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Authoritarian ‘geopolitics’ of survival in the Arab Spring

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Authoritarian ‘geopolitics’ of survival

in the Arab Spring
a b
Bülent Aras & Richard Falk
a
Professor of International Relations, Sabancı University, Turkey
and Global Fellow, Wilson Center, Washington, DC, USA
b
Albert G. Milbank Professor of International Law Emeritus,
Princeton University, USA
Published online: 24 Mar 2015.

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Arab Spring, Third World Quarterly, 36:2, 322-336, DOI: 10.1080/01436597.2015.1013307

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 Third World Quarterly, 2015
Vol. 36, No. 2, 322–336, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2015.1013307

Authoritarian ‘geopolitics’ of survival

in the Arab Spring
Bülent Arasa* and Richard Falkb
a
Professor of International Relations, Sabancı University, Turkey and Global Fellow, Wilson Center,
Washington, DC, USA; bAlbert G. Milbank Professor of International Law Emeritus, Princeton University,
USA

The Arab Spring has shaken not only the state and society dimension
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in the countries of the MENA region but also the power of authoritar-
ian leaders that had been ensured for a long period of time. This
paper takes a critical look at the issue of how authoritarian regimes
reacted to the new political atmosphere produced by the Arab Spring.
More specifically it attempts to identify how geopolitical reasoning
influenced the formulation of new strategies designed to promote the
survival of authoritarian regimes. It focuses upon the geopolitical rea-
soning relied upon by Iran and Saudi Arabia, which included creating
threat-enemy chains in domestic politics, shifting alliances in regional
policy and taking advantage of relations with external actors to gain
support for authoritarian rule at home.
Keywords: Arab Spring; geopolitics; authoritarian survival; Iran;
Saudi Arabia

Introduction
The protests that began in Tunisia and spread to the Middle East and North
Africa (MENA) have revealed a new collective consciousness with profound
political implications. These protests stemmed from the demand for change, the
search for democratic representation, the fight for political integrity and opposi-
tion to crony forms of neoliberal capitalism. This collective consciousness cap-
tured the political imaginations of entire populations throughout the MENA
region. However, this is not the first transnational diffusion in the region;
MENA has previously experienced transnational currents of Islamism and Arab
nationalism. Nevertheless, this most recent eruption is markedly and unexpect-
edly different from the earlier expressions of a shared ideological orientation.
The Arab Spring promoted a series of norms that challenge existing struc-
tures of power and authority, in addition to highlighting trans-boundary patterns
of loyalty in the region. The partial collapse of the established order in the Mid-
dle East – with respect to political, economic and social dimensions – represents
another major shift in a constantly changing international environment. From the

*Corresponding author. Email: [email protected]

© 2015 Southseries Inc., www.thirdworldquarterly.com

 Third World Quarterly 323

perspective of Western liberal democracies MENA region power structures had

long been deemed ‘outdated’ and undemocratic; nevertheless, their abrupt rup-
ture was no less seismic for that being the case.
The Arab nation-state system and non-state actors had been accustomed to
coexisting in parallel realms of engagement, although with a certain degree of
separateness. This is no longer the case. Instead, state and non-state entities are
intermingled and the tension between the two has redefined Arab politics and
geography. The Arab Spring put an end to state–society dissociation in a num-
ber of ways, ranging from regime transformation to civil war. Political issues,
especially the different shades of political Islam, dominate economic and cul-
tural realms in the Arab public sphere. Furthermore, Arab nationalism and
extremist tendencies have shaped this new public sphere. This emergent con-
sciousness not only provides motivation, solidarity, belief and strategy but is
also mobilising the publics in Arab countries to launch similar struggles against
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repressive regimes.
The nature of the emerging regional constellation ignores non-Arab elements
and considers them as presenting problems for the Arabs. This creates a less sta-
ble environment for regional and international actors whose national interests are
affected by developments within the MENA political geography. There is no real
place in this new political landscape for the former patron–client relations. The
transformative power of the Arab Spring is limited to Arab political geography
and did not have direct implications for countries outside this enclosure. The
‘Arab–Islam’ character of the public sphere manifests itself through empowering
non-state actors, enabling public mobilisation and limiting the role and influence
of problematic nation-state structures in this emerging political geography.
In the wake of the Arab Spring, identified by expert commentators as the
most significant uprising of this region in modern history, Arab authoritarianism
still persists in various forms. Authoritarian leaders face a range of practical
challenges resulting from this new collective consciousness and the diffusion of
universal norms and values in their respective countries. But authoritarian rule,
though challenged by the Arab Spring, has pushed back with resolve, sometimes
severely. The dynamics of oppressive rule will never be quite the same, despite
adaptation so far to the movements that comprised the Arab Spring. The pre-
Arab Spring regional order – whereby nation-states and territorially limited non-
state actors functioned in parallel – was ideal for preserving a hold on power at
home and also addressing regional issues. The resistance of authoritarian leaders
to change has its roots in decades of experience in managing authoritarian rule,
which now desperately needs to develop new strategies if it is to cope success-
fully with recent geopolitical challenges.
The attitudes of ruling regimes vary, according to their receptivity and resis-
tance to the transformative impact of this new collective consciousness. The
Arab Spring is also a learning process in terms of new calculations, recalibration
of policies, and development of strategies and tactics to handle the new political
atmosphere both for elites and reformist or revolutionary oppositional leaders. In
this article we discuss how policy makers make use of concrete geopolitical rea-
soning to shape a problem-solving agenda designed to facilitate authoritarian
survival.1 We will reinforce the general analysis with a focus on Saudi Arabia
and Iran to explain how the leadership in these two countries fashioned a
 324 B. Aras and R. Falk

