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1987 Decisions > G.R. No. 78164 July 31, 1987 - TERESITA
TABLARIN, ET AL. v. ANGELINA S. GUTIERREZ:

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 78164. July 31, 1987.]

TERESITA TABLARIN, MA. LUZ CIRIACO, MA. NIMFA B.

ROVIRA, EVANGELINA S. LABAO, in their behalf and in
behalf of applicants for admission into the Medical
Colleges during the school year 1987-88 and future years
who have not taken or successfully hurdled the National
Medical Admission Test (NMAT), Petitioners, v. THE
HONORABLE JUDGE ANGELINA S. GUTIERREZ, Presiding
Judge of Branch XXXVII of the Regional Trial Court of the
National Capital Judicial Region with seat at Manila, THE
HONORABLE SECRETARY LOURDES QUISUMBING, in her
capacity as Chairman of the BOARD OF MEDICAL
EDUCATION, and THE CENTER FOR EDUCATIONAL
 MEASUREMENT (CEM), Respondents.

SYLLABUS

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; DECLARATION OF

UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUTE AND ADMINISTRATIVE
ORDER; BURDEN OF PROOF TO BE DISCHARGED; CASE AT BAR.
— Article II of the 1987 Constitution sets forth in its second half
certain "State policies" which the government is enjoined to
pursue and promote. The petitioners here have not seriously
undertaken to demonstrate to what extent or in what manner
the statute and the administrative order they assail collide with
the State policies embodied in Sections 11, 13 and 17. They
have not, in other words, discharged the burden of proof which
lies upon them. This burden is heavy enough where the
constitutional provision invoked is relatively specific, rather than
abstract, in character and cast in behavioral or operational
terms. That burden of proof becomes of necessity heavier where
the constitutional provision invoked is cast, as the second portion
of Article II is cast, in language descriptive of basic policies, or
more precisely, of basic objectives of State policy and therefore
highly generalized in tenor. The petitioners have not made their
case, even a prima facie case, and we are not compelled to
speculate and to imagine how the legislation and regulation
impugned as unconstitutional could possibly offend the
constitutional provisions pointed to by the petitioners. Turning to
Article XIV, Section 1, of the 1987 Constitution, we note that
once more petitioners have failed to demonstrate that the
statute and regulation they assail in fact clash with that
provision. On the contrary we may note — in anticipation of
discussion infra - that the statute and the regulation which
petitioners attack are in fact designed to promote "quality
education" at the level of professional schools. When one reads
Section 1 in relation to Section 5 (3) of Article XIV as one must
one cannot but note that the latter phrase of Section 1 is not to
be read with absolute literalness. The State is not really enjoined
to take appropriate steps to make quality education "accessible
to all who might for any number of reasons wish to enroll in a
professional school but rather merely to make such education
accessible to all who qualify under "fair, reasonable and equitable
admission and academic requirements." cralaw virtua1aw library

2. ID.; CONSTITUTIONALITY ESSENTIALLY A QUESTION OF

POWER OR AUTHORITY; QUESTIONS AS TO DESIRABILITY,
WISDOM OR UTILITY OF LEGISLATION OR ADMINISTRATIVE
REGULATION PROPERLY ADDRESSED TO POLITICAL
DEPARTMENTS OF GOVERNMENT. — The petitioners also urge
that the NMAT prescribed in MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, is an
"unfair, unreasonable and inequitable requirement," which
results in a denial of due process. Again, petitioners have failed
to specify just what factors or features of the NMAT render it
"unfair" and "unreasonable" or "inequitable." They appear to
suggest that passing the NMAT is an unnecessary requirement
when added on top of the admission requirements set out in
Section 7 of the Medical Act of 1959, and other admission
requirements established by internal regulations of the various
medical schools, public or private. Petitioners arguments thus
appear to relate to utility and wisdom or desirability of the NMAT
requirement. But constitutionality is essentially a question of
power or authority: this Court has neither commission or
competence to pass upon questions of the desirability or wisdom
or utility of legislation or administrative regulation. Those
questions must be addressed to the political departments of the
government not to the courts.

