be-
wIldered by the multitudmous dancing particles; ItS
hmited amount of dIscnminative attention, reqUIred as
it is for the apprehenslOn of the stimuli that mdicate
food, danger, etc., would be exhausted long before
it was well under way. The anImal preoccupied with
the unnecessary would be unable to survIve to take
advantage of the knowledge thus obtamed.

(c) The Functions of the Secondary Qualities

In these considerations we find an at least partial
explanation of the existence and employment of the
34 THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE CIIAP

secondary qualIties; and It IS an explanation whIch

appears to be entirely in harmony wIth the doctrme
of representat1ve perception. If the apprehensIOn of
matenal bodIes In the1r actual mdependent nature
and in all their complex1ty 1S IncompatIble with the
purposes for wh1ch sense-perception IS evolved, some
other defintte mode m whlCh they may present them-
selves must be provided. A mere blurrIng of. their
outlIne, a simple Ignonng of their constItutIOn, wIll
not suffice The sense-perceptIOns must be definite,
and for the purposes whIch they serve -accurate and
preCIse. ThIS IS especIally obvious In regard to our
human sense-perceptions. Upon them rest all our
various dextenties and manual arts, as well as our
dehcate apprec1ations of subtle beauties m texture
and design.
How, then, can simphficatIOn and alteratIOn proceed
w1thout sacnfice of defimteness, that 1'>, w1thout In-
capacitatmg us from havmg a delIcately discnmmat1ve
apprehensIOn of all those detatls whIch are necessary
for the gU1dance of the more complex adapt1ve and
manipulative movements? Nature has succeeded in
meeting these seemingly confltctIng reqUIrements by
the ingemous invention of the secondary qualIties.
The senses, 1t may be noted, functIOn as telepathic
organs. They enable us to apprehend what is happen-
ing either at a dIstance from the body or at a dIstance
from the bram. Through the tastes we learn what
is happemng m the mouth, and so can decide as to
what foods are or are not benefiCIal to the body.
Through the thermal sensations we gain information
as to the temperatures playing on the surface of the
body, and so can guard ourselves against excessive cold
and heat. Through sound we learn of movements,
 III REPRESENTATIVE PERCEPTION 35
threatemng or helpful, throughout the whole extent
of a very WIde environment, and are able to determIne
whether they are near or dIstant. But it is In s1ght
that the admirable ~ffectiveness of Nature's dev1ces
is most apparent. For through sight we appre-
hend the external world In a personal perspective
wh1ch defines at a glance the spatial three-d1mensional
relatIoos In whlch objects stand to the body, and in
terms of dlversity of colour and shadIng their motions,
shapes, and relatlve sizes. All thls is secured through
. those vanous• IIlusIOns whIch constitute perspectlve-
objects changIng In shape, dWIndlIng In size, being
hIgh or low In the field of viSIOn, etc.-and by those
stIll more deep-rooted lllusIOns whereby objects appear
to possess as an Inherent property some specific
colour or shade of lIght. These latter IlluslOns are
the means whereby Nature secures to us an appre-
henSlOn of the outlme of each object in d1stInction
from the background aga1nst whIch 1t stands and from
the d1fferently coloured and shaded nearer objects
that may overlap and partially conceal it. By the
same means we are enabled to discriminate within
each object the detaIl of 1tS vis1ble superfiCIal parts.
Against the objectIOn that these perceptions, when
tested by a theoret1cal standard, are false and 1llusory,
that objects do not have, or at least that we have no
suffic1ent eV1dence that they have, any such colours,
and that even the apparent 1 shapes and S1zes of the
objects are determIned by standards of str1ctly pra'tt1cal
convenience, Nature needs no def~ The problem
which Nature has thus solved, that ~nabling animals.
and man to maintain themselves successfully in a
difficult environment, 1S a strictly practical problem;
1 Cf below, P lIS If
 THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE CHAP

and sen~t: - perception as a practical device cannot \

legitimately be tested by standards of a theoretIcal or
sCIentdic character.
But if a defence, on these lines, be called for,
it is at once forthcommg. Here, as so frequently
elsewhere, Nature ktlls two very dIfferent bIrds with
one and the same stone. Though sense-experience
originates In order to meet strIctly practIcal ',leeds,
its data have, as a matter of fact, lIkewise made
possIble man's acquiSItIon of theoretIcal mSIght. The
practIcal deVIces do, It IS true, mv~lve IlluslOn;
but they have served theIr purpose wlthout closmg
the path that leads to genume knowledge of the
independently real. They may have rendered the path
more indlrect and ClrcUltous than It mIght otherwise
have had to be-If mdeed any alternatlve to the path
actually followed can be allowed as possIble. Human
ingenUIty, however, though at tImes hard pressed to
escape from sensory perspectIves and to penetrate
behmd them to theIr generatmg causes, has not yet
come upon any msuperable obstacle preventive of
further advance. And Nature might also plead that
her deVIce of the secondary qualttIes, beSIdes making
both ordmary and scientIfic experience possible, has
justified Itself in and through the fine arts. For
there also the secondary qualItIes have shown their
fitness to sub serve values of a hIgher order than
the strIctly practical. BeSIdes condltlOning survival,
they are the means mdlspensable to stiII other
goods. 1
Thus the secondary qualities can no longer be
viewed m the manner of Descartes, Spinoza, and
Leibniz, as obscure and confused apprehensions of
1 Cf below, P U9 If
III REPRESENTATIVE PERCEPTION 37
reahties whIch they conceal from our VIew. They
eXIst in theIr own rIght, and they vIndicate theIr realIty,
as do the prImary qualItIes, by the mdispensable part I
whIch they play m Nature's ordered and complex
economy. In theIr absence ammal and human senses
could not supply data for a suffiCIently rapid appre-
hension, in a manner at once comprehensive m extent
and Qiscriminatmg as regards detail, of everything
that is essentIal for the purposes of adaptatIOn. Nor
in their absence could, at a later stage, either SCIence
or the fine ath have become pOSSIble.
The comparIson of the secondary qualIties to the
organic sensations, such as (to take Gahleo's Instance)
tIcklIng, may be more or less adequate If we have in
mind only those qualitIes whIch are YIelded by the
lower senses. But even in thIS reference the analogy
is biassed by Gahleo's mtentIOn to VIew them as bemg,
111 contrast to the prImary qualItIes, unreal and sub-
jectIve. Such a view IS more plaUSIble as regards
tastes than as regards odours, temperatures, and
sounds; and it is entIrely madequate when applIed
to lIght and colour. Colour IS a genu111ely objectIve
entity, and lIke temperature IS one of the mam clues
by study of whIch the scientIst penetrates ever deeper
into the secrets of Nature. 1 The diVision of realIty
into the merely mechamcal and the purely mental falls
to do justice to the dIverse levels upon which Nature
works; and recognitIOn of this fact is one of the
main features through which present-day statements
of the doctrine of representatIve perception differ from
the account given by Descartes.· 1 Supporters of the
doctrine continue, however, to regard our knowledge
1 Cf the use of spectra ID astronomy and of methods of staining ID the
biological sCiences
38 THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE CHAP III

of external realItyac; hemg medlate-a positIOn which,

I should contend, IS due to their faIlure to take
account of the dIverse factors which co-operate In
knowledge. These, however, are aspects of the
situation to which I shall return.1
1 Cf below, pp 49, 74-6, 178 fF, 2.2.9 ft'.
 CHAPTER IV
•
ARGUMENT IN CRITICISM OF THE DOCTRINE
OF REPRESENTATIVE PERCEPTION

I SHALL now • proceed to consider some of the main

objections to which the doctrine of representatIve per-
ception would seem to he open. These objectlOns
are certainly not less cogent than the arguments by
which the doctrine is upheld; and when we have
revIewed them, we shall be in a posItion to apprecIate
the very strange quandary In whIch phIlosophy has
unhapplly found Itself.

(I.) PHILOSOPHY'S PRESENT QUANDARY

On the one hand, we have the subjectIVIst teaching

of Berkeley and of those who follow m his train.
, Though Berkeley adopts Locke's VIew that sensa are
. n~t, as Descartes had mamtamed, modes of mind, but
are its objects, he none the less cuts away from the
doctrine of representative perception all Its more
genuinely realIst ImplIcatIons. There is, he contends,
no independently eXIstmg material world; the teachmg
of the natural sciences, when properly mterpreted,
demands no such assumption; ~a!~r~ c;o_nsists In the
sens.a, and therefore must ultimately be accounted for
exclusively In t~ms of them. So forcIble and con-
vinCIng is Berkeley'S teaching in thIS regard, that even
39
 THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE CHAP

to this day many leadlllg sClentIfic thinkers agree in

contending that only from a subjecttvlst standpoint
can either the ultlmate purposes or the present results
of the posltive SClences be correctly viewed. This is,
for instance, the standpOlnt of Karl Pearson and of
Ernst Mach-the latter of whom stands for the sole
type of philosophy which has, it would seem, exercised
any considerable mfluence upon Einstein. Or. the
other hand, we have a few philosophers, such as Reid
and Kant, challengIng this teachIng, but gaimng a
hearing maInly among speclahsts In philosophy, and,
as Vl-e find upon examIning their teaching, being much
more defimte m CrIticism than In construction. Their
efforts to prOVide an alternative view are, Indeed, far
from successful, and seem to disclose the contmulng
mfluence In their own thInkIng of those very prinCiples
from which they profess to have broken away. Also,
whatever be the ments of the counter-doctrInes which
they propose, these have never been so formulated as
to be understandable by non-professional students of
metaphYSICS. Accordingly It has inevitably followed
that the maIn trend of Influence, at least as regards
popular and sCientific thought, has been on the lines
of the Cartesian teachmg. It has been modified,
partly under Berkelelan and partly under sceptical
and naturahstlc influences, and It has, as we have
seen, been restated m the hght of bIOlogical data i
but, however thus altered or amphfied, that which
renders It ef>sentlally subjectiVist has contInued to
exercise a predominant influence. Even m the
philosophical disciplines this is what has happened-
at least frequently so in ethics, and almost invariably
so in psychology. Whether the many assaults now
bemg made upon the subjectivist pOSition are to be
IV REPRESENTATIVE PERCEPTION
more successful, or whether they are, at best, to be
mCldental vlctones 111 a campaIgn which as a whole is
to result in defeat, remams to be seen.

(u.) THE ALTERNATION BETWEEN REALISM AND

SUBJECTIVISM
T.he first and malO cntIcism which has to be passed
upon the doctrine of representative perceptIon is that
the argument 10 ItS support starts from a realist stand-
pomt inconltstent with the conclusIOns to which the
doctrine Itself commits us. It IS only by assummg
that we are acquamted wIth real objects that the
subjectivist obtaIns hIS startmg-point, namely, real
matenal bodies acting on the matenal bram, and
through the bra111 generating or occasIOning Ideas 10
the mmd. The external objects are separated from
their effects, the Ideas, by a large number of mter-
medIate processes, physical and physIOlogical, to which
they bear no resemblance, save 10 bemg spatIally con-
ditioned. Even grantmg, therefore, that ideas can
legItImately be regarded as effects of the brain-states
thus caused, the facts which prove that ideas are effects
due to mtermedlate processes set agomg by outsIde
objects justIfy no assertIOn as to theIr resemblance to
these objects, and so must undermine the realIst
assumptIon With whIch the argument starts. There
can, It would seem, be no ground save only the deus
ex machtna of a pre-establIshed harmony for retamlng
our primitive belief that they are qualified to reveal
material bodies.
Thus the realIst view of Ideas, as yielding know-
ledge of external objects, must be accepted as valid if
the subjectivist argument is to have a starting-point;
 THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE CHAP

it is httle likely to be valid if the <;ubjectivlst argument

be correct. EIther, therefore, the subjeCtiVIst must
establish his posItion wIthout assummg the ultimate
truth of hIS startmg-pomt, or he must recognise the
truth of thIS startmg-pomt as castmg doubt upon the
concluslOn reached.
ThIs argument has m one form or another been so
frequently stated, and 111 spIte of Its sImphcIty s.!ems
to be so cogently vahd, that as a rule subjective
IdealIsts now recognIse its fm ceo They therefore
endeavour to start from facts whIch involve no reahst
assumptIOns. And, 111 so domg, they generally pro-
pound theIr argument m the form of an argument
from relativIty. Even while remaming withm the field
of ordmary conSCIOusness, our perceptIOns can, they
contend, be proved to be subjective, numencally and
existentially dIstmct m the mind of each observer.

(iii.) THE ARGUMENT FROM RELATIVITY IN ITS

PHYSIOLOGICAL FORM
Let us first consIder thIS argument from relativity
in the form 111 whIch it IS most naturally first pro-
pounded, namely, m connectIOn with the physiological
concomItants of our mental expenences. We can
then proceed to conSIder the non-physiological restate-
ment of It. Sense-perceptIons are, as IS easIly shown,
condItioned by the mdividual circumstapces, VIew-
pomt, and previous experience of each observer. They
vary concurrently with changes in the relation of
our bodies to the objects, as when objects alter in
apparent size and form according to theIr distance
from us. Or they may vary in correspondence with
variatIOns within our bodies, as when what is red to
IV REPRESENTATIVE PERCEPTION 43
the ordInary observer is grey to the colour-bhnd, or
as when objects are seen double upon displacement
of one eyeball Thus the exact nature of the varia-
tions can only be accounted for In and through deter-
mInation of all the various influences which are actmg
on the bram. The perceptions vary independently of
the objects apprehended, and directly only with the
brail!-states. They are conditioned, mediately by
objects, Immediately by the bram-states which are
dependent on boddy conditions as well as on external
stlmuh. ..
These, then, are the ' facts'; they can neither be
called in questlOn nor Ignored; they constitute the
problem which awaits solution. How are they inter-
preted by the subjectlvlst~ He may argue In either
of two ways. If he beheves that our mental states
carry us to a trans-subjective world, matenal m char-
acter, he wdl argue from thiS condltionedness of our
perceptIOns to their subjectivity. He will contend
that Since our perceptions vary directly only With the
brain-states, they must be effects distinct from the
real objects and separately eXistent In each indiVidual
mind. But, obVIOusly, m so argumg the subjectivist
falls back upon the reahst mterpretatlOn of experience.
The argument from relatiVity, when stated In this
manner, reduces to the prevlOus argument from causal
dependence of expenence upon the brain.

(IV.) THE ARGUMENT FROM RELATIVITY IN ITS

NON-PHYSIOLOGICAL FORMS

The subjectivist may, however, take a very d1fferent

line, and so may seek to evade the force of the above
objectlOns. He may entirely give up the belief in an
++ THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE CHAP

Independent, matent'll world, and consequently In the

existence of a material body and bram. He may
contend that the only possible objects of the mmd are'
sensatlOns; and from thIS posltlOn he may then argue
that the objects thus Immediately known are subjective
for a twofold reason: first, because they are sensatiOns;
and secondly, because they are relatIve to each observer,
varying from mmd to mmd. "

(a) Fazlure to dlsttngulsh between Senstng and Sensa

To take these two arguments In order: even
without questIOnmg that the objects known are sensa-
hons, we may dispute the mference that they are
therefore subjective. Thanks to Ward, Moore, Stout,
and others, It IS now very generally recogmsed that
, sensatiOn' IS an ambIguous term. It IS used WIth two
very dIfferent meanmgs, as process of apprehenSIon
and as object apprehended. If sensatIOn IS mental
process, then for thIS suffiCIent reason It must fall
on the subjectIve Side. But If, on the other hand,
sensatIOns have to be regarded not as mental pro-
cesses, but as objects revealed In and through such
processes, this argument WIll fall to the ground.
Though red IS known only as sensatiOn, It IS un-
doubtedly an objectIve content. It IS not a state of
the subject, but an object to the subject. SimIlarly,
a sound or an odour or a taste IS an object apprehended
by the mInd, and IS therefore dIstmct from the processes
in which such apprehenSIOn consists. Nothing but
confUSiOn can result from emplOyIng the term ' sensa-
tion' in both these conflictmg connotations. The
ambIguity is very simIlar to that which makes the term
, experience,' whIch may mean eIther experiencing or
the experIenced, so servIceable to certam contemporary
IV REPRESENTATIVE PERCEPTION 45
schools of phIlosophy. It may be said that the two
aspects-process of apprehenslOn and object appre-
hended-are lllseparable; but even grantlllg this,
they are none the less dlstlllgUlshable. A name
which is adequately descnptlve of the one aspect
cannot nghtly be apphed to the other.
The subjectIvist argument, that objects as known
are ~ensations, and therefore are subjectIve, makes use
of this fundamental amblgUlty. Only by lllterpretmg
sensatlOns as slgmfymg objectIVe contents can it
Justify the :ssertlOn that objects as known are sensa-
tlons; and yet only by regardmg sensatIons as mental
processes can It legitimate the mference that they
are therefore subJective. The ground of the argu-
ment mvolves one mterpretatlOn of the term C sensa-
tion,' the concluslOn Imphes the other. It IS open to
us to propound the counter-argument. Since sensa-
tions are only known as objects they are dlstmct from
mental processes, and cannot be mental or subjective.
This IS the meanmg now ascnbed to the term C sensa-
tion ' by such psychologists as Ward, Stout, and Bmet.
They lImit It to denote objective content. Bmet
admits that there IS no contradiction in speakmg of an
object both as sensation and as matenal,1 He also
1 Alfred Bmet, L'Ame et Ie corps (1905), pp 13,63, Mr Moore, III hIs
"Refutation of IdealIsm," whIch appeared m Mznd m 1903 (reIssued m
PhIlosophIcal Studzes, 1922), preferred to employ' sensation' as slgmfymg
awareness But while 50 domg, he expounded the posltlon above adopted m
the followmg veryexphclt terms .. The awareness whIch I have mamtamed
to be mcluded m sensation IS the very same umque fact whIch constitutes
every kInd of knowledge • blue' IS as much an object and as lIttle a mere
content of my experIence, when I experience It, as the most exalted and
mdependent real thmg of whIch I am ever aware There IS, therefore, no
question of how we are to • get outsIde the CIrcle of our own Ideas and sen-
satlons' Merely to have a sensation IS already to be outsIde that CIrcle It 19
to know somethmg which IS as truly and really not a part of my experIence,
as anythmg whIch I can ever know" (PhtlosophlCal StudIes, p. Z7)
 THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE CHAP

points out that there is no reason why sensations, so

regarded, may not have permanent eXIstence. That
is to say, the use of the term ' sensatIOn,' when thus
clearly defined, decIdes nothmg eIther for or against
reahsm.
Though Locke defines 'Idea' as sIgmfymg an
object-" whatsoever IS the object of the understand-
mg when a man thmks " l-the other meanmg of the
term, VIZ. as an act of apprehenslOn, as meanlllg
'Idea of,' mtervenes to determme hIS lllterpretatlOn
of all Ideas as necessarIly mmd-dependent. 2 And the
latter sense-the history and etymological meamng of
the term notwithstandmg-is now, probably, Its
proper and most usual sense. Ideas are acts or
processes of apprehenslOn. We are consclOUS en and
through them, not of them. They do not terminate
thought, but enable the mllld to transcend Itself, and
to apprehend thmgs whIch are not Ideas, not states
of the mmd. This, Indeed, IS what Locke himself
teaches III other passages, though more by ImphcatIOn
than m clearly thought-out terms, and m a manner
whIch shll preserves to Ideas theIr medIatmg functIOn,
1 Essay I I 8
• Cf Gibson, Locke's Theory of K110wledge and Its HIstorical Relations,
pp 19-:U .. The Ided for [Locke] IS at once the apprehensIOn ofa content
and the content apprehended, It IS both a psychical eXistent and a logical
meamng" .. It IS with Ideas as 'obJects' of thought that the Essay IS
primarily concerned The term 'obJect,' howcver, Imphes for Locke
relation to ,md dependence upon a mmd or subJcct Thus while, as we
have seen, he assumes throughout a realm of real bemg, mdependent of the
cognitive process, but to whl(.h our knowledge ultimately refers, the con-
stituents of thiS realm are not' obJects' m hiS sense of the term, even at the
moment m which they are thought of Like Arnauld, again, he repudiates
the SUpposition that Ideas possess an eXIstence apart from the act of thought
by which thmr content IS apprehended ' Havmg Ideas and perceptIon,'
he decl.. res, are' the same thmg' He IS one' who thmks Ideas are nothmg
but perceptions of the mmd • "
IV REPRESENTATIVE PERCEPTION 47
as IntervenIng between the mInd and Independently
eXIstIng thIngs. 1
That Berkeley, though no less emphatIc than
Locke that Ideas are' objects of human knowledge,' 2
and as such OpposIte In nature to the mInd which
apprehends them, IS yet In some degree Influenced by
these two meal1lngs of the term' Idea,' seems at tImes
to b&. shown by hIS use of the ambIguous phrase • in
the mInd.' The only defimte meanIng of thIS phrase
IS Inseparable from the mInd, what IS made possIble
through the"mmd; and that IS only true of Ideas as
acts or processes; at least the contrary demands
separate proof.
Berkeley's further argument, that an tdea can re-
semble nothtng but an zdea, IS invalId, If 'idea' be
taken In thIS latter meanIng. An act of apprehension
need not resemble that of whIch It IS the apprehensIOn;
they may dIffer to almost any extent. My Idea of
the North Pole IS not to the north of my Idea of the
South Pole; the North Pole IS extremely cold, but
I can entertaIn It In Idea wIthout lowering the tempera-
ture even of the warmest of rooms. My apprehensIOn
of a red book IS not Itself red or heavy or hard, though
It enables me to have Ideas of these and the other
quahtIes of the book.
But even allowmg what Berkeley so explicItly
1 Cf GI bson, op CIt P 20 "It IS, mdeed, a fundamental mlsunder-
standmg of hIS posmon to suppose that, m hIS account of the genesIs of our
Ideas, Locke sought to derive the whole content of our knowledge from a
serIes of psychIcal facts deVOid of objective reference The function of the
Idea 19 repeatedly compared by hIm With that of the word Both were for
him essentIally representative, and he would no more have thought of
forming a theory of Ideas which should treat them apart from their obJectrve
reference than he would have regarded as satisfactory an account of words
which disregarded their possession of meanmg "
I PmlClples of HUmall Knowledge, § I
 THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE CHAP

asserts, that ideas are to be understood as objects

and not as acts of apprehenslOn, the above princIple,
that an Idea can resemble nothmg but an Idea, wIll yet
not hold. V\Te mIght as well argue that a reflectlOn
cannot resemble anythmg but a reflectlOn. A reflec-
tion dIffers fundamentally m its mode of eXIstence
from that whIch IS reflected. The real objects can
be touched; theIr reflectlOns cannot. \\Then ,"\e try
to touch them we touch only the mIrror. The objects
have weIght; the reflectlOns have no weIght. The
objects have permanent and mdependent eXlstence-
at least specIal argument IS required to prove the
contrary; the reflectlOns are dependent on the mIrror
and can only eXist through It. And yet the reflectlOns
do resemble theIr objects.

(b) Illeguzmate Assumptton that Seme-Perceptton must

be IdentIcal wtth Absolute Knowledge
But to return to our mam theme, cnticism of the
argument from relatIvity m Its non-physiOlogIcal forms:
we have still to consider that second form m which
the argument IS propounded, namely, that smce
sensations vary from mmd to mmd they must be
numerically and eXistentIally dlstmct for each observer.
If by sensatlOn were meant mental process, there
would be no questIon. Mental processes are ad-
mIttedly subJective; they take place separately m the
mind of each consciOUS bel11g. But Sl11ce by , sensa-
tIon' IS meant content apprehended, i e. a sensum,
the conclusion does not follow. The same Identical
objective entity may, for all the argument itself shows
to the contrary, be apprehended by dIfferent minds,
and yet none the less be apprehended dIfferently
by each ml11d. The subjectivIst is making the
IV REPRESENTATIVE PERCEPTION 49
assumptlOn that If we apprehend real objects m sense-
expenence, we must apprehend them m theIr mtnnsIc,
absolute nature, and that, on a reahst theory, as on
hIS own theory, sense-perceptlOn must therefore be
IdentIcal wIth sCIentific knowledge. l
A realIst phIlosophy need not, however, proceed
on any such assumptlOn. SlI1ce Berkeley believes
that QbJects eXIst only as Ideas, and therefore only as
known, he IS entIrely JustIfied m holdmg to It; but it
cannot, wIthout further proof, be extended to objects
regarded as d.usally efficaclOus and as eXIstentially inde-
pendent. The assumptlOn IS natural to su bject!vlsm
of the extreme type, but IS not accepted (Immediately
at least) by raalIsm. None the less, thIs IS not the
fundamental difference between the two theories; it
is rather that the subjectIvIst seeks to co-ordmate the
varymg sensations m terms of themselves, the realIst
by equatmg them wIth vanatlOns in the totalIty of
the complex condItIOns, both subjectIve and trans-
subjectIve, which he recognIses to be mvolved. Or to
state the same pOInt m another way; the dIfference m
attItude IS that whIle the realIst treats the sensed as
bemg a functIon of several factors, the subjectivist
treats the sensed as it stands, wIthout reference to
diverse factors at all.
1 Cf Mr G Dawes HIcks, Proc Arlst Soc, 1913-14, P 42. "The
reasoning would only be vahd on the assumptIon that If the table IS really
coloured, the real colour must appear the same In darkness and m dayhght,
through a paIr of blue spectacles and wIthout them, m artificIal light and
m the sun's hght-an assumption WhICh, on the VIew I am takmg, IS at
once to be dIsmIssed as untenable If the colour dId al'pear to be the same
m these varymg CIrcumstances, then certamly there would be reason, and
suffiCIent reason, for doubtmg the relIabIlIty of VIsual apprehenSIOn For
obVIously the condmons mentIOned-real, objective condItions, as I take
them to be--cannot be WIthout Influence upon any real colour the table
may be s,ud to posses.··
E
50 THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE CHAP

The occurrence, therefore, of such variations as

those above cited, is by Itself no conclusIve proof
either for or agamst anyone theory of knowledge.
The variatIOns constitute a problem to whIch dIfferent
types of subjectivism and various forms of realIsm offer
as many different solutions. The argument from rela-
tivity must be rejected as mvahd. By Itself It proves
nothing, and would never have been put forwar!;l. had
not the subjectivist been already convmced on other
grounds that the ImmedIate objects of mmd are strIctly
private. These other unexpressed ground.,; would seem
ultimately to reduce to the physIOlogical argument
whIch I have already consIdered.

(v.) THE ARGUMENT FROM IMMEDIATE EXPERIENCE

Mr. Ward and Mr. Stout have, however, in recent

times propounded yet another argument. They con-
tend that, apart from all physiological consIderatIOns,
the distInction between sensa and Independent objects
IS directly evident tn zmmedzate experzence. Thus Mr.
Ward maIntains that while we have ImmedIate experI-
ence of 'extensity,' we have no experIence of pubhc
space; and in proof of this contentIOn he cites the
fixity in size of •the visual field, as immediately
sensed.
"Whether, on shipboard, we look down at the deck, or
away to the horrwn, or upward~ at the sky above us, the
extensIty of the colour sensatIOn IS in each case the same;
the difference In the space seen IS due to acquired perceptIOns
involving movement." 1
But is not Mr. Ward ignoring the third dimension,
that of d~pth? This thIrd dimension may be pro-
1 NaJural,sm and AgnoShCIS!!, (1899). vol II P 136
IV REPRESENTATIVE PERCEPTION
gressively difFerentlated through our experiences of
motlon, but our apprehension of It cannot be created
thereby.l And when It IS taken mto account, It surely
rules out as Illegltlmate the Supposltlon that all magni-
tudes, as ImmedIately sensed, are projectIOns upon
a single two-dimensIOnal field, unvarying m size.
ExtensIty bemg always three-dImensIOnal, we have no
nght. to assert that the landscape seen through a
wmdow must be sensed as smaller than the frame of
the wmdow. Speakmg for myself, I fall to dIscover
in my own s~nse-expenence the eXIstence of any such
flat field. Defimte dlscnmmatIOn of depths IS certainly
a matter of acquired expenence; but surely the same
IS also true of lengths and sizes. Mr. Ward's argu-
ment, If consIstently pursued, must carry us back,
behmd even the two-dImensIOnal extensIty, to the' bIg,
blooming, buzzmg confusIOn' m whIch, as WIllIam
James contends, the world of the newly-born chIld
may be belIeved to consIst. If dlscnminatIOn can
progressIvely dIsclose the two-dImensional relations
which are at first confusedly apprehended, It may also
be conceIved as havmg progressIvely artIculated the
three-dImensIOnal world of developed conSCIOusness.
Mr. Ward's argument rests on the contentlOn that
sensa have a fixed, entIrely intractable character, upon
whIch mterpretatIOn can exerCIse no transformmg
influence. So far as the 'secondary qualIties' in
abstraction from theIr spatlal aspects are concerned,
thIS assumptIOn would seem to be In accordance WIth
the facts. But if we are Justlfied in dlstmgUIshmg
between sensing and intuiting, then, as we shall have
occasion to note,2 there is a certain amount of empirical
1 Cf Broad, SClenhfic Thought, p. :1.90 /F.
a See below, pp 76-9. and p II4 /F
S2 THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE CHAP

evidence, not easily mterpretable save as supporting

the VIew that dIstance, sIze, and the hke (t.e. those
features which relate to the • pnmary , quahties) vary
sensuously under varymg condItions. As I shall also
endeavour to show, these varIatIons do not confhct
wIth the belief that It IS the actual independent objects
whIch are being dIrectly apprehended. ImmedIate
expenence, so far as my own introspective 6fforts
enable me to judge, affords no eVIdence, eIther in the
case of extensIty or of any other sensory factor, that
the experienced IS ever an mtermediary' between the
mind and its pubhc world.

(vi.) THE DETERMINING SOURCE OF SUBJECTIVISM

Thus, so far as I can discover, subjective idealism

has its source, exchlSlvely, in a supposedly necessary
deductlOn from the belief that sensatlOns are mechanic-
ally generated through bram-processes. Other argu-
ments may be employed to develop the posItion, but
they cannot be regarded eIther as origmatmg or as
justIfymg It.1 The subjectivIst, even when he seeks
to ground hIs posltlOn exclusIvely on facts of relativity
or of immedIate expenence, IS still chIefly mfluenced
by the physlOloglcal standpomt whIch he professes to
reject.
Accordingly it does not matter from which side the
subjectivist may approach the facts. He may start
with the phYSICISt and physlOloglst from material
bodIes and the matenal bram, or wIth the psychologist
from our immediate mental experIences; in either case
he lands himself m the same quandary. He can only
1 On Berkeley's argument from the fact that mcrease of temperature ends
m pam, cf. Broad, Percephon, PhysICs and Realtty, pp 70-71
IV REPRESENTATIVE PERCEPTION Sj
prove thlngs perceived to be sUbjective by proving
them to be externally related to objects as their
mechamcal effects, and yet thiS can only be done by
Simultaneously interpretlng the thlngs perceived In
a manner which the realist standpoint can alone justify.
This perpetual alternatiOn between realism and idealism
is as contradictory as it is unavOidable.
Mr. Broad, while himself advocatlng a modified
form of representatlOnism, frankly admits the force of
thiS objectiOn:
>l
"The belIef that our sensa are appearances of something
more permanent and complex than themselves seems to be
prImitive, and to arIse inevitably In us with the sensing of the
sensa. It IS not reached by inference, and could not logically
be Justified by Inference On the other hand, there IS no
possibilIty of either refuting It logically, or of getting rId of It,
or--so far as I can see--of co-ordlnatlng the facts without It." 1
Otherwise stated, the situation would seem to be
this: the subjectivist either tnes to prove that what is
in his own mind IS not In another person's mind by
showing that what is in the other person's mind under
certaln Circumstances is not in hiS own mind under
these Circumstances, but in so dOing assumes these
circumstances in a reahst manner; or else he Simply
asserts that what IS in his own mind is not in the other
person's mind, and so lands in scepticism. This
would seem to be what is meant by Hume in the
following passages:
" Do you follow the Instincts and propensities of nature . • •
in assenting to the veracity of sense? But these lead you to
believe that the very perception or sensible image is the external
object. Do you disclaim this principle, In order to embrace a
more rational opinion, that the perceptions are only representa-
1 SCIentific Thought, p z68.
54 THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE CHAP

tlOns of somcthll1g cxternaU You herL depal t from your In-

ternal propensIties and more obvIous sentiments, and yet are
not able to satisfy your reason, whIch can never find any con-
vincing argument from e>.penence to prove that the perceptIons
are connected wIth any external obJects" 1
"That all [Berkeley's] arguments, though otherwIse Intended,
are, In realIty, merely ~ceptlcal, appears from thIS, that they admzt
of no answer and produce 110 convzctzon TheIr only effect IS
to cause that momentary amazement and IrresolutlOfl and
confUSIOn, which IS the re~ult of sceptIcism" 2

(Vll.) BERKELEY's PERVERSE PROcEDURl

Berkeley's type of subjectIVism is in thiS respect

even more perverse than that of Descartes or Locke.
For while Berkeley is more consistent in the workmg
out of his conclusIOns, he just thereby proportIOnately
weakens the foundatIOns upon which his entIre system
rests. What he does IS to accept the position adopted
by his predecessors, namely, that all the mmd can
directly apprehend IS Ideas, and then to proceed to
throw down the ladder by which alone it IS possible
to c11mb into thiS position. The evidence upon
which Descartes bases his contentIOn that matenal
bodies are 1I1vlSlble and 1I1tanglble IS the eVidence
supplIed by physics and physiology realIstically inter-
preted. Vlhat Berkeley does IS to deny the validity
of this eVidence, and yet none the less to hold to the
results obtained by ItS means. 3
1 An EnquIry Concernmg the Human Understandmg, section XII pt I,
towards the end
• Loc crt note ltahcs in text.
a Cf. Alexander, Space, T,me and Detty, vol I P 16' .. Berkeley saw
the truth that there IS no Idea to act as middleman between the mlDd and
external thlDgs, no veil betWixt the mlDd and reahty He found the reahty
therefore ID the Ideas themselves The other alternative IS not to discard
the supposed world of reality behlDd the Ideas but to dIscard the Ideas.
IV REPRESENTATIVE PERCEPTION 55
Conceive an analogous situatIOn. Let us, m the
manner of Plato's allegory of the Cave, make the
fanciful supposItion that a person has all his Me-long
had his viSion closed in by a mirror, that he has never
seen anything save in thiS mirror, and that he has
never been permitted to turn round and see the bodies
which are bemg reflected. If some one, not subject
to these hmitatIOns, were then to explain to him the
nature of mirrors and of hght and of the bodies which
reflect the hght, he would for the first time come to
comprehend that what he sees in the mirror is not
really there, and that the objects which he has hitherto
believed to be real objects are, as his friend tells him,
merely images which as such are only pOSSible 111 a
mirror, and whlch are therefore mlrror-~ependent. . '
But suppose, now, that he were a person With the
ingenious mmd of Berkeley. Might he not argue in
reply that It IS his friend who IS deluded? "You
are quite correct," he would say, " in mamtaming that
the objects which I apprehend are merely reflectlOns,
and can eXist only m a n11rror. -But as to those bodies
which you speak of as existmg outside mirrors and as
producing dupltcates of themselves m mirrors, I have
never myself seen any such objects, and I do not
recogmse the need of assuming them. The mirror
itself, of which we speak, IS the mfimte, and therefore
frameless, eternal Being that we name God. More-
over," he would proceed, " I am confirmed by what
you say about hght. You speak of hght as an in-
regarded as objects dependent on the mind. • When the prejudice IS
removed that an object, because It owes Its eXistence as an object to a sub-
Ject, owes to that subject Its qualltles of white or green and Its eXistence,
the appeal hes from Berkeley to experience Itself So appealed to, my
experience declares the distinct eXistence of the object as something non-
mental ,.
 THEORY OF KNO"WLEDGE CHAP

visIble somethIng which can never be seen and has no

colour. What are you saying except that lIght is not
light, that colour is not really colour but only a vIbra-
tIon in a SUSpICIOusly strange kllld of substance whIch
you are pleased to call ether, and which lIke your
alleged materIal substances can apparently eXIst where
I have never seen anything to eXIst, outsIde the UI1l-
versal mirror. No," he would conclude, "what"you
tell me is too preposterously lIlcredible. Objects can
have only a mIrror-lIke eXIstence, the supposedly
independent objects are reflecttons, and only eXIst as
such."
ObVIOusly thIS IS to gIve away the whole case. In
thus agreelllg WIth hIS frIend that the objects seen are
reflections, he has commItted hImself to the VIew that
they represent objects more real than themselves, and
that it IS by the intermedIate agency of lIght-waves
that they make theIr appearance. To deny the eXIst-
ence of such agenCIes whIle stIll regard1l1g the reflec-
tions as reflectIOns, IS ImpOSSIble. Yet thIS is what
Berkeley virtually does when he agrees WIth Descartes
and Locke that the objects ImmedIately known are
tdeas. V}ust as when we speak of reflectIOns as
reflections we Imply the eXIstence of a mirror and
of self-subsIst1l1g materIal bodIes, so when Berkeley
says that the objects known are Ideas, he is ascrib1l1g
to them a type of eXIstence which can gaIn meaning
only by contrast WIth another type which he yet asserts
to be meanIngless and inconceIvable. He is ques-
tIonlllg the physical and phYSIOlogIcal evidence for
Descartes' doctrine of representative perception, and
yet IS acceptlllg the all-important conclusion to which
the doctrine leads. That doctrine in its Cartesian
form may not be, and as I believe is not, a valid
IV REPRESENTATIVE PERCEPTION 57
doctrine; It can be questioned. But If so, it ought
to be questlOned as a whole. Its conc1uslOns ought
to be exammed at least as ngorously as the premisses
which have led to their adoptlOn. If there be real
material bodies actmg directly, or through a medium,
upon material sense-organs and the material bram, and
if what we then directly expenence comes into being
as a .result of the bram-processes thus caused, it may
well be that the only pOSSible, Immediate, sensuous
objects of mind are Ideas, t.e. mmd-dependent. But
If such phys'ologlcal arguments be mvahd, are we not
free to retam the commonsense view that objects are
known directly face to face, that they are causally
efficacious in their actlOn upon one another, and have
independent eXistence? We are back in the realm of
ordmary conSClOusness, and there IS no longer any
ground for questlOmng that different percipients
apprehend one and the same mdependent, pubhc
world. As above argued, none of the special argu-
ments by whIch Berkeley seeks to make good the
ehmination of Descartes' physical and physlOlogical
eVIdence seems able to survive a critical scrutmy.
This Criticism can be restated m yet another way,
suggested by A venanus. The spatial world which
we expenence varies together wIth one particular
part of Itself, namely, with the bram. And this rela-
tion appears to be mutual; change in either involves
change In both; they stand in functIonal relatlOn,
varymg simultaneously with one another. This IS the
relation In which, accordmg to physiology, the world,
as directly experienced, is related to the brain. On the
other hand, however, as the natural sciences likewise
teach, objects are causally related to the brain and by
their changes produce changes in it. This causal
 THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE CHAP

relation, as involv1l1g sequence and ImplY1l1g inde-

pendent, self-centred eXistence, holds only In the for-
ward order, and therefore excludes the possibIlIty of
simultaneous vanatlon. WhIch of the two attItudes
are we to adopt? 1 Descartes, follOWing In the steps
of phYSICS and physIOlogy, would have us accept both;
and so would commIt us to the view that the world
dIrectly expenenced IS not the real world, but o:1ly a
mental copy, pnvate to each separate percipIent.
Berkeley would have us accept only the latter part
of Descartes' conclusion, and yet rules '. himself out
from having the only kind of JustIficatIOn whIch
Descartes and the SCIences have offered therefor.
There lS, Berkeley teaches, no matenal brain existing
apart from expenence and conditlOmng It. Nothing
can eXist save minds and the worlds whlch they Im-
medlately expenence. And so we are left with the
questIOn to whlch Berkeley can glve no sufficient
answer, how, If this be so, we need reject the realist
assumptlOn of ord1l1ary conSCIOusness, that different
minds can dlrectly experience the same objects and can
experlence them as being, lIke the self, mdependent,
causally efficactous eXlstences.