geopolitical understanding oriented around regime survival, maintaining regional

alliances and securing international backing. Saudi Arabia and Iran are of partic-
ular interest, because they represent the primary sectarian cleavage in the Middle
East, yet nevertheless have discovered that they possess convergent interests
when it comes to preserving the stability of their respective regimes and to
meeting the threat of Islamic extremism that is part of the Arab Spring’s after-
math. Although Iran is not an Arab state, it was affected by the Arab Spring.
These two countries base the legitimacy of governance on an embodiment of
Islamic values, both purporting to be anti-secular religious states.

An emerging geopolitical landscape

One of the enduring consequences of the Arab Spring is the transformation of
the political imagination present among the masses and its linking to the emer-
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gence of a new political landscape. Societal demands have found channels to

put pressure on political elites, despite the authoritarian tendency to resist public
demands. The visits of Arab leaders to Gaza in the aftermath of the 2012 Israeli
attacks represented a landmark development in changing geopolitical patterns.2
The political geography of the Arab Spring consists of Arab states facing
transformation at various levels, the erosion of regional structures, alienation of
non-Arab elements, empowerment of non-state actors and reproduction of old
problems in a new context. As a consequence, the Arab political geography
faces four substantial tensions. Although this political geography has not been
expanded beyond the Arab states, the mental and intellectual universe of the
Arab Spring at once transcends and connects to universal norms of rights and
good governance. The tension between political geography and the intellectual
universe is intrinsic because of the challenges posed by the masses to authoritar-
ian rulers. Another tension emerges via the surfacing of non-Arab elements in
this geography, ie the Kurds. The political community of the Arab Spring geog-
raphy has non-Arab elements, but there is a tendency to associate these with
Arab issues and avoid their distinct contexts, both current and historical. A third
tension emerges from treating certain countries, such as Turkey and Iran, as
peripheral actors and seeking to keep them at bay with respect to so-called Arab
issues, yet failing to do so. A fourth tension is the result of the emergence of
new challenges in an already complex territorial system of political geography
through the empowerment and engagement of non-state actors. The former con-
stellations, such as Hamas and Hezbollah, struggle to adapt to the changing
regional environments, while the Kurds are gaining prominence through
semi-state structures and the Islamic State (IS) claims a de facto trans-boundary
existence.
The emerging geopolitics of this region is being shaped by flexible linkages
between state and non-state actors as well as among each other and through a
variety of interferences by regional and global external actors. Traditional state
actors adopt policies depending on their receptive or rejectionist attitudes
towards the transformative impact of the new collective consciousness. Although
this may seem, as Valbjorn and Bank have argued, reflective of the reformist
versus revisionist regional politics of the 1950s,3 the new structure is more like
a multi-grouping of shifting alliances reflecting the rise and fall of regimes and
non-state actors.
 Third World Quarterly 325

