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G.R. No. 228628. July 25, 2017.*

REP. REYNALDO V. UMALI, in his capacity as Chairman

of the House of Representatives Committee on Justice and
Ex Officio Member of the JBC, petitioner, vs. THE
JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL, chaired by THE HON.
MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO, Chief Justice and Ex
Officio Chairperson, respondent.

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Judgments; Moot and

Academic; Courts will still decide cases otherwise, moot and
academic if: (1) there is a grave violation of the Constitution; (2) the
exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public
interest is involved; (3) when the constitutional issue raised requires
formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and
the public; and (4) the case is capable of repetition yet evading
review.·As a rule, courts do not entertain moot questions. An issue
becomes moot and academic when it ceases to present a justiciable
controversy so that a declaration on the issue would be of no
practical use or value. This notwithstanding, the Court in a number
of cases held that the moot and academic principle is not a magical
formula that can automatically dissuade the courts from resolving a
case. Courts will still decide cases otherwise, moot and academic if:
(1) there is a grave violation of the Constitution; (2) the exceptional
character of the situation and the paramount public interest is
involved; (3) when the constitutional issue raised requires
formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and
the public; and (4) the case is capable of repetition yet evading
review. Considering that all the arguments herein once again boil
down to the proper interpretation of Section 8(1), Article VIII of the
1987 Constitution on congressional representation in the JBC, this
Court deems it proper to proceed on deciding this Petition despite
its mootness to settle the matter once and for all.
Same; Same; Same; Locus Standi; Words and Phrases; Locus

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standi or legal standing is defined as a personal and substantial

interest in a case such that the party has sustained or will sustain
direct injury as a result of the challenged governmental act.·Locus

_______________

* EN BANC.

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standi or legal standing is defined as a personal and

substantial interest in a case such that the party has sustained or
will sustain direct injury as a result of the challenged governmental
act. It requires a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy
as to assure the concrete adverseness which sharpens the
presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for
illumination of difficult constitutional questions. With that
definition, therefore, a party will be allowed to litigate only when he
can demonstrate that (1) he has personally suffered some actual or
threatened injury because of the allegedly illegal conduct of the
government; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged
action; and (3) the injury is likely to be redressed by the remedy
being sought. Otherwise, he/she would not be allowed to litigate.
Nonetheless, in a long line of cases, concerned citizens, taxpayers
and legislators when specific requirements have been met have
been given standing by this Court.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Each member of Congress has a
legal standing to sue even without an enabling resolution for that
purpose so long as the questioned acts invade the powers,
prerogatives and privileges of Congress.·Each member of Congress
has a legal standing to sue even without an enabling resolution for
that purpose so long as the questioned acts invade the powers,
prerogatives and privileges of Congress. Otherwise stated,
whenever the acts affect the powers, prerogatives and privileges of
Congress, anyone of its members may validly bring an action to

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challenge the same to safeguard and maintain the sanctity thereof.

With the foregoing, this Court sustains the petitionerÊs legal
standing as Member of the House of Representatives and as the
Chairman of its Committee on Justice to assail the alternate
representation of Congress in the JBC, which arrangement led to
the non-counting of his votes in its En Banc deliberations last
December 2 and 9, 2016, as it allegedly affects adversely CongressÊ
prerogative to be fully represented before the said body.
Same; Special Civil Actions; Certiorari; In Bordomeo v. Court of
Appeals, 691 SCRA 269 (2013), the Supreme Court (SC) clarified
that it is inadequacy that must usually determine the propriety of
certiorari and not the mere absence of all other remedies and the
danger of failure of justice without the writ.·Generally, the writ of
certiorari can only be availed of in the absence of an appeal or any
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. In
Bordomeo v. Court of Appeals, 691 SCRA 269 (2013), however, this

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Court clarified that it is inadequacy that must usually

determine the propriety of certiorari and not the mere absence of all
other remedies and the danger of failure of justice without the writ.
A remedy is considered plain, speedy and adequate if it will
promptly relieve the petitioner from the injurious effects of the
judgment, order, or resolution of the lower court or agency.
Same; Same; Appeals; Direct resort to the Supreme Court (SC)
will not be entertained unless the redress desired cannot be obtained
in the appropriate lower courts, and exceptional and compelling
circumstances, such as in cases involving national interest and those
of serious implications, justify the availment of the extraordinary
remedy of the writ of certiorari, calling for the exercise of its primary
jurisdiction.·As a matter of policy, direct resort to this Court will
not be entertained unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in
the appropriate lower courts, and exceptional and compelling
circumstances, such as in cases involving national interest and

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those of serious implications, justify the availment of the

extraordinary remedy of the writ of certiorari, calling for the
exercise of its primary jurisdiction. In The Diocese of Bacolod v.
Commission on Elections, 747 SCRA 1 (2015), and again in Maza v.
Turla, 817 SCRA 494 (2017), this Court took pains in enumerating
the circumstances that would warrant a direct resort to this Court,
to wit: (1) when there are genuine issues of constitutionality that
must be addressed at the most immediate time; (2) when the issues
involved are of transcendental importance; (3) cases of first
impression as no jurisprudence yet exists that will guide the lower
courts on this matter; (4) the constitutional issues raised are better
decided by this court; (5) the time element presented in this case
cannot be ignored; (6) the filed petition reviews the act of a
constitutional organ; (7) petitioners rightly claim that they had no
other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law; and (8) the petition includes questions that are dictated by
public welfare and the advancement of public policy, or demanded
by the broader interest of justice, or the orders complained of were
found to be patent nullities, or the appeal was considered as clearly
an inappropriate remedy.
Judicial and Bar Council; Jurisdiction; The Judicial and Bar
Council (JBC) does not fall within the scope of a tribunal, board, or
officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions.·Here, it is
beyond question that the JBC does not fall within the scope of a
tribunal,

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board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions.

