187

Bulletin of the New Zealand Society for Earthquake Engineering, Vol. 50, No. 2, June 2017

DAMAGE TO NON-STRUCTURAL ELEMENTS IN THE

2016 KAIKŌURA EARTHQUAKE

Andrew Baird1 and Helen Ferner2

(Submitted March 2017; Reviewed April 2017; Accepted April 2017)

ABSTRACT
This paper describes the damage to non-structural elements in buildings following the 14th November
2016 Kaikōura earthquake. As has been observed in recent earthquakes in New Zealand and around the
world, damage to non-structural elements is a major contributor to overall building damage. This paper
focusses on damage to non-structural elements in multi-storey commercial buildings, in particular
damage to the following: suspended ceilings, suspended services, glazing, precast panels, internal
linings, seismic gaps and contents. The nature and extent of damage to each of these components is
discussed in this paper with the help of typical damage photos taken after the earthquake. The paper also
presents observations on the seismic performance of non-structural elements where seismic bracing was
present. These observations suggest that seismic bracing is an effective means to improve seismic
performance of non-structural elements.

INTRODUCTION earthquake before the damage was cleaned up and buildings

reopened for operation.
Damage to non- structural elements has been a recurring
observation from recent New Zealand earthquakes [1, 2]. The Although noticeable structural damage occurred in a small
14 November 2016 Kaikōura earthquake provides extensive proportion of the building stock, damage to non-structural
examples of the vulnerability of non-structural elements (e.g. components and contents appeared to be significantly more
ceilings, cladding, partitions, building services, plant widespread. Of the buildings inspected, the extent of damage
equipment and piping etc.). to non-structural elements (such as ceilings, services, facades,
partition walls) was more than that observed to the primary
This paper focusses on non-structural damage to commercial structural components. This is in agreement with outcomes of
multi-storey buildings in Wellington observed in the previous seismic loss which have concluded that non-
immediate aftermath of the Kaikōura earthquake. The structural and content damage contribute a major share of the
buildings inspected were mostly of modern construction, built total losses in an earthquake [3].
in the 1980s or more recently and were typically concrete
moment frames with precast concrete floors and in-situ Commonly observed types of damage to non-structural
topping slabs. elements and contents are described in this paper with some
typical damage photos taken after the earthquake. Based on
The observations in this paper are based on a high level the level of inspection undertaken, it is not possible to provide
assessment completed in the days immediately after the statistics on the percentage of damage, or detailed typology of

Figure 1: Damage to suspended ceilings: failed ceiling t-rail (left), fallen lightweight ceiling tiles (centre),
fallen heavy plaster tiles (right).

1
Corresponding Author, Structural Engineer, Beca Ltd, Auckland, [email protected] (Member)
2
Technical Director, Beca Ltd, Auckland, [email protected] (Member)
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buildings where damage was observed, however it was evident to the other adjacent building components or potentially the
that more damage was observed to buildings located on other building components were reliant on the ceiling for
reclaimed land adjacent to the Wellington port, in the seismic restraint, which the ceiling may not have been
Thorndon area close to parliament and the Te Aro area. designed for.
This earthquake also provides some examples of the A noticeable feature of the ceiling damage observed was the
performance of non-structural elements that had been braced extent that damage occurred where various services
either as part of repairs and seismic retrofit following previous components such as lights, were supported by the suspended
recent earthquakes or new building design where ceilings. It appeared that the ceiling grid system was not
considerations of the performance of non-structural elements strong enough to support these additional loads leading to
were specifically taken into account in an effort to minimise failure of the ceiling system at these locations. In other
damage. instances the lights and other services elements fell from the
ceiling grid or out of the ceiling tiles.
OBSERVED DAMAGE Both lightweight and heavy tiles were observed to have fallen
This section reports on typical observed damage by non- in a number of instances. Although lightweight ceiling tiles,
structural element typology. such as the mineral fibre tiles shown in in Figure 1 (centre),
only weigh a couple of kilograms, some heavy tiles, such as
Suspended Ceilings the plaster tiles shown in Figure 1 (right), may weigh upwards
of 10kg. The life safety risk of heavy tiles falling was clearly
Widespread damage to suspended ceilings in multiple apparent to building occupants.
buildings was observed. Refer to Figure 1 for examples of
typical damage to suspended ceiling systems. The observed damage points to the vulnerability of suspended
ceiling systems in earthquakes. In particular where they are
The observed damage included examples of failure due to not braced against movement relative to other building
overloading of the ceiling components, and damage which elements and where the suspended ceiling grid members and
appeared to be the result of displacement incompatibilities connections have not been adequately designed for seismic
between the ceiling and other components. Failure of several loads. The extent, prevalence and type of damage observed
t-rails was observed which suggests that the inertial forces indicated a widespread lack of consideration of seismic effects
imposed on the component by the overall ceiling system on suspended ceilings in commercial multi-storey office
exceeded the capacity of the t-rail leading to failures similar to buildings. These observations align with a recently completed,
that shown in Figure 1 (left). Such failures of the ceiling grid but yet to be published, survey of Wellington and Auckland
were predominantly observed for large, uninterrupted areas of commercial offices which identified that ceiling seismic
suspended ceiling. This indicates that the seismic restraint of bracing is often absent from existing fit outs.
the ceiling was reliant on perimeter fixing of the grid to the
structure, and the ceiling rails were inadequate for the area of Suspended Services
ceiling they were being required to provide restraint to.
Damage to suspended services, such as HVAC, electrical and
Numerous examples of damage appeared to have resulted pipework was observed in multiple buildings. If a suspended
from interaction between the suspended ceiling and other ceiling was present, damage to suspended services almost
components, such as suspended services, partitions, and the always caused damage to the suspended ceiling also, since the
primary structure. Earthquake induced deformations of the ceiling was not strong enough to support the service
ceiling system (or adjacent components) result in damage to component falling from above. Often it was difficult to
the ceiling tiles and grid when these components interact, as determine the cause of the failure; the ceiling system or the
shown in Figure 1 (centre). This type of damage was observed services or a combination of both. Examples of damage to
to often occur at the perimeter of ceilings, adjacent to walls suspended services included damage to pendulum lighting
and partitions. It appears the ceiling was either not adequately fixed to ceiling tiles, as shown in Figure 2 (left). The damage
braced to prevent movement of the suspended ceiling relative observed indicates that the interaction of suspended lights