(vill.) FURTHER CRITICISM OF THE SUBJECTIVIST

POSITION

There is yet another type of criticism to which the

doctrine of representative perceptlOn lies open, namely,
1 I have considered A\enanus' views at greater length UI two articles
entitled "AvenarIUS' Philosophy of Pure Experience" In Ml1Id, N S voL xv.
(1905), p 13 If "The fundamental problem of metaphYSICS IS to reconcile
these two standpolDts-the attitude of pure expenence With the standpolDt
adopted In phYSICS and phYSiology How can the whole vary Simul-
taneously With a part of Itself, and with a part which IS causally dependent
for ItS changes upon ItS relations to the rest of that whole? ..
IV REPRESENTATIVE PERCEPTION 59
that It falls to deal with the problem whIch it sets out
to explain, how knowledge IS possIble. When it has
saId its say, and has concluded that m all cases the
objects apprehended are mental, not matenal, It pro-
ceeds, exactly in the manner of ordinary conSCiousness,
to recognise as ultimate fact that these objects are
known. No attempt IS made to determine the nature
of ~e knowmg processes, the Inquiry IS solely as to
the nature of the ImmedIate objects which these pro-
cesses dlsclose. 1
Further.)the thesis, that the objects known are in
all cases mental, while, as I shall try to show, not
really rendenng our capacIty of knowmg any the more
intelligIble, has had the unhappy effect of obscunng
the essential nature of the self-transcendence which
makes possIble conscIous expenence. I have argued 2
that since bodIes act upon and Influence one another,
self-transcendence may be regarded as charactensing
all eXIstences. But this is no suffiCient reason for
ignoring the fact that in the conscIous bemg we have
a type and degree of self-transcendence whIch can only
be mIsrepresented if interpreted on the analogy of
causal affectIOn, as ordmanly understood, namely, as
being a process wherein a self-centred eXistence
responds to external influence by a change wholly
Internal to Itself.
This, however, is precIsely what is done In sub-
jectivist teaching. The mysterious power by which,
in knowing, the self reaches out to other eXIstences
does not, it IS argued, involve any transcendence of
the limits inexorably imposed upon each finitll being.
It does not, for instance, demand any overcoming of
the differences of spatial location. It consists solely
1 Cf below, P 61 • Cf above, pp 6-7
60 THEORY OF KNO·WLEDGE CHAP

in the seWs capacity of self-knowledge. As embodled

existences, we are so caught up mto the umtary
system of the matenal U nlverse that even the most
dlstant objects are capable of modlfyIng the self, and
it lS the modificatIOns, thus caused, whlch alone are
known. Each self In potentta IS regarded as mlrronng
or rather reduphcatIng the entlre Universe. The
variety of Nature lS brought wlthIn the mind; ,and
the self bemg thus enlarged, self-knowledge is, it is
clalmed, adequate to the tasks lmposed upon it. l--
We need not be surpnsed that this perverse method
of resolvIng the paradoxes of knowledge should result
in the contradIctIOns above noted 1 Its defects are
but slIghtly concealed by the vagueness and ambIgUIty
of the terms employed. Thus whIle at the start
• mmd' IS taken as simply another name for the
, self,' and therefore as sharing In ItS supposed umty-
is not the UnIty of the mind wlth ltself the ground of
lts alleged capaclty of self-knowledge~-none the less,
in the course of the argument, the mind turns out to
be dlstmct from the self, and to be a name for the
field 2 that mcludes all those multltudmous states
which are occasIOned according as thiS or that object,
near or dIstant, IS acting upon the senses. And these
states, even as occurring • In the mind,' have to be
recognIsed as possessing all the various propertIes
through which natural eXistences differ from one
another and from the self. Some, for Instance, have
spatIal extension, and thereby stand In as marked
contrast to the processes through whlch they are
Cf above, p. 41 If.
1
There IS a similar vagueness In the bastard-phrase-at least It IS so In
I
a subjectivist context-' field of conscIOusness: supposed to eXist wlthm the
mmd The term' field' throws us back on spatial metaphor, not easuy
compatible With sub,ectlvlst teaching
IV REPRESENTATIVE PERCEPTION 61
apprehended as do objects m actual space. But if
so, why should we call m questlon the possibllity of
the outward lookmg attltude of ordmary consclOusnessi'
Why, If the self cannot recognise what lIes outside
itself, should we expect to find our apprehenslOn of
these objects any the more understandable when they
are thus brought wlthm the 'mind' m the form of
lmagesi' Are we not slmply restatmg m a subJechvzst
form that fundamental fact of seif-trartscendence which
m ltS lnItIaI, actually expenenced, realzst form, we have
treated as p~radox, and as such refused to recognise?
I have said 1 that subjectlvlsm dlrects lts efforts
excluslvely to determining the nature of the objects
whlch conSCIousness dIscloses, and makes no attempt
to determlne the nature of consclOUS awareness ltself.
When It has concluded that the objects known are m
all cases subjectIve or mental, or alternately, on the
VIew of Locke and Berkeley, that they can be entItled
Ideas, It takes It as self-evldent that the mmd, whose
states or Ideas they are, should apprehend them. It
argues that smce awareness has been shown to be the
apprehenslOn by the self of ltS own states or ldeas, all
the explanatlOn whlch anyone, knowing when and
where to stop, can reasonably demand has been glven.
And may It not be sald that In accepting self-transcend-
ence as an ultlmate fact mvolved In all knowledge, I
have as good as admltted thlsi' The pOint here ralsed
is lmportant, and mdeed qUlte fundamental m the
theory of knowledge; and I must therefore endeavour,
though at the expense of some httle repetItlOn, to
remove the misunderstanding to which, as it seems to
me, th1s objection is due.
F1rst of all, as has frequently been pointed out, it
1 Cf above, P 59
 THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE CHAP

should be clear that on any theory the possIbilIty of

direct, or immedIate, knowledge must be taken as
granted. What has prtmartly to be mvestIgated is
just this dIrect form of knowledge. The trust-
worthmess of 1l1dIrect knowledge, 1l1ferentlal or other,
must m all cases depend upon the trustworthIness of
the dIrect processes through which ItS data are acqUIred.
S1l1ce admittedly it IS the very purpose of knowledge
to know, smce it cannot do thIs unless it knows
immedIately, and since what It knows, whether objects
or 'Ideas,' must be real m the sense of b'emg actual,
the only questIOn pOSSible IS as to the amount and
kmd of realtty whIch ImmedIate conSCIousness dIS-
closes to our VIew.
My crItICIsm, from thIS standpomt, is not smgle
but twofold. As I have argued above, the sUbjectIvIsts
-Descartes IS m thiS respect typical, as mamtaInmg
a theSIS common to all subJectiVIsts-whIle recognIsmg
that awareness must be Immediate If It IS to be pOSSible
at all, refuse to admit that m such awareness there IS
any genume self-transcendence, 1 and therefore from
the start they have commItted themselves to the
conclusIon that the sole entItles Immediately appre-
hended are subjective m character. Though no
attempt has been made to JustIfy thIS assertIOn, it
predetermmes theIr conclusIOn. So much has, I
trust, already been made clear. But I have also to
pass a second cntIcIsm, namely, that Descartes and
his successors-so far as they hold fast to hIs sub-
jectIvIst theSIS-have supposed that In acceptIng the
occurrence of immediate knowledge they are lIkeWIse
commItted to the VIew that it is unanalysable. And
1 ThiS IS, I think, no less true of Locke and Berkeley-theIr modes of
speech notwithstanding-than of Descartes Cf above, p. 46 1f
IV REPRESENTATIVE PERCEPTION
surely, It may be said, they are justified in this
belief! Can awareness be Immediate, If It IS not
also quite ultlmate~ And m Its ultimateness, can
more be said about It than that It IS what it is,
and does what It does, as vouched for by Immediate
expenence in ourselves and others? Is the askmg
how awareness can be aware any better than the
mqu~nes how space IS able to be extended, redness
red, or water wet~ •
Only a few words should be required to meet this
obJectlOn; Ie will be considered later m more detail.
I do not mean to cntlclse the subjectivists for regardmg
awareness as an ultimate type of process. It is,
mdeed, ultimate; 1 at least we must so regard It. Mr.
Dawes Hicks, m dwellmg upon the fundamental
dlstmctlOn between the two types of relatlOn which
can hold between a physical thllIg and an act of
cogllltlOn, VIZ. as determmmg the act to occur and
as bemg Itself coglllsed by It, adds the following
comment:
"The dlstl11ctlOn cOincides very largely With that which
Shad worth Hodgson was accustomed to draw between 'con-
sCIOusness as an eXistent' and 'consciousness as a knowIng.'
ConscIOusness taken In the former sense, he used to argue, is
dependent upon neuro-cerebral processes which go on con-
comitantly With It, and to the question why It IS that such
and such an act of perception occurs at such a time It IS
legitimate to answer because such and such a neuro-cerebral
process has Just taken place, or IS taking place, at that time
But, on the other hand, conscIOusness taken as a knowmg-
the nature of conSCIOusness, that IS to say, which, however, he
regarded as made up of qualIties that, for the most part, do not

1 In describing It as ultimate, I do not mean that It IS either indefinable

or unconditioned, but only that It does not belong to a genus of which
there are other known species
 THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE CHAP

seem to me to belong to It-can In no wise be said to be

dependent upon the proce~~e, mentlOlled, we Me wholly in-
capable of conceiving the character of conscIOusness qua char-
acter as caused In any way whatsoever. When we attempt to
do so, we are really conceiving not the cause of the conscIous
state being what It IS, but the cause of Its happening or eXist-
ence" 1

With these remarks I can more or less a$ree.

The nature of awareness cannot be observed from the
outside, and ItS nature can never therefore be learned
from study of the bodIly processes whirh condItion
itS occurrence. These latter (as all but the most
extreme subjectivists agree In admitting) supply the
supportIng enVironment In which alone it is ever
found; hut study of them cannot supply the know-
ledge as to what it is that we must mean by con-
SClOusness. Such knowledge can be obtaIned only
by actual participatIOn In conscIOus awareness.
Yet when all thIS has been granted, it stIll remaInS
true that awareness, however ultImate In type, must
itself have a complex constitutIOn, and that no theory
of knowledge IS adequate which falls to discrimInate
the varIOUS factors which go to compose It. ThIS, as
it seems to me, can only be dented so long as we fall
to observe that meaning as well as fact is apprehended
In every apprehended fact. If the field known be
always of this character, must not the process of
awareness, in order to he competent to its apprehensIOn,
be itself articulated In some correspondIng manner~
The problem cannot, Indeed, be solved by the method
of direct introspection-though the data supplied by
. introspection have to be taken into account-but only
through study of what it is that awareness achieves.
1 Proc Anst Soc, 1916-17, P lZI
IV REPRESENTATIVE PERCEPTION
But while this greatly adds to the dIfficultIes which
have to be overcome, It does not render them in-
superable, and affords no k111d of excuse for shlrk111g
the task. Those who do so are allow111g unexamined
assumptlOns to determine theIr premIsses, and so to
decide theIr conclusIOns. This, at least, IS what
would seem to have happened 111 the case of those who
have. adopted a subjectIvist positIon 111 any of its
older, tradltlOnal forms. TheIr theory of knowledge,
in ItS answer to fundamental problems, IS-to repeat
my prevIOu~ form of words-little else than a re-
statement 111 subJecttvtst form of that fundamental fact
of self-transcendence which, 111 Its 111ltlal, actually
experIenced, realtst form, they have treated as paradox
and as such refused to recogmse. In Ignor111g, 111
theIr analysis of experIence, the element of meaning,
they ignore that very element through whIch alone the
fact of self-transcendence can be rendered 111telhgible.
For has not Kant, whatever his faIlures may otherwise
be, succeeded in ShOW111g-S0, at least, I should be
prepared to argue-that the ImmedIate IS not a separate
type of knowledge, but a factor itself conditlOned by
the presence and co-operatIon of other factors not so
descrIbable? But thIS is to antIcIpate: let us return
to the dIscussion of those SImpler Issues which the
subjectivIsts have themselves more or less expliCItly
recogmsed.

(ix.) A TWOFOLD CONCLUSION

If we set aside these last-mentioned considerations,
and review the road which we have thus far been
travelling, we appear to arrive at a twofold conclusIon.
Subjectivism, 111 ItS tradltlOnal forms, has certain
F
66 THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE CHAP

rad1cal, and seem10gly fatal, weaknesses; but none

the less it offers one great counter - advantage. Its
defects are one and all traceable to its method of
interpreting the cogmtIve s1tuatlOn. It repeats the
• dualism' which sets the problem-bringing • within
the mind' the pr1mary dlst1Oction between knowing
self and things known-and yet even by such extreme
measures it faIls to advance 10 any genuine manner
our understand10g of the issues 1Ovolved. ·With one
exception, the original difficulties of the s1tuatlOn
continue unabated, and with certain othefs of a much
more serious character superadded. The one excep-
tion IS the counter-advantage to which I have referred.
As we have noted, subjectivism would seem to render
comprehens1ble the d1spanty whlch SC1ence d1scloses
between the world as sensuously apprehended in a
umque personal perspective and the world as im-
personally and more adequately viewed 10 the natural
SCIences. If the secondary qualIties, and consequently
th10gs as lmmedIately experienced, are subjective
eX1stences, th1s d1spanty, 1t can be maintained, is
understandable; whereas It 1S seemingly by no means
easy of explanatlOn on any VIew whIch retains the
realist attitude of ordinary conSClOusness. This one
great advantage of the subjectivist POSItIon has so
outwe1ghed all the theoretical objections, however
logically unanswerable, wh1ch have been brought
against 1t, that, as I have emphasised, 1t is the
only theory of knowledge wh1ch has h1therto gained
acceptance among non-profeSSIOnal students of philo-
sophy. No matter how successful Kant and Hegel
may have been in their crit1cal handling of sub-
jectivist teaching, their success in this dIrection has
been more than counterbalanced by the1r failure to
IV REPRESENTATIVE PERCEPTION
provIde any alternative posItion whIch IS really work-
able and wh1ch is also compat1ble w1th the detatled
results of the phys1cal and physlOlog1cal SC1ences.
How far th1s defect 1S remed1able we may now
endeavour to determme by a more detailed examina-
tion of the conditions and mode of eXIstence of the
sensa. Are we committed to the view that they are
melltal in character?
 CHAPTER V
THE NATURE AND FUNCTIONS OF THE SEN~A

HAVING defined what I understand to have been the

historical sltuatlOn out of which the various present-
day theories of knowledge have emerged, I shall, in
what follows, leave aSide all views alternative to those
which I am myself endeavourmg to estabhsh, save in
so far as consideration of these other views can be of
assistance in developmg my own argument. In this
way I shall hope to be able to indicate much more
effectually than by direct cnticism the many respects
in which I have been aided by, and those other respects
in which I should dissent from, this and that type of
reahsm and of modified representationism advocated
in the recent hterature of the subject.1

(i.) THE ONTOLOGICAL STATUS OF THE

SECONDARY QUALITIES

What is the status of what are usually called the

secondary quahtles-colour, sound, taste, and the hke?
1 The two malO types of what I should call' modIfied representatlOnISm •
are those ofMr Broad and ofthe authors of Essays In CnhcaJ R.ealzsm (I9zo)
The crIUCISms which I should myself have been InclIned to pass upon the
latter have been very forcibly stated by Mr Loewcnberg In his • Meta-
phYSICS of CrItical RealISm' (Issues and Tendenezes In Contemporary
Phzlosophy, Berkeley, I9Z1) Mr Stout, as I understand, has now broken
With representatIODISm much more completely than In any of hIs publIshed
wrIUngs
oS
CHAP. V NATURE OF THE SENSA
Upon what conditlOns do they rest, and can they be
definitely classed e1ther as phys1cal or as mental?
We have already noted the ambigmty of the term
sensation. It may mean e1ther the process of sensing,
e.g. the apprehenslOn of red, or that wh1ch 1S sensed, e.g.
the red 1tself. The latter we may entitle a sensum.
Obviously the' secondary qualities' are not processes
of al'prehenslOn; they are sensa.
Further, though the secondary quahties may
perhaps turn out to be mental In character, there is
no procurable eV1dence that they are states of the
self. If by the self we mean the subject knowing,
the sensa are not states of the subject, but objects to
the subject. They are apprehended, t.e. contemplated.
Pleasure and paln may perhaps be classed as states of
the self: In so far as they are feehngs they would
seem to belong with processes of apprehension. Con-
siderable spec1al argument would, however, be required
to show that we can lnterpret a taste or a sound or a
colour In that manner. We can speak of the self (or
mind) as pleased or palned or angry, but not as sweet
or loud or red. 1 • These latter quaht1es are contem-
plated, and though In the process they may awaken
a subje~tive reactlOn, and so be appreciated, they are
In the~elves genuinely' objective' eXistences. As
objects, they terminate the processes which are d1rected
to their apprehenslOn.
We must agree w1th the supporters of the doctrine
1 Cf Stout, Manual, lrd edition, pp 9-IO, IIZ-IS' .. This relativity
of affective values to the complex totahty of our psychical life at the
moment supplies a characteristic distinction between affective states and
sensations which recur with comparative uniformity whenever a sense organ
IS similarly excited Anot her characteristic difference IS that distinct
affective states are not capable of existing together In a Simultaneous
plurality as sensations are ..
 THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE CHAP

of representative perceptlOn that the sensa, so far as

expertenced, are transitory. They are expenenced for
a time, and then cease to be expenenced. Whether
they are in themselves transltory, commg mto eXlstence
when we expenence them and passmg out of existence
when we cease to experience them, we have no d1rect
means of decidmg; and the resultmg questions ralse
many of the most dIfficult problems m metaph~ics.
The V1ew to wh1ch, on general grounds, I find myself
commltted, is that they are events, and therefore, as
capable of happenmg only once, essentially transitory.
But smce, hke all events, they are • slabs of duration,' 1
their duratlOn need not comclde w1th our expenencing
of them. For all that we know to the contrary, they
may precede and outlast it, or may cease to eX1st
before we have ceased to contemplate them.
Are the sensa hkeW1se pr1vate to each mdiv1dual?
When a bell IS rung, does each perclplent m Its ne1gh-
bourhood rece1ve therefrom hlS own separate set of
aud1tory sensa? Or can the same sensa be apprehended
by different perc1plents-umformly m proportlOn as
the cond1tions of locatlOn and heanng are umform, and
varymgly when these cond1tlOns vary?
In answer to these questlOns, three main attitudes
can be adopted. F1rst, there 1S the V1ew taken by
those who advocate the doctrme of representative
perceptlOn, that the sensa are in all cases both private
and subjective, t.e. are m the1r eXlstence mind-
dependent. Th1s V1ew we have already considered. 2
Secondly, there is the view taken by what may be
called naive realism, that the sensa actually exist, in
the form m which they appear to exist, as quahties
1 Cf Whitehead, The Concept of Nature, P S3 See also below, p 144 n.
a Cf. above, p. 18 If
v NATURE OF THE SENSA 71
of independent objects. This theory requires that we
account for such facts as that blood should be red
to the naked eye and yellow wIth red spots when seen
through a mIcroscope, that by the red-blind a red
object should be sensed in some other colour, and
so forth. But since thIS IS the view taken, not only
by ordInary conSCIOusness, but also by such phIlo-
sophical thinkers as Mr. Alexander and Mr. Percy
Nunn, Mr. Dawes HIcks and Mr. Laird,l It cannot
be hghtly waved aSIde. A thorough discussion of
the methods by whIch it has been defended would,
however, take us very far afield. 2 I prefer to proceed
by stating and developing the third remaimng VIew,
that the sensa are events, condItioned by physical,
physiological, and possIbly also (for deCIdIng thIS
point we have no sufficient data) psychIcal factors. 3
For the naIve realIsts the sensa are publtc and ob-
jectIve, whereas, on the view which I shall advocate,
though objective, t.C. non-subjective, they are, for
very sufficient, assignable reasons, open to the ob-
servatIOn of only one perCIpIent, and to that extent
are prtvate.
We may at once consider the maIn difficulty whIch
stands in the way of this last view. Colour is, It
would appear, apprehensible only as spread out, and
1 Cf. Alexander, Spau, T,me and DeIty, vol 11 pp 138-40, Percy
Nunn, Proc Arlst Soc, 1909-10, P 191 ff, and 1915-16, p 156 ff.
Dawes HIcks, Proc Arlst Soc, 1916-17, pp 34Z-4. Laird, A Study 111
RealIsm, pp 36-44
I Cf AppendIX to thiS chapter, below, p 89

8 In the case of Mr. Alexander, the doctrme that sensory quahues are
independently real IS not mcompatlble with their bemg regarded as events
Mr. Alexander maJntams that a quahty IS an event occurrmg wlthm a
certam set of events which constitute the thmg quahfied On the other
hand, he would not agree that sensa are condlhoned by the phYSical and
phYSIOlogical factors mvolved m the processes of perceptIOn
7'2 THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE CHAP

therefore as involving space. Must It not, therefore,

be where the space is? Can colour be an event
separate from extended existences, or have a set of
conditions, physIcal and physiologIcal, distinct from
the condItions determming the eXIstence of that of
which It is the colour? By general admission our
apprehenston of colour is thus mdirectly and complexly
condItioned. Can thIs conclusion be extended to' the
eXIstence of the colour itself?
In meetmg thIS ddEculty, I shall argue that the
sensa reduce wIthout remamder to the 'secondary
qualIties' ; and that though space IS apprehended tn
terms of sensa, It can never be apprehended through
sensa. At thIs stage in our argument only part of
the eVIdence for thIs pOSItIon can be stated; its
other grounds will be discussed in the succeedmg
chapters.
Mr. Ward and Mr. WIlham James have argued
that extensity is a characteristic of all sensa. There is,
for mstance, they contend, in sounds and tastes a
volumInousness or roomIness. The data upon which
thIs VIew IS based may, however, be taken as pointmg
In the Opposlte dlrect1On, as IndlcatIng that none of the
sensa are tn themselves extended, that all of them tend
to acqutre a seemmgly dIrect relatlOn to extension, and
that in the case of VIsual sensa thIs has gone so far that
colour cannot be consclOusly apprehended save as
spread out. For do not the sensa of the speCIal
senses shade more or less continuously Into the organic
sensa? The order of sequence is indeed doubtful,
since some of the organic sensa seem to suggest exten-
sity more definitely than, for instance, sounds usually
do. Still there is a marked difference between colours
and sounds or odours, and the latter are in this respect
v NATURE OF THE SENSA 73
more akin to the urgamc sensa than to our visual
experiences. Visual sensa are but one type, and a
somewhat exceptional type of sensa; and we may
endeavour to treat them on the analogy of the other
types, leavmg theIr dIfferentIating features for specIal
explanatIOn. Certainly, at least on first consIderation,
it seems more natural to treat tastes, odours, thermal
sensl1, sounds, and organic sensa, as suggestmg ex-
tensity only through acqUIred associatIOns, and as
being, not qualities of objects, but events, condItioned
by, and subsequent to, processes partly outsIde the
body and partly wlthm the body. On this view,
sensa occur as terminatmg members m certain lengthy
series of events whIch begm by bemg physIcal and
become physiological.
Further, if thIs view be taken, separate sets of
sensa must exist for each observer, since the sets of
conditIons upon whIch they follow are as dlstmct from
one another as are the bodies of the perCIpIents. This
does not, however, mean that the sensa must be sub-
Jective, but only that they must be prIvate. They
are prIvate, not because they fall outsIde the system of
nature, but because, though m themselves as mtegral
to nature as any other events, they are yet, owing to
the circumstances under whIch they arIse, accessIble
only to some one observer. Just as no two mdlvlduals
can touch one and the same spot at the same time, or
taste the same morsel of food, so no two observers can
apprehend at anyone moment, or even at dIfferent
moments, the same sensa. They are, so to speak, in
and by themselves just as public as any other natural
existences; but owing to accompanying circumstances
they are open only to some one individual's view, and
so may be described as private.
74 THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE CHAP.

If it be asked whether the sensa are physical or

psychical, the answer wlll largely be a matter of con-
vention, depending upon our defimtion of these terms.
The term • psychIcal' is wider than the term • con-
SClOUS; just as the term • physical; whIch applies to
ether and to electrons, IS wIder than the term 'matenal.'
The sensa cannot be shown to be conscious states, for
by that we could only mean that consciousness IS in-
separably bound up WIth them, and m support of such
a contention we have no sufficIent evidence. Certainly
their existence has never hitherto been demonstrated
save on the dIrect testimony of ImmedIate experience.
When they are known to exist, conSClOusness IS there
bearing wItness to theIr eXIstence. But this is no
proof that conSClOusness IS what makes them possible
of existence, and that they are unable to eXIst when
conSClOusness IS absent. l
Nor are data avaIlable for provmg that the sensa
are mental or psychtcalm any precIse meamng of these
terms. If we care to define the physIcal in a manner
which excludes the sensory, and If we allow of no
possible type of eXIstence mtermedlate between the
physIcal and the psychIcal, the sensa wIll have to be
assigned to the latter class. But when we ask what
grounds there are for excluding sensa from the physical
sphere, none appear to be forthcoming save such as
are bound up with those types of phIlosophy which
have their sources in Cartesian ways of thinking, and
whIch are therefore committed m one or another form
to the doctrine of representative perception. In their
attempts to define the relation of mind and body they
have given rise to the current theories of interaction,
1 On thIS general questIon, cf G E Moore, Proc Ansi SO(, I9I3-I4,

PP 366 -7 0
v NATURE OF THE SENSA 75
automatism, and parallehsm. As Wt:. have already
noted, this way of thinkIng is maInly determined by
the supposedly ultimate character of the physical
teaching of GalIleo and Newton; and so long as that
teachIng retaInS an unquahfied prestige, such a view
must appear to be inevitable. When, however, these
views are challenged, several alternative pOSSibilIties
at once open to our view. Thus If, as Whitehead
contends in hiS Concept of Nature, the fundamental
bifurcatIon IS not between the psychical, taken as
includIng the sensa, and the physical, taken as ex-
cludIng them, but between awareness and a physical
system of which the sensa are Integral factors, the
natural world Will have to be enVisaged in a very
different manner from any antiCipated in the traditional
phIlosophies. If, further, we can follow Whitehead
In hiS view that the fundamental natural concept IS
not that of substances but of events, and that correlatIOn,
not dlscermble contInUIty, IS the only absolutely in-
dispensable requirement In physical explanatlOn,l the
sensa, regarded as events 2 standIng In defimtely ascer-
taInable correlatIOns With physical and physiological
events, Will be factors as truly Integral In the System
of Nature as are any that are found In the inorgamc
world. Nature, on this View, becomes much more
mysterIous In character; fewer generalisatIOns, not
merely quantItative, are applIcable to It; there are
more loose ends; and new problems, not yet capable
even of conjectural solution, open out on every hand.
In particular, qualitative change, with all the difficulties

1 Cf below, pp 17~-5
• I do not mean to Imply that this IS Mr Whitehead's own view of
sensa He regards sensa as recogmsable, recurrmg objects, ,e as universals.
Events, 10 contrast, are umque, non-recurrmg particulars
 THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE CHAP

which it involves, has now to be faced as a physical,

not as a purely psychical, occurrence.
My statement that there 1S no sufficient evidence
as to whether sensa do or do not have psychical con-
ditions may seem to confhct with the contention that
in any d1vislOn of reahty mto the phys1cal and the
psychIcal they can most fitt10gly be classed as falhng
w1thm the former. In reply, 1t may be pOlntea out
that when the term psychical IS employed 10 Its widest
sense as covering not merely awareness but all those
powers and dlSposltlOns which constitute the mental
structures of which awareness IS a function, we are on
debatable ground. In the absence of a metaphYSical
1OS1ght into the nature of the ultimate relatlOns holdmg
between mmd and matter we have, perforce, to pro-
ceed m a tentative manner, and, as a first approxlma-
tion to truth-to use the phrase now so frequently m
the mouth of the scientist-may reasonably class the
sensa as belongmg rather to the phYSical than to the
psychical sphere. If reahty can be beheved to be a
system, and all its factors to be more or less mtegrally
connected, an entity can be physical, and yet may be
conditioned by what is different in nature from itself.
Further, even If It be granted that sensa do not as
a rule rest on psychical conditions, we are by no
means excluded from recogmsmg, should evidence be
forthcoming, that the psychical does yet in some
degree determine the speCific character wh1ch certain of
the sensa are immediately sensed as havmg. Discussion
of thiS question involves recognition of a distinction
which I regard as quite fundamental, but to which I
have not yet referred, between sensing and intuiting.
By sensmg I mean the process through which we
apprehend the sensa, strictly so called, and by intuition
v NATURE OF THE SENSA 77
the process through which we apprehend them in a
spatial and temporal setting. If, as I shall argue, the
two processes, though fundamentally dIfferent and quite
defimtely distinguishable, never occur apart, they are
likely to exercise influence on one another; and of
their so dOIng there is a consIderable amount of
empIrical evidence. My treatment of the matter must,
at tbts stage, be very incomplete; and I shall mean-
time leave aside all questiOns as to the lnterplay of
intuiting and sensing. In preparation, however, for
the discussion of these questiOns in subsequent
chapters, we may here consider certain more occasional,
and, so to speak, superficial, interventions of the
psychIcal factors.
The sense-qualities have developed In the phylo-
genetic process-such, at least, IS the assumptiOn
which I am maklng-pari passu With the develop-
ment of the sense-organs and of the parts of the braln
with which the sense-organs connect. That is to say,
the sensa are, we may hold, complexly conditiOned by
lnherited modifications in the structure, and conse-
quently in the functioning of the nervous system. It
is pOSSible that bodIly modifications brought about
in the course of the indIvidual's experIence are
simIlarly efficacIOUS, though in lesser degree, In
determining what is sensed. We have, however, no
evidence to support such a conclusion. On the other
hand, we do find that certaln of the sensa are con-
ditioned by individual expertences which lnvolve the
element of meamng; and since this IS an element for
which it is difficult-we may even, relying on our
present modes of insight, say impossible-to conceive
any physiological counterpart, we would seem to be
justified in concluding that certain of the sensa are in
 THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE CHAP

some degree psychIcally conditlOned. 1 EVidence to

this effect has been cited by Mr. Broad. After point-
ing out that the ch1ef reason for regarding visual
sensa as dependent on our bodies IS that their varia-
tions then become intelligible as conditioned by the
positions of the body, whereas the assumption that
they depend on our minds gives no explanation what-
soever of such facts, he proceeds as follows:
" It does ~eem to me undemable that In certain cases, and
to a certain extent, our past expeTlences and our present ex-
pectatIOns affect the actual properties of the sensa that we
sense, and do not merely affect the Judgments about phYSIcal
objects whIch we base upon sensa" 2

Take, for lnstance, the' staircase' diagram, given in

psychological text-books as an instance of ambiguous
figures:
" It~ sensIble appearance changes 'wIth a clIck,' as I look
at It, from that of a staircase to that of an overhanging cornice
ThiS change tends to take place as I concentrate my mind on
the Idea of the one or on that of the other Now, on the
present analYSIS of sensIble appearance, such a change as this
involves an actual qualItatIve change In the sensum. So tar is
It from being a mere change in the Judgments which I happen
to base on one and the same sensum, that the duectlon of
my thoughts changes first and IS the condition of the change in
the sensIble appearance" " The whole psychology of viSIon IS
fuII of such cases, some of them of a hIghly complex kind."

1 Cf Broad, Smnttjic Thought, P 516" there may well be

purely psychic conditions, haVing no bodily correlates, which must also be
fulfilled If sensations are to arise In the mind I am gOlllg to assume, for
the sake of slmphclty. In thiS book that there IS 8uch a complete parallehsm
between mind and body that It IS enough to mention bodily conditions,
because every psychiC condition has Its bodily correlate I am very far
from behevlng that tlus IS true, and am not even sure that It has any very
definite meaning which would SUl'Vlve analYSIS."
• Op czt. P 260.
v NATURE OF THE SENSA 79
" And it cannot be said here, as 10 the previous examples, that
reference to the mmd gives no help 10 explammg the facts
Here the boot IS rather on the other foot . . . Here a reference
to mental conditions really does explam concrete fact, whilst a
reference to hodtly conditions does not" 1

If thIS type of argument can be upheld, and If,

therefore, we can succeed in determining the pro-
gres.iive appearance, In terms of sensa, of factors whIch
Involve the element of meamng, we shall also be in
a posItion to suggest an explanatlOn of the manner
in which the now inseparable connection between
colour and extenslOn has, in the course of the phylo-
genetIC development, been brought about. 2
Before concluding this sectlOn there IS one other
important consideratlOn to which I may, In passing,
draw attention; I shall have occaSIon to dwell upon it
at some length later. On the above VIew of the sensa,
the tradItional manner of regarding the relatlOn of
mind and body WIll have to be restated, as Involving
two qUIte dIstinct problems. 3 For we shall have to
ascnbe to the brain a twofold funCtion, as condlttomng

I SCIentific Thought, pp 2.60-6 I I cannot follow Mr Broad m hiS further

contention (p 2.63, cf 2.66) that" It IS, of course, perfectly true that Images
are to a much greater extent qualitatively mmd-dependent than are sensa"
If I have not misunderstood him, he would here seem to be fallmg to dls-
tmgUlsh between what determmes the posslblhty of havmg Images, VIZ
past experience, and what determmes the character of the Images once
recalled Since their occurrence depends upon our prevIous experience,
they are much more under our control, but I can find no ground for
behevmg that, once selected, by the direction of attention or otherWise,
their qualitative characteristiCs are any less mdependent of mmd than are
those of the orlgmal sensa. They do not, It would seem, In the mterval
Since our first experience of them, undergo any essential change, save
perhaps dlmmutlOn ofthelr vividness and constancy.
I Cf below, p. zoo if

a Mr Stout has been the first to draw attention to thiS Important pomt.
Cf hiS forthcoming Gifford Lecturt'S.
80 THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE CHAP

the sensa and as conditioning awareness. Since these

two functions are fundamentally dlstmct, there must
be two sets of brain-processes; and they w1l1 call for
separate treatment.

(ii.) TIME, SPACE, AND THE SENSA

Let us now cons1der the thesis which I have pro-

pounded above, namely, that we apprehend time and
space In terms of sensa, but not through them, t.e. that
we gain an articulated V1ew of hme and space by
means of sensa, but that time and space are not
themselves sensory in character. This can most
easily be shown m the case of time. The passage
of time 1S not, it would seem, absent from the field
of conSClOusness for a single moment. It may not
be speCially attended to; it is at least • enjoyed'
or • endured.' Further, the time of wh1ch we are
always thus consclOUS 1S, to use William James's
phrase, a c;addleback of t1me. What we are consclOUS
of in bemg aware of succession is a duratlOn w1thm
which we dlscrImmate a past that has just passed,
the now present, and a future into which it IS leadmg.
The present always defines 1tself in conSClOusness
through this twofold contrast to the no longer and the
not yet. Consciousness, that IS to say, IS never
limited to the mstantaneously present. In order that
there may be consciousness of the present, there must
be consciousness of more than the present. Th1s,
then, bemg the form in which consciousness of time
alone occurs, I shall endeavour to show that it can
never be acquired s1mply through contemplation
of this or that sensum, as it comes about, as it
endures for a time, or as it ceases to be, or even
v TIME, SPACE, AND THE SENSA 81
through contemplation of an overlapping series of
such sensa.
Clearly, contemplation of a sensum in and by itself
cannot YIeld, or account for, conSClOusness of Its
coming about. Since the awareness must take cog-
nisance of the time prior to the happening of the
sensum, it cannot be Yielded by the not then eXistent
sens~m. SImilarly with awareness of cessatlOn of
a sensum. The awareness is of a field which outlasts
the sensum, and It must therefore apprehend more
than the sensum. Consc1Ousness of a continUing
sensum is equally complex. It presupposes awareness
of a lapse of time; and Since It IS the same sensum
that is at the earher and at the later time, the aware-
ness of the difference in tIme cannot be obtamed
from contemplat1On merely of the sensum. Thus in
all cases conSC1Ousness has a field more comprehensive
than any sensum, no matter in which of the three
modes the sensum be taken.
Nor can consciousness of time origmate in the
contemplation of overlapping sensa. If in theIr
beginmng and ceasing to be they entirely coincide,
they begin and cease to be at the same moment, and
the presupposed conSC1Ousness of antecedent time IS
not any more explained by them all taken together
than it is by anyone of them. If, on the other hand,
the times of theIr beginnings stand in temporal
sequence, and we date the later by reference to the
earlier, then while awareness of the coming to be of
the first item 1ll the senes is left unconsidered, and
will call for parallel treatment, that of the subsequent
items would seem to be accounted for. But this is
an incomplete explanation. In order to date the later
by reference to the earlier we must have ground for
G
820 THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE CHAP

judging it to br later, and such ground can only

consist in the awareness that It has really begun at
the moment specified, that is, that It has followed
upon a time in which It has not itself existed. And
though this antecedent time may be apprehended as
the time in which another sensum occurs, what makes
posslble the consciousness of the later item as making
tts entry mto the series is conSC10usness of the prec..:ding
time as a ttme otherwise specified, not merely conscious-
ness of the nature of the preceding sensum wh1ch
does thus specify it. That 1S to say, in all cases
awareness of a temporal field supplementary to this
or that sensum, and in which the sensa occur, pre-
cond1tions the apprehension of beginning, enduring,
and ceas10g to be.
To state the same argument in another form: 10
apprehend10g temporal overlapping of sensa we must
apprehend the point or edge at which a new sensum
begins or a given sensum ceases. But the edge is
not apprehended as a temporal edge save in so far as
it is viewed as occurring within a t1me that leads
into and later continues the moment of transition in
which the edge itself cons1sts. More is here ex-
perienced than what is sensuously experienced. The
time-span of known durations is what makes possible
apprehension of a time-limit, and this time-span has
itself to be thought of as continuing, and as continuing
into, a time wider than itself.
But, It will be objected, the temporal contexts
thus required can be explained as due to the revival
of past experiences, l and so may still be traceable
1 Kant, under the Influence of those very assumptIOns from which he
was endeavourmg to break away, inconsistently adopts thiS method of
explanation In hIS expOSItIon of the' syntheses of apprehensIOn'
v TIME, SPACE, AND THE SENSA
to the contemplatlOn of sensa. Examination of our
consciousness of time suffices, however, to disprove
this view. The type of context to which all such
temporal contexts have to conform IS a type which
must in its maIn features be present in every case,
and which is therefore as little capable of being
accounted for in terms of past as in terms of present
senStl.. As condItionIng all awareness of sensa, it
cannot be arrived at through any amount of such
awareness, not even if such awareness be thrown back
into a past about whIch so little is known that con-
jecture IS free to propound hypotheses, uncontrolled
by any facts of present experience. If, as above
maintained, conSClOusness of the now cannot be
accounted for save by postulating a consciousness of
the no longer and the not yet, there can be no way
of explaInIng how we can win our way to It by the
path of increasing experience; and consciousness of
duration must therefore be accepted as havIng been
present from the start.
This concluslOn can only be challenged If we are
prepared to deny that conSCIOusness, in order to be
consciousness, must In all cases have a temporal field.
The problem of the origIn of our apprehension of
time IS the problem of the origIn of consciousness
itself.
Such, then, as regards consciousness of time, is the
thesis which I am endeavouring to maintain. In
order that what is sensuously experienced may be,
what it always is, a complex duratIon, each Item
within it, and it itself as a whole, must be apprehended
in temporal perspective. Only if the wider, implied,
temporal perspective, and the time-span immedtately
experienced, be thus apprehended as passing Into one
 THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE CHAP

another, so that the texture of each is uniform in all

its transitions, can the changes wh1ch manifest them-
selves through the abrupt qualitative d1scontinuities
of sense sttll be apprehended m the manner in which
they are actually apprehended, namely, as constitutmg
a continuous medlUm of constant character. Ac-
cordmgly, to explam consciousness of durat10n and
change, we have to postulate that the percipielu IS
capable of apprehending a w1der, and in certam
respects, such as in the type of its contmUlty, a different
field from any that the sensa themselves, by themselves
(1f they ever so eXist), can be regarded as yielding.
ConSCIOusness, in so far as It 1S the apprehension of
time and the modes of time, transcends any and all
sensa, however extensive, and however, once they are
apprehended, they may be found to be interpretable
as a contznuous senes of overlapping durations.
The same argument apphes to our apprehension
of space. For even assummg (what I shall have to
call in question) that certain sensa, or all sensa, are
extended, there is one unfailing feature of our space-
experience which cannot be accounted for as due
merely to the contemplation of them as thus eXisting.
The space which we sensuously apprehend, be it large
or small, is always apprehended as falhng within a
space larger than itself, and as being conditioned in
its existence by this w1der whole. Consc1Ousness of
such a field cannot be conceived as first originating
through observatIOn of overlappings and delim1ta-
tions. That is necessary for definitely specifying any
space whether large or small, but will not suffice to
account for its first apprehension. The sensa have
indeed size and outlme only in so far as they delimit
or overlap one another; but what makes it possible
v TIME, SPACE, AND THE SENSA 85
that any two of them should be apprehended as thus
co-termmous or overlappmg IS the single wider field
withm whIch both are located, and WhICh thereby
Imposes condItions to whIch both must conform.
Spatial hmits, and therefore specIfic shapes and sizes,
can be known only through a conSCIousness whIch
from the start apprehends each of them in a wIder
umdry settmg. The primary task of sense-perception
is always-m space as m tIme-rather to dIfferentiate
than to synthesIse.
Here, too, the remark made above in regard to
time is in order. Not merely IS the spatial context an
implted wider context. WhIle bemg so, It lIkewise
wIth perfect contmulty passes mto, and mamtains
Itself throughout, and emerges again beyond, the per-
ceived space-span, and so enters mto the very texture
of what IS immedIately expertenced m sensuous form.
The field apprehended is thereby apprehended as
fundamentally umform m character, and when in
mature consciousness It comes defimtely to be recog-
nised as all-comprehensIve m its kmd, has to be
vIewed as smgle. How thIS should be possible, and
how in partIcular the sensa, notwlthstandmg their
manifold and qualitatively discontmuous character,
far from obscuring these features, should faclhtate
their apprehenslOn, and m certam cases should them-
selves take on the spread-out form, remains a matter
for later discussion.
There is, however, an objectIon of a related char-
acter, which may be consIdered in prehmlnary fashion
before we proceed. Why, it may be asked, should
we assume that the sensa are separate and unconnected?
Is not any cogency the above argument may have
entirely due to this false assumption? Do not the
86 THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE CHAP.

