Santana- Cruz vs.

CA 361 SCRA 520

Doctrine: A revocation of authority of Patrocinia Juanson-Cuizon as Attorney-in-Fact of private

respondents heirs of Valeriana Marilao, who are recognized as the real parties in interest in this case,
should not affect Atty. Raul A. Mora, who remains counsel of record of private respondents absent a
valid substitution of counsel. Atty. Raul A. Mora may not be presumed substituted by Atty. Julian S. Yap
merely from the filing of a formal appearance by the latter. No substitution of counsel of record is
allowed unless the following essential requisites of a valid substitution of counsel concur: (1) there must
be a written request for substitution; (2) it must be filed with the written consent of the client; (3) it
must be with the written consent of the attorney to be substituted; and (4) in case the consent of the
attorney to be substituted cannot be obtained, there must be at least a proof of notice that the motion
for substitution was served on him in the manner prescribed by the Rules of Court. In the Supplemental
Motion for Reconsideration filed by Atty. Raul A. Mora with the Court of Appeals, he stated that the
heirs of Valeriana Marilao never dismissed him nor replaced him as their counsel, thus, the appearance
of Atty. Julian S. Yap was improper. In petitioner’s Opposition filed on November 25, 1994, she stated
that she received two (2) motions for reconsideration from private respondents filed by different
counsels, and was bound to treat Atty. Raul A. Mora as private respondents’ counsel of record as she
had not received any notice of proper substitution of private respondents’ counsel. In the absence of
compliance with the essential requirements for valid substitution of the counsel of record, Atty. Mora,
the court can safely presume that he is responsible for the conduct of the case. The rule is intended to
ensure the orderly disposition of cases.

Facts:

§ On March 23, 1993, Attorney-in-Fact Patrocinia Juanson-Cuizon, representing private respondents

Felipe Riple, et. al filed against petitioner and Ma. Paz S. Concepcion, a Complaint for Revival/Execution
of Judgment After Lapse of Five Years with the RTC of Antipolo which sought to be revived/executed the
then CFI of Rizal, in Civil Case No. 6482, entitled "Felipe Riple, Et. Al. v. Francisco Santana, Et Al.," the
dispositive portion of which reads: judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the
defendants Francisco Santana and the Heirs of Catalina Reyes, ordering the latter to reconvey in favor of
the plaintiffs, as Heirs of Valeriana Marilao, Lots Nos. 2, 4, 6, 11 and 12 of plan Psd-1536-LRC and
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 65611 of the Register of Deeds of Rizal upon payment by the
plaintiffs to the defendants the sum of P6,233.40; to execute the necessary deed of reconveyance within
five (5) days from receipt of the aforementioned sum; to pay the plaintiffs the amount of P1,000.00 as
and for attorney’s fees; and to pay the costs. CFI affirmed the decision.
§ May 7, 1993, petitioner (Santana-Cruz) filed an Omnibus Motion praying that the Complaint be
dismissed which was denied. Writ of execution was affirmed to enforce the decision of CFI of Rizal in
favor of the petitioner (Santana-Cruz),

§ Sept. 1, 1993, the court a quo issued an Alias Writ of Execution which sought to implement the
decision of the Court of Appeals referred to in the Order dated August 19, 1993.

§ Sept. 6, 1993, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration with Motion to Quash Alias Writ of
Execution, which was denied by the court. However it ordered to cancel the Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 65611 and all the resultant titles derived therein and in lieu thereof, the corresponding new transfer
certificates of title be issued in the name of the petitioners, acting on the motion for modification of
order dated September 6, 199, filed by the petitioners thru their attorney-in-fact.

§ November 19, 1993, petitioner (Santana-Cruz) filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with a
Prayer for the Issuance of a TRO with the CA alleging that the court a quo acted with grave abuse of
discretion in issuing the three (3) Orders dated August 19, 1993 and October 21, 1993.

