The setting sun 1

The setting sun? Strategic implications of Japan’s demographic transition

With an aging population that has great impact on its economy and military security, one of Japan’s coping
mechanisms is to turn to technology. This reliance on technology is at the core of the author’s analysis of how Japan can
attain its “twin goals of national defense and international stability.”
After reading this material, you should be able to:
a. reflect on the geopolitical consequences of the country’s demographic problem
b. assess the country’s coping mechanisms with its demographic problem

Key Concepts to Understand:

xxx The security dimension of Japan's population predicament is critical, not least because manpower is
essential for the physical defense of the homeland and for discharging the nation's international
responsibilities. Demography's impact on Japan's national security boils down to two questions. First,
will Japan become less able to defend itself as its population ages and shrinks? Second, will Tokyo be
less able to help maintain the peace and security of the international system with the expected
demographic shift? xxx
Japan's Demographic Future. Projections of Japan's population are uniformly troubling. In
statistics compiled by the United Nations, Japan tops the global list of categories on aging, fertil ity decline,
and population decline. Japan is the front-runner in the graying process by which the proportion of older
people increases relative to those of younger people. The speed of population aging is expected to
accelerate in the coming years. As Richard Jackson and Neil Howe explain, "Japan's massive age wave
is the result of a perfect demographic storm: plunging fertility, soaring life expectancy, and negligible net
immigration." xxx
Beyond the aging problem, the declining birthrate has set the stage for a sustained depopulation
process. The United Nations Population Division forecasts three pathways for Japan's
demographic future. The more generous calculation predicts a drop to 114 million in 2050 from the peak
of 127 million in 2005. The more pessimistic assessment anticipates a dramatic dive to 90 million four
decades hence, representing an astounding 30 percent decrease in Japan's population. 8 Official
Japanese figures corroborate these estimates. In 2002 Japans National Institute of Population and Social
Security Research projected that slightly over 100 million of its citizens will inhabit the nation in 2050 and
that 35.7 percent of the population will be aged. 9 Four years later, the Institute published a revised
estimate, finding that Japan's population will fall faster than initially predicted to 95 million, of which 39.6
percent will be sixty-five or older by 2050.10 A private Japanese research institute estimates that Japan's
population will drop to 94 million people during the same period. 11
The looming demographic trends have not gone unnoticed in Japan's defense community. The
Council on Security and Defense Capabilities (CSDC) issued a report in 2004 that for the first time outlined
a comprehensive national security strategy for Japan. The report foresaw a significant expansion of Ja-
pans regional and global responsibilities. At the same time, it bluntly noted that Tokyo faces "constraining
factors" that could inhibit efforts at improving Japan's defense. Notably, it ranked the "dwindling birthrate"
as the primary constraint.12 The report supplied a vehicle to set the tone and direction of Tokyo's 2004
National Defense Program Guideline (NDPG), which sets forth broad contours for Japanese security
policy, defense priorities, and anticipated force levels, both in qualitative and quantitative terms. 13
Reflecting the demographic concerns expressed by the council, the NDPG noted, "In developing Japan's
defense forces, we have to take into account the fact that while the roles that our defense forces have to
play are multiplying, the number of young people in Japan is declining as a result of the low birth rate, and
fiscal conditions continue to deteriorate."14 The NDPG thus pledged to "recruit, cultivate, train and educate
high quality personnel to meet the challenge of the diversification and internationalization of Self-Defense
Forces [SDF] missions."15
Owing to the rapidly changing security environment, the Japanese government reconvened the council to
consider the nation's future strategic direction. The 2010 report urged Tokyo "to grow from an inward-
 The setting sun 2