alleged difficulties at once vamsh when we recognise

that what we contemplate IS a contmuous field in tIme
and space? If the field IS m Itself thus doubly con-
tmuous, does not this suffiCIently explam why through
dIrect mspectlOn It IS apprehended as being so?
I must refer the reader to the chapters that follow,
but may meantime guard agamst certain misunder-
standings which the objectlOn would seem to involve.
So far from meamng to deny that the sensuous field
IS always apprehended as contmuous m time and
space, I have myself been mSIstmg upon thIS very
fact. Consciousness, owmg to sleep and other causes,
may itself lapse, but the fields whIch It discloses to
us, however circumscrIbed, and however lacking in
observed contmUlty, m order to be apprehended as
temporal and spatial, have to be apprehended (im-
pliCItly, if not exphcltly) as selections from a whole
whIch, WIthout break, IS contmued mto and contmues
them. I do, mdeed, assume that the sensa are qualtta-
ttvely discontmuous. This, as it seems to me, is an
empmcal fact, and must be accepted as such. The
abrupt character of the tranSItions from qualtty to
qualtty is surely a no less marked feature of the experi-
enced than is the unfadmg mamtenance of continUlty
tn ttme and space. 1
I am also assummg that whIle all the sensa have
duration, and so far exhIbIt temporal continuity, none
of them, m and by themselves, possess spatial extensity.
Whether this latter assumption IS or IS not justified,
and how, if justified, the difficulties to which it gives
rise are to be met, wdl have to be discussed later. At
1 Whereas the relatIOn between two dIstinct spaces or times 18 the space
or time between the two, the relation between two sensa IS not a sensum;
e g the relation between two colours IS not a colour, nor IS It a sound.
v TIME, SPACE, AND THE SENSA
present I desire only to point out that my argument,
in the manner In whIch It IS stated above, does not
reqUlre, for its cogency, that we should deny the per-
sistence of sensa In time. All that IS demanded is
that we recogmse as a fact qUlte fundamental that the
continuing character of sensa does not, by itself,
suffice to explain conSClOusness of their contmuity,
and" that this consciousness cannot therefore be due
sImply to dIrect inSpectIOn. I have tried to show that
perSIstence, no less than change, Involves for ItS appre-
hension a WIder field than any or all SImultaneous
sensa can supply, and that even when prevlOusly
experienced sensa are taken into account the temporal
perspectIve necessary for the apprehenslOn of any
temporal relation remainS unaccounted for. Accord-
ingly, even if I were not questIOmng that extenSIty is
a property of sensa, I should stIll have to apply the
above view in explanation of our apprehension of
space. What is true on the larger scale as regards
the apprehension of this or that spatial field-that It
cannot be apprehended save as part of a field still
larger-is lIkeWIse true of the apprehensIon of any
of its sensuously expenenced parts: these can be so
experienced tn terms of sensa, only because very much
more is involved than the sensa therein apprehended
themselves make possible. This reply is no more than
a repetition of my previous points, but it may serve to
set them in a clearer light.
Mr. Stout has maintained,! though with a some-
what dIfferent purpose m VIew, a SImilar theSIS,
Cf. Manual, 3rd editiOn, p. 431 ff; PrtJc. Anst Soc, 1914-15, Note
on • Knowledge by acquaintance' and • Knowledge about,' pp HO-51,
Some Fundamental Po",ts in tile Tlleory of Knowledge (St Andrews
Unlvenlty QUIncentenary Publications, 1911). p 17 If; and more especIally
hIS forthcoming Gifford Lectures
88 THEORY OF KNO\VLEDGE CHAP

namely, that in aU expenence there is Involved a

form of knowledge which does not reduce to acquaint-
ance or to acquaintance plus Inference. This type
of apprehenslOn is, he maintaIns, an ultimate type: It
cannot be acqUIred, and must be present from the
start. As an Instance he c1tes the apprehension of
the past as past, and of all spaces as being parts of a
sIngle space. This posItion I should carry further,
contendIng that these and other SImIlar apprehensions,
reqUIred In the apprehensIon of tIme and of space,
together constItute that highly complex process whIch
we entItle awareness. SInce, as would appear to be
an empmcal fact, the minImUm field IS always both
temporal and spatIal,1 and therefore elaborately com-
plex, the awareness thereof IS lIkely to be no less so.
Those who regard extensIty as a property of all sensa
eVIdently intend to maIntaIn that It IS an ultimate
and Invanable feature of the sensed. For reasons
whIch I shall proceed to state, whIle agreeing that
time and space are for us ultImate features of the real,
I cannot see my way to regardIng them as sensuous.
Nor can I agree that awareness of extenSIty IS on aU-
fours WIth awareness of a 'qualIty' such as red
or sweet. This latter awareness appears to be un-
analysable, but the awareness of time and space must
surely have a complexity in some degree correspond-
ing to the complex characters whIch it reveals.
1 ThiS IS so even when we are attendmg to mental processes, SInce we
cannot attend to them Without also being aware of that to which they are
directed, namely, the spatlo-temporal.
v NATURE OF THE SENSA

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER V
MR. BROAD'S DISCUSSION OF THE ALTERNATIVE
THEORIES REGARDING THE PRODUCTION OF SENSA
WHILE completing the above chapter I have become
acquamted wlth Mr. Broad's very illummatmg dls-
cus9IOn 1 of the relatIve merits of the two main alterna-
tive Vlews regardmg the 'production' of sensatIons;
and for the reader's benefit I here insert a brief state-
ment of hls argument.
The productIOn of sensatIOns (a term whlch Mr.
Broad uses as sigmfymg the complex wlthm whlch
sensmg and a sensum can be dlstmgmshed) must be
elther selecttve or generative. Mr. Alexander lS the
most thoroughgOlng representatIve of the former
view. He regards sensa as contamed m physlcal
objects, and the physIOloglcal processes m the nervous
system and bram as havmg, m thls connectlOn, only
one functlOn, that of ' keepmg up' the mental process
(or' enjoyment ') which senses, t.e. contemplates them.
Objects have temperature, colour, and all their other
qualItles qmte mdependently of their relatIOn to any
ammal body or to any mind. The mtervenmg pro-
cesses, physlcal and physiological, determme whlch of
these qualItles we sense at any moment, but have
nothing to do wlth thelr existence. Bodles which
are lIterally red emit a posltive type of physlcal vlbra-
tions; and these latter are the means of stlmulatmg us
to sense the red colour.2 The VIbrations, so far from
being among the causal conditions of the eXlstence of I
the colours, are part of the effects subsequent there-
upon.
1 Saellhjie Thou.ght, P SZ3 if. a cr. op. CIt. P z80
 THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE CHAP

The alternative view IS that the physlOloglcal pro-

cesses have a further funCtion, that of conditioning the
existence of the sensa as well as that of conditioning
our awareness of them. ThIS IS the generative view
which I have been advocatIng. Sensa are the joint-
product of phYSical and phYSiological processes, and
possibly also of psychical processes. We are not
reqUlred, on thiS theory, to hold that sensa eXist only
in and through the processes whereby they are appre-
hended, nor to assert that they are non-physical. But
the theory does break with the selective view so far as to
maintaIn that the probablhtles are agaInst the eXistence
of sensa on the Simpler Inorganic level, and POInt to their
being conditioned by physIOlogical happenings.
SInce there does not seem to be any direct method
of deCidIng between the two theOries, we have to do
so by conSideration of their respective advantages and
disadvantages.
" [The] chief merit [of theOries of the selective type] IS that
they make the ontological status of sensa easier to understand
than do generative theOries With the latter there IS a sharp
distInction between sClentdic objects and events on the one
hand, and the sensa, which, under certaIn peculIar circum-
stances, they generate on the other. The very notion of
generation IS not easy to understand, whilst that of selection IS
fairly Intelligible. And the status of sensa, when generated, In
a world which consists almost wholly of SCientIfic events and
objects, IS certamly most peculiar . . . On the view of phYSical
objects and events which corresponds to the selective theory of
the production of sensa, all that we need to postulate IS unsensed
sensa and unsensed sense-objects. That IS, we only need to
assume more entities of the same kind as we meet in our sense-
histOries.
"Thus . . • if a purely selective theory can be made to
work, and If It can be accompanied by a satisfactory theory of
phYSical objects as composed wholly of sensa, it WIll have the
v NATURE OF THE SENSA 91
double ment of avozdmg the difficult notion of generation and of
gzving sensa a less ambiguous status t1Z the umverse than any
generative theory zs Izkely to do " 1
But the difficulties In the way of a purely selective
theory are no less obvIOUS. For it constrains us to
postulate a very grotesque type of complexity In the
emrincal objects .
•
" If phYSIOlogical proces~es be purely selective, we shall have
to postulate as many different kinds of sensa coexisting at a
given place and time as any observer, however abnormal his
bodily condition, can sense If put there at that tune" 2

For Instance, the pushmg of the eyeball aSIde wIth

the finger bnngs two sense-objects Into view where
prevIOusly there was only one. If boddy condItIOns
be purely selectIve, never generative, the two separate
and Similar sense-objects must have been there all the
tIme.
" I find thiS very difficult to swallow, and a supporter of a
purely selective theory wIll have to swallow a large number
of equally unpalatable doses. If the sensa which an abnormal
observer, or a normal observer In a temporarily abnormal state,
senses from a certain place were absolutely unlzke those which
normal observers sense from that place, a purely selective theory
would be more plaUSible. The difficulty IS that the abnormal
sensa are a great deal like the normal ones, and yet distinctly
different It IS very difficult, under these conditIOns, to resist
the conviction that both the abnormal and the normal sensa are
generated by two sets of condltlons, one common to both, and
one varying from observer to observer" 3
The range of this objection can be fully appreciated
only when we bear in mind all the varied, relevant
phenomena-negative after-images, dream-images, the
1 Smntrjic Thought, PP 57.6-7 Italics not In text.
I Op at P 528 a Op CIt P 529
 THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE CHAP

varying shapes and sizes and colours of objects, the

doubleness of all objects not on the horopter of
vlsion, etc.
In view of the above considerations may not the
most satisfactory solutIOn be found m a combmation
of the two views~ Perhaps so; but m that case, as
Mr. Broad pomts out, the selective theory loses many
of ItS advantages. If the mternal boddy processes are
allowed to be m any degree generative, even If only
by actmg m a manner analogous to dlstortmg media,
like coloured glasses, the lImits withm which thiS can
occur wlll not be determmable.
" We therefore [should] not really know that sensa can eXist
at all apart from brainS and nervous system~ And, even If we
decide to postulate sensa of some kind In places and times where
there are no brainS and nervous systems, we cannot have the
slightest Idea what intrinSIC sensible qUdlmcs ~uch sensa will
have . . . To call them sensa, under these circumstances,
seems rather misleading, for It IS liable to disgUise the purely
hypothetical character of these events and to suggest that we
know a good deal about their intrinSIC qualmes Really we
know nothll1g about the events which happen at intermediate
times and place!"> between the opemng of a shutter and our
sensing of a flash, except that they obey Maxwell's Equations." 1

In any case, the admiSSion of a power to alter,

distort, and duplIcate tS the introduction of the con-
cept of generation; and, as Mr. Broad proceeds to
show, the dlstmction between creative and causal
processes IS not an absolute one. There are creative
features m a so-called purely causal process, and there
are causal features in the alleged generation of sensa.
" The difference may be stated shortly, In terms of occurrent
and continuant conditions. Both causation and creation involve
1 Saentific Thought, PP 532,-3
 v NATURE OF THE SENSA 93
these two kinds of condition. In ordinary causation the event
which is determined by them Joms up wzth one or other ot the
continuant conditions, and becomes a part of zts history. In
creation, the event which is determined does not Jom up With
any of Its continuant condlt1ons to form a further stage In their
history, It either remains Isolated or IS the beglnmng of an
altogether new strand of history." 1
Qn the view that sensa are gene' .1tl'd, they do not
wholly faIl to join up with pre-exIstmg contInuants.
"What we must say is that sometzmes they seem to be
extremely Isolated, that often their conneXlOn With pre-existing
continuants IS rather remote and indirect, and that apparently
they never JOin up With the history of that particular continuant
(VIZ the brain) which IS the seat of the most Immediate speCial
occurrent condltlons. These facts show that the generation of
sensa by phYSical and phYSIOlogical processes must be con-
Siderably different from the causatIon of a change m one phYSical
object by a change m another But they do not suggest that
the generation of sensa, If It take place at all, IS a perfectly
umntelhglble process of creatIOn" 2
SImIlarly, the discontinuous, creative character is
never wholly absent from strictly phYSIcal causation,
though In the positive sciences It IS more or less
completely left out of account.
"We have no TIght then to feel surpnsed If the structure
and laws of the existent world as a whole fall to show that
sweet simplicity which distingUishes the particular part of It to
which natural sCientists have confined themselves SCience has
been able to make the great stndes which It has made by
deliberately Ignoring one Side of reahty .. In phIlosophy, as
In economiCS, facts do not cease to be real by being IgnOled,
and the philosopher becomes the residuary legatee of all those
aspects of realIty which the physiCist (quite rightly, for his own
purpose) has decided to leave out of account" 3
1 SCientific Tkougkt, PP 535-6 I Op Cit P 539
a Op CIt P S4l Cf below, PP 17'1.-5
94 THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE CHAP v.

Thus, though each of the two types of theory, the

I selectIve and the generatIve, has very serIOUS dIfficultIes

to meet, both are open possibilIties. Our choice must

depend partly upon our estImate of theIr respective
successes in accounting for the main outstanding
phenomena, and partly by the general views to
which we find ourselves committed In treating of
other problems in kindred fields.
 CHAPTER VI
THE PRESENTATIONAL CONTINUUMl

I MAY render the above positIons somewhat more

definite by contrasting them with those of Mr. Ward
and Mr. Stout. Though the views which I am ad-
vocating lead to conclusIons very different from those
of Mr. Ward, they are in some degree inspIred by
his teachIng, and especially by hIs doctrIne of a
presentational continuum. A somewhat detaIled state-
ment and dIscussion of that doctrIne would therefore
seem to be called for.

(1.) A RESTATEMENT OF MR. WARD'S DOCTRINE

OF A PRESENTATIONAL CONTINUUM

The doctrine had best be gIven In Mr. Ward's own

words:
" Psychologists have usually represented mental advance as
consisting fundamentally m the combmatlOn and recombmatlOn
of various elementary UnJts, the so-called sensations and primitive
movements: m other words, as consisting in a species of' mental
chemistry.' If needful, we might find In bIOlogy far better
analogies to the progressive differentiation of experience than
in the physical upbuildmg of molecules. The process seems
much more a segmentation of what IS origmally continuous

1 Should the reader prefer to keep to the mam broader lmes of the
argument, he can omit thiS chapter and proceed at once to Chapter VII
95
 THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE CHAP.

than an aggregatIOn of elements at fir&t independent and dis-

tinct. .• In our search for a theory of presentations, then,
It is from thIs' contInuIty of conscIOusness' that we must take
our start Workmg backwards from thIS as we find It now,
we are led alrke by partIcular facts and general conSIderatIOns
to the conceptIon of a totum obJectt'Uum or obJcctl\e contInuum
which IS gradually dIfferentIated" 1
"The notIon-whIch Hume and Kant dId so much to
encourage-that psychical life begrn~ with a confused manifold
of sensations, devoId not only of logIcal but even of psychologIcal
unity, IS one that become'i more Inconceivable the more closely
we consider It An absolutely new pre'ientatlOn, haVIng no
sort of connexlon With former presentations tIll the subject
has. synthesised It With them, IS a concept for which It would
be hard to find warrant either by direct observatIon, by Inference
from bIOlogy, or In consIderatIOns of a general kInd" 2
"The vIew here taken IS (1) that at Its first appearance In
psychIcal hfe a new sensatIOn or so-called elementary presenta-
tIon IS really a partIal modIficatIon of some pre-exIstIng and
persIstIng presentatIOnal whole, which thereby becomes more
complex than It was before; and (2) that thIS IncreasIng com-
plexIty and differentIatIon never gIves rrse to a pluralrty of
discontInuous presentations, haVIng a distInctness and IndiVidu-
ality such as the atoms or elementary particles of the phySIcal
world are supposed to have" 3 " The pure sensatIon we may
regard as a psychologIcal myth" 4

There appear to be two main reasons why this

doctrine of a presentational contmuum, though m-
fluentlal, has not been even more generally adopted.
In the first place, Mr. Ward's professed intentIon is
to descrIbe the development of experience not only 10
the individual and 10 the race, but also in Its evolution
1 Psyekologrcal Pnncrples, PP 75-6 Cf. Encyc Bnt, 9th editIon,
vol. xx P.45
I Op CIt P 77 Cf Ene]e Bnt, loe CIt, P 45
8 Op crt P 78 Cf Encye Bnt, loe CIt, P 46
• Op CIt P 143 Cf Encye Bnt, loe. CIt, P 53
VI PRESENTATIONAL CONTINUUM 97
from the lowest forms of animalltfe. For this purpose
Mr. Ward resorts to the assumptIOn that we are dealing
with one lOdlvidual who IS born as protoplasm and 10
the unbroken course of a slOgle lIfe develops lOto man.
" The lIfe-history of such an Imaginary individual, that IS to
say, would correspond with all that was new In the experience
of a certam typical senes of individuals each of whom advanced
a certain stage in mental differentiation. On the other hand,
from this history would be omitted that Inherited reproduction
of the net results of ancestral experience, that Innate tradition,
so to say, by which alone, under the actual conditions of
existence, racial progress is possIble" 1
Now obviously a descnptlOn which is thus to apply
both to phylogenetic and to ontogenetic development
must be very general; the phenomena covered are
so multitudmous and diverse that only by depart-
109 from the above assumption, and by recogmslOg
the lOterventlOn of predispOSitIOns or powers, of
which the psychologist IS not yet able to give any
specific evolutIOnary explanation, can anyone stage,
and espeCially the highly differentiated experience
proper to man, receive adequate attention. And as a
matter of fact, Mr. Ward frequently finds himself
constrained to dwell upon this alternative type of
problem. But even when he is doing so hiS funda-
mental assumption seems, at the really cntical points,
to exercise an unfortunate influence by diverting hiS
inquiry from the specific phenomena under considera-
tion to somewhat speculative conjectures as to the
general mode 10 which they have been evolved from
experiences simpler in type. In opposition to such a
standpoint, we may welcome Mr. Stout's weighty
pronouncement that in distinguishing between the
1 Psychologzcal Pnncrples, P 75' cr. Encyc Bnt, loco crt, P 4S
H
 THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE CHAP

original and the acquired the psychologist should

mainly be concerned
" to guard himself against the danger of explaining In a circle
by unconscIOusly introducing among the essential conditions of
mental development what he pretends to account for as Its
result To avoId fallaCIes of thzs sort It IS hest to err on the safe
sIde, if at all, and to rank as arzgmal whatever he cannot clearly
account for as derzvatlve." 1

There is little to challenge in the passages above

quoted from Mr. Ward, so long as they are taken as
applying to the broader features In the natural history
of the mind. The general pOint of view, as Mr. Ward
very justly claims, " has become the common property
of students to whom the Original IS unknown." 2
When, however, we inqUire In what precise respects
hiS deSCription of the field of consciousness, the totum
objectlvum, as being a continuum, can be accepted as
true of the field disclosed In our present human ex-
perience, objections multiply; and It IS by no means
easy to discover what precisely Mr. Ward intends in
thiS connectIOn. He does not mean that there are no
l abrupt qualitative changes. A clap of thunder 3 can
break In upon Silence; and hghts can flash out against a
dark background. Neither the thunder nor the lights
are qUite novel experiences, and all of them therefore
can be recogmsed; but there need be nothing like
them in the immediately precedmg experiences. The
new presentatIOns are mdeed mediated by aware-
ness of the tranSitIOn-stages, thunder-breakmg-m-upon-
silence, hghts-jlashtng-out-against-darkness; but these
are only the processes whereby the abruptness of the
1 Manual of PJ]chology, 3rd edition, P +lI Itahcs not In text.
• PJ]chologrcal PnnClples, p VII
a PJ]cllologlcal Pn7IClples, PP 77-8 Cf EnC.JC. Bnt ,IIX ClI, PP +5-6
Vl PRESENTATIONAL CONTINUUM 99
changes are apprehended, and whereby the changes,
once they occur, are experIenced as progressively modi-
fying the field lOto whIch they have unexpectedly
forced themselves. There is always contlOUlty in our
processes of awareness, even 10 the experIences of sur-
prise and disappolOtment; and had these processes a
wider presentatlOnal field, the thunder and the hghts
would doubtless be antlclpated before they occur, and
when occurring would be apprehended In the nexus of
the contmuously changIng physical occurrences with
whIch they are bound up. The situatIon, however,
being what It IS, the actual field IS circumscrIbed, and
the sensatIOns present themselves umntroduced, break-
109 the contInUlty of the experienced objectIve happen-
ings, and substItutlOg for quahtles 10 the eXlstlOg field
quahtIes of a qUIte OpposIte character. It is not that
the prevIous processes are experIenced as contmuously
changlOg 1Oto somethlOg different: the changes are
experienced as In contrast to the Immediately precedlOg.
The thunder does not, so to speak, begm as somethlOg
aklO to sIlence and yet a ltttle dIfferent from It, and
become ItS own self by contmuous lOtermediate stages.
But if this be granted, what justIfies Mr. Ward in
describing the presentational field as a continuum?
Seemingly only this, that the tIme and the space 10
which its states and processes are apprehended are 10
each case stngle and contmuous. There may also, as
Ward argues, have been continuity in the stages
whereby our qualItatIvely contrasted sense-experiences
have been differentiated out of the prImitive presenta-
tional continuum of the protoplasm. But thIs has
nothing at all to do with the question whether or not
in the complex field of any actual consciousness the
different factors are quahtatlvely continuous one wIth
100 THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE CHAP

another or with their immediate antecedents. The

continuity of the continuum, if we may trust intro-,
spection, hes exclusively 10 its temporal and spatial
aspects.

(ii.) AN EXAMINATION OF MR. WARD'S AND

MR. STOUT'S DOCTRINE OF SENSORY EXTENSITY

This, however, only brings us to a further, and

much more serious, dlfficulty. Mr. Ward has also
adopted the view, first propounded by Stumpf, that
extensity IS apprehended in the same manner as
quality.
" In [our] sensatIons we can dlstmgUlsh three vaTlations,
viz., varIatIons of quality, of mtenslty, and of what Dr. Bain
has called maSSIveness, or as we shall say, extensIty" 1
If thIS meant that each sensat10n has a space of
its own, It might be asked what 10 that case renders
the totum obJectt'Uum a contmuous field? This, however,
is not what Mr. Ward 10tends to maintain. Not-
withstanding hls treatment of extenslty as being on
a level with quahty, he ascribes extenslty to the field
as a whole, and dtscrtmmates the extensity of this or
that sensation within the single whole. Z The extensitles
of slmultaneous sensations are, he virtually asserts,
partial extensities within the single extensity of the
presentational continuum. The chlef relevant passages
run as follows:
" IntensIty belongs to what may be called graded quantity:
admIts of mcrement or decrement, but is not a sum of parts.
Nor is extensIty, as such, a sum of parts; though It turns out
1 Psychologrcal PnnClples, p 78 Cf Encyc Bnl, I« ell, p 46
8 How large a spread-out extenSIty, unIform In qualIty, can be appre-
hended through a sIngle sensatIon, IS not dIscussed.
 VI PRESENTATIONAL CONTINUUM 101

to Imply pluralIty, smet' It can be differentiated. We might

descnbe it as latent or merged pluralIty, or better still as a
\ ' ground' of plurahty. In other words, to say that a single
presentation has massiveness IS the same as saying that a portion
of the presentation-continuum, at the moment undifferentiated,
IS capable of differentiation-as happens, If for one of the two
stamps the wet cloth IS substituted" 1
Without stopping to consider how far it is legitimate
to ascribe to a single sensatIon 2 the extensity YIelded
by two stamps pasted side by side on the back of the
hand, we may note that in the opemng of the im-
mediately followmg paragraph Mr. Ward, wIthout any
further attempt at argument, qUlte unambiguously
assigns extensity to the field as a whole.
" Attnbutlng thiS property of extensity to the presentatlon-
contmuum as a whole,3 we have now to consider the relation
of any particular sensation to thiS larger whole So long as the
extensity of such sensation admits of dimInution without the
sensatIOn becomIng ml, so long the sensation either has or may
have two or more so-called • local signs' For what IS gone-
one of the stamps, e g, beIng removed-though Identical In
quality and intensity With what remaInS, Will obViously be a
different part of the whole. But such difference of relations to
the whole can only be regarded as affording a ground or POSSI-
bility of local distInction, not as bemg from the beginmng such
an overt difference as the term 'local sign,' when used by
Lotze, is meant to Imply. But we can say that more partial
presentatIOns are concerned In the sensation where there are
two stamps than where there is only one. The local dlfferentla-

Psychologzcal PnnClples, p 147 Cf Encyc Bnt, loc CIt, P 54

1
By • Bingle presentation' may be meant' smgle presented field' If so,
2
the difficulty IS merely evaded
8 The sentence In Its orlgmal more expliCit form (Encyc Bnt, II)( CIt.,
P 54) IS worth noting. .. AttrlbutIDg thIS property of extensity to the
presentation-continuum as a whole, we may call the relation of any particular
sensation to thiS larger whole ItS local SIgn, and can see that, so long as the
extensity of a presentation admits," etc.
102 THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE CHAP

tion of such compound sensation IS what we have next to

consider or, 10 other words, the development of what Weber
called Ortsznn, local or topical sense." 1
This last problem Ward proceeds to solve by the
aid of motor experience. But, as he is careful to
emphasise, all apprehenslOn of space is bound up with,
and is only possible in terms of, the 'extensity of
sensation.'
"This much we may allow IS onglnal, for the longer we
reflect the more clearly we see that no comb1OatlOn or associa-
tIOn of sensations varY10g only 10 10tenslty and qualIty, not even
If motor sensations were among them, will account for this
element In our spatial perceptIOn. .. The most elaborate
attempt to get extensity out of successIOn and co-existence 10
this way IS that of Herbert Spencer. He has done, perhaps, all
that can be done, and only to make It the more plain that the
entire procedure IS a VaTEpOV 'TTpOTEPOV But, before and
apart from movement altogether, we experience that massive-
ness or extensity of ImpreSSions wlthm which, when It IS
dIfferentiated, movements enable us to find posltlons, and to
determ10e distances." 2
In the very begmnmg of experience, Mr. Ward
suggests,3 every mtense sensation would' diffuse over'
the whole field apprehended, and only With increased
differentiation would restriction, and therefore the
apprehenslOn of simultaneous differently located areas,
come about.
1 Psychologzcal Pnnclples, p 147 Cf Encyc Brzt, loc CIt, P 54
2 0; CIt pp 145-6 Cf Encyc Bnt, loe CIt, P 53
3 Op CIt pp 79-80 Cf Ene]e Bnt, lac CIt, P 46 Cf the sen-
tence added In Psychologzcal Pnnczpies, p. 79 ... As already sald, the very
begmnlng of experience IS beyond us, though It IS our busmess-
'WOrkzng from cwrthln-to push our analysIS as far as we can" The
fundamental fact which Ward has here In mind, and which IS vouched
for by present experience, IS that, .. even at our level of mental evolutron,
an mcrease In the Intensity of a sensation IS apt to entail an IDcrease In
Its extensIty too."
VI PRESENTATIONAL CONTINUUM 103

"ThesE' procec;ses have now proceeded so far that at the

level of human consciousness we find It hard to form any
tolerably clear conceptIOn of a field of consciousness m which
an mtense sensatIOn, no matter what, mlght-so to say---dlffuse
over the whole Colours, e g, are with us so dlstmct from
sounds that--except as regards the excitement of attention or
the dram upon It-there IS nothmg m the mtensest colour to
affect the simultaneous presentatIOn of a sound. But, at the
begmnmg, whatever we regard as the earliest differentiation of
sound might have been mcopresentable With the earliest differ-
entiation of colour, If suffiCiently diffused, much as a field of
Sight all blue IS now lncopresentable with one all red . . . Now,
on the other hand, colours and sounds are so far localised that
we may be directly aware that the eye IS concerned With the
one and the ear With the other."
QUIte eVidently this passage IS inspired by the
convlctlOn that there IS but one single field appre-
hended. Otherwise it would be meamngless to speak
of • diffusIOn' or • radiation' • over the whole'; and
there would be no ground for allegmg that, smce
different sensatIOns cannot, Without blendmg, extend
over the same whole, they must for thIS reason, untll
• restnctIon ' comes about, be mcopresentable. • Diffu-
sion ' IS a metaphor 1 whIch IS only applIcable where
there is an mdependently eXisting field throughout
which, or over which, the dIffusion can take place. The
term reappears m Mr. Stout's account of the manner
in which, through local slgns,2 the extenSitIes of our
sensa are co-ordmated and internally developed.
Mr. Stout is, however, so far justified in usmg thIS
form of words, In that he does not regard the local
sign sensations as possessing extensity but as fusmg
1 That Mr Ward IS not unaware of thiS, IS shown by hiS havmg added
to the original wording of the E7Icycloptl!dra article the phrase' so to say.'
I Cf Manual, p 466 .. ExtenSity IS nothing but the contmuous re-
petition or diffUSion of local sign difference."
 THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE CHAP

with the extensities of the fundamental sensations,

tactual or vIsual, which they accompany.
Now how are we to combIne the two contentions
(I) that extensity is a property of the presentatIonal
continuum as a whole, and (2) that extensity is a pro- I
perty of sensation? Must not Mr. Ward either hold,
with greater consistency, to his thesis that "pure
sensatIon IS a psychological myth" and therefore in-
capable, in and by itself, of constItuting an extensive
field, or else be prepared to sacrIfice his doctrine
of the presentational contInuum~ The general trend
of hIs argument IS overwhelmIngly on the lInes of
the former alternatIve, whereas Mr. Stout seems qUIte
definitely to have decided for separate and indepen-
dent extensities peculiar to thIs or that sensum.
The issue IS complIcated by Mr. Ward's Insistence
upon a distInctIOn between extensity and space-a
dlstInctlOn which Mr. Stout retains, and which figures
prominently in his analysis of space-perception. 1 If
Mr. Ward means only to dIstinguish between space as
immedIately apprehended and this same space as inter-
preted in conceptual terms, there can be no question.
The former IS concrete and personal; the latter, on
the other hand, is at once abstract and ideal. Mr.
Ward asks us 2 to consider the difference between the
twelve-foot wide dItch for a traveller who can clear it
by a jump and for the traveller who must halt on its
brink. So, too, the concrete • up , is much more than
a dIfferent dIrection from • along.' Further, In the
concrete, the body is the datum to which all positions
are referred, and such positions differ not merely
geometrIcally but qualitatively.
1 Cf above, P 50
• Psychological PnnCtples, p 144 Cf. Encyc Bnt, lac cIt, P 53
VI PRESENTATIONAL CONTINUUM 105

" It IS a long way from thesf' mrt<; of perception, which

the brutes share with us, to that sCientific concept of space, as
having three dimensIOns and no qualitative differences, which
we have elaborated by the aid of thought and language, and
which reason may see to be the logical presupposltlon of what
in the order of mental development has chronologically pre-
ceded It" 1
But Mr. Ward offers yet another type of reason
which is hardly compattble with thiS method of dis-
tinguishing between extensity and space. Space, he
pOints out, is complex, involving a plurahty in relations
of externahty, juxtaposition, distance, etc., and, I may
add, forming in terms of these relations a continuum
of a highly speCific type. ThiS compleXity alone
would, Mr . Ward says, suffice to show that space,
unhke extenSity, IS certainly not "psychologically a
prIOri or original in such sense that it has been either
actually or potenttally an element in all presentation
from the very beginnIng." 2 But is not thiS a doubtful
assertion? Does it not beg the question at Issue? If
such compleXity, even as 'Imphcit,' IS inconSistent with
human experience, must not extensity be so hkewlse?
For does not extensity Itself involve plurahty and a qUlte
speCific type of continuity? And has not Mr. Ward,
in his Psychologual Prznctples,3 himself come forward
as a defender of the imttal compleXity of the first
beginmngs of human consciousness-the psycho plasm
in which the Individual consciousness origInates
having, he maintains, a complexity analogous to that
of its physical counterpart, the bioplasm?
Psychological PnnClples, p. 145. Cf Eneyc. Bnt, loc CIt, P 53
1
Encyc Bnt, loe CIt, P 53 In Psychologrcal Pnnnples, pp 144-5, the
I
passage IS altered In certain minor ways e g • ImpliCitly or explicitly' IS
substituted for' actually or potentially'
a p 4U, ff. Cf. below, pp 185-6.
106 THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE CHAP

The main, and ultimately, so far as I can see, the

sole possible argument In support of a radical dis-
tinction between extensity and space IS that which
follows when extensity is taken, as by Mr. Ward and
Mr. Stout, not as being a property of the real In-
dependent world but as belonging to a sensum or set
of sensa, and the various extensities as therefore being
onginally llldependent and unconnected. Both Mr.
Ward and Mr. Stout give, indeed, the further argu-
ment that extensity, as thus belongIng to sensatlOn,
vanes according to the standpoInt, etc, of the per-
cipient, whereas space IS an attribute of bodies, and
does not alter. Both thiS and the precedlllg argument
are, however, bound up with the theories of perceptIOn
which they respectively hold, and presuppose the
truth of the controversial doctnnes upon which these
theories rest.! While no one can deny the qUIte
obvious differences between our Initial expenences
of extensity and the mathematIcal conceptIOn of the
nature and properties of space, the contInuity of
development upon which Mr. Ward IS so Insistent,
and whIch leads him to rule out as Incredible any
pnmitive apprehension of space, can qUIte as easily
lead-when we start not from conjectural views as
to the beglllnlngs of conscious experience but from
present human expenence-to the contrary conclusion.
At least, since the prmciple of continUIty can thus be
worked from both ends, Mr. Ward's hne of argu-
ment, when not otherwise reInforced, is decidedly
precarious. And it is surely significant that Mr.
Stout, who starts with a non-spatial extensity-if
such a phrase be allowable-has, in order to make
1 I have already commented upon Mr Ward'. dlstlDctlOn between
sensory extensIty and publlc space, above. p. So
VI PRESENTATIONAL CONTINUUM 107

possIble the transitlOn from earlier to later experi-

ence, to postulate as present from the start, a category
of spatial unity.l
Mr. Stout's own doctrme of extensity is as follows:
In the first place, he does not hold that all sensatlOns '
have extensIty. Consequently he is able to adopt a
different view of' local signs' from that propounded
by Mr. Ward. The latter, as already stated,2 m
accordance wIth his VIew that all sensatlOns have
extensIty and with his doctnne of a presentatlOnal
contmuum, holds that the local sign of any partIcular
sensatlOn is its relatlOn to the continuum as a whole, \
t.e. that there are not separate sets of sensations
whIch act as local sIgns. For Mr. Stout, on the
other hand, the local signs consist in "a certain
unique and ultimate diversity between simultaneous
sensatlOns," 3 apprehended m connection wIth each
experience of extensity. These local sIgn sensatlOns
differ, apparently, from the sensations which have
extensIty, not only in the absence of extensity, but m
not depending upon any aSSIgnable difference in
quality or mtensity of stimulus. They depend on
differences in the manner in which locally dIstmct
parts of the sensitive surface of the body are connected
WIth the central nervous system.
There IS demanded, however, a further conditlOn;
and It is m the statement of thIs further condition
that the mam characteristics of Mr. Stout's doctrine
come to view. Mr. Stout is proceedmg to show how
by the aid of local sIgn presentatlOns we locate
sensuously given extensities on this or that part of
the surface of the body, and also dIscriminate within
a given extensity the relative positions of its parts.
1 Cf below, p. 110 I Cf. above, p. 100 ff 8 Manual, p :u6
108 THEORY OF KNO\VLEDGE CHAP

"Visual as well a<; tactual 'len<;atlon'l have well-marked local

signature We can distingUIsh a patch of whIte on the left
margin of the field of view from an otherwise similar patch of
white on the right margin The two light-stimuli affecting
separate parts of the retina do not combine to produce a single
sensatlon of greater intensIty than either would occasIOn by
itself, as would happen, for Instance, In the case of two Simul-
taneous sounds of the same quality On the contrary,
they produce two sensations distingUished by diversity of
local sign." 1

Now here, presumably, the two patches of white

which we thus m experience distinguish from one
another are, by differences m their local signs, pre-
vented from combmmg to produce a single sensation.
These differences, however, are not themselves spatial
but only quahtative. On thiS View, therefore, all that
we should experience are two extensities differentiated
to a purely quahtatlve manner. No explanatiOn has
yet been given why they should be apprehended as
spatially external to one another. Unfortunately,
when Mr. Stout proceeds to deal with this all-Important
point he drops one of the two patches of white, and
so simphfies his problem by the assumptIOn that
spatial relations are discrlmmated withm the given
extensity of a smgle sensation.2
" When I see a patch of white.. I experience a complex
of sensations differing In local sign If, now, I attempt to
analyse such a complex Into ItS component parts, I find that
each dlscermble part runs Into and IS continued Into others; the
endmg of each IS the beglnmng of another. In other words,
the whole IS senSibly contmuous-an unbroken unity." 3
1 Manual, p 116
I Nor do I find the questIon answered In the later chapter devoted to
the subJect of VIsual perceptIon.
a Manual, p 116
VI PRESENTATIONAL CONTINUUM 109

It is not entirely clear what ic:; here being asserted.

Is it simply the local signs that quahtatively shade
continuously into one another? If so, the sensible
continuity is only that of a qualitattvely graduated
serIes, and is not m any respect a spatial or extensive
contmuity. If, on the other hand, as the term' dis-
cermble part' would rather seem to Imply, the con-
tmuity thus senSibly apprehended IS extensive, how
come the quahtattve differences In the local sIgn
sensations to Signify spattal differences? Doubtless
this is a dIfficulty whIch m one form or another arises
on any theory as to how quahty and extenSIty are
interconnected; but as the local sIgn sensattons 1 have
been postulated for the very purpose of explammg
the apprehensIon of spattal differences, the demand for
a more defimte answer than is here given is surely not
unreasonable. But in any case, even granting the
suffiCIency of the above explanatlOn, it is clear that
the contmutty of the diverse parts of space, and as in-
volved therein awareness of ItS bemg a whole relatively
to its parts, must be due to the mitial, purely sensory
experience of extensity. This IS made even clearer
by Mr. Stout's next sentences:
" Finally I reach a lImit In the process of subdiVISIOn where
I can no longer make explICIt dlstInctlons at all. I am sMl
aware of an extensIve whole, but I cannot pick out Its parts
severally for separate consideratlon. I am aware of the parts
only implICitly In beIng aware of the whole contaInIng them" 2
That Mr. Stout, m defendmg hiS doctrine that
extensity is a property of sensation, takes a very
liberal view as to what may constitute a single sensa-
1 Mr. Stout postulates these for Sight though he admits that we have
no Introspectlve eVidence of thell' eXIStence.
J Manual, pp 216-17. ItaliCS not In text.
IIO THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE CHAP

tion, appears from such a passage as the followmg.

After referrmg to our expenence of two contact
sensations, and consequently of apartness, when the
two points of a pair of compasses touch the skin at
a sufficient interval, he proceeds:
" But when the pOints lie nearer to each other this IS not so
We then fall to single out separate contact-sensations from the
whole tactual presentation None the less, our sense-experience
is not the same as It would be If only one compass-leg touched
the skin The sematlon due to the double contact IS more ex-
tensive or dIffused. It IS blurred, spread out, and referred to
a wider area. The local sign differences are therefore still
present, though they are not separately singled out That they
are really present IS shown by the fact that It IS frequently
possible to discern the two touches separately when the compass-
pOints are applied successively Instead of Simultaneously. ThiS
IS especially easy when the first pOint IS removed before the
application of the second" 1
Apparently Mr. Stout is prepared to maintam that
this sensuous experience of extensity IS pOSSible in-
dependently of the employment of any categones.
In so far, however, as the mmd also apprehends space
(as distinguished from extensity), that is, an extended
world, certam a prIorI categories are, he contends,
quite mdlspensable; and among these he includes what
he entItles the category of spatIal unity.
" At our present level of mental development, spatial umty
means that all extended bodies are extended In one and the same
space, which IS defimtely contrasted as a whole with particular
extensions as Its parts. When we perceive, Imagine, or con-
ceive any particular extension, we clunk of It as continued
beyond itself, so as to be an inseparable portion of the one
aU-embracing space." II
1 Manual, p ZI7. Itahcs not In text
• Op. at p 438
VI PRESENTATIONAL CONTINUUM III

Also the space thu<; apprehended is tri-dlmensional:

"The apprehension of space as trl-dlmenslonal IS directly
bound up with the category of spatial unity . • . From the
outset the apprehensIOn of a third dimensIOn IS mvolved m the
apprehension of surfaces. .. Any given surface IS thought as
prolonged beyond Itself J and It is not only thought as pro-
longed mto a further surface but also mto extensIOn which IS
not superficial " 1
Whtle thus mamtamlng that the category of spatial
unity IS Involved In the apprehenSIOn of space, though
not In the apprehension of extensity, Mr. Stout adds
that he does not mean to Imply that the sensuous level
ever exists apart from the perceptual.
" If there IS a stage in which the mmd IS aware only of Its
own sensations, It does not seem pOSSible to point to any known
psychological processes by which thiS stage could be transcended
••• " 2 " [Consequently] we must assume from the outset some-
thmg answenng, m however vague a form, to our developed
consciousness of the world as a umty-a system wlthm which
all parts are in vanous ways connected With each other." 3
"Now we cannot, of course, attnbute to the undeveloped
conscIOusness the full and articulate conSCIOusness of the umty
of space which we possess ourselves None the less If we are
to advance securely m our psychological explanatIOn, It would
1 Manual, pp 439-40 Mr Stout Similarly postulates a category of
temporal unity (p 440) but 'WIthout dlShngulShrng between • protenIlty' or
duratIon and real tzme .. What we assume under thiS head IS that any
particular duration or change IS, from the outset, apprehended, however
vaguely, as havmg a • before' and • after' In early stages of mental
development, owmg to the dommance of direct practical mterest, the mmd
IS preoccupied With contmuatlon mto the future rather than the past
Such reference to the future seems Involved even In the most rudimentary
forms of the attention process as Indicated by the behaviour of anImals and
chIldren Even the most primItive attentIon IS essentially proSpective, It
IS a waiting or watchIng, a being on the alert for what 19 to come • In
other words, the reference to the future must be as primitIve as conative I
conscIOusness ..
2 Op CIt pp 431-2. 3 Op CIt. P 438.
112 THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE CHAP

seem that an embryo form of It must be present from the outset

as the conditIOn of further growth" 1

If Mr. Stout be prepared to go as far as this, is he

not in consistency bound to go yet further, and to
recogmse that the category of spatial umty IS mvolved
in the apprehension of extensIty, and that his dis-
tinction between extensity and space, when taken as
a radical one, IS therefore untenable? For must not
the category, If it IS to achieve the purpose for which
it is postulated, do more than merely lead us to think
each given extensity as bemg a portlOn of a single
and all-embracmg space? What has to be accounted
for is our perceptton that the vanous dlscnmmable
extensities do actually form parts of the total field of
the moment. We do not merely thtnk each of these
partial extents as belongmg to a smgle space; we
sensuously percetve them as a contmuous whole.
This whole we have mdeed likewise to conceive as
forming part of a still larger whole. But the spatial
umty must be mtuitlvely apprehended If It IS to be
conceived as being thus contmued beyond itself; and
this surely is already done m the apprehension of
extensity. In virtue of its continuity-mtuition of
which, as I shall try to show in the next chapter, pre-
supposes the employment of the categones-It is
only apprehensible as continued into, and therefore
as forming part of, space as a unity.2 The conceptual
elaboration of space m abstract thought can do no
more than body forth the actual nature of that very
extensity which we intuite in our sense-experience.
1 Manual, p 439
lOp. nt pp :n6-x7 Cf. P 466: .. Extensity IS nothing but the
continUOUS repeuuon or diffUSIOn of local Sign difference ..
VI PRESENTATIONAL CONTINUUM Il3

(iii.) MR. ALEXANDER'S DISTINCTION BETWEEN

SENSING AND INTUITING
Though Mr. Alexander does not hold that the
intuitive apprehension of space presupposes the cate-
gories, he insists upon the fundamental Importance
of the distinction between sensing and lntuiting, and
defines that dlstinctlOn in the following terms:
" The primary qualities which are empirical dIfferentlattons
of Space and Time never reach our minds, as Berkeley saw,
except along with secondary ones . . . But though our experi-
ence of Space and Time IS thus provoked In us through sensation
It does not follow and It IS not the case that they are apprehended
by the senses." 1 "Every sensory act contaInS in Itself, and
consequently conceals or masks, a simpler act of Intuition" 2
" It follows that when I see a blue patch I see Its blue quality,
but I have an Intultlon of ItS extent. I do not see a blue
which possesses an extent but I intUite an extent of space which
I see blue I do not apprehend an extended colour but a
coloured extent" 3
As Mr. Alexander proceeds to show, this point of
view has tn especial, 1n Its bearing on the theory of
knowledge, one great advantage.
" If we suppose that our colours are extended and our
touches also, we are faced With the problem of correlating the
spaces of vIsion and of touch. They are, In that case, as
Berkeley rightly held, distInct spaces, and they do but get
connected by custom, though It IS difficult to understand how.
Now If extent does not belong to colour as such, but colours
are seen In their places WithIn an extent, and the lIke IS true of
touch, it follows that when we apprehend the same object by
sight and touch we are apprehending the same extent, and in
the one case seeIng its colours and in the other feeling its press-
1 Space, Ttme and Detty, vol 11 p 143
a Op crt II p. 148. 3 Op crt 11 P 164.
I
 THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE CHAP

ures. . •• There are not two distinct spaces which have to be

connected by custom or otherwise, but one space which IS the I
scene of different qualIties. " Instead of haVing a variety of
different spaces which we never can make one, except by assum-
ing some space not given In experience which IS the condlOon
of all these various spaces, our intuitive apprehensIOn of things
supplies us wIth the IdentIcal framework of a pIece of space,
wIthin which the sensIble quahtles of the thmgs are found" 1
This positIOn hkewise possesses the supreme ad-
vantage, that it does not introduce between the mmd
and real space any intermediary, sensuous or otherwise.
It is not argued that mtuitlOn IS a more direct form of
. apprehensIOn than the act of sensmg,2 but only that
its objects, space and time, possess a constitutIOn
different in character from any sensuous quahty, and
such as allows of their being the fundamental features
of a publIc world that is independently real.