In the countries that have undergone political transformations – Tunisia,

Libya, Yemen and Egypt – the ruling elites change their stance depending on
domestic power calculations, though the latter two with limited room for
manoeuvre. Bahrain, Morocco and Jordan have aligned themselves with the
Gulf monarchies, mainly Saudi Arabia. The monarchic bloc seems to be a rela-
tively coherent group, considering that they are addressing the twin challenges
of the Arab Spring and political Islam, while deflecting responses to societal
demands via varying strategies of authoritarian rule.4 The geopolitical position-
ing of this bloc exhibits this shared perspective. The Gulf region is experiencing
a rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Qatar, albeit of diminishing intensity, though
with some effects extending beyond the immediate sub-region. Oman remains
somewhat isolated in this political atmosphere. Saudi Arabia relied upon a mili-
tary intervention to prevent a domestic upheaval in Bahrain, while Qatar, along
with Saudi Arabia, gave material and diplomatic support to the NATO-led mili-
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tary intervention in Libya. The United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Egypt pursued
a military operation in Libya, signalling military capabilities from within, poten-
tially marking a new trend in regional politics.5
The complexity of the Saudi Arabia–Qatar rivalry became evident in their
attitudes towards Egypt. Qatar supported Muhammed Morsi – who came to
power by a democratic election in 2012 – while Saudi Arabia supported the
General Abdel-Fettah el-Sisi administration, which came to power as a result of
a 2013 military coup. Saudi Arabia and its Gulf allies backed the coup in Egypt
and provided major financial aid to the new government.6 Saudi Arabia viewed
the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) as under the protection of Qatar and blames the
Doha government for using the MB to orchestrate regional upheavals.7 Saudi
pressure resulted in the departure of some Egyptian MB members from Qatar in
September 2014, suggesting that Qatar is giving way on matters of regional pol-
icy to its larger and more powerful neighbour.
In a number of Arab countries, and in some cases those with sub-regional
and even regional aspirations, non-state actors are posing increasing challenges
to the established order in the MENA, pursuing ideological, territorial and politi-
cal goals. The landmark preoccupying current example is the sudden emergence
of IS and the establishment of its control over extensive portions of Syrian and
Iraqi territories. IS is a brutal terrorist conglomerate that uses all possible means
to promote its goals, which centre upon an expanded presence in Iraq and Syria,
and later on, perhaps, elsewhere. The claim to establish a caliphate under the
authority of IS should be understood in part as a radical rejection of sovereign
states as the basis of political community and legitimate international authority
in the Arab world.
The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in Iraq is a collection of non-
state actors that has banded together to oppose IS’s encroachment upon the Kur-
dish autonomous area that operates within the federal Iraqi structure. Both KRG
and IS oppose Assad’s rule in Syria. IS threatens the de facto autonomy of Ku-
rds in Rojava (Northern Syria) and the quasi-state Kurdish entity, KRG, in
Northern Iraq.8
Hamas and Hezbollah, an older generation of non-state actors, have diver-
gent interests and positions. They maintain a degree of closeness, especially as a
result of having Israel as their common enemy. Hamas distanced itself from Iran
 326 B. Aras and R. Falk

and Syria during the Arab Spring and maintained close ties with Qatar and
Turkey.9 Saudi Arabia misleadingly treats Hamas as part of a wider MB
conspiracy to extend its influence in the region. Hezbollah became heavily
involved in Syria in order to defend Assad’s regime and later became concerned
with extending assistance to the Shia-led central government in Iraq. Hezbollah
sacrificed its earlier prestige in Arab public opinion by this effort to defend
authoritarian leaders in these two countries, which is generally interpreted as an
unabashed exhibition of sectarian solidarity.
Turkey and Iran remain outside the strict ethnic and political geography of
the Arab Spring, yet they partially function as members of the intellectual and
political community that seems emergent in the new regional geopolitics. They
have opposing positions and have aligned themselves with opposing actors in
Syria and Iraq. Although Iran is Saudi Arabia’s arch-enemy, Turkey’s relations
with the Gulf kingdom have recently deteriorated. The major source of conten-
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tion was Turkey’s diplomatic support for the Morsi government and its criticism
of the current Sisi political leadership in Egypt, being critical of its rise to power
through a coup and reacting critically to the bloody crackdown on the Muslim
Brotherhood. Iran is making an enormous effort to preserve Assad’s power in
Syria and is backing Shi’ia leadership in Iraq, and at the same time is exerting
influence over Hezbollah in Lebanon.10 Turkey’s decision to side with anti-gov-
ernment forces in Syria has been interpreted by Saudi Arabia as support for the
MB.11 The confrontation is indirect as between Saudi Arabia and Turkey, while
Iran and Saudi Arabia are directly at odds in the struggles taking place in
Yemen and Bahrain. Israeli policy has been to maintain an arm’s length distance
from the developments in the Arab Spring, on the assumption that the ferment
will inevitably result in Islamist regimes, which are perceived as lesser-known
enemies in the generally hostile Arab environment.12
These shifting alliances are visible in the regional restructuring of the posi-
tion of each country. The situation in Syria is almost a microcosm of the emerg-
ing geopolitics engaging the involvement of all major actors, the shifting
alliances and the continuous revisions of policies. Saudi Arabia and Qatar sup-
port different factions in Syria, while Lebanese Hezbollah and Iran back the As-
sad regime. Non-state actors are paying serious attention to the situation in
Syria. They have surfaced in the security void that exists in Syria and their
immediate future depends on the outcome of the struggle there. The various
strands of Syrian opposition, including the Kurds and several extremist groups,
are in their battles for existence and power. The necessity of devising self-
defence strategies, mobilising support, finding the resources to fight against the
Assad regime has resulted in confusion and frequent struggles among elements
of the anti-Assad coalition, which refuses to coalesce. Turkey backs the Syrian
opposition and now gives sanctuary to more than one-and-a-half million refu-
gees. Israel follows the development closely, but has remained mostly on the
sidelines, despite its evident concerns about the possible emergence of an Islam-
ist and anti-Israeli government in Syria.
The USA, the EU, Russia and China are the most important external actors
in this emerging geopolitics. Even though there are different degrees of
influence and engagement, overall their influence in this political geography
seems to be declining. The potential to influence regional politics externally has
 Third World Quarterly 327

