1. OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN FOR LUZON, Petitioner, v.

EUFROCINA
CARLOS DIONISIO AND WINIFREDO SALCEDO MOLINA, Respondents.

 July 10, 2017, G.R. No. 220700

Statement of Facts

The complainants of this case, spouses Editha and Eduardo Ponce, upon noticing a
drug store near the school gate inquired with the school Principal, Eufrocina Carlos
Dionisio (Dionisio), if a portion of the said school grounds could be for lease,
expressing their desire to open a drug store thereon. Dionisio did not right away
decline but simply said that she must first study the matter as it would take a long
and hard process if DepEd rules are to be followed. The complainants then
submitted a formal letter offering a monthly rent of P10,000 or P120,000 annually.

Upon Dionisio’s approval to process the lease agreement, she asked that only
P36,000 annual rent should be recorded in the guise of a donation instead of the
P120,000 original annual rent as agreed since she doesn’t want the school’s PTA
and the Brgy Council to know the exact amount involved in addition to the
P24,000 funds per year that she also asked.

Dionisio then ask P20,000 in advance of the P24,000 yearly fund. She also told the
complainants that the monthly rent for five years amounting to P60,000 should
also be paid in advance plus the P70,000 donation to the Teacher’s Association.
Thereafter, she asked an additional P200,000 more from the complainants as
donation to the said Teacher’s Association but the same has been declined for the
reason that the complainants could also spend money for the construction of the
drugstore. In return, they asked for a copy of the MOA to study the agreement but
Dionisio refused saying that it would be better for them to see it on the date of
signing itself.

On the day of signing, the complainants noticed that the MOA was one-sided but
Dionisio assured them that the same would not be a problem since she would still
be in active service for the term of the MOA. She then asked for an exlusitivity fee
of P200,000 for the complainants to be the only drug store in that part of the
school ground for the next two to three years.

Complainants then withdrew P1,000,000 from their bank account and gave it to
Dionisio together with the P280,000 which they already had with them. A
notarized copy of the MOA with the signature of Molina as President of the
Teachers’ Association was given to them in return.

Barely a month later, while the construction of the drug store was going on,
Dionisio informed the complainants that the area beside will be leased to another
drug store. It was then that upon complainants’ verification that Molina denied
receiving the money but suddenly made a turn-around when the complainants’
counsel demanded from Dionisio for an acknowledgement receipt of the P680,000
donation.
This prompted the complainants to seek for the legality of their transactions. It
was then that when complainants met with some DepEd officials that they were
informed of the MOA’s illegality for not having proper approval from DepEd, and
the lack of legal entity of the Teachers’ Association making it disqualified to enter
into the MOA.

Dionisio was then ordered to defer the construction of the new drug store in its
school grounds and hold in abeyance the operation of the same. Thus, the
complainants filed a complaint before the Ombudsman for violating Section 3(e) of
RA 3019, Section 12 of RA 6713 and its IRR, and for money laundering.

In their defense, respondents and their co-teachers denied and maintained that
they did not solicit money and that complainants donated the money at their own
instance. They also reasoned that the donation was for the school and the
Teachers’ Association merely ratified it explaining that public schools are with
limited budget and that they acted in good faith without any unlawful intent in
executing the MOA which redounded to the benefit of the school’s students since
the money was used to purchase additional educational materials. In addition,
respondents and their co-teachers said that they are mere laymen and unfamiliar
with the law only with the primary concern for the welfare of their students.

Procedural History

In the Ombudsman—
In its decision, respondents were found guilty of Simple Misconduct with the
suspension from government service without pay for a period of three months.
The court explained that respondents’ action of not seeking for authority from
DepEd or the Provincial Government before allowing the lease and authorizing
Molina in behalf of an entity without a legal personality to enter in to a MOA were
clear transgressions. In addition, Dionisio didn’t only allowed the association to
handle the money but also the procurement of services for the construction of the
school canteen and acquisition of school equipment without going through the
required process of the law. Molina was also found to be equally liable with
Dionisio for participating in such evil scheme but the other co-teachers were
dismissed for the said charges after concluding that there was no proof of their
actual participation in the questioned transactions.

The complainants then moved for reconsideration on the said decision. The
Ombudsman modified its prior decision making the respondents’ liability to Grave
Misconduct with the penalty of dismissal from the government service, together
with the accessory penalties of cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of retirement
benefits, and perpetual disqualification from re-employment in the government
service.

The respondents in returned also filed a motion for reconsideration but the same
was denied by the Ombudsman. Aggrieved, respondents then elevated the case to
the Court of Appeals.
In the CA—
The CA granted the respondents motion for appeal and reinstated the
Ombudsman’s initial ruling for Simple Misconduct only explaining that the
important element of corruption for Grave Misconduct was not established.
According to CA, there is also no evidence that respondent unlawfully used their
positions for the advancement of their own interests.

Being not satisfied with the CA’s decision, the Ombudsman moved for
reconsideration but the same was also denied. Thus, the case reached the SC.

ISSUE

Whether or not the respondents are liable only for Simple Misconduct.

HOLDING

No. Respondents are not only liable for Simple Misconduct but for Grave
Misconduct.

RULE OF LAW/LEGAL PRINCIPLES APPLIED and REASONING

Guided by a jurisprudence, the Court quoted this definition of Grave Misconduct:

"Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action,

more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by the public officer. To
warrant dismissal from the service, the misconduct must be grave, serious,
important, weighty, momentous, and not trifling. The misconduct must imply
wrongful intention and not a mere error of judgment and must also have a direct
relation to and be connected with the performance of the public officer's official
duties amounting either to maladministration or willful, intentional neglect, or
failure to discharge the duties of the office. In order to differentiate gross
misconduct from simple misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to
violate the law, or flagrant disregard of established rule, must be manifest in the
former."