(iv.) MR. RANDLE'S ANALYSIS OF SIZE-DISTANCE

PERCEPTION

While engaged in writmg the above I had the good

fortune to come upon Mr. H. N. Randle's very
interestmg article, recently pubhshed in Mmd,3 on
"Sense-Data and Sensible Appearances in Size-
Distance Perception." Mr. Randle's main thesis is
identtcal with Mr. Ward's contention that "pure
sensation IS a psychological myth," and is likewise
inspired by Mr. Ward's own fundamental conviction
1 SpflJ:e, T,me and DeIty. vol 11 pp 164-5 Cf Mr A.lexander's valu-
able diSCUSSion of counter-views and of Dr Head's more recent investigations,
11 pp 165-74, 178-82
I Cf op. CIt 11. P 147 n .. Intultlon IS no more direct than sensation
and thought. All our apprehenSions bring us face to face With theu \
objects ..
a Vol XXXI No IZ3, July 1922, P 284 ff
VI PRESENTATIONAL CONTINUUM I IS
that the presentational field IS at every moment a
single whole. But Mr. Randle has developed the
thesis with such thoroughness and consistency that
the terms in which it is formulated can be taken in
a more hteral and precise sense than Mr. Ward
himself ever ventures to assign to them. Is sensa-
tIOn, Mr. Randle asks, the doorway of knowledge~
And if it be so, can the world be kept at its proper
distance from us, as a real and genuinely independent
world? Is there mdeed any such entity as sensation?
These are questions directly relevant to our inquiry,
and Mr. Randle, as it fortunately happens, has chosen
to discuss them With special reference to the perception
of magnitude, that IS, of extensity. Those points in
his argument which bear on the problems before us I
shall bnefly summarise.!
SensatIOn, or sense-datum, is usually taken as bemg
a psychical entity corresponding to an elementary
physiological process; and whtle it IS generally granted
that it cannot be expenenced m purity, it is supposed
to be discermble as an element withm the field per-
ceived. Now if extensive magnitude be a property of
sensation, and be revealed in and through sensation, It
ought to be thus detectable, as a something fixed and
glven. 2 But, as we find, it varies freely, independently
of what is happening in the retina.
" Produce an after-Image of the sun and look at your finger-
tip, it Will be smaller than your nail. Project It on the table,
and It wIll be as big as a strawberry, on the wall, as large as

1 I shall have to omit hiS argument In favour of the non-subjectiVity of

• perspeCtive appearances'
• Mr Randle's argument proceeds, It may be observed, on the assumption
that Mr Ward's distinctIOn between exten91ty and space 19 untenable I
have already commented on that dI9t1nCtlOn, above, pp so-Sz, I04 If
rr6 THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE CHAP

a plate; on yonder mountain, bigger than a house And yet it

is an unchanged retinal ImpressIOn." 1
And what here occurs IS not the exception, but the
rule. When, as ordinarily happens, the entire retina
is affected, we see now one size of field and now
another-an open book on the table before us, or mdes
of country, as the case may be-and everything in
each field vanes with the field as a whole. We shall
therefore seek vamly for any size as ' glVen,' pnor to
the interpretation whereby the field seen is determined
to be of thiS or that kmd. When we look at the
moon through a telescope, the moon stimulates an
extent of retma many times larger than when we look
at it with the naked eye, and yet it IS a smaller, not a
larger, moon that IS then apprehended.
How have psychologists mterpreted thiS last in-
stance so as to harmomse It with their assumptIOn of
given sensuous extenSIties? By means of two sub-
conscious Inferences, sequent to one another,2 and such
that the second demes the premiss upon which the first
is based.
"The case IS analysed thus (I) the actual retinal Image IS,
and is seen as, larger, (2) as an effect of thiS, we Judge that
the moon IS near. (3) thIS Judgment of nearness makes us see
the thing smaller-because If the moon IS so near as It seems
It must really be qUite small, or Its retinal Image would be
enormously bIgger. It IS supposed, m fact, that the' sensation'
correspondmg to the magmfied retinal Image gives nse to a

1 W James, Pnncrples of Psychology, vol u P Z3I. Quoted by Randle,

p z8S On thiS general question, cf also Broad, Screnhfic Thought, p Z9I if,
especIally p Z97
8 Mr Stout, I understand, would not agree to thiS statement, he would
hold that apparent SlZC and distance are determined together, In correlation
With each other, as the resultant effect of all relevant factors (including
extensity) In co-operation
VI PRESENTATIONAL CONTINUUM I 17
judgment of nearness; and that this judgm!"nt of nearness then
destroys Its own cause, the sensation of largeness, and generates
in place of It a perceptIOn of smallness" 1
A similar explanatIOn IS given of the varying sizes
of the moon seen at the hOrIzon and at the zenith.
At the horizon, OWlDg to the lDterventlOn of numerous
objects lD the lDtermedlate field, to dimness of colour-
ing, etc., we lDfer that It IS distant; lD consequence of
this lDference we see It as large; and seeing it as large,
we infer that It must be near.
" This amounts to a chain of percepts each determining the
next In the seTles, with an absurd result Now there IS no
mtrospectlve eVidence that we see the moon distant, and If we
did, It would be psychologically ImpOSSible at the same time to
see It near The only possible result of such a rivalry of per-
ceptions would be an alternatIOn of the competing percepts, with
a moon danCing a very dlsconcertmg to-and-from coranto on
the horizon" 2
As Mr. Randle justly remarks, .. such epicycles of
explanatIOn," .. this amazlDg tissue of lIes lD the soul,"
are reqUired only If we lDSlst upon buttreSSing up the
fundamental assumptIOn that we Immediately (though
It may be subconscIOusly) apprehend each Item lD the
visual field as havlDg a gtven magnitude, and that we
then proceed, by subconscious processes, lD the hght
of prevIous experience, to alter and transform these
magnitudes. There IS, It would seem, but one ex-
planation which wIll fit all the facts; and It is an
explanation which, so far as regards extensive magni-
tude, allows of no fiXity that is purely sensuous.
Magnitude, though, of course, in part determlDed by
retinal processes, is also, and mainly, determined by
those factors which prescribe this or that meaning to
1 Randle, loc CIt pp. 2.93-4. • Randle, loc crt p 2.97
u8 THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE CHAP

the field ;1.'5 a whole. Singlenes'i Qr unity IS an un-

fadmg characteristic of the field apprehended, and
according as it is of this or that kind It constrams its
constituents to conform to its demands. 1 The psycho-
logist must break with merely physical metaphors, and
on the analogy of present-day ph YSlOloglcal theory
conceive the mmd as functIOnIng In an mtegratlve
manner. We must postulate' a schema or uncon-
scious dIsposItion' 2 which, 10 conditioning our con-
scious processes, determines them to the apprehensIOn
of a complex and relatIvely definIte field, characterIsed
throughout, In its wholeness and 10 ItS parts, by
sensuous magnItudes approprIate to Its type.
What other explanatIon wdl fit the facts? The
moon as seen through a telescope IS small because the
telescope causes a collapse of planes. The moon then
reduces automatically to the scale of the new per-
ceptual schema. "The moon projected on a nearer
plane IS the moon of a smaller world, and so suffers
shrInkage to match the world, of which It IS a func-
tion." 3 SimIlarly the moon looks bigger on the
horizon because the over-archmg heaven, be10g a much
flattened dome, demands as ItS correlate a smaller moon.
" The changes in the perceived size of sun and moon,

1 Instances of thIs are cIted by Stout In another connection Cf Manual,

pp 4 69-70
2 Cf Myers, Text-Book of Expenmental PsyekololfJ', 191 I, pt I pp ~8~,
29:1-4, quoted by Randle (p ~96) .. PossIbly we have here a schema or
unconSCIOUS dISpOSItiOn In regard to the dIstance of objects And when
thIS schema undergoes change, It manifests Itself In conscIOusness by etrecUllg
a change In apparent SIZe, whereupon the apparent SIZe determines our
awareness of the dIstance of the obJect" Dr Head has drawn attentlon to
the part played by' schemata' In the recogmtIon of posture and of the
localIty of affected parts of the body cf Brazn, vol XXXIV (I9II-U),
pp 185-9, reprInted In Stud,es rn Neurology (1920), pp 604-8.
• Randle, IDe CIt p 294
VI PRESENTATIONAL CONTINUUM I 19
as they clImb the zenith and descend again, are pro-
portional to the flattenIng of the arch." 1 SIgns of
distance, no less than extent of actual retinal Impression,
here play their part, but In subordInatIOn to the all-
controlling Influence of the wIder schema wIthin whIch
they function. This explanatIOn finds stnking con-
firmatIOn in the behavIOur, as above noted, of after-
sensatlOns. Their Size, as tmttally and Immedtately
expertenced, is a function of the background agaInst
which they are apprehended. 2
There IS, It may be noted, one fundamental respect
in which the tradItional theory agrees with Mr.
Randle's. What IS undemable-whatever our other
VIews may be-is the extraordInanly vanable character
of extens1ve magmtudes, according as th1s or that
, Interpretation' 1S given to them. They may, once
they are conscIOusly apprehended, res 1st further
modificatlOn. Though we may know that the moon
is no larger at the honzon, we contInue to see 1t so.
None the less we cannot dispute that Interpretation
counts among the condItIOns of sensible magmtude.
The two theones are at vanance only In regard to the
pre-conscIOus agencies to which the vanatIOns are
due. 3 Qualltatwe dIfferences, e g. between colours or
1Randle, 1oc c.t p 295
• Stout"s comment on the behaviour of the after-sensations IS as follows
.. Where the varymg distance of an object IS fixed by other means, the extent
of the retmal ImpreSSIOn mamly determmes perception of magmtude This
IS well seen lfi the case of after-Images" And, after quotmg the above
passage from James, he proceeds .. An actual thmg producmg a retinal
eXCItatiOn of the same extent would vary III Size accordlDg to distance
Hence the ,magznary thlllg suggested by the after-Image appears of different
SIZCS, when It IS perceived at different distances But the actual retinal
sensat,on IS III all cases the same" (Manual, pp 502-3) Italics not III text
8 ThiS last statement is, of course, vaIJd only In so far as we are justified
In challenglDg the doctrIne, advocated by Ward and Stout, of gIven, fixed
extenSitIes Cf above, pp 50, 104.
no THEORY OF KNO'VLEDGE CHAP.

between colours and tastes, are Intractable. They

have to be accepted as imtlally given, and cannot be
modified by any perceptual schema. Extensive mag-
nitudes, on the other hand, are so to speak drenched
with meaning. It enters Into their very marrow,
magically determining them to this or that standard.
They are not 'given,' hke quahtles, but arrived at
as a consequence of complexly condltlOned psychical
processes.
Mr. Randle states hiS position yet more exphcltly,
and In a very suggestIve manner, In further defimng
what he entItles " sensible appearance." If by sense-
datum we mean that whIch we Immediately expenence
in consequence of the fact that a particular stImulus
is acting on a sense-organ, then we find In the appre-
henSlOn of magmtude-Mr. Randle extends this view
to the apprehenslOn of' quahtles '-that It IS discover-
able only as a varymg function of the total field per-
ceived, t.e. as ' sensIble appearance.' As thus, "a flutd
product of an elaborately constructIve schematlsm of
perception," It IS in every respect the reverse of the
alleged sense-datum. It IS Indeed Immediately experi-
enced, but only In the varymg modes to which It IS
thus determmed.
"The outstanding feature of the senSible appearance IS Its
plasticity and flUidity, as contrasted with the stubborn and super-
fiCial rigidity of the alleged sense-datum I ts boundary hnes
are not fixed, and there IS always more In It than 'meets the
eye.' In view of the Infimtely complex cross-currents of
meamng that carry and constitute It, the so-called Image, how-
ever determinate and ' given' it may be at the moment of Its
appearance In consciousness (and it always seems to be a given
and determinate thing), nevertheless has more of expres5lon
than of Impression In It, and Its possiblbnes as expressive of the
real nature of things, are not subject to the bmltatlons which
VI PRESENTATIONAL CONTINUUM I2I

the supposed Impression (or sf'nc;e-datum) seems to carry with

it." 1

There is also a second difference.

" The sense-datum IS supposed to precede a meaning which
it subsequently acquires, whereas the sensible appearance IS
Inseparable from and preconditioned by the meaning whIch It
expresses. • . . It seems to me that, logically and psycho-
logically, meaning IS the presuppositIOn and condition precedent
of every sensible appearance, sensible appearances being never
impresslOnal, but always expreSSIOnal, In nature" 2
If sense-data are regarded, m the usual manner, as
so many fixed ImpreSSIOns, the mmd wIll be lImited
merely to the combmmg and dlsJommg of them; and
the continUity of the real world, as actually given in
perceptIOn, Will never be accounted for.
" It lS not wonderful that behavlOuflst psychology should
attempt to Ignore conSCIOusness, as not haVing any functIOnal
Significance In the thought-process, seemg that traditional
psychology has confined conscIOusness to Simulacra, which by
their Immoblhty and detachment are debarred from plaYing any
role In the moving drama of expenence-bemg, hke Berkeley'S
ideas, 'vIsibly mactlve' " 3
When these statements are carned over from our
apprehension of such features as extensity and motion
to our apprehenSion of the secondary qualIties, I should
be mclined, as above mdlcated,4 to dissent from them
in certain respects. I have no inclInation to defend
the view of sense-data as 'raw' and 'refractory'
material,6 but I should heSitate to assert that the mmd
is "formative of its own materials," 8 or to say that
" sensible appearances are the language in which the
1 Randle. 11K Cit P 304 I Randle, 11K CIt pp 304-5
a Randle. loc CIt P 306 • Pp 77-8
& Randle. loc CIt P 303. 8 Randle, ,bid.
122 THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE CHAP VI

poetic faculty of mmd trIes to find, under lImitatIOns,

an expression, not altogether inadequate, for those
meamngs which we call physical facts "1 I can, how-
ever, whole-heartedly agree that .. experience IS not
connected through • ideas,' and on the surface, but in
the depth through meanings, and [that] to confine it
to superficial impressions-sense-data-is necessarily
to disintegrate it." II
1 Loc. CIt p. 30S' I Ibzd
 CHAPTER VII

THE CATEGORIES

BEFORE proceeding to a detailed treatment of the

dIstmctlOn between sense and mtuition, we must come
to a decision upon certam connected questIons. Are
time and space the only non-sensuous elements m
sense-experience? Or are forms of relatlOn, those which
are usually entItled the categories, hkewise demanded?
Should the latter questlOn have to be answered m the
affirmative, what are the functions whIch fall to these
categories? Are they sImply addtttonal to tIme and
space, and apprehended only m certam other types
of eXIstence, such as the substantial and the causal, or
are they not rather necessary for the very appre-
henSIOn of tIme and space themselves? Also, If these
categories be non-sensuously known, how come we to
apprehend them?

(i.) THE SUBJECTIVIST ACCOUNT OF THE NATURE

AND FUNCTIONS OF THE CATEGORIES
These questIOns bnng into VIew another main
tenet of the subjectivist position: namely, that our
modes of apprehending outward Nature are sub-
jectively determined, and that when we seem to our-
selves in outer experience to be apprehendmg more
12 3
 THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE CHAP.

than the bal e sensa are quahfied to reveal, we are, all

unconsciously to ourselves, tnterpretIng the sensa in
the hght of concepts whIch, however seemIngly im-
personal, are anthropomorphic In character, and
originate from withIn. 1 The sensatlOnahst starting-
POInt 2 renders unavOidable some such concluslOn.
Inner experience must be made to Yield richer content
in proportlOn as outer expenence fails us In this or
that regard. Conjectures as to what supplements
experience may be demed; but when expenence In
its actuahty is alone In questlOn, it cannot by any
alchemy of logic be reduced to less than itself. \Vhat
is taken from one of its two divisions must be trans-
ferred to the other, though what is thus transferred
may Indeed become mirage-hke In the process. If
Nature be In retreat, the mInd must occupy, as best it
can, the vacated territory; and if at last, after pro-
gressive ehmInatlOn of this and that factor, only the
sensa are allowed as comIng to us from without, all
else in Nature Will have to be viewed as subjectively
generated-our data for apprehendIng these other
factors, and the specific modes in which they are
apprehended, beIng due to the self.
ThiS is the subjectiVist doctrine of an Inner and
an outer path to knowledge. Through the outer path,
1 The subjectiVIst tendenCIes whIch contInue Into, and so greatly pervert,
Kant's teachIng are, It may be noted, one and all bound up wIth hIS con-
VIction that the categorIes are of subjective orIgIn Cf below, p 131
2 In Locke and In Berkeley, rational concepts IncompatIble wIth sensa-
tionalIst prInCIples, and yet not estabhshed In such Independent manner as
to JustIfy theIr employment, Intervene to modIfy theIr VIew of the sItuatIon
Descartes, on the other hand, goes so far In rejecting all aId from sensation
that he has to deal WIth the opposIte type of dIfficulty, VIZ that of assIgnIng
to the sensa any genUInely cognItive functlOn Sense-experlence IS rendered
unmtellIglble, and purely conceptual knowledge, explaIned as orIgInatIng
entIrely from WIthIn, IS substItuted In Its place Cf above, pp lO-3Z
VII THE CATEGORIES 12 5
that is, through sensation, we- learn of the sensibly
extended, the constItuents of whIch, as capable of
motion and change, are hkewise in tIme. 1 Through
the inner path, that IS, through ImmedIate conscious-
ness, in feeling and conation, of the self as an abIding
and active agent, we reflectively form the concepts of
substance, causality and the hke, and then, proceeding
by analogy to apply them in interpretatIOn of our
outer experiences, we come to apprehend what we
never dIrectly experIence, natural eXIstences, In-
dependently real, and In causal InteractIOn. WhIle
subjectivist thinkers may vary from one another, thIs
is the standard-pOSItIon In and about whIch they
OSCIllate. They may at times show some apprecIatIOn
of ItS unsatisfactoriness, and may seek to modIfy it
in this or that respect, but so long as in any degree
they hold to a subjectlVlst standpoint, they cannot
succeed In breaking away from It. Those factors
whIch, unhke space and time, cannot be smuggled
into the data yielded by the senses, and whIch yet
are admIttedly Involved In what we at least appear
to experience, must perforce be obtaIned by the
inner path.
The Imtlal lIkelihood of the subjectIvIst hne of
approach goes far to justify the perSIstent efforts whIch
have been made in ItS support, and explaIns why,
until It had been defimtely shown by Hume to be an
tmpasse, the alternative positIOn, first suggested by
Kant-that the categories are essentially obJectzve and
are discovered through outer expenence-should have
been so umversally overlooked. For IS it not indeed
undemable that our inner experiences enter Into our
1 The distinction of paths breaks down, however, In regard to time
time IS apprehended by the Inner as well as by the outer path.
126 THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE CHAP

apprehensions of outer things? V\Then two bodies

clash violently, there is a sympathetic and painful
reverberation in ourselves; and In less Intense, but
in no less ObVIOUS a manner, we congemally partICIpate
In the flIght of bIrds, the movement of waves, the
upward push of the arch in a buIlding, and the stead-
fast bearing of the supportIng pIllars. Vo{e do not
feel ourselves to be outsIders In an allen world, but
particIpate, together with all other natural eXIstences,
In a common lIfe. To such an extent IS thIS carned
by the savage and by the child, that practIcally all the
terms whIch they employ, and whIch are stIll In use,
In descnbIng the behavlOur and energlsmg of outer
thIngs, have In theIr OrIgIn been expressIve of Inner
experiences. Even terms denved from outer happen-
ings have been reInterpreted on the analogy of human
actIvity. MotlOn, for example, that most umversal of
all outer experIences, has been interpreted as some-
thIng that comes Into eXIstence, exhausts itself In
exercise, and ceases to be. GaIIleo's dIscovery, not
made unttl the seventeenth century, that the analogy
IS totally Inappltca ble, and that motion (dynamIcally 1
conceIved) IS as Ingenerable and as Indestructible as
matter Itself, was undoubtedly one of the maIn causes
whIch brought about the Cartesian dualism-motton
beIng interpreted as a mode of extension, and therefore
as OppOSIte to mInd.
But thIS recogmtlOn of the Influence of Inner ex-
penence upon our interpretatIOn of outer happenings
must be balanced by equal recognition of the influences
which act in the opposite directlOn. As Mr. Alexander
1 I e In dlstmctlon from the merely geometrIcal manner 10 which It IS
also conceived by Descartes Cf my Sruthes In the Cartman Phliosophy.
PP 70 • 7S If
VII THE CATEGORIES 12 7

very justly pomts out,1 the inftuence is reciprocal,

espec1ally in the h1gher mental reaches. It is in and
through expenencmg th1s or that activ1ty or type of
permanence in ourselves (t.e. enjoying it) that we find
it exemphfied in the external events and thmgs wh1ch
we contemplate. We then speak of phys1cal causahty
and physical substance.
" And having these conceptions we come back to our own
minds and ask whether we ourselves are not subject to phYSIcal
causatIOn, or are not substances In the same sense as external
things, and we may thus raIse problems whIch seem to us of
great dIfficulty."

It 1S mamly, however, to Mr. Alexander's further

pomt that I desire to draw attentIOn, namely, that:
" Out of thIS Interplay of minds and things It follows that
whIle, on the one hand, we speak of force or power In physical
things In language borrowed from our own WIlls, on the other
hand, psychologIcal terminology, as in such terms as apprehen-
sIon or comprehension or conceptIOn, IS largely derIved from
experience of phYSIcal things or of the action of our bodIes on
phYSIcal things "

Th1s, as I take 1t, 1S eV1dence that though at the

start man exaggerates hIS kmship WIth Nature, and
ascribes to her, m na1ve fashion, his own expenences,
yet at the same time, and for the same reason, he 1S
so outward-lookeng that he allows Nature to colour
and mfluence, in a qU1te undue degree, h1s apprec1a-
t10n and understandmg of h1s own most charactenst1c
actiVIties. For, be It noted, 1t IS not any knowledge
of himself, not any introspective or reftective observa-
tion of the nature of the self, that yields the terms
whereby natural existences are mterpreted. The
1 Space, T,me and Deltl, vol I pp. 187-8.
128 THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE CHAP

factors which intervene m his apprehension of physical

happenings are feelIngs and conations. So outward-
lookmg IS he, that he does not reflect upon them as
being mner, or as being many pecuhar sense hIs own.
Does he not experience them when he observes two
outsIde eXIstences mteracting, and qUlte as dIrectly,
though not so mtensely, as when the activIty IS that
of hIs own body? These feehngs and conations are
thus, more or less, m the posItIOn of sensa; m terms of
them he expenences all actIVIty, alIke m hImself and
in others. And the outcome, as I have already saId,
IS that whIle Nature IS thereby brought nearer to hIm,
he IS in equal degree cut off from observation of what
is most truly charactenstic m hIS own mner hfe. So
far as knowledge IS concerned, It IS therefore, on the
whole, truer to say that the unsophIsticated mmd
conceives the mode of the self's eXIstence on the analogy
of what matenal bodIes are experIenced to be than
that bodIes are conceived on the analogy of the self.
Even when pnmitIve man comes to distmgUlsh an
, amma • or ' mner' self, what he crudely pIctures IS
not the soul m any PlatOnIC or psychologIcal sense,
but a mere duplIcate of the body, released, mdeed,
from some of the lImItatIOns, chIefly of movement,
to which the body IS subject, but otherWIse m all
respects slaVIshly modelled upon the phYSIcal pattern.
Now if the factors directly enJoyed are feelIngs and
conations, and If they are expenenced when any
activity IS observed, whether in objects or m the
self, what grounds are there for the view that the
concept of substance as representing the factor of
permanence, and the concept of causalIty as represent-
ing the factor of activity and agency, are first appre-
hended only m reference to the self, and are then, by
VII THE CATEGORIES 12 9

analogy, imputed to other existences~ If we grant the

subjectivist thes1s that, as data for determining the
nature of independent existences, only sensa can be
expenenced, th1s V1ew of the ongm of these two
concepts will doubtless, for lack of any conceivable
alternative, have to be adopted. Sensa, wh1ch as such
are alleged to be merely pnvate, purely subject1ve, and
constantly changmg, could certainly never suggest
them. But this surely is to prove overmuch. For if
such be the character of our outer experiences, what
clues can they afford suffic1ent to JUSt1fy us in 1mputmg
to them the categones, even 1f otherw1se obtamed?
If the sensa be in unceasing change, what ground 1S
there for asserting that they represent something sub-
stantial and ab1dmg? If they be mmd-dependent,
what ground is there for assertmg that they causally
determme one another or stand for objects wh1ch so
behave~ The categories, even 1f true of the self, w1ll
be palpable fictIOns when thus applted-as Hume,
agreeing m these prem1sses, has so conclus1vely
demonstrated.
Hume's own d1fficulties one and all begin when he
professes to explain how these concepts, even if they
be viewed as fictions, are to be accounted for, t e. how
we come falsely to believe that we possess 1deas which
really we do not possess. In denymg the poss1b1hty of
any direct apprehens10n of permanence and contmUlty
in the world of outer experience, he has already
committed himself to the dental of any kind of mner
expenence which will account for their apprehens1on,
either as genuine or as fictions.

K
 13 0 THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE CHAJI.

(ii.) A REALIST VIEW OF THE NATURE AND

FUNCTIONS OF THE CATEGORIES

It is at this point that Kant, while in the main

holding to Hume's negative conclusions, reinforces
and supplements them by certain others of a more
positive character. In the first place, Kant shows that
our apprehension of an abiding, outer world is not
dependent upon the employment of concepts ante-
cedently obtamed through refiectlOn upon the self.
When we are aware, as we undoubtedly are, of per-
manence and contmuity in the self, thiS can only be
because we are at the same tIme consclOUS of per-
manence and cont1OUlty 10 the objects apprehended.
There are not two separate paths by which, at different
moments and 10 successive stages, separate portlOns
of our knowledge have been acqUIred. Only in the
process of apprehend10g an abld10g world 10 outer
space can there be any awareness either of the sensa or
of the self. Only as elements Within a total reality
which includes and determines them, can either of
these latter factors be discnm10ated and IdentIfied. l
1 Even as regards our apprehension of other selves we are, It would
seem, JustIfied In holdIng that It IS acquired by direct experience and not
merely as an Inference by analogy from the outward behaVIOur of other
persons' bodies The problem IS, however, very complicated and difficult.
The most satisfactory solution yet offered IS, I believe, that given by Mr.
Alexander He POInts out that Inference by analogy from the behaViour
of other persons' bodies cannot be employed to explaIn the qUite InstInctive
\ behaVIOur of anImals towards each other, and also would be flatly at variance
\wIth the history of our own mmds .. [The subJect!\lst theory] Implies
that we begin With a knowledge of ourselves and construe foreign selves In
that likeness. Now It IS almost a commonplace that the reverse IS rather
the case, that our reflective conscIOusness of ourselves arises In and through
our consciousness of others We are led, not of course to the enjoyment
of ourselves but to noticmg ourselves, through Intercourse With others the
knowledge of ourselves and that of others grow up together Our own
VII THE CATEGORIES 13 1
In the second place, Kant propounds a thesis, no
less important and certainly not less fundamental, that
the categories of substance and causality, and indeed
all a prtorl categones, are essentially objectIve concepts,
t.e. are concepts of features constItutIve of what is appre-
hended. Kant, it IS true, lIkewise holds, at least in his
more usual modes of expressing h1mself, that these
categories onginate ' from withIn.' This, however, IS
largely a mere prejudice, surv1ving from early Leib-
niZlan upbrIngIng, and a main source of what 1S most
confusing and least satisfactory In the development
and formulatlOn of h1s CntIcal teaching. The above
thesis connects with all that is most onginal and still
VItal In his theory of knowledge.
The indebtedness which Mr. Alexander, though
the protagonist of so contrary a type of ph110sophy,
acknowledges to Kant's teaching is preCIsely for this
doctnne.
" Kant IS far removed from the notIOn that we manu-
facture or work up objects of knowledge by means of the
categories, still less that we Impute these forms to objects.
They are for him veritable elements In objective knowledge.
. . . I am makIng these remarks not In order to fortify myself
by hiS authorIty, which I certainly could not invoke, but to
record a grateful conviction that With or after Plato there IS
nothIng comparable In Importance upon thiS subject With what
may be learned from him, even by one who believes that mind
which IS Kant's source of categories .. IS only a name for
mInds which are empIrIcal things like other empirical things.

mdlvlduahty stands out for us agamst a background of other persons ..

To malntam such a view we must, however, be able to speCify the direct
experience which thus assures us not mferentlally but directly of other
mmds ThiS Mr Alexander claims to have done In the sequel to the above
quotation (Cf Space, T,me and Detty, vol II pp 31-7) On the general
problem, cf. also Laird, Problems of the Self, pp Z4-8.
13'2. THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE CHAP

It IS to be remembered that for a man of Kant's age the

only method open to a phIlosopher, whether It was Kant or
Reid, of IndIcatIng that the world of experIence contaInS per-
vasive features as well as varIable ones, was to refer this part of
experience to mInd In ItS objective character" 1
In treating of the categories, and of the part which
they play In our knowledge, there are three main pOints
upon whIch I shall dwell; and I may at starting
indicate these in prehmmary fashion.
In the first place, though conSCIOusness or aware-
ness, as knowledge, cannot be creative of its object,
and must in Its essential nature be contemplative, it is
never merely contemplative, everything bemg done,
so to speak, by the self-revelation of the object.
This has already been mdicated In the analysis of
the complex processes Involved in the apparently
simple and direct apprehenSIOn of time and space.!
To these processes I have, following Kant, gIven the
tItle intuit1On. I do not, however, thereby mean to
maintain what Kant teaches In the earlIer port1Ons
of the Crtttque of Pure Reason, that the process of
intU1tion IS ultimate and simple, takmg place, so to
speak, in and by itself, in mdependence of all
categonal thinking. 3 As I shall endeavour to show,
in development of what has already been suggested,
I the intuitive apprehens10n of time and space involves
\ the apprehenSIon of meanmgs, and as factors in-
dispensable to the pOSSIbIlIty of such meanings, certam
categonal relations.
Secondly, there are four, and only four, possible
modes of existence which we can contemplate directly
1 Space, T,me and DeIty, vol I PP 190 -:1.
I Cf above, p 80 if
• This IS one of the pOints In which Kant's ultimate results run directly
counter to hiS initial statements
VII THE CATEGORIES 133
face to face: 1 sizes, shapes, motions, and the sensa in
terms of which alone any of the first three are lntuitively
apprehensible. As we have already noted, the sensa
would seem to stand by themselves. For their appre-
hension we have to postulate a process of awareness,
which we may entitle sensing. The first three types,
on the other hand, lnvolve much more than senslng;
they involve lntuition. Among the questions which
we shall have to consider IS the questIOn as to how
these processes, senslng and lntUltlng, are at once
distlnguished from, and related to, one another.
Thirdly, though the categories would at first sight
appear to be of two distinct types, those which so
directly connect With what is lntuited, that they may
be said to be themselves lntUltable, such as the category
of whole and part, and those which are apprehensible
only in thought, such as the categones of substance
and causalIty, this dlstlnctlOn, on further analysis,
turns out to be untenable. All the categories alIke
mvolve the thought of a somethlng-a whole, a sub-
stance, or an agency-which, whIle it can be located
at this and at that moment, here and there, cannot
Itself be lntUltively apprehended. In other words, a
feature common to all the categones IS that they are
formal and problematic in character: that to which
they refer can, by their means, be entertained m
thought, but cannot be rendered speCific save In pro-
portion as empirical data are forthcomlng. Only m
so far as the character of the data vanes for this and
that type of category, is there justification (more
seeming, however, than genuine) for the distinction
just suggested.
1 Cf Stout. Manual. p 18 if. and below. pp. 162-3. 166
IJ4 THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE CHAP

(a) The Categories as involved in the Apprehension

of T,me and Space
So much in general introductlOn: let us now
consider whether and m what manner categones are
involved in the apprehenslOn of tIme and space. I
shall do so without any attempt at exhaustIve treatment.
It wlll suffice If I can show the kInd of role whi<:h
categories play in all IntUitIve apprehensIon
There are, It would seem, at least two categories
which are IndIspensable for any kmd of mtUltlOn,
whether of tIme or of space-the categones of totalIty
(whole and part) and necessItatlOn (determmmg \
ground and condltlOned consequent). To take the
former first: If we conceIve any specIfic tIme or specIfic
space as always formIng part of a larger tIme or space
which condItions it, the concept of totalIty 15 obVIously
involved. Part IS a term correlatIve to the term whole;
to employ the former IS to mtroduce the latter. ThIS
concept of whole and part cannot, however, be empm-
cally, I.e. sensuously, acqUired, If, as I have argued, the
apprehenslOns of tIme and space, whIch presuppose
It, themselves condition all empIrical awareness. Nor
can It be a denvative concept, elaborated out of the
mtuztzve contemplatlOn of the temporal and the spatial.
The objects of IntUitlOn, tIme and space, are mdeed
apprehended as continuous; but, as we find upon
analYSIS, such contInUity already Involves the employ-
ment of the category as a condition of its appre-
hension. For only as we employ the concept of
whole and part can we apprehend specific tImes and
specific spaces as being continuous, i.e. as always
being wholes, relattvely to their constituent parts, and
VII THE CATEGORIES 135
yet at the ::.ame time as always being themselves parts
of a time and space whIch transcend them. If there
be no apprehension of the relatIOn of whole and part,
there can be no apprehensIOn of contInUIty.
It may, however, be objected that the continUIty
whIch Involves such concepts for ItS apprehensIon IS
reached only at a late stage In mental development,
and IS fundamentally dIfferent from, though elaborated
in the lIght of, earlIer and cruder expenences of tIme
and space. These latter, It wIll be saId, YIeld an
expenence of ' unInterrupted ness ' whIch IS unique In
kInd accordIng as It IS temporal or spatIal, and whIch
IS apprehended In a purely IntUItIOnal manner, m-
dependently of all concepts whIch, as such, must be
later products, dependent upon the development of
dIscursIve thInkmg. But, as I have already argued, 1
sensmg and IntUItmg do not by themselves suffice for
the apprehenSIOn of eIther type of umnterruptedness.
Categonal thinking is lIkeWIse involved. When we
apprehend that whIch IS now actually before us as
a duratIOnal tIme-span or as an extended space, we
must apprehend any portIOn thereof as part of the
whole, and the field as a whole as Itself beIng part
of a yet larger whole whIch IS not itself actually
IntuIted. ThIS IS necessary If eIther type of contmUIty
IS to be apprehended at all. If so much be not
granted as apprehended from the start, there IS no
way of explaInIng how any further knowledge, 'dIs-
cursive' In type, could be acquIred. To mamtam that
thought must in all cases be subsequent to intuition
would therefore seem to be ImpossIble. That would
rule out those very experIences which, by admission,
are necessary to the formation, at a later stage, of the
]. Cf. above, pp I3Z, 134
13 6 THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE CHAP

appropriate concepts. Initially, the presupposed cate-

gorial concepts must, mdeed, be employed without
explicit formulation, much m the manner in which
a child employs the category of causalIty when it
assumes that the fire whIch has burnt it once will,
if approached too closely, burn it again. For as
Mr. Stout, in treatmg of such early stages of mental
development in hIs Manual of Ps)'cholog)',I so consist-
ently argues, categories first reveal theIr presence In
a practIcal manner as determmmg behavIOur Con-
SCIOusness, under their gmdance, reaches out and
anticipates a wider or future experience. Mr. Stout,
as we have noted,2 himself assumes a category of
"spatial umty"; but as I have sought to show, such
a category would seem to be too general In character
to serve the purposes for whIch It IS postulated; and
m any case IS surely more correctly defined as bemg
the category of whole and part applied to, or rather
essentially and Inseparably mvolved In, the appre-
hension of each and every extensIOn. These same
remarks wtll equally apply to Mr. Stout's category of
" temporal umty."
To repeat, apprehenSIOn of continuity In all ItS
spatial and temporal modes presupposes the employ-
ment of the category of whole and part, and cannot
therefore account for our first apprehension of it.
Though as a relational category It IS not, in and by
Itself, Intuitable, yet as employed m all intUItive appre-
hension it makes pOSSIble our apprehenSIOn of that
general or universal meaning which finds such in-
exhaustibly manifold embodiment in the times and
spaces which, thanks to its aid, we do actually intuite
in the concrete. In continUIty, as intUltively appre-
1 Cf p. 436 ff B Above, plIO ff
VII THE CATEGORIES 137
hended in the forms of time and space, the problem of
the one and the many, of the universal and the par-
ticular, of meanmg and that which embodies meaning,
presents Itself m Its most fundamental form. The
manyness of tIme or of space is only apprehensIble in
terms of the oneness of. each; and yet any gIven
example of thiS oneness, as found in a gIven space or
a gIven tIme, IS Itself, relattvely to ItS constttuent parts,
only apprehensible m the same way. What White-
head calls' extensIty,' that IS, the property of extendmg
one over the other, IS a universal characterIstic of
all times and of all spaces; and as ulllversal, it mvolves
a meanmg m whIch the categorlal re1atIOn IS an essentIa1
element.
A simIlar argument can be stated m terms of the
connected category of necessitatIOn-the concept com-
mon to logIcal ground and causal connectIOn. ThiS
category also, It would seem, IS mvolved m the
apprehension of the kind of contmUlty exemplIfied
by both ttme and space. Any partIcular tIme or any
partIcular space, however large or however small, is
condItioned and made pOSSIble by the earlIer tIme and
by the wIder space which leads mto or contams It.
That is to say, the kind of wholeness which IS to be
found m tIme and space IS one that determmes the
elements constituent of It. Though the category may
therefore be said to express a feature qUIte fundamental
to both time and space, and actually constItuent of
them, none the less this feature, in order to be
intuited, must be apprehended, not merely in the
particularity of some one actual instance, but again
as a universal meaning in whIch the categorial relation
IS involved.
Though the fact that the category of necessitatIOn,
13 8 THEORY OF KNO"W"LEDGE CH.\P