Neither did it act in any judicial or quasi-judicial capacity nor did it
assume any performance of judicial or quasi-judicial prerogative in
adopting the rotational scheme of Congress, which was the reason
for not counting the votes of the petitioner in its En Banc
deliberations last December 2 and 9, 2016. But, despite this, its act
is still not beyond this CourtÊs reach as the same is correctible by

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certiorari if it is tainted with grave abuse of discretion even if it is

not exercising judicial and quasi-judicial functions. Now, did the
JBC abuse its discretion in adopting the six-month rotational
arrangement and in not counting the votes of the petitioner? This
Court answers in the negative. As correctly pointed out by the JBC,
in adopting the said arrangement, it merely acted pursuant to the
Constitution and the Chavez ruling, which both require only one
representative from Congress in the JBC. It cannot, therefore, be
faulted for simply complying with the Constitution and
jurisprudence. Moreover, said arrangement was crafted by both
Houses of Congress and the JBC merely adopted the same. By no
stretch of imagination can it be regarded as grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the JBC.
Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Mandamus; As an
extraordinary writ, mandamus lies only to compel an officer to
perform a ministerial duty, not a discretionary one.·It is essential
to the issuance of a writ of mandamus that the applicant has a clear
legal right to the tiling demanded and it must be the imperative
duty of the respondent to perform the act required. The burden is
on the petitioner to show that there is such a clear legal right to the
performance of the act, and a corresponding compelling duty on the
part of the respondent to perform the act. As an extraordinary
writ, it lies only to compel an officer to perform a
ministerial duty, not a discretionary one. A clear line
demarcates a discretionary act from a ministerial one. A purely
ministerial act is one which an officer or tribunal performs in a
given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the
mandate of legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of his
own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done. On
the other hand, if the law imposes a duty upon a public officer and
gives him the right to decide how or when the duty shall be
performed, such duty is discretionary and not ministerial. The duty
is ministerial only when the discharge of the same requires neither
the exercise of official discretion or judgment. Clearly, the use of
discretion and the performance of a ministerial act are mutually
exclusive. Fur-

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ther, the writ of mandamus does not issue to control or review

the exercise of discretion or to compel a course of conduct.
Same; Civil Procedure; Judgments; Stare Decisis; Words and
Phrases; Stare decisis et non quieta movere is a doctrine which
means to adhere to precedents and not to unsettle things which are
established.·As stated in the beginning of this ponencia, stare
decisis et non quieta movere is a doctrine which means to adhere to
precedents and not to unsettle things which are established.
This is embodied in Article 8 of the Civil Code of the Philippines
which provides, thus: ART. 8. Judicial decisions applying or
interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the
legal system of the Philippines. The doctrine enjoins adherence to
judicial precedents and requires courts in a country to follow the
rule established in a decision of the Supreme Court thereof. That
decision becomes a judicial precedent to be followed in subsequent
cases by all courts in the land. The doctrine is based on the
principle that once a question of law has been examined and
decided, it should be deemed settled and closed to further
argument. The same is grounded on the necessity for securing
certainty and stability of judicial decisions, thus, time and again,
the court has held that it is a very desirable and necessary judicial
practice that when a court has laid down a principle of law as
applicable to a certain state of facts, it will adhere to that
principle and apply it to all future cases in which the facts
are substantially the same. It simply means that for the sake of
certainty, a conclusion reached in one case should be applied to
those that follow if the facts are substantially the same, even
though the parties may be different. It proceeds from the first
principle of justice that, absent any powerful countervailing
considerations, like cases ought to be decided alike. Thus, where the
same questions relating to the same event have been put forward by
the parties similarly situated as in a previous case litigated and
decided by a competent court, the rule of stare decisis is a bar to any
attempt to relitigate the same issue. The doctrine has assumed such
value in our judicial system that the Court has ruled that
„[a]bandonment thereof must be based only on strong and
compelling reasons, otherwise, the becoming virtue of predictability
which is expected from this Court would be immeasurably affected

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and the publicÊs confidence in the stability of the solemn

pronouncements diminished.‰ Verily, only upon showing that
circumstances attendant in a particular case override the
great benefits de-

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rived by our judicial system from the doctrine of stare

decisis, can the courts be justified in setting aside the same.
Statutory Construction; Time and time again, it has been
repeatedly declared by the Supreme Court (SC) that where the law
speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no room for
interpretation, only application.·As this Court declared in Chavez
v. Judicial and Bar Council, 696 SCRA 496 (2013), Section 8(1),
Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution is clear, categorical and
unambiguous. Thus, it needs no further construction or
interpretation. Time and time again, it has been repeatedly
declared by this Court that where the law speaks in clear and
categorical language, there is no room for interpretation,
only application. The wordings of Section 8(1), Article VIII of the
1987 Constitution are to be considered as indicative of the final
intent of its Framers, that is, for Congress as a whole to only have
one representative to sit in the JBC. This Court, therefore, cannot
simply make an assumption that the Framers merely by oversight
failed to take into account the bicameral nature of Congress in
drafting the same. As further laid down in Chavez, the Framers
were not keen on adjusting the provision on congressional
representation in the JBC as it was not in the exercise of its
primary function, which is to legislate. Notably, the JBC was
created to support the executive power to appoint, and Congress, as
one whole body, was merely assigned a contributory nonlegislative
function. No parallelism can be drawn between the representative
of Congress in the JBC and the exercise by Congress of its
legislative powers under Article VI and constituent powers under
Article XVII of the Constitution. Congress, in relation to the

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executive and judicial branches of government, is constitutionally

treated as another coequal branch in the matter of its JBC
representation.
Judicial and Bar Council; To add another member in the
Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) or to increase the representative of
Congress to the JBC, the remedy is not judicial but constitutional
amendment.·While it is true that Section 8(1), Article VIII of the
1987 Constitution did not explicitly state that the JBC shall be
composed of seven members, however, the same is implied in the
enumeration of who will be the members thereof. And though it is
unnecessary for the JBC composition to be an odd number as no tie-
breaker is needed in the preparation of a shortlist since judicial
nominees are not decided by a „yes‰ or „no‰ vote, still, JBCÊs
membership cannot be

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increased from seven to eight for it will be a clear violation of

the aforesaid constitutional provision. To add another member in
the JBC or to increase the representative of Congress to the JBC,
the remedy is not judicial but constitutional amendment.

LEONEN, J., Dissenting Opinion:

Judiciary; Appointments; View that hoping to unshackle the

Republic from the abuses of power during Martial Law but at the
same time wanting to insulate the process of judicial appointments
from partisan politics, the 1986 Constitutional Commission, through
Commissioner Roberto Concepcion, proposed the creation of an
independent body that would vet potential appointees to the
judiciary.·Hoping to unshackle the Republic from the abuses of
power during Martial Law but at the same time wanting to insulate
the process of judicial appointments from partisan politics, the 1986
Constitutional Commission, through Commissioner Roberto
Concepcion, proposed the creation of an independent body that