3. ID.; PRINCIPLE OF NON-DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE

POWER; APPLIED WITH CIRCUMSPECTION WHERE STATUTES
DEAL WITH COMPLEX AND TECHNICAL SUBJECTS; PRINCIPLE
OF SUBORDINATE LEGISLATION; STANDARDS SET FOR
SUBORDINATE LEGISLATION NECESSARILY BROAD AND HIGHLY
ABSTRACT. — The general principle of non-delegation of
legislative power, which both flows from the reinforces the more
fundamental rule of the separation and allocation of powers
among the three great departments of government, must be
applied with circumspection in respect of statutes which like the
Medical Act of 1959, deal with subjects as obviously complex and
technical as medical education and the practice of medicine in
our present day world. Mr. Justice Laurel stressed this point 47
years ago in Pangasinan Transportation Co., Inc. v. The Public
Service Commission: "One thing, however, is apparent in the
development of the principle of separation of powers and that is
that the maxim of delegatus non potest delegare or delegati
potestas non potest delegare, adopted this practice (Delegibus et
Consuetudiniis Anglia edited by G.E. Woodbine, Yale University
Press, 1922, Vol. 2, p. 167) but which is also recognized in
principle in the Roman Law (d.17.18,3) has been made to adapt
itself to the complexities of modern government, giving rise to
the adoption, within certain limits, of the principle of
‘subordinate legislation,’ not only in the United States and
England but in practically all modern governments. (People v.
Rosenthal and Osmena [68 Phil. 318, 1939]. Accordingly, with
the growing complexity of modern life, the multiplication of the
subjects of governmental regulation, and the increased difficulty
of administering the laws, there is a constantly growing tendency
toward the delegation of greater power by the legislature, and
toward the approval of the practice by the courts." The standards
set for subordinate legislation in the exercise of rule making
authority by an administrative agency like the Board of Medical
Education are necessarily broad and highly abstract. As
explained by then Mr. Justice Fernando in Edu v. Ericta — "The
standard may be either expressed or implied. If the former, the
non-delegation objection is easily met. The standard though
does not have to be spelled out specifically. It could be implied
from the policy and purpose of the act considered as a whole. In
the Reflector Law, clearly the legislative objective is public
safety. What is sought to be attained as in Calalang v. Williams is
‘safe transit upon the roads.’" We believe and so hold that the
necessary standards are set forth in Section 1 of the 1959
Medical Act: "the standardization and regulation of medical
education" and in Section 5 (a) and 7 of the same Act, the body
of the statute itself, and that these considered together are
sufficient compliance with the requirements of the non-
delegation principle.

4. ID.; POLICE POWER; NATURE AND OBJECTIVE; REGULATION

OF PRACTICE OF MEDICINE INCLUDING ADMISSION TO RANKS
OF AUTHORIZED PRACTITIONERS A VALID EXERCISE THEREOF.
— There is another reason why the petitioners’ arguments must
fail: the legislative and administrative provisions impugned by
them constitute, to the mind of the Court, a valid exercise of the
police power of the state. The police power, it is commonplace
learning, is the pervasive and non-waivable power and authority
of the sovereign to secure and promote all the important
interests and needs — in a word, the public order — of the
general community. An important component of that public order
is the health and physical safety and well being of the
population, the securing of which no one can deny is a legitimate
objective of governmental effort and regulation. Perhaps the only
issue that needs some consideration is whether there is some
reasonable relation between the prescribing of passing the NMAT
as a condition for admission to medical school on the one hand,
and the securing of the health and safety of the general
community, on the other hand. This question is perhaps most
usefully approached by recalling that the regulation of the
practice of medicine in all its branches has long been recognized
as a reasonable method of protecting the health and safety of
the public. That the power to regulate and control the practice of
medicine includes the power to regulate admission to the ranks
of those authorized to practice medicine, is also well recognized.
Thus, legislation and administrative regulations requiring those
who wish to practice medicine first to take and pass medical
board examinations have long ago been recognized as valid
exercises of governmental power. Similarly, the establishment of
minimum medical educational requirements — i.e., the
completion of prescribed courses in a recognized medical school
— for admission to the medical profession, has also been
sustained as a legitimate exercise of the regulatory authority of
the state.

5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. — What we have before us in

the instant case is closely related; the regulation of access to
medical schools. MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, as noted earlier,
articulates the rationale of regulation of this type: the
improvement of the professional and technical quality of the
graduates of medical schools, by upgrading the quality of those
admitted to the student body of the medical schools. That
upgrading is sought by selectivity in the process of admission,
selectivity consisting, among other things, of limiting admission
to those who exhibit in the required degree the aptitude for
medical studies and eventually for medical practice. The need to
maintain, and the difficulties of maintaining, high standards in
our professional schools in general, and medical schools in
particular, in the current stage of our social and economic
development, are widely known. We believe that the government
is entitled to prescribe an admission test like the NMAT as a
means for achieving its stated objective of "upgrading the
selection of applicants into [our] medical schools" and of
"improv[ing] the quality of medical education in the country."
Given the widespread use today of such admission tests in, for
instance, medical schools in the United States of America (the
Medical College Admission Test [MCAT] and quite probably in
other countries with far more developed educational resources
than our own, and taking into account the failure or inability of
the petitioners to even attempt to prove otherwise, we are
entitled to hold that the NMAT is reasonably related to the
securing of the ultimate end of legislation and regulation in this
area. That end, it is useful to recall, is the protection of the
public from the potentially deadly effects of incompetence and
ignorance in those who would undertake to treat our bodies and
minds for disease or trauma.