The Court then explained its points in this manner:

Firstly, it is correct for Ombudsman to point out that respondents had no authority
to lease a portion of a public school, it being owned by the Provincial Government.
Under Section 18 of RA7160 or the Local Government Code of 1991, it is the LGU
which has the authority to “lease, encumber, alienate, or otherwise dispose of real
or personal property held by it in its proprietary capacity.”

Although there was an involvement by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan ng Bulacan

when it ratified the MOA between the parties, the Court also made an observation
 that the same was made more than four years since the MOA was executed and
only after the Ombudsman already ordered the respondents guilty of Grave
Misconduct. Clearly, the gesture was only an afterthought which made no changes
to the fact that respondents acted with no authority upon entering the MOA.
Next, respondents undeniably failed to uphold the principle of accountability of
public officers which, by the way, was enshrined in our Constitution. In Pat-og, Sr.
v. Civil Service Commission, the Court emphasized that public school teachers are
first and foremost civil servants accountable to the people. The money received by
the respondents were not submitted with official receipts and other documents
that would support their claim even if the same was used for public purposes.

Lastly, even to say that the money was also used for the construction of the school
canteen and the purchase of some educational equipment, the fact still remained
that there was a failure to comply with the requirements of RA 9184 or the
"Government Procurement Reform Act" which explicitly provides that all
government procurement must be done through competitive bidding. Although the
same law allows alternative modes of procurement, respondents were not able to
establish such lawful efforts.

JUDGMENT

Respondents Eufrocina Carlos Dionisio and Winifredo Salcedo Molina are

found guilty of Grave Misconduct, and are dismissed from government service.
Accordingly, their civil service eligibility is cancelled, and their retirement and
other benefits are forfeited, except their accrued leave credits as it is a standing
rule that "despite their dismissal from the service, government employees are
entitled to the leave credits that they have earned during the period of their
employment. As a matter of fairness and law, they may not be deprived of such
remuneration, which they have earned prior to their dismissal.

2. ALBERTO PAT-OG, SR., Petitioner, v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, Respondent.

June 5, 2013, G.R. No. 198755

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Alberto Pat-og, a third year high school teacher, was filed a criminal case for the
crime of Less Serious Physical Injury and an administrative case for Grave
Misconduct, after allegedly punching Robert Bang-on on the stomach who was
then a 14-year old second high school student during a MAPEH class. The incident
took place in a basketball court where Bang-on was attending his morning class
and Bat-og, on the same venue, was also holding a separate class. Bang-on and
some of his classmates joined Pat-og’s third students who were practicing
basketball shots. Pat-og was then giving some instructions of forming two lines
which Bang-on didn’t heard correctly and instead formed a third line in the middle
of the two lines. Much to his surprise, Pat-og held his right arm and punched
Bang-on on his stomach for not following the instruction. As a result, the student
sustained a contusion hematoma in the hypogastric area as provided by the
medico-legal in a certificate.

In his counter-affidavit for the case filed before the CSC-CAR, Pat-og denied the
charges saying that after the boys failed to form two lines, he only scolded them
with a loud voice. While he was approaching them, he noticed students who don’t
belong in his class one of which was Bang-on who supposed to be having his own
MAPEH class under another teacher. He said that he just glared at them, continued
scolding and dismissed the class. To support his claim, he offered sworn
statements of other students to prove that he did not box Bang-on.

Meanwhile, the RTC rendered Pat-og guilty of the offense of slight physical injury
with a penalty of imprisonment from eleven to twenty days and since Pat-og
applied for probation, the judgment became final and executory, then entered.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In the CSC-CAR—
The Civil Service Commission-Cordillera Administrative Region, the parties
involved are from the Mountain Province, found Pat-og guilty of Simple Misconduct
with the maximum penalty attached to the offense which is six months suspension
without pay. The CSC-CAR believed that the act committed by Pat-og was
sufficient to find him guilty of Grave Misconduct but decided that the
corresponding penalty from the service was too harsh under the circumstances.

Pat-og then filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied for lack of merit.

In the CSC—
By the dismissal of Pat-og’s appeal, CSC affirmed the decision of the CSC-CAR and
made modification making him now liable instead for grave misconduct.

Based on the records, there existed a substantial evidence to prove that Pat-og did
punch Bang-on. A great weight was also given to the medico-legal certificate
shown. The court as well considered the prior criminal conviction as evidence
against Pat-og in the administrative case based on the same set of facts and
circumstances involved.

Pat-og then moved for reconsideration on this decision questioning the jurisdiction
of the CSC over the case saying that he must first be heard by a committee to be
constituted pursuant to the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers. The same
motion was still denied making Pat-og estopped from challenging its jurisdiction
due to his active participation in the administrative proceedings.

In the CA—
The Court Of Appeals in the same token, affirmed the resolution of the CSC. It
agreed that Pat-og was estopped to question the jurisdiction of CSC. It also
viewed that Pat-og was never denied of due proceed as he previously claimed that
he was denied for such right when he was not allowed to interview the witnesses
during the cross examination. The CA, thus, concluded that there was no error in
the CSC’s ruling. As for the motion for reconsideration being filed by Pat-og
against the said ruling, the same was also denied. Hence, the present petition.

ISSUES

Whether or not petitioner is estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the Civil
Service Commission to hear and decide the administrative case against him.

Whether or not due process was not afforded to the petitioner.

Whether or not petitioner should be awarded with the supreme penalty of the
offense.

HOLDING

Yes. Petitioner is estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the CSC since
among the several tribunals with concurring jurisdiction the CSC is the one that
first took cognizance of the complaint.