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would vet potential appointees to the judiciary. This body would be

represented by the different stakeholders of the legal sector and
would have the mandate of preparing the list of potential judicial
appointees to be submitted to the President. The proposal became
what is now the Judicial and Bar Council.
Same; Same; Locus Standi; View that the Supreme Court (SC)
ruled that members of Congress have standing to question any
action that impairs the CongressÊ powers and privileges, regardless
of whether there was a prior Congressional resolution.·Respondent
contends that petitioner has no standing to file this case absent a
resolution from the House of Representatives authorizing him to do
so. It anchors its argument on Philippine Constitutional Association
v. Enriquez, 235 SCRA 506 (1994), where this Court stated: While
the petition in G.R. No. 113174 was filed by 16 Senators, including
the Senate President and the Chairman of the Committee on
Finance, the suit was not authorized by the Senate itself. Likewise,
the petitions in G.R. Nos. 113766 and 113888 were filed without an
enabling resolution for the purpose. Respondent, however, failed to
read the entirety of the quoted portion. In Philippine Constitutional
Association, the procedural issue on standing was whether Senators
could question a presidential veto on an appropriations bill despite
the absence of a Senate resolution authorizing them to file the case.
This Court, in addressing the issue, first acknowledged that
previous

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decisions have required Senators to first submit a Senate

resolution authorizing the filing of the case. Nevertheless, this
Court ruled that members of Congress have standing to question
any action that impairs the CongressÊ powers and privileges,
regardless of whether there was a prior Congressional resolution.
Same; Same; Same; View that the continuing problematic
application of Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council, 676 SCRA 579
(2012), vests petitioner, as the current representative of the House to

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the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC), with sufficient standing to

raise this issue before the Supreme Court (SC).·In any case, parties
are vested by this Court with legal standing when constitutional
challenges have become justiciable, consistent with this CourtÊs role
in the constitutional order. While the parties must first establish
their right to appear before us on a given question of law, they
must, more importantly, present concrete cases and controversies.
In this instance, the continuing problematic application of Chavez v.
Judicial and Bar Council, 676 SCRA 579 (2012), vests petitioner, as
the current representative of the House to the Judicial and Bar
Council, with sufficient standing to raise this issue before us.
Office of the Solicitor General; View that as a general rule, the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) represents the Philippine
government in all legal proceedings. The rule has exceptions, such as
when it takes an adverse position and acts as the „PeopleÊs
Tribune.‰·The Office of the Solicitor GeneralÊs mandate is to
„represent the Government of the Philippines, its agencies and
instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation,
proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the services of a
lawyer.‰ Thus, as a general rule, the Office of the Solicitor General
represents the Philippine government in all legal proceedings. The
rule has exceptions, such as when it takes an adverse position and
acts as the „PeopleÊs Tribune.‰
Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies; View that the rule on
exhaustion of administrative remedies applies to administrative
agencies, not to Congress.·Citing the rule on exhaustion of
administrative remedies, respondent contends that the Petition is
not the plain, speedy, and adequate remedy since petitioner should
have first asked Congress to repudiate the rotational representation
agreement. This rule, however, applies to administrative agencies,
not to Congress. Respondent fails to cite any provision of law or

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Congressional rule that requires petitioner to have his concern

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addressed by Congress before filing a petition with this Court.

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; View that in Diocese of
Bacolod v. Commission on Elections, 747 SCRA 1 (2015), the
Supreme Court (SC) stated that „a direct resort to this court is
allowed when there are genuine issues of constitutionality that must
be addressed at the most immediate time.‰·There is also a time
element to be considered that would allow the direct resort to this
Court. In Diocese of Bacolod v. Commission on Elections, 747 SCRA
1 (2015), we stated that „a direct resort to this court is allowed
when there are genuine issues of constitutionality that must be
addressed at the most immediate time.‰ We further recognized that
„[e]xigency in certain situations would qualify as an exception for
direct resort to this [C]ourt.‰
Judiciary; Supreme Court; Appointments; Culpable Violation of
the Constitution; View that under the Constitution, the President
only has ninety (90) days from the vacancy to appoint members of
the Supreme Court (SC); This 90-day period is mandatory. Failure
to comply is considered a culpable violation of the Constitution.·
Under the Constitution, the President only has 90 days from the
vacancy to appoint members of the Supreme Court. Thus, the
Judicial and Bar Council must be able to submit its list of nominees
before the running of the period. Article VIII Judicial Department
. . . . Section 4. (1) The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief
Justice and fourteen Associate Justices. It may sit En Banc or in its
discretion, in divisions of three, five, or seven Members. Any
vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence
thereof. This 90-day period is mandatory. Failure to comply is
considered a culpable violation of the Constitution. In De Castro v.
Judicial and Bar Council, 615 SCRA 666 (2010): [T]he usage in
Section 4(1), Article VIII of the word shall · an imperative,
operating to impose a duty that may be enforced · should not be
disregarded. Thereby, Sections 4(1) imposes on the President the
imperative duty to make an appointment of a Member of the
Supreme Court within 90 days from the occurrence of the vacancy.
The failure by the President to do so will be a clear disobedience to
the Constitution.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Judgments; Stare Decisis; View
that stare decisis provides the public with a reasonable expectation
that courts will rule in a certain manner given a similar set of

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facts.·The principle of stare decisis is derived from the Latin

maxim „stare decisis et non quieta movere‰; that is, „it is best to
adhere to decisions and not to disturb questions put at rest.‰ Its
function is to ensure certainty and stability in the legal system.
Ruling by precedent is meant to assure the public of the courtÊs
objectivity. Stare decisis provides the public with a reasonable
expectation that courts will rule in a certain manner given a similar
set of facts. Courts, however, are cautioned against „blind adherence
to precedents.‰ Decisions of this Court previously found to have
been valid may become impractical, contrary to law, or even
unconstitutional. It then becomes the duty of this Court to abandon
that decision: The principle of stare decisis does not mean blind
adherence to precedents. The doctrine or rule laid down, which has
been followed for years, no matter how sound it may be, if found to
be contrary to law, must be abandoned. The principle of stare decisis
does not and should not apply when there is conflict between the
precedent and the law. The duty of this Court is to forsake and
abandon any doctrine or rule found to be in violation of the law in
force.
Same; Same; Same; Same; View that there is also a need to
abandon decisions „when this Court discerns, after full deliberation,
that a continuing error in the interpretation of the spirit and intent
of a constitutional provision exists.‰·There is also a need to
abandon decisions „when this Court discerns, after full deliberation,
that a continuing error in the interpretation of the spirit and intent
of a constitutional provision exists.‰ Assuring the public of stability
in the law and certainty of court actions is important. It is, however,
more important for this Court to be right. Thus, it becomes
imperative for this Court to reexamine previous decisions to avoid
continuing its error: The rule of stare decisis is entitled to respect.
Stability in the law . . . is desirable. But idolatrous reverence for
precedent, simply as precedent, no longer rules. More important
than anything else is that the court should be right. And
particularly is it not wise to subordinate legal reason to case law
and by so doing perpetuate error when it is brought to mind that
the views now expressed conform in principle to the original

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decision and that since the first decision to the contrary was sent
forth there has existed a respectable opinion of nonconformity in
the court. Indeed, on at least one occasion has the court broken
away from the revamped doctrine, while even in the last case in
point the court was as evenly divided as it was possible to be and
still reach a decision.