substantially decreased, even though there are still multiple roles served by links
with external actors – either to help protect or challenge existing governmental
arrangements or to contribute legitimacy to the opposed options of political
transformation or authoritarian survival. These external actors did not play an
overt role in the onset of the Arab Spring, although each sought to be positively
involved in the aftermath. China is a pragmatic player, cooperating with govern-
ing regimes without alienating opposition movements to the extent possible.13
Russia backs the Assad regime and possesses an undisguised distrust of Western
countries, which, in their view, deceived Moscow by misusing the UN mandate
in Libya.14 Russia and China generally invoke the principle of non-interference
in sovereign states and are particularly sensitive to the pitfalls of any regime
change produced by the military exertions of external powers. The USA aims to
preserve its allies in the region, while simultaneously supporting, at least rhetori-
cally, societal demands for change. This posture was dramatically illustrated by
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Washington’s at first reluctant acceptance of the 2011 overthrow of Hosni Muba-

rak in Egypt, while two years later remaining silent in the face of a bloody mili-
tary coup against the elected government in the same country. The USA
supported the Tunisian and Libyan transitions, while not diverting its critical
gaze during the coercive silencing of oppression in Bahrain.15 The EU had close
political and economic relations with the Arab world as constituted before the
Arab Spring, as a dimension of the community it was seeking to establish in the
Mediterranean region. The EU has avoided taking an active role in supporting
the struggle in the region for rights, liberty and good governance.16 The role the
EU played in Libya and Tunisia was largely shaped by the national interests
and foreign policy outlook of several of its most influential member states, espe-
cially France and the UK.

Geopolitical reasoning and authoritarian survival

The new collective consciousness creates new norms of social interaction for
regional actors, which in turn redefines the role and legitimacy of borders, creat-
ing a new political geography. Political elites feel under pressure to find new
ways to justify changes in their positions of authority. The familiar territorial
structures of the sovereign state face the emergence of new delimitations of ter-
ritorial identity. The declaration of IS as a state overlapping Syrian and Iraqi
borders came as quite a shock to nation-states that considered the realm of polit-
ical conflict as either within or between sovereign states, but not calling into
question previously recognised international boundaries. This cross-border or
transnational re-territorialisation of political community and a new concept of
territory challenge the fundamental structure of regional order.
Re-territorialisation may occur in a region-making process as ‘developments
which occur when certain territorial entities lose their importance, in favor of
other territorial configurations’.17 Although one may raise questions as to
whether these types of structure have the capacity to create lasting boundaries,
this new type of territoriality certainly calls attention to the tensions between
societal and spatial relations and how that may under some conditions subvert
existing territorial boundaries. The overall effect is potentially one of an evolv-
ing new political geography through the gradual institutionalisation of the
changing dynamics of socialisation among regional actors as affected by these
 328 B. Aras and R. Falk

new boundary practices.18 Although the new territorial entities are surfacing on
the periphery of regional geopolitics, they are nevertheless directly challenging
the stability of central powers acting within this regional system. They also raise
concerns among external actors. In addition to the empowerment of sub-national
entities, the geography of the Arab Spring contributes negatively to the erosion
of nation-states, as well as to the stability of regional organisations.19
The authoritarian regimes face major challenges by way of the emergence of
this new political geography and its tendency to produce unstable borders.
Regime survival requires that state actors have the capacity to protect borders
and govern territory, since the latter are the means and symbols of reifying polit-
ical power, as well as preserving legitimate differences and distinctions. The
political elites need to develop a new foreign policy discourse and problem-solv-
ing strategy so as confront this redefinition of political geography. The approach
of two authoritarian regimes in the region, Saudi Arabia and Iran, has been to
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‘spatialise’ their foreign policies in order to counter the diffusion of the transfor-
mative impact of the Arab Spring, and ensure that regional geopolitics adheres
to a trajectory that reflects their interests and perspectives. Although the prac-
tices of authoritarian geopolitics associated with survival under challenge may
seem like a new strategy, the roots of this geopolitical reasoning can be traced
back to the pre-Arab Spring period, which is now being redefined within these
new geographical conditions. In this sense, although the regional context is dif-
ferent, the two countries’ understanding and interpretation of this reasoning has
remained the same.20 This unconditional prioritisation of regime survival leaves
no room for flexibility in geopolitical reasoning, but motivates these regimes to
oversimplify geographical reality and reproduce familiar geopolitical discourse,
as well as maintain old foreign policy practices, despite the obvious changes in
political realities.