No. Petitioner was afforded with proper administrative due process. The fact that
Pat-og actively participated in the proceedings before the lower courts was
apparently enough to give him every opportunity to explain and seek
consideration.

No. The penalty awarded must not be in the supreme or highest form considering
that there was also sufficient provocation of the part of Bang-on and since this was
a first offense done by the petitioner in his 33 years of government service.

RULE OF LAW/LEGAL PRINCIPLE APPLIED and REASONING

On the issue of jurisdiction—

In Puse v. Santos-Puse, the Court held that the CSC, the DepEd and the Board of
Professional Teachers-PRC have concurrent jurisdiction over administrative cases
against public school teachers.

Under Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution, the CSC is the body in charged with
the establishment and administration of a career in the civil service which
embraces all branches and agencies of the government.

EO 292 (The Administrative Code of the 1987) and PD 807 (the Civil Service
Decree of the Philippines) expressly provide that the CSC has the power to hear
and decide administrative disciplinary cases instituted with it or brought to it on
appeal.
 Concurrent jurisdiction is that which is possessed over the same parties or subject
matter at the same time by two or more separate tribunals. And when this
happens, the body that first took cognizance of the complaint shall exercise
jurisdiction to the exclusion of the others. Thus, CSC had the authority to proceed
and decide the case to the exclusion of the DepEd and the Board of Professional
Teachers.

On the issue of Administrative Due Process—

Due process is simply the essence to be heard, or in administrative proceedings, a
fair and reasonable opportunity to explain one’s side, or an opportunity to seek
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. Administrative due process
cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict judicial sense. In
administrative proceedings, a formal or trial-type hearing is not always necessary
and technical rules of procedure are not strictly applied. Hence, the right to cross-
examine is not an indispensable aspect of administrative due process.

Having actively participated on the proceedings before the CSC-CAR, the CSC, and
the CA, the petitioner was afforded every opportunity to explain his side and seek
reconsideration of the ruling against him.

Lastly, on the penalty—

Misconduct means intentional wrongdoing or deliberate violation of a rule of law or
standard behavior. To constitute an administrative offense, misconduct should
relate to or be connected with the performance of the official functions and duties
of a public officer. In Grave Misconduct, the element of corruption, clear intent to
violate the law or flagrant disregard of an established rule must be manifest.

Under Section 8, Article VIII the Code of Ethics of Professional Teachers, it is

expressly provided that “a teacher shall not inflict corporal punishment on
offending learners”. Clearly, punching Bang-on cannot be considered as a teacher
in loco parentis to discipline his student. It is beyond cavil that the petitioner, as a
public school teacher, deliberately violated his Code of Ethics. Under the law, the
penalty for grave misconduct is dismissal from the service with cancellation of
eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits and perpetual disqualification from
reemployment in the government service.

However, in this case, the Court decided that the penalty can be tempered with
compassion as there were also mitigating circumstances present such as sufficient
provocation on the part of Bang-on and the offense being done by the petitioner
for the first time for the last 33 years in service and at the cusp of retirement.

JUDGEMENT

The Court found Alberto Pat-og, Sr. guilty of Grave Misconduct, the penalty being
Reduced from dismissal from the service to suspension for six months only.

3. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, petitioner, vs. VICTORIO N. MEDRANO, respondent.

 October 17, 2008, GR No. 177580

STATEMENT OF FACTS

One afternoon in March 2003, Ma. Ruby Dumalaog, a high school teacher, was allegedly
abused sexually by her superior, Victorio Medrano the officer-in-charge of the school and
concurrently principal, who also made sexual advances to her on that same day. This
incident prompted the complainant to file a case before the Ombudsman against her
superior for violation of RA 7877 or Anti-Sexual Harassment Act of 1995 and Grave
Misconduct.

In his defense, the respondent denied the accusation claiming that it was maliciously
designed to harass and threaten him to give in to the complainant’s demand to be given
a regular teaching position.

Meanwhile, the complaint filed for an urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Preventive Suspension
which was approved by the Ombudsman in return.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In the Ombudsman—
In its decision, respondent was found guilty for Grave Misconduct and penalty imposed is
dismissal from service. With respect to the criminal case, the Ombudsman found
probable cause to indict respondent for violation of the Anti- Sexual Harassment Act of
1995. An information was then filed in the MeTC.

Respondent moved for reconsideration to both issuance. As to the administrative case,

respondent challenged the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman over the case. He claimed
that under Section 9 of RA 4670 or the Magna Carta for Public Teachers, administrative
complaints against a public teacher should first be heard by an investigating committee
of DepEd.

In a Joint Order, the Ombudsman then maintained its decision with regard to the
criminal case but made a modification in the administrative case by changing Grave
Misconduct to Sexual Harassment with a penalty of suspension from the service for one
year, without pay.

Dissatisfied, respondent move for a Petition for Review before the CA.

In the CA—
The Court of Appeals nullified the decision of the Ombudsman on the sole ground that it
has no jurisdiction over the present case. The latter filed for a motion for reconsideration
which was also denied. Hence, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari before the
SC.
Meanwhile, the respondent instead of filing a comment on the present petition, filed a
Manifestation With Motion In Lieu of Comment praying that the instant case be
dismissed for moot and academic since the complainant executed an Affidavit of
Desistance saying that the same was “just a product of mistake of fact and clear
misunderstanding between the respondent” and the complainant. She also mentioned
that the respondents after all was not actually criminally nor immorally motivated to do
any form of offense/ harm to her. In the said affidavit, complainant was also retracting
everything she said against the respondent and expressed her disinterest to the
pursuant of the criminal and administrative case. Petitioner then opposed the
respondent’s move for lack of legal bases.