Figure 2: Damage to suspended services: fallen suspended pendulum lighting (left), fallen diffuser fixed to ceiling grid (centre),
fallen HVAC diffuser (right).
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Figure 3: Damage to precast concrete panels: ejected seals (left), top connection of precast panel with oversized hole for bolt (centre),
sheared off bolts of precast panel connection with oversized washers (right).

hung from suspended ceiling system requires specific concealed from view. It is only once internal linings have been
consideration when designing the seismic bracing of the removed that the full extent of damage can be understood. The
ceiling system. minor damage visible from street level can be a strong
indicator that more significant damage may exist, since this is
Other examples include HVAC equipment and ducting located normally indicative of movement of the panels.
above ceilings where it was observed neither the ceilings
and/or the HVAC equipment was braced, as shown in Figure 2 Minor visible exterior damage was visible for the one known
(centre and right). Damage appeared to have resulted from the case of precast panel connection failure that occurred. The
relative displacement of the various services elements relative failure involved full-height panels on a six storey building.
to the ceiling system leading to multiple instances of services The panels were fixed to the structure with a rigid weld plate
components falling out of the ceiling. The life safety risk connection at the base. This plate was welded to an angle
associated with the falling of services components including bracket that was cast into the floor slab. The top connection
lights, diffusers, ducting, etc. was noted. consisted of an angle cast into the soffit of the floor beam with
an oversized hole in it. A bolt was fixed through the angle into
Precast Panels a cast in TIM in the panel. A 6mm oversized washer on the
bolt then allowed the bolt to (theoretically) move within the
Damage to several precast concrete panels was visible from oversized hole, as shown in Figure 3 (centre).
outside buildings on street level, however such damage was
minor, consisting of hairline cracks in panels, panels being Although it appeared the design had considered the
out-of-plumb, or torn or ejected sealant, such as that shown in requirement for relative deformation between the structure and
Figure 3 (left). panel with the oversized hole, it was apparent on inspection
that no sliding of the bolts had occurred. The 6mm washers
Previous earthquake reconnaissance has found that more appeared to have been bent into the oversized hole, causing
critical damage is often concentrated in the connections the connection to lock up. It is likely that the bolts were unable
between the precast panels to the primary structure [4]. Such to slide due to being over-tightened. Experimental testing of
damage is a result of the connections being required to slotted connections has also found that the connections are at
accommodate relative deformation between panels and the risk of locking up if a thin washer is used [5].
primary structure. If precast panel connections are not
properly detailed it is possible for the connections to be With no ability to accommodate the inter-storey drift of the
severely damaged even when the panel itself shows little signs building, the washer sheared straight through the top
of distress. A thorough damage assessment of precast panels is connection bolts, as shown in Figure 3 (right). Of the 6 storeys
generally difficult due to the connections normally being of panels, only 3 bolts remained out of a total of 24. The
panels did not fall from the building, due to the nominal

