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Motion for Reconsideration and Motion for Partial

Reconsideration denied.

Note.—Where the Bureau of Lands, a specialized government

agency tasked to determine the classification of parcels of land, has
already certified that the subject land is untenanted, the Supreme
Court must accord such conclusions great respect, if not finality, in
the absence of evidence to the contrary. (Jeremias vs. Estate of the
Late Irene P. Mariano, 566 SCRA 539 [2008])
——o0o——

G.R. No. 176389. December 14, 2010.*

ANTONIO LEJANO, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES, respondent.

G.R. No. 176864. December 14, 2010.*

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. HUBERT JEFFREY

P. WEBB, ANTONIO LEJANO, MICHAEL A. GATCHALIAN,
HOSPICIO FERNANDEZ, MIGUEL RODRIGUEZ, PETER
ESTRADA and GERARDO BIONG, appellants.

Criminal Procedure; Due Process; Legal Research; Webb is not

entitled to acquittal for the failure of the State to produce the semen
specimen at this late stage; The ruling in Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83
(1963), that he cites has long been overtaken by the decision in Arizona v.
Youngblood, 488 U.S. 41 (1988), where the U.S. Supreme Court held that
due process does not require the State to preserve the semen specimen
although it might be useful to the accused unless the latter is able to show
bad faith on the part of the prosecution or the police.—Still, Webb is not
entitled to acquittal for the failure of the State to produce the semen
specimen at this late stage. For one thing, the ruling in Brady v. Maryland
that he cites has long been overtaken by the decision in Arizona v.
Youngblood, where the U.S. Supreme Court held that

_______________

* EN BANC.

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due process does not require the State to preserve the semen specimen
although it might be useful to the accused unless the latter is able to show
bad faith on the part of the prosecution or the police. Here, the State
presented a medical expert who testified on the existence of the specimen
and Webb in fact sought to have the same subjected to DNA test. For,
another, when Webb raised the DNA issue, the rule governing DNA
evidence did not yet exist, the country did not yet have the technology for
conducting the test, and no Philippine precedent had as yet recognized its
admissibility as evidence. Consequently, the idea of keeping the specimen
secure even after the trial court rejected the motion for DNA testing did not
come up. Indeed, neither Webb nor his co-accused brought up the matter of
preserving the specimen in the meantime.
Criminal Law; Alibis and Denials; Judges; Impartiality; Not all
denials and alibis should be regarded as fabricated—indeed, if the accused
is truly innocent, he can have no other defense but denial and alibi; A judge
must keep an open mind, guarding against slipping into hasty conclusion,
often arising from a desire to quickly finish the job of deciding a case—a
positive declaration from a witness that he saw the accused commit the
crime should not automatically cancel out the accused’s claim that he did
not do it; A lying witness can make as positive an identification as a truthful
witness can.—The trial court and the Court of Appeals are one in rejecting
as weak Webb’s alibi. Their reason is uniform: Webb’s alibi cannot stand
against Alfaro’s positive identification of him as the rapist and killer of
Carmela and, apparently, the killer as well of her mother and younger sister.
Because of this, to the lower courts, Webb’s denial and alibi were fabricated.
But not all denials and alibis should be regarded as fabricated. Indeed, if the
accused is truly innocent, he can have no other defense but denial and alibi.
So how can such accused penetrate a mind that has been made cynical by
the rule drilled into his head that a defense of alibi is a hangman’s noose in
the face of a witness positively swearing, “I saw him do it.”? Most judges
believe that such assertion automatically dooms an alibi which is so easy to
fabricate. This quick stereotype thinking, however, is distressing. For how
else can the truth that the accused is really innocent have any chance of
prevailing over such a stone-cast tenet? There is only one way. A judge
must keep an open mind. He must guard against slipping into hasty
conclusion, often arising from a desire to quickly finish the job of deciding a
case. A positive declaration from a witness that he saw the accused commit
the crime should not automatically cancel out the accused’s claim that he
did not do it. A lying witness can make as positive an identification as a
truthful witness can. The lying witness can also say as forthrightly and
unequivocally, “He did it!” without blinking an eye.
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Same; Same; Witnesses; The positive identification must meet at least

two criteria—first, the positive identification of the offender must come from
a credible witness, and, second, the witness’ story of what she personally
saw must be believable, not inherently contrived.—Rather, to be acceptable,
the positive identification must meet at least two criteria: First, the positive
identification of the offender must come from a credible witness. She is
credible who can be trusted to tell the truth, usually based on past
experiences with her. Her word has, to one who knows her, its weight in
gold. And second, the witness’ story of what she personally saw must be
believable, not inherently contrived. A witness who testifies about
something she never saw runs into inconsistencies and makes bewildering
claims.
Same; Same; Same; Police assets are often criminals themselves.—
Here, as already fully discussed above, Alfaro and her testimony fail to meet
the above criteria. She did not show up at the NBI as a spontaneous witness
bothered by her conscience. She had been hanging around that agency for
sometime as a stool pigeon, one paid for mixing up with criminals and
squealing on them. Police assets are often criminals themselves. She was the
prosecution’s worst possible choice for a witness. Indeed, her superior
testified that she volunteered to play the role of a witness in the Vizconde
killings when she could not produce a man she promised to the NBI.
Same; Same; Alibi; Requisites.—To establish alibi, the accused must
prove by positive, clear, and satisfactory evidence that (a) he was present at
another place at the time of the perpetration of the crime, and (b) that it was
physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime.
Same; Same; If one is cynical about the Philippine system, he could
probably claim that Webb, with his father’s connections, can arrange for the
local immigration to put a March 9, 1991 departure stamp on his passport
and an October 27, 1992 arrival stamp on the same.—If one is cynical
about the Philippine system, he could probably claim that Webb, with his
father’s connections, can arrange for the local immigration to put a March 9,
1991 departure stamp on his passport and an October 27, 1992 arrival stamp
on the same. But this is pure speculation since there had been no indication
that such arrangement was made. Besides, how could Webb fix a foreign
airlines’ passenger manifest, officially filed in the Philippines and at the
airport in the U.S. that had his name on them? How could Webb fix with the
U.S. Immigration’s record system those two dates in its record of his travels
as well as the dates when he supposedly departed in secret from the U.S. to
commit the crime in the Philippines and then return there? No one has come
up with a logical and plausible answer to these questions.

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Same; Same; Best Evidence Rule; Pleadings, Practice and Procedure;

While the best evidence of a document is the original, this means that the
same is exhibited in court for the adverse party to examine and for the judge
to see—the practice when a party does not want to leave an important
document with the trial court is to have a photocopy of it marked as exhibit
and stipulated among the parties as a faithful reproduction of the original.
—The Court of Appeals rejected the evidence of Webb’s passport since he
did not leave the original to be attached to the record. But, while the best
evidence of a document is the original, this means that the same is exhibited
in court for the adverse party to examine and for the judge to see. As Court
of Appeals Justice Tagle said in his dissent, the practice when a party does
not want to leave an important document with the trial court is to have a
photocopy of it marked as exhibit and stipulated among the parties as a
faithful reproduction of the original. Stipulations in the course of trial are
binding on the parties and on the court.
Same; Same; Evidence; Official Documents; Passports; Webb’s
passport is a document issued by the Philippine government, which under
international practice, is the official record of travels of the citizen to whom
it is issued, and the entries in that passport are presumed true; The U.S.
Immigration certification and computer print-out, the official certifications
of which have been authenticated by the Philippine Department of Foreign
Affairs, merely validated the arrival and departure stamps of the U.S.
Immigration office on Webb’s passport—they have the same evidentiary
value—and, the officers who issued these certifications need not be
presented in court to testify on them.—The U.S. Immigration certification
and the computer print-out of Webb’s arrival in and departure from that
country were authenticated by no less than the Office of the U.S. Attorney
General and the State Department. Still the Court of Appeals refused to
accept these documents for the reason that Webb failed to present in court
the immigration official who prepared the same. But this was unnecessary.
Webb’s passport is a document issued by the Philippine government, which
under international practice, is the official record of travels of the citizen to
whom it is issued. The entries in that passport are presumed true. The U.S.
Immigration certification and computer print-out, the official certifications
of which have been authenticated by the Philippine Department of Foreign
Affairs, merely validated the arrival and departure stamps of the U.S.
Immigration office on Webb’s passport. They have the same evidentiary
value. The officers who issued these certifications need not be presented in
court to testify on them. Their trustworthiness arises from the sense of
official duty and the penalty attached to a breached

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duty, in the routine and disinterested origin of such statement and in the
publicity of the record.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; If the Supreme Court were to
subscribe to the extremely skeptical view taken by the trial court and the
Court of Appeals regarding travel documents like the passport as well as the
domestic and foreign records of departures and arrivals from the airports, it
might as well tear the rules of evidence out of the law books and regard
suspicions, surmises, or speculations as reasons for impeaching evidence.—
The trial court and the Court of Appeals expressed marked cynicism over
the accuracy of travel documents like the passport as well as the domestic
and foreign records of departures and arrivals from airports. They claim that
it would not have been impossible for Webb to secretly return to the
Philippines after he supposedly left it on March 9, 1991, commit the crime,
go back to the U.S., and openly return to the Philippines again on October
26, 1992. Travel between the U.S. and the Philippines, said the lower courts
took only about twelve to fourteen hours. If the Court were to subscribe to
this extremely skeptical view, it might as well tear the rules of evidence out
of the law books and regard suspicions, surmises, or speculations as reasons
for impeaching evidence. It is not that official records, which carry the
presumption of truth of what they state, are immune to attack. They are not.
That presumption can be overcome by evidence. Here, however, the
prosecution did not bother to present evidence to impeach the entries in
Webb’s passport and the certifications of the Philippine and U.S.’
immigration services regarding his travel to the U.S. and back. The
prosecution’s rebuttal evidence is the fear of the unknown that it planted in
the lower court’s minds.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Webb’s documented alibi altogether
impeaches Alfaro’s testimony, not only with respect to him, but also with
respect to the other co-accused.—Webb’s documented alibi altogether
impeaches Alfaro’s testimony, not only with respect to him, but also with
respect to Lejano, Estrada, Fernandez, Gatchalian, Rodriguez, and Biong.
For, if the Court accepts the proposition that Webb was in the U.S. when the
crime took place, Alfaro’s testimony will not hold together. Webb’s
participation is the anchor of Alfaro’s story. Without it, the evidence against
the others must necessarily fall.
Same; Presumption of Innocence; In our criminal justice system, what
is important is, not whether the court entertains doubts about the innocence
of the accused since an open mind is willing to explore all possibilities, but
whether it entertains a reasonable, lingering doubt as to his guilt.—In our
criminal justice system, what is important is, not whether the court enter-
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tains doubts about the innocence of the accused since an open mind is
willing to explore all possibilities, but whether it entertains a reasonable,
lingering doubt as to his guilt. For, it would be a serious mistake to send an
innocent man to jail where such kind of doubt hangs on to one’s inner being,
like a piece of meat lodged immovable between teeth. Will the Court send
the accused to spend the rest of their lives in prison on the testimony of an
NBI asset who proposed to her handlers that she take the role of the witness
to the Vizconde massacre that she could not produce?
CARPIO-MORALES,  J., Concurring Opinion:
Criminal Law; Evidence; Witnesses; Dangerous Drugs Act; Evidence
derived from the testimony of a witness who was under the influence of
drugs during the incident to which he is testifying is indeed very unreliable.
—The paper of authors Burrus and Marks, “Testimonial Reliability of Drug
Addicts,” teaches: . . . [W]here the prolonged use of drugs has impaired the
witness’ ability to perceive, recall or relate, impeaching testimony is
uniformly sustained by the courts. Aside from organic deterioration,
however, testimony may be impugned if the witness was under the influence
of drugs at the time of perceiving the event about which he is testifying or at
the time he is on the stand. This necessarily follows, for even the temporary
presence of drugs affects the functioning of the body’s organs, and thus
bears directly on the credibility of the witness’ testimony… (underscoring
supplied) Evidence derived from the testimony of a witness who was under
the influence of drugs during the incident to which he is testifying is indeed
very unreliable. So it has been held that “habitual users of narcotics become
notorious liars and that their testimony is likely to be affected thereby.” We
believe it will be admitted that habitual users of opium, or other like
narcotics, become notorious liars. The habit of lying comes doubtless from
the fact that the users of those narcotics pass the greater part of their lives in
an unreal world, and thus become unable to distinguish between images and
facts, between illusions and realities.
Same; Same; Same; The prosecution’s star witness appears to be a
rehearsed witness—prior to her decision to surface and claim to tell what
she “knew” about the crimes, the crimes had already been played out in the
media, both print and broadcast, in every gory detail.—Given Alfaro’s
confession of having for years, after the commission of the crimes, been
numbed by the effects of drug abuse, would the dissenters take as gospel
truth her what they termed “vivid” and “infallible” recollection of the
minutiae surrounding the commission of the crime in June 1991, and point
to the accused as the male-

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factors, particularly Webb, despite evidence, documentary and testimonial,

supporting his alibi? The explanation for this feat of wizardry is within
arms-length—Alfaro appears to be a rehearsed witness. Prior to her decision
to surface and claim to tell what she “knew” about the crimes, the crimes
had already been played out in the media, both print and broadcast, in every
gory detail. It was a raging topic that drew intense discussions in both talk
shows and informal gatherings, and all sorts of speculations about it were
rife. In fact, prior to the arrest of the accused, members of the Philippine
National Police (PNP) arrested some members of an “akyat-bahay” gang
who were charged accordingly. These gang members were later released
upon orders of the Makati Regional Trial Court after it was discovered that
their confessions were fabricated by the PNP to conform to the physical
evidence found at the crime scene. It is not thus difficult to believe that
Alfaro could have become familiar with the evidentiary details of the
crimes, given that she was practically a resident at the offices of the NBI
which was actively investigating the crimes, not to mention her being an
NBI “star” witness.
Same; Same; Same; A testimony given four years after the occurrence
of crime which gives minute details that even contradict tales earlier given
is too incredible as to draw dubiety.—A testimony given four years after the
occurrence of crime which gives minute details that even contradict tales
earlier given is too incredible as to draw dubiety. The lucid observations of
Court of Appeals Justice Renato C. Dacudao in his Dissent for the acquittal
of the accused, and the graphic analysis of Justice Roberto Abad in his
ponencia on why Alfaro’s testimony can not be relied upon are thus well
taken. It bears stressing that the defense’s earnest assertion that the
prosecution failed to rebut the pieces of evidence, highlighted by the
defense, that seriously dent its (the prosecution’s) case has not been
controverted.
Same; Same; Facts decide cases—conjectures and suspicions are not
facts, hence, they have no evidentiary value, and they cannot be the bases of
conviction as they cannot substitute for the constitutional requirement of
proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.—It is now the dissenters’ reasoning
which turns highly speculative and conjectural, one borne out of unfounded
suspicion. It suspects that the Webb family may have used its “financial
resources and political influence” to control all the U.S. and Philippine
immigration people, thus allowing Webb to secretly “travel back to the
country and again fly to the U.S. several times” between March 9, 1991 and
October 26, 1992. It bears noting that the prosecution proffered no evidence
to establish that during the interregnum Webb had surreptitiously slipped out
of the U.S.A. to the Philippines, and that he subsequently re-entered the
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all immigration controls and protocols in both countries. This is the stuff of
which spy novels are made, but not in the real world where the lives of
innocent individuals are at stake. Facts decide cases. Conjectures and
suspicions are not facts, hence, they have no evidentiary value. They cannot
be the bases of conviction as they cannot substitute for the constitutional
requirement of proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Suspicions, no
matter how strong they are, must never sway judgment.
Same; Same; Witnesses; If half the world away could not even be
considered to be “so far removed from the crime scene” as to evince the
physical impossibility of actual presence, then the defense of alibi can only
be appreciated when an accused lands in a different planet.—While alibi is,
indeed, a weak defense because the accused can easily fabricate his story to
escape criminal liability, in the present case, Webb’s alibi could not have
been fabricated with ease. His travel and immigration documents showing
his departure from the Philippines and arrival in the U.S.A., not to mention
the testimonial and documentary evidence on his activities while in the
U.S.A. between March 9, 1991 and October 26, 1992, deserve full credit. If
half the world away could not even be considered to be “so far removed
from the crime scene” as to evince the physical impossibility of actual
presence, then the defense of alibi can only be appreciated when an accused
lands in a different planet.
BRION, J., Supplemental Opinion:
Courts; Sub Judice Rule; Freedom of Expression; The sub judice rule
restricts comments and disclosures pertaining to pending judicial
proceedings—the restriction applies not only to participants in the pending
case, i.e., to members of the bar and bench, and to litigants and witnesses,
but also to the public in general, which necessarily includes the media.—In
essence, the sub judice rule restricts comments and disclosures pertaining to
pending judicial proceedings. The restriction applies not only to participants
in the pending case, i.e., to members of the bar and bench, and to litigants
and witnesses, but also to the public in general, which necessarily includes
the media. Although the Rules of Court does not contain a specific provision
imposing the sub judice rule, it supports the observance of the restriction by
punishing its violation as indirect contempt under Section 3(d) of Rule 71:
Section 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing.—x x x
a person guilty of any of the following acts may be punished for indirect
contempt: x x x x (d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly,
to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice[.]