while it is distinct from that of totahty, l is yet required

in apprehendmg the relatlOn by whIch a whole IS a
whole relatively to its parts, may not be very eVIdent, or
may even be questionable In the case of more concrete
wholes, It IS ea,)lly dIscernIble In regard to temporal
and spatial wholes, taken m theIr temporal and spatIal
aspects. The' now ' cannot come to exist save m and
through the 'no longer'; the triangle whIch we de-
SCrIbe m markmg off a space by the mtersectlOn of
three straIght Imes cannot eXIst sa, e m and through
the WIder space wlthm whIch It hes, and neIther type
of eXistence can, It would seem, be apprehended save
as thus determmed m a WIder context.
In general, then, we can say that the prImary
functIon of such categories as the above IS not to
clarify our mtUItlons, but to make them pOSSIble.
The relatIOns m questlOn can, mdeed, be dIscovered
by the processes of analytIc thmkmg, as actually con-
stituent of what IS mtUlted. But they are umversals,
and thus are not themselves mtUlted Smce, then,
one constituent of the mtUlted IS apprehended by
thought, categonal thmkmg IS a condition of, and IS
not derived from, intUItion.
TIme and space beIng, as they are, complex, it is
not surprising that our mtuitlOn of them should thus
rest on a varIety of condltlOns. And SInce time and
space are UnIform as well as complex-uniformIty
is only another name for theIr continUIty-and are
apprehended as thus UnIform, what other agency than
the entertainIng of universal meanings, made possible
by categorial thmking, can be really adequate to the
needs of the Situation?
In one important respect time and space are appre-
1 Cf the passage quoted from Mr Alexander, below, p 147. n
VII THE CATEGORIES 139
hended In a manner analogous to the categorIal rela-
tlOns; namely, as always extendIng beyond the sensu-
ously intUlted, and yet as presupposed In it. In mature
and exphcit conSClOusness, and, as we may therefore
argue, also In impltcit conSClOusness, the thought or
conception of tIme and space, In theIr ' totalIty,' IS a
condItion of the apprehenSIon of either In any gIven
sensuous experIence; the thought of somethIng not
sensuously gIven condItions the sensuous experIences
which are gIven. And whIle what IS thus thought as
transcending the gIven IS a continuatlOn of what IS
apprehended in the gIven, It IS not first generated by
prolongatiOn of the gIVen. On the contrary, the gIven
is apprehensIble only as sequent upon, or as deltmited
from, the not - gIven. This, mutatzs mutandzs, is
analogous to the manner In whIch we apprehend the
categorial relations. They have a mealllng wIder
and more general than that whIch IS to be found In
anyone of the prImary experIences 111 whIch they
come to conSCIousness. Indeed, In the case of the
category of totalIty, there IS a conflIct between the
very nature of the tIme and space 'forms' whIch
embody It, and the demands of the category ItSelf.-
a conflIct which constraInS the mInd to the drawmg
of the fundamental dIstinctIon between the actual and
the Illusory, between realIty and appearance. l
The concepts of contInUlty, Infi1l1tude, and absolute-
ness are, it would seem, derIvative concepts, partly
conceptual and partly intUltlOnal 111 character. To
the concept of continuity I have already referred. In
it the categories of totality and neceSSItatiOn are
employed to make possible the intuitive experIence of
time and space. The extended 111 time and ~p.a~.is
1 Cf below, pp 140-43, 235-6.
 THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE CHAP

always manifold) and mdeed inexhaustibly manifold;

and yet never falls to preserve Its aspect of being)
relatively to Its constituent parts, a genuine totality.
We cannot Ignore eIther aspect; and we contnve to
combme them m the apprehenSIon of time and space
as continuous. In continUity the whole IS so deter-
minant of ItS constituent parts that It malntams Itself
as continuous, however far analysIs be carned; that is,
it cannot be conceived as an aggregate, bmlt up of
parts which It does not Itself make pOSSIble.
This concept of continuity, m turn, IS found to
lead up to) and to mvolve) the concept of infimty in
time and space. Time and space, beIng apprehended
as continuous, must also be apprehended as Infimte.
For If they be contmuous) then however small or
however large a gIven time or space may be, the same
truth holds, namely that they continue, and are con-
tinued mto, a tIme and a space which transcend
them.
The concept of absoluteness is of kmdrep. character.
If everythlllg expenenced IS expenenced as belongIng
to a tIme-space world) nothIng, It would seem) can be
apprehended by us save as belongIng to, and formIng
part of) a whole more comprehenSive than itself) i.e.
as condItioned or non-absolute. Owing to this funda-
mental characteristIc of our expenence we possess a
critenon whereby we are enabled to distinguish
between truth and falsIty, between appearance and
reality. What can be apprehended as fittIng into the
whole of our experience, however wide, is true and ,
real; what cannot be so interpreted is false and
illusory.
But this criterion we are constrained to apply to
the entire time-space world; and when we do so, a
VII THE CATEGORIES
conflict arises between the aspect of time and space
which gams expresslOn through the category of
totality and that other connected aspect which IS
more appropriately expressed through the category of
necessitatIon. There are two, and, as it would seem,
only two alternatives. EIther we rest in the con-
ception of the actual mfinlte, and all possibIlity of
absoluteness, z e. of a totahty whIch IS not itself sub-
ordinated withm a wider whole, IS ruled out. Or,
on the other hand, we find m expenence some justifica-
tion for behevmg that the mfinltude of Euchdean
tIme and space does not hold of realIty, properly
understood.
For thIs latter attitude we may claIm justIficatIOn
on the ground that certam dommant and decisIve
experiences dIsclose to us, through theIr spIrItual
sIgnificance, types of realIty not compatible with the
uniformIty of the actual mfinlte; or else through
mathematIco-physlcal SCIence we may achIeve, In terms
of a non-Euchdean tIme-space system, a genume
realtsation of wholeness and unity. UltImately these
two lmes of argument may prove to be not incom-
patIble. For there is no apparent reason why the two
methods may not be combmed. In either case-
though not on the VIew of reality as actually mfinite
-the dIstmction between empincal realtty and em-
pineal IllusIOn can then be extended, so as to yield
the wIder-reachmg distmctlOn between appearance and
realIty-appearance being conceIved as that which,
if it could be apprehended (as it cannot, so long as
appearance is appearance) in the complete context to
which it ultimately belongs, would be otherwise
\apprehended than it is actually apprehended. We
shall not thereby be commItted to the view that
 THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE CHAP

nothing can be known by us save as appearance, and

that genuine reality is in all spheres closed to our
view. But It wlll allow of our holding, should
evidence to thls effect be forthcommg, that at least in
certain cases what we are apt to view as genuine
reality is but appearance. Though the dIstmction IS
itself a metaphysical one, the extent and consequences
of 1tS apphcatlOn can, ltke that between empirical
reality and empirical IlluslOn, be determined only by
empIrical InvestlgatlOn. It WIll alter, widen, or
narrow, as experience matures, and accordmg as the
results of expeflence pOInt to a close-kmt or to an
opener type of wholeness in the absolutely real 1
Thus, on this view, no addItional semi-mystical a
priori concepts, such as the' Absolute' or the' Un-
conditioned' require to be postulated. 'Vhat Kant
entitles the 'Ideas of Reason' are slmply special
apphcatlOns of the category of totahty to empmcally
acquired material. Nothing, not even time or space,
can be apprehended by us save m conformity with
1 Mr Alexander, In crltlclsmg the VIew, a. held by 1\& BO'Olnquet, that
the only satIsfactory statement of a cause IS the whole unnerse, proceeds:
.. If thIs were true the Idea of cause "ould mdeed retam a certain usefulness
In practIce, but as a theoretIcal baSIS of procedure In sCIence It would be
useless But the objectIOn rests on a mISconception It assumes that the
operatIon of the st2rs IS a motIon which mterferes WIth the causal act by
whIch a man knocks another down, and does so because there IS d,rect or
indirect connectIon between all parts of the UnIverse, throughout Space-
T,me The questIon rather IS whether the IntImate causal relatIon men-
tIoned IS mterfered WIth hy the rest of the UnIverse whIch undoubtedly
\ sustams It VI'hat sCIence has to do IS Just to dIscover these bmlted,
Inumate, relatIons of eXIstents whIch are called causal ones Everythmg
whIch It find. by mquIrY relevant has to be included and becomes part
of the substances Involved Everytlung whIch, though its presence IS
assumed, does not mterfere so as to control or VItiate, lapses for the speaal
causal relatIon Into the pOSItIOn of an Immaterial condItion" (Space, Till"
tUld Detty, vol I pp :z89-90) Cf also Broad, PercephQn, PhySICl and
Rea/tty. pp 143 -6.
 VII THE CATEGORIES
what this category prescribes; and, in fateful con-
sequence of thIs fundamental characteristic, the human
m1Od, in all ItS activItIes, is essentially metaphysical,
always apprehend10g what is experIenced as Implying
\ more than It is ever Itself experienced as be1Og. Our
consciousness IS self-transcend1Og and self-hmit1Og,
vIew10g the 10tuited 10 terms of the non-intUlted,
the parts 10 terms of a conditiomng whole. And so
we are tied down to two alternatives, either the actual
infinite or an ultimate whole, t.e. a whole whIch is
\ not itself part of a more comprehensIve whole. Only
on the latter alternative wIll there exist what is
properly deSCribable as an Absolute or Unconditioned.
For the notion of a whole which does not itself fall
wIth10 a wider whole IS just the notIOn of the
UnconditIOned-that whIch has no conditions whIch
determ10e It from WIthout. And this conceptIOn is
pOSSIble, even though we are not able to say what
such a whole can be.
On the other alternatIve-the real being actually
mfinite, and therefore not allowing of totalIty, save
in the modIfied form of cont1OUlty-Absoluteness
and U nconditionedness are meaningless and self-
contradIctory concepts. The ideal which has mspired
so many intellectual inquiries, that of bringing WIthin
the scope of a s10gle system all the factors whIch
are determinant of existences apprehended in sense-
experience, will then have to be viewed as an Ideal
whIch not only is not attainable, but which, when
conceived as representmg ultimate reality, just thereby
misrepresents it.
 THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE CHAP

Ch) The Formal Prohlematic Character of the

Categories
Owing to the manner in which the various cate-
gories are bound up with the category of totahty, a
further concluslOn seems to follow, namely, that they
share in Its problematic character, enabhng us to
think and locate, but never to comprehend (m the
sense of definmg m a positive manner) that to which
they refer. Such positive knowledge of the nature of
the unity apprehended must in all cases be obtamed,
when it is obtamable, from empirical data. If these
assertlOns be true, they are highly Important; and I
shall therefore dwell upon them at some length.
That the category of totahty IS not mapproprIately
describable as an essentially problematic conception,
is a statement which rests upon the followmg grounds.
No one can deny that we know quite defimtely what
IS meant by temporal and spatial mclUSlOn. The
'speclOus present' includes within Itself the times
covered by each of ItS constituent events; a yard in-
cludes the distances represented by each of its constitu-
ent feet.1 Such relatlOns of mclusion are intUltively
1 Cf WhItehead, The Concept of Nature, pp 58-9 .. Durations can have
the two-termed relational property of extendmg one over the other Thus
the duratIOn whIch IS all nature durmg a certam mmute extends over the
duration whIch IS all nature durmg the thIrtieth second of that mInute
ThIS relation of • extendIng over'- ' extensIOn,' as I ~hall call It-IS a
fundamental natural relation whose field comprIses more than durations
I shall • maIntam that the same relation of extensIOn lIes at the
base both of temporal and spatIa! extensIOn I shall use the terms
• whole' and • part' exclUSIvely m thIS sense, that the • part' IS an event
I whIch IS extended over by the other event whIch IS the • whole' Thus
1D my nomenclature • whole' and • part' refer exclUSIvely to thIS
fundamental relation of extensIon •• The contmulty of nature arIses
from extensIon AccordIngly there are no maXImum duratIons and
no mmlmum durations. Thus there IS no atomIc structure of durations,
 VII THE CATEGORIES 145
apprehended In the time-'1pan of durational conscious-
ness and In the direct apprehensIOn of the given
spatial field; and by reasoning therefrom we can
in thought give a quite precise meaning to similar
relatIOns on the larger scales that exceed immediate
expenence. Thus If by 'totahty' we mean simply
that which stands to Its constituents in the relatIOn of
a temporal or spatial whole, immediate expenence
suffices to Yield to the category a meaning so defimte
that we can never be In doubt what we should mean
thereby, or to what types of eXistences it is apphcable.
Also, we are able, by means of concepts which have
been elaborated by the mathematician, to define this
relation In stnctly conceptual terms. The parts are
never truly Isolable; they pass continuously into one
another, hke the poslttve real numbers, which do not
start with the number I, and proceed by jerks through
the successive Integers, but proceed from 0 con-
tinuously through the infinitely numerous intermediate
numbers into I, and through I slmtlarly Into 2, and
so forth. To use the prescnbed techmcal terms, they
constttute a' compact senes,' such that between any two
constituents another constituent of the same order has
always to be concelved as Intervemng. Just as there
are never two' next' real numbers, so there are never
two' next' pOints either In time or in space.
Thus in conceptually describing the relation of
incluslOn (or uninterruptedness) which we apprehend
intUItiVely, we find ourselves constrained to employ
the concept of continuity; and as we further find, the
and the perfect definition of a duration, so as to mark out Its indIVIdualIty
and dIstingUIsh It from hIghly analogous durations over whIch It IS paSSing,
or whIch are passing over It, IS an arbItrary postulate of thought
l Exactness IS an Ideal of thought, and IS only realIsed In experIence by the
I selectIon of a route of apprOXimatiOn." Cf below, p 147"
L
 THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE CHAP

concept of whole and part is definite and precise only

in proportlOn as that of contInUlty IS so likewise.
What, however, IS It that the latter concept achieves
in this regard? May we not say that what It does is
to define the relatIons in which parts that are to be
parts of temporal or spatial wholes must stand to one
another, and that this IS ItS sole functIOn ~ It does not
profess to assign to the term ' totality' or ' wholeness'
or' incluslOn ' any meanmg which IS not equally appro-
priate to the parts composing It. For the contmUlty
which it prescnbes to parts that are to be parts IS a I
continuity which for the same reason must belong to \
the whole wlthm which they fall. It too must be a
part to a larger whole, just as are ItS parts to It. It IS
a whole only m the sense In wh1ch some part1cular
number 1S a whole, namely, that, as being a number
which we have found reason to select from a senes of
numbers; 1t 1S a total w1th reference to 1tS const1tuent
umts, but IS Itself a constituent of all higher numbers.1
Th1s IS not a wholeness wh1ch m any adequate fash10n
meets the demands of the concept which we employ 111
Its apprehensIOn
This last statement calls for further justificatIOn.
WhIle the concepts of whole and of part are, we may
say, the relata which we think in thmkIng the relatIons
constituent of contInUlty, the descnptlOn above given
of continuity defines only the relatIOns and not die
relata themselves. It tells us m what relatIOns' parts'
must stand to other parts If a whole 1S to eXist. It
does, indeed, define each part by its position in the
1 The account here given of • wholeness' connects With that given of
mfimtude Any mfinIte magnitude IS a part of an mfinIte magnItude,
and has an mfimte magnItude as a part The above method of definmg
• wholeness' thus Involves all the problems of continuity and therefore of
the actual infinIte
VII THE CATEGORIES
series; but this posItIOn, m turn, is Itself defined only
through the relations in whIch It stands to other
posItions simllarly defined. That whIch in parts I

makes them capable of constituting a whole is not I

explamed, but from start to fimsh presupposed. So

also wIth the correlative relatum, that of wholeness.
It too IS defined only by the relatIOns m which It stands
to ItS own constltuents. EIther It is that whIch is
gIven, and to whIch analysis, followmg the method of
• extensIve abstractIOn,' 1 can be apphed; or It IS con-
structed through synthesIs of parts of the same nature
as Itself, m whIch case It IS reached by reversmg the
process whereby we advance to the constltuent
elements. In eIther case, so far IS It from havmg any
kmd of wholeness whIch prevents It from bemg m
equal degree partlal, that, on the contrary, what renders
It a whole, namely, Its essentIal contmUIty, is hkewise
What prevents It from ever Itself being anything save
a part m a stll1 larger whole of the same type. WhIle,
\ therefore, the category of totalIty enables us to appre-
hend the relatton of mclusIOn, It does not, m Its temporal
and spatIal, any more than In Its numerical employ-
ment, thereby enable us to dIscern any eXIstence which
adequately embodIes the meanmg to whIch It gives
expression; and thIS, It would seem, is why it has to
VOIce Itself m further demands which the SCIences and
metaphYSICS anse m order to satisfy.
But what, It may be asked, IS the meaning to whIch
the category gIves expression, If it be not a meamng
which is adequately apprehended' in temporal and
1 Cf Whitehead, The Concept of Nature, pp 78-9 .. The clue discovered
by the commonsense of mankInd and systematically utlhsed In sCience IS
what I have elsewhere called the law of convergence to slmphclty by
diminution of extent," Cf. p 57 .. A moment IS a hmlt to which we
approach as we confine attention to durations of mlDlmum extensIOn"
 THEORY OF K~O\VLEDGE CHAP

spatial • wholes.' I have already stated that the

category is problematic, enabling us to think and
locate, though never to specify that to which it refers.
"\\That I thereby desire to sIgnify IS that the category is
formal, not specific, In character So far as the category,
in and by Itself, IS our gUIde, thai 10 "",-huh zt IS 10 be
appltcable can be staled only In negalrr:e lerms, aJ v..'hat
ISnot parttal or Incomplete.
ThIs formal character belongs mdeed to all the
categories, and IS one of their chief merits. It IS Illus-
trated even In the characters of time and space. For
is not each of these, nOhnthstandmg the umqueness of
ItS own posItIve nature, none the less astomshIngly
cathohc In ItS compatibIlIty WIth a qUIte mexhaustible
varIety of different types of eXistences and occurrences~
The categories exhibIt a SImilar fleXIbIlIty, and while
not allOWIng us to predICt what preCIsely we shall find,
guide us to regIOns where we may hope to make dIS-
coveries, and supply terms In whIch these dISCOVerIes
can always be stated once they are made. Thus the
category of totahty, whIle leadmg us to seek alIke In
tIme and In space, and In regard to what IS experienced
m these medIa, for what wIll complete the mcomplete,
does so WIthout enablIng us to antICIpate m what thIS
completeness will be found to consIst. l As we have
1 Too IS a characterIstIc of the categorIes to whIch :i'.fr. Stout has
frequently drawn attentIOn Cf Proc Anst Soc, 19I.}-I5. ~ote on
'Knowledge by acquamtance' and 'Knowledge about; pp 35D-5[ "I take
knowledge by descrIptIon to be as ultImate as knowledge b) acquamtance
The pOSSIbility of It rests for me on the fact that some entities, at least,
have a certam kmd of IDcompleteness, such that on apprehendlDg them
we are able to apprehend them as bemg mcomplete and are therefore aware
of somethmg as bemg necessary to complete them "'e may also know
that the somethIDg. lDasmuch as It has to satISfy thIS condition, must be of
a certam general character But Its speCIfic and detaIled nature has, at
least ID most cases, to be otherwise ascertamed,"
 I.
VII THE CATEGORIES
alreauy ub~erved, in deahng with temporal and spatial
• wholes,' the specific nature of the • wholeness'
obtained is not m either case prescnbed by the cate-
gory, but IS differently determmed according as the
medmm m whIch It IS bemg apphed IS temporal or
spatIal. Also, for its adequate conceptual defimtlOn It
demands the expert knowledge of the mathematICIan.
Yet even so, the notlOn of wholeness thus obtamed
falls to measure up to what the category prescnbes.
It IS indeed • wholeness '-so far we locate correctly-
relatively to ItS parts. But smce the very reason whIch
determmes us to regard It as bemg, in thIS respect, a
whole, constra1l1S us to regard it as always Itself a part
m a yet larger whole of the same type, the formal
reqUIrement of the category IS not completely fulfilled.
When we pass to phYSIcal apphcatlOns of the
category, the situatlOn IS dIfferent; but the same con-
cluslOn none the less follows for other reasons. When
we employ the category m the apprehenSion of phYSIcal
eXIstences m time and space, some empincal factor
enters • from wIthout,' ImpOSIng a hmltatlOn whIch I
tIme and space, as contmuous, cannot themselves YIeld; 1
and wIth111 thiS empmcally defined time-span or space-
area totahty is then located. When, for instance, we
treat a cloud as a umty, we do so because, 111 contrast
to its surround1l1gs, It moves as a s1l1gle whole-this
motion bemg directly apprehended OW1l1g to the fact
that the cloud IS more or less umformly coloured, and
so stands out aga1l1st Its dIfferently coloured back-
ground. In all such cases as this-another example
would be a train consisting of engine and carnages-
we locate unity where we find community of motion.
Now obviously these instances are no better fitted
than are times and spaces to embody, in any adequate
ISO THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE CHAP

fashion, the meaning which lhe calegury expresses.

Owing to sharpness of outhne and the consequent
absence of contInuity we are no longer constraIned to
regard each cloud as part of a yet larger cloud; but on
the other hand, owmg to the Irregular and changeable
form of the outhne, and the tendency of the cloud to
break up Into parts, each with Its own outhne and
motion, this advantage (If It may be so called) IS more
than counterbalanced. Either the object IS entItled a
unity only by courtesy and for convemence In the
making of practical judgements, or, In proportIOn as It
is more than thIs, It is of a problematIc character, and
for the determmatlOn of the nature and extent of the
unity referred to we have to rely exclusively upon
empIrical data. The mere employment of the cate-
gory, by Itself, decIdes nothing.
The sItuation IS agam different when the apphca-
cion of the category IS determined by the results
of experimental investigatIOn, as when the phYSICist
applIes the category In definIng the nature of a molecule
or atom or electron. The difficulties which emerge
are Indeed, at first sIght, simIlar to those which suggest
themselves In reference to the cloud. Each IS a
plurality, and the two former can be broken up Into
their components. But what mamly justifies the em-
ployment of the category is that each IS more than
merely an aggregate of ItS parts, and that the genuine-
ness of ItS UnIty can be exhibited In a vanety of different
reactions, not merely In temporary commumty of
visible motion or temporary persistence of visible
outline. To the extent, however, to which the umty
IS genuine, it is certainly not predetermined by the
category, and even its general nature can only be dis-
covered in and through experimental InvestigatIOn.
VII THE CATEGORIES lSI

Also, as thus detcrmIncd, It IS found to vary greatly in

type. The molecule IS richer in content but less
stable 1n structure than the atom, and the atom, in
turn, than the electron; and to ask whether the
molecule or the electron IS the truer embodIment of
unity IS to raise a questIOn which IS more easIly asked
than answered. For It does not merely turn upon the
defimtion of terms, but upon Issues which are funda-
mental alIke In SCIence and in phIlosophy. Usually,
or at least until qUlte recently, the physicIst has con-
ceived these ultImate entities somewhat in the manner
of KelVin's vortex-atoms, as dlfferentiatlOns, stresses,
or the lIke, In some continUOUS medlUm whIch has
the fundamental characteristics of space, and there-
fore Yields no better embodIment for the category
than does space ItSelf.1 Also the concept of energy,
and therewIth the categories of substance and causalIty,
enter to complIcate the Issues.
The problematic, and strictly formal, character of
the category of tOtalIty becomes stIll more obvious
when we pass to ItS employment In the apprehenSIon
of the lIvmg organism and of the self. For whIle
these two types of eXIstence gIve a very strong Im-
presslOn of being genuine UnIties, the character of
theIr UnIty IS proportIOnately problematIC, transcend-
mg our present means of comprehenSIOn. That the
organIsm IS in some manner or degree a genume UnIty,
and is at least a fuller and rIcher whole than any of ItS
parts, wIll be agreed to by all biologists save those
who adopt the so-called ' mechanistIC • positIon in its
most extreme form, and so treat the organism as being
merely a collocation of purely phYSIcal entities, and
1 Cf Lord Sahsbury's dictum .. By ether would appear to be meant
Simply the substantive of the verb to undulate ..
15'2 THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE CHAP

regard each of these entities as more fittmgly express-

ive of the concept of umty than IS the orgamsm as
a whole. The ambiguity of the posItion IS concealed
by the supposed analogy of the organism to a machme.
That analogy IS not applicable unless the non-sCientific
hypotheSIS of specIal creatIOn IS used to justify the
teleological conceptIOns apart from which the term
• machine • has no definiteness of meaning.
If, however, we allow that the hvmg organism IS
a more genuine embodIment of umty than are purely
physical eXistences, and that it has, for Instance, a
self-preservative tendency, such as gives rise to a
• struggle for eXistence,' we must also grant that, to
the very extent to which thiS IS so, our knowledge not
only of its precise but even of ItS general nature IS
wholly dependent upon empmcal mvestlgatlOn. 1 Also,
owing to the manner m which, as our knowledge has
gained mcrease, the orgamc processes have become for
us not less but more complex, without any hmlt thereto
being yet discernible, the nature of the hvmg orgamsm
far transcends our present means of comprehension.
No theory of • vital control • or of ' entelechy • m the
least avaIls to explam the type of umty whIch the
hvmg thing possesses. At best the vltahst pOSitIOn
can only be formulated as bemg that the umty of the
organism IS ItS fundamental characteristic, and that It
has to be taken mta account If any complete, or ap-

1 Cf Prmgle-Patuson. The Idea of Immorlahty. p 93 .. The parts of

an organlllm are so much members one of another and of the whole which
they constItute-they are so mterpenetratlve m their actIOn-that It IS hardly
a paradox to say that the organIsm qua organ.sm IS not m space at all
Part and whole acquire here a meanIng unknown to phySICS. a meanIng In
which the necessary correlation of the terms IS for the first time apparent.
The orgamsm IS the first real whole, the first natural UnIty" But
must It not be added that thiS unity IS proportionately problematic?
VII ThE CATEGORIES IS3
proximately complete, explanatIOn IS to bi" given of
the processes whIch, occurrIng withIn It, serve to
maintain It In eXIstence. 1 But even so much can be
asserted only If the assertlOn be backed by experi-
mental eVIdence, and by demonstratIon of the precIse
means whereby the organism IS enabled to control and
direct the processes whIch, by admisslOn, are necessary
to uphold It. And so In thIS sphere also the category
of totalIty contInues to be a strictly problematiC
concept, gUIdmg us In the locatIng of umty and In the
seekIng out of the data whereby ItS nature may, as we
trust, be progressIvely defined, but never, In and by
Itself, sufficIng for its comprehenslOn, and never,
in any postttve manner, predetermInIng even the
general features of that whIch we are endeavourmg
to explain.
SImIlar remarks are In order when the category of
totalIty IS employed to define the nature of the self.
That the self IS In some manner and degree a Unity IS
again beyond questIon, but when we seek to define
the character and exact degree of thIS unity, problems
multIply. As I shall have occaSIOn to maIntaIn In
later chapters, the self is conditIOned in a twofold
manner. On the subjective sIde it conSIsts In
psychical powers and disposltlOns which are hIghly
complex, and which In some manner, not preCIsely
definable, are conditIOned by VItal processes In the
body, and more espeCIally In the braIn. On the
objective side the self also demands for ItS pOSSibilIty
the objective field of our sense-experience; for thIS
field is no less necessary to the pOSSIbIlity of conscIOUS-
1 ThIS IS the pOSItion malntamed by Dr J S. Haldane m hIS OrganISm
and Envtronment ar tllustrated by the PhYSIology of Breathing (New Haven,
[9(7)
 154 THEORY OF KNO\VLEDGE CHAP

ness than are the conscious processes themselves. 1

Thus from both sides, the subjectIve and the objectIve,
the self has Its roots and filaments mextncably mter-
woven wIth what lIes, or seems to lIe, beyond Itself:
It is a self at all only because realIty m ai' Its other
aspects is mmIstrant to It. And yet we speak of It
as a umty! AdVIsedly so, but not because we can
profess to comprehend, even dIstantly, how It IS
pOSSIble that It should be so. The UnIty of the self
is, If anythrng, even less comprehensIble than the
unity of the hvrng organIsm-as mdeed we should
expect, If, as would seem to be the case, the organIsm
1 .. That there cannot be an act of knowmg \\Ithout somethmg to
know, or, more generally, that there cannot be an act of Judgmg, e\-en an
act of apprehending at all, \\Ithout somethmg to Judge, somethmg to
apprehend, IS one of the most self-eVident propoSItIOns, lelded by a qUite
elementary consideratIOn of these processes" (Quoted by i\1r G Dawes
Hicks from Memong, Proc. Arzst Soc, 1916-17, pp JIS-I9) !l.Ir Da\\es
HICks adds m comment .. [Memong] lays It down as a characterIstic
feature of the psychIcal, In contrad,stinctIOn to the non-psych,cal, that It
IS directed upon somethmg (auf etv..tU genchtet) , and that this' something'
liS neither Identical With nor partIally IdentIcal with the pSi chlcal act
I directed upon It A mental act IS not, In other words, an e\ent which IS
complete m Itself In a sense the same IS. no dou bt, true of e\ ery event
A phYSical event IS dependent for ItS occurrence upon what IS other than
Itself But the dependence here In question IS a dependence of a totally
different order A phYSical event can be described In and for Itself Not
so, a mental event To speak of an act of awareness SImply ....ould be to
speak of that which IS never met With Awareness In and for Itself haS
no eXistence, and, mdced, no meamng, a • somethmg , of which there
IS awareness IS Its indispensable correlative" Cf Alexander, Space, T,me
and DeIty, vol II pp 105 and I I 5 .. The plant selects from the 5011, but
the phosphates are already there, and It does not make them Mind IS
equally a reaction to external thmgs and \\ hat It selects for ItS object IS
present In the thing or In some other part of the umverse So far IS the
object from bemg dependent on the mmd that, on the contrary, the mInd ",
at any rate for Its orIginal materIal, dependent on the object, Just as the
sIlver must eXIst before It can be used as a shIllIng and be Impressed with
the Kmg's effigy" .. ConSCIousness eXists In the mtercourse of the con-
SCIOUS bemg and thlDgs, and IS neither eqUivalent to the objects It selects
nor can eXIst WIthout those objects ..
VII ThE CATEGORIES
is but one among the many conditions upon which
the existence of the self depends. The self is not
self-subsistent. If It survives the death of the body,
it can do so only m so far as reahty contmues to
uphold It by other and different means. 1
When we pass beyond these empIrIcal Unities to
such a metaphysical entIty as the Ulllverse, and ask
whether we are able to define in any POSItIve manner
in what the totahty of the U lllverse consIsts, the fact
that our concept of totahty IS problematic requires no
lengthy argument. As we have already noted,2 the
ralsmg of thIs question brIngs us face to face With
the problem of the actual mfilllte. In recogmsmg
contmUlty as a fundamental feature of realIty, so far
as reahty IS in tIme and space, have we committed
ourselves to acceptance of the actual mfilllte, and
therefore to demal of umty In every absolute sense?
Or are there alternatIve pos<;lblhtIes~ ObvlOusly these
questIons cannot be answered simply through analYSIS
of any category. The notIon of the actual mfinite IS
not mherently self-contradictory; to that extent it IS a
genume posslbIhty. In decIdmg what other possi-
bIlities there may be, and whIch best harmoDlse WIth
our total experIence, the mathematIcal SCIences and the

1 A passage to this effect hngers In my memory from Mr Stout's

Gifford Lectures I cannot, however, recall It sufficiently .. ccuratcly for
purposes of quotation Cf Stout, Some Fundamental Pomts m the Theory
of KnO'Wledge CSt Andrews Umverslty QUIDcenten<lrY Pubhcatlons, 19II),
p u .. It will be seen that ID treating of the umty of the self I have
omitted all reference to self-conscIousness. I have done 90 IntentIOnally, on
the ground that there can be no conscIousness of self unless there 19 a self to
be conscIous of But thiS, In the first IDstance, can only be constituted
by acts which have for their objects somethIDg other than their own belDg.
Given a self to know, there 19 no reason why It should not be known ..
Cf also Prmgle-PattlSon, The Idea of ImmortalIty, pp 195-7.
Z Cf. above, ~p 140-43.
15 6 THEORY OF KNO\VLEDGE CHAP

humanIstic dIscIplines ahke have the rtght to claIm a

hearing. For In both of these dIverse fields data are
procurable which have a beanng, direct or Indirect,
upon the issues at stake. Though the problem IS
metaphysical, It can only be deCided in the light of
specIfic eVidence, empincally acquired.

(c) The RelatIons holdtng between Senstng, Categortal

Thtnktng, and Intulttng
We are now In a posItIon to consider the relations
In which sensing, categonal thInkIng, and intUItIng
stand to one another. As I have been inSisting,
intuition IS not purely receptIve; It is the appre-
hension of what IS contemplated, in terms of meanIng
- that which IS apprehended beIng apprehended
quite as much In and through these meanIngs as In
and through what IS directly 'seen' or 'touched.'
This IS, Indeed, the essentIal difference between I
sensIng and IntUItIng. In sensIng a red we apprehend
an entity by direct acquaintance. \Ye stand over
agaInst It, and It reveals to us Its actual nature. It
cannot, of course, by Itself form a complete field of
conscIOusness. ConSCIOusness, If ltmlted to It, would
thereby be made to vanIsh. But for ItS apprehenSIOn,
so far as its redness IS concerned, no further meanmg,
demandIng categortal expreSSIOn, IS Involved. Not
so WIth the objects of IntUItIOn. TIme and space,
whatever else they may lIkeWise be, are relatIOnal
forms of existence. For though they can be directly
contemplated in terms of sensa, thiS, it would seem,
1S only pOSSible because an elaborate compleXity of
categonal relatIons is beIng SImultaneously appre-
hended, as constltutmg the nature of what IS thus
VII TI '.fE CATEGORIES 157
perceived. Red, we may say, is an opaque entity; it
is a dtJferentzattng factor 1n the real. T1me and space,
on the other hand, are, so to speak, surcharged w1th
meaning; and whlle each 1S umque in 1tS kmd, they
integrate w1th one another and w1th all existmg things
and events.
Connected therewith 1S a second dIfference, namely,
that our first knowledge of red cannot be further
developed. We may, of course, learn much about the
phys1cal and physlOloglCal antecedents of the redness;
but In the 1nIt1al expenence we have somethmg which
the blmd can never acqu1re, and whIch the sCIentist is
not in the least concerned to alter or enlarge. TIme
and space, on the other hand, being apprehended in
terms of meamngs as well as of what IS dIrectly l
contemplated, demand for theIr • adequate' appre-
henSlOn vaster labours than the mathematICIans of
genIUs from Pythagoras to Emstem have yet accom-
phshed. Thus a dIstmgUlshed mathematiclan can
venture to descnbe the teachmg, m regard to tIme,
space, and matter, now most generally accepted,
at least among the non - mathematIcal, as bemg
bemghtedly medIaeval.
.. There IS a trimness about It, with Its mstantaneous present,
Its vanIshed past, Its non-existent future, and Its mert matter.
This tnmness IS very mediaeval and III accords with brute fact
The theory which I am urgmg admIts a greater ultimate
mystery and a deeper ignorance.. . It IS Impossible to
meditate on time and the mystery of the creative passage of \
nature WIthout an overwhelmmg emotion at the hmltations of
human intelligence." 1
1 The Concept of NaJun, p 73. Cf P 178 on • the creative advance of
nature'. .. We habitually muddle together thiS creative advance, which
we experIence and know as the perpetual transition of nature Into novelty,
WIth the smgle-term iCrIeS whIch we naturally employ for mc:\surement,"
 THEORY OF KNO~LEDGE CHAP

Thus categonal thInkIng, OWing to Itc; citr('ct con-

nection with IntUltlOn, connects also, Indirectly, with
sensIng. IntultlOn IS Impossible without categonal
thinkin g ; nothIng can be intuited save by the aid of
\ meanIngs conceptually entertained. And SInce sensa
can never by themselves constitute a complete present-
atlOnal field, but reqUIre as supplementary factors the
objects of IntultlOn, the occurrence of senSing IS hke-
wise conditioned by categonal thInkIng Complete
conSClOusness, t.e. any actual conSClOusness, Involves
all three-on the objective side, the sensa, the cate-
gonal relatlOns, time, and space, on the subjective
side, sensIng, categonal thInkIng, and IntUltIng.
As already noted, what IS known as In tlme and
space is always apprehended as prolonged and supple-
mented In and through Ideal meamngs \Vhen we
look out upon a Visual field, the opaque Intenor of the
objects seen, and those of their surfaces which are
turned away from us, eXist for us In thought, that IS,
m Ideal constructIOn. So much IS umversally recog-
nised; but as I have endeavoured to show,l the Ideal
factor enters even Into what, In seemmg, IS utterly
Immediate, VIZ. the dIsCnmInatlOn of the given shapes
and Sizes, of the given times and motlOns. And though
Ideal meamng IS thus all-pervasive, It does not render
the world thereby apprehended subjective or merely
Imaginary. On the contrary, these meamngs disclose
to US, much more completely than can the sensa, the
constltutlOn and scope of the Independently reaP
1 Above, p 134 if.
• Cf Space, TIme and Detty, vol I pp 4I-Z .. We must not Imagine
that the elements are unreal because they are Ideal constructIOns, as the
word construction IS apt to suggest, any more than we must Imagme that
a man's back IS unreal because I do not see It but only Imagme It or have
It m Idea For sense has no monopoly of reahty We ~ch reahty by all
 VII TI-:E CATEGORIES 159
Space is mdeed visually intUltable only as It IS coloured;
but the factor of thought IS no less necessary than the
factor of sense, In order that 'spreadoutness' be
apprehensIble In intUltIOn.
Though Mr. Alexander would very justly disavow
the mterpretatIOn which I shall place upon what he is
saymg, I cannot resist quotmg the followmg happily
expressed passage:
" . reality IS not lImited to sensible constituents but con-
tams Ideal and conceptual ones The back of a solId object
which we see m front, the taste of an orange which we feel
or see are Ideal, but they belong none the less to the real solId
and the real orange Likewise the concept or thought of a dog
IS as real a constituent of the dog as what makes him a sIngular
thmg It is Its structural plan. Like all the objects of our
expeflence, any part of space contaInS the two aspects of
sIngulanty and u11lversality It IS Itself and it follows a law
of structure. Pomts are smgular, but they have such structure
as becomes a pomt and are so far unIversal" 1

If the above statements be agreed to, we shall be

justified m concludmg that, so far as tIme and space
are concerned, thought and intUitIOn mutually condition
one another. For though continUity must be thought
in order to be intUIted, It IS no less true that when thus
thought, through the approprIate concepts, what is
intUlted reveals to us a type of ' unmterruptedness '
whIch IS unique in its kmd and could never have been
antiCIpated had the categorIaI concepts alone been at
our disposal. Space can be apprehended only because
it IS actually there, and m the process of intUitIOn

\ our powen All we have to be sure of IS that we use them rIghtly, so that
the whole, by whatever powers of ours It IS apprehended, shall be Itself and
self-conSIstent ..
1 Space. T,me f!2Id DeIly, vol. I p lSI.
160 THEORY OF KNOW.LEDGE CHAP

presents itself to us in Its own per30n. The employ-

ment of certain categorIal concepts is a condItion
antecedent to our IntUIting an existence of thIs
general type (t.e. one whIch possesses contInUIty);
but the intUItIOn, when it comes, dIscloses a something
not otherwIse knowable. IntUItIon, we may say, IS so
far lIke sensIng In that It has the contemplative char-
acter, and gives to somethIng objective the opportumty
for its self-revelation. The knower must be adequately
eqUIpped; but It IS upon the object that the outcome
depends.
The presence In the IntUIted of more than can be
anticipated through the cat ego rIal concepts mvolved
in its apprehenSIOn IS patently eVident when we con-
sider that the categorIal factors are seemmgly Identical
for both time and space 1 Yet time and space, how-
ever they may agree In certam fundamental features
which concern their singleness and continUIty, are
otherwise extraordinarIly different. Popular thought
may be in error when It conceIves them as separate
eXIstences. They may, as many mathematlCians maIn-
tam, condItIOn one another; and tIme be, as It were,
only a dImenSIon whIch wIth space makes up a four-
dimenSIOnal system. StIll It remains none the less
true that time IS not redUCible to space, If It be VIewed
as dIfferent from space, nor to the other three dimen-
sions, If It be aSSImIlated to space, and that only In
IntUItIOn, not In conceptual thinking, can what thus
umquely dIst111gUIshes It be dIsclosed to our VIew.
But, It WIll be agam objected, If each type of con-
tinuity is actually embodied 111 the time and the space
which we intuite, and if In intuition time and space
stand self-revealed, Will not contemplatIon, conceived
1 Also for number.
VII THE CATEGORIES 161

as a process analoglu'5 to sensing, by Itself suffice for

their apprehensIOn~ This objectIOn I suppose myself
to have already answered in dealing with the appre-
hension of a duratIOnal span and an extensive field. 1
If duration cannot be passively contemplated, neither
can the speCial type of' umnterrupted pluralIty' that
constitutes time; and the same must be true of ' un-
10terrupted pluralIty' 10 ItS spatial form. IntUltion,
it would seem, can remam intUitive and be genUlnely
contemplatIve, even though, for ItS actuahsatIOn, it be
complexly conditioned on the subjective side. Here,
as so universally throughout the natural world, seeming
slmphclty IS but masked compleXity, and is only
pOSSible through the co-operatIOn of a multitude of
factors which do not disclose themselves to superficial
view.
ConSCiousness, to repeat, even when most truly
contemplative, IS never merely contemplative, every-
thing be10g done, so to speak, by the self-revealing of
the object. "\Ye may not argue that because sensing
allows, or rather perhaps constrams to, thiS 1Oterpreta-
tlon, IntUlt10g may do so hkewlse. For sensing, If my
general thesis be sound, IS Itself only pOSSible 10 so far
as it is supplemented by processes of a fundamentally
different character. The total field of our appre-
hension, or at least those of ItS features which are
pervasive of it, cannot be apprehended 10 the same
manner as ItS sensory elements.

