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VOL. 205, JANUARY 30, 1992 625

Yap vs. Paras
*
G.R. No. 101236. January 30, 1992.

JULIANA P. YAP, petitioner, vs. MARTIN PARAS and ALFREDO

D. BARCELONA, SR., Judge of the 3rd MTC of Glan Malapatan,
South Cotabato, respondents.

Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Prejudicial question; For a civil

case to be considered prejudicial to a criminal action, it must appear not
only that the civil case involves the same facts upon which the criminal
prosecution is based, but also that the resolution of the issues raised in said
civil action would be necessarily determinative of the guilt or innocence of
the accused.—Section 5, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure
as amended provides: Section 5. Elements of prejudicial question,—The two
(2) essential elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the civil action
involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the
criminal action; and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or
not the criminal action may proceed. A prejudicial question is defined as
that which arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of
the issue involved therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to another
tribunal. The prejudicial question must be determinative of the case before
the court but the jurisdiction to try and resolve the question must be lodged
in another court or tribunal. It is a question based on a fact distinct and
separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it
determines the guilt or innocence of the accused. We have held that "for a
civil case to be considered prejudicial to a criminal action as to cause the
suspension of the criminal action pending the determination of the civil
action, it must appear not only that the civil case involves the same facts
upon which the criminal prosecution is based, but also that the resolution of
the issues raised in said civil action would be necessarily determinative of
the guilt or innocence of the accused."
Same; Same; Same; Suspension; The order dismissing the criminal
action without a motion for suspension in accordance with Sec. 6, Rule 111
of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended and without the
accused in the civil case for the annulment of the second sale, suggests not
only ignorance of the law but also bias on the part of the respondent judge.
—It is worth remarking that not every defense raised in the civil action will
raise a prejudicial question to justify

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* FIRST DIVISION.

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Yap vs. Paras

suspension of the criminal action. The defense must involve an issue similar
or intimately related to the same issue raised in the criminal action and its
resolution should determine whether or not the latter action may proceed.
The order dismissing the criminal action without a motion for suspension in
accordance with Rule 111, Section 6, of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure as amended, and even without the accused indicating his defense
in the civil case for the annulment of the second sale, suggests not only
ignorance of the law but also bias on the part of the respondent judge.
Judicial Ethics; Code of Judicial Conduct; A judge shall be faith-ful to
the law and maintain professional competence and should administer justice
impartially.—Judge Alfredo D. Barcelona, Sr. is sternly reminded that under
the Code of Judicial Conduct, "a judge shall be faithful to the law and
maintain professional competence" and "should administer justice
impartially." He is hereby reprimanded for his questionable conduct in the
case at bar, with the warning that commission of similar acts in the future
will be dealt with more severely.

SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION for certiorari to review the order of the

Municipal Trial Court of Glan Malapatan, South Cotabato.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Mariano C. Alegarbes for petitioner.
Public Attorney's Office for private respondent.

CRUZ, J.:

This is still another dispute between brother and sister over a piece
of property they inherited from their parents. The case is
complicated by the circumstance that the private respondent's
counsel in this petition is the son of the judge, the other respondent,
whose action is being questioned.
Petitioner **Juliana P. Yap was the sister of private respondent
Martin Paras.

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** She died pendente lite on September 2, 1991, and was by resolution of the Court
dated January 13, 1991, substituted by her children, Ruperto, Rustico, Ignacio,
Rogelio, Arsenio, Jr., all surnamed Yap, Rainilda Yap Breta, and the children of the
deceased Teodora Yap Cuaycong.

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Yap us. Paras

On October 31, 1971, according to Yap, Paras sold to her his share
in the intestate estate of their parents for P300.00. The sale was
evidenced by a private document. Nineteen years later, on May
2,1990, Paras sold the same property to Santiago Saya-ang for
P5,000.00. This was evidenced by a notarized Deed of Absolute
Sale.
When Yap learned of the second sale, she filed a complaint for
estafa against Paras and Saya-ang with
1
the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor of General Santos City. On the same date, she filed a
complaint for the nullification of 2 the said sale with the Regional
Trial Court of General Santos City.
After investigation, the Provincial Prosecutor instituted a
criminal complaint for estafa against Paras with the Municipal
Circuit Trial Court of Glan-Malapatan, South Cotabato, presided by
Judge Alfredo D. Barcelona, Sr.
On April 17, 1991, before arraignment of the accused, the trial
judge motu proprio issued an order dismissing the criminal case on
the ground that:

x x x after a careful scrutiny of the statements of complainant, Juliana P. Yap

and of the respondent Martin Paras and his witnesses, the Court holds and
maintained (sic) that there is a prejudicial question to a civil action, which
must be ventilated in the proper civil court. In the case of Ras vs. Rasul, 100
SCRA 125, the Supreme Court had already made a pronouncement that "a
criminal action for Estafa for alleged double sale of property is a prejudicial
question to a civil action for nullity of the alleged Deed of Sale and3
defense
of the alleged vendors of forgeries of their signatures to the Deed."