Authoritarian geopolitics of Saudi Arabia and Iran

The series of upheavals, including civil war in Syria, IS extremism, military
coups and authoritarian oppression produce a geopolitical reality that is difficult
to convey to the publics in Saudi Arabia and Iran. This is also true for other
states in the region. The confusing and turbulent regional stage enables policy
makers to fashion geopolitical truths for internal consumption and to justify their
foreign policy manoeuvres. Policy makers simplify the geopolitical reality, pro-
duce and reproduce depictions of allies and enemies, and make these practical
concerns major drivers and determinants of official policy. Geopolitical reason-
ing relies on the following: deeply rooted authoritarian resilience relying on
experience and coercive practices in controlling domestic politics, understanding
the dangers associated with regional politics, and a familiarity with extra-regio-
nal actors and contexts. It also takes advantage of resources at the disposal of
these two countries.
The geographical reasoning embraces multiple agendas and strategies to
shape an authoritarian survival policy to be implemented in relation to different
audiences at the domestic, regional and global levels. While this results in dou-
ble standards and hypocrisy in policy, authoritarian rulers have few qualms.
Authoritarian regimes in the Middle East have a long history of suppressing
 Third World Quarterly 329

oppositional forces and dominating domestic politics. In this vein the foreign
policy of authoritarian leaders has been an extension of this unconditional
domestic priority of regime survival. International allies have contributed to this
goal by both stabilising a hostile regional environment by way of military inter-
vention in some cases and through training and arms sales in others.21 Saudi
Arabia and Iran have been two prominent authoritarian regimes with the ability
to develop patterns of geopolitical reasoning for the consumption of domestic
and foreign audiences. They possess the range of capabilities to give this geopo-
litical reasoning direct forms of policy implementation.22 Their unmistakable
aim is to preserve authoritarian rule against real and imagined challenges and to
avoid any transformative impacts deriving from the Arab Spring.
Geopolitical reasoning enables policy makers to legitimise or at least to ratio-
nalise their policies in the domestic sphere. Such a vision entails enemy and
threat chains, balanced against the projected support of allies. In this sense one
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major concern among these policy makers is the diffusion of transnational val-
ues that may generate resistance to authoritarian rule. Saudi policy makers inter-
preted the Arab Spring as a dangerous development that could potentially be
replicated at the domestic level within other countries and in Saudi Arabia as
well; consequently they adapted a firm attitude of opposition from the outset.23
Saudi involvement in Libya, Syria and Bahrain was presented as necessary in
order to secure the Kingdom’s interests, especially connected with regime and
regional stability. This reasoning benefits the alleged Saudi role as patron to the
Arabs and its position as Custodian of two Holy Cities. The regional role helps
to secure authority and legitimacy in the internal domain. It also takes advantage
of the Wahhabi interpretation of the establishment of Islam in Saudi Arabia,
considering the sensitivity regarding the rise of Shia currents in the surrounding
regions. In this sense the greater visibility of Shia rhetoric is useful in magnify-
ing the threat that has emerged within the regional setting. It becomes a policy
instrument deployed against the country’s own Shia population, and is also used
to condemn all opposition, whether Shia or not, for weakening the government
at a time when it is facing a hostile environment.
Iranian policy makers had a short honeymoon period with the Arab Spring,
assuming and hoping that the sequence of regional upheavals would eventually
lead to the emergence of Iranian-style Islamist regimes in the region.24 However,
when it became clear that the new collective consciousness promotes universal
rights, liberties and good governance, the Iranian establishment distanced itself
and started to interpret the popular uprisings as part of an international conspir-
acy by which it was also being targeted. Their version of the geopolitical stage
presented the popular uprisings as terrorist movements and uprisings, inviting
civil wars in the Arab Spring countries. The 2009 popular riots in Iran sparked
by the controversy surrounding the presidential elections remain a stark remin-
der of the risks of public unrest in the country. In this light any tolerance of the
diffusion of a transnational struggle for good governance poses a serious threat
to the Islamic Republic. Decades of experience in oppressing the opposition
have helped the Iranian establishment fine tune its ability to repress and defuse
nascent protest movements. The demands for free and fair elections in Iran were
reflected in the popular slogan ‘where is my vote?’ 25 The vibrant civil society
and search for good governance not only gained momentum but also established
 330 B. Aras and R. Falk