looking pacifist nation to an outward-looking 'Peace-Creating Japan that imaginatively and skillfully plays
a greater and more active role in the sphere of international security." 16 But it, too, conceded that Japans
"rapidly aging society and declining birthrate will make it difficult to allocate resources to defense
capabilities," tempering any expectations that the defense budget would grow in the future. 17 The 2010
NDPG also acknowledged the need to "appropriately adapt to the declining birth rate ... and the
diversification of SDF missions."18
Similarly, annual defense white papers produced by Japan's Ministry of Defense have explicitly
noted that population trends will harm recruitment and will likely exert downward pressures on the end
strength of SDF personnel. For instance, the 2005 report observed that the male population eligible to join
the Self-Defense Forces (aged eighteen to twenty-six) peaked at 9 million in 1994." In other words, the pool of
recruits has been shrinking for well over a decade. In 2006 those between the ages of eighteen and
twenty-six stood at 6.68 million, representing a 25 percent decline over twelve years. 20 UN statistics bear
out these trends. According to the UN's World Population Prospects, the number of Japanese males aged
fifteen to twenty-four declined from 9.5 million in 1995 to 7.2 million in 2005. 21 The Ministry of Defense
predicts that eligible male recruits will fall somewhere between 5.5 and 6 million by 2018. 22 By way of
comparison, a similar pool of potential military recruits aged eighteen to twenty-four years in the United
States will increase by 16 percent over roughly the same period (1995-2020). 23 By 2030 this age group in
Japan could fall as low as 4.8 million.24 These figures suggest that the youth available to join the ranks of
the armed services could shrink to unsustainable levels.
xxx. To compound the expected recruitment difficulties, security threats—ranging from homeland
defense to peacekeeping operations—that place a premium on manpower may remain unchanged or
could very well increase in the coming years. xxx. But it is nevertheless useful to postulate alternative
futures that explicitly link demographics to national security because such scenarios help forecast the
more likely challenges that Japan will face in the coming years.
Scenarios for Low-Growth Developed States. Developed states suffering from low growth
rates face two distinct types of scenarios that threaten national security. xxx
Scenario 1: imbalance of power. Akin to realist explanations of international relations, the
imbalance-of-power scenario posits that large population differentials can produce a major disequilibrium
in the conventional military balance between two states. Such an imbalance could in theory stimulate
geostrategic calculations on both sides that are more conducive to war. A much larger or faster-growing
state may be more inclined toward aggression because it can tap into a huge reservoir of man power to
overwhelm a smaller neighbor. A state with a slower growth rate, or a significantly smaller population,
may be tempted to strike preemptively against a larger power in order to preclude the expected
intolerable shift in the balance of power.25
But there are four intervening variables that would serve as brakes to such a simplistic, offensively
oriented construct. First, geography matters. If the two states are separated by a nautical border, either
side may be blunted by "the stopping power of water." 26 For example, despite the tremendous disparity in
populations between mainland China and Taiwan, the ninety miles of water separating the two states
have prevented either side from invading the other for decades. 27
Second, even if two states share a land border, specific geographic features may favor the
defense sufficiently to blunt predatory or preemptive tempta tions. Difficult terrain, such as
mountains, jungles, and rivers, could prove to be a sufficient physical buffer. If a state boasts a large
territory or enjoys sanctuaries, its potential ability to maximize strategic depth and wage a war of
protraction and attrition could serve to deter aggressors. During the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese War, the far
larger Chinese side suffered tremendous human losses with no tangible gains due in large part to the
difficult operating environment along the invasion routes.
Third, the presence of nuclear weapons on both sides is likely to deter direct aggression
between two states with significant population differentials. The destructive power of nuclear weapons
may make even a modest attack on a populous state unacceptably painful. Although several crises over
the past decade brought India and Pakistan to the brink, the ongoing standoff over Kashmir has not
spiraled into conflict since both sides tested nuclear devices in 1998. Islamabad has overtly adopted a
first-strike posture to deter the much larger Indian army from entering into a conventional war that
Pakistan cannot hope to win.28
Finally, the larger state must be able to translate its human potential into credible
offensive power. In light of the ongoing advances in military technologies, quality has increasingly
trumped quantity. Smaller states armed with first-class, high-tech militaries may be able to generate
 The setting sun 3