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Congress; View that there is no Member of Congress that can

represent all of Congress. Congress is represented by both the Senate
and the House of Representatives.·There is no Member of Congress
that can represent all of Congress. Congress is represented by both
the Senate and the House of Representatives. The Constitution
itself provides for only one (1) instance when both chambers must
vote jointly.
Statutory Construction; View that it is a basic rule of statutory
construction that constitutional provisions must be harmonized so
that all words are operative.·A verba legis interpretation of Article
VIII, Section 8(1) of the Constitution leads to an ambiguity and
disregards the bicameral nature of Congress. Chavez presumes that
one (1) member of Congress can vote on behalf of the entire
Congress. It is a basic rule of statutory construction that
constitutional provisions must be harmonized so that all words are
operative.
Judicial and Bar Council; View that increasing the CouncilÊs
membership to eight (8) would not violate the provisions of the
Constitution.·Article VIII, Section 8(1), however, does not provide
a numerical count for its membership unlike in other the provisions
of the Constitution. Increasing the CouncilÊs membership to eight
(8) would not violate the provisions of the Constitution.
Same; Mandamus; View that the Judicial and Bar Council
(JBC) could have been compelled by a writ of mandamus to count
petitionerÊs votes in the En Banc sessions of December 2 and 9, 2016.

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·The Judicial and Bar Council could have been compelled by a writ
of mandamus to count petitionerÊs votes in the En Banc sessions of
December 2 and 9, 2016. Mandamus is provided for under Rule 65,
Section 3 of the Rules of Court: Section 3. Petition for Mandamus.·
When any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully
neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins
as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully
excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to
which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person
aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court,
alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be
rendered commanding the respondent, immediately or at some
other time to be specified by the court, to do the act required to be
done to protect

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the rights of the petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained

by the petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of the respondent.
Same; Same; View that the difference between a discretionary
act and a ministerial act is settled.·The difference between a
discretionary act and a ministerial act is settled: The distinction
between a ministerial and discretionary act is well delineated. A
purely ministerial act or duty is one which an officer or tribunal
performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in
obedience to the mandate of a legal authority, without regard to or
the exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety
of the act done. If the law imposes a duty upon a public officer and
gives him the right to decide how or when the duty shall be
performed, such duty is discretionary and not ministerial. The duty
is ministerial only when the discharge of the same requires neither
the exercise of official discretion or judgment.
Same; Same; Appointments; View that a writ of mandamus
cannot be issued to compel the council to withdraw a list originally

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submitted and to add other nominees that have not previously

qualified.·The determination of the qualifications and fitness of
judicial applicants is discretionary on the part of the Judicial and
Bar Council. A writ of mandamus cannot be issued to compel the
council to withdraw a list originally submitted and to add other
nominees that have not previously qualified.
Same; Same; Same; View that the Judicial and Bar Council
(JBC) has the ministerial duty to count the votes of all its members.
Petitioner, as the Chair of the House of Representatives Committee
on Justice, should be considered a regular ex officio member of the
Council, and his votes in the December 2 and 9, 2016 En Banc
Meetings should have been counted.·The Judicial and Bar Council
has the ministerial duty to count the votes of all its members.
Petitioner, as the Chair of the House of Representatives Committee
on Justice, should be considered a regular ex officio member of the
Council, and his votes in the December 2 and 9, 2016 En Banc
Meetings should have been counted. This relief, however, has
already become moot in light of the recent appointments to this
Court. In future deliberations, however, the Judicial and Bar
Council should have the ministerial duty to separately count the
votes of both Congressional representatives in the Council.

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Umali vs. Judicial and Bar Council

SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS in the Supreme Court.

Certiorari and Mandamus.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Charisse Gail D. Apatan for petitioner.

VELASCO, JR., J.:

Stare decisis et non quieta movere. This principle of

adherence to precedents has not lost its luster and
continues to guide the bench in keeping with the need to
maintain stability in the law.1
This Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus under Rule

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65 of the Rules of Court filed directly with this Court by

herein petitioner Rep. Reynaldo V. Umali, current Chair of
the House of Representatives Committee on Justice,
impugns the present-day practice of six-month rotational
representation of Congress in the Judicial and Bar Council
(JBC) for it unfairly deprives both Houses of Congress of
their full participation in the said body. The
aforementioned practice was adopted by the JBC in light of
the ruling in Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council.2
As an overview, in Chavez, the constitutionality of the
practice of having two representatives from both houses of
Congress with one vote each in the JBC, thus, increasing
its membership from seven to eight, was challenged. With
that, this Court examined the constitutional provision that
states the composition of the JBC, that is, Section 8(1),
Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, which reads:

SECTION 8(1). A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created

under the supervision of the Supreme Court composed of the Chief
Justice as ex officio Chairman, the

_______________

1 Tala Realty Services Corp. v. Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage

Bank, G.R. No. 132051, June 25, 2001, 359 SCRA 469.
2 G.R. No. 202242, July 17, 2012, 676 SCRA 579.

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Secretary of Justice, and a representative of the Congress as ex

officio Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor
of law, a retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a
representative of the private sector. (Emphasis supplied)

Following a painstaking analysis, this Court, in a

Decision dated July 17, 2012, declared the said practice of

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having two representatives from Congress with one vote

each in the JBC unconstitutional. This Court enunciated
that the use of the singular letter „a‰ preceding
„representative of the Congress‰ in the aforequoted
provision is unequivocal and leaves no room for any other
construction or interpretation. The same is indicative of the
FramersÊ intent that Congress may designate only one
representative to the JBC. Had it been otherwise, they
could have, in no uncertain terms, so provided. This Court
further articulated that in the context of JBC
representation, the term „Congress‰ must be taken to mean
the entire legislative department as no liaison between the
two houses exists in the workings of the JBC. There is no
mechanism required between the Senate and the House of
Representatives in the screening and nomination of judicial
officers. Moreover, this Court, quoting the keen observation
of Retired Supreme Court Associate Justice Consuelo
Ynares-Santiago, who is also a JBC Consultant, stated that
the ex officio members of the JBC consist of representatives
from the three main branches of government, to wit: the
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court representing the
judiciary, the Secretary of Justice representing the
executive, and a representative of the Congress
representing the legislature. It can be deduced therefrom
that the unmistakable tenor of Section 8(1), Article VIII of
the 1987 Constitution was to treat each ex officio member
as representing one coequal branch of government having
equal say in the choice of judicial nominees. Now, to allow
the legislature to have more than one representative in the
JBC would negate