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Same; Same; Same; We have long recognized in this jurisdiction that

the freedom of speech under Section 4, Article III of the Constitution is not
absolute; While the sub judice rule may be considered as a curtailment of
the right to free speech, it is “necessary to ensure the proper administration
of justice and the right of an accused to a fair trial.”—Persons facing
charges for indirect contempt for violation of the sub judice rule often
invoke as defense their right to free speech and claim that the citation for
contempt constitutes a form of impermissible subsequent punishment. We
have long recognized in this jurisdiction that the freedom of speech under
Section 4, Article III of the Constitution is not absolute. A very literal
construction of the provision, as espoused by US Supreme Court Justice
Hugo Black, may lead to the disregard of other equally compelling
constitutional rights and principles. In Vicente v. Majaducon, 461 SCRA 12
(2005), this Court declared that “[the freedom of speech] needs on occasion
to be adjusted to and accommodated with the requirements of equally
important public interests such as the maintenance of the integrity of courts
and orderly functioning of the administration of justice.” Courts, both within
and outside this jurisdiction, have long grappled with the dilemma of
balancing the public’s right to free speech and the government’s duty to
administer fair and impartial justice. While the sub judice rule may be
considered as a curtailment of the right to free speech, it is “necessary to
ensure the proper administration of justice and the right of an accused to a
fair trial.” Both these latter concerns are equally paramount and cannot
lightly be disregarded.
Same; Same; Same; The Constitution simply gives the citizens the right
to speech, not the right to unrestricted publicized speech.—Before
proceeding with this line of thought, however, let me clarify that the sub
judice rule is not imposed on all forms of speech. In so far as criminal
proceedings are concerned, two classes of publicized speech made during
the pendency of the proceedings can be considered as contemptuous: first,
comments on the merits of the case, and second, intemperate and
unreasonable comments on the conduct of the courts with respect to the
case. Publicized speech should be understood to be limited to those aired or
printed in the various forms of media such as television, radio, newspapers,
magazines, and internet, and excludes discussions, in public or in private,
between and among ordinary citizens. The Constitution simply gives the
citizens the right to speech, not the right to unrestricted publicized speech.
Same; Same; Same; Due Process; The right to a fair trial is an adjunct
of the accused’s right to due process.—The right to a fair trial is an adjunct
of the accused’s right to due process which “guarantees [him] a presumption
of

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innocence until the contrary is proved in a trial x x x where the conclusions
reached are induced not by any outside force or influence but only by
evidence and argument given in open court, where fitting dignity and calm
ambiance is demanded.”
Same; Same; Same; The fact that the jury system is not adopted in this
jurisdiction is not an argument against our observance of the sub judice rule
—justices and judges are no different from members of the jury, they are not
immune from the pervasive effects of media.—As may be observed from the
cited material, the sub judice rule is used by foreign courts to insulate
members of the jury from being influenced by prejudicial publicity. But the
fact that the jury system is not adopted in this jurisdiction is not an argument
against our observance of the sub judice rule; justices and judges are no
different from members of the jury, they are not immune from the pervasive
effects of media. “It might be farcical to build around them an impregnable
armor against the influence of the most powerful media of public opinion.”
As I said in another case, in a slightly different context, even those who are
determined, in their conscious minds, to avoid bias may be affected.
Same; Same; Same; Principle of Open Justice; Words and Phrases;
The people’s freedom to criticize the government includes the right to
criticize the courts, their proceedings and decisions—this is the principle of
open justice, which is fundamental to our democratic society and ensures
that (a) there is a safeguard against judicial arbitrariness or idiosyncrasy,
and that (b) the public’s confidence in the administration of justice is
maintained.—This, of course, is not meant to stifle all forms of criticism
against the court. As the third branch of the government, the courts remain
accountable to the people. The people’s freedom to criticize the government
includes the right to criticize the courts, their proceedings and decisions.
This is the principle of open justice, which is fundamental to our democratic
society and ensures that (a) there is a safeguard against judicial arbitrariness
or idiosyncrasy, and that (b) the public’s confidence in the administration of
justice is maintained. The criticism must, however, be fair, made in good
faith, and “not spill over the walls of decency and propriety.” And to
enhance the open court principle and allow the people to make fair and
reasoned criticism of the courts, the sub judice rule excludes from its
coverage fair and accurate reports (without comment) of what have actually
taken place in open court.
Same; Same; Same; Due Process; The resulting (but temporary)
curtailment of speech because of the sub judice rule is necessary and
justified by the more compelling interests to uphold the rights of the accused
and promote the fair and orderly administration of justice.—In sum, the
court, in a pending

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litigation, must be shielded from embarrassment or influence in its all-

important duty of deciding the case. Any publication pending a suit,
reflecting upon the court, the parties, the officers of the court, the counsel,
etc., with reference to the suit, or tending to influence the decision of the
controversy, is contempt of court and is punishable. The resulting (but
temporary) curtailment of speech because of the sub judice rule is necessary
and justified by the more compelling interests to uphold the rights of the
accused and promote the fair and orderly administration of justice.
Same; Same; Same; If we do not apply at all the sub judice rule to the
present case, the reason is obvious to those who have followed the case in
the media—both parties are in pari delicto as both have apparently gone to
the media to campaign for the merits of their respective causes—the
egregious action of one has been cancelled by a similar action by the other.
—If we do not apply at all the sub judice rule to the present case, the reason
is obvious to those who have followed the case in the media—both parties
are in pari delicto as both have apparently gone to the media to campaign
for the merits of their respective causes. Thus, the egregious action of one
has been cancelled by a similar action by the other. It is in this sense that
this Supplemental Opinion is independent of the merits of the case. Their
common action, however, cannot have their prejudicial effects on both;
whatever the results may be, doubts will linger about the real merits of the
case due to the inordinate media campaign that transpired. Lest we be
misunderstood, our application of the sub judice rule to this case cannot
serve as a precedent for similar future violations. Precisely, this
Supplemental Opinion is a signal to all that this Court has not forgotten, and
is in fact keenly aware of, the limits of what can be publicly ventilated on
the merits of a case while sub judice, and on the comments on the conduct
of the courts with respect to the case. This Court will not standby idly and
helplessly as its integrity as an institution and its processes are shamelessly
brought to disrepute.
VILLARAMA, JR., J., Dissenting Opinion:
Criminal Law; Presumption of Innocence; Evidence; The Supreme
Court has consistently held that the rule on the trial court’s appreciation of
evidence must bow to the superior rule that the prosecution must prove the
guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.—This Court has consistently
held that the rule on the trial court’s appreciation of evidence must bow to
the superior rule that the prosecution must prove the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt. The law presumes an accused innocent, and this
presumption must prevail unless overturned by competent and credible
proof. Thus, we

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are tasked to consider two crucial points in sustaining a judgment of

conviction: first, the identification of the accused as perpetrator of the crime,
taking into account the credibility of the prosecution witness who made the
identification as well as the prosecution’s compliance with legal and
constitutional standards; and second, all the elements constituting the crime
were duly proven by the prosecution to be present.
Same; Same; Same; Witnesses; It is axiomatic that a witness who
testifies in a categorical, straightforward, spontaneous and frank manner
and remains consistent on cross-examination is a credible witness.—The
testimony of Alfaro on its material points was corroborated by Birrer, Dr.
Cabanayan, White, Jr., Cabanacan and Gaviola. Appellants’ presence at the
scene of the crime before, during and after its commission was duly
established. Their respective participation, acts and declarations were
likewise detailed by Alfaro who was shown to be a credible witness. It is
axiomatic that a witness who testifies in a categorical, straightforward,
spontaneous and frank manner and remains consistent on cross-examination
is a credible witness.
Same; Same; Same; Same; A criminal case rises or falls on the
strength of the prosecution’s case, not on the weakness of the defense.—A
criminal case rises or falls on the strength of the prosecution’s case, not on
the weakness of the defense. Once the prosecution overcomes the
presumption of innocence by proving the elements of the crime and the
identity of the accused as perpetrator beyond reasonable doubt, the burden
of evidence then shifts to the defense which shall then test the strength of the
prosecution’s case either by showing that no crime was in fact committed or
that the accused could not have committed or did not commit the imputed
crime, or at the very least, by casting doubt on the guilt of the accused.
Same; Alibi; We have held in a   number of cases that alibi is an
inherently weak and unreliable defense, for it is easy to fabricate and
difficult to disprove.—We have held in a number of cases that alibi is an
inherently weak and unreliable defense, for it is easy to fabricate and
difficult to disprove. To establish alibi, the accused must prove (a) that he
was present at another place at the time of the perpetration of the crime, and
(b) that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime.
Physical impossibility “refers to the distance between the place where the
accused was when the crime transpired and the place where it was
committed, as well as the facility of access between the two places.” Due to
its doubtful nature, alibi must be supported by clear and convincing proof.
“Alibi, the plea of having been elsewhere than at the scene of the crime at
the time of the commission

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of the felony, is a plausible excuse for the accused. Let there be no mistake
about it. Contrary to the common notion, alibi is in fact a good defense. But,
to be valid for purposes of exoneration from a criminal charge, the defense
of alibi must be such that it would have been physically impossible for
the person charged with the crime to be at the locus criminis at the time
of its commission, the reason being that no person can be in two places
at the same time. The excuse must be so airtight that it would admit of
no exception. Where there is the least possibility of accused’s presence
at the crime scene, the alibi will not hold water.
Same; Witnesses; The rule is well-entrenched in this jurisdiction that in
determining the value and credibility of evidence, witnesses are to be
weighed, not numbered.—The rule is well-entrenched in this jurisdiction
that in determining the value and credibility of evidence, witnesses are to be
weighed, not numbered. The testimony of only one witness, if credible and
positive, is sufficient to convict. As to appellant Webb’s voluminous
documentary evidence, both the RTC and CA judiciously examined each
exhibit and concluded that these do not pass the test of admissibility and
materiality insofar as proving the physical impossibility of his presence at
the Vizconde residence on June 29, 1991 until the early morning of June 30,
1991.
Same; Same; Alibi; While it is true that presentation of passport, plane
ticket and other travel documents can serve as proof that an accused was
indeed out of the country at the time of the killings, it must still be shown
that the evidence is clear and convincing, and the totality of such evidence
constitutes an airtight excuse as to exclude the least possibility of his
presence at the crime scene.—As to the travel documents consisting of his
US passport, US INS certifications and other evidence presented by
appellant Webb in support of his alibi, while it is true that such presentation
of passport, plane ticket and other travel documents can serve as proof that
he was indeed out of the country at the time of the Vizconde killings, it must
still be shown that the evidence is clear and convincing, and the totality of
such evidence constitutes an airtight excuse as to exclude the least
possibility of his presence at the crime scene. However, appellant Webb
failed in this regard and the RTC and CA did not err in giving scant weight
to his arsenal of evidence, particularly so on the strength of the positive
identification of appellant Webb as Carmela’s rapist and one of those who
actually took part in the brutal killing of Carmela, her mother and sister
between midnight of June 29, 1991 and early morning of June 30, 1991.
Same; Same; Same; Verily, it is only when the identification of the
accused as the author of the crime charged is inconclusive or unreliable
that

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alibi assumes importance.—Alibi cannot be sustained where it is not only

without credible corroboration, but also where it does not, on its face,
demonstrate the physical impossibility of the accused’s presence at the place
and time of the commission of the crime. Against positive evidence, alibi
becomes most unsatisfactory. Alibi cannot prevail over the positive
identification of a credible witness. Appellant Webb was placed at the crime
scene by Alfaro who positively identified him as the one (1) who plotted and
committed the rape of Carmela, and later fatally stabbed her, her mother and
sister, aided by or in concert with Lejano and Ventura. Gaviola and
Cabanacan gave corroborating testimonies that appellant Webb was here in
the country, as he was just in his house at BF Homes Subdivision Phase III,
at least a few weeks prior to and on June 29 to 30, 1991. Verily, it is only
when the identification of the accused as the author of the crime charged is
inconclusive or unreliable that alibi assumes importance. Such is not the
situation in the case at bar where the identification of the perpetrators by a
lone eyewitness satisfied the moral certainty standard.
Same; Same; Same; Presumption of Innocence; Words and Phrases;
Definitely, “reasonable doubt” is not mere guesswork whether or not the
accused is guilty, but such uncertainty that “a reasonable man may
entertain after a fair review and consideration of the evidence.”—It is the
prosecution’s burden to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt. Definitely, “reasonable doubt” is not mere guesswork whether or not
the accused is guilty, but such uncertainty that “a reasonable man may
entertain after a fair review and consideration of the evidence.” Reasonable
doubt is present when—after the entire comparison and consideration of all
the evidences, leaves the minds of the [judges] in that condition that they
cannot say they feel an abiding conviction, to a moral certainty, of the truth
of the charge; a certainty that convinces and directs the understanding, and
satisfies the reason and judgment of those who are bound to act
conscientiously upon it.
Same; Same; Same; Judicial Notice; Philippine Passport Act of 1996
(R.A. No. 8239); The Court takes judicial notice of reported irregularities
and tampering of passports in the years prior to the recent issuance by the
Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) of machine-readable passports—in
fact, the proliferation of photo-substituted passports, fake immigration
stamps, assumed identity and double passports, among others, have been
cited as grounds to justify the necessity of amending the Philippine Passport
Act of 1996.—That reasonable doubt is not engendered by the presentation
of certifications of entry into and exit from the US, passport with stamp
marks of departure and declarations of witnesses who are mostly relatives
and friends