§ On October 12, 1994, the CA rendered judgment, which gave due course to the petition for certiorari
and prohibition. The three (3) questioned orders are REVERSED and SET ASIDE, the alias writ of
execution is declared VOID and the Complaint for revival/execution of judgment is DISMISSED on the
ground of prescription.

§ On November 2, 1994, Atty. Julian S. Yap (counsel for private respondents) filed a Motion for
Reconsideration, stated that private respondents (Felipe Riple, et. al), some of whom have died and are
succeeded by their heirs, had revoked the authority of their Attorney-in-Fact, Patrocinia J. Cuizon, to
represent them.

§ On November 15, 1994, the CA received another Motion for Reconsideration filed by the counsel of
record, Atty. Raul A. Mora, for Private Respondents.
§ On December 15, 1994, CA denied the MR of private respondents and the supplemental MR.

§ January 5, 1995, private respondents, through Atty. Julian S. Yap, filed with this Court a Petition for
Extension of Time to File Petition for Review, which was denied.

§ January 4, 1995, private respondents, this time through Atty. Raul A. Mora, filed with this Court
another Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition, which was granted. On February 22, 1995,
petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss the Case.

§ Meantime, while two petitions were pending, the Court of Appeals promulgated the Resolution
granting the MR filed by private respondents through atty. Raul Mora and the decision promulgated on
October 12, 1994 RECONSIDERED and SET ASIDE. New judgment is rendered DISMISSING the petition for
lack of merit. Court of Appeals, clarified that its Resolution promulgated on December 15, 1994 was a
denial of the private respondents’ motion for reconsideration filed by Atty. Julian S. Yap, finding that the
said motion merely reiterated the same issues and arguments already extensively discussed and passed
upon in the decision sought to be reconsidered. It was, however, confronted again by another motion
for reconsideration filed by private respondents, through their Attorney-in-Fact Patrocinia Juanson
Cuizon, represented by Atty. Raul A. Mora; and the appellate court this time found cogent and
compelling reason to reverse and set aside its Decision promulgated on October 12, 1994.

§ The Court of Appeals held that the respondent judge, in the light of the ruling in the case of National
Power Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 31 did not err in treating the complaint as a motion for
execution and ordering the issuance of an alias writ of execution, and ruled that the delay of more than
thirteen (13) years, from the time the decision in CA-G.R. No. 48321-R became final and executory on
December 23, 1979, should not be counted in computing the 5-year period in executing a judgment by
motion, since the delay was not private respondents’ doing but petitioner’s. Hence, the Court of
Appeals set aside its Decision dated October 12, 1994 thereby holding that private respondent’s
complaint for revival/execution of judgment has not prescribed, and dismissed petitioner’s petition for
certiorari and prohibition.

Issue:

whether or not respondent court of appeals decided a question of substance in a manner that is
contrary to law and applicable decisions of this honorable court, involving the absence of jurisdiction of
the court of appeals over a case which has been elevated to this honorable court on petition for review
on certiorari.

Ruling:

Petitioner contends that when private respondents through Atty. Mora filed on January 6, 1995 a
motion for extension of time to file a petition for review with this Court, they had perfected their appeal
to this Court; hence, respondent Court of Appeals lost jurisdiction over CA-G.R. SP No. 32631, including
the jurisdiction to amend, alter or modify the Decision dated October 12, 1994 and the Resolution dated
December 15, 1994; hence, the Resolutions dated February 9, 1995 and April 21, 1995 were issued by
the Court of Appeals without jurisdiction. Moreover, Section 8, Rule 9 of the Revised Internal Rules of
the Court of Appeals, provides:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Effect of Filing an Appeal in the Supreme Court. — No motion for reconsideration or rehearing shall be
acted upon if the movant has already filed in the Supreme Court an appeal by certiorari or a motion for
extension of time to file such petition. If such petition is subsequently filed, the motion for
reconsideration pending in this Court shall be deemed abandoned.

