Astorga vs.
Villegas
on 7:00 AM in Case Digests, Political Law
0
G.R. No. L-23475, April 30, 1974
o Enrolled Bill Doctrine: As the President has no authority to approve a bill not passed by
Congress, an enrolled Act in the custody of the Secretary of State, and having the official
attestations of the Speaker of the House of Representatives, of the President of the Senate, and of
the Chief Executive, carries, on its face, a solemn assurance by the legislative and executive
departments of the government, charged, respectively, with the duty of enacting and executing
the laws, that it was passed by Congress.
o Approval of Congress, not signatures of the officers, is essential
o When courts may turn to the journal: Absent such attestation as a result of the
disclaimer, and consequently there being no enrolled bill to speak of, the entries in the journal
should be consulted.
FACTS:
House Bill No. 9266, a bill of local application, was filed in the House of Representatives
and then sent to the Senate for reading. During discussion at the Senate, Senator
Tolentino and Senator Roxas recommended amendments thereto. Despite the fact that
it was the Tolentino amendment that was approved and the Roxas amendment not
even appearing in the journal, when Senate sent its certification of amendment to the
House, only the Roxas amendment was included, not the Tolentino amendment.
Nevertheless, the House approved the same. Printed copies were then certified and
attested by the Secretary of the House of Reps, the Speaker, the Secretary of the
Senate and the Senate President, and sent to the President of the Philippines who
thereby approved the same. The Bill thus was passed as RA 4065. However, when the
error was discovered, both the Senate President and the Chief Executive withdrew their
signatures.
ISSUES:
o Whether or not RA 4065 was passed into law
o Whether or not the entries in the journal should prevail over the enrolled bill
RULING:
Rationale of the Enrolled Bill Theory
The rationale of the enrolled bill theory is set forth in the said case of Field vs. Clark as
follows:
The signing by the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and, by the President of
the Senate, in open session, of an enrolled bill, is an official attestation by the two
houses of such bill as one that has passed Congress. It is a declaration by the two
houses, through their presiding officers, to the President, that a bill, thus attested, has
received, in due form, the sanction of the legislative branch of the government, and that
it is delivered to him in obedience to the constitutional requirement that all bills which
pass Congress shall be presented to him. And when a bill, thus attested, receives his
approval, and is deposited in the public archives, its authentication as a bill that has
passed Congress should be deemed complete and unimpeachable. As the President
has no authority to approve a bill not passed by Congress, an enrolled Act in the
custody of the Secretary of State, and having the official attestations of the Speaker of
the House of Representatives, of the President of the Senate, and of the President of
the United States, carries, on its face, a solemn assurance by the legislative and
executive departments of the government, charged, respectively, with the duty of
enacting and executing the laws, that it was passed by Congress. The respect due to
coequal and independent departments requires the judicial department to act upon that
assurance, and to accept, as having passed Congress, all bills authenticated in the
manner stated; leaving the courts to determine, when the question properly arises,
whether the Act, so authenticated, is in conformity with the Constitution.
It may be noted that the enrolled bill theory is based mainly on "the respect due to
coequal and independent departments," which requires the judicial department "to
accept, as having passed Congress, all bills authenticated in the manner stated." Thus it
has also been stated in other cases that if the attestation is absent and the same is not
required for the validity of a statute, the courts may resort to the journals and other
records of Congress for proof of its due enactment. This was the logical conclusion
reached in a number of decisions, although they are silent as to whether the journals
may still be resorted to if the attestation of the presiding officers is present.
Approval of Congress, not signatures of the officers, is essential
As far as Congress itself is concerned, there is nothing sacrosanct in the certification
made by the presiding officers. It is merely a mode of authentication. The lawmaking
process in Congress ends when the bill is approved by both Houses, and the
certification does not add to the validity of the bill or cure any defect already present
upon its passage. In other words it is the approval by Congress and not the signatures
of the presiding officers that is essential.
When courts may turn to the journal
Absent such attestation as a result of the disclaimer, and consequently there being no
enrolled bill to speak of, what evidence is there to determine whether or not the bill had
been duly enacted? In such a case the entries in the journal should be consulted.
The journal of the proceedings of each House of Congress is no ordinary record. The
Constitution requires it. While it is true that the journal is not authenticated and is
subject to the risks of misprinting and other errors, the point is irrelevant in this case.
This Court is merely asked to inquire whether the text of House Bill No. 9266 signed by
the Chief Executive was the same text passed by both Houses of Congress. Under the
specific facts and circumstances of this case, this Court can do this and resort to the
Senate journal for the purpose. The journal discloses that substantial and lengthy
amendments were introduced on the floor and approved by the Senate but were not
incorporated in the printed text sent to the President and signed by him. This Court is
not asked to incorporate such amendments into the alleged law, which admittedly is a
risky undertaking, but to declare that the bill was not duly enacted and therefore did not
become law. This We do, as indeed both the President of the Senate and the Chief
Executive did, when they withdrew their signatures therein. In the face of the manifest
error committed and subsequently rectified by the President of the Senate and by the
Chief Executive, for this Court to perpetuate that error by disregarding such rectification
and holding that the erroneous bill has become law would be to sacrifice truth to fiction
and bring about mischievous consequences not intended by the law-making body.