enough combat power to more than compensate for their numerical inferiority. The small state of Israel
has repeatedly defeated its demographically larger Arab neighbors due to its emphasis on operational
excellence and technological superiority in weaponry.29 Arab states, on the other hand, have been unable
to convert their far larger populations into effective fighting forces.
How do these variables and considerations apply to Japan? The only potential competitor in
Northeast Asia that possesses a large enough population to threaten Japan is China. Despite a looming
demographic crisis of its own, China boasts a population ten times larger than that of Japan. Historical
animosities, territorial disputes, and a budding rivalry for leadership in Asia have frequently produced
turbulence in bilateral ties. One might be tempted to conclude that conflict is inevitable.
The four constraining factors noted above, however, are all present to dampen the demographic
sources of confrontation. Most obviously, Japan and China are separated by the East China Sea and the
Yellow Sea. The distance from Shanghai to Naha, Okinawa, for example, is 511 miles. If China cannot
cross the 90-mile-wide body of water separating it from Taiwan today, then the Japanese home islands
will be safe from a Chinese amphibious assault for many decades to come. Japans mountainous terrain
and the few pockets of densely populated urban areas make for an operational nightmare, even if China
could successfully reach the home islands. Beijing's small nuclear arsenal, which has long- targeted
major U.S. bases in Japan, is counterbalanced by the extension of America's nuclear umbrella to Tokyo.30
Finally, despite China's impressive military modernization efforts over the past two decades, Japan's SDF
boasts a small but world-class navy and air force that are sufficiently lethal to deter Chi nese aggression.
A demographically driven conflict between Beijing and Tokyo, them, is improbable for the foreseeable
future.
Scenario 2: resource mismatch. This scenario envisions a low-growth state undergoing an
enervating transition propelled by four trends. First, population decline inevitably leads to a gradual
decrease in eligible manpower that can be recruited and fielded for combat. Second, higher demand
for social services from a growing retiree population crowds out resources for defense
expenditures, including finances for recruiting, training, and retaining military personnel. Third, as
competition over the productive members of society intensifies, the better-paying private sector
attracts and lures away the best and the brightest that the military needs to command and operate a
modern force. Fourth, risk aversion begins to characterize decision-making in government,
particularly in aging democracies. An older electorate may be temperamentally inclined towards
conciliatory policies while smaller families may become reluctant to place their children in harm's way. 31
As a consequence of such developments, low-growth nations may increasingly acquire a taste for
technological solutions to make up for labor shortages. In particular, states may exhibit strategic
preferences for standoff precision-strike weaponry, unmanned platforms, and other high-tech gadgetry to
reduce casualty concerns while still maintaining the capacity to respond robustly to threats. However, the
proclivity to rely on technology to compensate for declining manpower creates its own pathology. With
fewer and more highly skilled people operating very expensive high-tech platforms, casualty and risk
aversion could increase for a state unwilling to lose its high-value resources . Moreover, the military
campaigns in Afghanistan and in Iraq over the past decade vividly demonstrate the limits of technology.
The "transformation" that former secretary of defense Donald Rumsfeld touted certainly produced
spectacular operational successes at the conventional level of war. But the inability of the U.S. military to
quell the subsequent insurgency underscored the reality that manpower is still required for a range of
military operations other than war. As such, as long as the specter of failed or failing states that threaten
to provide safe havens for terrorists remain, the pressure to muster resources for manpower-intensive
stability operations in "ungoverned spaces" will mount for developed nations. 32
Over the longer term, an even more troubling outcome looms. Even if the political will existed
among developed states to maintain regional and global order, declining populations and the diminishing
returns from technology investments will likely reach a kind of crossover point. If manpower and tech-
nology combined can no longer meet the demands of stability operations, for example, then strategic
paralysis might very well ensue. Aptly illustrating the stark choices for developed nations, Peter Peterson
argues that even if military capital is successfully substituted for military labor, the deployment option may
be dangerously limited. Developed nations facing a threat may feel they have only two extreme (but
relatively inexpensive) choices: a low-level response (antiterrorist strikes and cruise-missile diplomacy)
or a high-level response (an all-out attack with strategic weapons).33 In other words, developed countries
may find themselves unable to issue threats or take military actions that correspond proportionately to the
varying levels of threats. Put in even more dramatic terms, developed nations may become trapped
 The setting sun 4