Figure 4: Damage to exterior cladding and glazing: glass and debris on footpaths in Wellington CBD [7] (left),
spider glazing failure (centre), tiled cladding failure (far right).
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moment capacity provided by the base detail. Once the stress concentrations in the glass result in the entire glass
discovered, the street below was cordoned off until a new panels shattering, as shown in Figure 4 (centre). The amount
connection was fitted. of deformation a spider glazing system can accommodate is
not large (1% drift is the limit of a typical system) and since
Due to the aforementioned difficulty in identifying high risk the system does not have any redundancy like framed systems,
damage of precast panels, the Kaikōura Earthquake Technical large failures can occur. Similar damage was previously
Clearinghouse provided a session for the Wellington City observed to frameless glazing systems in the 2010-11
Council ‘Targeted Assessment Programme’ that specifically Canterbury earthquakes, highlighting their vulnerability to
included additional guidance for damage evaluation of precast earthquake induced deformations [5].
concrete floor systems and cladding panels [6].
Several other instances of damage were observed to various
Exterior Cladding and Glazing cladding systems that appeared to be due to the system being
unable to accommodate structural deformations, such as the
Damage to exterior cladding and glazing was widely reported tiled cladding shown in Figure 4 (right).
in the media immediately following the Kaikōura earthquake
[7]. Such damage typically consists of glass and debris on
Internal Linings
footpaths below buildings, as shown in Figure 4 (left).
Depending on the size of the glass shards, and the type of Damage to internal linings, in particular plasterboard lined
glass, (e.g. tempered glass vs non-tempered glass), such interior partition walls, was widely observed throughout a
falling objects can present a life-safety risk to pedestrians number of buildings. Refer to Figure 5 for examples of typical
outside buildings. damage to internal linings.
Damage to exterior cladding and glazing is typically attributed In most cases the damage comprised of cracks to the
to a lack of movement allowance within the glazing system. plasterboard lining due to the lining being unable to
Once the movement allowance of the cladding system is accommodate the earthquake induced movement of the
exceeded the stiff, brittle glass cracks and potentially falls out structure. Partitions are relatively stiff but also weak in their
of the framing. It was observed that older glazing systems in-plane direction, therefore they require some method of
were more likely to exhibit glazing damage, likely due to the seismic separation when spanning between levels to avoid
fact that they have very little ability to accommodate building damage. In all instances observed it appeared the damage was
movement. The one exception to this was the relatively due to relative displacement between building elements, and a
modern frameless glazing system, of which a number of cases lack of seismic separation, rather than damage due loss of
of significant damage were observed. Frameless glazing, often connection capacity holding the wall linings to the supporting
referred to as spider glazing, typically utilises tempered glass structure.
so when the movement allowance of the system is exceeded,

Figure 5: Damage in internal linings: plasterboard debonding from structural beam (top left), cracked and delaminated
plasterboard (top centre), cracked plasterboard lining of stairwell (top right), broken glass lining adjacent to stair (bottom left),
typical movement induced cracking in plasterboard (bottom right).
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Where large partitions had no seismic separation, damage was The stair appeared to have been detailed to slide to
typically located at the joints between individual panels of accommodate inter-storey drift, as movement was evident at
plasterboard, as shown in Figure 5 (top right and bottom the base of the stair. However a large glass panel had been
right). In other locations earthquake induced movement had fixed to both the stair and the adjacent structure and
caused cracks through the panels, and these were typically consequently, as the stair moved relative to the structure
observed to have been initiated at corners or other during the earthquake the glass had been heavily damaged.
discontinuities, such as that shown in Figure 5 (top centre). A
small number of instances were observed where the Although not seen to be a life safety risk from a structural
plasterboard had been glued directly to the structure, and the engineering perspective, damage to internal linings can be
structural movements had caused the lining to de-bond and very concerning to the public due to the highly visible nature
break away, or otherwise become dislodged, as shown in of such damage. Discussions with tenants during inspections
Figure 5 (top left). found that organisations were uncomfortable about staff
working in buildings with obvious damage to interior wall
While none of the observed damage to internal wall linings linings. This indicates that considerations of non-structural
was considered to have presented a life safety risk to damage extend beyond life safety to include public perception
occupants, the potential impact on fire ratings was noted, in issues as well as costs and time to undertake repairs.
particular the linings in egress ways such as stairs.
Considering how this damage may compromise fire Seismic Gaps
separations may need to be included as part of a building
assessment in future before a building is reoccupied following Although not a non-structural element, the performance of
a significant earthquake. seismic gaps has been included in this paper due to the
observed damage to architectural finishes. This damage
The damage of many internal linings also demonstrated that highlights one of the main issues facing the seismic
structural movements are not always adequately understood by performance of non-structural elements; the need to
architects and there is a need for such movements to be better understand and communicate seismic movements to architects,
communicated. One example of this was damage to a glass building owners and tenants.
lining adjacent to a stair, as shown in Figure 5 (bottom left).