6. ID.; BILL OF RIGHTS; EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS;

NOT VIOLATED BY MECS ORDER NO. 52, S. 1985. — Petitioners
have contended, finally, that MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, is in
conflict with the equal protection clause of the Constitution. More
specifically, petitioners assert that portion of the MECS Order
which provides that "the cutoff score for the successful
applicants, based on the scores on the NMAT, shall be
determined every year by the Board of Medical Education after
consultation with the Association of Philippine Medical Colleges"
infringes the requirements of equal protection. They assert, in
other words, that students seeking admission during a given
school year. e.g., 1987-1988, when subjected to a different
cutoff score than that established for an, e.g., earlier school year,
are discriminated against and that this renders the MECS Order
"arbitrary and capricious." The force of this argument is more
apparent than real. Different cutoff scores for different school
years may be dictated by differing conditions obtaining during
those years. Thus, the appropriate cutoff score for a given year
may be a function of such factors as the number of students who
have reached the cutoff score established the preceding year;
the number of places available in medical schools during the
current year; the average score attained during the current year;
the level of difficulty of the test given during the current year,
and so forth. To establish a permanent and immutable cutoff
score regardless of changes in circumstances from year to year,
may well result in an unreasonable rigidity. The above language
in MECS Order No. 52, far from being arbitrary or capricious,
leaves the Board of Medical Education with the measure of
flexibility needed to meet circumstances as they change.
 DECISION

FELICIANO, J.:

The petitioners sought admission into colleges or schools of medicine

for the school year 1987-1988. However, the petitioners either did
not take or did not successfully take the National Medical Admission
Test (NMAT) required by the Board of Medical Education, one of the
public respondents, and administered by the private respondent, the
Center for Educational Measurement (CEM).

On 5 March 1987, the petitioners filed with the Regional Trial Court,
National Capital Judicial Region, a Petition for Declaratory Judgment
and Prohibition with a prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and
Preliminary Injunction. The petitioners sought to enjoin the Secretary
of Education, Culture and Sports, the Board of Medical Education and
the Center for Educational Measurement from enforcing Section 5 (a)
and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382, as amended, and MECS Order No.
52, series of 1985, dated 23 August 1985 and from requiring the
taking and passing of the NMAT as a condition for securing
certificates of eligibility for admission, from proceeding with
accepting applications for taking the NMAT and from administering
the NMAT as scheduled on 26 April 1987 and in the future. After
hearing on the petition for issuance of preliminary injunction, the
trial court denied said petition on 20 April 1987. The NMAT was
conducted and administered as previously scheduled.

Petitioners accordingly filed this Special Civil Action for Certiorari with
this Court to set aside the Order of the respondent judge denying the
petition for issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.

Republic Act 2382, as amended by Republic Acts Nos. 4224 and

5946, known as the "Medical Act of 1959" defines its basic objectives
in the following manner: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"SECTION 1. Objectives. — This Act provides for and shall govern (a)
the standardization and regulation of medical education; (b) the
examination for registration of physicians; and (c) the supervision,
control and regulation of the practice of medicine in the Philippines."
(Emphasis supplied)

The statute, among other things, created a Board of Medical

Education which is composed of (a) the Secretary of Education,
Culture and Sports or his duly authorized representative, as
Chairman; (b) the Secretary of Health or his duly authorized
representative; (c) the Director of Higher Education or his duly
authorized representative; (d) the Chairman of the Medical Board or
his duly authorized representative; (e) a representative of the
Philippine Medical Association; (f) the Dean of the College of
Medicine, University of the Philippines; (g) a representative of the
Council of Deans of Philippine Medical Schools; and (h) a
representative of the Association of Philippine Medical Colleges, as
members. The functions of the Board of Medical Education specified
in Section 5 of the statute include the following: chanrobles law library

"(a) To determine and prescribe requirements for admission into a

recognized college of medicine;

(b) To determine and prescribe requirements for minimum physical

facilities of colleges of medicine, to wit: buildings, including hospitals,
equipment and supplies, apparatus, instruments, appliances,
laboratories, bed capacity for instruction purposes, operating and
delivery rooms, facilities for outpatient services, and others, used for
didactic and practical instruction in accordance with modern trends;

(c) To determine and prescribe the minimum number and minimum

qualifications of teaching personnel, including student-teachers ratio;

(d) To determine and prescribe the minimum required curriculum

leading to the degree of Doctor of Medicine;

(e) To authorize the implementation of experimental medical

curriculum in a medical school that has exceptional faculty and
instrumental facilities. Such an experimental curriculum may
prescribe admission and graduation requirements other than those
prescribed in this Act; Provided, That only exceptional students shall
be enrolled in the experimental curriculum;

(f) To accept applications for certification for admission to a medical

school and keep a register of those issued said certificate; and to
collect from said applicants the amount of twenty-five pesos each
which shall accrue to the operating fund of the Board of Medical
Education;

(g) To select, determine and approve hospitals or some departments

of the hospitals for training which comply with the minimum specific
physical facilities as provided in subparagraph (b) hereof; and

(h) To promulgate and prescribe and enforce the necessary rules and
regulations for the proper implementation of the foregoing
functions." (Emphasis supplied).