Petitioner asserts that assuming that the Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated December 15, 1994
concerned only the motion for reconsideration filed by private respondents through Atty. Yap, the fact
that private respondents through Atty. Mora filed on or about January 6, 1994 with this Court a Motion
for Extension of Time to File Petition means that they have abandoned their motion for reconsideration
supposedly pending with the Court of Appeals. As prescribed by Section 8 of its Revised Internal Rules,
respondent Court of Appeals should not have acted on private respondents’ motion for reconsideration,
if any was pending.

We observed that private respondents filed with the respondent court two (2) separate motions for
reconsideration through two (2) counsels, namely, Atty. Raul A. Mora and Atty. Julian S. Yap. The motion
for reconsideration filed by Atty. Yap stated, among others, that due to acts inimical to their interests,
the private respondents had revoked the authority of Attorney-in-Fact Patrocinia Juanson-Cuizon to
represent them and through their newly designated Attorneys-in-Fact decided to take over from her the
conduct of the instant case and to retain Atty. Julian S. Yap as their counsel considering that Atty. Raul A.
Mora was the personal counsel of Patrocinia Juanson-Cuizon. The Court of Appeals in its Resolution
dated February 9, 1995 stated that "there is no showing that all the private respondents have revoked
the authority granted to Patrocinia Juanson-Cuizon." Be that as it may, a revocation of authority of
Patrocinia Juanson-Cuizon as Attorney-in-Fact of private respondents heirs of Valeriana Marilao, who
are recognized as the real parties in interest in this case, should not affect Atty. Raul A. Mora, who
remains counsel of record of private respondents absent a valid substitution of counsel. Atty. Raul A.
Mora may not be presumed substituted by Atty. Julian S. Yap merely from the filing of a formal
appearance by the latter. 38 No substitution of counsel of record is allowed unless the following
essential requisites of a valid substitution of counsel concur: (1) there must be a written request for
substitution; (2) it must be filed with the written consent of the client; (3) it must be with the written
consent of the attorney to be substituted; and (4) in case the consent of the attorney to be substituted
cannot be obtained, there must be at least a proof of notice that the motion for substitution was served
on him in the manner prescribed by the Rules of Court. In the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration
filed by Atty. Raul A. Mora with the Court of Appeals, he stated that the heirs of Valeriana Marilao never
dismissed him nor replaced him as their counsel, thus, the appearance of Atty. Julian S. Yap was
improper. In petitioner’s Opposition filed on November 25, 1994, she stated that she received two (2)
motions for reconsideration from private respondents filed by different counsels, and was bound to
treat Atty. Raul A. Mora as private respondents’ counsel of record as she had not received any notice of
proper substitution of private respondents’ counsel. In the absence of compliance with the essential
requirements for valid substitution of the counsel of record, Atty. Mora, the court can safely presume
that he is responsible for the conduct of the case. The rule is intended to ensure the orderly disposition
of cases.

Had the respondent court taken notice that absent a valid substitution of counsel, Atty. Raul A. Mora
was still the counsel of record for the private respondents, it would have disregarded the motion for
reconsideration filed by Atty. Julian S. Yap for private respondents, which it however resolved in the
Resolution promulgated on December 15, 1994. Thinking that the motion for reconsideration he filed on
October 29, 1994 was also denied by the respondent court in said Resolution of December 15, 1994, and
after his supplemental motion for reconsideration was unacted upon after the denial of said motion for
reconsideration, Atty. Mora filed a motion for extension of time to file a petition for review on certiorari
with this court. However, after the respondent court in its Resolution dated February 9, 1995 clarified
that the Resolution of December 15, 1994 was a denial of the motion for reconsideration filed by Atty.
Julian S. Yap, and granted the motion for reconsideration filed by Atty. Raul A. Mora at the same time
setting aside its Decision dated October 12, 1994, Atty. Mora withdrew his action in this Court.