Figure 6: Damage at seismic gaps: timber boards enclosing atrium bridge at seismic gap (top left), dislodged ceiling tiles at seismic
gap (top centre), seismic gap underneath desk (top right), tile damage at seismic gap (bottom left), bent seismic gap cover plate
(bottom centre), undamaged sprinkler pipe and fire seal at seismic gap (bottom right).
192

One building complex inspected comprised several individual failure of the pipe at this junction was observed.
structures interconnected on various levels at a central
multilevel atrium with bridges and seismic gaps between each Observations from this building suggest that perhaps more
structure. From a structural point of view, all of the seismic attention is needed when considering architectural finishes at
gaps were observed to have performed as intended as it was seismic joints. This is particularly relevant to finishes which if
evident that significant amounts of relative movement between damaged could cause a life safety risk to building occupants
buildings had occurred. No ledge failures were observed or below or as they exited a building immediately following an
loss of structural support at any of the seismic gaps. Inspection earthquake.
indicated that while the structure had been designed to allow The extent of the damage at the seismic joint areas was
relative movement of the different structures at the seismic striking both from a repair cost perspective and the
gaps this consideration had not extended to the architectural implications on building operability in the immediate post-
finishes. Damage to the architectural elements, such as earthquake environment.
balustrades, floor coverings, and architectural panel was
extensive, as shown in Figure 6. It is evident that the risks associated with seismic gaps need to
be better communicated and understood by the end users of
In some instances the architectural finishes covered the buildings. This is exemplified by the desk located on top of a
seismic gap and were damaged as a result of the earthquake seismic gap shown in Figure 6 (top right). The chair at this
induced movements, for example the floor finishes. In other desk had fallen into the seismic gap during the earthquake, and
instances an insufficient movement gap had been allowed at it is likely that if someone was working at the desk at the time,
the seismic gap for the architectural finishes causing that serious injury could have occurred.
balustrades and various architectural panels to be damaged. In
one instance the balustrades were glass and hence the damage Contents
meant that the bridge was no longer safe for use. Some pieces
of the glass balustrade fell a short distance onto landings and Widespread damage to contents was noted in the commercial
walkways while other pieces fell multiple storeys to the buildings included in the post-earthquake reconnaissance.
ground level of the atrium below. Figure 7 illustrates typical examples of contents damage, such
as overturned book cases and storage. Contents spilling from
The arrangement of this building meant that some of the drawers and cupboards or falling from desk tops and other
seismic gaps were at elevated positions multiple storeys above surfaces within the offices was widely observed. Damage to
the ground floor atrium area. Architectural panels and other contents in retail shops and supermarkets was also reported
finishes were damaged and became dislodged, some falling [9]. This indicates the retail industry may not have learnt the
several floors to the ground floor level. The life safety risk of lessons from the experience in the Canterbury earthquakes,
these architectural elements falling to building occupants was e.g. protecting contents using catches, wires, etc.
clearly apparent.
While relatively easily repaired and cleaned up post-
A notable feature of this complex was that the seismic joints earthquake, the extent and types of furniture which fell
appeared to be located at main egress paths meaning these suggests a potential for injury to people within the building
walkways would likely be used in the immediate post- during an earthquake. The significant contribution building
earthquake environment. The implications of movement at a contents made to injury numbers has been noted in recent New
seismic joint appear to have been poorly understood when the Zealand earthquakes [9]. This suggests that building tenants
finishes were being considered or the possible health and should consider the restraint of building contents as part of fit
safety implications if damage occurred. out works. For example fixing cupboards and bookcases to
Fire sprinkler pipes were observed to cross one of the seismic floors and / or walls and including positive catches on
gaps as shown in Figure 6 (bottom right). The pipe cupboard doors or drawers to restrain the contents from falling
arrangement indicates the installer had some idea that a out.
movement joint was required for the sprinkler main. It is
however noted that the installed joint does not meet the Seismic Bracing of Non-Structural Elements
requirements for a groove mechanical joint in NZS4541:2013
The adequacy of non-structural seismic restraint was evident
or the alternative flexible V loop type system [8]. Even so, no
during the post-earthquake reconnaissance of Wellington

Figure 7: Damage of building contents: toppled bookcase (left), toppled office furniture (centre), books spilt from bookcases (right).
 193

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