between a policy of appeasement resembling that of British diplomacy during the inter-war period and a
strategy of massive nuclear retaliation adopted by the Eisenhower administration during the early years of
the Cold War. Confronted with either inaction or over-reaction as policy choices, regional and global
powers may be unable or unwilling to fulfill multiple security responsibilities.
A Looming Strategy-Resource Mismatch? The second scenario perhaps best describes
Japan’s future predicament. As noted, Tokyo clearly recognizes the coming demographic crisis in security
terms. Yet, at the same time, Japan has in recent years promised to engage in a range of international
operations that it had previously shunned. The 2010 CSDC report, for example, deemed improving the
international security environment as important to Japanese national security as the physical defense of
the nation. As the commissioners sweepingly asserted, "Preventing conflicts in all corners of the world, or
managing the risks of emerging conflicts is an important factor for Japan’s security."34 Indeed, the report
designated SDF involvement in stabilizing the global security environment as a "primary role."35 To
achieve the twin goals of national defense and international stability, declared the council, Tokyo
needed to (a) depend on its own efforts, (b) act in concert with Japan’s main ally, the United States, and
(c) engage in "multilayered security cooperation" with South Korea, Australia, NATO, India, China,
Russia, and the United Nations.36
The commissioners further argued that "Japan should aim at acquiring the capability for adequate
response to 'complex contingencies' in which various events may break out simultaneously or
continuously rather than separately."37 More concretely, the report proposed entrusting an array of
missions to the Self-Defense Forces. Among the missions it contemplated were ballistic- and cruise-
missile defense; counterterrorism; defense of remote islands, territorial waters, and airspace; and
exclusive economic zones, non-combatant evacuation operations, and disaster response. The council
reiterated the possibility that these threats could arise concurrently, severely challenging the
responsiveness and effectiveness of the SDF.
The 2010 NDPG reaffirmed the commissions assertion that national security and international stability are
indivisible, pledging to "participate more actively in United Nations peace-keeping activities and activities
to deal with nontraditional security issues, such as humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, and counter
piracy initiatives."38 For operations closer to home, the document mandated the capacity to defend against
ballistic-missile attacks, cope with cyber attacks, respond to incursions by enemy special-operations
forces, defeat an invasion of Japan's offshore islands, patrol and prevent intrusion into Japan's
surrounding seas and airspace, and manage the effects of WMD attacks. In addition, the SDF must
conduct "continuous" intelligence-gathering, surveillance, and reconnaissance operations while engaging
in joint training and exercises with other militaries and in "international peace cooperation activi ties."39
Japanese defense planners clearly plan to keep the SDF very busy on a more or less permanent basis.
Policy documents issued under the rubric of the U.S.-Japanese alliance in recent years strongly
endorsed this decidedly forward-leaning posture on global security affairs. In February 2005 the Security
Consultative Committee (SCC), the highest-level official working group bringing together the Japanese
ministers of foreign affairs and defense with their American counterparts, issued a joint statement boldly
setting forth "global common strategic objectives." The alliance specifically identified "international peace
cooperation activities" and "the stability of the global energy supply" as areas demanding closer col-
laboration between the two partners.40 That October the SCC reiterated the common strategic objectives
set forth in February, called on both countries to develop "flexible capabilities," and opened the door for
third-party participation in allied endeavors.41
The 2007 SCC joint statement specifically identified "the redefinition of the SDFs primary mission
to include international peace keeping operations, international disaster relief operations, and responses
to situations in areas surrounding Japan" as an area of major breakthrough.42 In June 2011, the SCC
identified twenty-four common strategic objectives that included maintaining regional security, assuring
access to the global commons, promoting stability in the Middle East, and strengthening international
cooperation.43 The joint statement explicitly endorsed the goals that the SCC set forth in 2005 and 2007,
underscoring the enduring nature of the alliances global outlook. In short, as Japan assumes greater
global responsibilities, the demands and accompanying stresses on the SDF promise to multiply.
At the same time, Japan will be confronting a range of interrelated constraints that would stand
in the way of the new national security objectives Tokyo aspires to. The expected decreases in manpower
availability previously noted will certainly be one factor. In the post-Cold War period, Japan has con-
sistently maintained an active-duty force of 240,000 members, representing roughly 0.18 percent of the
overall population.44 By comparison, 0.5 percent of the U.S. population is in active-duty service. If Japan