Section 7 prescribes certain minimum requirements for applicants to

medical schools: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Admission requirements. — The medical college may admit any

student who has not been convicted by any court of competent
jurisdiction of any offense involving moral turpitude and who
presents (a) a record of completion of a bachelor’s degree in science
or arts; (b) a certificate of eligibility for entrance to a medical school
from the Board of Medical Education; (c) a certificate of good moral
character issued by two former professors in the college of liberal
arts; and (d) birth certificate. Nothing in this act shall be construed
to inhibit any college of medicine from establishing, in addition to the
preceding, other entrance requirements that may be deemed
admissible.

. . ." (Emphasis supplied)

MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, issued by the then Minister of

Education, Culture and Sports and dated 23 August 1985,
established a uniform admission test called the National Medical
Admission Test (NMAT) as an additional requirement for issuance of a
certificate of eligibility for admission into medical schools of the
Philippines, beginning with the school year 1986-1987. This Order
goes on to state that: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"2. The NMAT, an aptitude test, is considered as an instrument

toward upgrading the selection of applicants for admission into the
medical schools and its calculated to improve the quality of medical
education in the country. The cutoff score for the successful
applicants, based on the scores on the NMAT, shall be determined
every year by the Board of Medical Education after consultation with
the Association of Philippine Medical Colleges. The NMAT rating of
each applicant, together with the other admission requirements as
presently called for under existing rules, shall serve as a basis for the
issuance of the prescribed certificate of eligibility for admission into
the medical colleges.

3. Subject to the prior approval of the Board of Medical Education,

each medical college may give other tests for applicants who have
been issued a corresponding certificate of eligibility for admission
that will yield information on other aspects of the applicant’s
personality to complement the information derived from the NMAT.

x x x

8. No applicant shall be issued the requisite Certificate of Eligibility

for Admission (CEA), or admitted for enrollment as first year student
in any medical college, beginning the school year, 1986- 87, without
the required NMAT qualification as called for under this Order."
(Emphasis supplied)

Pursuant to MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, the private respondent

Center conducted NMATs for entrance to medical colleges during the
school year 1986-1987. In December 1986 and in April 1987,
respondent Center conducted the NMATs for admission to medical
colleges during the school year 1987-1988. chanrobles.com : virtual law library

Petitioners raise the question of whether or not a writ of preliminary

injunction may be issued to enjoin the enforcement of Section 5 (a)
and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382, as amended, and MECS Order No.
52, s. 1985, pending resolution of the issue of constitutionality of the
assailed statute and administrative order. We regard this issue as
entirely peripheral in nature. It scarcely needs documentation that a
court would issue a writ of preliminary injunction only when the
petitioner assailing a statute or administrative order has made out a
case of unconstitutionality strong enough to overcome, in the mind
of the judge, the presumption of constitutionality, aside from
showing a clear legal right to the remedy sought. The fundamental
issue is of course the constitutionality of the statute or order
assailed.
1. The petitioners invoke a number of provisions of the 1987
Constitution which are, in their assertion, violated by the continued
implementation of Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act 2381, as
amended, and MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985. The provisions invoked
read as follows: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

(a) Article II, Section 11: "The state values the dignity of every
human person and guarantees full respect of human rights.

"(b) Article II, Section 13: "The State recognizes the vital role of the
youth in nation building and shall promote and protect their physical,
moral, spiritual, intellectual and social well being. It shall inculcate in
the youth patriotism and nationalism, and encourage their
involvement in public and civic affairs.

"(c) Article II, Section 17: "The State shall give priority to education,
science and technology, arts, culture and sports to foster patriotism
and nationalism, accelerate social progress and to promote total
human liberation and development.

"(d) Article XIV, Section 1: "The State shall protect and promote the
right of all citizens to quality education at all levels and take
appropriate steps to make such education accessible to all.

"(e) Article XIV, Section 5 (3): "Every citizen has a right to select a
profession or course of study, subject to fair, reasonable and
equitable admission and academic requirements." cralaw virtua1aw library

Article II of the 1987 Constitution sets forth in its second half certain
"State policies" which the government is enjoined to pursue and
promote. The petitioners here have not seriously undertaken to
demonstrate to what extent or in what manner the statute and the
administrative order they assail collide with the State policies
embodied in Sections 11, 13 and 17. They have not, in other words,
discharged the burden of proof which lies upon them. This burden is
heavy enough where the constitutional provision invoked is relatively
specific, rather than abstract, in character and cast in behavioral or
operational terms. That burden of proof becomes of necessity
heavier where the constitutional provision invoked is cast, as the
second portion of Article II is cast, in language descriptive of basic
policies, or more precisely, of basic objectives of State policy and
therefore highly generalized in tenor. The petitioners have not made
their case, even a prima facie case, and we are not compelled to
speculate and to imagine how the legislation and regulation
impugned as unconstitutional could possibly offend the constitutional
provisions pointed to by the petitioners.