ISSUE

Whether or not an affidavit of desistance by a complainant and a dismissal of the

criminal case must also render the administrative case moot and academic.

Whether or not the Ombudsman has an exclusive and concurrent jurisdiction with the
DepEd over administrative disciplinary authority of a public school teacher.

Whether or not the respondent, at this point of the case, is estopped to question the
Ombudsman’s jurisdiction over the administrative case.

HOLDING

No. An affidavit of desistance by a complainant and a dismissal of the criminal case will
not render the administrative case moot and academic since the two remedies are
distinct and independent character.

No. Although the Ombudsman has a concurrent jurisdiction with DepEd, the same is not
exclusive when it comes to administrative discipline with public school teachers.

Yes. The respondent, after going through the whole process in the lower courts, is now
estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the petitioner.

RULE OF LAW/LEGAL PRINCIPLE APPLIED and REASONING

First issue—
In Gerardo R. Villaseñor and Rodel A. Mesa v. Sandiganbayan and Louella Mae Oco-
Pesquerra (Office of the Special Prosecutor, Ombudsman), the Court stressed the
distinct and independent character of the remedies available to an offended party
against any impropriety or wrongdoing committed by a public officer. The settled rule is
that criminal and civil cases are altogether different from administrative matters, such
that the first two will not inevitably govern or affect the third and vice versa. Verily,
administrative cases may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings.
As to an affidavit of desistance, it is, as a rule, viewed with suspicion and reservation for
the reason that it can easily be secured from a poor and ignorant witness usually
through intimidation or for monetary consideration. Therefore, desistance itself is not
usually a ground for dismissal once it has been instituted in court.

In this present case, the affidavit of the complainant was concluded by the court to be
suspicious and unreliable. First, her affidavit was executed only after three years since
the petitioner rendered its decision. Next, the language used. In her six-page complaint
the complainant narrated in her own Filipino dialect whereas in the said one-page
affidavit of desistance, English with legal terms are already used. Lastly, the affidavit is
bereft of any factual particulars.

Second issue—
The Court did a generous effort of tracing the source, nature and extent of the power
and authority of the Ombudsman vis-à-vis the provisions of the Magna Carta for Public
Teachers.

Citing Section 5, Article XI of the Constitution that created the independent Office of the
Ombudsman to be the “protector of the people”; to Sections 12 and 13 of the same
Article of the Constitution which enumerates the Ombudsman’s far reaching powers, the
Court concluded that the same is not exclusive as the framers of the Constitution gave
the leeway to prescribe, by subsequent legislation, additional powers, functions or duties
to the Ombudsman.

In addition, RA 6770 or the Ombudsman Act of 1989 restrains the Ombudsman from
exercising its disciplinary authority “over officials who may be removed only by
impeachment or over Members Congress and the Judiciary”.

The abovementioned provisions taken together reveal the manifest intent of the
lawmakers to bestow upon the Ombudsman full administrative disciplinary power over
public officials and employees except those mentioned.

However, when it comes to an administrative charge against a public teacher, Section 9

of the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers specifically provides that the same shall
be heard initially by an investigating committee. It, therefore, reflects the legislative
intent to impose a standard and a separate set of procedural requirements in connection
with the administrative proceedings involving public teachers. Thus, the Court holds that
the administrative disciplinary authority of the Ombudsman over a public school teacher
is not an exclusive power but is concurrent with the proper committee of the DepEd.

Undoubtedly, respondent in this case is covered by the definition of the term “teacher”
under RA 4670. Hence, the administrative complaint against respondent should have
been referred by the Ombudsman to the proper committee of the DepEd for the
institution of appropriate administrative proceedings.

Third issue—
It can then be recalled that the respondent had actively participated in the
administrative proceedings before the Ombudsman instead of referring his case to the
proper DepEd committee. It was only after petitioner had rendered an adverse Decision
that he, in a Motion for Reconsideration, impugned petitioner’s assumption of jurisdiction
over his case. Verily, respondent cannot be permitted to challenge petitioner’s acts
belatedly. In a long list of jurisprudence, it was repeatedly mentioned that “participation
by parties in the administrative proceedings without raising any objections thereto bars
them from raising any jurisdictional infirmity after an adverse decision is rendered
against them.”

JUDGEMENT

The Court reversed and set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals and remanded to
the said court, the case to be decided based on its merits.

4. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, REPRESENTED BY OMBUDSMAN CONCHITA CARPIO

MORALES, Petitioner, v. MARIA ROWENA REGALADO, Respondent

February 07, 2018, G.R. Nos. 208481-82

STATEMENT OF FACTS

St. Martha’s Day Care and Tutorial Center, Inc.’s owner and administrator,
Carmelita Doromal, went to the Bureau of Immigration-Davao to inquire about the
requirements for her to obtain an accreditation to admit foreign students. The
respondent, Maria Rowena Regalado, an officer of the same office, told her to pay
an amount of P50,000 as “processing fee”. Upon Doromal’s protest of the amount
being prohibitive, Regalado said that she can reduce the amount showing a copy
of Office Memorandum Order No. RBR 00-57 of the Bureau of Immigration which
provides that "the head office of the Bureau of Immigration, through the
Immigration Regulation Division, ha[d] the authority to allow the accreditation at a
lower amount, depending on her recommendation." Not long enough, necessary
papers were then submitted for the school’s accreditation.

Regalado, further, told Doromal who was then hesitant, that the amount of the fee
being asked could soar as high as P100,000 if done by officers coming from BOI-
Manila as there is a need to spend for their fare, hotel accommodation and meals
on top of the P50,000 “honorarium”. In addition, Regalado insisted on how paying
just P50,000 to her would benefit Doromal. She explained, however, that in the
P50,000 only P10,000 would be covered by the receipt.