a base in Iran. The target audience of the Iranian regime is composed of

supporters of the Islamic revolution, and its geopolitical reasoning seeks to
ensure their support while oppressing the other, including by brutal means if
necessary. Geopolitical reasoning plays a role in justifying the exercise of power
in a polarised society, which by its nature also intensifies polarisation,
potentially producing a dangerous escalating cycle of domestic violence. The
slogan of the opposition – ‘No Lebanon! No Gaza! I will die for my country!’26
– exhibits a certain public awareness of the geopolitical manipulation by the
state establishment of the Iranian citizenry.
Geopolitical reasoning in both countries aims to secure as much support as
possible from the largest segment of society. The challenge in Saudi Arabia is
regionalised, with fear of an uprising by the Shia community and of a democra-
tising Islamic movement of the sort associated with the Muslim Brotherhood,
while Iran faces a political and, somehow restrained, opposition based on a
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struggle for political rights and liberties, as well as the hostility of Israel and the
West. Iran’s depiction of Sunni extremism as a vital threat to its survival, and
Saudi utilisation of the Shia threat as a divisive factor are mirror images of each
other. Despite different enemy-threat chains and different policies, geopolitical
reasoning in both countries reflects a considerable degree of similarity in terms
of strategies, aims and preference for coercive tactics to repress the opposition,
but there are vast differences in their respective linkages to external political
forces.
Geopolitical reasoning becomes a foreign policy practice at the regional
level. The strategy is to first set firewalls beyond the borders to prevent any fur-
ther diffusion of the transformative impact. A second step is to get involved in
several countries that are facing popular uprisings in order to help eliminate any
threat of political transformation from below. The third step is to create regional
blocs for the sake of pursuing a region-wide rivalry. All share the same motive:
preventing the regional atmosphere from turning against them internally and, by
so doing, posing a challenge to their authoritarian rule at home. As geopolitical
reasoning produces geopolitical narratives for consumption in domestic power
struggles, it does the same in a more nuanced way when addressing regional
audiences. The definition of the regional political environment and designation
of enemies and allies serve this purpose.
Geopolitical reasoning is also bound up with what might be called ‘present-
ism’, which depicts different versions of reality by continuously rewriting histor-
ical engagement and using its own account of reality to validate its position.
Both Iran and Saudi Arabia have their own geopolitical depictions of the sectar-
ian divide, corrosive Islamic movements, extremist expansion, shifting alliances,
ideological divergences, differing narratives and protracted transformations. The
current levels of Iranian engagement in Syria, and of Saudi Arabian involvement
in Egypt, are the result of the critical importance of controlling the political
future of those particular regimes, involvements that follow from their regional
geographic reasoning. The significant Iranian support for the Assad regime and
Saudi backing of a military coup in Egypt are mainly aimed at creating firewalls
in order to restrict as much as possible the inward flow of external influence.
Both paid heavy prices in Syria and Egypt – not to mention the damage
wrought by the civil war and the coup for these countries – and put their
 Third World Quarterly 331

regional clout at risk as a result of these policies, which clashed with interna-
tional values associated with peace and human rights. However, there was virtu-
ally no hesitation by either government in pursuing the firewall policy, and each
probably would do the same thing in the future if other countries in the region
seemed vulnerable to political forces seen as threatening. By its own explanation
Saudi Arabia is dealing with a harmful Islamic current in Egypt,27 while Iran is
helping an ally in Syria against terrorist groups and external interventions.28 The
Iranian establishment goes further by claiming a right to defend Shia religious
sites in Syria through its assistance for the Assad regime.29 Such versions of
geopolitical reality heighten geopolitical tensions and increase political violence
in the region.
These status quo regimes also attempt to manipulate the aforementioned new
collective consciousness that seemed in 2011 likely to transform the political
geography of the entire region. The justification for Iranian involvement in
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Yemen and Bahrain was to limit Saudi influence and the related expansion of
Wahhabi currents.30 The Saudi policy of altering the composition of the Syrian
opposition, as well as engaging in several other countries militarily and politi-
cally is rationalised as an effort to marginalise the MB and block Iranian pene-
tration of the Gulf region.31 Neither Riyadh nor Tehran hesitates to agitate
domestic and regional constituencies with a projected geopolitical war between
the two. These geopolitical images support self-depictions as the saviour of their
allies, reproducing a new cycle of authoritarian patron–client relations in the
regional context.
For Iran a sine qua non in regional policy means maintaining strong ties
with Syria, Iraq and Lebanese Hezbollah. In the Saudi version the priority is the
Gulf region, Egypt and other kingdoms in the region, namely Jordan and Mor-
occo. Non-state actors challenge Saudi and Iranian policies while justifying their
positions in a number of cases. Saudis help Jordan, Lebanon and Morocco to
strengthen their security structures and, through border surveillance in the for-
mer two, reinforce the idea of protecting them against intervention by non-state
actors. The geopolitical reasoning in both countries fosters a regional role of
upholding order, namely promoting a responsible and constructive regional type
of stability in the face of irresponsible and destructive threats. Saudi and Iranian
attitudes against IS are an example of this sort of presentism. IS diverts attention
from the Syrian issue and even fights Assad’s internal enemies, while delegiti-
mising the Shia-led Iraqi government through its expansion into northern Iraq,
thereby demonstrating that government’s inability to exercise sovereign control
over its territory. Although IS presently serves Iranian interests in Syria and
may foster Saudi Arabian goals in Iraq, both strongly oppose the IS presence in
Syria and Iraq.32 In effect, IS extremism takes precedence over the secondary
goals of securing sympathetic regimes throughout the region.
Both Iran and Saudi Arabia benefit from a new cold war atmosphere in the
region. This also gives them a chance to secure a position based on the habits
and experiences of external international actors during the cold war era.
US–Saudi relations and Russian–Iranian–Syrian relations reinsert cold war-style
binary divisions in the region.33 The geography of the Arab Spring is a more
challenging one for international actors, forcing them to constantly recalibrate
their policies towards the region in ways that make it impossible to sustain
 332 B. Aras and R. Falk