Turning to Article XIV, Section 1, of the 1987 Constitution, we note

that once more petitioners have failed to demonstrate that the
statute and regulation they assail in fact clash with that provision. On
the contrary we may note - in anticipation of discussion infra — that
the statute and the regulation which petitioners attack are in fact
designed to promote "quality education" at the level of professional
schools. When one reads Section 1 in relation to Section 5 (3) of
Article XIV as one must one cannot but note that the latter phrase of
Section 1 is not to be read with absolute literalness. The State is not
really enjoined to take appropriate steps to make quality education
"accessible to all who might for any number of reasons wish to enroll
in a professional school but rather merely to make such education
accessible to all who qualify under "fair, reasonable and equitable
admission and academic requirements." cralaw virtua1aw library

2. In the trial court, petitioners had made the argument that Section
5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382, as amended, offend against
the constitutional principle which forbids the undue delegation of
legislative power, by failing to establish the necessary standard to be
followed by the delegate, the Board of Medical Education. The
general principle of non-delegation of legislative power, which both
flows from the reinforces the more fundamental rule of the
separation and allocation of powers among the three great
departments of government, 1 must be applied with circumspection
in respect of statutes which like the Medical Act of 1959, deal with
subjects as obviously complex and technical as medical education
and the practice of medicine in our present day world. Mr. Justice
Laurel stressed this point 47 years ago in Pangasinan Transportation
Co., Inc. v. The Public Service Commission: 2

"One thing, however, is apparent in the development of the principle

of separation of powers and that is that the maxim of delegatus non
potest delegare or delegati potestas non potest delegare, adopted
this practice (Delegibus et Consuetudiniis Anglia edited by G.E.
Woodbine, Yale University Press, 1922, Vol. 2, p. 167) but which is
also recognized in principle in the Roman Law (d.17.18,3) has been
made to adapt itself to the complexities of modern government,
giving rise to the adoption, within certain limits, of the principle of
‘subordinate legislation,’ not only in the United States and England
but in practically all modern governments. (People v. Rosenthal and
Osmena [68 Phil. 318, 1939]. Accordingly, with the growing
complexity of modern life, the multiplication of the subjects of
governmental regulation, and the increased difficulty of
administering the laws, there is a constantly growing tendency
toward the delegation of greater power by the legislature, and
toward the approval of the practice by the courts." 3

The standards set for subordinate legislation in the exercise of rule

making authority by an administrative agency like the Board of
Medical Education are necessarily broad and highly abstract. As
explained by then Mr. Justice Fernando in Edu v. Ericta 4 —

"The standard may be either expressed or implied. If the former, the

non-delegation objection is easily met. The standard though does not
have to be spelled out specifically. It could be implied from the policy
and purpose of the act considered as a whole. In the Reflector Law,
clearly the legislative objective is public safety. What is sought to be
attained as in Calalang v. Williams is ‘safe transit upon the roads.’" 5

We believe and so hold that the necessary standards are set forth in
Section 1 of the 1959 Medical Act: "the standardization and
regulation of medical education" and in Section 5 (a) and 7 of the
same Act, the body of the statute itself, and that these considered
together are sufficient compliance with the requirements of the non-
delegation principle. chanrobles law library

3. The petitioners also urge that the NMAT prescribed in MECS Order
No. 52, s. 1985, is an "unfair, unreasonable and inequitable
requirement," which results in a denial of due process. Again,
petitioners have failed to specify just what factors or features of the
NMAT render it "unfair" and "unreasonable" or "inequitable." They
appear to suggest that passing the NMAT is an unnecessary
requirement when added on top of the admission requirements set
out in Section 7 of the Medical Act of 1959, and other admission
requirements established by internal regulations of the various
medical schools, public or private. Petitioners arguments thus appear
to relate to utility and wisdom or desirability of the NMAT
requirement. But constitutionality is essentially a question of power
or authority: this Court has neither commission or competence to
pass upon questions of the desirability or wisdom or utility of
legislation or administrative regulation. Those questions must be
addressed to the political departments of the government not to the
courts.

There is another reason why the petitioners’ arguments must fail:

the legislative and administrative provisions impugned by them
constitute, to the mind of the Court, a valid exercise of the police
power of the state. The police power, it is commonplace learning, is
the pervasive and non-waivable power and authority of the sovereign
to secure and promote all the important interests and needs — in a
word, the public order — of the general community. 6 An important
component of that public order is the health and physical safety and
well being of the population, the securing of which no one can deny
is a legitimate objective of governmental effort and regulation. 7