In a text message, Doromal said that she could not pay the P50,000. Regalado, in
return, said that if she were to decline paying, she would then have to go through
the entire accreditation process all over again. Not convinced, Doromal said that
she doesn’t mind as long as she would be relieved of having to pay P50,000.

Numerous attempts have been made by Regalado in order to persuade Doromal to

pursue the accreditation. Finally, when Regalado said that the amount was
reduced to P10,000, Doromal agreed and allowed to proceed with the inspection of
St. Martha’s. Upon paying, Doromal asked if she could pay the P10,000 in check
but Regalado insisted on payment by cash. She also added that an “honorarium”
must also be paid, but when asked how much Regalado just said "[I]kaw na
bahala, ayaw ko na talaga i-mention yan baka umatras ka pa." She also had an
instruction that the same must be given in her office with the cash specifically
enclosed in an unmarked brown envelope and to say that it contained “additional
documents”, if anyone were to inquire.

Due to Doromals’ trip to the US, she just asked someone to deliver to Regalado’s
office what has been asked. Much to her surprise, Regalado blurted “O my god.”
when she found the amount of P1,500 as honorarium. She said that it should be at
least P30,000 as this will go to “her boss” along with the accreditation papers and
endorsement letter. When asked “is this under the table ma’am?” Regalado
brazenly replied, "Yes, my dear, that's the system ng government.", “Ganito ang
system, ano ako magmamalinis?” She then gave further instruction to return the
following day with the P30,000 and directed to pay the accreditation fee of
P10,000 with the cashier, demanding that the official receipt be surrendered to
her.

A complaint was then filed before the Office of the Ombudsman against Regalado
for an administrative case for Grave Misconduct and for violation of Section 7(d) of
Republic Act No. 6713.

In her defense, Regalado denied, saying that the complainants were merely in
league with “people who had grudge against her”. She further admitted the asking
for P50,000 but cited the Office Memorandum Order No. RBR 00-57 and that the
amount due may be lowered. She even claimed that she only really wanted to help
St. Martha’s.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In the Ombudsman-Mindanao—
The Office of the Ombudsman found substantial evidence to held respondent guilty
of Grave Misconduct and violation of Section 7(d)of RA 6713.

In the Ombudsman—
The Ombudsman approved the decision of the Office of the Ombudsman-
Mindanao. Regalado then filed for motion for reconsideration which was also
denied by the same tribunal. An appeal was then filed by respondent before the
CA.

In the CA—
The same decision was upheld by the Court of Appeals explaining that in the first
place, St. Martha’s did not even have to seek accreditation. The memorandum
order that the respondent used as basis was said to apply only to the accreditation
of Riper Education Institutions and not to Day Care Centers like St. Martha’s. The
same memorandum order as well required the payment of P10,000 only, not
P50,000, as accreditation fee. The court concluded that Regalado knowingly used a
falsified copy of the Memorandum, one which did not even bear the signature of
the BOI commissioner, and which erroneously indicated P50,000 as the
accreditation fee.

As respondent moved for reconsideration, the CA amended its prior decision by

considering certain mitigating circumstances such as it was a first time offense of
Regalado and that she had previously been credited with “good work
performance”. The penalty was lowered and reinstatement to her former position
was ordered.

Dissatisfied, the Ombudsman (petitioner) then filed a Petition before the SC

against the ruling of the CA.

ISSUE

Whether or not the reduction of respondent’s penalty due to the mitigating

circumstances, as considered by CA, was proper.

HOLDING

No, the reduction of penalty due to the appreciation of such mitigating

circumstances was not proper. The actions of the respondent are so grave that it
was a serious error for CA to set aside the original penalty.

RULE OF LAW/LEGAL PRINCIPLE APPLIED and REASONING

The Court cited the 1987 Constitution revisiting the spirit underlying public office
as “a public trust; public officers and employees must at all times be accountable
to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and
efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.” Fundamental is
the notion that one’s tenure in the government springs exclusively from the trust
reposed by the public and that continuance in office is contingent only upon the
extent to which one is able to maintain trust. No one has a vested right to public
office. One can continue only when proven to be worthy of public trust.

Along with dignity of public office, misconduct tainted with "any of the additional
elements of corruption, willful intent to violate the law or disregard of established
rules" is considered grave. Accordingly, the 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in
the Civil Service (2017 RACCS) consider Grave Misconduct as a grave offense
warranting the ultimate penalty of dismissal from service with the accessory
penalties of cancellation of eligibility, perpetual disqualification from public office,
bar from taking civil service examinations, and forfeiture of retirement benefits.

Apart from that, RA 6713 explicitly identifies as unlawful the solicitation or

acceptance of gifts "in the course of their official duties or in connection with any
operation being regulated by, or any transaction which may be affected by the
functions of their office." For its parts, the same law penalizes violations of its
sections with imprisonment and/or fine as well as disqualification to hold office. It
 states that dismissal from the service may be warranted through an administrative
proceeding, even if the erring officer is not subjected to criminal prosecution. This
is in keeping with the three (3)-fold liability rule in the law on public officers,
"which states that the wrongful acts or omissions of a public officer may give rise
to civil, criminal and administrative liability. An action for each can proceed
independently of the others."

The respondent unquestionably violated RA 6713. It doesn’t really matter if the

respondent actually received or profited from her solicitation of any amount, or
that if she solicited even after she had completed the inspection of St. Martha’s.
The fact still remained that Section 7(d) of Republic Act No. 6713 penalizes both
solicitation and acceptance. This is similar to how Section 3(c) of Republic Act No.
3019 penalizes both the requesting and receiving of pecuniary or material
benefits. In Section 7(d), the prior or subsequent performance of official acts is
also immaterial. Thus, it is clear that respondent’s action deserve the supreme
penalty of dismissal from service.