(d) The Categories of Substance and Causality

But the categories, besides thus serving, in co-
operation with the intuited, to make pOSSible our
1 Above, p 80 ff
M
 THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE CHAP

intuitions, have also a further fur:ction. They have,

as we find, a wider range, and make possible meanings
-such as substance and causality-which can have no
equivalent 10 exclusively spatial and temporal relations.
Intuition has, it IS true, a sponge-like quality whereby
it appropriates to itself the contnbutlOns of thought;
as in the analysis of sense-perceptlOn, only with diffi-
culty, and not by any method of Isolation, can the con-
ceptual factors be singled out. None the less there IS
a quite defimte hmlt to the extent to which the 10tUlted
can yield embodiment to categonal forms. This IS a
matter to which I have already made reference 1
Through 10tUltive sense-experience we can apprehend,
10 addltlOn to the sensa, only shape, Size, and motion.
We can perceive neither substance nor causabty, nor
consequently, to take the more concrete forms 10
which these categorIes are SCientifically specified, either
mass or energy. Mass and energy are Ideal con-
structlOns, necessary 10 order to account for what we
experience, but never so appear10g m their own persons
that we can contemplate them face to face 10 the direct
manner of shape, size, and motion. Nor are they 10
the posltlOn of the 1Otenor parts of bodies, or even of
the inner experIences which we Impute to other selves.
We can, on occaSlOn, venfy how the mner parts of
bodies are arranged, and in our own persons, feelmgs
and conations are directly expenenced. But mass and
energy m the phYSical realm, as lIkewise mental powers
and dispositions in the psychical realm, are 10 an
altogether different pOSition. They can only be arrived
at through the processes of ideal construction. That
is to say, they can only be thought, and can never be
I either sensed or 1Otulted. Our thinking of them,
1 Cf above, pp 1]:1.-]
VlJ THF CATEGORIES
though directed byl the categorial forms which they
serve to specify, IS indeed based upon the data of
experience; but however mamfold be the data, and
however rehable be the processes by which the Ideal
constructlOns are built up, they must to the end remain
outside the provmces of mtultlOl1 and of mner experi-
ence. We are not merely Imputing to this or that
reahty what we otherwise or elsewhere experience; we
are discermng what to the end contmues to be dls-
cermble only by this method. But if so, must not
such thmkmg be regarded as, so to speak, creatlve-
t.C. as proceedmg by a method of metaphysical postula-
tton I-and If It be thus creative, can It at the same
time legitimately be regarded as revealmg, hke sensmg
and mtUltmg, the nature of the mdependently reaP
Before attemptmg to answer this difficult questIOn,
we must determme more precisely the nature of those
categones which conform to the type of substance and
causahty.
The very generally recogmsed fact that substance
and causahty stand m the closest pOSSible connectIOn
With one another would seem to be due to the connec-
tIOn of both with the category of whole and part, which
is, in fact, the baSIS of all other categories. For just
as the category of necessitation slgmfies the relation
whereby a whole IS a whole relatively to its parts,
namely, as determming them, substance would appear
to sigmfy the correlative aspect whereby these parts go I
to constitute the whole which thus determines them.
However a whole may condltlOn ItS parts, It must be a
whole of parts, and in the absence of the parts would
1 I e making postulates for which experience affords no grounds-
a method which Mr Alexander and Mr Whitehead are very rightly
emphatic m reJectmg.
 THEORY OF KNOVYLEDGE CHAP

not be a whole or Indeed eXIst In "any form. To this

extent the relation IS recIprocal; and In so far, though
not further or otherwIse, the parts are seff-subslstent.
Had thIS connection m whIch substance always stands
to the whole that acts as ItS enVIronment been kept
more conSIstently In VIew, phtlosophy mIght have
aVOlded many of the deceptive short-cuts by whIch It
has sought to attaIn ItS goal. Just as the part IS
necessItated to be what It IS through the whole whIch
it goes to constitute and uphold, so It can only be
understood m terms of what hes • outwith '1 itself.
However • substantial' and • self-subsIstent,' to the
end it remains a part, and by that we must mean that
it is mgredlent throughout the range of ItS condi-
tIOns and effects, and that however partial It may
Itself be, these cannot fall short of the whole WIthIn
which they are found. 2 The parts can have eXistence
only through partIcIpatIOn m the wholeness of the
whole; they cannot be self-subSIstent In any sense
which preyents their bemg In equal degree self-
transcendent. ThIS IS qUIte eVident when we are
dealing With whole and part In ItS stnctly temporal
or spatial aspect. Modern mathematiCs may define
a continuum as being composed of pOints, but It at
once adds that they constitute a • compact' series,
such that between any two pomts other points can
always be found to eXist. In other words, an analYSIS
of the continuum can never reduce It to a countable
number of self-subsIstent pomts. The points are
POSllloIlS, and positions have meaning only by reference 1
to the series or other wholes within which they are
1 I use thiS ScotticISm as conveYlDg a meaning more exact than the
term • outside •
I Cf the passage quoted from Mr. Whl~ehead, above p 7"
VII THt;E CATEGORIES
dtsmmtnatcd. That this IS no less true of substance
in all ItS possIble applications IS what I here venture
to suggest. l
OWIng to the close connectlOn in which substance
and causality stand to one another, sImIlar remarks
are equally applicable to the latter. If necessitation
refers to the manner in which a whole determInes ltS
constituent parts, the very usual vIew of causatIOn as
conslstIng in a relatlon between two substances or two
events, or even between two dlstInct sets of conditions,
will have to be reconsidered. If substances and events
are, as we must recognise, In all cases embedded In,
and constltuted by, the wlder wholes which make
them what they are, no causal actIOn can draw ltS
resources exclUSively from any such narrowly delimIted
eXistences. When causal agency or connection is
Viewed In the above manner the causal relatlOn becomes
unintelligible, and does vlOlence to the contInUltles
whICh are so fundamental a feature of all natural
occurrences. Causal agency, lIke substance, always.,
transcends the bounds of that In which It IS Immediately'
located; and to comprehend either we must reckon
wlth the context and environment with which they are
indissolubly bound up. I do not challenge Hume's
mam theSIS, that the agency, as agency, transcends
our means (at least present means) of knowledge.
But If the more concrete standpOInt be adopted, much
In hiS method of statIng hiS argument WIll call for
alteration of a quite radical character.
1 How • open' or how • closed' the Universe may be, I am not here
Intending to prejudge Cf above, pp 141-3
166 THEORY OF KN0'YLEDGE CHA:P

(e) The Ltmtts wtthtn whzch Immedtate Experience

tS enclosed
At thIS pomt we are called upon to consider, more
fully than we have yet done, the lImIts wlthm whIch
Immediate expenence IS enclosed, and the manner m
whIch thought, m Ideal constructIOn, enables the mmd
to transcend these lImIts and so to apprehend realIty
in ItS wIder and deeper aspects.
The range allowed to ImmedIate expenence, on the
objectIve sIde, IS determmed by the extent to whIch
Nature can mamfest Itself through the features of
size, shape, motion, and the sensa. Whatever m
Nature IS not expressed til these features, though ItS
fuller nature may for thought be expressed through
them (as, e g., Its sohdlty or 'materlahty' through
sensatIOns of reslstance),I does not allow of bemg
sensuously expenenced. It can only be reached
through Ideal constructIOn. Mass and energy are
subject to thIs hmltatIOn. 2
On the subJecttve stde, these hmlts are determmed
by the extent to whIch the mInd can ImmedIately
expenence Its own states and processes; and thIs, as
It would seem, It can do only In feehng and conation,
t.e. In processes of' enjoyment.' Processes of cogmtIOn
or awareness, t.e. all forms of conscIOusness whIch are
not feelmgs or conatIOns,3 are processes whIch we
1 • Matter' IS a more or less popular term, denotmg what, from the
sCIentIfic pomt of VIew, are hIghly com pie'!: phYSIcal entItIes Its presence
IS determmed, for ordinary conSCIousness, pnmarlly by sensabons of contact ~
and resIstance
2 On thIS subject, cf Stout's Manual oj Psychology, 3rd ed p. 18 If.
• I am here retaInIng the usual dIstInction between the three aspects of
conscIous experIence' (I) awareness as a term eqUivalent to the term
cognItIOn, (2) feelIng, and (1) conatIon Con,clousness and awareness are
not, therefore, bynonymous terms.
VII

postulate in view of certain changes in, and features

of, the field of the sensuously experienced and of the
thought-about-a field whIch, of course, mcludes
the 'enjoyed I feelmgs and conatIOns. In other
words, we have no awareness of awareness, any more
than we directly contemplate mass or energy. Aware-
ness is indeed as fundamental m the psychIcal life as
physIcal SCIence shows energy to be m the natural
world. For to allege that we are never aware of
awareness IS not to assert that we know nothmg about
It; we know a great deal about It. Awareness can,
for mstance, be defined as an essentially contemplattve
process, and yet as not merely a paSSIve capacIty of
bemg 'modIfied' (whatever that may mean) by the
objects to which It IS ' dIrected I (another term really
meaningless m thIS connectIOn).! It must, It would
seem, be hIghly complex, mvolving the apprehenslOn
of those fundamental meamngs that are necessary to
the mtuition of tIme and space.
That such analyses are much more precanous than
those by whIch in physIcal SCIence the existence of
mass and energy are demonstrated, I am not concerned
to questIon. But that the dtfference IS, m all essentIals,
a difference only m degree-due in the psychIcal field
to the greater paUCIty of the data and to the greater
compleXIty of what is bemg analysed-the phYSICIst,
in face of the present dlsturbmg controversies in
regard to his mam ultImate concepts, wIll probably
not care to deny.
Together with the processes of awareness, the
psychologist is constrained to postulate a varIety of
1 On Mr Alexander's ultra-realist View, the • direction' of awareness
does, of course, have a very definite meanmg, but I am speakmg from a
different standpoint
168 THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE CHAP.

special powers and dISposItIOns. just as the physical

is wider than the material, so the psychIcal IS wIder
than the consclOUS. For not only IS the Immensely
greater proportIOn of the m1Od's possIble consclOUS
expenences, e.g. ItS memones, not 10 consclOusness at
anyone moment; the powers and dIsposItions which
constItute the self, for 10stance the capacItIes, partly
1Onate, largely acqUIred, whIch form the 1Od1VIdual's
more or less abId10g 10tellectual and moral character,
cannot ever appear 'wIth1O the conSCIOUS field' In
themselves. They determ1l1e our 10tellectual processes
and our conduct, and they find expreSSIOn m the
feelmgs and conatIOns, but only, we may say, 10 a
manner analogous to that 10 whIch mass and energy
reveal themselves 10 and through SIze, shape, motion,
and the sensa, t.e. not dIrectly 10 theIr own persons,
but very efficIently, for all practical purposes, 10 the
effects whIch 10 the dIrectly expenenced entIties they
do determ1Oe.
There are certam types of eXIstence whIch cannot
be exclusIvely referred eIther to the class of ImmedIate
expenences or to the class to whIch energy and mental
dispOSitions belong, though hke the latter they are
reached by processes of Ideal constructlOn. Such are
the constituents 1Oto whIch sCience breaks up the
larger bodies which alone are apprehensible 10 sense-
experience, z.e. molecules, atoms, and electrons. If
we directly expenence the larger bodies, then Zpso
facto we are directly expenenc10g theIr constituents-
not with any completeness, but still in at least
certam of theIr features, e.g. as to the portlOns of
space wIth10 which they lie, the general shapes to
which by theIr groupings and vIbratory motions they
give rIse, and the translatory motlOns whICh, 10 com-
vu THE CATEGORIES
posing a mal>l>, they share In common. Also, these
constituents are viewed as themselves possessing shapes
and motlOns, In some degree' analogous to those of the
bodIes whIch they compose. On thIS assumption
we can In ImaginatIon pIcture molecules, atoms, and
electrons; we can even construct enlarged models of
what we conceIve to be theIr groupmgs and spatial
inter-relatIons.
The status of the ether IS a more dIfficult question.
On KelVin's VIew of atoms as vortIces In ether, the
ether WIll so far be In much the same positlOn as
the atoms themselves. We shall be expenencIng It
dIrectly in so far as we expenence bodIes whIch are
made up of portlOns of the ether m thIS or that state
of tenSIon. We shall not, of course, thereby ex-
penence the ether In such manner as to be able, by
dIrect Inspection, to read off ItS propertIes and char-
actenstIcs. But neIther can we do thIS in regard
to gross matter, t.e. read off the constItutIon and
charactenstIcs of molecules and atoms. Both matter
and ether we know dIrectly In the ImmedIate expen-
ence of theIr behavlOur, and therefore much m the
manner In whIch we gather a man's abIlIties and
character, t.e. hIS abldmg capaCItIes and dIspOSItions,
from hIS dIrectly observed actIons. In other words,
we may say that we know molecules, atoms, and ether
dIrectly In certain of theIr charactenstIcs, and through
Ideal constructlOn as regards theIr other propertIes.
These latter propertles, In turn, are of two types,
those which are expressible in terms of SIze, shape, or
motion, and which therefore allow of being pIctured
in Imagination, and so of being represented by a
mechanical or diagrammatic deVIce, and those whIch
are redUCIble to or Involve mass and energy. These
170 THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE CHAP

remarks will stlll hold, though wiLh certain modIfica-

tions, even when ether IS mterpreted, not on the
analogy of' matter,' but in the manner of Whitehead,
as .. an ether of events." For so long as the concept
of ether IS employed at all m physical SCience, pre-
sumably it belongs to the same class of hypothetically
constructed entities as molecules, atoms, and electrons.

(f) Further ConsIderatIon oj the Categorzes

oj Substance and Causaltty
The category of substance stands for the demand
that we find the self-subSIStent (m the duly quahfied
sense above noted),l and causahty for the demand that
we find the really effective agenczes (hkewlse m the
above quahfied sense). Both categones are forms
whereby umty IS sought: the former seeks this umty
m the abldmgly eXistent, the latter m the changes
which the eXistent undergoes. Further, both cate-
gOries obtam apphcatlOn m our experience only m
connection With sensa, that IS, only where, and m so
far as, the contmUltIes of time and space are dlffer-
\ent1ated through qualItatIve d1fferences. For m sub-
stance we seek that which umfies d1fferent sensa, and
IS the ground of their bemg expenenced together, and
of their eXlstmg 10 this or that specific mode under this
or that set of conditions; and m causahty we seek the
conditIOns which determine a quahtatlvely character-
Ised event to take the place of another event of d1fferent
character.
We may, in the light of results established by the
SCiences, come to recognise that the qualities are sensa,
and so to regard them as events and not as attributes
1 Pp 16 3-5
VlI THE CATEGORIES
of bodies, but we de, not thereby succeed m ehminating
all qualitatIve differences even from the mechanical
sphere. For when the secondary quahtles are thus
transferred to another plane of occurrence, their place
is taken by the various forms of energy; and, as we
have noted, energy IS a type of eXistence not plcturable
m ImagmatlOn, and never capable of exhaustive defil11-
tlon, though progressively defined, as regards certam
of Its modes of behavIOur, m the light of the data
supplIed by dIrect experIence.
ThIs, It would seem, IS one mam ground of the
problematiC character of the categorIes. For smce
energy enters into all mstances of substance and
causahty that are locahsable m the physIcal realm, and
IS mdeed (though not as opposed to, but as mvolvmg
mass) theIr most fundamental factor, It confers on the
Ul11tles which we seek to define by means of these
categones ItS own abId111gly problematic character.
If we cannot profess to comprehend how anyone
type of energy can eXIst abidmgly 111 'one' place or
, one' thmg; If, that IS to say, 'potential' energy be
definable only through the effects which follow when
certam conditions are realIsed, we cannot hope to
comprehend how a number of dIfferent potential
energIes-colour, heat, chemIcal energies, etc.-are
ul11ted m substance. And when the no less prob-
lematIC factor, that of mass, IS recogl11sed, thIS con-
clUSIOn IS the more fully confirmed.
SimIlarly, as regards causalIty, m determming the
manner m whIch one form of energy passes mto
another, we can directly observe only those character-
istics whIch take the form of SIze, shape, motion, and
the sensa. The energy as energy, and therefore the
process as genumely actIve or causal, eludes our appre-
 17'2 THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE CHAP

hension. We continue to thtnk it, and endeavour

through observatton of Its effects to locate It. We
hkewise endeavour to obtam as complete a knowledge
as possible of ItS varymg modes of behavIOur, not only
in all the pOSSible types of Situatton m which It can be
found to eXist, but also m all those 111 whIch by expen-
mental mterference It can be made to eXist. V\Te may
Indeed say that m the end by these means thiS and that
form of energy becomes as well known to us as does
the self; and how high and valuable a type of com-
prehensIOn that IS, will be admitted by all. But to
state the SituatIOn m thiS way IS Simply to recognise
that the kmd of lImitatIOn Imposed on our present
knowledge of nature extends m Similar fashIOn to our
knowledge of mind. The UnIty and ultimate nature
of the self IS certamly not less mysterIous than that of
objects; ItS active agency, when It calls up an Image of
a past event, or when It brmgs about bodIly movement,
in order to be ' understood,' would demand, In addItIon
to the solution of specIfically psychical problems, the
solutIon of those very physIcal problems whIch we have
just been conSiderIng, and that m the hIghly complex
forms In whIch they present themselves In the ph YSIO-
logIcal sCiences.
But to return to our mam pOInt: when, on the
SCIentIfic level sensa are no longer regarded, m naive
fashIOn, as properties of materIal bodies, but as them-
selves mdependent natural events, we have a further
problem, that of 'causally' correlatmg them wIth
the various physical and phYSIOlogical processes upon
which they supervene. 1 Herein, even more patently
1 Cf Whitehead, The Concept of Nature, pp 97-8 .. In natural sCience
I •to explam • means merely to discover' mterconnexlOns' For example, ID
one sense there IS DO explanation of the red which we see It IS red, and
VII THE CATEGORIES 173
than in our causal. correlation of different types of
energy, the establIshment of contmulty of process-
an ldeal after which the sCientist IS ever stnvmg-has,
at one stage or another, to glve place to a slmple
correlation of non-contmuous happemngs.
This, however, It IS Important to note, IS not a mere
fatlure of explanation, a stoppmg short m the SClen-
tdic analysIs, owmg to lack of data or to limitation
of sCientIfic techmque. ContInUlty, as we have to
recogmse, IS but one of the two confltctmg Ideals of
umty which Inspire the scientIst m his search for know-
ledge. The other ldeal lS represented by the cate-
ganes of substance and causahty, expressive the one of
the relatlve mdependence of the self-subSistent, and the
other of the relatlve mdependence mvolved m bemg
an active agent. In proportion as complete contmUlty
is establIshed, these types of existence lose theIr
specIfic characters, and realIty IS thereby proportIOn-
ately Impovenshed. The only eXistence then allowed
IS that typIfied by the contt1luance of a motIon not
interfered with; the only occurrence recogmsed IS that
of transttton from the same to the same. Substance, and
also actIvity m the sense of any advance mto novelty,
are entlrely elImmated. \Vhen the establIshment of

there IS nothing else to be said about It Either It IS posited before you In

sense-awareness or you are Ignorant of the entity red But ~clence has
explained red Namely It has discovered InterconneXlOns between red as a
factor In nature and other factors In nature, for example, waves of lIght
which are waves of electro-magnetic dlsturbance~ There are also varIOus
pathological states of the body which lead to the seeing of red \\Ithout the
occurrence of hght waves. Thus connexlons have been discovered between
red as pOSited In sense-awareness and various other factors In nature The
discovery of these conneXlons constitutes the SCientific explanation of our
vIsion of colour" Cf Broad on the relative character of the distinction
between causation and creation, Saenttjic Thought, pp 535-44, partially
quoted above, pp., 92.-l
174 THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE CHAP

such continuity IS conceIved as at' ideal in scientific

explanation, the dIfferentiating factors are all the
time bemg taken for granted. It is tacItly, but
inconsIstently, assumed that the dIfferentiatIOns wIll
still in some manner persist when the goal IS
attained. Indeed we can observe, m the hIstory
of the sciences, a certain tendency to alternate
between the two Ideals. At one time dIscreteness,
as in the chemIcal analYSIS of seemingly continuous
bodies, is mainly emphasl!;ed and progreSSIvely estab-
lished; and even the ether may then be vIewed as a
gas 1 On the other hand, when thIS method of
explanation has been carried to a certain pOint, the
OppOSIte tendency reasserts Itself, and the dIscrete
eXIstences, atoms or electrons, are VIewed as being but
dIfferentIatIons of an ethenc medmm regarded as
continUOus. These OppOSIte tendenCIes Illustrate the
twofold reqUlrements which, as I have already
emphaSIsed, are prescrIbed by any Ideal of unity that
is genumely to fulfil the demands VOIced through the
fundamental category of totahty. There can be no
totahty If there be no parts; and there can be no parts
If the self-subSIstent be dIsallowed. In other words,
there must be dIfferentiatIOns of content If there IS to
be a wholeness whIch IS more than merely that which
belongs to each and every portIOn of a contInUOUS
senes or medmm. On the other hand, there can be
no parts, and therefore nothing self-subSIstent, save in
and through a whole whIch supphes the wider context
and the conditIOning enVIronment necessary thereto.
Accordmgly any complete reduction to continuity, if
genuine and not merely apparent, sIgmfies only that in
some particular case factors, which appear in correla-
1 As by Mendeleeff
VII THE CATEGORIES 175
tion with, or as bear,ers of, the contmuous process, can
for the purposes m hand be left out of account. This
is what happens when the process whereby energy IS
communicated from one body to another IS treated as
a contmuous process. The two bodies, as bearers
of the motIon and as sequent • owners' of the energy,
are Ignored. There is no causal activity, not only
because there is nothing to act, but also because there
is really no change such as demands causal agency for
its occurrmg. The energy, viewed as a process of
actual matton, has, so to speak, been persomfied, as
bemg an entity m and by Itself, and therefore as con-
tmumg to be what presumably It has unchangmgly
all along been, namely, a vibratory or translatory
motIOn. Such a method of procedure may be Justified
by Its fruits when the sCientist has m mmd, say,
the pnnclple of the conservatIon of energy, z.e. of
ItS eqUlvalence With Itself en quantzty throughout
all ItS pOSSible transformatIOns. In such an mquiry
the precise nature and conditIOns of the transforma-
tions are not relevant consideratIOns, and can there-
fore be left out of account But as the prIncIple, m
its employment of the term • transformatIOn,' Itself
indicates, the other features, though abstracted from,
are not demed, still less dIsproved. In other inquiries,
as in chemical analysis, their consequences and effects
are among the direct subjects of study.
To return now to the question, above raised,l as to
whether In employmg the concepts of substance and
active agency we are not mdulging 10 a type of meta.-
physical postulation for which experience can afford
no evidence. My answer, as already suggested,z is
that so far are these concepts from being at a certain
• P. '3+ If.
17 6 THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE CHAP

stage in knowledge-whether at the animistlc stage or

later through the Greek philosophers I-introduced
as ungrounded postulates, to obviate dlfncult1es wh1ch
ought never to have been raised, that on the contrary
only in and through them can ordinary sense-experi-
ence be acqUlred. Metaphysical postulatl0n-1f the
processes by wh1ch we thus round out our exper1-
ence may be so descrlbed-1s leg1timate, because only
Ias metaphys1cally onented 1S the human type of
conSClOusness possible at all; 2 only by transcendmg
the 1mmed1ate can 1t apprehend the 1mmed1ate. The
functlOn of the fundamental categories (whole and
part, necess1tatlOn) IS to endow the mmd w1th the
capac1ty to apprehend certain universal meanings
wh1ch are md1spensable for the mtUltlOn of time and
space. These categones are apprehended m and
through our awareness of the latter; and though they
must be further specified before they take the forms
of substance and causahty, th1s specificatlOn 1S only
such as they themselves prescribe, in the1r relation to
the other aspects of sense-experience.
What goes far to justify the attack upon 'meta-
phys1cal postulation' 1S the assumptlOn which has
generally gone along w1th It, that not only can
substance and causahty be located in th1s and that
portion of space, in this and that set of events, but
1 Mr. Whitehead would seem to ascribe their mtroductlon mainly to
Aristotle Cf The Concept of Nature, pp 16-18, 2.4
• Cf Stout, Some Fundamental Pomts m the Theory of KnfJ'Wledge CSt
Andrews University QUlncentenary Publications, 1911), p. 2.1 "Thought,
as such, has for Its ultimate object the universe In Its unity; but not,
of course, the umverse m all Its detail The speCial features emerge
successively, leavmg a relatively mdefimte background. The unity of
the universe IS apprehended m apprehending ItS parts as being partIal--as
bemg Incomplete and requlrmg completion through their relations Within
a whole which transcends them ..
VII THE CATEGORIES 177
that the categories. In and by themselves, yield a.
more than purely formal insight Into their nature.)
Such positive insight, as I have argued, is only
possible In proportion as empirical data-thus far
all too limited in extent and type-are available for
the purpose.

N
 CHAPTER VIn
SENSE AND INTUITION

WE may now proceed to a question, the conslderation

of whlch I have hltherto been deferring, and upon
which much remams to be said; how, if visual
and other sensa be not in themselves extended,
we yet apprehend them as spread-out; or to state
the question in reverse fashlOn: how the mtuited
comes to be apprehended In terms of the sensed. If
the sensa and extension be really, In their Intrinsic
nature, mdependent of one another, how come they
to be thus, In our experIence, Inseparably inter-
connected? It must also be explamed how mtUltion
can be distinct from sensmg, and yet at the same
time be a direct, face-to-face apprehenslOn of the
independently real.

(i.) PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS

The reasons which I have given for adoptmg the

above pOSitions are, in the mam, threefold. In the
first place, the sensa are, It would seem, complexly
conditioned by antecedent physical and physiological
processes, and as thus occurring as terminal members
in very lengthy series cannot be known to be qualities
inherent in the physical objects in which the series
originate. Just as sound cannot be knawn to be in
178
CHAP VIII SENSE AND INTUITION 179
a bell, so the rcdn~ss of a red book cannot be asserted
to be spread out over the covers of the book. The
posItion usually adopted by subjectivist thinkers IS
that the redness-, though not In the book, may none
the less have a spreadoutness proper to Itself. ThIs
view I am unable to accept for the further, second,
reason, that If extensity be thus allowed to vIsual
sensa, the space whIch we contemplate wIll not be real
space, but a duphcate, and that In consequence all
the dlflicultles of a thoroughly sUbjectIvIst posltlOn
wdl be on our hands. Then thIrdly, and lastly, thIS
position has likeWise to be rejected for the reason
that space being what it IS, It cannot be apprehended,
in the manner of colour, by a process of sensing.
It is, It would seem, an object not of sense but of an
IntuitlOn In which categonal thinking plays an in-
dIspensable part. That wherem it does agree with
colour is, we may believe, that the process of itS appre-
hension, however complexly condltlOned, is genuinely
contemplattve, YIelding knowledge of the independently
real. Just as we contemplate a sensum face to face,
and know it for what it ls-a constItuent In a public
world, though, for assIgnable reasons, dIrectly known
only by one perCIpient-so we IntUlte space in itS
actual, unique nature, as a fundamental feature of
the real.
As I have also already pomted out,l on thIS view
the brain has two very different functions: on the one
hand, as condItIOnIng the sensa; and on the other
hand, as conditioning the various processes, sensing,
intuiting, and categorial thInkIng, whereby the sensa
and all other factors are apprehended.
These, then, bemg the reasons which constrain us
1 Above, PP 79-&0
180 THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE CHAP

to hold that the colour-sensa, m l:' greement with all

other sensa, are extensionless, I may now proceed to
indIcate the manner m whIch I should propose to meet
the many and ObVlOUS dIfficulties to which this posItion
gives rise.
My problem may be stated to be that of showing
how sensmg and mtUItmg, notwIthstanding theIr
dIversity of nature, co-operate m making possIble the
contemplatIve process whereby coloured space reveals
itself to the mInd. l That we experIence colour only
as extended and VIsual space only as coloured is the
agreed datum, of whIch the subjectIVIst and the In-
tUItIve theories are competmg explanatlOns. On the
subjectivIst VIew, the space so apprehended is a
prIvate space, dIstmct from that of the natural
world. On the VIew whIch I am defending, real,
Independent space, In ItS own person, is here makIng
entry Into the 'conSCIOUS field: Both VIews run
counter to the belIefs of ordmary conSClOusness. On
the subjectivIst VIew, we suffer from an IllUSIOn when
we belIeve, as the unsophIstIcated always do, that the
space whIch the colour occupIes IS portIOn of an
Independent space. But on that type of intUItIve
view whIch I am endeavouring to formulate we
are committed to a seemIngly much more paradOXIcal
consequence, namely, that we are almost certaInly
subject to an IlluslOn when we belIeve, as again the
unsophIstIcated always do, that colour really occupIes
the space en whtch tt IS seen. The realIty whIch IS
thus seen must, indeed, have some POSItIve properties
of its own; and just possibly it may be coloured, and
1 SInce the objections to the position which I am defendIng are at their
strongest In regard to colour, any answer which I can give will apply,
a f0rtlon, to ot her types of sensa
VIII SENSE AND INTUITION r8r
may even have the particular colour whIch It IS seen
as hav1Og; 10 all probabIhty, however, It has not.
I may be able, in some degree, to tone down this
unqualified statement, that a sensum is never where
it IS seen-if sensa be not in space, are they not as
correctly seen in one space as in any other?-but in
substance it must stand.

(a) The Assoctationzst Hypothests

I may now make my thesis more defiDlte. The
VIew commonly held in assocmtlODlst psychology, from
the tIme of Locke 1 onwards, IS that the m10d at each
moment constructs out of the given sensa, WIth the aid
of revIved sensa connected therewith, the time and
space world of ' immedIate 'experience. A well-mgh
incredIble elaborateness of construction is thus postu-
lated as be10g carried out by the mind, and as hav10g
to be achIeved anew at each moment. Now If the VIews
for which I have been contendmg can be accepted, no
such exceSSIve burden need be Imposed upon the
mind. For if our awareness of what IS pubhc cannot
be accounted for as due solely to awareness of sensa,
but demands the co-operatIon of factors not contained
in, or revealed by, the sensa, a much simpler machinery
will suffice. If there IS conscIOusness of tIme and
space whenever there is conSClOusness at all, may we
not reasonably expect that the constant factors wIll
have conditions, physiological and psychIcal, dIstinct
from, and supplementary to, those whIch condition
apprehension of the ever-changing sensa? Why should
the constant be regarded as ever-renewed, and not
rather as economically prOVIded for in some constant
1 Cf below, P 183. note z
 THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE CHAP

way. When a letter of more or less uniform Import

has to be addressed to a large number of people with
dlffermg reqUirements, we find It conve111ent to have
a fixed form printed, with blanks for the names and
other varymg Items. This is preferable to the re-
composmg and rewriting of each separate epistle.
Surely Nature may be expected to have hit upon so
obvious an economy as this, and not to have laid
upon the bram and mmd the enormous and useless
strain of creatmg ever anew out of the varymg sensa
of the moment the fixed and constant features that are
always there when anythmg at allis bemg apprehended.
Does not the associatlO111st hypothesIs appear un-
natural, the more we thmk of It? On the lower levels
of vegetable and ammal hfe, Nature's devices are,
indeed, not mfrequently extravagantly wasteful; but
as she advances to the higher reaches, her methods,
just m proportIOn as they become the more effective,
are characterised, m equal degree, by the more
economical adaptatIOn of means to ends.
\~.rhen, further, we observe that conscIOusness
always mvolves the thought of more than IS per-
ceived, and that only by reference to a wider reahty
than IS bemg sensuously apprehended IS conscious-
ness possible at all, the associationist theory displays
another and yet more serious defect. That the sensa
of our developed conscIOusness demand for their
apprehensIOn a settmg or context supplementary to
themselves, the assoclatlOmsts are, of course, very well
t aware. This supplement, addItIonal to the sensa,
but demanded in apprehension of the sensa, they
regard as consisting m the reVIval of past experi-
ences. But such a position Implies that conscious-
ness begms as bemg awareness of smgle sensa, and
VIIl SENSE AND INTUITION
only hecomes complex in proportlOn as experience
develops. As alrt:ady argued,l analysIs of our con-
sciousness of time suffices to disprove this view. If
the ' now' cannot be apprehended save m a context
of the ' no longer' and the ' not yet,' reVival of past
expenences will not account for such a mode of aware- ,
ness. This type of context is a type which must in
its mam features be present m every case; and It IS
therefore as httle capable of bemg accounted for m
terms of past as m terms of present sensa.
The plauslbdlty of the aSSoclatlOmst theory IS partly
due to our read mess to accept the fundamental assump-
tion upon which Locke proceeds in hiS Essay, namely,
that by the method of analysts we can discover the
elements out of which the eXlstmg complexes have
arisen. This assumptIOn finds frUltful applicatIOn m
physics and chemistry, but It should not Without due
precautions be carried over mto the bIOlogical and
psychological fields. The Simple, or apparently Simple,
sensations mto which we can decompose our complex
perceptIOns are, Locke declares, the umts out of which
all expenence has been bUllt up, and through the
aggregatIOn of which It has developed. 2 Mtght we
not as well argue that the cross-sectIOn of a mature
chicken reveals to us, m the various bones and tissues,
the diverse original components out of which It has
been pieced together? To take such a view IS to adopt
one-half of the mediaeval view of growth, accordmg to
which the various parts of an oak, roots, trunk, and
branches, exist m the acorn, Without the other half

1 cr. above, pp. B2.-J

2 Though Locke cannot correctly be regarded as the father of assocla.
tIOnlSm, he has exerCIsed conSIderable mJiuence upon Its development, and
not least on thll partIcular pOlDt
 THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE CHAP

which alone makes it consIstent, namely, that a minia-

ture oak exists complete m the acorn, that the seed
is already at the start just as complex as that into
which it passes, and that growth is therefore only
increase in SIze. When we reject such mediaeval
fancies and conform our VIews to the evidence, as
now known, we have to recogmse that the parts of
a mature organism are as much products of growth
and development as IS the orgamsm itself, and that
nothmg really simIlar to them need be found in the
seed or germ-plasm from which they have been
dIfferentIated.
Owing to the fact that the egg of a chIcken can be
studIed as well as the chIcken Itself, thIS fundamental
fact has all along been appreCIated m biology; but
smce the mind of the new-born chlld can be studIed
only very mdlrectly through ItS behavlOur, the ab-
surdItIes of the assoclatlOmst psychology have per-
sisted even to our own day. Even Herbert Spencer,
though he appreCIated the bearmgs of the blOlogical
standpoint, was so unduly influenced by the atomIstIc
hypotheses prevallmg m the phYSIcal sciences, that
he attempted a grotesque blendmg of the two views,
regardmg our consclOus experIences as SImply so
many permutatlOns and combinations of an elementary
and unchangtng mental umt-a umt too SImple to be
any longer expenenced separately by us, but whIch
he conjecturally descnbed as bemg of the nature of
a SImple' shock' sensatlOn.
Atoms are no longer regarded by the physicist
and chemist as being simple m constitution; nor are
they any longer spoken of, in the manner of Tyndall
and Huxley, as being" the foundation-stones" of the
material Umverse. The analytIC method contmues
VIII SENSE AND INTUITION
to bear good frUIt in these fields) but it need no longer
be viewed as the type of explanatlOn to whIch every
science, even that of psychology, ought to conform.

(0) The Structure and Complex Constltutton

of the P sychoplasm
The mam dlfficultles of the VIew whIch I am
endeavouring to propound begm when we mquire
how awareness of time, space, and the categories can
be possIble, If It be not acquIred through the sensa;
and in meetmg these dIfficulties I shall agam make use
of a doctnne propounded by Mr. Ward-the doctrme
of 'psychoplasm,' as expounded m hiS Psychologteal
Prtnctples. 1
" As bioplasm, not a concourse of atoms, IS for the present
the limitIng term for biology, so we may speak of psychoplasm,
and not a ' mamfold of sensations' or ' mInds tuff ' as our present
limit In psychology Of the more ultimate nature of either
plasm. of the precise relatIOns of the one to the other. or of the
relation of hfe In the phYSIOlogical sense to experience or life
In the psychological sense, on all these POInts. we certaInly
know little and need for the present say nothIng But
the analogy between biogenesIs and psychogeneSIs IS both
mdlsputable and strikIng we have several times been led
InCIdentally to note It. GeneSIS m both cases ImplIes a umty
that is '>haped from wlthm-a conceptIOn, be It observed, that
is essentIally non-mechanical"
Mr. Ward, owing to the influence of hiS somewhat
monadlstlc view of the soul or knowing subject, takes
the term psychoplasm as referrmg only to the objective
content of experience, I.e. to the presentatlOnal con-
tinuum.ll I shall take it as applying to the subjective
factors, the powers, dispositions, and processes by
2 Cf op. czt P 424
186 THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE CHAP

means of which this continuum IS apprehended; and

so as representing an alternative to the aSSOcIatIOnIst
standpoint.
" [The] crude [asSOCiatIOnist] psychology, obsolescent In this
country Since the article ' Psychology' of the ninth editIOn of
the Encyclopeedla Brltanmca, may fairly be regarded now as
obsolete. Mental processes are not grouped Into wholes by
assoCiatIon but are distIngUishable processes within a mental
continuum. The agglutInative conceptIOn of mInd IS replaced
by the organic one MInd has Its structure and constitutIon
as an animal body has" 1
As Mr. \Vard proceeds to pOint out,2 Slllce the
bIOplasm is continUOUS throughout the successive
generations, and so In the offspnng IS contllluous With
that of the parents, we may conjecture that on the Side
of the psychoplasm, as on the Side of the bIOplasm, the
individual comes heIr to a complex and nch Inhent-
ance. The subjectIve continuum, In and through
whIch consciousness onglllates, and the objectIve
continuum which IS thereby apprehended, may well,
from the start, have a compleXIty In some degree corre-
sponding to the bIOplasm that organIcally condItIons
the pOSSibIlIty of the former.
The general character of this compleXIty has already
been indIcated. Since conscIOusness is incapable of
eXIsting save in so far as there is a field of whIch it IS
aware, and Slllce time, space, and certain categorial
relations are elements Invanably present in thIS field,
we are justIfied in arguing that conSCIOusness, on
its subjective side, must be correspondingly complex.
To apprehend the immediate, it must be able to
transcend the immediate; in order to intulte the
1 Alexander, Spau. Ttme and Detty, vol 11 P 13
• Op. CIt P +2+ ff
VIII SENSE AND INTUITION
specific characters of tIme and c;pace, it must be
eqUipped for appr~hendmg certam umversal mean-
ings, and as involved 10 these latter the fundamental
categories.
When we examme these umform elements, time,
space, and the categones, we find that they agree 10
one malO feature, namely, in bemg formal. They are
not contents, but only forms for the orgamsatlOn of
contents hIghly vanable 10 theIr characters. ThIS is
why, for the posslblhty of expenence, a further factor,
that obtamed through the process of sensing, IS
equally l11dlspensable. There can be no awareness
save on the occaSlOn, as well as 1fl terms, of sensa.
Our consclOUS expenence IS thus a functlOn of two
dIstmct factors, each of whIch must have ItS own
specIfic set of condltlOns, and 10 accordance therew1th
1tS own appropnate value. Through the constant
factors a public world 1S revealed; through the sensa,
10 terms of wh1ch alone th1s public world can be
actually expenenced, 1t 1S apprehended 10 a perspectIve
sU1ted to the l11d1v1dual's pract1cal needs.
This dlst1l1ctlOn connects wlth the twofold functlOn
of the bram to wh1ch I have already referred; Its
functlOn as cond1tlOmng awareness, and 1tS functlOn as
lcond1tiomng the occurrence of sensa. In the former
aspect the bram appears to function 111 a constant and
umform manner, correspondl11g to the umform pubhc
character of the world wh1ch by so functlonmg 1t
enables us to apprehend. In 1tS other aspect the
bram condltlOns the ever-changmg, dlscontmuous,
qualitatively varymg sensa, which are private to the
md1v1dual, and which, as such, are appropriate for
enabling him to apprehend the public world 10 a per-
spectIve as unique as are his instmctlve and other
188 THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE CHAP

needs. Each of the two fa<..tor::. has Its own role to

play, and m the absence of eIther awareness would
not occur.
Another way of stating thIS positlOn IS the followmg.
What we apprehend IS, m all cases, a complex situatlOn.
Withm this complex SItuation we dlscnminate the
contents of what It IS usual to call our sensations. But
as these contents are discrImmated wlthtn the SItua-
tion, they cannot be the materials out of whIch the
sItuation as a whole IS constructed. A whole cannot
be constructed out of a selectlOn of ItS own constItuent
parts. Indeed, the sense-contents can, It would seem,
come into eXIstence at all only under the condItions
whIch the situatlOn Itself supphes. If there be no
vlbratmg body and no aIr, no ear WIth Its mner laby-
rmthme structure and no bram connected therewIth,
there WIll be no sounds. If the hght of the sun, con-
SIstIng m wave vibratlOns, does not act on the retina
and through It on the OccIpItal lobes, no colours wIII
emerge. The sensa are events determIned by, and
happenmg wlthm, the space-hme situatlOn; and to
make them posslble, the total SItuatIon is reqUlred.
All that we are therefore Jushfied m saymg IS that we
come to apprehend the situatlOn m terms of certam of
the events whIch occur wIthm It.
If we seek some other body of sense-material out of
whIch the SItuation as a whole may be constructed,
then wIth Kant we must postulate a mamfold more
comprehenSIve than, and dIfferent from, the data of the
speCIal senses. But thIS surely is a needless and per-
verse procedure 1 Kant, It would seem, hImself only
does so owmg to the subjectIVIst manner in whIch hIS
phenomenalism, very dIfferent though it may be from
the subjectivism of Berkeley and his lIke, is stdl pro-
VIII SENSE AND INTUITION
pounded. If we aaopt an out-and-out reahst position,
no such postulate ne~d be made. Independent reality
will then be regarded as dIrectly apprehended, that is,
as making entry, not by proxy but In its own person,
Into the' field of consclOusness.'
In thIs way we avoid Descartes' subjectivist mode
of interpreting the dIfference between the primary and
the secondary quahtles of bodies, as being an opposi-
tion between quahtles that are independently real and
quahties that are states of the mind. Instead we
bIfurcate realIty so as to set only awareness on the one
sIde, and all contents, including the sensa, on the other.
The private character of the sensa is then exphcable
WIthout assumptIon of theIr subJectivIty.
That conSCIOusness, notwIthstanding Its complex
character, should functIOn so unIformly, and should,
hke whIte sunhght, conceal under a seeming sImphclty
the complexity of the processes In whIch It consIsts, IS,
as already suggested,l entirely In keepIng WIth Nature's
ordinary procedure. All Nature's sImphClties, whether
of constItution or of function, mask the well-nIgh
incredIble complexIty of the manifold contnbutory
factors whIch make them pOSSIble. Consciousness,
hke instinct, yields to introspection no insIght Into the
conditions whIch make it actual; but thIs IS no ground
for regarding eIther of them as supplying the condI-
tions of its own eXIstence. The unIform character of
conSCIOusness, so far from justifying any Inference as
to SImplICIty In ItS condItions, pOints the other way.
The ease and SImplicity of motion In a centIpede, the
act of sneeZing in a new-born child (involving, as the
physiologist assures us, the acrobatIC feat of co-
ordinating some sixty or more muscles), are the
1 Above, PP 14, 33 fr.
 THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE CHAP

outcome of InherIted mechanisms in the nervous

system of the Insect and of the chIld, and accordmgly
are more complexly conditIOned than any other known
types of natural occurrence. The condItions of our
sense-experience are not, I belIeve, exclusIvely physio-
logical; but they are at least, we may safely conclude,
hIghly mamfold and complex.
AgaIn, that the braIn should have two such very
dIfferent functIOns as that of condltlomng awareness
and that of conditlomng the sensa, IS also m lIne WIth
Nature's general mode of behaVIOur. It dehghts,
often quite grotesquely, m emplOyIng one and the same
organ for both lower and higher purposes. The
tongue, for Instance, whtle servIng as an organ for
speech, IS lIkewise the organ of taste, and as an
Instrument mdispensable m the act of ~wallowmg
and m cleanSIng the mouth, has functions still
humbler m character. The functIOns of the bram
are, indeed, so far as we can dIscover, always
exerCIsed sImultaneously. ThIS, however, does not
cause any practIcal InconvenIence. On the contrary,
such SImultaneous exercise of the two functIOns IS the
very condItIOn of effectIve control of environment,
constraming us, as it does, m being conscious of the
pubhc world, to apprehend It In a perspective UnIquely
suited to our spatial standpomt and personal needs.
Though thIS does, of course, throw obstacles in the
way of our acqumng exact knowledge of the m-
dependent nature of the matenal world, none the less,
even here, as I have already pointed out, Nature attains
two dIverse ends through a single set of instruments.
Sense-perception, in man as in the animals, though
prImarIly a strIctly practIcal device for the purposes
of adaptation, subserves, no less eifecti"ely, the very
VIII SENSE AND INTUITION
different function of making possIble the progressive
acquIsition of scientIfic Insight.
As already noted, 1 the primary function of the sensa
is to define a personal perspective, SUited to the per-
cipient's personal standpoint and IndiVidual needs.
They determIne the extent to which, the hmlts under
which, and the speCific modes In which the pnmary
qualIties are sensuously apprehended. As expenence
shows, where there are no secondary qualIties, there IS
never sense-expenence In any form. Through gusta-
tory, olfactory, and auditory sensa we apprehend
objects as conditiOnIng taste, odour, and sound;
through cutaneous and motor sensa as havIng tempera-
ture and as being solId or matenal (t.e. as resIstant),
through VIsual sensa as connected wIth lIght and
colour. Owing to the fact that the IndiVidual
acqUires his experience by the instrumentalIty of an
animal organism, It IS only thus In terms of secondary
qualIties, and under the hmltatlOns determined by
them, and In the modes whlCh they admit, that in-
dependent objects are InItIally apprehended.