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of appellant Webb, can be gleaned from the fact that passports and plane
tickets indicating dates of arrival and departure do not necessarily prove that
the very same person actually took the flight. This Court takes judicial
notice of reported irregularities and tampering of passports in the years prior
to the recent issuance by the DFA of machine-readable passports. In fact, the
proliferation of photo-substituted passports, fake immigration stamps,
assumed identity and double passports, among others, have been cited as
grounds to justify the necessity of amending the Philippine Passport Act of
1996 (R.A. No. 8239) as proposed in the Senate, “x  x  x to rally for the
issuance of passports using tamper proof and the latest data encryption
technology; and provide stiffer penalties against proliferators of fake
passports.”
Same; Rape with Homicide; Conspiracy; Although only one (1) rape
was actually proven by the prosecution, as conspirators who mutually
agreed to commit the crime and assisted one (1) another in its commission,
on the occasion of which the rape victim, her mother and sister, were killed,
each of the accused-appellants shall be criminally liable for rape with
homicide.—The existence of conspiracy between appellants Webb, Ventura,
Lejano, Gatchalian, Fernandez, Rodriguez and Filart was satisfactorily
proven by the prosecution. Conspiracy exists when two or more persons
come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to
commit it. Conspiracy comes to life at the very instant the plotters agree,
expressly or impliedly, to commit the felony and forthwith decide to
actually pursue it. It may be proved by direct or circumstantial evidence.
Although only one (1) rape was actually proven by the prosecution, as
conspirators who mutually agreed to commit the crime and assisted one (1)
another in its commission, on the occasion of which the rape victim
Carmela, her mother Estrellita and sister Jennifer, were killed, each of the
accused-appellants shall be criminally liable for rape with homicide.
Same; Same; Accessories; Words and Phrases; Accessory is one who
has knowledge of the commission of the crime, yet did not take part in its
commission as principal or accomplice, but took part in it subsequent to its
commission.—The Revised Penal Code in Article 19 defines an accessory as
one who has knowledge of the commission of the crime, yet did not take
part in its commission as principal or accomplice, but took part in it
subsequent to its commission by any of three modes: (1) profiting himself or
assisting the offender to profit by the effects of the crime; (2) concealing or
destroying the body of the crime, or the effects or instruments thereof in
order to prevent its discovery; and (3) harboring, concealing, or assisting in
the escape of the principals of the crime, provided the accessory acts with
abuse of his

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public functions or when the offender is guilty of treason, parricide, murder,

or an attempt to take the life of the Chief Executive, or is known to be
habitually guilty of some other crime.
Same; Same; Same; Under paragraph 3 of Article 19 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended, there are two (2) classes of accessories, one of
which is a public officer who harbors, conceals or assists in the escape of
the principal—such public officer must have acted with abuse of his public
functions, and the crime committed by the principal is any crime, provided it
is not a light felony.—Under paragraph 3 of Article 19 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended, there are two (2) classes of accessories, one of which is a
public officer who harbors, conceals or assists in the escape of the principal.
Such public officer must have acted with abuse of his public functions, and
the crime committed by the principal is any crime, provided it is not a light
felony. Appellant Biong is one (1) such public officer, and he abused his
public function when, instead of immediately arresting the perpetrators of
the crime, he acceded to the bidding of appellant Webb to “clean the
Vizconde house,” which means he must help hide any possible trace or sign
linking them to the crime, and not necessarily to prevent the discovery of
the bodies in such actual condition upon their deaths. Hence, such
“cleaning” would include obliterating fingerprints and other identifying
marks which appellants Webb, Lejano and Ventura might have left at the
scene of the crime.
Same; Rape; Deoxyribonucleic Acid (DNA) Testing; With the great
advances in forensic science and under pertinent state laws, American
courts allow post-conviction Deoxyribonucleic Acid (DNA) testing when its
application has strong indications that the result could potentially exonerate
the convict.—Appellant Gatchalian reiterates his and appellant Webb’s
motion for DNA testing of the semen specimen taken from the vaginal
cavity of Carmela during the autopsy conducted by Dr. Cabanayan, which
motion was denied by the RTC for lack of available scientific expertise and
technology at the time. With the great advances in forensic science and
under pertinent state laws, American courts allow post-conviction DNA
testing when its application has strong indications that the result could
potentially exonerate the convict. Indeed, even a convicted felon has the
right to avail of new technology not available during his trial.
Same; Same; Same; The source of the semen extracted from the vaginal
cavity of the deceased victim is immaterial in determining Webb’s guilt—
from the totality of the evidence presented by both the prosecution and the
defense, Webb was positively identified as Carmela’s rapist.—We hold that
the source of the semen extracted from the vaginal cavity of the deceased
victim is im-

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material in determining Webb’s guilt. From the totality of the evidence

presented by both the prosecution and the defense, Webb was positively
identified as Carmela’s rapist. As the records bear out, the positive
identification of appellant Webb as Carmela’s rapist satisfied the test of
moral certainty, and the prosecution had equally established beyond
reasonable doubt the fact of rape and the unlawful killing of Carmela,
Estrellita and Jennifer on the occasion thereof. Even assuming that the DNA
analysis of the semen specimen taken from Carmela’s body hours after her
death excludes Webb as the source thereof, it will not exonerate him from
the crime charged. Alfaro did not testify that Webb had ejaculated or did not
use a condom while raping Carmela. She testified that she saw Webb rape
Carmela and it was only him she had witnessed to have committed the rape
inside the Vizconde residence between late evening of June 29, 1991 and
early morning of June 30, 1991. Moreover, she did not testify that Carmela
had no sexual relations with any other man at least 24 hours prior to that
time. On the other hand, a positive result of DNA examination of the semen
specimen extracted by Dr. Cabanayan from Carmela’s cadaver would
merely serve as corroborative evidence.
Same; Same; Same; The presence or absence of spermatozoa is
immaterial in a prosecution for rape—the important consideration in rape
cases is not the emission of semen but the unlawful penetration of the female
genitalia by the male organ.—We thus reiterate that the vaginal smear
confirming the presence of spermatozoa merely corroborated Alfaro’s
testimony that Carmela was raped before she was killed. Indeed, the
presence or absence of spermatozoa is immaterial in a prosecution for rape.
The important consideration in rape cases is not the emission of semen but
the unlawful penetration of the female genitalia by the male organ. On the
other hand, a negative result of DNA examination of the semen specimen
could not have exonerated Webb of the crime charged as his identity as a
principal in the rape-slay of Carmela was satisfactorily established by the
totality of the evidence. A finding that the semen specimen did not match
Webb’s DNA does not necessarily negate his presence at the locus criminis.
SERENO, J., Separate Concurring Opinion:
Criminal Procedure; Public Prosecutors; It cannot be overemphasized
that the prosecuting officer is the representative not of an ordinary party to
a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is
as compelling as its obligation to govern at all, and whose interest,
therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that
justice shall be done.—At the outset, it cannot be overemphasized that the
prosecuting officer “is the representative not of an ordinary party to a
controversy, but of a sov-

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ereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its

obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal
prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done. As
such, he is in a peculiar and very definite sense the servant of the law, the
twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer. He
may prosecute with earnestness and vigor—indeed, he should do so. But,
while he may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is
as much his duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a
wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring about a
just one.”
Same; Due Process; What is in truth referred to when expanding on the
concept of “fair trial” is that the rights of the accused are protected, to the
extent necessary to ensure fairness for him—rights of the victim are not
ignored, but they are respected only to the extent that they are consistent
with the fairness of the trial for the accused.—In the words of Richard
Refshauge: “The adversarial system … is rooted in the notion of a contest
with winners and losers, yet the prosecutor is ethically forbidden from
embracing that notion. The question then, is not what will make the prospect
of a conviction more certain, but what is fair and what will contribute to
justice.” Thus, a criminal trial is not about personal redress for the victims,
but about determining the guilt and the just punishment of the accused.
What is in truth referred to when expanding on the concept of “fair trial” is
that the rights of the accused are protected, to the extent necessary to ensure
fairness for him. Rights of the victim are not ignored, but they are respected
only to the extent that they are consistent with the fairness of the trial for the
accused.
Same; Same; Presumption of Innocence; The presumption of innocence
of the accused is at the center of our criminal justice system—the
cornerstone, as it were, of all the other rights accorded to the accused,
including the right to due process of law; Because the accused must be
presumed innocent, and because they are entitled to due process of law, it is
the duty of the prosecution not to issue prejudicial statements about them
while the trial is being conducted, a standard which applies with even more
force to the trial judge.—The presumption of innocence of the accused is at
the center of our criminal justice system—the cornerstone, as it were, of all
the other rights accorded to the accused, including the right to due process
of law. In pronouncing the presumption of innocence of the accused and
their right to due process, the Constitution declares that the risk of letting
the guilty walk free would be error on the side of justice. This outcome is
infinitely better than imprisoning an innocent person. Because the accused
must be presumed innocent, and because they are entitled to due process of
law, it is the duty of the prosecution

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not to issue prejudicial statements about them while the trial is being
conducted. This standard applies with even more force to the trial judge who
must at all times not only be impartial, but also appear to be so.
Same; Same; Same; Judges; Bias and Partiality; When allegations of
instances of the trial judge’s bias were first brought to this Court, it was
understandable that the Court would accord the judge the presumption of
regularity in the performance of her duties, but her subsequent acts, as well
as her Decision—taken together—showed a pattern now recognizable in
retrospect as bias against the accused, amounting to denial of due process.
—Allegations of issuance of prejudicial comments about the accused in this
case pertained to the acts of the trial judge, and not the prosecution. When
allegations of instances of the trial judge’s bias were first brought to this
Court, it was understandable that the Court would accord the judge the
presumption of regularity in the performance of her duties. Her subsequent
acts, however, as well as her Decision—taken together—showed a pattern
now recognizable in retrospect as bias against the accused, amounting to
denial of due process.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Right of Access to Evidence; The accused’s
right to access to evidence necessitates in the correlative duty of the
prosecution to produce and permit the inspection of the evidence, and not to
suppress or alter it.—As discussed in the preceding section, the accused’s
right to access to evidence necessitates in the correlative duty of the
prosecution to produce and permit the inspection of the evidence, and not to
suppress or alter it. When the prosecution is called upon not to suppress or
alter evidence in its possession that may benefit the accused, it is also
necessarily obliged to preserve the said evidence. To hold otherwise would
be to render illusory the existence of such right. The advent of DNA
technology prompted this Court’s promulgation of the New Rules for DNA
Evidence. As DNA evidence provides objective proof of identification and
may be obtained from evidence left in the scene of the crime or in the
victim’s person, it also gives new meaning to the above duty of the
prosecution. The prosecution did not fare well when measured against this
standard.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Deoxyribonucleic Acid (DNA)
Testing; If a negative Deoxyribonucleic Acid (DNA) test result could not be
considered as providing certainty that Webb did not commit the crime,
would it not have at least cast a reasonable doubt that he committed it?—
The idea that a negative DNA test result would not have necessarily
exculpated Webb, because previous sexual congress by Carmela with
another man prior to the crime could not be discounted, would
unrealistically raise the bar of evidence—and for the wrong party, i.e., for
the part of the defense, instead of for the prosecu-

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tion. If a negative DNA test result could not be considered as providing

certainty that Webb did not commit the crime, would it not have at least cast
a reasonable doubt that he committed it?
Same; Same; Since “the task of the pillars of the criminal justice
system is to preserve our democratic society u+nder the rule of law,
ensuring that all those who appear before or are brought to the bar of
justice are afforded a fair opportunity to present their side,” the measure of
whether the accused herein has been deprived of due process of law should
not be limited to the state of mind of the prosecution, but should include
fundamental principles of fair play.—In our various decisions relating to
interlucotory orders and incidents pertaining to this case, this court’s
adherence to instrumentalism has led to our finding in each instance that
there was no due process violation committed against petitioner, because
bad faith was not shown by the prosecution or the trial judge. However,
since “the task of the pillars of the criminal justice system is to preserve our
democratic society under the rule of law, ensuring that all those who appear
before or are brought to the bar of justice are afforded a fair opportunity to
present their side,” the measure of whether the accused herein has been
deprived of due process of law should not be limited to the state of mind of
the prosecution, but should include fundamental principles of fair play.
Hence, as we write finis to this case, it is time we evaluate the total picture
that the prosecution’s acts or omissions have wrought upon the accused’s
rights with each seemingly innocuous stroke, whatever its intention may
have been. The various violations of the accused’s rights have resulted in his
failure to secure a just trial. As such, the judgment of conviction cannot
stand.

PETITIONS for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution

of the Court of Appeals.
   The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
  Vicente Millora and Florante Arceo Bautista for Antonio
Lejano.
  Jose Flaminiano for Hospicio Fernandez.
  Vitaliano N. Aguirre II, Divinagracia S. San Juan, Demetrio C.
Custodio, Jr., Eloysa G. Sicam, and Joaquin Miguel Z. Hizon for
Hubert Webb, et al.
  Ramon Miguel Ongsiako for M. Rodriguez, Ongsiako and De la
Cruz.
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      Acerey C. Pacheco for Peter Estrada.

  Ricardo Valmonte for Gerardo Biong.
  Romulo, Mabanta, Buenaventura, Sayoc & De Los Angeles and
Francisco C. Gatchalian for Michael A. Gatchalian.

ABAD, J.:

Brief Background

On June 30, 1991 Estrellita Vizconde and her daughters Carmela,

nineteen years old, and Jennifer, seven, were brutally slain at their
home in Parañaque City. Following an intense investigation, the
police arrested a group of suspects, some of whom gave detailed
confessions. But the trial court smelled a frame-up and eventually
ordered them discharged. Thus, the identities of the real perpetrators
remained a mystery especially to the public whose interests were
aroused by the gripping details of what everybody referred to as the
Vizconde massacre.
Four years later in 1995, the National Bureau of Investigation or
NBI announced that it had solved the crime. It presented star-witness
Jessica M. Alfaro, one of its informers, who claimed that she
witnessed the crime. She pointed to accused Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb,
Antonio “Tony Boy” Lejano, Artemio “Dong” Ventura, Michael A.
Gatchalian, Hospicio “Pyke” Fernandez, Peter Estrada, Miguel
“Ging” Rodriguez, and Joey Filart as the culprits. She also tagged
accused police officer, Gerardo Biong, as an accessory after the fact.
Relying primarily on Alfaro’s testimony, on August 10, 1995 the
public prosecutors filed an information for rape with homicide
against Webb, et al.1
The Regional Trial Court of Parañaque City, Branch 274,
presided over by Judge Amelita G. Tolentino, tried only seven of the
accused since Artemio Ventura and Joey Filart remained at large.2
The prosecution presented Alfaro as its main witness with the others
corrobo-

_______________

1 Records, Vol. 1, pp. 1-3.

2 Rollo (G.R. 176389), pp. 393-399 and Rollo (G.R. 176864), pp. 80-104.

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rating her testimony. These included the medico-legal officer who

autopsied the bodies of the victims, the security guards of Pitong
Daan Subdivision, the former laundrywoman of the Webb’s
household, police officer Biong’s former girlfriend, and Lauro G.
Vizconde, Estrellita’s husband.
For their part, some of the accused testified, denying any part in
the crime and saying they were elsewhere when it took place.
Webb’s alibi appeared the strongest since he claimed that he was
then across the ocean in the United States of America. He presented
the testimonies of witnesses as well as documentary and object
evidence to prove this. In addition, the defense presented witnesses
to show Alfaro’s bad reputation for truth and the incredible nature of
her testimony.
But impressed by Alfaro’s detailed narration of the crime and the
events surrounding it, the trial court found a credible witness in her.
It noted her categorical, straightforward, spontaneous, and frank
testimony, undamaged by grueling cross-examinations. The trial
court remained unfazed by significant discrepancies between
Alfaro’s April 28 and May 22, 1995 affidavits, accepting her
explanation that she at first wanted to protect her former boyfriend,
accused Estrada, and a relative, accused Gatchalian; that no lawyer
assisted her; that she did not trust the investigators who helped her
prepare her first affidavit; and that she felt unsure if she would get
the support and security she needed once she disclosed all about the
Vizconde killings.
In contrast, the trial court thought little of the denials and alibis
that Webb, Lejano, Rodriguez, and Gatchalian set up for their
defense. They paled, according to the court, compared to Alfaro’s
testimony that other witnesses and the physical evidence
corroborated. Thus, on January 4, 2000, after four years of arduous
hearings, the trial court rendered judgment, finding all the accused
guilty as charged and imposing on Webb, Lejano, Gatchalian,
Fernandez, Estrada, and Rodriguez the penalty of reclusion perpetua
and on Biong, an indeterminate prison term of eleven years, four
months, and one day to twelve years. The trial court also awarded
damages to Lauro Vizconde.3

_______________

3 Records, Vol. 25, pp. 170-71.

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On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s

decision, modifying the penalty imposed on Biong to six years
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minimum and twelve years maximum and increasing the award of

damages to Lauro Vizconde.4 The appellate court did not agree that
the accused were tried by publicity or that the trial judge was biased.
It found sufficient evidence of conspiracy that rendered Rodriguez,
Gatchalian, Fernandez, and Estrada equally guilty with those who
had a part in raping and killing Carmela and in executing her mother
and sister.
On motion for reconsideration by the accused, the Court of
Appeals’ Special Division of five members voted three against two
to deny the motion,5 hence, the present appeal.
On April 20, 2010, as a result of its initial deliberation in this
case, the Court issued a Resolution granting the request of Webb to
submit for DNA analysis the semen specimen taken from Carmela’s
cadaver, which specimen was then believed still under the
safekeeping of the NBI. The Court granted the request pursuant to
section 4 of the Rule on DNA Evidence6 to give the accused and the
prosecution access to scientific evidence that they might want to
avail themselves of, leading to a correct decision in the case.
Unfortunately, on April 27, 2010 the NBI informed the Court that
it no longer has custody of the specimen, the same having been
turned over to the trial court. The trial record shows, however, that
the specimen was not among the object evidence that the
prosecution offered in evidence in the case.
This outcome prompted accused Webb to file an urgent motion to
acquit on the ground that the government’s failure to preserve such
vital evidence has resulted in the denial of his right to due process.