The CA’s appreciation of the mitigating circumstances is clearly misplaced.

In Medina v. Commission on Audit, this Court emphasized that "a grave offense
cannot be mitigated by the fact that the accused is a first-time offender or by the
length of service of the accused. Grave misconduct is not a question of frequency,
but, as its own name suggests, of gravity or weight. Underscoring the severity of
grave misconduct and other offenses meriting dismissal, the 2017 RACCS now
specifically state that no mitigating circumstances, of any sort, may be appreciated
in cases involving an offense punishable by dismissal from service. With regard to
the respondent’s “good work performance”, the actions done by Regalado suggest
otherwise.

JUDGEMENT

The Court did not hesitate to impose respondent the supreme administrative
penalty, finding Maria Rowena Regalado guilty of Grave Misconduct and of
violating Section 7(d) of RA 6713. She is to suffer the penalty of dismissal from
service, along with its accessory penalties of cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of
retirement benefits, and perpetual disqualification from employment in
government.

5. ELISEO F. SORIANO, Petitioner,
vs.
MA. CONSOLIZA P. LAGUARDIA, in her capacity as Chairperson of the Movie and
Television Review and Classification Board, MOVIE AND TELEVISION REVIEW AND
CLASSIFICATION BOARD, JESSIE L. GALAPON, ANABEL M. DELA CRUZ, MANUEL
M. HERNANDEZ, JOSE L. LOPEZ, CRISANTO SORIANO, BERNABE S. YARIA, JR.,
MICHAEL M. SANDOVAL, and ROLDAN A. GAVINO, Respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 165636

ELISEO F. SORIANO, Petitioner,
vs.
MOVIE AND TELEVISION REVIEW AND CLASSIFICATION BOARD, ZOSIMO G.
ALEGRE, JACKIE AQUINO-GAVINO, NOEL R. DEL PRADO, EMMANUEL BORLAZA,
JOSE E. ROMERO IV, and FLORIMONDO C. ROUS, in their capacity as members of
the Hearing and Adjudication Committee of the MTRCB, JESSIE L. GALAPON,
ANABEL M. DELA CRUZ, MANUEL M. HERNANDEZ, JOSE L. LOPEZ, CRISANTO
SORIANO, BERNABE S. YARIA, JR., MICHAEL M. SANDOVAL, and ROLDAN A.
GAVINO, in their capacity as complainants before the MTRCB, Respondents.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Eliseo Soriano (host of Ang Dating Daan) and his rival, Michael Sandoval (host of
Ang Tamang Daan by the Iglesia ni Cristo) in one of their regular sparring on air,
had a counter that went beyond the usual.

It appears that Sandoval, in one of his shows attacked Soriano for his
inconsistencies in his bible teachings using as comparison Soriano’s spliced
recordings in his statements with matching subtitles of his utterance to emphasize
the inconsistencies. In an apparent reaction to what he perceived as a malicious
attack against him, Soriano said this words while on air in his show:

"….gago ka talaga Michael. Masahol ka pa sa putang babae. O di ba? Yung putang

babae ang gumagana lang doon yung ibaba, kay Michael ang gumagana ang itaas,
o di ba! O, masahol pa sa putang babae yan. Sabi ng lola ko masahol pa sa putang
babae yan. Sobra ang kasinungalingan ng demonyong ito…"

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Michael and seven other minister of INC filed a complaint against Soriano in the
MTRCB which the latter ordered for Soriano’s show to be suspended for 20 days.

Soriano then challenged the validity of that preventive suspension. Meanwhile,

after hearing the main case, the MTRCB found Soriano guilty as charged and
imposed on him a penalty of three months suspension from appearing on the Ang
Dating Daan program. Soriano thus filed a second petition to question the said
decision to which the Court consolidated the two cases. Thus, the present petition
reached the SC.

ISSUE

Whether or not the petitioner’s suspension constitute prior restraint and an

abridgement of his exercise of religion and freedom of expression.

HOLDING
 No. The said preventive suspension doesn’t constitute prior restraint and
abridgment of his exercise of religion and freedom of expression because
petitioner’s statements has nothing that expressed his religious beliefs or his
avowed evangelical mission.

RULE OF LAW/LEGAL PRINCIPLE APPLIED and REASONING

The Court made emphasis of the government’s interest in protecting the children
who may be subjected to petitioner’s invectives. The State has a duty to guard the
television, which purpose the MTRCB serves, and has served, in suspending Ang
Dating Daan for petitioner’s statements. As emphasized in Gonzalez v. Kalaw
Katigbak, the freedom of broadcast media is, in terms of degree of protection it
deserves, lesser in scope, especially as regards television, which reaches every
home where there is a set, and where children will likely be among the avid
viewers of the programs shown. The same case also laid the basis for the
classification system of the MTRCB when it stated, "It cannot be denied though
that the State as parens patriae is called upon to manifest an attitude of caring for
the welfare of the young." The Court has, in fact, considered the factual
antecedents of and his motive in making his utterances, and has found those
circumstances wanting as defense for violating the program’s "G" rating. There is
no better way to convey the Court’s ruling but to directly quote it in its actual
words:

“There is nothing in petitioner’s statements subject of the complaints

expressing any particular religious belief, nothing furthering his avowed
evangelical mission. The fact that he came out with his statements in a
televised bible exposition program does not automatically accord them the
character of a religious discourse. Plain and simple insults directed at
another person cannot be elevated to the status of religious speech.

Even petitioner’s attempts to place his words in context show that he was
moved by anger and the need to seek retribution, not by any religious
conviction. His claim, assuming its veracity, that some INC ministers
distorted his statements respecting amounts Ang Dating Daan owed to a TV
station does not convert the foul language used in retaliation as religious
speech.