The respondent court explained why it acted on the motion for reconsideration filed by Atty. Raul A.
Mora, thus:

x x x
CA treated the motion for reconsideration filed by Atty. Raul A. Mora separately from the motion for
reconsideration filed by Atty. Julian S. Yap.

As shown by their sequence as they appear in the rollo and the dates of receipt, the Court received the
motion for reconsideration of Atty. Julian S. Yap first, on November 2, 1994 to be exact. The said motion
for reconsideration was resolved in Our resolution promulgated December 15, 1994. The supplemental
motion for reconsideration with leave of court, filed by Atty. Raul A. Mora, was received on December
16, 1994. The main motion for reconsideration filed by Atty. Mora, which appears to have been filed by
mail and actually received by this Court on November 15, 1994, was sewed and attached to the rollo,
after the resolution of December 15, 1994 (denying the motion for reconsideration of Atty. Yap) and
after the supplemental motion for reconsideration.

The original private respondents as shown in the petition were "Patrocinia Juanson-Cuison, representing
Felipe Riple, Elisa Marilao, Jose Poblete, Felix Poblete, Francisco Tolentino, Florentino Tolentino,
Hospicio Tolentino, Virginia Tolentino, Maximina Tolentino, Pacita Marilao, Maria Marilao, Reynaldo
Marilao, Francisco Marilao, Jr. and Crisanta Marilao," assisted by Atty. Raul A. Mora. The private
respondents represented by Atty. Julian S. Yap surfaced only after the decision. This is the reason why
we have said in Our resolution promulgated February 9, 1995 that We cannot ignore the motion for
reconsideration filed by Atty. Raul A. Mora and that the "safer course is to act on the motion for
reconsideration, not to disregard it."

The Court of Appeals states that: We cannot ignore the motion for reconsideration filed by Atty. Raul A.
Mora regardless of the allegation that the authority of Patrocinia Juanson-Cuison to represent the
surviving private respondents and the heirs of the deceased private respondents had been revoked.
There is no showing that all the private respondents have revoked the authority granted to Patrocinia
Juanson-Cuizon. The safer course is to act on the motion for reconsideration, not to disregard it.

x x x

We thus hold that the respondent court did not err in acting on the motion for reconsideration of
private respondents, which was seasonably filed through their counsel of record, Atty. Raul A. Mora, on
October 29, 1994 and received by the Court on November 15, 1994. In fact, the respondent court should
have acted only on the said motion for reconsideration. The inadvertence on the part of the respondent
court and the delay in sewing the original copy of said motion for reconsideration in the rollo of the case
should not prejudice the legal interest of private respondents who were under the proper
representation and charge of their counsel of record, Atty. Raul A. Mora. To set things straight,
inasmuch as Atty. Yap had no authority to represent private respondents, absent a valid substitution of
their counsel, the motion for reconsideration filed by him is deemed a mere scrap of paper; and
consequently, the Resolution dated December 15, 1994 of the Court of Appeals on the said motion, and
its subsequent Resolution dated December 22, 1994 are hereby declared null and void. Hence, the
resolution of this Court of the petition for review on certiorari (G.R. No. 118341) filed by Atty. Yap is also
a nullity. We note that Atty. Mora withdrew his action filed with this court (G.R. No. 118360) after the
Court of Appeals in its Resolution dated February 9, 1995 clarified that its Resolution dated December
15, 1994 denied the motion for reconsideration which was filed only by Atty. Yap, and granted the
motion filed by Atty. Mora. Hence, no appeal with this Court, may be considered perfected by private
respondents when the respondent Court of Appeals issued the questioned resolutions dated February 9,
1995 and April 21, 1995; thus, the respondent court had jurisdiction to issue the same.

WHEREFORE, the Amended Decision of the Court of Appeals dated February 9, 1995 is hereby SET
ASIDE, and its Decision dated October 12, 1994 is REINSTATED.