 The setting sun 5

were to maintain force levels in absolute or relative terms, then demographic pressures appear manage-
able over the next decade. Assuming that Japan decreases to 123 million people by 2020 (126,440,072
as of Monday, August 3, 2020, based on Worldometer elaboration of the latest United Nations data), the
total number of SDF personnel would slide to 231,000 if Tokyo fixed the ratio of active duty to population
at 0.18 percent. Keeping troop levels at 240,000 in 2020 would require slightly less than 0.2 percent of the
population. If Tokyo moves forward to integrate international operations into its defense portfolio, then
present force levels are not likely to be enough. Medium-size European powers that engage actively in
international operations and boast power projection capabilities provide a useful benchmark. Both the
United Kingdom and France field active-duty forces that constitute roughly 0.3 percent of their respective
populations. If Japan were to replicate equivalent force sizes, the SDF would need to recruit, train, and
deploy 140,000 additional active-duty personnel. Given the narrowing band of eligible recruits, such
expansion will be difficult at best.
It should be noted, however, that force size alone is only one crude measure of Japans ability to
fulfill its international responsibilities. The age distribution of personnel in the officer and
noncommissioned ranks is another useful qualitative indicator. Ideally, the nation's youth—from the late
teens to the early twenties—fill the most junior ranks of a healthy, vigorous military. Japan's personnel
system, by contrast, encourages the exact opposite phenomenon. The retirement age of the three lowest
officer ranks is fifty-four.45 Consequently, 60 percent of fifty-two-year-old officers serve as captains and
lieutenants in the Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF). xxx. It bluntly conceded that "the SDF is, in fact,
getting older across the board."47 From an operational perspective, the U.S. military would consider the
majority of Japans tactical leaders too old to serve in the field. In other words, increases in personnel may
be a necessary but insufficient condition for the SDF's combat effectiveness to keep up with new
demands.
Moreover, this age structure partially masks the looming shortages in recruits. The luxury to retain junior
officers for two to three decades substantially reduces the strain to refill the billets of lower ranks,
depressing recruitment needs. By way of (an admittedly extreme) comparison, the U.S. military operates
under a pressurized promotion system in which service members must be promoted within a certain time
frame to stay in the military or, failing that, face mandatory retirement. This "up or out" approach ensures
a steady supply of young officers to lead frontline units. If the SDF were to pursue a more
demographically balanced force, then recruitment targets would almost certainly surge above current
levels. Whether the SDF could meet higher benchmarks in light of the coming squeeze on eligible male
recruits remains to be seen.
Perhaps more troubling, there are already some telling signs that the SDF is beginning to strain
under the weight of current operations. Some senior leaders of the Ground Self-Defense Force have
voiced concerns about manpower shortages. The former commandant of Japans officer candidate school,
General Joji Higuchi, claims that post-Cold War reductions in personnel and equipment have already
"compressed and skeletonized" the current force structure. 48 He concludes ominously that amid the rush
to field new weaponry such as ballistic missile defense systems, "the minimal defense capabilities that
Japan should retain as an independent nation have already been forfeited." Some frontline units are
under-strength by 20 percent, severely undermining readiness. As a result, a former GSDF field officer
laments, "It is doubtful that the SDF with the current strength level will be able to carry out PKO
[peacekeeping operations], countermeasures to deal with pirates, or the raid and search mission." 49
The Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) faces similar challenges. Following Tokyo's dispatch of
a naval task force to the Indian Ocean in support of U.S.-led antiterrorism activities, the Japanese media
began to question whether the deployment was creating a gap for homeland defense. Among the four
escort fleets available, two (and up to three) are either in training or under repair at any given time. As a
result, the Indian Ocean mission left only one major flotilla at homeport to provide for the nation’s
defense.50 It was later revealed that the former chief of staff of the MSDF, Admiral Koichi Furusho, worried
that Japan lacked the maritime capacity to monitor missile launches from North Korea following
Pyongyang's admission that it possessed an illicit nuclear program in late 2002. 51. After North Korea
launched a series of ballistic missiles in July 2006, similar concerns were raised about the availability of
MSDF destroyers to protect Japan.52
Such apparent over commitment has led Admiral Furusho to openly express fears that the naval
service may soon reach a breaking point. As new missions have proliferated, even while manpower has
remained fixed over the past two decades, the MSDF has turned to stopgap measures, siphoning off
servicemen from frontline destroyers, training, and support units to fulfill the additional obligations. As a
 The setting sun 6