We cannot accept that petitioner made his statements in defense of his

reputation and religion, as they constitute no intelligible defense or
refutation of the alleged lies being spread by a rival religious group. They
simply illustrate that petitioner had descended to the level of name-calling
and foul-language discourse. Petitioner could have chosen to contradict and
disprove his detractors, but opted for the low road.”

And since the television program has a “G” rating, the defining standards to be
employed in judging the harmful effect of the utterance would those for the average
child, not those for the average adult. The concern was then that the program petitioner
hosted and produced would reach an unintended audience, the average child and the
audience viewed it that matters.

DISSENTING OPINIONS

Antonio T. Carpio, Associate Justice—

The associate justice expressed his dissent by saying that a state having democracy
needs a healthy public that people can exchange ideas, acquire knowledge and
information, confront public issues, or discuss matters of public interest, without fear of
reprisals. The Constitution even mandates full protection to freedom of speech, of
expression, and the press.

Prior restraint has been defined as official governmental restrictions on any form of
expression in advance of actual dissemination. But the mere prohibition of government
interference before words are spoken is not an adequate protection of the freedom of
expression if the government could arbitrarily punish after the words have been spoken.
The threat of subsequent punishment itself would operate as a very effective prior
restraint. Any form of prior restraint bears a presumption against its constitutional
validity. The burden is on the censor to justify any imposition of prior restraint, not on
the censored to put up a defense against it. In the case of print media, it has been held
that just because press freedom may sometimes be abused does not mean that the
press does not deserve immunity from prior restraint. The settled rule is that any such
abuse may be remedied by subsequent punishment.

The “clear and present danger” test was discussed by the associate justice quoting
Gonzalez v. Chairman Katigbak, to wit:

The test, to repeat, to determine whether freedom of expression may be limited is the
clear and present danger of an evil of a substantive character that the State has a right
to prevent. Such danger must not only be clear but must also be present. There should
be no doubt that what is feared may be traced to the expression complained of. The
causal connection must be evident. Also, there must be reasonable apprehension about
its imminence. The time element cannot be ignored. Nor does it suffice if such danger be
only probable. There is the requirement of its being well-nigh inevitable.

In television broadcast, as in the case at hand, censorship is allowable only under the
clearest proof of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil to public safety, public
morals, public health, or any other legitimate public interest.

One of the exceptions in freedom of expression is when the speech is said to be

obscene. Roth v. United States laid down the more acceptable test for obscenity:
"whether to the average person, applying contemporary community standards, the
dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest." Such
material is defined as that which has "a tendency to excite lustful thoughts," and
"prurient interest" as "a shameful or morbid interest in nudity, sex, or excretion." In
expand the same, Miller v. California included two additional criteria: "the work depicts
or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the
applicable state law; and the work, taken as whole, lacks serious literary, artistic,
political, or scientific value." In our jurisprudence, the test is whether the material
appeals to prurient interest.

The associate justice added that prior restraints, indeed, is an extreme measure that
may only be imposed after satisfying the “clear and present danger” test. He concluded
that the suspension of the program stops not only the petitioner, but also to others who
are exercising their constitutional right to free speech via television. Ending his
dissenting opinion then in a reminder from Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes – that the
market place of ideas is still the best alternative to censorship. The market place of
ideas makes freedom of speech robust and allows people to be more tolerant of
opposing views. It has been said that freedom of speech is not only to freely express
oneself within the context of the law but also to hear what others say, that all may be
enlightened, regardless of how obnoxious or erroneous the opposing views may be.
Thus, his vote to the approval of Petitioner’s Motion for reconsideration.

Roberto A. Abad, Associate Justice—

Abad made a stand that the suspension of Ang Dating Daan would equate also to the
closure of the church to its followers. Not being able to tune in on their Bible teaching
program in the evening would then be like going to church on Sunday morning only to
find that its doors and windows heavily barred.

First point, the associate justice said that it is not fair for the Court to close the 27 years
bible ministry programs just because of a 15-second outburst of Soriano to his bitterest
critics.

Second, the obscenity on television being an exception to the protection of freedom of

speech. He said that a thing is prurient only when it arouses lascivious thoughts or
desires or tends to arouse sexual desire. The said suspension would probably be justified
if the general patronage program was intentionally sneaked in snippets of lewd, prurient
materials to attract an audience to the program, which is definitely not the case in the
present issue.

Third, the statements were merely indecent. Even the Court agreed that Soriano’s
outburst not fall under the category of obscene making it only “indecent”. But were his
words and their meaning utterly indecent? Abad believes it is definitely not, saying that
the breach of decency is only slight.

Fourth, on the ground that the average child as listener. Associate Justice Abad
reasoned in this way: “There is no question that Soriano attacked Michael, using figure
of speech, at past 10:00 in the evening, not at 2:00 in the afternoon. The average
Filipino child would have been long in bed by the time Ang Dating Daan appeared on the
television screen. What is more, Bible teaching and interpretation is not the stuff of kids.
It is not likely that they would give up programs of interest to them just to listen to
Soriano drawing a distinction between "faith" and "work or action." The Court has
stretched the "child" angle beyond realistic proportions. The MTRCB probably gave the
program a general patronage rating simply because Ang Dating Daan had never before
been involved in any questionable broadcast in the previous 27 years that it had been on
the air.”

Lastly, there being a disproportionate penalty. The Court applied the balancing of
interest in arriving the said penalty imposed. Under this test, when particular conduct is
regulated in the interest of public order and the regulation results in an indirect,
conditional, partial abridgment of speech, the duty of the courts is to determine which of
the two conflicting interests demands the greater protection under the particular
circumstances presented. He further said that the abridgement of speech cannot be
regarded as indirect, conditional, or partial. It is a direct, unconditional, and total
abridgment of the freedom of speech, to which a religious organization is entitled, for a
whole quarter of a year.