Perhaps the only issue that needs some consideration is whether

there is some reasonable relation between the prescribing of passing
the NMAT as a condition for admission to medical school on the one
hand, and the securing of the health and safety of the general
community, on the other hand. This question is perhaps most
usefully approached by recalling that the regulation of the practice of
medicine in all its branches has long been recognized as a reasonable
method of protecting the health and safety of the public. 8 That the
power to regulate and control the practice of medicine includes the
power to regulate admission to the ranks of those authorized to
practice medicine, is also well recognized. Thus, legislation and
administrative regulations requiring those who wish to practice
medicine first to take and pass medical board examinations have
long ago been recognized as valid exercises of governmental power.
9 Similarly, the establishment of minimum medical educational
requirements — i.e., the completion of prescribed courses in a
recognized medical school — for admission to the medical profession,
has also been sustained as a legitimate exercise of the regulatory
authority of the state. 10 What we have before us in the instant case
is closely related; the regulation of access to medical schools. MECS
Order No. 52, s. 1985, as noted earlier, articulates the rationale of
regulation of this type: the improvement of the professional and
technical quality of the graduates of medical schools, by upgrading
the quality of those admitted to the student body of the medical
schools. That upgrading is sought by selectivity in the process of
admission, selectivity consisting, among other things, of limiting
admission to those who exhibit in the required degree the aptitude
for medical studies and eventually for medical practice. The need to
maintain, and the difficulties of maintaining, high standards in our
professional schools in general, and medical schools in particular, in
the current stage of our social and economic development, are
widely known.

We believe that the government is entitled to prescribe an admission

test like the NMAT as a means for achieving its stated objective of
"upgrading the selection of applicants into [our] medical schools" and
of "improv[ing] the quality of medical education in the country."
Given the widespread use today of such admission tests in, for
instance, medical schools in the United States of America (the
Medical College Admission Test [MCAT] 11 and quite probably in
other countries with far more developed educational resources than
our own, and taking into account the failure or inability of the
petitioners to even attempt to prove otherwise, we are entitled to
hold that the NMAT is reasonably related to the securing of the
ultimate end of legislation and regulation in this area. That end, it is
useful to recall, is the protection of the public from the potentially
deadly effects of incompetence and ignorance in those who would
undertake to treat our bodies and minds for disease or trauma. chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

4. Petitioners have contended, finally, that MECS Order No. 52, s.

1985, is in conflict with the equal protection clause of the
Constitution. More specifically, petitioners assert that portion of the
MECS Order which provides that.

"the cutoff score for the successful applicants, based on the scores
on the NMAT, shall be determined every year by the Board of Medical
Education after consultation with the Association of Philippine Medical
Colleges." (Emphasis supplied).

infringes the requirements of equal protection. They assert, in other

words, that students seeking admission during a given school year.
e.g., 1987-1988, when subjected to a different cutoff score than that
established for an, e.g., earlier school year, are discriminated against
and that this renders the MECS Order "arbitrary and capricious." The
force of this argument is more apparent than real. Different cutoff
scores for different school years may be dictated by differing
conditions obtaining during those years. Thus, the appropriate cutoff
score for a given year may be a function of such factors as the
number of students who have reached the cutoff score established
the preceding year; the number of places available in medical
schools during the current year; the average score attained during
the current year; the level of difficulty of the test given during the
current year, and so forth. To establish a permanent and immutable
cutoff score regardless of changes in circumstances from year to
year, may well result in an unreasonable rigidity. The above language
in MECS Order No. 52, far from being arbitrary or capricious, leaves
the Board of Medical Education with the measure of flexibility needed
to meet circumstances as they change.

We conclude that prescribing the NMAT and requiring certain

minimum scores therein as a condition for admission to medical
schools in the Philippines, do not constitute an unconstitutional
imposition.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED and the Order

of the respondent trial court denying the petition for a writ of
preliminary injunction is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, C.J., Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez,

Jr., Cruz, Paras, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento and Cortes, JJ.,
concur.

Endnotes:

1. See People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 (1937) and Pelaez v.

Auditor General, 15 SCRA 569 (1965).

2. 70 Phil. 221 (1940).

3. 70 Phil., at 229; underscoring supplied.

4. 35 SCRA 481 (1970).

5. 35 SCRA, at 497; underscoring supplied. At this point,

Mr. Justice Fernando dropped a useful footnote of the
following tenor: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"This Court has considered as sufficient standards, ‘public

welfare,’ Municipality of Cardona v. Binangonan, 36 Phil.
547 (1917); ‘necessary in the interest of law and order,’
Rubi v. Provincial Board, 39 Phil. 660 (1919); ‘public
interest,’ People v. Rosenthal, 68 Phil. 328 (1939); and
‘justice and equity and substantial merits of the case,’
International Hardwood v. Pangil Federation of Labor, 70
Phil. 602 (1940)." cralaw virtua1aw library

In People v. Exconde, 101 Phil. 1125 (1957), Mr. Justice

J.B.L. Reyes said: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"It is well established in this jurisdiction that, while the

making of laws is a non-delegable activity that
corresponds exclusively to Congress, nevertheless, the
latter may constitutionally delegate authority and
promulgate rules and regulations to implement a given
legislation and effectuate its policies, for the reason that
the legislature often finds it impracticable (if not
impossible) to anticipate and provide for the multifarious
and complex situations that may be met in carrying the
law into effect. All that is required is that the regulation
should be germane to the objects and purposes of the
law; that the regulation be not in contradiction with it, but
conform to the standards that the law prescribes —."
(101 Phil. at 1129; Emphasis supplied).