result, some ships are shorthanded by 30 percent. If the personnel needs are unmet, Admiral Furusho
warns, then "a collapse involving insufficient manpower resources for recruitment, education and training
(schools), and rear-area support" could result. He asserts, "It can be predicted that the combat
capabilities of the MSDF as a whole will be weakened." 53 The Ministry of Defense's plans to transfer
sailors from four destroyers decommissioned ahead of schedule to replenish undermanned ships in the
fleet reflect the persistence of this human resource scarcity. 54
Over the longer term, whether Japan can harness the wherewithal to build more ships and to
generate the crews to operate them remains uncertain. The escalating costs of advanced surface
combatants suggest that Tokyo will encounter difficulties in substantially expanding its force structure and
personnel. For instance, the Aegis destroyers armed with state-of-the-art antiballistic missile systems are
prohibitively expensive.55 Moreover, they provide a relatively narrow range of capabilities in the context of
manpower-intensive international peacekeeping operations. Even if modern ships equipped with
automated systems require fewer crew members, the MSDF would have to grow by several orders of
magnitude in order to be able to conduct sea-lane defense, interdict WMD, intercept ballistic missiles,
provide relief in the aftermath of major disasters, participate in international operations, and prepare for
conventional at-sea engagements. Such an expansion seems highly unlikely. Revealingly, the 2010
CSDC report more or less decreed that the MSDF would have to do more with less as aging ships and
aircraft are decommissioned without the prospects of replacement. In response to the downward
pressures on the naval force structure, the council urged the maritime service to extend the service life of
front-line units as an interim measure.56
Financially, the SDF has labored under an informal cap on the defense budget at 1 percent of
GDP for decades. In absolute terms, Japan's defense budget has remained stagnant over the past
decade even as personnel expenditures, including ever-growing pensions, occupy a larger share of the
spending. It remains to be seen whether the massive reconstruction efforts following the March 2011
tsunami and earthquake will add more pressure on defense expenditures. Competition over young and
skilled workers will intensify to cutthroat levels as business demand for workers to fill vacancies left
behind by retired baby boomers is met by a dwindling supply of potential employees. The 2006 edition of
Defense of Japan, for example, anticipated a recruitment crunch as private firms hire more employees to
offset the anticipated wave of baby-boomer retirements. 57 To rival the private sector, the SDF will have to
pay far more to recruit and retain its soldiers than ever before.
Moreover, as Japan focuses on increasing the quality of troops via better training and education
for existing and new missions, personnel expenses are likely to grow at an even faster pace. And if Japan
assumes more overseas missions, the demand for larger personnel increases will likely follow, adding
even more pressure on a tightly circumscribed budget. These factors together would crowd out funds for
military modernization programs that are critical for Tokyo to project power effectively to distant shores.
To compound an already stressful situation, a fiscal crisis looms, and this crisis will only worsen
as depopulation shrinks the tax revenue base in the coming years. An advisory panel on the future of
Japan's fiscal policy projected severe spending cuts that would be needed to restore the government's
health by 2015. The commission speculated that if the Japanese government were to rely exclusively on
spending reductions, expenditures would have to be scaled back by 32 percent at the 2006 fiscal level.
The panel warned that such cuts would slash the defense budget by 70 percent, threatening the SDF's
ability to provide disaster relief to Japanese citizens at home. 58 While it would be too politically painful for
Tokyo to undertake such drastic measures, the bleak outlook illustrated by the commissioners
demonstrate that the Defense Ministry's pleas for more manpower will more likely fall on deaf ears in the
future.
Misplaced Faith in Technology? What, then, explains Japan's bold (and perhaps ill-founded)
decision to broaden its security responsibilities even in the face of daunting resource scarcity both in
terms of manpower and finances? In a word, technology. Japan's defense community has apparently
come to believe that technological advances premised on the so-called Revolution in Military Affairs
(RMA), a concept that has been in vogue since the first Gulf War, would overcome quantitative inferiority.
Such expectations are somewhat understandable from a nation as technologically oriented as Japan. But
faith in technology may be misplaced, particularly in the unforgiving environment of war and conflict
prevention.
In 2000, the Japanese government released a report entitled Info-RMA: Study on Info-RMA and
the Future of the Self-Defense Forces, which sparked a lively debate within the defense community. It
argued that pursuing Japan's own brand of RMA would produce "a defense posture that could perform