Issues Presented

Accused Webb’s motion to acquit presents a threshold issue:

whether or not the Court should acquit him outright, given the gov-

_______________

4 CA Rollo, Vol. IV, pp. 3478-3479.

5 Resolution dated January 26, 2007, Rollo (G.R. 176839), pp. 197-214.
6 A.M. 06-11-5-SC effective October 15, 2007.

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ernment’s failure to produce the semen specimen that the NBI found
on Carmela’s cadaver, thus depriving him of evidence that would
prove his innocence.
In the main, all the accused raise the central issue of whether or
not Webb, acting in conspiracy with Lejano, Gatchalian, Fernandez,

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Estrada, Rodriguez, Ventura, and Filart, raped and killed Carmela

and put to death her mother and sister. But, ultimately, the
controlling issues are:
1. Whether or not Alfaro’s testimony as eyewitness, describing
the crime and identifying Webb, Lejano, Gatchalian, Fernandez,
Estrada, Rodriguez, and two others as the persons who committed it,
is entitled to belief; and
2. Whether or not Webb presented sufficient evidence to prove
his alibi and rebut Alfaro’s testimony that he led the others in
committing the crime.
The issue respecting accused Biong is whether or not he acted to
cover up the crime after its commission.

The Right to Acquittal

Due to Loss of DNA Evidence

Webb claims, citing Brady v. Maryland,7 that he is entitled to

outright acquittal on the ground of violation of his right to due
process given the State’s failure to produce on order of the Court
either by negligence or willful suppression the semen specimen
taken from Carmela.
The medical evidence clearly established that Carmela was raped
and, consistent with this, semen specimen was found in her. It is true
that Alfaro identified Webb in her testimony as Carmela’s rapist and
killer but serious questions had been raised about her credibility. At
the very least, there exists a possibility that Alfaro had lied. On the
other hand, the semen specimen taken from Carmela cannot possibly
lie. It cannot be coached or allured by a promise of reward or
financial support. No two persons have the same DNA fingerprint,
with the

_______________

7 373 U.S. 83 (1963).

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exception of identical twins.8 If, on examination, the DNA of the

subject specimen does not belong to Webb, then he did not rape
Carmela. It is that simple. Thus, the Court would have been able to
determine that Alfaro committed perjury in saying that he did.
Still, Webb is not entitled to acquittal for the failure of the State
to produce the semen specimen at this late stage. For one thing, the
ruling in Brady v. Maryland9 that he cites has long be overtaken by
the decision in Arizona v. Youngblood,10 where the U.S. Supreme

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Court held that due process does not require the State to preserve the
semen specimen although it might be useful to the accused unless
the latter is able to show bad faith on the part of the prosecution or
the police. Here, the State presented a medical expert who testified
on the existence of the specimen and Webb in fact sought to have the
same subjected to DNA test.
For, another, when Webb raised the DNA issue, the rule
governing DNA evidence did not yet exist, the country did not yet
have the technology for conducting the test, and no Philippine
precedent had as yet recognized its admissibility as evidence.
Consequently, the idea of keeping the specimen secure even after the
trial court rejected the motion for DNA testing did not come up.
Indeed, neither Webb nor his co-accused brought up the matter of
preserving the specimen in the meantime.
Parenthetically, after the trial court denied Webb’s application for
DNA testing, he allowed the proceeding to move on when he had on
at least two occasions gone up to the Court of Appeals or the
Supreme Court to challenge alleged arbitrary actions taken against
him and the other accused.11 They raised the DNA issue before the
Court of Appeals but merely as an error committed by the trial court
in rendering its decision in the case. None of the accused filed a
motion with the appeals court to have the DNA test done pending
adjudication of

_______________

8  People v. Yatar, G.R. No. 150224, May 19, 2004, 425 SCRA 504, 514.
9  Supra note 7.
10 488 U.S. 41 (1988).
11 Webb v. De Leon, G.R. No. 121234, August 23, 1995, 247 SCRA 652; Webb v.
People, G.R. No. 127262, July 24, 1997, 276 SCRA 243.

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their appeal. This, even when the Supreme Court had in the
meantime passed the rules allowing such test. Considering the
accused’s lack of interest in having such test done, the State cannot
be deemed put on reasonable notice that it would be required to
produce the semen specimen at some future time.
Now, to the merit of the case.

Alfaro’s Story

Based on the prosecution’s version, culled from the decisions of

the trial court and the Court of Appeals, on June 29, 1991 at around

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8:30 in the evening, Jessica Alfaro drove her Mitsubishi Lancer,

with boyfriend Peter Estrada as passenger, to the Ayala Alabang
Commercial Center parking lot to buy shabu from Artemio “Dong”
Ventura. There, Ventura introduced her to his friends: Hubert Jeffrey
P. Webb, Antonio “Tony Boy” Lejano, Miguel “Ging” Rodriguez,
Hospicio “Pyke” Fernandez, Michael Gatchalian, and Joey Filart.
Alfaro recalled frequently seeing them at a shabu house in
Parañaque in January 1991, except Ventura whom she had known
earlier in December 1990.
As Alfaro smoked her shabu, Webb approached and requested
her to relay a message for him to a girl, whom she later identified as
Carmela Vizconde. Alfaro agreed. After using up their shabu, the
group drove to Carmela’s house at 80 Vinzons Street, Pitong Daan
Subdivision, BF Homes, Parañaque City. Riding in her car, Alfaro
and Estrada trailed Filart and Rodriguez who rode a Mazda pick-up
and Webb, Lejano, Ventura, Fernandez, and Gatchalian who were on
a Nissan Patrol car.
On reaching their destination, Alfaro parked her car on Vinzons
Street, alighted, and approached Carmela’s house. Alfaro pressed the
buzzer and a woman came out. Alfaro queried her about Carmela.
Alfaro had met Carmela twice before in January 1991. When
Carmela came out, Alfaro gave her Webb’s message that he was just
around. Carmela replied, however, that she could not go out yet
since she had just arrived home. She told Alfaro to return after
twenty minutes. Alfaro relayed this to Webb who then told the group
to drive back to the Ayala Alabang Commercial Center.

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The group had another shabu session at the parking lot. After
sometime, they drove back but only Alfaro proceeded to Vinzons
Street where Carmela lived. The Nissan Patrol and the Mazda pick-
up, with their passengers, parked somewhere along Aguirre Avenue.
Carmela was at their garden. She approached Alfaro on seeing her
and told the latter that she (Carmela) had to leave the house for a
while. Carmela requested Alfaro to return before midnight and she
would leave the pedestrian gate, the iron grills that led to the
kitchen, and the kitchen door unlocked. Carmela also told Alfaro to
blink her car’s headlights twice when she approached the pedestrian
gate so Carmela would know that she had arrived.
Alfaro returned to her car but waited for Carmela to drive out of
the house in her own car. Alfaro trailed Carmela up to Aguirre
Avenue where she dropped off a man whom Alfaro believed was
Carmela’s boyfriend. Alfaro looked for her group, found them, and
relayed Carmela’s instructions to Webb. They then all went back to
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the Ayala Alabang Commercial Center. At the parking lot, Alfaro

told the group about her talk with Carmela. When she told Webb of
Carmela’s male companion, Webb’s mood changed for the rest of
the evening (“bad trip”).
Webb gave out free cocaine. They all used it and some shabu,
too. After about 40 to 45 minutes, Webb decided that it was time for
them to leave. He said, “Pipilahan natin siya [Carmela] at ako ang
mauuna.” Lejano said, “Ako ang susunod” and the others responded
“Okay, okay.” They all left the parking lot in a convoy of three
vehicles and drove into Pitong Daan Subdivision for the third time.
They arrived at Carmela’s house shortly before midnight.
Alfaro parked her car between Vizconde’s house and the next.
While waiting for the others to alight from their cars, Fernandez
approached Alfaro with a suggestion that they blow up the
transformer near the Vizconde’s residence to cause a brownout
(“Pasabugin kaya natin ang transformer na ito”). But Alfaro
shrugged off the idea, telling Fernandez, “Malakas lang ang tama
mo.” When Webb, Lejano, and Ventura were already before the
house, Webb told the others again that they would line up for
Carmela but he would be the first. The others replied, “O sige, dito
lang kami, magbabantay lang kami.”

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    Alfaro was the first to pass through the pedestrian gate that had
been left open. Webb, Lejano, and Ventura followed her. On entering
the garage, Ventura using a chair mounted the hood of the
Vizcondes’ Nissan Sentra and loosened the electric bulb over it
(“para daw walang ilaw”). The small group went through the open
iron grill gate and passed the dirty kitchen. Carmela opened the
aluminum screen door of the kitchen for them. She and Webb looked
each other in the eyes for a moment and, together, headed for the
dining area.
As she lost sight of Carmela and Webb, Alfaro decided to go out.
Lejano asked her where she was going and she replied that she was
going out to smoke. As she eased her way out through the kitchen
door, she saw Ventura pulling out a kitchen drawer. Alfaro smoked a
cigarette at the garden. After about twenty minutes, she was
surprised to hear a woman’s voice ask, “Sino yan?” Alfaro
immediately walked out of the garden to her car. She found her other
companions milling around it. Estrada who sat in the car asked her,
“Okay ba?”
After sitting in the car for about ten minutes, Alfaro returned to
the Vizconde house, using the same route. The interior of the house
was dark but some light filtered in from outside. In the kitchen,
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Alfaro saw Ventura searching a lady’s bag that lay on the dining
table. When she asked him what he was looking for, he said: “Ikaw
na nga dito, maghanap ka ng susi.” She asked him what key he
wanted and he replied: “Basta maghanap ka ng susi ng main door
pati na rin ng susi ng kotse.” When she found a bunch of keys in the
bag, she tried them on the main door but none fitted the lock. She
also did not find the car key.
Unable to open the main door, Alfaro returned to the kitchen.
While she was at a spot leading to the dining area, she heard a static
noise (like a television that remained on after the station had signed
off). Out of curiosity, she approached the master’s bedroom from
where the noise came, opened the door a little, and peeked inside.
The unusual sound grew even louder. As she walked in, she saw
Webb on top of Carmela while she lay with her back on the floor.
Two bloodied bodies lay on the bed. Lejano was at the foot of the
bed about to wear his jacket. Carmela was gagged, moaning, and in
tears while Webb raped her, his bare buttocks exposed.

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Webb gave Alfaro a meaningful look and she immediately left

the room. She met Ventura at the dining area. He told her, “Prepare
an escape. Aalis na tayo.” Shocked with what she saw, Alfaro
rushed out of the house to the others who were either sitting in her
car or milling on the sidewalk. She entered her car and turned on the
engine but she did not know where to go. Webb, Lejano, and
Ventura came out of the house just then. Webb suddenly picked up a
stone and threw it at the main door, breaking its glass frame.
As the three men approached the pedestrian gate, Webb told
Ventura that he forgot his jacket in the house. But Ventura told him
that they could not get in anymore as the iron grills had already
locked. They all rode in their cars and drove away until they reached
Aguirre Avenue. As they got near an old hotel at the Tropical Palace
area, Alfaro noticed the Nissan Patrol slow down. Someone threw
something out of the car into the cogonal area.
The convoy of cars went to a large house with high walls,
concrete fence, steel gate, and a long driveway at BF Executive
Village. They entered the compound and gathered at the lawn where
the “blaming session” took place. It was here that Alfaro and those
who remained outside the Vizconde house learned of what
happened. The first to be killed was Carmela’s mother, then Jennifer,
and finally, Carmella. Ventura blamed Webb, telling him, “Bakit
naman pati yung bata?” Webb replied that the girl woke up and on
seeing him molesting Carmela, she jumped on him, bit his
shoulders, and pulled his hair. Webb got mad, grabbed the girl,
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pushed her to the wall, and repeatedly stabbed her. Lejano excused
himself at this point to use the telephone in the house. Meanwhile,
Webb called up someone on his cellular phone.
At around 2:00 in the morning, accused Gerardo Biong arrived.
Webb ordered him to go and clean up the Vizconde house and said
to him, “Pera lang ang katapat nyan.” Biong answered, “Okay
lang.” Webb spoke to his companions and told them, “We don’t
know each other. We haven’t seen each other…baka maulit yan.”
Alfaro and Estrada left and they drove to her father’s house.12

_______________

12  The ponencia, pp. 4-9.

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1. The quality of the witness

Was Alfaro an ordinary subdivision girl who showed up at the
NBI after four years, bothered by her conscience or egged on by
relatives or friends to come forward and do what was right? No. She
was, at the time she revealed her story, working for the NBI as an
“asset,” a stool pigeon, one who earned her living by fraternizing
with criminals so she could squeal on them to her NBI handlers. She
had to live a life of lies to get rewards that would pay for her
subsistence and vices.
According to Atty. Artemio Sacaguing, former head of the NBI
Anti-Kidnapping, Hijacking, and Armed Robbery Task Force
(AKHAR) Section, Alfaro had been hanging around at the NBI
since November or December 1994 as an “asset.” She supplied her
handlers with information against drug pushers and other criminal
elements. Some of this information led to the capture of notorious
drug pushers like Christopher Cruz Santos and Orlando Bacquir.
Alfaro’s tip led to the arrest of the leader of the “Martilyo gang” that
killed a police officer. Because of her talent, the task force gave her
“very special treatment” and she became its “darling,” allowed the
privilege of spending nights in one of the rooms at the NBI offices.
When Alfaro seemed unproductive for sometime, however, they
teased her about it and she was piqued. One day, she unexpectedly
told Sacaguing that she knew someone who had the real story
behind the Vizconde massacre. Sacaguing showed interest. Alfaro
promised to bring that someone to the NBI to tell his story. When
this did not happen and Sacaguing continued to press her, she told
him that she might as well assume the role of her informant.
Sacaguing testified thus:

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ATTY. ONGKIKO:

Q. Atty. Sacaguing, how did Jessica Alfaro become a witness in the Vizconde
murder case? Will you tell the Honorable Court?
x x x x
    A. She told me. Your Honor, that she knew somebody who
    related to her the circumstances, I mean, the details of
    the

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           massacre of the Vizconde family. That’s what she told me,