6. E.G., U.S. v. Toribio, 15 Phil. 85 (1910); Ermita-Malate

Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc. v. Mayor of
Manila, 20 SCRA 849 (1967) and Morfe v. Mutuc, 22
SCRA 424 (1968).

7. E.G., Case v. Board of Health, 24 Phil. 256 (1913);

People v. Witte, 146 NE 178 (1925) and Lorenzo v.
Director of Health, 50 Phil. 595 (1927).

8. Barsky v. Board of Regents, 347 US 442, 98 L.Ed. 829,

74 SCT. 650 (1954); Louisiana State Board of Medical
Examiners v. Beatty, 220 La. 1, 55 So2d. 761 (1951) and
Reisinger v. Com., State Board of Medical Education and
Licensure, Et Al., 399 A2d 1160 (1979).

9. Dent v. West Virginia, 129 US 114, 32 L.Ed. 623, 9

SCt. 231 (1889); State v. Bair, 112 Jowa 466, 84 NW 532
(1900).

10. People v. Love, 298 Ill 304, 131 NE 809, 16 ALR 703
(1921); Collins v. Texas, 223 US 288, 56 L.Ed. 439, 32
SCt. 286 (1912).

11. See, e.g., McDonald v. Hogness, Et Al., 92 Wash. 431,

598 P. 2d. 707 (1979).

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G.R. No. L-47147 July

3, 1987 - PEOPLE OF THE
PHIL. v. SENEN OLA

G.R. No. L-67472 July

3, 1987 - DARIO C.
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G.R. Nos. L-48879-82

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1987 - LEONARD W.
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G.R. No. L-49728 July

15, 1987 - PEOPLE OF
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AUSAN
 G.R. No. L-63438 July
15, 1987 - MANUEL
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G.R. No. L-30637 July

16, 1987 - LIANGA BAY
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G.R. No. 76639 July

16, 1987 - EMILIO SY v.
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G.R. No. L-37007 July

20, 1987 - RAMON S.
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G.R. No. L-69377 July

20, 1987 - PEOPLE OF
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G.R. No. 71813 July

20, 1987 - ROSALINA P.
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COMMISSION

G.R. No. L-33050 July

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G.R. No. L-33654 July

23, 1987 - MEYNARDO Q.
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G.R. No. L-35800 July

23, 1987 - ROSALINDA
PA-AC v. ITOGON-SUYOC
MINES, INC.
 G.R. No. L-41171 July
23, 1987 - PATROCINIO
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G.R. No. L-46010 July

23, 1987 - CANDIDA B.
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G.R. No. L-46903 July

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G.R. No. L-56398 July

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G.R. No. L-57338 July

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G.R. No. L-58292 July

23, 1987 - ADAMSON &
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AUGUSTO M. AMORES

G.R. No. L-69303 July

23, 1987 - HEIRS OF
MARIA MARASIGAN v.
INTERMEDIATE
APPELLATE COURT

G.R. No. 73008 July

23, 1987 - PEOPLE OF
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BOHOLST

G.R. No. 76872 July

23, 1987 - WILFREDO S.
TORRES v. NEPTALI A.
GONZALES
 G.R. No. L-78780 July
23, 1987 - DAVID G.
NITAFAN v.
COMMISSIONER OF
INTERNAL REVENUE

A.C. No. 1327 July 27,

1987 - RE: ATTY.
OCTAVIO D. FULE

G.R. Nos. L-36906-07

July 27, 1987 - ISAAC O.
TOLENTINO v. ONOFRE A.
VILLALUZ

G.R. Nos. 71131-32

July 27, 1987 - REPUBLIC
SURETY AND INSURANCE
CO., INC. v.
INTERMEDIATE
APPELLATE COURT

G.R. Nos. 72316-17

July 27, 1987 - PEOPLE
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BALMUDE LIZA

G.R. No. 76746 July

27, 1987 - DURABUILT
RECAPPING PLANT &
COMPANY v. NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION

G.R. No. 77918 July

27, 1987 - FRANCISCO
LECAROZ v. JAIME N.
FERRER

G.R. No. L-46591 July

28, 1987 - BANCO
FILIPINO SAVINGS AND
MORTGAGE BANK v.
MIGUEL NAVARRO

G.R. No. L-49162 July

28, 1987 - JANICE MARIE
JAO v. COURT OF
APPEALS

G.R. No. L-54045 July

28, 1987 - DIRECTOR OF
LANDS v. EDUARDO R.
BENGZON

G.R. No. L-56614 July

28, 1987 - ROMAN
SANTOS, JR. v. COURT
OF APPEALS

G.R. No. L-71768 July

28, 1987 - PEOPLE OF
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TANAMAN

G.R. No. L-32621 July

29, 1987 - ASSOC. OF
BAPTISTS FOR WORLD
EVANGELISM, INC. v.
FIRST BAPTIST CHURCH

G.R. No. L-51306 July

29, 1987 - PEOPLE OF
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CAMAY

G.R. No. L-51369 July

29, 1987 - MODESTA
BADILLO v. CLARITA
FERRER

G.R. No. 74041 July

29, 1987 - PEOPLE OF
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LIGON

G.R. Nos. 77317-50

July 29, 1987 - MADID
MACAGA-AN v. PEOPLE
OF THE PHIL.