(c) Anttezpatton zn Pzetortal Terms oj Later Argument

If I may be allowed to anticipate my later argument
by suggesting, in a crude, pictorial manner, the kind
of answer which I shall ultImately give to the ques-
tIon before US, what occurs when we have sense-
experIence of objects may be deSCrIbed somewhat as
follows. ConSCiousness, 10 virtue of the complex dIS-
positions which constitute the mind's capacity of
apprehension, has as the field of its observation inde-
pendent reality in time and space. But this conscious-
1 Cf above, p 3% tf.
 THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE CHAP.

ness comes into actIOn only when aroused by sensa,

private to each individual. It then, as it were,
paints this or that portion of umform time-space
m the pigments which these sensa supply. Thus
when I seem to myself to see a reflected object as
behind a mirror, what I do IS to pamt the space which
I mtUlte as behind the mirror with the colour-sensa
which I am experiencing at the moment, and so
to make the space behind the mirror sensible to the
mind. It tS the space behind the mirror which is then
seen; we are mdeed seeing It erroneously, as we find
when we bring the same sense to bear under altered
conditions, or under the same conditions test the first
expenence by another sense, such as touch. But the
use here made of the sensa does not differ m general
character from that to which we put them when we
see a book as red or the matter in bodies as bemg con-
tmuous. In all three cases the mterpretatlOn IS deter-
mmed by consideratIOns of convenience, and can be
corrected in terms of expenence which the sensa them-
selves enable us to acquire. In the first case the error
can be, and is corrected, in the lIght of ordmary
expenence; m the other two cases m the lIght of
experience sought out experimentally by the scientist.
From this standpomt, as we have likewise already
noted,I a reason can be given why we should be able
to apprehend objects only in terms of sensa which are
\not their inherent qualIties, namely, that our senses
function in subordmatlOn to the needs of a type of
experience which is telepathic in character. Through
the senses, as contmued into the brain, we come
to apprehend what is happening either at a distance
from the body, or in the case of organic sensa at a
1 Cf above, p 34
 VIII SENSE AND INTUITION 193
distance from the b. ain, and (what is of fundamental
importance for self - preservatlOn ahke among the
animals and in man) in a personal perspectIve that
exactly corresponds to the umque relatlOns in which
the observer stands to objects far and near. For
thiS latter purpose sensa, prtvate to each mdlvidual,
, and so the better varymg With his unique personal
\ vlewpomt, are a very sUltable arrangement. Colour
enables us to determme dlrectlOn, to distmgulsh at
a glance the outline of an object as it stands out
against its differently coloured background - we
can conceive no means by which thiS would be
possible in the absence of colour-to dlscrimmate
distance accordmg to bnghtness or dImness of colour-
ing, and so forth. In terms of colour-dIfferences we
are thus enabled telepathically to apprehend distance,
shape, and size. Sound warns us of movements,
and unhke colour enables us to apprehend what is
behmd our backs, as well as of what is m front,
and by its variatlOns to reveal both direction and
distance. It also admirably supplements sight owing
to its serviceablhty m the dark as well as in the
hght. Slmllar advantages justIfy the eXistence and
employment of the other types of sensa. In this, as
m other ways, the biological sciences afford a large
body of circumstantial eVidence in support of the view
here taken of the ontologIcal status and empirical
function of the sensa.
But what need, It will be said, to regard the senses
as functiomng m thiS telepathic manner, if, as I have
insisted, it is the very nature of consciousness to be
self-transcendent, and to have as its field, not subjective
or mental states, but an independent world m time
and space. 1;'he answer may be given: first, that since
o
194 THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE CHAP.

the mind can, out of its own resources, bring Into

operation only formal or categorial factors, it cannot
experience time save m a concrete duratlOnal span,
or intUlte space save as senSIbly embodied, and is
therefore dependent throughout upon given sensa.
We may be able-once we have acqUlred defimte
experIence-to think, in formal, categorIal terms, what
cannot be sensed, but for first apprehension sensa are
indispensable.
Further, If sense-experIence IS to be of any use to
animals or to man, m -their ordmary aCtiVIties, it must
be, not a contemplative apprehensIon of thmgs as
they are In themselves, not even If they be selectively
simplIfied by being apprehended only m certam of
theIr features and m part of theIr constItutIOn, but
an apprehenSIOn of them In thezr relatzons to the self.
Only so can the necessary rapidIty and adaptiveness
of response be effectively attamed. Other arrange-
ments by whIch this could have been secured may be
abstractly conceivable; but that the method actually
followed is by way of special sensa, strIctly private
and phYSIOlogically (and pOSSIbly also m part psychIC-
ally) generated, appears to be the most reasonable
interpretation of the known facts.

(d) The Nature of' Mental Images •

On thiS theory, by adoption of the view worked
out by Mr. Alexander,l we can obtain a very SImple
solution of the important question as to how we
apprehend those times which are too long past to fall
within the specious present, and those spaces which
1 Space. T,me and Detty. vol I P 97 If. III If • vol 11 P 8l ff •
:U8-19. :u8-9·
VIII SENSE AND INTUITION 195
are too distant to be cognised In terms of present
sensa. No estabhsh.ed psychologIcal results stand in
the way of our assuming that Images are Identical in
character wIth sense-perceptlOns. We may therefore
assume that In them, as In perception, sensa prIvate
to the indivIdual and physlOloglcally condItIOned con-
stItute an essentIal factor. Presumably these sensa
dIffer from those supphed m perceptIOn chiefly in
bemg proximately imtIated not by stimuh actmg on
the sense-organs, but by processes commg from other
parts of the bram. Very probably they also dIffer as
regards Intensity, steadmess, and duratIon, though, as
dreams, hallucinations, and the hke appear to show,
even In these respects the dIfferences are mamly due
to theIr incapacIty to acqUlre, m ordmary waking
expenence, a sensory background harmonIous wIth
themselves. OtherWIse they seem to playa part exactly
analogous to that of the primary sensa. 1 They are
employed by the mmd to define and articulate public
tIme and pubhc space. When we pIcture prevIOusly
expenenced happenmgs and eXIstences, we paint the
past tIme and the dIstant space m terms of sensa
now bemg expenenced by us. These sensa are still
employed to render sensIble and to partlculanse a
time and a space whIch they do not themselves reveal.
What we apprehend m and through them are not
mental or pnvate objects, but the actual events of the
past which have been experIenced by us In the past,
or whIch have been reported by others, and the
actual persisting objects whIch have been observed
by ourselves or others, and which, as we may in many
1 If I am correct In regardlDg sensa as not' quahtles' but events. the
sensa of first experience and the so-called revived sensa must aldce be
regarded as one-lime occurrences.
 THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE CHAP

cases have reason to know, still exist, 111 some distant

space, continuous with the space of present sense-
perception. Just as when we see a now present but
spatially distant object, we are experiencmg the actual,
real, independent object, so when I 111 Ed111burgh plcture
St. Paul's Cathedral (previOusly seen) 111 London, what
I am apprehending lS the actual St. Paul's, and not
any merely mental duphcate of It. Slmllarly, when
we plcture to ourselves the past, we are plcturIng the
actual past at the dlstance In time at whIch It actually
occurred. Of course 111 all cases there are the same
unavoidable elements of sensory perspective, Just as
happens when I apprehend a drop of water through
present VlslOn, or dlscnminate the just past within
the wlder period of the speciOUS present. 1 In lmagl-
natlOn, as In sense-expenence, conSCiOusness of the
public world and awareness of the sensa co-operate,
each condltlOnIng the posslbllity of the other.

(e) Intuttton eZ Mode of Dtrect Contemplatton

But I have not yet dIrectly faced the fundamental
difficulty which has been doggIng our steps from the
start, as to how sensing and intUltIng, notwithstanding
their very dlfferent characters and functions, are yet
able to co-operate, or the still more serlOUS dtfficulty
how intuitmg, thus regarded as distmct from sensmg,
can be capable of yield111g direct knowledge of the
independently real.
There is a preliminary difficulty which may be in
the mind of the reader. If only the sensa be directly
sensed, and if, as has been argued, they yield, in and
1 We have also to bear In mind how large a part reVived sensa play even
In what seems to be a purely sensory apprehenSIOn of wl:at IS here and now
VIlI SENSE AND INTUITION 197
by themselves, no apprehension of time or of space,
are we not committed to the very unsatisfactory view
that everything over and above the sensa IS merely
thought, and not experienced? ThinkIng may be a
rellable means of knowledge; but what has to be
accounted for IS not merely knowledge of time and
space, but that which we undoubtedly also possess,
actual sense-experience of them.
This objection is, however, based upon a mis-
understanding; and I have mentIOned It only in
order to emphasise my entire agreement With the
pOint of view from which It is propounded. I am
not attempting to argue that in experiencing the
sensa we mentally Interpret them m terms of forms
which the mInd supplIes in the act of apprehension.
On the contrary, I am maintainmg that It IS pubhc
time and publIc space which we directly mtUlte; and
that If we are to speak of • mental Interpretation;
this phrase can only be apphcable to the processes
whereby each percIpient Interprets these mdependent
eXistences In terms of hiS private sensa. For, as I
have been endeavouring to show, save m and through
the contemplation of time and space no conSCIOusness \
IS possible. To reduce conscIOusness to the appre-
hensIOn merely of sensa IS, In effect, to abolIsh con-
sciousness, and therefore to render mcomprehenslble
how we should ever acqUire consciousness even of
the sensa. That IS to say, on the view which I am
advocating, our apprehensIOn of sensa as occurrmg
in time or as extended in space IS not an additIOn
to the knowledge which the sensa yield. We do
not advance, by way of inference or interpretatIOn,
from conscIOusness of sensa to consciousness of time
and space. . The latter type of consciousness is a
 THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE CHAP

condItion of the former; and thIS being so, our

apprehensIOn of time and space must be as ImmedIate
and as stnctly contemplative as IS our awareness of
the sensa themselves. If tIme and space cannot be
immediately apprehended, neIther can the sensa.
Again, I am not Simply assertmg, m the manner
of Kant, that tIme and space condItIOn our conscIousness
of the sensa; I also des1re to mamtam, w1th equal
insistence, that they condlt10n the very occurrence of
the sensa. Only m a tIme-space world wh1ch allows
of the required antecedent happenmgs, phYSical and
physiologIcal, can the complexly conditioned sensa
obtam foothold in eXistence. For If we admit that
sensa, though always pnvate to each perc1pIent, are
not for thiS reason subjecttve, but are objecttve happen-
mgs, there need be no difficulty m also admlttmg that
they are events mtegral to the system of phYSical
nature. And thiS, obVIously, 1S a very rad1cal de-
parture from the standpomt of subJect1v1sm. If the
sensa be thus mtegral to the phys1cal system, and
are known directly, then to that extent we have an
1mmediate apprehenSIOn of mdependent realtty. And
since it can be shown that not only do sensa allow of
thiS ' mterpretatlOn • as occurnng withm a space-ttme
world, but that m adoptmg it the human mmd has
successfully butlt up a coherent body of detatled
knowledge in regard to the cond1t1ons of the1r occur-
rence and of their modes of eXistence, the realtst inter-
pretatIOn of time and space may be regarded as holdmg
the field. Unless m approachmg these problems we
are to insist upon retammg those dualistic assumptions
whIch have been usual since the time of Descartes, and
whIch Kant, after all his efforts to overcome them, still
left standmg, we may well expect that since conscious
VJJI SENSE AND INTUITION 199
beings are integral to the real world, factors so funda-
mental as time an'd space wIll be found to play a
central role m all occurrences, whether of consc1OUS
experience or of external nature. The onus proband,
must he with those who venture to propound the
counter-thesIs.
I have stated my reasons for refusmg to recognise
spatiality as inherent in the visual or other sensa. One
other reason may here be ment1Oned-it prepares the
way for our further dIscussion - namely, that the
usual method of explanation will not apply in the
analogous case of tIme. Only the apprehens10n of
the order of the occurrence of sensa, not the appre-
hension of the content of this or that sensum, wIll YIeld
awareness of tIme. TIme envelops the sensa, so to
speak, and m transcending each sensum, transcends
all the sensa; just as does space, on the view which
I am advocatmg. Time does, indeed, appear to be
more Inextricably bound up with the sensa than IS
space; admIttedly they have duratIOn, whereas we are
quest10mng whether any of them have extension.
But thIS dIfference can easily be exaggerated. If
sensa have to be regarded as actually occurnng and
enduring in a time-order, they have lIkeWIse to be
regarded (or at least in physical SCIence are so regarded)
as occurnng in dependence upon events that are
spatially ordered. It will not, as already stated,
suffice to regard space and time as mterpretatzons gIven
to the sensa. They must be more than that; they
must be intuited, i.e. contemplated. They must be
apprehended in a face to face manner, as actual com-
ponents of independent reality.
200 THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE CHAP.

U) The Evolution of Sense experzence:

the Powble Alternattve f'tews
But Nature begins the task of creating or hberat-
ing 1 conscIOusness on a very humble scale, and only
advances to the human type after long preliminary
preparation by the elaboration of ammal forms. At
all stages in this evolution, only that amount of con-
sciousness is allowed which IS necessary for the practical
purposes of adaptation; and It is further tied down-
time and space apart-'to those particular features In
the environment which are capable of acting on the
organism, either, In the earlIest stages, through ItS
general sensitiveness, or, in the higher stages, through
action upon the special organs of sense.
We are mainly concerned With the sense of sight.
How it functions in the lower vertebrates when there
IS no yellow spot and no binocular VISion, we can only
conjecture. We cannot, With any precIsIOn, say how
far, In these lower stages, colours are dlstlngmshed,
or how far they are used In the discernment of out-
line, etc. But If Dr. Elliot Smith's very interesting
theory 2 as to the ongln of human Intelligence, that It
has come about In connection With, and as a result of,
the development of binocular vision, be accepted, it
will go some way towards explaining why our funda-
mental categones are so closely bound up with space,
and why they can most easily be estabhshed and defined
In this reference. It Will also aid us in explaimng how
colour has come to be the mind's chief ally in the appre-
hension of size, shape, dIstance, and the like. In the
1 I do not WlSh to r;use the questions here mvolved
I Cf. Presldenllal Address to the AnthropologIcal SectIon of the
Bntlsh AsSOCIatIon, Dundee, I9U
VIII SENSE AND INTUITION 'lOI

earliest stages the function of visua1 senc;a was not,

probably, of this &aracter. They doubtless served
merely to dlscrimmate between lIght and darkness,
and m detecting the directIOn m which the lIght is
located. DiscnmmatIon of colours may also, even
apart from apprehensIOn of definite spatlal forms, have
been of value in enablmg an animal to recogmse what
lS serviceable as food, and to react defenslvely agamst
danger. But for appreciatIOn through slght of spatlal
relations we must presuppose the mental capaclty to
apprehend outlIne as outlIne, i.e. to apprehend space 10
its essential complexlty.
The capaclty for spatial dlscrimination must already,
however, pnor to any hlgh development of slght, have
been present in connectIOn wlth the sense Of touch. It
must at least have been present in the form of a capacity
to locate contacts m the parts of the body from whlch
they come. When we leave aSlde slght, we do indeed
find It difficult to plcture to ourselves how the mmd
can have apprehended the body, m ltS mam parts and
as a whole, m purely tactual terms. But thls IS merely
a consequence of the predommance whlch slght has
acquired in our lmaginatlve actlvlties; the capacltles
of the blind concluslvely demonstrate that tactual sensa
'afford all the sense-data reqUIred for adequate appre-
i~ension of space-relations, and through combmatIOn
of separate expenences for constructmg images of the
targer areas. In the cutaneous sensa there is, however,
no such qUlte ObVIOUS fusIOn wlth spreadoutness as
we find in the case of the visual sensa. Pressure, heat
and cold have an ambiguous character - agreeing
therem with tastes and odours, and even with sounds-
whlch renders It difficult to decide how far thelr con-
nection with. space really extends. We may observe
 202 THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE CHAP

that it was not until the associationists had failed in

their attempts to account for our apprehension of
space from extenslOnless sensa, and untIl Kant had
also faIled to explain It by means of forms contributed
by the mmd, that the psychologists bethought them-
selves of asserting the possibilIty that extensity may
be a property belonging to each ~lngle sensum. ThiS
In Itself affords good eVidence that the extensity, at
least of certain types of sensa, IS by no means beyond
question. In developed experience all sensa, oWing to
the IntUltIve character of the complex perceptIOns into
which they have been taken up, have indeed acqUlred
a more or less direct connection With space. That
such extensity as they may have, or appear to have, can
be due exclusively to this source, alway;;, therefore,
remains as an open possibilIty. In any case the Issue
cannot be deCided Simply by direct inspection of the
o sensa, as they now present themselves. 1
A pOint which calls for notice IS the further diffi-
culty of decldll1g what we ought to mean by a Single
sensum. PhYSiologically we may be able to define It
as being the response of a sll1gle pressure spot or a
Single temperature spot to a stImulus that does not
spread on to neighbouring spots. But In the case of
all ordinary tactual experiences a large number, not
only of pressure- sensa, but also Simultaneously of
temperature-sensa, are aroused. 2 And It IS In con-
nection With thiS multiplIcity of simultaneous sensa,
coming from ddferent though usually neighbouring
locations, that space-perception takes place. When
an ' isolated • sensum is experimentally produced in the
psychological laboratory, it is being produced m a
1 Cf. below, p. 214, passage quoted from Dr. Head
• Cf. Dr. Head In Brain, vol xI!. p. 183'
VIII SENSE AND INTUITION 20 3

percipient whose acquired powers of spatId.1 dIscrimina-

tion and locatIon he already hIghly developed, and
who cannot therefore be sure that wIth the best in-
tentlOns, and after every effort, he can succeed m
divestmg the sensum of all that does not mtnnsically
belong to It. If, m addItion, as even those who regard
extensity as a property of all sensa usually agree m
assummg, there be local-sIgn sensations whIch vary
for each separate tactual spot, then even If a tactual
sensum can be dIvested of all other external aSSOCIa-
tions and accretlOns, It wIll stIll be accompanIed by the
correspondmg local sIgn sensum; and It may be to the
latter, not to the former, that extensIty alone belongs. J
When, further, we bear m m1lld that the earlIer expen-
ences of touch, even when relatively preCIse and
definIte, have probably ansen, not pnmarIly as per-
ceptual 10calIsatlOns, but as reflex responses whereby
bodIly adjustment to the stimulus IS automatIcally
brought about WIth the least possIble delay,! and that
the tactual sensa have therefore always been accom-
pamed by motor sensa, the part played by the tactual
sensa, m and by themselves, IS proportIOnately dImm-
Ished. Then, lastly, we have lIkeWIse to recogmse
that gIven sensa tend, as expenence develops, to be
vastly outnumbered by the prevlOusly expenenced
sensa whIch are recalled. 2
When all these facts are taken mto account, the
two alternatIves between whIch we have to choose
become the plamer. The sensa, gIven and recalled,
as they thus multiply with the maturing of experience,
do not remam unorganised. So much is agreed.
1 Cf quotabon from Mr. C S. Myers, given below, pp ZlI-IZ
B Cf Dr Head on the part played by what he calls' schemata,' Bra""
vol. XXXIV. pp. 1805-9
 THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE CHAP.

Either, therefore, we must trace the sources of the

organisation exclusively to the sensa, and so regard
them as organising themselves through the mechalllsm
of assocIative recall; and that wIll mean that we adopt
the assocIatiolllst VIew, that at each moment, and ever
anew, the enttre field, wIth all the complex factors of
whIch it IS made up, IS reconstructed. Or else we
hold that thIS applIes only to the ever-changing
sensory factors-certaInly by themselves already suffi-
CIently numerous and complex-and that the more
constant factors, those WhICh dictate the manner and
method of organisatIon, and whIch in so doing VOIce
the need for, and POInt the way towards, further
advance, are otherwIse provIded for. The psycho-
plasm conceIved on the analogy of the bioplasm WIll
be, on thIS latter VIew, not a manIfold of sensatIons,
but a reactIng agent WIth powers and capaCItIes
of a predetermIned nature. Among these-only so
is it a psychoplasm, and it is as legItImate to start
111 psychology from the fact of conSCIousness as In
biology from the fact of lIfe-must be the capaCItIes
which make pOSSIble awareness; and SInce a tIme-span
and a space-extent are, as analYSIS of ItS maturer forms
would seem to show, indispensable to ItS occurrence,
these capaCItIes must from the start allow of the appre-
hension of tIme and space, and therefore of the various
formal factors necessary thereto. All these powers
can be aSCrIbed to the psychoplasm WIthout our having
to regard It as thereby approaching, still less out-
rivallIng, the complexity of the bioplasm which
organically conditions it. Taken together these pre-
dIspositions will make possible that type of awareness
to which I have given the tItle ' intuition,' meaning
thereby the face to face apprehension of time and space.
VIII SENSE AND INTUITION

(ii.) THE MAIN ISSUE

But if neither time nor space be presented in the

content of the given sensa, how, it will again be asked,
is such apprehension possible? Upon this chief out-
standing difficulty we may now at last venture a frontal
attack.
By general admission, awareness is ultimate in the
form of sensing. Thereby we acquire knowledge
of a great variety of different types of eXlstence-
orgamc sensa, tastes, odours, pressures, temperatures,
sounds, colours. The objectIOn to our assuming that
there is an equally ultimate process of intuiting IS that
the latter process never occurs save in terms of the
former, and that when it does so, certain sensa them-
selves take on that very feature which, on our View,
sensing is incapable of Yielding. This objection is
not merely that sensing will, at least so far as space is
concerned, suffice to explain all our existing know-
ledge; but also that if sensa do not embody space, the
process of intUltion will be a process to which sensing
does not serve as an analogy. For whereas the external
world, through ItS actIOn on the bodily senses, deter-
mines for the mind which of ItS multitudinous details
will be attended to, there is (on the assumption of a
non-sensory process of intuition) no corresponding
machinery to provide for the confining of attention to
this or that portion of space, and the shutt1l1g out of
the two immensities (the great and the small) which
engulf the mind when it attempts to contemplate
space in its full actuality.
But this objection rests on the subjectivist assump-
tion that sensa are in a quite different posltion from
independent, physical existences. Virtually, it is
206 THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE CHAP

being alleged that while it is understandable that the

latter should exist in our close neIghbourhood and yet
not be known to us, sensa as ' In the mInd' must have
free access to conSCIOusness. Now If we are really in
earnest with the assertIOn that sensa are not mental
states, but are objective happenIngs, and if we further
recogmse that they are not thereby cut off from being
dIscovered by, and known to, the conscious mind,
what objectIOn can there be to our holding that time
and space, whIch presumably are no less objective, are
likeWIse apprehended In a dIrect manner~ We may
take the absolute or the relatIOnal VIew of time and
space. Even on the absolute view they are relational
modes of eXIstence, at least to the extent of making
pOSSIble certain umque types of relation between
partIcular eXIstences. This I have recognised in the
account whIch I have gIven of the nature of mtUltlOn.
So far, then, sensmg and mtUltmg-the dIfferences
which correspond to dIfferences m theIr objects bemg
thus allowed for-stand on the same level. In both
cases we dzrectly apprehend the genumely objectzve.
And consequently the above-noted dIfficulty, that the
process of apprehenSIOn IS selectIve, and m all cases
omIts Immensely more than It has knowledge of,
applIes equally to both. vVhy we should be able to
apprehend sensa, and yet be unable to apprehend those
phYSIOlogIcal processes whIch are, It would seem, theIr
most ImmedIate accompamments, we are qUlte unable
to say. Usually, mdeed, It IS assumed that the pro-
cesses of apprehension are effects of the processes in
the brain, and that this suffiCIently explains why the
latter can never be themselves dIrectly known. Just
because they are the means to, they can never them-
selves be the objects of the knowing process. But
VIIl SENSE AND INTUITION 20 7

this view, lIke the view of sensa as being' in the mind,'

commits us, I sl'iould maintain, to a subjectIvist
standpoint, and is therefore open to all those many
objectIOns whIch we have already consIdered. The
problem of mind and brain cannot be dIsposed of In
thIs easy, off-hand fashion, as If mind and bram were
related in the same external manner as are causally
connected processes in the physIcal world. I therefore
feel JustIfied m assuming that the lImItation of sensing
to the sensa that we at present have, is for us an ultImate
fact which we have perforce to recognise, but whIch
we cannot m any degree profess to explam. Pre-
sumably, the answer would involve such knowledge,
not only of the nature and functlOnmg of the brain,
but also of the nature of mind, as is not yet even
dIstantly foreshadowed m our present theories, even
when most speculative
But If thIs lImItation whereby sensmg has as Its
possible object, in this or that case, only thIs or that
sensum, be allowed as ultImate, why should not a
SImilar lImItatIOn be recogmsed in the case of mtUIting? \
And if we take cognisance of the further fact, hkewise
vouched for by experIence, that mtUIting and sensmg
mutually condItIon one another, netther being possIble
in the absence of the other,l WIll not the umformity of
the hmitatlOn be as completely accounted for as the
situation allows?
There WIll therefore remain to be considered only
the one outstanding objection, that If sensa do not
themselves possess extensity, there is no conceIvable
arrangement whereby they can come to be endowed
with it. Is this objection conclusive~ Does it suffice
to show that we have been proceeding on false lines,
,1 Cf. pp 82-3, 156-8, 182-3, 190-91.
208 THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE CHAP

and have here endcd in an impasse? My answer will

be twofold.
In the first place, if we are justified in maintaining
that time and space are beyond the scope of sensing in
and by itself, then even if sensa are endunng and
extended, their duration and extenslOn will demand
for their apprehenslOn some such processes as those
which we have ascnbed to mtuition. In the second
place, the sensa have hitherto been supposed to possess
extenSlOn only on one or other of two assumptions.
Either their extenslOn is not that of the real world, but
is proper to the sensa viewed as termmattng members
of lengthy senes which begm by being phYSical and
become physlOloglcal. Or else thetr extenslOn IS m-
dependently real, and the so-called sensa are properties
inherent m phYSical thmgs. The former view I
reject because of the subjectivism with which it IS
bound up; and the latter because of ItS failure to
account for the facts of perspective and llluslOn, and
so for the very far-reachmg dtfferences between the
world of ordmary conSClOusness and that of sCience.
There therefore remains only the view which I have
been advocatmg. I may at once admit that I cannot,
in any fully satisfactory manner, profess to explam bow
It comes about that in the combmed action of sensing
and intUlting the sensa are able to take on the spread-
out form and the intuited space to become, what we
have no evidence that It ever really is, warm or sonorous
or coloured, anclso m these respects sensible. To thiS
extent the objection will still, when all has been said,
have to be recognised as a very serious, outstanding
difficulty. But, on the other hand, there are certain
relevant and helpful conslderatlOns which, when borne
in mind, have the effect of diminishing the force of the
VIII SENSE AND INTUITION
objection, and of suggesting possible lmes upon which
an answer compatible with the position here defended
may ultimately be found. To these considerations,
and to the very weighty corroborative evidence supplied
by results recently obtamed through physiological
study of the brain, I shall now direct the reader's
attention.
As we have noted, 1 there is a certain amount
of empirical evidence that the intuitIOnal factors,
accordmg as they take this or that form, determme
what IS actually seen, and not merely our judg-
ments regardmg what IS seen. To employ our
previous example, this is what happens in the case
of the 'staircase' diagram; we can see It either as
a staircase or as an overhangmg cornice. Other
examples 2 are the varymg sizes of the sun and moon
at the horizon, at their zenith, and as seen through a
tube. These examples, it IS true, cast no direct light
upon the processes whereby extensIOnless sensa can
have acquired extensity, but they may be interpreted
as showing that the mtuitional factors are at once
relatively distinct from the sensory, and yet also
extraordinanly influential m determmmg the latter.
Though the amount of retmal stimulation IS constant
m the two cases, there is more spreadout colour when
the moon IS seen at the honzon than when it IS seen
in mid-heavens. Either thiS has to be admitted or
we have to hold that the sensory field does not vary
in size when on shipboard we look no~ down upon the
deck and· now out upon the sea and sky. Certamly,
neither of the alternatives is an easy alternative.
Either we have to questlOn the possibility of vanation
m size, and that means likewise of depth, inde-
1 Cf above, p 76 ff B Cf above, p u6 ff
p
 210 THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE CHAP.

pendently of the amount of retina affected, and then

set ourselves to deal wIth the many serIOUS dIfficultIes
peculiar to such a view; or we recognise as one of
the strange, but none the less certaIn, features of our
sense-experience thIs extraordinary varIabIlIty of vIsual
I fields, as contrasted with the relatively mInute and
'absolutely fixed SIze of the retIna, l and conclude
therefrom that the intUItional factors, while capable
of varying independently of the actual physIcal stimulI,
are yet so closely concatenated wIth the sensory
qualities as to determine the amounts of space over
which these latter are apprehended as spreadout.
Further, since a close connectIOn between sensa
and extensIty must, on any theory, be recognised as
having been establIshed at a very early stage, we are
not requIred to assume that the various quahtatIve
differences are developed prior to theIr being appre-
hended as spreadout. SInce the general sensItiveness
of the skIn precedes the development of the senses of
sight and hearIng, the connectIon between sensa and
extensity Vi III presumably begin on the thermal and
tactual levels. Thus If the eye in its origIn be, as
1 Cf Sherrmgton, The Integrative ActIon of the Nervous System, p 334
.. In the case of the eye not only IS the slice of environment pertammg to
It at even a short distance more Wide and high than that of the skm, but It
IS at each moment multlphed by the thll"d dimension In the photo-
receptive system the so-called • optic nerve' (which, Since It IS the second
neurallmk and therefore to some extent a • common path,' presents numerical
reduction from the first or private path In the retina Itself) con tams more
conductive channels (nerve-fibres) In man (1,000,000, Krause) than are
contained In the whole serres of afferent Spinal roots of one Sid- of the body
put together (634)000, Ingbert), and of these latter the cutaneous afferent
fibres form only a part, and of that part the tango-receptive fibres them-
selves form only a fraction The large number of the channels In the
retinal path 19 no doubt prlmarlly mdlcatlve of spatial dIfferentmtIons of
the receptive surface, but that spatial differentiation IS Itself indicative of
the numbers of the stImulI frequentmg that receptIve field ..
VIII SENSE AND INTUITION 211

Dr. Sherrmgton declares,l simply" a set of glorified

heat spots," which, 0wing to a lowenng of the threshold
of sensibility, have ceased to respond to heat-waves
and now respond to the shorter and more dehcate
hght-waves, the contmUlty of development will be
assured, even at the cntical stage at which the quah-
tative differences of light and colour begm to emerge.
The connectlOn established between thermal sensa
and extension wdl be carned over, to be confirmed
and extended m the newer Visual experiences. For
the heat-spots, however 'glorified,' wdl retain those
brain-connections through which m their earlier
functlOnmgs they have conditloned awareness of the
locahty affected, or at least have conditloned the
reflex responses that vary With such localisation. As
Mr. C. S. Myers has pomted out:
1 Op CIt P 323 .. In the animal's progression certain of ItS segments
lead [These] are exposed to external Influences more than the rest
Not only do they receive more stimulI, meet more' obJects' demanding
pursUit or aVOidance, but It IS they which usually first encounter the
agents benefiCIal or hurtful of the environment as related to the indi-
vidual Pre-emlnent ad~antage accrues If the receptors of these segments
react sensitively and dIfferentially Some of them are specialIsed In
such dpgree as almost obscures their fundamental affinity to others distributed
In other segments Thus among the system of receptors for which
radiation IS the adequate agent, there are developed In one of the leading
segments a <.ertaln group, the 7eunal, particularly and solely, and extra-
ordinarily highly, amenable to radiatIOns of a certain lImited range of
wave-length These are photo-receptors, for which lIght and only lIght,
e g not heat, IS the adequate stimulus In hke manner a certain group
belonging to the system receptive of mechanical Impacts attains such
susceptibilIty for these as to react to the Vibrations of water and air that
constitute phYSical sounds The retma IS thus a group of glorified' warm-
spots,' the 'foch1ea a group of glOrified 'touch-spots' Again a group
belongmg to the system adapted to chemical stimulI reach In one of the
leadmg segments such a pitch of delIcacy [lIkeWise through a lowering of
the threshold of senSibility] that particles In quantity unwelghable by the
chemist, emanatmg from substances called odorous, excite reaction from
them" [r e smell IS taste at a distance no odorous substance IS, It appears,
tasteless]
212 THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE CHAP•

.. A swt:d taste corresponds with one type of reactIOn, a

bitter taste with another, similarly -'lIth the sensations of
colour and pitch, different types of reactIOn are evoked from
longer or shorter waves. . . . At bottom, differences In type
of movement must be the cause of differentiatIOn In the quality
of sensation, it would be of no advantage for the organism to
experience different qualities of sensation, unless those differences
were serViceable In promoting different types of response." 1
Whatever readjustment and further elaboration of
the intuitlOnal machinery may be demanded before
vIsion can discharge ItS present complex functlOns,
there IS no need of our assuming that the problem is
to gIVe spreadout form to sensa which first arise m
complete Independence as purely qualItative. What
tS alone essential IS that we should recognise the distinct
functions which sensing and intUiting, and also there-
fore the corresponding types of brain-processes, are
called upon to discharge, and the fact that both are
required to make possible sense-expenence of the kmd
possessed by US,2
A similar explanation can be given why sounds
should tend to be apprehended as havmg a "roomI-
ness." If the ear be " a set of glonfied touch-spots,"
the auditory sensa, In the stage, so to speak, before
they have themselves come about, Will have acqUIred
1 Quoted by Alexander, Space, T,me and DeIty, vol II p 128, from
Bnt 'Journal of Psychology, vol VI, II § 1 Cf also Head, Brain, vol xII
(1918), p 184 (StudIes In Neurology, pp 746-7)
• Cf Alexander, Space, T,me and DeIty, vol II p 148 .. In senSIng
a colour we have not two separate acts of conscIOusness whose objects we
refer to one another There IS no separate consCIousness of the place, to
which to refer the colour; for the consciousness or mtultIon of the place IS
only excited so far as we have the sense of the colour • Conseque.ntly
there are not two acts of mInd but only one act of mInd, which ID Its sensory~
character apprehends the colour, and ID ItS IDtult!ve character apprehends
the place of It. We are conscIous of a place coloured or of colour In
place ..
VIII SENSE AND INTUITION 21 3

that relatlOn to sp~ce which is usual In tactual sensa.