    Your Honor.
ATTY. ONGKIKO:
Q. And what did you say?
x x x x
A. I was quite interested and I tried to persuade her to introduce to me that
man and she promised that in due time, she will bring to me the man, and
together with her, we will try to convince him to act as a state witness and
help us in the solution of the case.
x x x x
Q. Atty. Sacaguing, were you able to interview this alleged witness?
WITNESS SACAGUING:
A. No, sir.
ATTY. ONGKIKO:
Q. Why not?
WITNESS SACAGUING:
A. Because Jessica Alfaro was never able to comply with her promise to
bring the man to me. She told me later that she could not and the man
does not like to testify.
ATTY. ONGKIKO:
Q. All right, and what happened after that?
WITNESS SACAGUING:
A. She told me, “easy lang kayo, Sir,” if I may quote, “easy lang Sir, huwag
kayong…”
COURT:
How was that?
WITNESS SACAGUING:
A. “Easy lang, Sir. Sir, relax lang, Sir, papapelan ko, papapelan ko na lang
‘yan.”
x x x x

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ATTY. ONGKIKO:
Q. All right, and what was your reaction when Ms. Alfaro stated that
“papapelan ko na lang yan?”
WITNESS SACAGUING:
A. I said, “hindi puwede yan, kasi hindi ka naman eye witness.”
ATTY. ONGKIKO:
Q. And what was the reply of Ms. Alfaro?
WITNESS SACAGUING:
A. Hindi siya nakakibo, until she went away.
(TSN, May 28, 1996, pp. 49-50, 58, 77-79)

Quite significantly, Alfaro never refuted Sacaguing’s above

testimony.
2. The suspicious details
But was it possible for Alfaro to lie with such abundant details
some of which even tallied with the physical evidence at the scene
of the crime? No doubt, yes.
Firstly, the Vizconde massacre had been reported in the media
with dizzying details. Everybody was talking about what the police
found at the crime scene and there were lots of speculations about
them.
Secondly, the police had arrested some “akyat-bahay” group in
Parañaque and charged them with the crime. The police prepared the
confessions of the men they apprehended and filled these up with
details that the evidence of the crime scene provided. Alfaro’s NBI
handlers who were doing their own investigation knew of these
details as well. Since Alfaro hanged out at the NBI offices and
practically lived there, it was not too difficult for her to hear of these
evidentiary details and gain access to the documents.
Not surprisingly, the confessions of some members of the
Barroso “akyat bahay” gang, condemned by the Makati RTC as
fabricated by the police to pin the crime on them, shows how crime
investigators could make a confession ring true by matching some of
its details with the physical evidence at the crime scene. Consider
the following:

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          a. The Barroso gang members said that they got into

Carmela’s house by breaking the glass panel of the front door using
a stone wrapped in cloth to deaden the noise. Alfaro could not use
this line since the core of her story was that Webb was Carmela’s
boyfriend. Webb had no reason to smash her front door to get to see
her.

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Consequently, to explain the smashed door, Alfaro had to settle

for claiming that, on the way out of the house, Webb picked up some
stone and, out of the blue, hurled it at the glass-paneled front door of
the Vizconde residence. His action really made no sense. From
Alfaro’s narration, Webb appeared rational in his decisions. It was
past midnight, the house was dark, and they wanted to get away
quickly to avoid detection. Hurling a stone at that glass door and
causing a tremendous noise was bizarre, like inviting the neighbors
to come.
b. The crime scene showed that the house had been ransacked.
The rejected confessions of the Barroso “akyat-bahay” gang
members said that they tried to rob the house. To explain this
physical evidence, Alfaro claimed that at one point Ventura was
pulling a kitchen drawer, and at another point, going through a
handbag on the dining table. He said he was looking for the front-
door key and the car key.
Again, this portion of Alfaro’s story appears tortured to
accommodate the physical evidence of the ransacked house. She
never mentioned Ventura having taken some valuables with him
when they left Carmela’s house. And why would Ventura rummage
a bag on the table for the front-door key, spilling the contents, when
they had already gotten into the house. It is a story made to fit in
with the crime scene although robbery was supposedly not the
reason Webb and his companions entered that house.
c. It is the same thing with the garage light. The police
investigators found that the bulb had been loosened to turn off the
light. The confessions of the Barroso gang claimed that one of them
climbed the
parked car’s hood to reach up and darken that light. This made
sense since they were going to rob the place and they needed time to
work in the dark trying to open the front door. Some passersby
might look in and see what they were doing.

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Alfaro had to adjust her testimony to take into account that

darkened garage light. So she claimed that Ventura climbed the car’s
hood, using a chair, to turn the light off. But, unlike the Barroso
“akyat-bahay” gang, Webb and his friends did not have anything to
do in a darkened garage. They supposedly knew in advance that
Carmela left the doors to the kitchen open for them. It did not make
sense for Ventura to risk standing on the car’s hood and be seen in
such an awkward position instead of going straight into the house.
And, thirdly, Alfaro was the NBI’s star witness, their badge of
excellent investigative work. After claiming that they had solved the
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crime of the decade, the NBI people had a stake in making her sound
credible and, obviously, they gave her all the preparations she
needed for the job of becoming a fairly good substitute witness. She
was their “darling” of an asset. And this is not pure speculation. As
pointed out above, Sacaguing of the NBI, a lawyer and a ranking
official, confirmed this to be a cold fact. Why the trial court and the
Court of Appeals failed to see this is mystifying.
At any rate, did Alfaro at least have a fine memory for faces that
had a strong effect on her, given the circumstances? Not likely. She
named Miguel “Ging” Rodriguez as one of the culprits in the
Vizconde killings. But when the NBI found a certain Michael
Rodriguez, a drug dependent from the Bicutan Rehabilitation Center,
initially suspected to be Alfaro’s Miguel Rodriguez and showed him
to Alfaro at the NBI office, she ran berserk, slapping and kicking
Michael, exclaiming: “How can I forget your face. We just saw each
other in a disco one month ago and you told me then that you will
kill me.” As it turned out, he was not Miguel Rodriguez, the accused
in this case.13
Two possibilities exist: Michael was really the one Alfaro wanted
to implicate to settle some score with him but it was too late to
change the name she already gave or she had myopic vision, tagging
the wrong people for what they did not do.

_______________

13 TSN, August 6, 1996, pp. 13-41; TSN, May 22, 1997, pp. 72, 81-131, 142-157;
Exhibits “274” and “275”.

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3. The quality of the testimony

There is another thing about a lying witness: her story lacks sense
or suffers from inherent inconsistencies. An understanding of the
nature of things and the common behavior of people will help
expose a lie. And it has an abundant presence in this case.
One. In her desire to implicate Gatchalian, Fernandez, Estrada,
Rodriguez, and Filart, who were supposed to be Webb’s co-
principals in the crime, Alfaro made it a point to testify that Webb
proposed twice to his friends the gang-rape of Carmela who had hurt
him. And twice, they (including, if one believes Alfaro, her own
boyfriend Estrada) agreed in a chorus to his proposal. But when they
got to Carmela’s house, only Webb, Lejano, Ventura, and Alfaro
entered the house.
Gatchalian, Fernandez, Estrada, and Rodriguez supposedly
stayed around Alfaro’s car, which was parked on the street between
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Carmela’s house and the next. Some of these men sat on top of the
car’s lid while others milled on the sidewalk, visible under the street
light to anyone who cared to watch them, particularly to the people
who were having a drinking party in a nearby house. Obviously, the
behavior of Webb’s companions out on the street did not figure in a
planned gang-rape of Carmela.
Two. Ventura, Alfaro’s dope supplier, introduced her for the first
time in her life to Webb and his friends in a parking lot by a mall. So
why would she agree to act as Webb’s messenger, using her gas, to
bring his message to Carmela at her home. More inexplicably, what
motivated Alfaro to stick it out the whole night with Webb and his
friends?
They were practically strangers to her and her boyfriend Estrada.
When it came to a point that Webb decided with his friends to gang-
rape Carmela, clearly, there was nothing in it for Alfaro. Yet, she
stuck it out with them, as a police asset would, hanging in there until
she had a crime to report, only she was not yet an “asset” then. If, on
the other hand, Alfaro had been too soaked in drugs to think clearly
and just followed along where the group took her, how could she
remember so much details that only a drug-free mind can?

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Three. When Alfaro went to see Carmela at her house for the
second time, Carmella told her that she still had to go out and that
Webb and his friends should come back around midnight. Alfaro
returned to her car and waited for Carmela to drive out in her own
car. And she trailed her up to Aguirre Avenue where she supposedly
dropped off a man whom she thought was Carmela’s boyfriend.
Alfaro’s trailing Carmela to spy on her unfaithfulness to Webb did
not make sense since she was on limited errand. But, as a critical
witness, Alfaro had to provide a reason for Webb to freak out and
decide to come with his friends and harm Carmela.
Four. According to Alfaro, when they returned to Carmela’s
house the third time around midnight, she led Webb, Lejano, and
Ventura through the pedestrian gate that Carmela had left open.
Now, this is weird. Webb was the gang leader who decided what
they were going to do. He decided and his friends agreed with him
to go to Carmela’s house and gang-rape her. Why would Alfaro, a
woman, a stranger to Webb before that night, and obviously with no
role to play in the gang-rape of Carmela, lead him and the others
into her house? It made no sense. It would only make sense if Alfaro
wanted to feign being a witness to something she did not see.
Five. Alfaro went out of the house to smoke at the garden. After
about twenty minutes, a woman exclaimed, “Sino yan?” On hearing
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this, Alfaro immediately walked out of the garden and went to her
car. Apparently, she did this because she knew they came on a sly.
Someone other than Carmela became conscious of the presence of
Webb and others in the house. Alfaro walked away because,
obviously, she did not want to get involved in a potential
confrontation. This was supposedly her frame of mind: fear of
getting involved in what was not her business.
But if that were the case, how could she testify based on personal
knowledge of what went on in the house? Alfaro had to change that
frame of mind to one of boldness and reckless curiosity. So that is
what she next claimed. She went back into the house to watch as
Webb raped Carmela on the floor of the master’s bedroom. He had
apparently stabbed to death Carmela’s mom and her young sister
whose bloodied bodies were sprawled on the bed. Now, Alfaro
testified

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that she got scared (another shift to fear) for she hurriedly got out of
the house after Webb supposedly gave her a meaningful look.
Alfaro quickly went to her car, not minding Gatchalian,
Fernandez, Estrada, Rodriguez, and Filart who sat on the car or
milled on the sidewalk. She did not speak to them, even to Estrada,
her boyfriend. She entered her car and turned on the engine but she
testified that she did not know where to go. This woman who a few
minutes back led Webb, Lejano, and Ventura into the house,
knowing that they were decided to rape and harm Carmela, was
suddenly too shocked to know where to go! This emotional
pendulum swing indicates a witness who was confused with her own
lies.
4. The supposed corroborations
Intending to provide corroboration to Alfaro’s testimony, the
prosecution presented six additional witnesses:
Dr. Prospero A. Cabanayan, the NBI Medico-Legal Officer
who autopsied the bodies of the victims, testified on the stab wounds
they sustained14 and the presence of semen in Carmela’s genitalia,15
indicating that she had been raped.Normal E. White, Jr., was the
security guard on duty at Pitong Daan Subdivision from 7 p.m. of
June 29 to 7 a.m. of June 30, 1991. He got a report on the morning
of June 30 that something untoward happened at the Vizconde
residence. He went there and saw the dead bodies in the master’s
bedroom, the bag on the dining table, as well as the loud noise
emanating from a television set.16
White claimed that he noticed Gatchalian and his companions,
none of whom he could identify, go in and out of Pitong Daan
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Subdivision. He also saw them along Vinzons Street. Later, they

entered Pitong Daan Subdivision in a three-car convoy. White could
not, however, describe the kind of vehicles they used or recall the
time when

_______________

14  Exhibits “G” to “G-2”, “Q” to “R”, “V”, “W” and “X”, Records, Vol. 8, pp.
308-310, 323-324, 328-330.
15 Exhibits “H” to “K”, Records, Vol. 8, pp. 311-315; TSN, January 30, 1996, pp.
xx.
16 TSN, March 25, 1996, pp. 8-14, 17-34.

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he saw the group in those two instances. And he did not notice
anything suspicious about their coming and going.
But White’s testimony cannot be relied on. His initial claim
turned out to be inaccurate. He actually saw Gatchalian and his
group enter the Pitong Daan Subdivision only once. They were not
going in and out. Furthermore, Alfaro testified that when the convoy
of cars went back the second time in the direction of Carmela’s
house, she alone entered the subdivision and passed the guardhouse
without stopping. Yet, White who supposedly manned that
guardhouse did not notice her.
Surprisingly, White failed to note Biong, a police officer, entering
or exiting the subdivision on the early morning of June 30 when he
supposedly “cleaned up” Vizconde residence on Webb’s orders.
What is more, White did not notice Carmela arrive with her mom
before Alfaro’s first visit that night. Carmela supposedly left with a
male companion in her car at around 10:30 p.m. but White did not
notice it. He also did not notice Carmela reenter the subdivision.
White actually discredited Alfaro’s testimony about the movements
of the persons involved.
Further, while Alfaro testified that it was the Mazda pick-up
driven by Filart that led the three-vehicle convoy,17 White claimed it
was the Nissan Patrol with Gatchalian on it that led the convoy since
he would not have let the convoy in without ascertaining that
Gatchalian, a resident, was in it. Security guard White did not,
therefore, provide corroboration to Alfaro’s testimony.
Justo Cabanacan, the security supervisor at Pitong Daan
Subdivision testified that he saw Webb around the last week of May
or the first week of June 1991 to prove his presence in the
Philippines when he claimed to be in the United States. He was
manning the guard house at the entrance of the subdivision of Pitong
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Daan when he flagged down a car driven by Webb. Webb said that
he would see Lilet Sy. Cabanacan asked him for an ID but he
pointed to his United BF Homes sticker and said that he resided
there. Cabanacan replied, however, that Pitong Daan had a local
sticker.

_______________

17 TSN October 10, 1995, pp. 97-98 (Records, Vol. 4, pp. 271-272).

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Cabanacan testified that, at this point, Webb introduced himself

as the son of Congressman Webb. Still, the supervisor insisted on
seeing his ID. Webb grudgingly gave it and after seeing the picture
and the name on it, Cabanacan returned the same and allowed Webb
to pass without being logged in as their Standard Operating
Procedure required.18
But Cabanacan’s testimony could not be relied on. Although it
was not common for a security guard to challenge a Congressman’s
son with such vehemence, Cabanacan did not log the incident on the
guardhouse book. Nor did he, contrary to prescribed procedure,
record the visitor’s entry into the subdivision. It did not make sense
that Cabanacan was strict in the matter of seeing Webb’s ID but not
in recording the visit.
Mila Gaviola used to work as laundry woman for the Webbs at
their house at BF Homes Executive Village. She testified that she
saw Webb at his parents’ house on the morning of June 30, 1991
when she got the dirty clothes from the room that he and two
brothers occupied at about 4.a.m. She saw him again pacing the floor
at 9 a.m. At about 1 p.m., Webb left the house in t-shirt and shorts,
passing through a secret door near the maid’s quarters on the way
out. Finally, she saw Webb at 4 p.m. of the same day.19
On cross-examination, however, Gaviola could not say what
distinguished June 30, 1991 from the other days she was on service
at the Webb household as to enable her to distinctly remember, four
years later, what one of the Webb boys did and at what time. She
could not remember any of the details that happened in the
household on the other days. She proved to have a selective
photographic memory and this only damaged her testimony.
Gaviola tried to corroborate Alfaro’s testimony by claiming that
on June 30, 1991 she noticed bloodstains on Webb’s t-shirt.20 She
did not call the attention of anybody in the household about it when
it would

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18 TSN, March 14, 1996, pp. 79-89, 103-104.