coherent polices. Not until IS expansion into Kurdish regions of Iraq and the
brutal killing of Kurds did the USA develop a strategy and carry out a limited
air attack in Iraq in August 2014. The formulation of a responsive US strategy
paved the way for the emergence of a US-led coalition, backed by key Arab
countries, including Saudi Arabia, to fight against IS and for joint air strikes
against IS in Syria in September 2014. Although Iran has concerns about the
wider political results of US airstrikes in the region, it does not have any
problem fighting against IS and is willing to lend its support.34 For the external
powers the duality of protecting old alliance patterns and responding to an
emerging situation has led to some controversial policies. Russia did not oppose
the UN Security Council Resolution on the intervention in Libya, yet it opposes
any comparable interference in the civil strife in Syria. The Russian position
partially reflects its reasonable anger at being manipulated in 2011 into
supporting a limited humanitarian initiative to protect civilians trapped in
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Benghazi, while the actual NATO operation was expanded from its outset to
seek regime change in Tripoli, and the overthrow of Qaddafi.
After initial hesitation the USA supported the removal of Mubarak in Egypt
but remained silent when Saudi-led military forces oppressed the protests in
Bahrain.35 Again the distinction reflects differing priorities. The US government
did not want to have an unstable atmosphere in Bahrain, where it possesses an
important naval base, the home of its Fifth Fleet. Saudi Arabia and Iran exploit
this duality and the lack of involvement by external actors to justify their geopo-
litical reasoning, support their regional causes and preserve their hold on power
at home. Despite the policy calculations of international actors, Saudi Arabia
and Iran have succeeded in securing consistent international backing for their
policies in the region. The alliance or closer relations with the USA, Russia,
China and others provides legitimacy for authoritarian rulers; for instance, Saudi
Arabia needs US backing in Egypt as Russian support in the UN Security Coun-
cil and Russian arms supplies assist Iran in Syria.

Conclusion
The geopolitical tremor that preceded the Arab Spring was the Islamic Revolu-
tion in Iran, resulting in a national transformation that became a regional event.
The Arab Spring, however, transformed the Arab political landscape with its
diverse actions and reactions. It launched a new phase in the authoritarian coun-
ter-revolutionary reactions in national spaces, ie Egypt, Bahrain, Syria and also
at regional levels, ie Saudi Arabia, UAE, Iran. The roles of non-state actors, the
political turmoil in several countries and the civil war in Syria required national
actors to respond via shifting alliances and continuous recalculation of policies.
Two counter-revolutionary powers in the region, Saudi Arabia and Iran, are
expending more energy and resources than others in order to ensure the survival
of their respective authoritarian regimes.
Saudi Arabia and Iran aim to preserve authoritarian rule at home, while
continuing their rivalry on a regional scale, and to secure support from external
international actors. The collective consciousness that shaped the new Arab
Spring geography sets forth public demands relating to human rights and greater
economic equity, good governance and a change in the regional political
 Third World Quarterly 333

landscape. While struggling with each other, Saudi Arabia and Iran each defends
the status quo against the ongoing transformation being experienced in Arab
countries. Geopolitical reasoning emerges from their policy calculations in
response to the situation, resulting in strategies to ensure the resilience of their
respective regimes in a political atmosphere that could turn hostile.
Saudi Arabia and Iran face limits in structuring a region or determining the
course of developments in the ways they desire. They are putting the region into
disarray and sowing the seeds of longstanding enmity, which may at some point
prove self-destructive. Iran has vital interests but not as a part of the new Arab
political geography. It put its influence at risk and, as a result, its position in the
Arab palaces and the street seems to be in sharp decline. Saudi Arabia is an
insider and a capable actor in the Arab geography. However, its performance
and impact does not match what it wishes to achieve in the region. The Saudi
strategy of leading a counter-revolution against the Arab Spring has put it out of
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touch, and its message is failing to resonate with a number of Arab countries
and the Arab masses. For both countries the strong link between regime survival
and geopolitical orientation has led to miscalculations, reduced flexibility in the
decision-making process and an inability to adapt to a changing regional envi-
ronment. It is also uncertain for how long they will be able to oppress public
demands at home through coercive methods.
Saudi Arabia and Iran faced challenges on four fronts in their attempt to
channel their geopolitical projections to their domestic, regional and interna-
tional constituencies. First, they faced the limits of overstretching in the regional
environment. The scope of their involvement is beyond their capabilities and
has forced setbacks on certain fronts. Second, the change in regional geography
is so fundamental that it is difficult to reverse, and the new non-state actors are
likely to survive for the foreseeable future. Third, the chance of cold war-style
patron–client relationships with international actors is smaller than ever. They
have succeeded only in creating unreliable and suspicious partnerships with
external powers who are likely to be highly selective and opportunistic in their
regional manoeuvres, lacking the ideological fervour and coherence that existed
during the Cold War. Fourth, the geopolitical reasoning and problem-solving
agenda has not improved the domestic standing of either government. The ultra-
securitised approach towards domestic opposition continues to be the only possi-
ble means of maintaining power.
Saudi and Iranian geopolitical reasoning has lost consistency at the domestic,
regional and international levels. To their surprise the two countries have found
themselves in a position of urgently needing to cooperate with one another in
response to Islamic State expansion into Iraq. Although one may argue that they
did not intend to provoke sectarian divisions, the loss of consistency in their
policies converged with the narrative of rivalry along sectarian lines. One may
assume certain setbacks on a number of regional issues but the escalation of
regional rivalry on sectarian grounds limits the prospects for common ground.
As the victims of their own policy directions, cooperation or rapprochement is
also an unlikely prospect in the short to medium term. They are likely to recali-
brate polices based on shifting interpretations of policies and interests. However,
the ultimate priority in both instances is regime survival and any tactical adjust-
ments would aim only at securing domestic authority.
 334 B. Aras and R. Falk