In this case, however, the connectlOn established on
the tactual level has, for obvIous reasons, not been so
strongly reinforced as In the case of sight. Indeed
we may rather regard it as havIng contInued only in
a weakened and faded-out form.
These remarks, as I recognIse, only suffice to throw
the difficulty further back. How come extenslOnless,
thermal and tactual sensa to acqUIre the spreadout
form? If the problem cannot be answered on the
visual level, neither can it be answered on the more
prImitive levels. What alone has been gaIned is an
appreciatlOn of the gradual manner In which our
present experiences have been brought about, and
consequently of the complexity of the processes which
at the Innumerable Intermediate stages have presum-
ably been at work; and this forms a natural brIdge,
over which we can pass to conslderatlOn of the very
revolutlOnary results obtaIned by Dr. Head and hiS
collaborators, In their InvestlgatlOns Into the physlO-
logical conditions of the cutaneous sensations.
Hitherto I have IntentIonally aVOIded all reference to
these important results, partly because the posltlOns
which I am maIntaining had been arrived at before
the work of Dr. Head and hiS collaborators had come
to my attentIon,l and my general argument would only
have been obscured by their earlier introductIOn, and
partly because, in physlOlogical investIgatlOns of so
dlfficult:. and comphcated a character, the results
r~ached, though in certain respects sufficiently definite,
1 I must previously have read the Supplementary Note In Mr Alexander's
Space, T,me and Detty, vol 11 p 178, In which Dr Head's work IS referred
to, but eVidently then failed to appreciate Its real character and Import-
ance. I first read Dr Head's articles In Brain In the summer of 19Z3,
while I was revIsing thiS chapter
 THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE CllAP

are still much too tentative to s~rve as basis for a

philosophIcal analysIs of sense-expenence. A bnef
statement of them may, however, serve to show that
the most recent developments In the physIology of
the braIn are very decidedly pOIntIng In the directlOn
of some such position as I have been outlImng.
Take, for Instance, the naIve, tradItional assumptlOn
that the Impulses whIch ongmate in penpheral end-
organs" pass unaltered to the cortex, there to underlie
that psychIcal state we call a sensatIon." 1 This
assumption, Dr. Head maIn tams, IS no longer tenable.
"The day of the a prIori psychologist IS over so far as
sensatIOn IS concerned A man can no longer Sit In hiS study
and spm out of hmlSelf the laws of psychology by a process of
self-examination. For we have been able to !>how that, at a
level deeper than any he can reach by introspection, are pre-
pared those !>tates which condition the nature and characterISliCS
of the ultimate sensatIOn. AppreCiatIOn of posItion m space,
graduated response to stimuli of varying intensity, and recogni-
tion of the Similarity and difference of objects In contact With
the body, were all thought to be matters of' Judgment' We
\ have shown that the forms assumed by these aspects of sensation
I are ordered and predestined on the phYSIOlogical level, as the
result of mnumerable mtegratlons, which take place outside
conscIOusness. These processes are not open to conscIous
analYSIS, It IS only the Interplay of sensations that can be
discovered by mtrospectlon " 2

Broadly stated, Dr. Head's maIn conclusion IS that

apprehension of cutaneous sensatIons, on theIr qualIta-
tIve SIde, IS dIstmct from apprehenSIon of thetr Jocahues
1 Brazn, vol XXXIV, I9II-I2., P I h (StudIes In Neurology, pp 60I-Z), ocf.
vol xh, 1918, P 177 "The psychologist, who attempts to discover a strict
psychophysIcal parallelism, Ignores the central lmk of the problem He
assumes that the nature and conditions of the phYSical stimulus can be
brought IOto direct relation with the psychu,.al act of sensation ..
• Lo, nt vol xii p 177 (Studies In Neurology, p 741)
VIII SENSE AND INTUITION 21 5

in the body and of their positions relatively to une

another. He clte!/ eVidence to show that the optic
thalamus is the organ which conditions sensations of
pam, the crude sensatlOns of heat and cold, and the
sensatlOns of contact and roughness. When through
bram-IeslOns the thalamus acts mdependently of the
cerebral cortex, these sensations are expenenced
merely m their affective and quahtative aspects, without
precise spatial dlscnmmatlOn of any kmd.
" The patient generally gives up all attempts at appreCiation,
sayIng he has' no Idea' of the shape, form, or relative size and
weight of the test-obJect." 1 "A cortical lesion never abolIshes
sensibility to contact, the response may be Intermittent,
Irregular, and grossly defective, but IS never completely absent.
A weight restIng on the hand may not be recogmsed, but at
the moment when It is placed on the skIn and, not Infrequently,
when It IS removed, or even gently touched, the patient says
that' somethIng has happened.' When the loss of sensatIOn IS
extremely severe and all sensory Impulses passlllg to the cortex
have been cut off, the patient may be unable to recogmse that
the effect he experiences IS produced by an external object and
may simply reply that somethlllg IS happemng to him. These
contact-stimuli, which may produce thiS vague sensatIOn of
'somethmg happenlllg' wlthlll the body, evoke precise recogm-
tlOn that an object IS actmg on ItS surface when the cortical
paths are mtact " 2

On Dr. Head's view, the a~rent impulses which

pass to the optic thalamus, and under normal condltlOns
from the thalamus to the cortex, are in all cases highly
complC"~. So far from standmg in direct, simple
correlation with the physical stimulus, they are suffi-
ciently numerous and diverse to form five distinct sets
of impulses, each set following its own path, and each
1 Brain, vol XXXIV p ISS (Stud,es In Neurology, p 604)
• Loc czt vol XXXIV p. lSI (Stud,es In Neurology, pp 600-601)
216 THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE CHAP

therefore liable to be separately affected by brain-

lesions. The respective functions' of these five sets
of afferent Impulses are, he mamtams,! as follows:
(I) to yield the appreciation of postural position and
passive movement; (2) to facilItate the discrimination
and recognition of tachle quahtIes other than contact
and roughness, and the dlscrimmatlOn of differences
in weight; (3) to condition spatial dlscrimmatlOn and
the recogmtlOn of size and shape; (4) to make possible
localIsation of a spot affected; (5) to Yield discrimma-
hon of thermal sensations and recogmtlOn of their
vanatlOns in mtenslty. That IS to say, Dr. Head is
prepared to argue, in view of the pathological pheno-
mena which follow upon nervous leslOns and of other
eVidence, that all forms of spatial apprehenslOn are
independent of touch, bemg conditioned by bram-
arrangements dlstmct from those which condltlOn the
stnctly quahtahve differences.
" When the mfluence of the cortex IS removed. and the OptiC
thalamus exerts Its aCtiVIty uncontrolled. the patient may cease
to associate hIS sensory expenences WIth any external agency
Removal of the cortical factors III sensatIOn has reduced to
elementary proportions the power of proJectIon. as we know It
m the mtact human bemg It IS no longer pOSSIble to recogmse
the SIze. shape. weight. and spatial relations of an external
object. nor, mdeed, to appreCIate the relative intensity of the
stImulatmg action It excites" 2

In the development of the higher centres the

thalamus has, of course, been brought into subordma-
tion to the cortex. •
" All stimuli which appeal to the thalamic centre have ~
high threshold. They must reach a high mtensIty before they
1 Brazn. vol XXXIV. p 183 (Stud,es 111 Neurology. p 60z)
2 Loc CIt vol xh PP 188-9 (Stud,es 111 Neurology. PI' 750-51)
VIII SENSE AND INTUITION 21 7

can enter consciousness, but once they have risen above the
threshold they tend td produce a change of excessive amount
and duration, and this It IS the business of the cortical mecharnsm
to control. The low mtenslty of the stimuli that can arouse
the sensory cortex, and ItS qUick reactlon-penod, enable It to
control the activity of the cumbersome mecharnsm of the
thalamiC centre." 1

But, as Dr. Head adds, we must not expect to

experience, even in the abnormal condltlOns caused by
bram-lesions, the origmal crude experiences of the
earlIer stage.
"The functions of the central nervous system are not a
palimpsest where a new text IS written over an earlier manu-
scnpt partly erased. The more pnmltlve activities have been
profoundly modified by the advent of the new centres, which I
utilise some of the faculties ongmally possessed by the older
mecharnsm." "Removal of [the] dominant mechamsm does
not reveal the functions of the phylogenetlcally older organs m
all their pnmary simplicity The ongmal thalamencephalon
cpntamed elements, not only of the human optic thalamus, but
also, In a crude form, of certain phYSIOlogical processes, now
entirely relegated to the cerebral cortex. Even the specific activity
of this onglnal thalamus was Incomparably less highly developed
than the dissociated thalamic functIOns of man. . . . A leSIOn
which sets free the human optiC thalamus "" reveals a con-
dition, which is a part of the complete [later developed] act
and does not reproduce an ancient mecharnsm in its onglnal
form" II

Dr. Head outlines, in terms of motor response, an

alternat~ve method of distmguishing between sub-
cortical and cortical functions. Segmented animals
r~spond to stimuli by co-ordinated movements leading
to r.etraction of the segment affected. A higher
1 Brazn, vol XXXIV P [9[ (StudIes In Neu.rology, p 609)
2 Loc CIt vol ill pp [82" [80 (Stud,es In Neurology, pp 745, 743"4)
2.18 THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE CHAP

development of function in the central nervous system

makes possIble the more complicated mass-reflex,
whereby local defensive retractlOn IS replaced by
movements of the whole animal. Both these types of
response are, however, of an uncontrolled character.
Only when, m those stdl higher types of animal life in
which the leadmg segment, that which normally first
advances mto new tern tory, assumes dommance by
becoming the seat of the " distance receptors," such as
the olfactory eplthehum, the hair-cells of the ear, and
the pigment spots of the eye, does dlscnmmahve
choice make ItS appearance, and the resultmg motor
responses become genumely adaptive and selectIve m
character'! In one respect all three types of response
agree, namely, m that the character of the response
vanes independently of the quahty of the stimulus, m
correlation with the position of the part affected.
"Scratchmg the sole of the foot IS followed by a
different movement from that caused by stimulatmg
[10 the same manner] the skm of the thigh." 2 Accord-
mgly m all three types we have to assume the eXistence
of afferent Impulses dlstmct from those of the speCial
senses. The adaptive type of response differs, how-
ever, m qUite radical fashlOn from the other two, m
that it involves conscIous awareness of space. For
1 Cf. SherrlDgton, The IntegratIve ActIon of the Ner<Vous System, pp
335-6 "The animal's receptive range. IS greater In the direction
about the 'leadmg' pole The Visual receptors are usually near the
leadmg pole, and so placed that they see mto the field whither ;rogresslOn
goes And Similarly WIth the olfactory receptors The motor traIn behInd,
the elongated motor machInery of the rest of the body [the fore and aft
arrangement of the lower vertebrates] IS therefore from thiS POInt of mw
a motor appendage at the behest of the distance-receptor organs In. front
The segments lYIng at the leadmg pole of the anImal, armed as they are
with the great' dIStance' sense-organs, constitute what IS termed the' head' ..
• Brain, vol xII p 189 (Studies In NeuroloKJ', p 7)I)
VIII SENSE AND INTUITION 21 9

though the motor response is sttll, of course, executed

through reflex mechal11sms, It IS so highly dIscnmina-
tive, in delIcately vaned adaptatIOn to obJccttvc relations,
that merely qualItative, affective expenences no longer
suffice. l There IS demanded a capacity for appre-
hend111g "complex projectIOnal relatIOns," t.C. a publIc
world In space and tIme. Segmental and maSSIve
responses yIeld only automatic Withdrawal from
noxious 111fluences. Adaptive action, conscIOusly
directed 111 view of a spatially ordered enVironment,
alone makes possIble mal11pulatlve control over the
external agenCIes.
"When we attempt to clImb through barbed Wire, we are
forced to respond not only to the pam but to the posItIon of the
wire. The pam produced by prIckmg a protopathic hand IS
all-compellmg, It IS Impossible not to make a movement of
Withdrawal. But under normal conditIOns the ungovernable
reaction IS controlled by the eXIstence of those forms of sensI-
bilIty which underlIe recognItIOn of relatIOns m space ThiS
enables us to choose whether the hand shall be removed or not
• • • Thus, It IS essentially the spatial elements In sensory
ImpreSSIOns which have led to the transformation of an mevItable
segmental reaction Into a dlscrImmatlve response of the complete
organIsm. • . . The prOjected aspects of sensatIOn are not
related to ourselves, but to external objects In fact, an
'obJect' might be defined as a complex of prOjected responses,
It IS said to have characters, such as size. shape, weight, and
pOSitIOn in space, which distingUish It from all others. The
recognition of such features, however, depends on phYSIOlogical
actiVIties. the product bf certam definIte centres In the cortex.
If these'.tprocesses are unable to mRueJlce conSCIOusness, the
• 1 Cf. l« CIt .. On the reflex level, afferent Impulses can be shown to
be adapted to spatial conditions and to the mtenslty and relative character
of tho stimulus, although the whole procedure remams outSide conscIOusness
If. however. they succeed In reachmg the highest receptive centres, they
endow sensation With spatial attributes, relative mtenslty, and mdlvldual
character" •
220 THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE CHAP.

• object' disappears, although Its affective and quahtative aspects

still produce their appropnate sensory reactions." 1
In this manner Dr. Head reinforces and further
extends the views whIch Dr. Shernngton has so Im-
pressively developed In his Integrattve Actton oj the
Nervous System. The cerebral cortex bemg the organ
not only of the distance-receptors-of smell, hearing,
and sIght-but also of the processes whereby the
spatIal features of these and all other sensa are appre-
hended, sensatIOns whIch on the lower level, prior to
cortical development, can possess, wIth any definite-
ness, the aspects only of quality and feeling-affection,
then take on those • projectIOnal' features whIch
charactense our specIfically human type of experIence.
And thIS VIew Dr. Head would stIll further extend,
to cover our conSCIOusness of tIme .
.. The sensory actIVIties of the cortex are not only responsible
for projection 10 space, but also ensure recogmtlon of sequence
10 time. . . . One of the commonest defects produced by a
I cortical IOJury IS thiS want of temporal defimtlOn, a stimulus,
rhythmically repeated, • seems to be there all the time.' The
patient cannot appreciate the moment at which It IS applIed or
removed. There IS no complete recogmtlon of an extended
sequence of events
.. Thus, It IS the projected elements 10 sensation to which
we owe our conceptions both of coherence In space and In
time. I have attempted to show that these factors are not
essentially due to Judgment or conscIous assoCiation, but depend
to a great extent on physIOlogical actIVIties and diSpOSitIOns
When these are permitted to excite consCIOusness, thFyappear
as an ordered sensation, related to other events in the external
world and extended serially In time." 2
I BrQln, vol xh pp. 191-2 (Studres in Neurology, pp 753-4)
2 Loc CIt vol xh. P 193 (Stud,es In Neurology, p 754) "All the lugber
projectional aspects of sensation •• form a contmuous series of diSpOSI-
tions . The umt of conSCIOusness, as far as these factors 1D sensation
VIU SENSE AND INTUITION 221

This, as the reader will note, comes very near to a

doctrine of tempccal and spatial Intmtion. Though
Dr. Head's investigatiOns have, thus far, been directed
almost exclusively to the cutaneous senses, analogous
results would doubtless be obtained If a similar
investigation could be made of the phenomena of
vIsion. Since viSIOn develops so much later, and
would seem to be so much more dependent upon
the hemispheres,l it IS hardly hkely that colours will
ever be experienced, even In the most extensive braIn-
lesions, save in the spreadout form. This, however,
is only what we should expect If Dr. Head IS justified
in his mam contentlOn as to the manner m whIch
sensation is complexly conditioned at a lower level
than any to which IntrospectIOn can penetrate. 2 The
terms 'projected' and 'projectional' are, I should
maintain, unnecessarily subjectivist in character, and
indeed denve from the psychology which Dr. Head
IS so effectively undermIning. Dr. Head has himself,
however, made it amply clear that he does not mean
to suggest that sensations are first apprehended as
unproJected, and are projected by some subsequent
mental process.
"Those factors In sensation do not depend primanly on
, judgment' or 'association ' j for, on the physiological level. I
afferent Impulses possess projectIOnal characteristics" 3
Such, then, is the empirical evidence in support of
the distinction between sensing and intUltmg. As
are conce.tlled, IS not a moment of time, but a • bappenmg' This consIsts
of a group of occurrences belonging to profoundly different orders m the
llsycho-phYSlologlcal hierarchy."
1 Cf Sberrmgton, Integratrve Achon of the Nervous SYltem, pp 33S,

349. 390
2 Cf the passage quoted above, p 2.14
a Bram, vol cJIl. p. 189 (Swam m Nl!U1TJiolf.'" P 751).
 THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE CHAP

already stated, I have no desIre to suggest that this

eVIdence can be interpreted only 1,., thIs one way, as
favouring the precise doctnnes whIch I have been
defendmg. It can, however, at least be argued that
not only are these doctnnes qUlte as compatIble wIth
the physiological and other evidence as are the counter-
VIews, but that they have the great advantage of allow-
mg us to regard our knowledge as bemg of mdependent
reality, and as sufficIently rehable to permIt of a pro-,
gressively deepenmg SCIentific inSIght Into ItS absolute
nature. For though I have gone so far WIth the sub-
jecttvists as to allow that m locatmg the secondary
quahttes m physical objects we are, almost certamly,
subject to an IlluSIOn, these quahttes are on our theory
aIds to the dIscnmInatIon of the real posItion, real
shape, and real motIOn of bodies, and need not, there-
fore, prevent our regardmg sense-expenence as being
the dIrect apprehensIon, however partIal and dIstorted,
of a real and independent material world. The
extensity apprehended en terms of sensa IS the extensity
of the perceIved objects, not of the sensa as such.
If some such reahst VIew, after due weIght has been
allowed to all the relevant consIderatIOns, proves to
be, on the whole, the most satisfactory interpretation
of the cogmtive situation, need we be dnven out of it
by those objections whIch we have been considering?
In view of the present mfant stage of psychology, of
our very Imperfect knowledge of the bram, and of the
very incomplete analYSIS yet made of our fundamental
categories, and perhaps not least of the baffiin~ char-
acter of time and space, which have not yet yielded aU
their secrets even to the mathematician, any theory of
knowledge is bound to be highly conjectural and tenta-
tIve. Every type of phIlosophy has to be allowed
vnI SENSE AND INTUITION 223

some freedom m the choice of Its dIfficulties as well as

of its strong pomts, and so m decIdmg in Its various
fields for that theory which proves most helpful in
dealing wIth the broader Issues. If subjectivIsm
proves more hampering than helpful as a general
phIlosophical standpoint, the many doubtful features
in a realist view, provided these be not demonstrably
mcompatible with the doctrines avowed or wIth the
ascertainable data, are no suffiCIent reason for regardmg
it as untenable.
 CHAPTER IX
CONCLUSIONS

I SHALL conclude by indicating, in a quite summary

manner, the main consequences that follow upon adop-
tion of the standpoint which I have been advocating.
In substituting for Dr. Head's general distinction
between crude and projected sensation several more
'speclal distinctions, I have ascnbed to the bram-
processes a complexity even greater than that which
he has depicted. On the view above presented, the
cerebral processes conditiomng our human sense-
experience wIll consist m the concatenated mterplay,
on the one hand, of the three types of processes which
condition sensmg, intUltmg, and categonal thmking,
and, on the other hand, of these three types of processes
with those other processes which conditIOn the sensa.
On the mental side, bram-development will thus be
accompanied by a steadily mcreasmg enlargement and
articulatIOn of the world direct! y experienced, and by
a correspondmgly mcreased complexity in the cognitive
processes whereby it IS enabled, m this degree, to
reveal itself to us. This does not, of course, bring
us any nearer to a solution of the problem in what
manner precisely the mind is conditioned (or it may
be liberated) by the body; but at least, if my analysis
of sense-experience be in general correct, we have
224
CHAP IX CONCLUSIONS
secured dire(.t apprehension-foreshortened, indeed,
and as we may sa)' 'glorified,' m terms of sensa,
but stll1 none the less dIrect apprehension-of the
independently real; and have done so without making
any assumptlOns beyond what the empirical data
would seem to JUStify.
Since categories are in all cases purely formal, only
by empincal study can we obtain mSIght into the
nature of the eXIstences to which they apply. Thus
we cannot hope to determme in any a pnon manner,
or by any kmd of dIalectIcal argument, that the self
is a unity or is 'self-subsistent.' On these questions
the empirical data are alone competent to determine
our concluslOns, and are of a very vaned nature,
partly ~ensory, partly spIritual, denved from all the
diver.!e;.:relevant fields. For in deahng WIth the self,
our attentlOn must not be limIted to mtrospective
study of our so-called inner states and processes, nor
even to study of these in theIr connectlOn WIth the brain.
Owing to the ObVlOUS manner In which so much else
than the brain co-operates WIth It in the production
of sensa, the brain IS universally recogmsed as mtegral
to nature; but the self, even apart from all relatIOn
to the bram, is integral to nature m a stIll more
fundamental manner. Since awareness presupposes,
for its very eXIstence, an objective field, and smce
thIS field-If our VIew be correct-has as its most
fundamental features real, mdependent time and space,
the relatIon of mmd and nature IS, as we must
recognis~, a problem much more comprehensive than
arJ'Y dealt with in the current theories of the relatIOn
of mtnd and body. And when to these condItIons
we add the values which elIcit our energies and direct
our activities,.,to the consequent transformation of the
Q
226 THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE CHAP

given environment, as also of the self, perspectives,

yet wider in character, open to our view. As I

Whitehead justly remarks I-though in a somewhat

different connectlOn-the ignormg of these and other
relevant facts has
" been disastrous both to sCience and to philosophy, but chiefly
to philosophy. It has transformed the grand questIOn of the
relations between nature and mind Into the petty form of the
interaction between the human body and mind" " Know-
ledge IS ultimate. There can be no explanatIOn of the • why'
of knowledge; we can only descnbe the • what' of knowledge
• • • The object of . . . metaphYSical sCience IS not to explaIn
knowledge, but to exhibit in ItS utmost completeness our con-
cept of reality"
What, then, is the situation which our knowledge
does actually disclose? What kind of world IS re-
vealed in sense-expenence, and how does the self stand
related to It? The world experienced is a single
domam, complexly umfied. As m space, its parts
are in contmuous connectlOn With one another, and so
in their • totality' form a smgle whole. As In time,
its events stand in contInUOUS temporal relatIOns of
past, present, and future, and so, from thiS pOint of
view also, form a SIngle whole. Again, as orgamsed
through the categones of substance, causality, and
reCiprocity, It forms a dynamically Interconnected
system. And SInce time and space are ItS fundamental
and most pervasive features, contmulty may be de-
scribed as its pnmary characteristic.
Accordingly I have adopted Ward's doctrine of a
presentational contInuum, while modifying it in Qne
fundamental respect. Ward's POSition is as thorough-
going In ItS subjectivism as is the teaching of Leibniz,
1 The Concept of Nature, pp. 2.7 ff, 31'~.
IX CONCLUSIONS 227

with which in other respects his philosophy has so

many points of coneact. The continuum IS, he main-
tains, a sensory field private to each percipient. In
oppositlOn to this view I am maintaining what would
appear to be essential to any genuinely reahstlc stand-
point, that what IS strictly sensory in the continuum is \
not continuous, and that what IS continuous in It is
not sensory. So far as time and space are concerned,
the outer world presents itself to us directly, as it
were In Its own person. Time and space In their
in exhaustiveness 1-the feature which renders con-
tinUity the source of all the problems of Infimtude-
bear the imprint of reahty, and fecundate the mind as
nothing else does. In the process of getting Itself
Into consciousness the outer world has, indeed, become
depnved of all but a very small portIOn of ItS rich
content, and what remains IS altered and simphfied In
terms of the sensa which It brings Into eXistence
through ItS action upon the hVlng orgamsm. It
presents to us only such of Its features as we must
have cogmsance of, If, as animal existences, we are to
adapt ourselves to them. More would be useless,
and as preoccupying the mind pOSitIVely harmful.
And in order that the adaptive processes may be
sufficiently rapid and effective, these selected features
are also presented in a perspective which IS unique and
personal.
When these allowances are made, httle may seem
to be leit that is genumely pubhc. Nothing that we
experience exists independently, precisely In the form
it\ which we expenence It. So far we can agree WIth
the <subjectivists. Indeed, since imaginatIon IS tied
1 Cf Whitehead, The Concept of NaJure, p 14 .. Unexhaustlveness IS
an essential char~terlStlc of our knowledge of nature ..
228 THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE CHAP

down to the secondary qualitIes, we have to admit that

while the Independent constitutlOn of objects may be
conceptually apprehended In the lIght of the results
established by the sciences, such concepts can never be
rendered precise through the employment of Images.
For though the independently real IS tasted, smelt,
and touched, and IS apprehended through its radia-
tions of sound, temperature, and light, we have no
means of determinmg how far, or In what manner,
any of these qualItIes may precIsely match those with
which It is intrinSIcally endowed. Even the primary
qualities are not apprehended in any qUIte impersonal
manner. The maximum field which a blind man can
sensuously experience at first hand, at anyone moment,
consists in the space whIch he spans with outstretched
arms. This is not, indeed, for the blind man, a fixed
unit, determined by the length of hIS arms. In so far
as It is three-dimensIOnal It IS highly elastIc. If what
he thus grasps is, say, the corner of a house, he directly
experIences a space very much larger than the extent
of his grasp. StIll In the case of the blind man,
immediate experiences of thIS character are the only
data at his disposal when he endeavours to conceIve
imaginatively the vast spaces of geography and
astronomy. The power of sight enables us to envisage
a WIder simultaneous whole; for though the eye be so
much smaller than the hand, and minute compared
with the outstretched arms,l yet, thanks to the mean-
ings WIth which visual space IS saturated, wi, find Its
field to be now a few cubic inches, now an open land-
scape, now the boundless ocean or the starry heaverfs.
But all such immediately experienced spaces, wholther
of the blind or of the seeing, fail to do justIce to what
1 Cf pasnge quoted from Dr. Sherrmgton above,' 'p :uo n
IX CONCLUSIONS 229

lis being apprehended. Since:: ::.pace is cont1l1uous, even

the smallest area IS Itself an immensIty relatively to its
parts; and consequently its SIze as experIenced,
whether 10 perception or 10 imagination, can never
be true to the 'absolute scale' (whatever that may
mean) of its object, be it large or small. In picturing
a molecule or the Western HemIsphere we represent
them by the device of some convenIent UnIt (arbItrary
save in ItS determ1Oation by practical consIderations)
that scales up the almost 10credlble mInuteness of
structure in the molecule, and scales down the vast
regIOns of the two AmerIcas. And just as 10 the
case of the molecule we have to omit most of the
detail of its atomic and sub-atomic structure, so 10
the case of the Americas we have to leave out of the
reckOnIng the houses, the boundarIes and shapes of
fields-indeed all but a quite minute proportIon of
the constituent features.
But when all such conSIderations have been allowed
their full weight, It remains true that as regards the
consequences which follow, there is an all-Important
dIfference between a subjecttvist theory and the thesIs
here propounded. If what we experience IS 10 any
degree and respect publIc and not pnvate, independ-
ently real and not merely subjective, then, however
partially and distortedly it IS apprehended, we may by
1OdlrectIOn find 10 its appearances data suffiCIent for
its truer apprehension. And thIS indeed IS, as I have
already remarked, in many respects the most surprtS10g
feature ·of the whole strange situation. Nature, in
determining the character of the animal organism, of
its s6nse-organs and nervous system generally, has had
in VIew primarily only the self-preservatIOn of the
species. Yeli 10 following this path, she has also made
23 0 THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE CHAP

possible the acqumng of knowledge. In prepanng

such knowledge as IS of aId In su..-vlval-allowing no
more knowledge than IS Indispensable for this purpose
-she has in man brought Into eXistence, or at least
lIberated, a type of sense-expenence whIch, when
reinforced by instruments of precision, when sIfted
and tested by all manner of indirect expenmental
devices, Yields data sufficient for the attaInIng of
sCientific inSight. What has been evolved under the
apparently exclusive domInatIon of purely practIcal
needs, turns out In the end to subserve, with amazIng
adequacy, the reqUIrements of the dISInterested seeker
after truth.
This IS the supreme example of Nature's many-
sidedness. Nature creates beauty as widespread as
herself, whIle In the process, as It would appear,
attendIng only to stnctly utIlItarIan ends. That Insects
and other ammals may have food, and that plants may
scatter their seed, she develops the flowers and the
frUIts, With all their diverSity of pleasmg form, scent,
and colounng. But in no field does Nature succeed
in bringIng down two such different birds With a
SIngle stone as In human sense-expenence, so elabor-
atelyarnved at by way of the sense-organs and nervous
system. Nature here set out to deVise methods whereby
the most rudlmentaryorgamsms may secure a suffiCIency
of food and mamtaIn themselves and the species in a not
over-promisIng enVIronment. She struggled WIth thiS
problem for mIllIons of years, and what IS very admir-
able-we can hardly help personifying NatJre; we
obtain so versatIle and IntrIguing a personality whelJ.
we dO-IS that no sooner had she solved her irtitial
problem than she contrived to complIcate It by making
the organIsms which she had thus successfu}ly eqUIpped
IX CONCLUSIONS
improve themselves into beings that demanded a wider
environment and a1fresh eqUIpment. And this went
on, the first solutIOns bemg modIfied and elaborated so
as to cover new factors, untIl, after well-nIgh inter-
mmable intermedIate stages, she has as her supreme
mventIOn the nervous system of the hIgher vertebrates.
And what then follows surpasses In strangeness all
that has gone before. All along Nature has, seem-
mgly, been intent upon provIdmg her creatures, in
theIr conSCIOUS experience, WIth an adequate mstru-
ment of practical adaptatIOn. And now we find that
whIle successfully doing thIS, she has at the same time,
as It were Inadvertently, prOVIded the last-born of her
chIldren WIth the means of settmg aSIde all ImmedIate
practIcal purposes, and mdeed of establIshmg himself
In her anCIent nghts, takmg the future mto hIs own
hands, and delIberately thwartmg her when her ways
do not conform to hIs own preferred plans. DIs-
cerning truth, beauty, and goodness, he adopts the
attItude of contemplatIOn, and In VIew of these absolute
values organIses even hIS practIcal lIfe on a dIfferent
plane.
But this surely IS a perverse and unconvincing
VIew of the situatIOn thus dIsclosed. Can Nature's
proceedIngs be so purely accIdental as thIS account
of them would Imply? Is It not truer-keepIng
merely to the bare facts-to reverse the pOInt of VIew,
and to recognIse as supremely sIgnIficant the seemmgly
accIdental bye-products of Nature's anImal deVIces?
Nature!.....such, at least, has been her actual behaVIOur
,,--seeks man out; she creates him, endows hIm with
thepretical as well as with other needs, and then pro-
gressively responds to these needs, the more he seeks
her ald. 1s not Nature here revealing herself-I
23 2 THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE CHAP.

raise the question, but shall not attempt to discuss it

-as Super-Nature; and can s~e be synoptically
envisaged save when so conceived? 1
And is not this view-It is the ldeahst view-alone
truly reahstic~ It enables us to regard Nature as
integrally bound up with the condltlOns that make I
knowledge possible. Nature, whtle occupied in brmg-
ing about the ammal organism, has hkewlse, throughout
the whole process, been engaged m bringmg about
the knowmg mmd, and in respondmg to the faculties
with which she endows it. Furthermore, in endowmg
man with those mstinctive, emotlOnal needs which
finally develop into intellectual cunosity and the
passionate ambition to discover truth, she has also
contnved to provlde hlm wlth the necessary drivmg
power that enables her, working from her own side,
to make her revelatlOn of herself to hlm more and
more complete. Nature has sought out man, has come
to him, has sttmulated, aroused, and possessed hlm;
and m all his conscIous experience her contmuous
co-operatlOn IS the pnmary condition of hiS ever-
mcreasmg success.
A subJectivlst Vlew of knowledge, we may there-
fore maintain, is not merely inadequate; It IS a
complete misreadmg of the actual facts. In inter-
pretmg the sltuatlOn through ItS subjectlvlst features,
it renders unmtelliglble the objective factors, which,
however obscured by perspectlve, play a qUIte funda-
mental role m shaping and determmmg the POSSI-
bility and the growth of knowledge. From tlfe start,
in the awareness of time and space, and therefore in.
1 Treatment of thIS question does not come WIthIn the scope o¥ the
present volume That would Involve dISCUSSIon of the varIous problems
bearing upon the realIty and prevement Influence of Spll'lturl values
IX CONCLUSIONS 233
some manner and degree of the categories, reality has
secured direct representatlon m the field of con-
sciousness, and in so doing has Imposed upon the mind
an objective mterpretatlOn of 1tS private sensa, opening,
even to the view of the animal mind, a pubhc world
in which It meets its fellows face to face-so much
so that even for man the discovery that h1s world is not
wholly pubhc, but m its features largely determmed
by perspective in terms of sensa, is 1tself one of the
later results of theorettcal inqUlry.
Such, then, would seem to be the character of the
world expenenced, and such has been its actual,
h1stor1cal behavlOur, in preparing the phys1cal and
physlOlogical cond1tions m and through which our
sense-experience and our scientific knowledge have
come about. How, now, does the situatlOn appear
when we V1ew 1t from the other end, namely, from the
pomt of V1ew of the knowmg mmd? In answer to
th1s questlOn, I have mamly dwelt upon one all-
important consideration. Though the self may-as
an ideahst, I believe that it does-possess powers
which In certam respects transcend the strictly natural,
yet, as we learn from experience, such powers are
capable of acting only m so far as Nature affords not
only the opportumties but also the terms and matenal
reqUlred for the1r effecttve operation.1 Thls 1S most
stnkmgly obv10us m that feature through which,
more than through any other, the mmd transcends
the g1ven and immed1ate, and m wh1ch, mdeed, all
its metaphysical needs have their source, namely, m
its apprehension of totality and infinitude. This power
of Jranscendence 1S the mind's own power, but 1t is
1 Cf Baron F von HUgel, The MySht:al Element of Rehgtotl (2nd
edition, 1923)' 101 1 PP 43-7, vol 11 P 367 If.
 THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE CHAP

assisted and constrained thereto by the essential features

of the time and the space which characterise Nature
in those of Its aspects whIch would seem to be most
completely, and-If mIstakenly mterpreted on sub-
jectIVIst, Cartesian lines - even to be duahstIcalIy
opposed to the mental processes whereby they are
apprehended. Accordtngly, when these and the other
kmdred conslderatlOns, whIch we have already noted,
are borne m mInd, whatever other Issues may remaIn
for dIScussIon, we should at least be under no tempta-
tIon to seek solution of the problems of phIlosophy In
any such easy fashlOn as may seem to offer when we
do vlOlence to the umty of Nature by treattng mmd
and matter as separate, self-condItIOned eXIstences,
standmg in merely external, causal relations to one
another. We shall agree WIth the extreme matenal-
I!'JtlC type of naturahsm-as agamst the duahstIc or
agnostIc types so favoured m the nmeteenth century
-at least in thIS, that we find no grounds for behevtng
that there are separate sovereIgntIes In the U mverse,
standmg m external, and so to speak dIplomatIC or
hostIle, mtercourse WIth one another. There is ample
scope-m proportlOn as eVIdence is forthcommg-for
dIstmgUlshmg between the morganic and the organic,
between the phYSIcal and the mental, between the
natural and the spmtual; but m these dIstmctlOns
we shall not expect to find separable factors. The
organic, for instance, does not exist apart from the
morgamc, but conSIsts m the raIsmg of the latter to
hIgher powers. What we shall look for are different
levels wherein the lower yields embodiment to the.
hIgher, and the higher by means of the lower achieyes
that whIch is proper to itself. Such contentions
appear to be m harmony WIth, or at least. not to be
IX CONCLUSIONS 235
incompatible with, the known facts; and at the same
time they have tAle very considerable recommenda-
tion that they are more In keepIng with our abysmal
Ignorance of the other, yet unknown, possibilIties of
which reality may permit, than are the counter-views
that rest upon duahstlc dIstmctlOns which for theIr
establIshment demand knowledge beyond what we
possess.
We shall also conclude that the dIstInctIOn between
appearance and realIty (phenomena and thIngs In
themselves), however applIed, IS qUIte peculIarly un-
fitted to express the relatIOn between mInd and Nature.
The mmd does, mdeed, condItion the possIbIlIty of
appearance. Appearance IS a SImplIficatIOn of realIty,
demanded for the purposes of ammal and human
eXIstence. 1 In the achIevement of thIS goal, the sensa,
as so many real happenIngs, come about, and form
an Important additIOn to the sum of realIty. In and
through them Nature mamfests ItS power of "creat-
ivelyadvancmg Into novelty." ConsIdered simply as
occurrences, and apart from the uses for whIch we

1 So far I can agree with Mr G Dawes Hicks that "the dIStinctIOn

between a • thIng' and ItS' appearances' IS not a dlstmctlon between the
• thing' as a whole and Its constituents A' thIng' IS made up of parts
and of qualIties, and anyone of ItS qualIties may' appear' In a countless
number of ways But thiS qualIty IS not resolvable IIlto ItS ways of appear-
Ing, It remaInS one, though ItS appearances vary, and IS, as such, a qualIty
of the' real thIng,' whIle the appearances of It are not The appearances
are no more than the orderly manner In which the qualIty IS apprehended
by a finite mInd under the condlllons and lImitations Imposed by sense
Intultlonil' (Proc .I1mt Soc, 1916-17. pp 357-8) Cf also Pro, for 1913-
1914, P 2.7: .. The antithesIS which contmually besets our thInkmg
obetween thIngs as they are and thIngs as they appear IS not an antltheslS
between two separate spheres of existence Thmgs as they appear are not
extc!'rnal to or mdependent of thmgs as they are, thIngs as they are do
appear The contrast falls Within experience Itself and m no way
pOInts beyond ~t."
23 6 THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE CHAP.

employ them, they are not appearances but realitIes.

Furthermore, they enable reahty, dworkIng through
man, to add to Itself, by creatIOn of the manual and of
the fine arts, types of beIng dIfferent from any that
, naturally • exist. But in these actiVItIes, as In those
of ordInary experIence and of SCIence, mInd does not
fall on the side of appearance; it reveals to us both
realIty and appearance, enablIng us to draw the
distInction and IncreasIngly to dIscern, and In theory
to correct, the IllUSIOns through whIch appearances
fulfil their practlcal ends. Appearance connects with
practtcal ends, and wIth the lImItation of outlook
necessary for concentratIOn, and for rapIdity and ease
of response. MInd, as standIng for theorettcal values,
IS the great emanCIpator from the IllUSIOns whIch
thus result. Knowledge, to repeat, IS knowledge; Its
functIOn IS to reveal; It IS not creatIve, but con-
templatIve. Even when what we contemplate is, as
we say, ' only appearance,' as when we see an object
behInd a mirror, what is so perceIved reduces without
remaInder, alIke as regards ItS sensed and ItS IntuIted
factors, to the actually eXIstent. The exigencies of
practical Me have Intervened, through induced habits
and other means that may perhaps be partly physio-
logIcal, and If mental are certainly non-conSCIOUS, to
determIne ' incorrect • location, as well as simplifica-
tion and perspectIve in terms of sensa; but the last
named, the sensa, are real events, Integral to Nature;
and the former are non-conscIOUS processes whose
occurrence we can learn to appreciate, and in theory
to discount.
Since, then, appearance has a practical use, a{\d
therefore normally a suffiCIent reason for existing, it
casts no doubt upon the general reliabih,ty of our
IX CONCLUSIONS 237
mental procesbes, or upon theIr capacity, when we
use the resources ?laced at our dIsposal, progressively
to penetrate to the absolutely real. The knowing
mind IS able to do so, not because It is mdependent
of the world which it apprehends, but because it is
integrally bound up with it, and so IS mimstered to
and upheld by it. More problems remam than are
hereby answered. But at least we are assured of one
all-important conclusion. Since reality lIes open to
our VIew, it can be rehed upon, as we extend the range
of our empirical data, sensory and spiritual, and
interpret them by the aid of theories rigorously tested,
to educate us ever more fully into understandmg of
Itself.
 INDEX
Absoluteness, concept of, 140-43, Descartes, 4-5, 16, 18 if., 30-31, 36,
15S-6
Agnosticism, 2.34
37, 39, 54, 56 -7, 58, 62, u6
189,2.34
n.,
Alexander, S, IX, x, 6-7, 54 n, 71, Duncan, R K, 2.8 n.
89, 1I3-14, 12.6-7,130-31, 142. 11,
154 n, 158-9, 163 n, 16711,194, Elnstem,40
2.I2. n., 2.13 n Electron, status of, 168-9
Anderson, J , x Energy, status of, 162., 166, 171-2.
Appearance and reality, dlstmctlon Enjoyment, 89, n8, 166
between, 139, 140-43, 2.35-6 EpiphenomenalIsm, 2.5
ASSOCiationists, 181 If Ether, status of, 169-70
Atoms, status of, 168-9 Explanation. phYSical, 75, 172. ff
AvenarlUs, IX, 57-8 ExtenSity, 13, 50-52., 100 if, II5 11 ,
Awareness See ConscIOusness 178 tr, 208 j f

Behaviourism, 25, 3 I 11. GaWeo, 20 if, 30, 37, 75, u6

Bergson, H , IX, X Gibson, J, 46 11 ,47 11
Berkeley, 2., 5, 8, 16, 39,47-8, 52. 11 , Haldane, J S, 153 11.
54 1f ,61, I2 411 Head, H, II4 11, 1I8 11, 2.02. n,
Bifurcation of Nature See White- 203 11, uz 11, Ul if, 2.24
head Hegel,66
Bmet, A, 45 Hicks, G Dawes, 49 11, 6]-4, 71,
BIOplasm, 186, 2004 154 11,135 n
Bosanquet, B , 8, 142. n Hodgson, S , 63
Bowman, A A, X Hugel, Baron F von, X, 2.33 11
Bradley, F H, 8 Hume, 5, 16, 53-4, I2. 5, 12.9, 130, 165
Broad, CD, x, 51 11, 53, 78-9, Huxley. Thomas, 5-6, 184
89 ff, u6 11 , 142 n , 172 11
Idea, the two meanings of the term,
Categorlal thlnkmg See Con- 4 6- 8
sCiousness Ideal construction, 158, 166 If
Categones, 10,12.3 if, 144 if, 156 if, IllUSion, 12, 27 ff, 35-7, 139 See
2.2.4-5 Perception
CausatIOn. 92.-3, 12.3. uS, 12.8-9, Images, nature of mental, 194-6
133, 142. 11, 161 if, 170 if Infimty, concept of, 140-43, 155-6
ConSCIOusness, 59 If, 76 If, 83-4, Intuition, 76 if, II3-I4., 156 If, 178
87-8, 132., 156 If, 161, 166 If, if, 196-9. lOS If, 2.1.4-5 See
181 If., 186 ff, 197-8, 2.05 if, Consciousness
2.2.4 ff•
..Continuity, analYSIs of, 134 ff, James. Willram, 51, 72. 80, II5-16
139-40 , 157-61, 164
CO!jtmuum, presentational, 80 if., Kant, 20, 8, 16, 40, 65, 66, Hz 11,
95 if, 185-6, 2.2.6-7 12.411, 1205, 131-2., 142., 188, 2.02.
..) Critical Realism, Essays In, 68 11. KelVIn, Lord, 27, 151, 169
239
240 THEORY OF ,KNOWLEDGE
Laud, }., 71, 130 n. Randle, H N., II4 1£.
Lelbnlz, 16, 36 Reid, Thomas, 40, 132.,
Locke, zz n, ]20, ]9, 46-7, 56, 61,
62., lZ4 n, 181, 18] Sahsbury, Lord, [51 n.
Lodge, Su Ohver, 2.8 n. Secondary q uahtles SCI! Qualities
Loewen berg, } , 68 n. Self, nature of the, 153-5, 168, 1720
Selves, apprehenSion of other, 1]0 n
Mach, E, 40 Sensa, ], 10 1£, '1,7 1£, ]9, 44 ff,
Male branche, IX 681£ ,89ff, 170-71, 172. 1£,1781£,
Mass, status of, 162., 166 1920-4, 2.00 1£, z14 1£
Matter, 166 Senses, development of the, 2.00 If
Mendelo!elf, 174 n. Sensing, In distinction from sensa,
Mind, problem of body and, 79-80, 44 If, from mtultlng, 76 If,
153-5, 179, zoo 1£, 2.07, 20204 If , II]-14 See Consciousness
20 34-5 Smith, G Elliot, zoo
Molecule, status of, 168-9 Space, 10, 1]-14, 84 If, 156 If ,
Moore, G E, 45 n, 74 n. apprehensIOn of distant, 194-6
Myers, C S, II8 n, ZII-IZ Spencer, Herbert, 5-6, 1020, 184
SPlnoza, 16, 36
Nature, 20-4, 9, 10 If, 14-15, zZ9 If , Stout, G F, x, 45, 50-52., 68 n,
problem of relation of mind to, 69 n, 79, 87-8, 95, 97-8, 100 If ,
n5 If II8 n, II9 n, I]] n , []6, 148 n,
NeceSSitation, category of, 134, 155 n, 166 n
137 1£, 163-5 Stumpf, C , 100
Newton, 2., 75 Substance, category of, lZ], lZ5,
Nunn, T Percy, 71 1208-9, 133, 161 1£, 170 1£
Super-Nature, 20]20
OptiC thalamus, 2015 1£ TelepathiC function of senses, ]4,
OrganIsm, concept of, 1520-] 192.-4
ThlnklDg, categorlal See Con-
ParallehsmJ 5, 205 sCiousness
Pearson, K, 40 Time, la, 13-14, 80 1£, 156 If ,
Perception, not primarily a form of apprehenSion of past, 194-6
knowledge, I I If, 207 1£, ]1, ]Z-3, Totahty, category of See Whole
33-7, 190-94, 2.2.7 1£ and part
Perspective, I l-lZ, ]]-5, 1871£ , 196, Tyndall, J, 184
202.71£
Phenomena See Appearance Uncondltlonedness, concept of, 140-
Postulation, metaphYSical, 163, 175- 143, 155-6
177 Values, 1,]-4, 20205-6, 2,]0-]1, 2.]2. n,
Powers, mental, 15]-4, 166 If, '1,]6
1851£, 190-91
Primary quahtles See Quahtles Ward, James, 45, 50-520, 72., 95 1£,
Pringle-Pattison, AS, 1520 n, II4-15, II9 n, 185-6
155 n Whitehead, AN, x, 6-7, 204, 70 n ,
Psychoplasm, 185 If., 2,04 75. 137. 144 n..
147 J'. 157.
16] n , 164 n .• 170, 172. n. 176 n ,
Qualities, primary and secondary, 2,206,20207 n
10 If, 2,1-5, 2,7 If, 3] If, 68 If, Whole and part, category of, 134 1£ ~
75, 77, 170 -7 1 , zz7 If See Sensa 144 1£ , 16]-5. 176

P"ntcll", Great BrItaIn 1',Y It & R CLARK. LIMI1SD, Ed,,~lm7"gIr.