19 TSN, December 5, 1995, pp. 21-65.
20 Id.

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have been a point of concern that Webb may have been hurt, hence
the blood.
Besides, Victoria Ventoso, the Webbs’ housemaid from March
1989 to May 1992, and Sgt. Miguel Muñoz, the Webbs’ security
aide in 1991, testified that Gaviola worked for the Webbs only from
January 1991 to April 1991. Ventoso further testified that it was not
Gaviola’s duty to collect the clothes from the 2nd floor bedrooms,
this being the work of the housemaid charged with cleaning the
rooms.
What is more, it was most unlikely for a laundrywoman who had
been there for only four months to collect, as she claimed, the
laundry from the rooms of her employers and their grown up
children at four in the morning while they were asleep.
And it did not make sense, if Alfaro’s testimony were to be
believed that Webb, who was so careful and clever that he called
Biong to go to the Vizconde residence at 2 a.m. to clean up the
evidence against him and his group, would bring his bloodied shirt
home and put it in the hamper for laundrywoman Gaviola to collect
and wash at 4 a.m. as was her supposed habit.
Lolita De Birrer was accused Biong’s girlfriend around the time
the Vizconde massacre took place. Birrer testified that she was with
Biong playing mahjong from the evening of June 29, 1991 to the
early morning of June 30, when Biong got a call at around 2 a.m.
This prompted him, according to De Birrer, to leave and go to BF.
Someone sitting at the backseat of a taxi picked him up. When
Biong returned at 7 a.m. he washed off what looked like dried blood
from his fingernails. And he threw away a foul-smelling
handkerchief. She also saw Biong take out a knife with aluminum
cover from his drawer and hid it in his steel cabinet.21
The security guard at Pitong Daan did not notice any police
investigator flashing a badge to get into the village although Biong
supposedly came in at the unholy hour of two in the morning. His
departure before 7 a.m. also remained unnoticed by the subdivision
guards. Besides, if he had cleaned up the crime scene shortly after
midnight, what was the point of his returning there on the following
morning to

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_______________

21 TSN, April 16, 1996, pp. 18-38, 79.

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dispose of some of the evidence in the presence of other police

investigators and on-lookers? In fact, why would he steal valuable
items from the Vizconde residence on his return there hours later if
he had the opportunity to do it earlier?
At most, Birrer’s testimony only established Biong’s theft of
certain items from the Vizconde residence and gross neglect for
failing to maintain the sanctity of the crime scene by moving around
and altering the effects of the crime. Birrer’s testimony failed to
connect Biong’s acts to Webb and the other accused.
Lauro Vizconde testified about how deeply he was affected by
the loss of her wife and two daughters. Carmella spoke to him of a
rejected suitor she called “Bagyo,” because he was a Parañaque
politician’s son. Unfortunately, Lauro did not appear curious enough
to insist on finding out who the rejected fellow was. Besides, his
testimony contradicts that of Alfaro who testified that Carmela and
Webb had an on-going relation. Indeed, if Alfaro were to be
believed, Carmela wanted Webb to come to her house around
midnight. She even left the kitchen door open so he could enter the
house.
5. The missing corroboration
There is something truly remarkable about this case: the
prosecution’s core theory that Carmela and Webb had been
sweethearts, that she had been unfaithful to him, and that it was for
this reason that Webb brought his friends to her house to gang-rape
her is totally uncorroborated!
For instance, normally, if Webb, a Congressman’s son, courted
the young Carmela, that would be news among her circle of friends
if not around town. But, here, none of her friends or even those who
knew either of them came forward to affirm this. And if Webb
hanged around with her, trying to win her favors, he would surely be
seen with her. And this would all the more be so if they had become
sweethearts, a relation that Alfaro tried to project with her testimony.
But, except for Alfaro, the NBI asset, no one among Carmela’s
friends or her friends’ friends would testify ever hearing of such
relationship or ever seeing them together in some popular hangouts
in

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Parañaque or Makati. Alfaro’s claim of a five-hour drama is like an

alien page, rudely and unconnectedly inserted into Webb and
Carmela’s life stories or like a piece of jigsaw puzzle trimmed to fit
into the shape on the board but does not belong because it clashes
with the surrounding pieces. It has neither antecedent nor
concomitant support in the verifiable facts of their personal histories.
It is quite unreal.
What is more, Alfaro testified that she saw Carmela drive out of
her house with a male passenger, Mr. X, whom Alfaro thought the
way it looked was also Carmela’s lover. This was the all-important
reason Webb supposedly had for wanting to harm her. Again, none
of Carmela’s relatives, friends, or people who knew her ever testified
about the existence of Mr. X in her life. Nobody has come forward
to testify having ever seen him with Carmela. And despite the
gruesome news about her death and how Mr. X had played a role in
it, he never presented himself like anyone who had lost a special
friend normally would. Obviously, Mr. X did not exist, a mere ghost
of the imagination of Alfaro, the woman who made a living
informing on criminals.

Webb’s U.S. Alibi

Among the accused, Webb presented the strongest alibi.

a. The travel preparations
Webb claims that in 1991 his parents, Senator Freddie Webb and
his wife, Elizabeth, sent their son to the United States (U.S.) to learn
the value of independence, hard work, and money.22 Gloria Webb,
his aunt, accompanied him. Rajah Tours booked their flight to San
Francisco via United Airlines. Josefina Nolasco of Rajah Tours
confirmed that Webb and his aunt used their plane tickets.
Webb told his friends, including his neighbor, Jennifer Claire
Cabrera, and his basketball buddy, Joselito Orendain Escobar, of his
travel plans. He even invited them to his despedida party on March
8,

_______________

22 TSN, August 14, 1997 and September 1, 1997.

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1991 at Faces Disco along Makati Ave.23 On March 8, 1991, the eve
of his departure, he took girlfriend Milagros Castillo to a dinner at
Bunchums at the Makati Cinema Square. His basketball buddy
Rafael Jose with Tina Calma, a blind date arranged by Webb, joined
them. They afterwards went to Faces Disco for Webb’s despedida
party. Among those present were his friends Paulo Santos and Jay
Ortega.24
b. The two immigration checks
The following day, March 9, 1991, Webb left for San Francisco,
California, with his Aunt Gloria on board United Airlines Flight
808.25 Before boarding his plane, Webb passed through the
Philippine Immigration booth at the airport to have his passport
cleared and stamped. Immigration Officer, Ferdinand Sampol
checked Webb’s visa, stamped, and initialed his passport, and let
him pass through.26 He was listed on the United Airlines Flight’s
Passenger Manifest.27
On arrival at San Francisco, Webb went through the U.S.
Immigration where his entry into that country was recorded. Thus,
the U.S. Immigration Naturalization Service, checking with its Non-
immigrant Information System, confirmed Webb’s entry into the
U.S. on March 9, 1991. Webb presented at the trial the INS
Certification issued by the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization
Service,28 the computer-generated print-out of the US-INS
indicating Webb’s entry on March 9, 1991,29 and the US-INS
Certification dated August 31, 1995,authenticated by the Philippine
Department of Foreign Affairs, correcting an earlier August 10,
1995 Certification.30

_______________

23 TSN, July 9, 1997, pp. 22-26.

24 TSN, July 8, 1997, pp. 15-19; and TSN, June 9, 1997, pp. 22-26.
25 Exhibit “227”.
26 TSN, May 28, 1997, pp. 112-118, 121-122.
27 Exhibit “223”.
28 Exhibits “207” to “219”.
29 Exhibit “207-B”.
30 Exhibit “212-D”.

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c. Details of U.S. sojourn

In San Francisco, Webb and his aunt Gloria were met by the
latter’s daughter, Maria Teresa Keame, who brought them to Gloria’s
house in Daly City, California. During his stay with his aunt, Webb
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met Christopher Paul Legaspi Esguerra, Gloria’s grandson. In April

1991, Webb, Christopher, and a certain Daphne Domingo watched
the concert of Deelite Band in San Francisco.31 In the same month,
Dorothy Wheelock and her family invited Webb to Lake Tahoe to
return the Webbs’ hospitality when she was in the Philippines.32
In May 1991, on invitation of another aunt, Susan Brottman,
Webb moved to Anaheim Hills, California.33 During his stay there,
he occupied himself with playing basketball once or twice a week
with Steven Keeler34 and working at his cousin-in-law’s pest control
company.35 Webb presented the company’s logbook showing the
tasks he performed,36 his paycheck,37 his ID, and other employment
papers. On June 14, 1991 he applied for a driver’s license38 and
wrote three letters to his friend Jennifer Cabrera.39
On June 28, 1991, Webb’s parents visited him at Anaheim and
stayed with the Brottmans. On the same day, his father introduced
Honesto Aragon to his son when he came to visit.40 On the
following day, June 29, Webb, in the company of his father and
Aragon went to Riverside, California, to look for a car. They bought
an MR2 Toyota car.41 Later that day, a visitor at the Brottman’s,
Louis Whittacker,

_______________

31  TSN, June 3, 1997, pp. 14-33; photograph before the concert Exhibit “295,”
Records (Vol. 2), p. 208.
32 TSN, April 23, 1997, pp. 128-129, 134-148.
33 TSN, April 30, 1997, pp. 69-71.
34 TSN, June 2, 1997, pp. 51-64, 75-78.
35 TSN, June 16, 1997, pp. 12, 16-38, 43-59 and 69-93.
36 Exhibits “305”.
37 Exhibits “306” and “307”.
38 Exhibits “344” and “346”.
39 Exhibits “244”, “245” and “246”.
40 TSN, July 16, 1997, pp. 35, 41-42, 48-49, 58, 61-62.
41 TSN, July 16, 1996, pp. 16-17, 23-32, 61-63, 78-84.

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saw Webb looking at the plates of his new car.42 To prove the
purchase, Webb presented the Public Records of California
Department of Motor Vehicle43 and a car plate “LEW WEBB.”44 In
using the car in the U.S., Webb even received traffic citations.45
On June 30, 1991 Webb, again accompanied by his father and
Aragon,46 bought a bicycle at Orange Cycle Center.47 The Center
issued Webb a receipt dated June 30, 1991.48 On July 4, 1991,
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Independence Day, the Webbs, the Brottmans, and the Vaca family
had a lakeside picnic.49
Webb stayed with the Brottmans until mid July and rented a
place for less than a month. On August 4, 1991 he left for
Longwood, Florida, to stay with the spouses Jack and Sonja
Rodriguez.50 There, he met Armando Rodriguez with whom he
spent time, playing basketball on weekends, watching movies, and
playing billiards.51 In November 1991, Webb met performing artist
Gary Valenciano, a friend of Jack Rodriguez, who was invited for a
dinner at the Rodriguez’s house.52 He left the Rodriguez’s home in
August 1992, returned to Anaheim and stayed with his aunt Imelda
Pagaspas. He stayed there until he left for the Philippines on October
26, 1992.
d. The second immigration checks
As with his trip going to the U.S., Webb also went through both
the U.S. and Philippine immigrations on his return trip. Thus, his
departure from the U.S. was confirmed by the same certifications
that con-

_______________

42 TSN, June 26, 1997, pp. 13-28.

43 Exhibit “338”.
44 Exhibit “348”.
45 Exhibits “341” and “342”.
46 TSN, July 16, 1996, pp. 16-17, 23-32, 61-63, 78-84.
47 Exhibit “349”.
48 Exhibit “337-B”.
49 TSN, May 9, 1996, pp. 26-32, 37, 44-57.
50 Id.
51 TSN, July 7, 1997, pp. 19-35.
52 TSN, July 2, 1997, pp. 33-37.

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firmed his entry.53 Furthermore, a Diplomatic Note of the U.S.

Department of State with enclosed letter from Acting Director
Debora A. Farmer of the Records Operations, Office of Records of
the US-INS stated that the Certification dated August 31, 1995 is a
true and accurate statement. And when he boarded his plane, the
Passenger Manifest of Philippine Airlines Flight No. 103,54 certified
by Agnes Tabuena55 confirmed his return trip.
When he arrived in Manila, Webb again went through the
Philippine Immigration. In fact, the arrival stamp and initial on his
passport indicated his return to Manila on October 27, 1992. This
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was authenticated by Carmelita Alipio, the immigration officer who

processed Webb’s reentry.56 Upon his return, in October 1992, Paolo
Santos, Joselito Erondain Escobar, and Rafael Jose once again saw
Webb playing basketball at the BF’s Phase III basketball court.
e. Alibi versus positive identification
The trial court and the Court of Appeals are one in rejecting as
weak Webb’s alibi. Their reason is uniform: Webb’s alibi cannot
stand against Alfaro’s positive identification of him as the rapist and
killer of Carmela and, apparently, the killer as well of her mother
and younger sister. Because of this, to the lower courts, Webb’s
denial and alibi were fabricated.
But not all denials and alibis should be regarded as fabricated.
Indeed, if the accused is truly innocent, he can have no other defense
but denial and alibi. So how can such accused penetrate a mind that
has been made cynical by the rule drilled into his head that a defense
of alibi is a hangman’s noose in the face of a witness positively
swearing, “I saw him do it.”? Most judges believe that such
assertion automatically dooms an alibi which is so easy to fabricate.
This quick stereotype thinking, however, is distressing. For how else
can the

_______________

53 Exhibit “212-D”.
54 Exhibit “261”.
55 Exhibit “260”.
56 TSN, June 23, 1997.

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truth that the accused is really innocent have any chance of

prevailing over such a stone-cast tenet?
There is only one way. A judge must keep an open mind. He
must guard against slipping into hasty conclusion, often arising from
a desire to quickly finish the job of deciding a case. A positive
declaration from a witness that he saw the accused commit the crime
should not automatically cancel out the accused’s claim that he did
not do it. A lying witness can make as positive an identification as a
truthful witness can. The lying witness can also say as forthrightly
and unequivocally, “He did it!” without blinking an eye.
Rather, to be acceptable, the positive identification must meet at
least two criteria:
First, the positive identification of the offender must come from a
credible witness. She is credible who can be trusted to tell the truth,

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usually based on past experiences with her. Her word has, to one
who knows her, its weight in gold.
And second, the witness’ story of what she personally saw must
be believable, not inherently contrived. A witness who testifies
about something she never saw runs into inconsistencies and makes
bewildering claims.
Here, as already fully discussed above, Alfaro and her testimony
fail to meet the above criteria.
She did not show up at the NBI as a spontaneous witness
bothered by her conscience. She had been hanging around that
agency for sometime as a stool pigeon, one paid for mixing up with
criminals and squealing on them. Police assets are often criminals
themselves. She was the prosecution’s worst possible choice for a
witness. Indeed, her superior testified that she volunteered to play
the role of a witness in the Vizconde killings when she could not
produce a man she promised to the NBI.
And, although her testimony included details, Alfaro had prior
access to the details that the investigators knew of the case. She took
advantage of her familiarity with these details to include in her
testimony the clearly incompatible act of Webb hurling a stone at the
front door glass frames even when they were trying to slip away qui-

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etly—just so she can accommodate this crime scene feature. She

also had Ventura rummaging a bag on the dining table for a front
door key that nobody needed just to explain the physical evidence of
that bag and its scattered contents. And she had Ventura climbing the
car’s hood, risking being seen in such an awkward position, when
they did not need to darken the garage to force open the front door—
just so to explain the darkened light and foot prints on the car hood.
Further, her testimony was inherently incredible. Her story that
Gatchalian, Fernandez, Estrada, Rodriguez, and Filart agreed to take
their turns raping Carmela is incongruent with their indifference,
exemplified by remaining outside the house, milling under a street
light, visible to neighbors and passersby, and showing no interest in
the developments inside the house, like if it was their turn to rape
Carmela. Alfaro’s story that she agreed to serve as Webb’s
messenger to Carmela, using up her gas, and staying with him till
the bizarre end when they were practically strangers, also taxes
incredulity.
To provide basis for Webb’s outrage, Alfaro said that she
followed Carmela to the main road to watch her let off a lover on
Aguirre Avenue. And, inexplicably, although Alfaro had only played
the role of messenger, she claimed leading Webb, Lejano, and
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Ventura into the house to gang-rape Carmella, as if Alfaro was

establishing a reason for later on testifying on personal knowledge.
Her swing from an emotion of fear when a woman woke up to their
presence in the house and of absolute courage when she nonetheless
returned to become the lone witness to a grim scene is also quite
inexplicable.
Ultimately, Alfaro’s quality as a witness and her inconsistent, if
not inherently unbelievable, testimony cannot be the positive
identification that jurisprudence acknowledges as sufficient to
jettison a denial and an alibi.
f. A documented alibi
To establish alibi, the accused must prove by positive, clear, and
satisfactory evidence57 that (a) he was present at another place at the

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57 People v. Hillado, 367 Phil. 29; 307 SCRA 535 (1999).