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Umali vs. Judicial and Bar Council

the principle of equality among these three branches of the

government, which is enshrined in the Constitution.3
The subsequent motion for reconsideration thereof was
denied in a Resolution dated April 16, 2013, where this

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Court reiterated that Section 8(1), Article VIII of the 1987

Constitution providing for „a representative of the Congress‰
in the JBC is clear and unambiguous and does not need
any further interpretation. Besides, this Court is not
convinced that the Framers simply failed to adjust the
aforesaid constitutional provision, by sheer inadvertence, to
their decision to shift to a bicameral form of legislature.
Even granting that there was, indeed, such omission, this
Court cannot supply the same. Following the rule of casus
omissus, that is, a case omitted is to be held as
intentionally omitted, this Court cannot under its power of
interpretation supply the omission even if the same may
have resulted from inadvertence or it was not foreseen or
contemplated for to do so would amount to judicial
legislation. Ergo, this Court has neither power nor
authority to add another member in the JBC simply by
judicial construction.4
In light of these Decision and Resolution, both Houses of
Congress agreed on a six-month rotational representation
in the JBC, wherein the House of Representatives will
represent Congress from January to June and the Senate
from July to December.5 This is now the current practice in
the JBC. It is by reason of this arrangement that the votes
cast by the petitioner for the selection of nominees for the
vacancies of then retiring Supreme Court Associate
Justices Jose P. Perez (Perez) and Arturo Brion (Brion)
were not counted by the JBC during its En Banc
deliberations held last December 2 and 9, 2016. Instead,
the petitionerÊs votes were simply placed in an envelope
and sealed subject to any further disposition as this

_______________

3 Id., at pp. 597-606.

4 Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council, G.R. No. 202242, April 16,
2013, 696 SCRA 496.
5 Rollo, pp. 42 & 45.

209

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Court may direct in a proper proceeding.6 This is the root of

the present controversy that prompted the petitioner to file
the instant Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus based on
the following grounds:

I.

THE WRIT OF CERTIORARI IS PROPER TO ENJOIN THE JBC

TO CORRECT ITS UNWARRANTED DENIAL OF THE VOTES
REGISTERED BY [HEREIN PETITIONER] DURING THE EN
BANC DELIBERATIONS ON DECEMBER 2 AND 9, 2016
BECAUSE THE DECISION IN THE CHAVEZ CASE IS
DEFECTIVE/FLAWED.

II.

THE WRIT OF MANDAMUS IS PROPER TO MANDATE THE

JBC TO ACCEPT/COUNT SAID VOTES CAST BY [PETITIONER]
BECAUSE THE RECONSTITUTION OF THE JBC IS
DEFECTIVE/FLAWED AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

III.

THE PRESENT PRACTICE OF THE JBC IN ALLOWING ONLY

ONE REPRESENTATIVE FROM THE SENATE OR THE HOUSE
OF [REPRESENTATIVES] TO PARTICIPATE AND VOTE ON A [6-
MONTH] ROTATION BASIS IS IMPRACTICABLE, ABSURD AND
UNCONSTITUTIONAL, CREATES AN [INSTITUTIONAL]
IMBALANCE BETWEEN THE TWO INDEPENDENT
CHAMBERS OF CONGRESS, AND INSTITUTES AN INHERENT
AND CONTINUING CONSTITUTIONAL DEFECT IN THE
PROCEEDINGS OF THE JBC THAT ADVERSELY AFFECTS
APPOINTMENTS TO THE JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT,
INCLUDING AND PARTICULARLY [THIS COURT].

_______________

6 Petition, id., at pp. 9-10.

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IV.

THE 1987 CONSTITUTION CLEARLY REQUIRES

PARTICIPATION AND VOTING BY REPRESENTATIVES FROM
THE SENATE AND THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES IN
JBC PROCEEDINGS AND ALL APPOINTMENTS TO THE
JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT, INCLUDING AND PARTICULARLY
[THIS COURT].
A. THE BICAMERAL NATURE OF THE LEGISLATIVE
DEPARTMENT WAS BELATEDLY DECIDED UNDER THE
1987 CONSTITUTION, BUT MUST BE DEEMED AS
INCORPORATED AND MODIFYING THE JBC
STRUCTURE UNDER SECTION 8(1)[,] ARTICLE VIII OF
THE [1987] CONSTITUTION, TO GIVE FULL MEANING
TO THE INTENT OF ITS FRAMERS.
B. THERE WAS A CLEAR OVERSIGHT AND TECHNICAL
OMISSION INVOLVING SECTIONS 8(1)[,] ARTICLE VIII
OF THE [1987] CONSTITUTION THAT SHOULD BE
RECTIFIED BY [THIS COURT].
C. THE FULL REPRESENTATION OF CONGRESS IN
THE JBC IS POSSIBLE ONLY WITH PARTICIPATING AND
VOTING FROM REPRESENTATIVES FROM THE TWO
INDEPENDENT CHAMBERS, OTHERWISE THE JBC
PROCEEDINGS ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
D. THE PRESENCE OF THE SENATE AND [THE]
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES MEMBERS IN THE JBC
UPHOLDS THE COEQUAL REPRESENTATION IN THE
COUNCIL OF THE THREE MAIN BRANCHES OF
GOVERNMENT.7

_______________

7 Id., at pp. 11-12.

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As instructed by this Court,8 both Houses of Congress,

through the Manifestation of the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), which acts as the PeopleÊs Tribune in this
case, and the JBC commented on the Petition.
The OSG wants this Court to revisit Chavez for its
alleged unexecutability arising from constitutional
constraints. It holds that the current practice of alternate
representation was only arrived at because of time
constraints and difficulty in securing the agreement of both
Houses of Congress.9 And, since the Constitution itself did
not clearly state who is the CongressÊ representative in the
JBC, the provision, therefore, regarding the latterÊs
composition must be harmonized to give effect to the
current bicameral system.10 With this in view, the OSG
believes that it is only proper for both Houses of Congress
to be given equal representation in the JBC as neither
House can bind the other for there can be no single member
of either House who can fully represent the entire
legislature for to do so would definitely result in
absurdity.11
Further, the OSG avers that ChavezÊs strict
interpretation of Section 8(1), Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution violates the very essence of bicameralism and
sets aside the inherent dichotomy between the two Houses
of Congress.12 To note, a JBC memberÊs votes are reflective
of the position and the interest such member wants to
uphold, such that when the representatives from each
House of Congress vote for a certain judicial nominee, they
carry the interests and views of the group they represent.
Thus, when only one would represent both Houses of

_______________

8 Per Resolutions dated January 17, 2017 (id., at pp. 84-85) and

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February 14, 2017 (id., at pp. 255-256).