The petitioner moved for reconsideration, which was denied on

April 30, 1991. She then came to this Court for relief in this special
civil action for certiorari.
The Court could have referred this petition to the Court of
Appeals, which has concurrent jurisdiction under BP 129, but
decided to resolve the case directly in view of the peculiar
circumstances involved.

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1 Rollo, p. 8.
2 lbid., p. 13.
3 Id,pp. 30-31.

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Yap vs. Paras

The petitioner's contention is that where there is a prejudicial

question in a civil case, the criminal action may not be dismissed but
only suspended. Moreover, this suspension may not be done motu
proprio by the judge trying the criminal case but only upon petition
of the defendant in accordance with the Rules of Court. It is also
stressed that a reversal of the order of dismissal would not bar the
prosecution of the accused under the double jeopardy rule because
he has not yet been arraigned.
The Court notes that the counsel for private respondent Paras
who filed the comment in his behalf is the son and namesake of
Judge Barcelona. Atty. Alfredo L. Barcelona, Jr. is employed in the
Public Attorney's Office. He has made it of record that he was not
the counsel of Paras at the time the questioned order of dismissal
was issued by his father. He thus impliedly rejects the charge of bias
against his father.
Perhaps out of filial loyalty, Atty. Barcelona suggests there may
have been a basis for the order in view of the alleged double sale of
the property which was being litigated in the regional trial court. He
concedes, however, that the order may have been premature and that
it could not have been issued motu proprio. Agreeing that double
jeopardy would not attach because of the lack of arraignment, he
asks that his Comment be considered a motion for the suspension of
the criminal action on the ground of prejudicial question.
The Court has deliberated on the issues and finds that the
respondent judge did indeed commit grave abuse of discretion in
motu proprio issuing the order of dismissal.
Section 6, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as
amended by this Court on July 7, 1988, provides as follows:

Section 6. Suspension by reason of prejudicial question.—A petition for

suspension of the criminal action based upon the pendency of a prejudicial
question in a civil action may be filed in the office of the fiscal or the court
conducting the preliminary investigation. When the criminal action has been
filed in court for trial, the petition to suspend shall be filed in the same
criminal action at any time before the prosecution rests.

Judge Barcelona's precipitate action is intriguing, to say the least, in

light of the clear provision of the above-quoted rule.

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Yap vs. Paras

The rule is not even new, being only a rewording of the original
provision in the Rules of Court before they were amended. It plainly
says that the suspension may be made only upon petition and not at
the instance of the judge alone, and it also says suspension, and not
dismissal. One also wonders if the person who notarized the
disputed second sale, Notary Public Alexander C. Barcelona, might
be related to the respondent judge.
But more important than the preceding considerations is the trial
judge's misapprehension of the concept of a prejudicial question.
Section 5, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as
amended provides:

Section 5. Elements of prejudicial question,—The two (2) essential elements

of a prejudicial question are: (a) the civil action involves an issue similar or
intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and (b) the
resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may
proceed.

A prejudicial question is defined as that which arises in a case the

resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved
therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal.
The prejudicial question must be determinative of the case before
the court but the jurisdiction to try and
4
resolve the question must be
lodged in another court or tribunal. It is a question based on a fact
distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected 5
with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused.
We have held that "for a civil case to be considered prejudicial to
a criminal action as to cause the suspension of the criminal action
pending the determination of the civil action, it must appear not only
that the civil case involves the same facts upon which the criminal
prosecution is based, but also that the resolution of the issues raised
in said civil action would be

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4 People vs. Aragon, 94 Phil. 357; Merced vs. Diez, 109 Phil. 155; Zapanta vs.
Montesa, 114 Phil. 428; Fortich-Celdran vs. Celdran, 19 SCRA 502.
5 De Leon vs. Mabanag, 70 Phil. 202; Mendiola vs. Macadaeg, 1 SCRA 593.