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most efficiently with a minimum of reaction time, and could respond flexibly in accordance with rapidly
changing situations."59 Notably, the term "efficiency," connoting a more effective use of scarce resources
such as human capital, stands out as an expected operational outcome of the RMA.
As Tokyo wrestled with the RMA concept, the terms and language associated with it began to
surface in official documents, including the annual defense white papers. 60 Indeed, the 2007 issue seems
to have internalized the concept completely, and its authors enthusiastically endorsed the RMA in glowing
terms. The report exclaimed, "Technological advancements led by the information and communications
technology have not simply sparked spectacular improvements in combat capabilities, but brought about
fundamental transformation of military powers."61
The 2004 CSDC report, for example, voiced hope that the armed forces could offset manpower
and other resource challenges by squeezing new efficiencies out of government contractors, using
information technology as a force multiplier, streamlining the chain of command, and improving education
and training in the ranks. The SDF, in short, must "perform many functions without enlarging the size of
the force."62 The 2004 NDPG similarly declared that Japan would build a "multi-functional, flexible, and
effective defense force . . . without expanding its size." It pledged that "the Government of Japan will
rationalize and streamline personnel, equipment, and operations so as to attain greater results with
limited resources that are available."63 In other words, technology would enable the SDF to do more with
the same or, perhaps, with less.
Japanese defense planners are already examining a range of technological solutions designed to
substitute capital for labor.64 One promising area is the development of unmanned systems. In December
2009 the SDF successfully flight tested a prototype of Japan's first high-speed unmanned aerial vehicle
(UAV).65 According to the 2010 defense budget, the medium-range UAV would be designed to perform
peacetime reconnaissance missions.66 More ambitious, Nisohachi Hyodo argues that the Self-Defense
Forces must aggressively develop robotics technologies that can take over dangerous and tedious human
duties ranging from border and sea-lane patrols to disaster relief. 67 Tokyo has also exhibited an interest in
standoff precision-strike weaponry as another technological alternative. Before being ousted from power,
the Liberal Democratic Party issued an electoral manifesto on defense policy that boldly articulated plans
to marry Japan's proven space-based technologies with missiles. It proposes the combined use of
satellites and long-range cruise or ballistic missiles for conducting strike missions against enemy missile
bases.68 Presumably, offensive missiles would take the place of manned airpower, thus reducing the risk
of casualties in high-threat environments.
Japan’s debate over policy, strategy, and resources for its Self-Defense Forces recalls former
secretary of defense Donald Rumsfeld’s obsession with "transforming" the U.S. armed forces. Rumsfeld
sought to jettison heavy formations and capabilities, particularly in the manpower-intensive ground
services, on the logic that "networked" forces relying on high technology could achieve more with less.
Technology, he argued, can compensate for numbers. As a corollary, the assumption seems to be that
forces optimized for high-intensity warfare can perform all lesser missions—"lesser included," in the
awkward phraseology used by the Pentagon—with few if any additional assets. Japan’s high-end military
force designed for major combat operations, then, should be able to discharge stability operations using
existing assets.
But can it? Three enduring strategic risks stand in the way of a technological silver bullet. First,
military transformation or even a partial RMA is not cheap. The U.S. experience in the 1990s suggests
that acquisition costs will likely skyrocket for states seeking to transform their armed forces for high-tech,
information-based warfare.69 Looming fiscal constraints would place severe limits on the innovative
potential of Japan's scientific and engineering communities. Second, a less technologically sophisticated
adversary could employ numerical superiority to swamp a smaller, high-tech force. As the Info-RMA
report observed, "If the pre-RMA force massively overwhelmed the post-RMA force, even the post-RMA
force would have difficulty [turning] the tables, since the precision-engagement capability of the post-RMA
force would become saturated."70 China, for example, could impose costs by throwing the weight of its
large, obsolescent units against its enemies, even while reserving its more modern forces for other
purposes.
Third, nontraditional security threats ranging from humanitarian crises to failed states may be
impervious to high-technology options, demanding the staying power of troops on the ground. As the
internal think tank of the Ministry of Defense observes, wars often "require large-scale military activity
during the follow-up processes of restoring order and reconstruction." Thus, it counsels defense planners
to consider "sustainability to handle prolonged activities based on the understanding that many situations
 The setting sun 8