9 Manifestation in lieu of Comment (to the Petition dated December
28, 2016), OSG, id., at pp. 168-169.
10 Id., at p. 175.
11 Id., at p. 183.
12 Id., at p. 185.

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Umali vs. Judicial and Bar Council

Congress in the JBC, the vote would not be representative

of the interests embodied by the Congress as a whole.13
In the same way, the OSG contends that the bicameral
nature of the legislature strictly adheres to the distinct and
separate personality of both Houses of Congress; thus, no
member of Congress can represent the entire Congress.
Besides, the phrase „a representative of the Congress‰ in
Section 8(1), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution is
qualified by the phrase „ex officio members.‰ The ex officio
nature of the position derives its authority from the
principal office. It, thus, follows that each house of
Congress must be represented in the JBC.14
Also, the OSG states that the constitutional intent in
creating the JBC is to ensure community representation
from the different sectors of society, as well as from the
three branches of government, and to eliminate partisan
politics in the selection of members of the judiciary. The
focus, therefore, is more on proper representation rather
than qualitative limitation. It even insists that when the
Framers deliberated on Section 8(1), Article VIII of the
1987 Constitution, they were still thinking of a unicameral
legislature, thereby, giving Congress only one
representative to the JBC. However, with the shift from
unicameralism to bicameralism, „a representative of the
Congress‰ in the JBC should now be understood to mean
one representative from each House of Congress. For had it
been the intention of the Framers for the JBC to be

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composed only of seven members, they would have

specified the numbers just like in the other constitutional
provisions. As such, the membership in the JBC should not
be limited to seven members. More so, an eventual
deadlock in the voting would not pose any problem since
the voting in the JBC is not through a „yes‰ or a „no‰ vote.15

_______________

13 Id., at p. 187.
14 Id., at pp. 191, 194 & 198.
15 Id., at pp. 199-202, 207 & 210.

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As its final argument, the OSG maintains that while

CongressÊ participation in the JBC may be nonlegislative,
still, the involvement of both Houses of Congress in its
every proceeding is indispensable, as each House
represents different constituencies and would necessarily
bring a unique perspective to the recommendation process
of the JBC.16
For its part, the JBC vehemently pleads that the present
Petition be dismissed as its adopted rotational scheme and
the necessary consequences thereof are not the proper
subjects of a certiorari and even a mandamus petition for
the same do not involve an exercise of judicial, quasi-
judicial or ministerial functions. Apart from that, it
committed no grave abuse of discretion in refusing to
recognize, accept and count the petitionerÊs votes during its
En Banc deliberations last December 2 and 9, 2016 for it
merely acted in accordance with the Constitution and with
the ruling in Chavez. More so, there is no showing that the
petitioner has no plain, speedy and adequate remedy other
than this Petition for nowhere herein did he assert that he
exerted all efforts to have his concern addressed by

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Congress, such as asking the latter to repudiate the

rotational arrangement. Thus, for the petitionerÊs failure to
exhaust all remedies available to him in Congress, he
deprived the latter of an opportunity to address the matter.
Also, the practice and acquiescence of both Houses of
Congress to such an arrangement operates as an estoppel
against any member thereof to deny its validity. As regards
a writ of mandamus, it cannot be issued to compel the JBC
to count the petitionerÊs votes for it will not lie to control
the performance of a discretionary act.17
The JBC further enunciates that the petitioner has no
locus standi to institute this Petition in his capacity as
Chairman of the House of Representatives Committee on
Justice

_______________

16 Id., at pp. 217 & 224.

17 Comment/Opposition (On the Petition dated 28 December 2016),
JBC, id., at pp. 262-268.

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Umali vs. Judicial and Bar Council

and Ex Officio Member of the JBC without the requisite

resolution from both Houses of Congress authorizing him to
sue as a member thereof, which absence is a fatal defect
rendering this Petition dismissible.18
In the same vein, the JBC asseverates that this Petition
should also be dismissed as the allegations herein are mere
rehash of the arguments and dissents in Chavez, which
have already been exhaustively litigated and settled
therein by this Court, more in particular, the interpretation
of Section 8(1), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, hence,
barred by the doctrine of stare decisis. Similarly, there
exists no substantial reason or even supervening event or
material change of circumstances that warrants ChavezÊs

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reversal.19
The JBC likewise insists that it was the intent of the
Framers of the Constitution for the JBC to have only seven
members. The reason for that was laid down in Chavez,
that is, to provide a solution should there be a stalemate in
the voting. As to the alleged oversight and technical
omission of the Framers in changing the provision on the
JBC to reflect the bicameral nature of Congress, these are
flimsy excuses to override the clear provision of the
Constitution and to disturb settled jurisprudence. As
explained in Chavez, CongressÊ membership in the JBC was
not in the interest of a certain constituency but in
reverence to it as a major branch of government.20
Last of all, the JBC holds that should this Petition be
granted, there would be an imbalance in favor of Congress
with respect to the representation in the JBC of the three
main and coequal branches of the government. For the
unmistakable tenor of Section 8(1), Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution was to treat each ex officio member as
representing one coequal branch of government. And, even
assuming that the current six-month rotational scheme in
the JBC created an

_______________

18 Id., at pp. 269-271.

19 Id., at pp. 271-273.
20 Id., at pp. 273-280.

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Umali vs. Judicial and Bar Council

imbalance between the two Houses of Congress, it is not

within the power of this Court or the JBC to remedy such
imbalance. For the remedy lies in the amendment of this
constitutional provision.21
Given the foregoing arguments, the issues ought to be

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addressed by this Court can be summed up into: (1)

whether the petitioner has locus standi to file this Petition
even without the requisite resolution from both Houses of
Congress permitting him to do so; (2) whether the
petitionerÊs direct resort to this Court via a Petition for
Certiorari and Mandamus is the plain, speedy and
adequate remedy available to him to assail the JBCÊs
adoption of the rotational representation leading to the
non-counting of his votes in its En Banc deliberations last
December 2 and 9, 2016; (3) whether the JBC acted with
grave abuse of discretion in adopting the six-month
rotational scheme of both Houses of Congress resulting in
the non-counting of the petitionerÊs votes in its En Banc
deliberations last December 2 and 9, 2016; (4) whether the
JBC can be compelled through mandamus to count the
petitionerÊs votes in its En Banc deliberations last
December 2 and 9, 2016; and (4) whether this CourtÊs
ruling in Chavez applies as stare decisis to the present case.
Before delving into the above stated issues, this Court
would like to note that this Petition was primarily filed
because of the non-counting of the petitionerÊs votes in the
JBC En Banc deliberations last December 2 and 9, 2016
held for the purpose of determining, among others, who
will be the possible successors of the then retiring Associate
Justices of the Supreme Court Perez and Brion, whose
retirements were set on December 14 and 29, 2016,
respectively. The list of nominees will then be forwarded to
the President as the appointing authority. With the
appointments of Associate Justices Samuel R. Martires
(Martires) and Noel G. Tijam (Tijam) on March 2 and 8,
2017, respectively, this Petition has