Abad said that instead of the penalty imposed on the television program, the Court could
have just raise the program’s restriction classification from General Patronage to
Parental Guidance.

JUDGEMENT

Considering all the attending factors involved, the suspension of the program is said to
only be a limited disciplinary action. Thus, the denial of the petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration.

6. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, Petitioner vs. PDERO DELIJERO, JR., Respondent

STATEMENT OF FACTS

The mother of the alleged victim filed a complaint against a public school mathematics
teacher, respondent Pedro Delijero. Her daughter, Myra dela Cruz, a 12-year old first
year high school student was said to be courted by respondent where several
handwritten love letters, a Valentine’s card and Two Hundred Pesos as allowance were
given.

Myra, in her affidavit, also said that at around 10:00am, more or less, Mr. Pedro called
her attention to get inside his room. He immediately closed the open door and thereby
kissed the neck of Myra. Out of fear, she pushed him away and rushed to the door and
went outside. A Joint Affidavit was also submitted by three of Myra’s classmates as they
were also requested by Delijero to hand the letters to Myra.

Delijero denied kissing Myra and said that it was she who fell in love with him and wrote
him love letters. The respondent claimed that we was just forced to answer the letters
with the fear as Myra threatened him that she would kill herself if he would not answer
her and reciprocate her love. Their relationship after all was just merely platonic.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In the Ombudsman—
The respondent, instead of submitting a position paper, submitted a Manifestation
stating that the administrative aspect of the complaint was also the same subject of
complaint before the Office of the Regional Director, DepEd.

The Office of the Ombudsman then found respondent guilty of Grave Misconduct.
Respondent moved for reconsideration on the said decision asking that a dismissal be
considered and the penalty be changed to suspension but the same was also denied.

Respondent then appealed to the CA.

In the CA—
The Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the respondent without ruling on the issue raised
by respondent and instead discussed the issue of jurisdiction. It ruled that the
Ombudsman has no jurisdiction to investigate the complaint and should have
immediately dismissed the same after respondent’s information, through the
manifestation, that there was also a pending case of the same in DECS.

The Ombudsman then filed an Omnibus Motion to Intervene and for Reconsideration
assailing the decision of the CA but the motion was denied. Hence, the present petition
for review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

ISSUE

Whether or not the Ombudsman has jurisdiction over the administrative complaint
against respondent.

Whether or not the Ombudsman has the authority to determine the administrative
liability of an erring public official or employee.

HOLDING

Yes. The Ombudsman has jurisdiction over the administrative complaint given the fact
that respondent actively participated in the administrative proceeding.

Yes. The Ombudsman has the authority to determine and impose administrative liability,
the same being not merely recommendatory but actually mandatory.

RULE OF LAW/LEGAL PRINCIPLE APPLIED and REASONING

Resolving the first issue—

The Court in a long list of statutes and jurisprudence examined the source, nature and
extent of the power and authority of the Ombudsman.
Invoking Section 5, Article XI of the Constitution, the fundamental law which created the
Office of the Ombudsman. Sections 12 and 13 of the same Article, the duties, power and
functions of the said office were also discussed by the Court point by point. The
enumeration of the Ombudsman’s powers is not exclusive as it can be perceived that the
framers also gave Congress the leeway to prescribe additional powers, functions and
duties to the Ombudsman.

RA 6770 or The Ombudsman Act of 1989 was also raised to examine the functional,
structural organization and extent of the administrative disciplinary authority of the
petitioner. Section 19 of the same law mandates for the office of the Ombudsman to not
only “act promptly on complaints” against such public officers or employees, but also to
“enforce their administrative, civil and criminal liability in every case where the evidence
warrants in order to promote efficient service by the Government to the people.”

The Court also holds that the administrative disciplinary authority of the Ombudsman
over public school teachers is not an exclusive power but is concurrent with the proper
committee of the DepEd. In Medrano, the Court ruled that the active participation of an
individual before the administrative proceedings and the belated challenge to the
jurisdiction of the said body bars him from assailing such acts under the principle of
estoppel. Likewise, in Office of the Ombudsman v. Galicia, the Court ruled that the right
to due process was not violated, notwithstanding that the DECS had original jurisdiction
to hear the complaint.

In this present case, although respondent submitted a manifestation and having already
filed his counter affidavit and the affidavit of his witnesses and the exhibits attached
thereto, he also submitted the same for the resolution of the Office of the Ombudsman.

Resolving the second issue—

In Office of the Ombudsman v. Masing, the Court settled that the power of the
Ombudsman to determine and impose administrative liability is not merely
recommendatory but actually mandatory. The Court as well reiterated its ruling in Office
of the Ombudsman v. Laja, that "the Ombudsman’s order to remove, suspend, demote,
fine, censure, or prosecute an officer or employee is not merely advisory or
recommendatory but is actually mandatory." Implementation of the order imposing the
penalty is, however, to be coursed through the proper officer. Lastly, in Office of the
Ombudsman v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that while Section 15(3) of RA 6770
states that the Ombudsman has the power to "recommend x x x removal, suspension,
demotion x x x" of government officials and employees, the same Section 15(3) also
states that the Ombudsman in the alternative may "enforce its disciplinary authority as
provided in Section 21" of RA 6770.

JUDGEMENT

The Court then set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals and remanded the same
for the Court of Appeals to decide the case based on the merits. The Court as well
believed that there were other issues that the CA did not discussed since it only chose to
tackle the issue on jurisdiction alone.