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necessarily determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused."
It is the issue in the civil action that is prejudicial to the
continuation of the criminal action, not the criminal action that is
prejudicial to the civil action.
The excerpt quoted by the respondent judge in7 his Order does not
appear anywhere in the decision of Ras v. Rasul. Worse, he has not
only misquoted the decision but also wrongly applied it. The facts of
that case are not analogous to those in the case at bar.
In that case, Ras allegedly sold to Pichel a parcel of land which
he later also sold to Martin. Pichel brought a civil action for
nullification of the second sale and asked that the sale made by Ras
in his favor be declared valid. Ras's defense was that he never sold
the property to Pichel and his purported signatures appearing in the
first deed of sale were forgeries. Later, an information for estafa was
filed against Ras based on the same double sale that was the subject
of the civil action. Ras filed a "Motion for Suspension of Action"
(that is, the criminal case), claiming that the resolution of the issues
in the civil case would necessarily be determinative of his guilt or
innocence.
Through then Associate Justice Claudio Teehankee, this Court
ruled that a suspension of the criminal action was in order because:

On the basis of the issues raised in both the criminal and civil cases against
petitioner and in the light of the foregoing concepts of a prejudicial
question, there indeed appears to be a prejudicial question in the case at bar,
considering that petitioner Alejandro Ras' defense (as defendant) in Civil
Case No. 73 of the nullity and forgery of the alleged prior deed of sale in
favor of Luis Pichel (plaintiff in the civil case and complaining witnesses in
the criminal case) is based on the very same facts which would be
necessarily determinative of petitioner Ras' guilt or innocence as accused in
the criminal case. If the first alleged sale in favor of Pichel is void or
fictitious, then there would be no double sale and petitioner would be
innocent of the offense charged. A conviction in the criminal case (if it were
allowed to

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6 Ras vs. Rasul, 100 SCRA 125; Mendiola vs. Macadaeg, supra.
7 Supra.

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Yap vs. Paras

proceed ahead) would be a gross injustice and would have to be set aside if
it were finally decided in the civil action that indeed the alleged prior dead
of sale was a forgery and spurious.
xxx
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The petitioner Alejandro Ras claims in his answer to the complaint in

Civil Case No. 73 that he had never sold the property in litigation to the
plaintiff (Luis Pichel) and that his signatures in the alleged deed of sale and
that of his wife were forged by the plaintiff. It is, therefore, necessary that
the truth or falsity of such claim be first determined because if his claim is
true, then he did not sell his property twice and no estafa was committed.
The question of nullity of the sale is distinct and separate from the crime of
estafa (alleged double sale) but so intimately connected with it that it
determines the guilt or innocence of herein petitioner in the criminal action.

In the Ras case, there was a motion to suspend the criminal action on
the ground that the defense in the civil case—forgery of his
signature in the first deed of sale—had to be threshed out first.
Resolution of that question would necessarily resolve the guilt or
innocence of the accused in the criminal case. By contrast, there was
no motion for suspension in the case at bar; and no less importantly,
the respondent judge had not been informed of the defense Paras
was raising in the civil action. Judge Barcelona could not have
ascertained then if the issue raised in the civil action would
determine the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case.
It is worth remarking that not every defense raised in the civil
action will raise a prejudicial question to justify suspension of the
criminal action. The defense must involve an issue similar or
intimately related to the same issue raised in the criminal action and
its resolution should determine whether or not the latter action may
proceed.
The order dismissing the criminal action without a motion for
suspension in accordance with Rule 111, Section 6, of the 1985
Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended, and even without the
accused indicating his defense in the civil case for the annulment of
the second sale, suggests not only ignorance of the law but also bias
on the part of the respondent judge.
Judge Alfredo D. Barcelona, Sr. is sternly reminded that under
the Code of Judicial Conduct, "a judge shall be faithful to the law
and maintain professional competence" and "should ad-

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Samhwa Company Ltd. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court

minister justice impartially." He is hereby reprimanded for his

questionable conduct in the case at bar, with the warning that
commission of similar acts in the future will be dealt with more
severely.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Order issued by
Judge Alfredo D. Barcelona, Sr. dated April 17, 1991, dismissing
Criminal Case No. 1902-G, and the Order dated April 30, 1991,
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denying the motion for reconsideration, are REVERSED and SET

ASIDE. Criminal Case No. 1902-G is ordered REINSTATED for
further proceedings, but to be assigned to a different judge.
SO ORDERED.

Narvasa (C.J.), Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

Petition granted; order reversed and set aside.

Note.—Court finds Judge Montemayor guilty of gross

negligence and grave partiality in issuing the questioned orders and
writs. (McCormack vs. Montemayor, 187 SCRA 713.)

——o0o——

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