_______________

21 Id., at pp. 280-282.

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Umali vs. Judicial and Bar Council

now been rendered moot insofar as the petitionerÊs prayers

to (1) reverse and set aside the JBC En Banc deliberations
last December 2 and 9, 2016; and (2) direct the JBC to
count his votes therein as its ex officio member,22 are
concerned.
As a rule, courts do not entertain moot questions. An
issue becomes moot and academic when it ceases to present
a justiciable controversy so that a declaration on the issue
would be of no practical use or value. This notwithstanding,
the Court in a number of cases held that the moot and
academic principle is not a magical formula that can
automatically dissuade the courts from resolving a case.
Courts will still decide cases otherwise, moot and academic
if: (1) there is a grave violation of the Constitution; (2) the
exceptional character of the situation and the paramount
public interest is involved; (3) when the constitutional issue
raised requires formulation of controlling principles to
guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and (4) the case is
capable of repetition yet evading review.23 Considering that
all the arguments herein once again boil down to the
proper interpretation of Section 8(1), Article VIII of the
1987 Constitution on congressional representation in the
JBC, this Court deems it proper to proceed on deciding this
Petition despite its mootness to settle the matter once and
for all.
Having said that, this Court shall now resolve the issues
in seriatim.
On petitionerÊs locus standi. The petitioner brings this
suit in his capacity as the current Chairman of the House
of Representatives Committee on Justice and Ex Officio
Member of the JBC. His legal standing was challenged by
the JBC for lack of an enabling resolution for that purpose
coming from both Houses of Congress.
Locus standi or legal standing is defined as a personal
and substantial interest in a case such that the party has
sus-

_______________

22 Rollo, p. 83.

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23 Lu v. Lu YM, Sr., G.R. No. 153690, August 26, 2008, 563 SCRA
254, 273.

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tained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the

challenged governmental act. It requires a personal stake
in the outcome of the controversy as to assure the concrete
adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues
upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of
difficult constitutional questions.24 With that definition,
therefore, a party will be allowed to litigate only when he
can demonstrate that (1) he has personally suffered some
actual or threatened injury because of the allegedly illegal
conduct of the government; (2) the injury is fairly traceable
to the challenged action; and (3) the injury is likely to be
redressed by the remedy being sought.25 Otherwise, he/she
would not be allowed to litigate. Nonetheless, in a long line
of cases, concerned citizens, taxpayers and legislators when
specific requirements have been met have been given
standing by this Court. This was succinctly explained in
Francisco, Jr. v. The House of Representatives, thus:

When suing as a citizen, the interest of the petitioner assailing the

constitutionality of a statute must be direct and personal. He must
be able to show, not only that the law or any government act is
invalid, but also that he sustained or is in imminent danger of
sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not
merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way. It must
appear that the person complaining has been or is about to be
denied some right or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled or
that he is about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by
reason of the statute or act complained of. In fine, when the
proceeding involves the assertion of a public right, the mere fact
that he is a citizen satisfies the requirement of personal interest.

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24 Imbong v. Ochoa, Jr., G.R. Nos. 204819, 204934, 204957, April 8,

2014, 721 SCRA 146, 283.
25 Lozano v. Nograles, G.R. Nos. 187883 & 187910, June 16, 2009,
589 SCRA 354, 360.

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In the case of a taxpayer, he is allowed to sue where there is a claim

that public funds are illegally disbursed, or that public money is
being deflected to any improper purpose, or that there is a wastage
of public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or
unconstitutional law. Before he can invoke the power of judicial
review, however, he must specifically prove that he has sufficient
interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by
taxation and that he would sustain a direct injury as a result of the
enforcement of the questioned statute or contract. It is not sufficient
that he has merely a general interest common to all members of the
public.
xxxx
As for a legislator, he is allowed to sue to question the
validity of any official action which he claims infringes his
prerogatives as a legislator. Indeed, a member of the House
of Representatives has standing to maintain inviolate the
prerogatives, powers and privileges vested by the
Constitution in his office.26 (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)

The legal standing of each member of Congress was also

upheld in Philippine Constitution Association v. Enriquez,27
where this Court pronounced that:

The legal standing of the Senate, as an institution, was recognized

in Gonzales v. Macaraig, Jr. (citation omitted). In said case, 23
Senators, comprising the entire membership of the Upper House of

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Congress, filed a petition to nullify the presidential veto of Section

55 of the GAA of 1989. The filing of the suit was authorized by
Senate Resolution No. 381, adopted on February 2, 1989, and which
reads as follows:

_______________

26 G.R. Nos. 160261, 160263, November 10, 2003, 415 SCRA 44, 136-
137.
27 G.R. Nos. 113105, 113174, 113766, August 19, 1994, 235 SCRA
506.

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Umali vs. Judicial and Bar Council

Authorizing and Directing the Committee on Finance to

Bring in the Name of the Senate of the Philippines the Proper
Suit with the Supreme Court of the Philippines contesting the
Constitutionality of the Veto by the President of Special and
General Provisions, particularly Section 55, of the General
Appropriation Bill of 1989 (H.B. No. 19186) and for Other
Purposes.
In the United States, the legal standing of a House of Congress to
sue has been recognized (citation omitted).
While the petition in G.R. No. 113174 was filed by 16
Senators, including the Senate President and the Chairman
of the Committee on Finance, the suit was not authorized by
the Senate itself. Likewise, the petitions in G.R. Nos. 113766
and 113888 were filed without an enabling resolution for the
purpose.
Therefore, the question of the legal standing of petitioners in the
three cases becomes a preliminary issue before this Court can
inquire into the validity of the presidential veto and the conditions
for the implementation of some items in the GAA of 1994.
We rule that a member of the Senate, and of the House of
Representatives for that matter, has the legal standing to
question the validity of a presidential veto or a condition

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imposed on an item in an appropriation bill.