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time of the perpetration of the crime, and (b) that it was physically
impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime.58
The courts below held that, despite his evidence, Webb was
actually in Parañaque when the Vizconde killings took place; he was
not in the U.S. from March 9, 1991 to October 27, 1992; and if he
did leave on March 9, 1991, he actually returned before June 29,
1991, committed the crime, erased the fact of his return to the
Philippines from the records of the U.S. and Philippine
Immigrations, smuggled himself out of the Philippines and into the
U.S., and returned the normal way on October 27, 1992. But this
ruling practically makes the death of Webb and his passage into the
next life the only acceptable alibi in the Philippines. Courts must
abandon this unjust and inhuman paradigm.
If one is cynical about the Philippine system, he could probably
claim that Webb, with his father’s connections, can arrange for the
local immigration to put a March 9, 1991 departure stamp on his
passport and an October 27, 1992 arrival stamp on the same. But this
is pure speculation since there had been no indication that such
arrangement was made. Besides, how could Webb fix a foreign
airlines’ passenger manifest, officially filed in the Philippines and at
the airport in the U.S. that had his name on them? How could Webb
fix with the U.S. Immigration’s record system those two dates in its
record of his travels as well as the dates when he supposedly
departed in secret from the U.S. to commit the crime in the

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Philippines and then return there? No one has come up with a logical
and plausible answer to these questions.
The Court of Appeals rejected the evidence of Webb’s passport
since he did not leave the original to be attached to the record. But,
while the best evidence of a document is the original, this means that
the same is exhibited in court for the adverse party to examine and
for the judge to see. As Court of Appeals Justice Tagle said in his
dissent,59 the practice when a party does not want to leave an
important

_______________

58 People v. Saban, G.R. No. 110559, November 24, 1999, 319 SCRA 36, 46.
59 Rollo (G.R. 176839), pp. 216-217.

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document with the trial court is to have a photocopy of it marked as

exhibit and stipulated among the parties as a faithful reproduction of
the original. Stipulations in the course of trial are binding on the
parties and on the court.
The U.S. Immigration certification and the computer print-out of
Webb’s arrival in and departure from that country were authenticated
by no less than the Office of the U.S. Attorney General and the State
Department. Still the Court of Appeals refused to accept these
documents for the reason that Webb failed to present in court the
immigration official who prepared the same. But this was
unnecessary. Webb’s passport is a document issued by the Philippine
government, which under international practice, is the official record
of travels of the citizen to whom it is issued. The entries in that
passport are presumed true.60
The U.S. Immigration certification and computer print-out, the
official certifications of which have been authenticated by the
Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs, merely validated the
arrival and departure stamps of the U.S. Immigration office on
Webb’s passport. They have the same evidentiary value. The officers
who issued these certifications need not be presented in court to
testify on them. Their trustworthiness arises from the sense of
official duty and the penalty attached to a breached duty, in the
routine and disinterested origin of such statement and in the
publicity of the record.61
The Court of Appeals of course makes capital of the fact that an
earlier certification from the U.S. Immigration office said that it had
no record of Webb entering the U.S. But that erroneous first
certification was amply explained by the U.S. Government and
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Court of Appeals Justice Tagle stated it in his dissenting opinion,

thus:

While it is true that an earlier Certification was issued by the U.S.

INS on August 16, 1995 finding “no evidence of lawful admission of
Webb,” this was already clarified and deemed erroneous by no less than
the US INS Officials. As explained by witness Leo Herrera-Lim, Consul
and Second Secretary of the Philippine Embassy in Washing-

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60 Section 44, Rule 130, Rules of Court.

61 Antilon v. Barcelona, 37 Phil. 148 (1917).

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ton D.C., said Certification did not pass through proper diplomatic
channels and was obtained in violation of the rules on protocol and
standard procedure governing such request.
The initial request was merely initiated by BID Commissioner
Verceles who directly communicated with the Philippine Consulate in
San Francisco, USA, bypassing the Secretary of Foreign Affairs which
is the proper protocol procedure. Mr. Steven Bucher, the acting Chief of
the Records Services Board of US-INS Washington D.C. in his letter
addressed to Philip Antweiler, Philippine Desk Officer, State
Department, declared the earlier Certification as incorrect and
erroneous as it was “not exhaustive and did not reflect all available
information.” Also, Richard L. Huff, Co-Director of the Office of
Information and privacy, US Department of Justice, in response to the
appeal raised by Consul General Teresita V. Marzan, explained that
“the INS normally does not maintain records on individuals who are
entering the country as visitors rather than as immigrants: and that a
notation concerning the entry of a visitor may be made at the
Nonimmigrant Information system. Since appellant Webb entered the
U.S. on a mere tourist visa, obviously, the initial search could not have
produced the desired result inasmuch as the data base that was looked
into contained entries of the names of IMMIGRANTS and not that of
NON-IMMIGRANT visitors of the U.S..62

The trial court and the Court of Appeals expressed marked

cynicism over the accuracy of travel documents like the passport as
well as the domestic and foreign records of departures and arrivals
from airports. They claim that it would not have been impossible for
Webb to secretly return to the Philippines after he supposedly left it
on March 9, 1991, commit the crime, go back to the U.S., and
openly return to the Philippines again on October 26, 1992. Travel

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between the U.S. and the Philippines, said the lower courts took only
about twelve to fourteen hours.
If the Court were to subscribe to this extremely skeptical view, it
might as well tear the rules of evidence out of the law books and
regard suspicions, surmises, or speculations as reasons for
impeaching evidence. It is not that official records, which carry the
presumption of

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62 Rollo (G.R. 176839), pp. 218-219.

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truth of what they state, are immune to attack. They are not. That
presumption can be overcome by evidence. Here, however, the
prosecution did not bother to present evidence to impeach the entries
in Webb’s passport and the certifications of the Philippine and U.S.’
immigration services regarding his travel to the U.S. and back. The
prosecution’s rebuttal evidence is the fear of the unknown that it
planted in the lower court’s minds.
7. Effect of Webb’s alibi to others
Webb’s documented alibi altogether impeaches Alfaro’s
testimony, not only with respect to him, but also with respect to
Lejano, Estrada, Fernandez, Gatchalian, Rodriguez, and Biong. For,
if the Court accepts the proposition that Webb was in the U.S. when
the crime took place, Alfaro’s testimony will not hold together.
Webb’s participation is the anchor of Alfaro’s story. Without it, the
evidence against the others must necessarily fall.

Conclusion

In our criminal justice system, what is important is, not whether

the court entertains doubts about the innocence of the accused since
an open mind is willing to explore all possibilities, but whether it
entertains a reasonable, lingering doubt as to his guilt. For, it would
be a serious mistake to send an innocent man to jail where such kind
of doubt hangs on to one’s inner being, like a piece of meat lodged
immovable between teeth.
Will the Court send the accused to spend the rest of their lives in
prison on the testimony of an NBI asset who proposed to her
handlers that she take the role of the witness to the Vizconde
massacre that she could not produce?
WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the
Decision dated December 15, 2005 and Resolution dated January

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26, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. 00336 and

ACQUITS accused-appellants Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb, Antonio
Lejano, Michael A. Gatchalian, Hospicio Fernandez, Miguel
Rodriguez, Peter Estrada and Gerardo Biong of the crimes of which
they were charged for fail-

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ure of the prosecution to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

They are ordered immediately RELEASED from detention unless
they are confined for another lawful cause.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Director, Bureau of
Corrections, Muntinlupa City for immediate implementation. The
Director of the Bureau of Corrections is DIRECTED to report the
action he has taken to this Court within five days from receipt of this
Decision.
SO ORDERED.

Peralta, Bersamin and Perez, JJ., concur.

Corona (C.J), I join the dissent of J. Villarama.
Carpio, J., No Part, I testified in this case.
Carpio-Morales, J., Please see Concurring Opinion.
Velasco, Jr., J., On Official Business.
Nachura, J., No Part. Filed pleading as Sol Gen.
Leonardo-De Castro, J., I join the dissent of J. Villarama.
Brion, J., I certify that J. Brion cast a dissenting vote with
Villarama. See Supplemental Opinion.
Del Castillo, J., No Part.
Villarama, Jr., J., See Dissenting Opinion.
Mendoza, J., I vote for the vacation of the verdict of conviction
there being a lingering doubt.
Sereno, J., See Separate Concurring Opinion.

CONCURRING OPINION

CARPIO-MORALES, J.:

While it should be the common desire of bench and bar that crime is not
left unpunished, it is no less important, if not more so, that the innocent be
shielded from hasty prosecution and rash conviction. We have nothing but
praise for sincerity and zeal in the enforcement of the law. Nevertheless, the
undeserved penalties inflicted upon the blameless, and the indelible stain

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upon their name, which is never quite washed away by time, should caution
all concerned to a more careful and conscientious scrutiny of all the facts
before the finger is pointed and the stone is cast.1 (emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

And so, as in all criminal cases, the very voluminous records of

the present cases call for a “more careful and conscientious scrutiny”
in order to determine what the facts are before the accused’s
conviction is affirmed.
On June 30, 1991, Estrellita Vizconde and her daughters, then
19-year old Carmela and then seven-year old Jennifer, were found
dead in their home at No. 80 Vinzons Street, BF Homes Subdivision,
Parañaque. They all bore multiple stab wounds on different parts of
their bodies. Some of their personal belongings appeared to be
missing.
An intense and sustained investigation conducted by the police
resulted in the arrest of a group of suspects, the Akyat Bahay gang
members, some of whom gave detailed confessions to having
committed the crimes, hence, their indictment in court.2 The Makati
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 63 eventually found those
suspects to have been victims of police frame-up, however, and were
thus ordered discharged.
Subsequently, in 1995, the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI) which conducted a parallel investigation announced that it
had solved

_______________

1 Salvacion v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. L-68633, July 11 1986, 142 SCRA 707,
713.
2 The cases were (1) Criminal Case No. 91-7135 filed by then Assistant Chief
State Prosecutor Aurelio C. Trampe before the sala of Judge Julio R. Logarta of the
Makati City RTC, Branch 63, on November 11, 1991 (for robbery with homicide)
against Villardo Barroso y Datuin, Roberto Barroso y Datuin¸ Rolando Mendoza y
Gomez, Ernesto Cesar, Bienvenido Baydo, Angelito Santos y Bisen, Rey Doe and
several other John Does still at large; (2) Criminal Case No. 91-7136 (for the rape
with homicide of Carmela Nicolas Vizconde filed by ACSP Aurelio C. Trampe with
the same RTC, Branch 63, on November 11, 1919) also against the same accused and
(3) Criminal Case No. 91-7137 (for robbery, with homicide wherein the victim was
ESTRELLITA NICOLAS VISCONDE) likewise filed against the same accused by
ACSP Aurelio C. Trampe.

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the crime by presenting its “star witness” in the person of Jessica

Alfaro y Mincey (Alfaro), one of its “informers” or “assets,” who
claimed to have been an eyewitness to the crime. She named the
accused Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb, Antonio “Tony Boy” Lejano,
Artemio “Dong” Ventura, Michael A. Gatchalian, Hospicio “Pyke”
Fernandez, Peter Estrada, Miguel “Ging” Rodriguez, and Joey Filart
as the culprits. She also tagged Parañaque police officer Gerardo
Biong as an accessory after the fact. On the basis of Alfaro’s
account, an Information was filed on August 10, 1995 before the
Parañaque RTC against Webb, et al.3 for rape with homicide,
reading as follows:

“That on or about the evening of June 29 up to the early morning of June

30, 1991, in the municipality of Parañaque, province of Rizal, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Hubert Jeffrey
P. Webb conspiring and confederating with accused Antonio “Tony Boy”
Lejano, Artemio “Dong” Ventura, Michael Gatchalian y Adviento,
Hiospicio “Pyke” Fernandez, Peter Estrada, Miguel “Ging” Rodriguez and
Joey Filart, mutually helping one another, while armed with bladed
instruments, with the use of force and intimidation, with lewd design, with
abuse of superior strength, nighttime and with the use of motor vehicle,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of the person of
Carmela Vizconde against her will and consent.
That by reason or on the occasion of the aforesaid rape or immediately
thereafter, the above-named accused with intent to kill, conspiring and
confederating together, mutually helping one another, did then and there and
with evidence premeditation, abuse of superior strength, nighttime, with the
use of motor vehicle, assault and stab with bladed instruments Carmela
Vizconde, Estrellita Vizconde and Jennifer Vizconde, thereby inflicting
upon them numerous stab wounds in different parts of their bodies which
caused their instantaneous death.
The accused GERARDO BIONG and JOHN DOES having knowledge
after the commission of the above-mentioned crime, and without having
participated therein as principals or accomplices, took part subsequent to its
commission by assisting, with abuse of authority as police officer, the
above-named principal accused, to conceal or destroy the effects or
instruments thereof by failing to preserve the physical evidence and
allowing their destruction in order to prevent the discovery of the crime.”

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3 Records, Vol. I, pp. 1-3.

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The case was, after the Presiding Judge of Branch 258 of the
Parañaque RTC inhibited, re-raffled to Branch 274 of the Parañaque
RTC. The trial court, then presided over by Judge Amelita G.
Tolentino, tried only seven of the accused, Artemio Ventura and
Joey Filart having remained at large.4
At the trial, the prosecution presented Alfaro as its main witness.
The other witnesses were Dr. Prospero Cabanayan, the medico-
legal officer who autopsied the bodies of the victims; Lolita
Carrera Birrer, an ex-lover of Gerardo Biong; Mila Gaviola,
former laundrywoman of the Webbs; Normal White and Justo
Cabanacan, security personnel of the Pitong Daan Subdivision, BF
Homes, Parañaque, and Lauro G. Vizconde, Estrellita’s husband.
The defense presented testimonial evidence which tended to cast
a bad light on Alfaro’s reputation for truth, as well as on the
implausibility of her account.
At all events, some of the accused invoked alibi, claiming to have
been somewhere else at the time of the commission of the crime. In
Webb’s case, he presented documentary and testimonial proof that
he was in the United States of America from March 1991 to October
1992.
The trial court, impressed by Alfaro’s detailed narration of the
events surrounding the commission of the crime, deemed her a
credible witness after finding her testimony to have been
corroborated by those of the other prosecution witnesses, as well as
by the physical evidence. To the trial court, her testimony was
categorical, straightforward, spontaneous, and frank, and withstood
grueling cross-examinations by the different defense counsel.
On the other hand, it belittled the denial and alibi of accused
Webb, Lejano, Rodriguez, and Gatchalian in light of their positive
identification by Alfaro.