in today's security environment call for continuous defense operations of an intermediate nature between
peacetime and emergency activities."71 The authors have clearly taken to heart the lessons of postwar
Iraq. The March 2011 tsunami disaster, too, was a stark reminder that manpower still matters. In the
largest deployment of troops in Japan's postwar history, Tokyo called up over 100,000 SDF personnel to
engage in disaster relief operations. Technology, then, clearly has its limits for missions ranging from
traditional homeland defense to increasingly prevalent stability operations. The lesson may be that Japan
will need to scale back its ambitions related to international peace operations. In the future, Tokyo may
have to confine itself to low-impact, rear-area support missions that require no substantial commitment of
manpower.
Strategic Implications for Japan. Unless the policy statements issued by Japan are empty
rhetoric, it is safe to assume that Tokyo genuinely intends to expand its security responsibilities. Oth-
erwise it would not have engaged in an unprecedented internal reassessment process, nor would it have
so publicly declared its intentions before the world. As Tokyo gazes into a future in which a smaller Japan
will inhabit the international system, there are critical considerations and decisions that demand attention
now.
First, there is clearly a policy-strategy-resource mismatch. Given the expected manpower
shortages, it is exceedingly doubtful whether the SDF could cope with multiple, simultaneous, or near-
simultaneous contingencies, prosecuting some combination of conventional and stability operations. If
Tokyo hopes to attain its wide-ranging set of political objectives, Japanese leaders must set clearer
priorities—in effect establishing a hierarchy among traditional war-fighting tasks and the nontraditional
tasks Tokyo anticipates. They must also consider the strategic, operational, and force-structure
implications of any priorities they choose to set. Do, say, humanitarian missions outweigh counterpiracy
operations along the approaches to the Strait of Malacca?
Second, Japanese decision makers should challenge the largely unexamined assumptions
underlying the nation's new strategic direction. They should define much more concretely "international
peace cooperation activities," a vague umbrella term which obscures more than it conveys. Military
operations other than war span a wide spectrum of tasks that impose many different operational
demands. While Tokyo could easily provide token forces for certain low-tempo peacekeeping operations,
Japan will likely be hard pressed to contribute to manpower-intensive stability operations. Thus, analytical
rigor is at a premium for Tokyo as it debates how to respond to its immediate surroundings and beyond,
both of which are in flux. Japanese leaders must disabuse themselves of the notions that technology
trumps manpower, that more can be done with less, and that a one-size-fits-all force structure can
achieve their nations goals. That Japan wants to be a good international citizen while minding its own
security interests is praiseworthy. Whether it can do everything it wants to do is another question.
Third, Tokyo's pledges to do more on the international stage and the po tential inability to fulfill
those promises could have dire consequences for the U.S.-Japan alliance. As previously noted, the
fanfare surrounding Japan's display of greater self-confidence was largely celebrated in the context of the
alliance. Washington will clearly expect (and demand) more from Tokyo. Indeed, former secretary of
defense Robert Gates publicly endorsed the Japanese government’s plans to pass a permanent
legislation that would enable the SDF to deploy more readily as circumstances warrant. 72 (At present,
Japans Diet must pass laws approving the dispatch of the SDF on a case-by-case basis.) The risk is that
Japans potential failure to meet higher expectations from the United States, even for symbolic purposes,
could harm the health of the relationship. For example, as depopulation pressures increase, the likelihood
that Japan is forced to bow out of U.S.-led international initiatives could grow. Despite Washington's
insistent calls for Tokyo to "show the flag" or "put boots on the ground," Brad Glosserman and Tomoko
Tsunoda bluntly assert that "there will be no feet to put in those boots, nor hands to hold the flag." 73 The
consequences of Tokyo's unwillingness or inability to participate in "coalitions of the willing" operations
remain to be seen.
Fourth, over the longer term it is conceivable that Japan will become even more dependent on
the United States for its defense. This dependence promises to be a double-edged sword. On the one
hand, Tokyo may feel compelled to integrate its forces with their U.S. counterparts. Enhanced
interoperability would not only bind the two nations closer strategically, but such "jointness" would also
serve as force multipliers that generate greater combat power for the SDF, which will not grow
significantly in size. Such an outcome clearly dovetails with the Defense Ministry's philosophy on the IT-
RMA. Ongoing efforts to permit the SDF to operate more seamlessly with U.S. forces are clearly intended
to improve the efficiency of Japanese forces.74 On the other hand, allied integration at the operational
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level could erode Japan's strategic independence by heightening the risk of Japanese entanglement in
crises and conflicts that Tokyo would otherwise seek to avoid. Consider, for instance, the SDF finding
itself inadvertently embroiled in a U.S.-China confrontation over Taiwan due to its tight operational
linkages to U.S. forces deployed in Asia. Dependence could also lead to overdependence on the United
States, tempting Japanese decision makers to hitch a "free ride" on U.S. security commitments. Japan
may hand off defense responsibilities to the United States to such an extent that the SDF becomes a
hollow, unusable force. Neither scenario bodes well for the integrity of the alliance.
Fifth, strategic options, including a nuclear breakout, that were once in conceivable could become
thinkable for Japan. In a forecast of the international system in 2025, the National Intelligence Council
identifies "emerging unfavorable demographic trends" and "more intensive military competitions" as po-
tential sources of insecurity for Japan.75 Leading Japanese politicians already fret about long-term
national decline and the prospective inability to compete militarily with China, attributing their fears directly
to low fertility and aging.76 Such anxieties could become particularly acute if the Japanese polity perceives
a weakened U.S. resolve to fulfill its security commitment to Tokyo. A Japan that felt under siege and
alone could very well pursue the ultimate weapon as a desperate measure. A congressional report on
Japan's nuclear future amplifies this point:
Another wild card is the likelihood that Japan will face a major demographic challenge because of
its rapidly ageing population: such a shock could either drive Japan closer to the United States
because of heightened insecurity, or could spur nationalism that may lean toward developing
more autonomy.77
The latter, worst-case scenario may be farfetched at the moment. But it is worth considering how
Tokyo would arrive at such an outcome. If the negative trends in the U.S.-Japanese alliance illustrated
above unfold, then either party or both sides could lose confidence in the credibility of the security
partnership. Washington may withdraw its security guarantees or Tokyo may question America's
extended deterrence. In the absence of a U.S. nuclear umbrella, it is possible that Japan would seriously
consider developing its own nuclear arsenal in order to shore up its independent defensive capabilities.
Indeed, Japanese observers have already begun to explore nuclear options that were once considered
taboo. As one Japanese analyst forcefully declares, "A 'nuclear umbrella to be provided by someone else
cannot protect Japan from the Chinese military's nuclear missiles, the capability of which has been
improving steadily every year. Japan needs to have its own autonomous nuclear deterrence
capability'.'7This nuclear scenario clearly portends dangers for regional and global stability.
Finally, in light of the gloomy prognosis in the foregoing paragraphs, an analytical caveat is
warranted. This study assumes that key strategic parameters, such as the informal cap on the defense
budget and the authorized end strength of active-duty personnel, will remain fixed indefinitely. But radical
policy changes are possible under extraordinary circumstances. Wild cards and systemic shocks could
shake deeply felt beliefs or undermine longstanding principles, producing sharp turns in strategic
orientation. Japan is certainly no stranger to such about-faces. The decision to abandon isolationism
during the Meiji era and another one to embrace an American-led international order in the postwar period
are decisive turning points in Japanese history. A dramatic departure from the status quo of similar
magnitude should not be discounted out of hand. Violent or peaceful unification of the Korean states
hostile to Tokyo or a naval war with China over disputed maritime claims could trigger a fundamental
reassessment of Japan's options. Perceptions of American inaction or ineptitude over a cross-strait
conflict that leads to the forcible Chinese unification of Taiwan would be another game changer . The
bottom line is that there is nothing inevitable about Japan's self-imposed constraints. It would be prudent
for defense planners to keep an open mind about the role of contingency in international politics. xxx

Enhancement Activity:

You can now assess your understanding by briefly describing the effects or consequences of Japan’s
demographic problem on the four areas that are listed in column 1.

Areas of Concern Consequences of Japan’s Demographic Problem

Labor Force

Economic Relations
with Other States