12. TERESITA ALCANTARA VERGARA vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No.
160328, February 04, 2005
Facts:
On June 13, 1988, Livelihood Corporation (LIVECOR) granted Perpetual Garments
Corporation (PERPETUAL) a continuing credit line in the amount of P750,000.00.4 The parties
agreed that for each availment from the line, PERPETUAL would execute a promissory note and
issue postdated checks corresponding to the amount of the loan. Petitioner, in her capacity as
Vice President and General Manager of PERPETUAL, signed the credit agreement and all the
postdated checks.
One of the checks issued and signed by petitioner was Check No. 019972 for
P150,000.00. When deposited on December 15, 1988, the check was
dishonored for insuffiency of funds.5 On the same month, LIVECOR verbally informed
petitioner of the dishonor of the check.
On April 1, 1991, LIVECOR charged petitioner with violation of BP 22.
Petitioner averred that she cannot be charged with violation of BP 22 because she replaced
Check No. 019972 on May 25, 1989, with 6 checks, each for P25,000.00 or for the total amount
of P150,000.00. She claimed that from the time of dishonor up to March 1992, PERPETUAL
paid LIVECOR P542,000.00 thus covering the full amount of the dishonored check.
On June 10, 1992, the trial court rendered decision finding petitioner guilty of violating
BP 22. It ruled, however, that petitioner is not civilly liable to LIVECOR.
Dissatisfied, both LIVECOR and petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals. On March
28, 2003, the appellate court dismissed the consolidated appeals and affirmed the trial court’s
decision in all respects. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but was denied on September 30,
2003. Hence, the instant petition.
1st Topic: Violation of BP 22; equipoise doctrine
Issue:
Whether petitioner should be convicted of violation of BP 22.
Ruling:
No. Petitioner should not be convicted of violation of BP 22.
The elements of the crime are as follows:
1. The accused makes, draws or issues any check to apply to account or
for value.
2. The check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for
insufficiency of funds or credit; or it would have been dishonored for the
same reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the
bank to stop payment.
3. The accused knows at the time of the issuance that he or she does not
have sufficient funds in, or credit with, drawee bank for the payment of
the check in full upon its presentment.15
To hold petitioner liable for violation of BP 22, it is not enough that she issued the
check that was subsequently dishonored for insufficiency of funds. It must be
shown further that the person who issued the check knew "at the time of issue that he
does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such
check in full upon its presentment." Because this element involves a state of mind
which is difficult to establish, Section 2 of the law creates a prima facie presumption of
such knowledge.
In other words, the prima facie presumption arises when a check is issued. But the law
also provides that the presumption does not arise when the issuer pays the amount of the
check or makes arrangement for its payment "within five banking days after receiving
notice that such check has not been paid by the drawee." Verily, BP 22 gives the accused
an opportunity to satisfy the amount indicated in the check and thus avert
prosecution.16 (Emphasis ours)
Going through the records of this case, we find that it was not clearly established
when the notice of dishonor was served on petitioner.
To our mind, the testimonies presented in the trial by the prosecutor do not categorically
prove exactly when petitioner received the notice of dishonor. Hence, there was no way
of determining when the 5-day period prescribed in Section 2 of BP 22 would start and
end.
In Danao v. Court of Appeals,20 we held that if there is no proof as to when such
notice was received by the drawer, then the presumption or prima facie evidence provided
in Section 2 of B.P. Blg. 22 cannot arise, since there would simply be no way of
reckoning the crucial 5-day period.
In the present case, no proof of receipt by petitioner of any notice of non-payment of the
checks was ever presented during the trial.
Even assuming that petitioner was properly notified of the dishonor, still, the prima
facie presumption of knowledge of insufficiency of funds would not arise.
The presumption that the issuer has knowledge of the insufficiency of funds is
brought into existence only after it is proved that the issuer had received notice of
dishonor and that within 5 banking days from receipt thereof, he failed to pay the amount
of the check or to make arrangement for its payment. The prosecution is burdened to
prove these acts that give rise to the prima facie presumption.
Under the equipoise rule, where the evidence on an issue of fact is in equipoise
or there is doubt on which side the evidence preponderates, the party having the burden
of proof loses. The equipoise rule finds application if, as in this case, the inculpatory facts
and circumstances are capable of two or more explanations, one of which is consistent
with the innocence of the accused and the other consistent with his guilt, for then the
evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty, and does not suffice to produce a
conviction. Briefly stated, the needed quantum of proof to convict the accused of the
crime charged is found lacking.
In the case at bar, the constitutional presumption of innocence tilts the scales in
favor of petitioner considering that the prosecution failed to discharge its burden of
proving the evidentiary facts that would establish the prima facie presumption of
knowledge of the insufficiency of funds. In criminal cases, the prosecution’s cases must
rise and fall on the strength of its own evidence, never on the weakness of the defense.