Notes on contributors
Bülent Aras is Senior Scholar and Coordinator of the Conflict Resolution and
Mediation stream at Istanbul Policy Center, Professor of International Relations
in the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences at Sabancı University and Global Fel-
low at Wilson Center. He is Academic Coordinator of the Project on the Middle
East and Arab Spring (POMEAS). His current research interests include the geo-
politics of the Arab Spring, non-state actors in peace building and bridging the
gap between theory and practice in foreign policy. Recent work has been pub-
lished in Middle East Policy, International Peacekeeping, Political Science
Quarterly, International Journal, Journal of Balkans and Near Eastern Studies,
Journal of Third World Studies and Third World Quarterly.
Richard Falk is Albert G. Milbank Professor of International Law Emeritus at
Princeton University where he was a member of the faculty for 40 years (1961-
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2001). He is Chair of the International Board of Advisers of POMEAS. Between

2002 and 2013 he was associated with Global & International Studies at the
Santa Barbara campus of the University of California, where he continues to
direct a research project on ‘Climate Change, Human Security, and Democracy’
in his role as Fellow of the Orfalea Center. He was the Special Rapporteur on
Occupied Palestine for the United Nations Human Rights Council between 2008
and 2014. He served as Chair of the Board, Nuclear Age Peace Foundation,
2004–12 and is now its Senior Vice President. In 2008–09 he was appointed
expert advisor to the President of the UN General Assembly. He has published
more than 50 books. The most recent is (Re)Imaging Humane Global Gover-
nance (2014).

Notes
1. See Ó Tuathail, “Theorizing Practical Geopolitical Reasoning,” 601‒628.
2. Tunusian, Qatari, Eyptian and Turkish high-level delegations visited Gaza in 2012.
3. Valbjørn and Bank, “The New Arab Cold War,” 3–25.
4. See, for example, Samaan, “Jordan’s New Geopolitics,” 15–26; and Benchemsi, “Morocco,” 57–69.
5. See Roberts, “Behind Qatar’s Intervention in Libya”; Dabrowska, “Saudis’ Response”; and Kirkpatrick
and Schmitt, “Arab Nations Strike in Libya.”
6. Sager, “Challenging Times.”
7. See Roberts, “Qatar and the Muslim Brotherhood,” 84–94.
8. Author interview with Dlawer Ala’Aldeen, President of Middle East Research Institute, Washington, DC,
August 24, 2014.
9. Author interview with a Senior Hamas official, Istanbul, June 12, 2013.
10. Parchami, “The ‘Arab Spring’,” 35–52.
11. Noureddine, “Debate.”
12. Edwards and Jones, “Missing the ‘Devils’?,” 399–415.
13. Sun and Zoubir, “China’s Response,” 2–20.
14. Allison, “Russia and Syria,” 795‒823.
15. See Gerges, “The Obama Approach,” 299‒323; and Ambrosio, “Democratic States,” 331‒346.
16. Perthes, “Europe and the Arab Spring,” 73–84.
17. Scholte, Globalization.
18. Popescu, “The Conflicting Logics,” 420.
19. For a similar discussion, see Keating, “Europeanism and Regionalism,” 1–22.
20. Ó Tuathail and Agnew, “Geopolitics and Discourse,” 79–80.
21. Brown, International Politics.
22. Aarts and Nonneman, Saudi Arabia; and Ramazani, Independence without Freedom.
23. Steinberg, “Leading the Counter-revolution.”
24. Author Interview with Trita Parsi, Washington, DC, August 29, 2014.
25. Ibid.
 Third World Quarterly 335

26. Khalaj and Khalaf, “Reformists take Over.”

27. McCants, “Islamist Outlaws.”
28. “Iran Favors solving Syrian Issue.”
29. Dagher, “Fighters.”
30. Sen, “Proxy War.”
31. Ibid.
32. “Saudi King Warns”; and Gladstone, “Hassan Rouhani Hints.”
33. Tudoroiu, “The Arab Spring,” 304–320.
34. Cooper and Schmitt, “Airstrikes by US”; and Krever, “Iran’s President.”
35. Ambrosio, “Democratic States,” 304–320.

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