G.R. No. L-58651 July

30, 1987 - VIRGINIA T.
VELASCO v. GRACIANO P.
GAYAPA, JR.

G.R. No. L-63132 July

30, 1987 - ELIAS S.
MENDOZA v.
INTERMEDIATE
APPELLATE COURT

G.R. No. 71907 July

30, 1987 - EDI-STAFF
BUILDERS
INTERNATIONAL v.
VICENTE LEOGARDO, JR.

G.R. No. 72727 July

30, 1987 - BENITO DILAG
v. INTERMEDIATE
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G.R. Nos. 74485-86

July 30, 1987 - PEOPLE
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GARUFIL

G.R. No. 77353 July

30, 1987 - ASSOCIATED
BANK v. ARSENIO M.
GONONG

A.M. No. R-181-P July

31, 1987 - ADELIO C.
CRUZ v. QUITERIO L.
DALISAY

G.R. No. L-31681 July

31, 1987 - DIRECTOR OF
LANDS v. COURT OF
FIRST INSTANCE OF
RIZAL, BR. XII

G.R. No. L-31974 July

31, 1987 - NICOLAS
LEYTE v. VICENTE N.
CUSI, JR.

G.R. No. L-47521 July

31, 1987 - CAROLINA
CLEMENTE v.
GOVERNMENT SERVICE
INSURANCE SYSTEM

G.R. No. L-46724 July

31, 1987 - PEOPLE OF
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SERANTE

G.R. No. L-47661 July

31, 1987 - JUANITO
CARIÑO v. COURT OF
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G.R. No. L-48672 July

31, 1987 - TROPICAL
HOMES, INC. v.
NATIONAL HOUSING
AUTHORITY

G.R. No. L-49703 July

31, 1987 - REPUBLIC OF
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R. FLOJO

G.R. No. L-58781 July

31, 1987 - TEOFILO
MAGNO v. COURT OF
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31, 1987 - ALFREDO R.
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SANDIGANBAYAN

G.R. No. L-63862 July

31, 1987 - PEOPLE OF
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ANDAYA

G.R. No. L-65211 July

31, 1987 - EDGARDO P.
TOLEDO v.
INTERMEDIATE
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G.R. No. L-66186 July

31, 1987 - AMANCIO
SESE v. INTERMEDIATE
APPELLATE COURT

G.R. No. L-66419 July

31, 1987 - FILINVEST
CREDIT CORPORATION v.
IVAN MENDEZ

G.R. No. L-67583 July

31, 1987 - BASILISA S.
ESCONDE v. SAMILO N.
BARLONGAY

G.R. No. L-69542 July

31, 1987 - PEOPLE OF
THE PHIL. v. ALFONSO
AUDITOR

G.R. No. L-69901 July

31, 1987 - ANTONIO
RAMON ONGSIAKO v.
INTERMEDIATE
APPELLATE COURT
 G.R. No. 70287 July
31, 1987 - PEOPLE OF
THE PHIL. v. FELICIANO
B. RUALO

G.R. No. 70648 July

31, 1987 -
COMMISSIONER OF
CUSTOMS v. COURT OF
TAX APPEALS

G.R. No. L-72301 July

31, 1987 - ROLANDO
PONSICA, ET AL. v.
EMILIO M. IGNALAGA

G.R. No. L-72555 July

31, 1987 - TABACALERA
INSURANCE CO. v.
NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS COMMISSION

G.R. No. 74007 July

31, 1987 - UNIVERSITY
OF THE EAST v.
MINISTER OF LABOR.

G.R. No. 74289 July

31, 1987 - GOLDEN GATE
REALTY CORP. v.
INTERMEDIATE
APPELLATE COURT

G.R. No. 74562 July

31, 1987 - PHIL. LONG
DISTANCE TELEPHONE
CO. v. NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS COMMISSION

G.R. No. 74625 July

31, 1987 - MATEO P.
FRANCISCO v. PELAGIO
S. MANDI

G.R. No. 75380 July

31, 1987 - VICTORIA M.
TOLENTINO v. NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION

G.R. No. 76273 July

31, 1987 - FEU-DR.
 NICANOR REYES
MEDICAL FOUNDATION v.
CRESENCIANO TRAJANO

G.R. No. 78164 July

31, 1987 - TERESITA
TABLARIN, ET AL. v.
ANGELINA S. GUTIERREZ

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