_______________

4 Rollo (G.R. No. 176389), pp. 393-399 and Rollo (G.R. No. 176864), pp. 80-104.

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And so after a protracted trial, the trial court rendered on January

4, 2000 a 172-page decision finding all the accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of rape with homicide.
Thus the trial court disposed:

“WHEREFORE, this Court hereby finds all the principal accused GUILTY
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF RAPE WITH
HOMICIDE AND HEREBY SENTENCES EACH ONE OF THEM TO SUFFER

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THE PENALTY OF RECLUSION PERPETUA. This Court likewise finds the

accused Gerardo Biong GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT AS AN
ACCESSORY AFTER THE FACT, AND HEREBY SENTENCES HIM TO
SUFFER AN IMPRISONMENT OF ELEVEN (11) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS
AND ONE (1) DAY TO TWELVE (12) YEARS. In addition, the Court hereby
orders all the accused to jointly and severally pay the victim’s surviving heir, Mr.
Lauro Vizconde, the following sums by way of civil indemnity:
1) The amount of P150,000.00 for wrongful death of the victims;
2) The amount of P762,450.00 representing actual damages sustained by Mr.
Lauro Vizconde;
3) The amount of P2,000,000.00 as moral damages sustained by Mr. Lauro
Vizconde;
4) The amount of P97,404.55 as attorney’s fees.”5

On appeal, the Court of Appeals rendered its challenged Decision

of December 15, 2005 affirming with modification the trial court’s
decision by reducing the penalty imposed on Biong to six years
minimum and twelve years maximum and increasing the award of
civil indemnity to Lauro Vizconde to P200,000.00.6 The appellate
court found that indeed there was sufficient evidence that Rodriguez,
Gatchalian, Fernandez, and Estrada had conspired to rape and kill
Carmela as well as to kill Estrellita and Jennifer.

_______________

5 Decision dated January 4, 2000.

6 CA Rollo, Vol. IV, pp. 3478-3479.

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    On motion for reconsideration by the accused, the appellate

court’s Special Division of five members, voting three against two,
sustained its affirmance of the trial court’s decision.7 Hence, this
appeal.
On April 20, 2010, as a result of its initial deliberation in this
case, the Court issued a Resolution granting the request of Webb to
submit for Deoxyribonucleic Acid (DNA) analysis the semen
specimen taken from Carmela’s cadaver, which specimen was
believed to be still under the safekeeping of the NBI. The Court
granted the request pursuant to Section 4 of the Rule on DNA
Evidence8 to give the accused and the prosecution access to
scientific evidence which could affect the result of the case.
On April 27, 2010, however, the NBI informed the Court that it
no longer had custody of the specimen which it claimed had been

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turned over to the trial court. Parenthetically, the trial court records
do not

_______________

7 Resolution dated January 26, 2007, Rollo (G.R. No. 176839), pp. 197-214. The
resolution was penned by Justice Rodrigo V. Cosico, with the concurrence of Justices
Regalado E. Maambong and Normandie B. Pizarro. Justices Renato C. Dacudao and
Lucenito N. Tagle, dissented.
8 A.M. 06-11-5-SC effective October 15, 2007. Section 4 states:
Application for DNA Testing Order.—The appropriate court may, at any time,
either motu proprio or on application of any person who has a legal interest in the
matter in litigation, order a DNA testing. Such order shall issue after due hearing and
notice to the parties upon a showing of the following:
a. A biological sample exists that is relevant to the case;
b. The biological sample:
(i) was not previously subjected to the type of DNA testing now requested; or
(ii) was previously subject to DNA testing, but the results may require
confirmation for good reasons;
c. The DNA testing uses a scientifically valid technique;
d. The DNA testing has the scientific potential to produce new information that
is relevant to the proper resolution of the case; and
e. The existence of other factors, if any, which the court may consider as
potentially affecting the accuracy or integrity of the DNA testing.
This rule shall not preclude a DNA testing, without need of a prior court order, at
the behest of any party, including law enforcement agencies, before a suit or
proceeding is commenced.

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show that the specimen was among the object evidence that was
offered in evidence in the case by any of the parties. It was in light
of this development that accused Webb filed an urgent motion to
acquit on the ground that the government’s failure to preserve such
vital evidence has resulted in the denial of his right to due process.
In the draft decision prepared by Justice Martin S. Villarama as a
basis of this Court’s deliberation, the decision of the appellate court
affirming with modification the trial court’s decision was affirmed.
In discussing why the Decision of the Court of Appeals is being
affirmed with modification, the draft decision which was the basis of
this Court’s deliberations, started by stating a “fundamental rule,”
viz.:

“It is a fundamental rule that findings of the trial courts which are factual
in nature and which involve credibility are accorded respect when no glaring

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errors, gross misapprehensions of facts and speculative, arbitrary and

unsupported conclusions can be gathered from such findings.9 When the
trial court’s findings have been affirmed by the appellate court, said findings
are generally conclusive and binding upon this Court.”10

The draft decision, which was later adopted by the dissenters,

found “no glaring errors, gross misapprehensions of facts and
speculative, arbitrary and unsupported conclusions” made by the
lower courts. It readily credited the testimony of prosecution “star”
witness Jessica Alfaro (Alfaro) who, it observed, “underwent
exhaustive and intense cross-examination by eight . . . defense
lawyers . . . [and] revealed such details and observations which only
a person who was actually with the perpetrators could have known.”
The trial court banked primarily on Alfaro who claimed to be an
eyewitness to the massacre and considered the testimonies of the
other prosecution witnesses as merely corroborative of hers.
Jurisprudence has consistently summoned, however, that for
testimonial evidence to be worthy of belief, it must firstly proceed
from the mouth of a credible witness. A person may be credible
where he is

_______________

9  People v. Pringas, G.R. No. 175928, August 31, 2007, 531 SCRA 828.
10 People v. De Guzman, G.R. No. 173197, April 24, 2007, 522 SCRA 207.

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without previous conviction of a crime; who is not a police character

and has no police record; who has not perjured in the past; whose
affidavit or testimony is not incredible; who has a good standing in
the community; and who is reputed to be trustworthy and reliable.11
Secondly, the person’s testimony must in itself be credible.
Daggers v. Van Dyck12 illuminates:

“Evidence to be believed, must not only proceed from the mouth of a

credible witness, but it must be credible in itself—such as the common
experience and observation of mankind can approve as probable under the
circumstances. We have no test of the truth of human testimony, except its
conformity to our knowledge, observation, and experience. Whatever is
repugnant to these belongs to the miraculous and is outside of judicial
cognizance.” (underscoring supplied)

Alfaro was found both by the trial and appellate courts to be a

credible witness. She impressed the trial court which found her to
have “testified in a categorical, straightforward, spontaneous and
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frank manner, and [to] ha[ve] remained consistent in her

testimony.”13
By Alfaro’s own admission, she was a habitual drug addict who
inhaled and sniffed shabu “every other day”14 since December 1990.
It was about this time that she met Artemio “Dong” Ventura who
provided her with a regular supply of shabu at the so-called “house
of shabu” in Parañaque.15 In March 1991, she stopped getting her
supply of shabu from Ventura as she instead got it from other
sources including Orly Bacquir and Cris Santos and places such as
Quezon City, Makati and Tondo.16

_______________

11 Siao Tick Chong v. Republic, No. L-22151, March 30, 1970, 32 SCRA 253,
258.
12 37 N.J. Eq. 130, 132. Cited in Salonga, Philippine Law on Evidence, 774
(1964) and VIII Francisco, The Revised Rules Of Court In The Philippines, 458-459
(1997).
13 January 4, 2000 RTC Decision, p. 74.
14 Vide TSN, October 18, 1995, pp. 105-106.
15 TSN, October 23, 1995, pp. 6-9.
16 Id., at pp. 25-27.

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In the afternoon of June 29, 1991, the date of the commission of

the crime, before she and accused Peter Estrada, who she claimed
was her boyfriend, went to the Alabang Commercial Center, she had
taken illegal drugs, and in the evening of even date, she not only
smoked shabu but sniffed cocaine as well at the “parking lot.”17 It
was only in about October 1994 that she stopped taking illegal
drugs.
The paper of authors Burrus and Marks, “Testimonial Reliability
of Drug Addicts,”18 teaches:

“. . . [W]here the prolonged use of drugs has impaired the witness’ ability to
perceive, recall or relate, impeaching testimony is uniformly sustained by
the courts. Aside from organic deterioration, however, testimony may be
impugned if the witness was under the influence of drugs at the time of
perceiving the event about which he is testifying or at the time he is on the
stand. This necessarily follows, for even the temporary presence of drugs
affects the functioning of the body’s organs, and thus bears directly on the
credibility of the witness’ testimony…”19 (underscoring supplied)

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Evidence derived from the testimony of a witness who was under

the influence of drugs during the incident to which he is testifying is
indeed very unreliable.20 So it has been held that “habitual users of
narcotics become notorious liars and that their testimony is likely to
be affected thereby.”21

_______________

17 Id., at pp. 35-36; TSN, October 10, 1995, pp. 80-96, 156-163.
18 35 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 259 (1960)
19 Ibid.
20 Vide 98 C.J.S. 348.
21 Vide People v. Lewis, 25 Ill. 2d 396, 185 NE 2d 168 where the Supreme Court
of Illinois ruled:
The question of whether a witness is a narcotics addict is an important
consideration in passing upon the credibility of a witness for, as we have stated, the
testimony of a narcotics addict is subject to suspicion due to the fact that habitual
users of narcotics become notorious liars. (citations omitted)
In People v. Perkins, 26 Ill 2d 2300, 186 NE 2d 330 (1962) , the Supreme Court of
Illinois said:
The defendant contends that the trial court erred in finding him guilty on the basis
of the uncorroborated testimony of a drug addict who was the

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“We believe it will be admitted that habitual users of opium, or other like
narcotics, become notorious liars. The habit of lying comes doubtless from
the fact that the users of those narcotics pass the greater part of their lives in
an unreal world, and thus become unable to distinguish between images and
facts, between illusions and realities.22 (underscoring supplied)

Defense witness Dr. Rey San Pedro, then Deputy Executive

Director of the Dangerous Drugs Board, opined that drug addicts or
dependents are generally liars who would lie for less than noble
objectives, such as for money and/or to satisfy their craving for
attention, viz.:
Atty. M. Ongkiko:
Q: Based on your experience, Doctor, will this dependency of shabu affect the
character of a person specifically, for example, the capacity to tell the truth,
would that affect?
Witness Dr. Rey San Pedro:
A: Our general examination of patients showed that they become liars.
Atty. M. Ongkiko:
Q: They become liars. Yes, what would be the usual motivation for a shabu-
dependent person to become liars. Why, why do they lie?
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Witness Dr. Rey San Pedro:

A: My experience, Sir, is because they are aware that what they are doing is
wrong and therefore they want to hide it. Not only from the family, but also
from their friends.

_______________

 only witness to the alleged crime, and further urges that the evidence as a whole does not prove him guilty

beyond a reasonable doubt. We have repeatedly held that the fact that a witness is a narcotics addict

and a police informer has an important bearing upon his credibility and, while his position is not

that of an accomplice, the situation is sufficiently similar to that of an accomplice to warrant a close

scrutiny of the testimony of such a witness, recognizing the fact that habitual users of narcotics become

notorious liars and that their testimony is likely to be affected thereby. (Citations omitted; emphasis

supplied)

22 State v. Fong Loon, 29 Idaho 248, 158 Pac. 233, 236.

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Lejano vs. People

Atty. M. Ongkiko:
Q: Yes. They could lie on the persons they go out with?
Witness Dr. Rey San Pedro:
A: Yes, Sir.
Atty. M. Ongkiko:
Q: They could lie on the persons they meet?
Witness Dr. Rey San Pedro:
A: Yes, Sir.
Atty. M. Ongkiko:
Q: They could lie on the persons from whom they allegedly get the drugs?
Witness Dr. Rey San Pedro:
A: Yes, Sir.
Atty. M. Ongkiko:
Q: Is it not correct, Doctor, that the tendency of a drug dependent is to hide the
identity of the drug suppliers. Is this correct?
Witness Dr. Rey San Pedro:
A: This is our experience. I have not encountered a patient who would tell you
where they get their supply.
Atty. M. Ongkiko:
Q: Who would tell you the correct name of the drug supplier?
Witness Dr. Rey San Pedro:
A: Yes, Sir.
Atty. M. Ongkiko:
Q: And who would tell you the correct address of the drug supplier, correct?
Witness Dr. Rey San Pedro:
A: Correct.
Atty. M. Ongkiko:
Q: Their tendency is to give you misleading information, correct?
Witness Dr. Rey San Pedro:

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A: Yes, Sir.
Atty. M. Ongkiko:
Q: Now, would a drug dependent on shabu lie for money?

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Witness Dr. Rey San Pedro:

A: Yes.
Atty. M. Ongkiko:
Q:Yes. When I say lie for money so that she could get money?
Witness Dr. Rey San Pedro:
A: She could get money.
Atty. M. Ongkiko:
Q: He will, from her relatives, from her friends, or even from third persons?
Witness Dr. Rey San Pedro:
A: Yes, Sir. They even sell the family belongings.
Atty. M. Ongkiko:
Q: They even sell their personal effects?
Witness Dr. Rey San Pedro:
A: Yes, Sir.
Atty. M. Ongkiko:
Q: Would they sell their honor to get money, like a woman becoming a
prostitute?
Witness Dr. Rey San Pedro:
A: I have not encountered a case like that.
Atty. M. Ongkiko:
Q: You have not encountered that much. But tell me, Doctor, would they lie in
order to get attention?
Witness Dr. Rey San Pedro:
A: Yes, they do.
Atty. M. Ongkiko:
Q: Yes, because they want to be the center of attention to cover up for their drug
dependency, correct?
Witness Dr. Rey San Pedro:
A: Yes, Sir.
Atty. M. Ongkiko:
Q: Now, Doctor, if a person were drug dependent on shabu since 1990, 1991, up
to and including December, 1994. So, that is a long time, isn’t it?

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Lejano vs. People

Witness Dr. Rey San Pedro:

A: ’90 to ’94?
Atty. M. Ongkiko:

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Q: Yes, drug dependent. What would it take, Doctor, in order that we can cure
this patient of his or her dependency on shabu, what would it take?
Witness Dr. Rey San Pedro:
A: They have to be rehabilitated, Sir, treated and rehabilitated.
Atty. M. Ongkiko:
Q: Treated and rehabilitated, where?
Witness Dr. Rey San Pedro:
A: In a hospital.
Atty. M. Ongkiko:
Q: In a hospital. Does the government provide for such facilities?
Witness Dr. Rey San Pedro:
A: Yes, Sir.
x x x x23 (underscoring supplied)

Former National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) Director

Epimaco Velasco had a view similar to that of Dr. San Pedro’s—that
any information which is being furnished by a drug addict is “not
generally reliable” and his capacity to lie may be “very great.”24 

_______________

85 TSN, August 7, 1997, 35-45.

86 TSN, June 4, 1997, pp. 47-48.
Atty. Ongkiko:
Q: As an investigator, Governor, will you tell the Honorable Court how did you
relate or rather assess the reliability of any information furnished by a drug addict?
Witness Velasco:
A: Well, I will consider it, Your Honor, not generally reliable.
Atty. Ongkiko:
Q: Why do you say that?
Witness Velasco:
A: Well, because, you know, if one is under the influence of drugs or one is
considered to be an addict, you could hardly believe his information. 

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In their earlier mentioned paper, Burrus and Marks write on the

“peculiar effects upon veracity” of the principal types of drugs, like
cocaine and amphetamine which were used by Alfaro:

“x x x x
b. Cocaine—Cocaine is a powerful cortical stimulant which causes a
state of euphoric excitement and varying degrees of pleasurable
hallucinations. Under its influence, a person experiences sensations of great
muscular and mental strength and overestimates his capabilities. He is truly,
at least while under the drug’s influence, in an “unreal” or “dream
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world,” and the majority exception of admitting impeaching testimony

where the witness was under the influence of the drug at the time of
perception or testifying seems clearly sustainable in medical evidence.
Over time, cocaine produces on the addict a degree of physical and
mental deterioration not found in connection with the use of opiates. The
cocaine addict is not a normal person; many, in fact, become paranoids and
suffer from feelings of persecution. Visual, auditory and tactual
hallucinations are common, as are digestive tract disorders, and occasionally
convulsions.
It would seem to follow that, so far as medical evidence is concerned,
expert testimony should be admissible to impeach

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