Where the veto is claimed to have been made without or in excess of
the authority vested on the President by the Constitution, the issue
of an impermissible intrusion of the Executive into the domain of
the Legislature arises (citation omitted).
To the extent the powers of Congress are impaired, so is the
power of each member thereof, since his office confers a
right to participate in the exercise of the powers of that
institution (citation omitted).

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An act of the Executive which injures the institution of Congress

causes a derivative but nonetheless substantial injury, which can be
questioned by a member of Congress (citation omitted). In such a
case, any member of Congress can have a resort to the courts.
Former Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando, as Amicus Curiae,
noted:
This is, then, the clearest case of the Senate as a whole or
individual Senators as such having a substantial interest in
the question at issue. It could likewise be said that there was
the requisite injury to their rights as Senators. It would then
be futile to raise any locus standi issue. Any intrusion into
the domain appertaining to the Senate is to be resisted.
Similarly, if the situation were reversed, and it is the
Executive Branch that could allege a transgression, its
officials could likewise file the corresponding action. What
cannot be denied is that a Senator has standing to
maintain inviolate the prerogatives, powers and
privileges vested by the Constitution in his office
(citation omitted).28 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

It is clear therefrom that each member of Congress has a

legal standing to sue even without an enabling resolution
for that purpose so long as the questioned acts invade the

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powers, prerogatives and privileges of Congress. Otherwise

stated, whenever the acts affect the powers, prerogatives
and privileges of Congress, anyone of its members may
validly bring an action to challenge the same to safeguard
and maintain the sanctity thereof.
With the foregoing, this Court sustains the petitionerÊs
legal standing as Member of the House of Representatives
and as the Chairman of its Committee on Justice to assail
the alternate representation of Congress in the JBC, which
arrangement led to the non-counting of his votes in its En
Banc

_______________

28 Id., at pp. 519-520.

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deliberations last December 2 and 9, 2016, as it allegedly

affects adversely CongressÊ prerogative to be fully
represented before the said body.
On petitionerÊs direct resort to this Court via certiorari
petition. The JBC questions the propriety of the petitionerÊs
direct resort to this Court via the present Petition to assail
its adoption of the rotational representation of Congress
resulting in the non-counting of his votes in its En Banc
deliberations last December 2 and 9, 2016. The JBC insists
that the said scheme was a creation of Congress itself; as
such, the petitionerÊs plain, speedy and adequate remedy is
to appeal to Congress to repudiate the same. Direct resort
to this Court should not be allowed if there is a remedy
available to the petitioner before Congress.
Generally, the writ of certiorari can only be availed of in
the absence of an appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law. In Bordomeo v. Court
of Appeals, however, this Court clarified that it is

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inadequacy that must usually determine the propriety of

certiorari and not the mere absence of all other remedies
and the danger of failure of justice without the writ. A
remedy is considered plain, speedy and adequate if it will
promptly relieve the petitioner from the injurious effects of
the judgment, order, or resolution of the lower court or
agency.29
In the same way, as a matter of policy, direct resort to
this Court will not be entertained unless the redress
desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate lower courts,
and exceptional and compelling circumstances, such as in
cases involving national interest and those of serious
implications, justify the availment of the extraordinary
remedy of the writ of certiorari, calling for the exercise of
its primary jurisdiction.30 In

_______________

29 G.R. No. 161596, February 20, 2013, 691 SCRA 269, 286.
30 Yee v. Bernabe, G.R. No. 141393, April 19, 2006, 487 SCRA 385,
394.

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The Diocese of Bacolod v. Commission on Elections,31 and

again in Maza v. Turla,32 this Court took pains in
enumerating the circumstances that would warrant a
direct resort to this Court, to wit: (1) when there are
genuine issues of constitutionality that must be addressed
at the most immediate time; (2) when the issues involved
are of transcendental importance; (3) cases of first
impression as no jurisprudence yet exists that will guide
the lower courts on this matter; (4) the constitutional
issues raised are better decided by this court; (5) the time
element presented in this case cannot be ignored; (6) the
filed petition reviews the act of a constitutional organ; (7)

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petitioners rightly claim that they had no other plain,

speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law;
and (8) the petition includes questions that are dictated by
public welfare and the advancement of public policy, or
demanded by the broader interest of justice, or the orders
complained of were found to be patent nullities, or the
appeal was considered as clearly an inappropriate
remedy.33
Here, while this Court agrees with the JBC that the
petitionerÊs preliminary remedy to question the rotational
arrangement of Congress is to ask the latter to repudiate
the same, this, however, cannot be considered plain, speedy
and adequate. This Court is, thus, inclined to sustain the
petitionerÊs direct resort to this Court not only because it is
the plain, speedy and adequate remedy available to him
but also by reason of the constitutional issues involved
herein and the urgency of the matter. As correctly pointed
out by the OSG, the Constitution mandates that any
vacancy to the office of an Associate Justice of the Supreme
Court must be filled up within the 90-day period from its
occurrence. Therefore, the JBC must submit the list of
nominees prior to the start of that

_______________

31 The Diocese of Bacolod v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No.

205728, January 21, 2015, 747 SCRA 1.
32 G.R. No. 187094, February 15, 2017, 817 SCRA 494.
33 The Diocese of Bacolod v. Commission on Elections, supra at pp.
45-50.

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period. As the nominations covered by the questioned

December 2016 JBC En Banc deliberations were intended
for vacancies created by then Associate Justices Perez and

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Brion, who respectively retired last December 14 and 29,

2016, hence, any resort to Congress during that time would
already be inadequate since the JBC list of nominees would
be submitted any moment to the Office of the President for
the appointment of the next Associate Justices of the
Supreme Court. Since time is of the essence, the
petitionerÊs direct resort to this Court is warranted.
On the alleged grave abuse of discretion of the JBC in
adopting the rotational representation of Congress
correctable by certiorari. The petitioner ascribed grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the JBC in its adoption of
the rotational scheme, which led to the non-counting of his
votes in its En Banc deliberations last December 2 and 9,
2016, as it deprives Congress of its full representation
therein. The JBC, on the other hand, believes otherwise for
it merely acted in accordance with the mandate of the
Constitution and with the ruling in Chavez. Also, such
rotational scheme was a creation of Congress, which it
merely adopted.
Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the present
Rules of Court are the two special civil actions used for
determining and correcting grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The sole office
of the writ of certiorari is the correction of errors of
jurisdiction, which necessarily includes the commission of
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction.34 The burden is on the petitioner to prove that
the respondent tribunal committed not merely a reversible
error but also a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction. Showing mere abuse of discretion
is not enough, for the abuse must be shown to be grave.
Grave abuse of discretion means either

_______________

34 Araullo v. Aquino III, G.R. No. 209287, July 1, 2014, 728 SCRA 1,
72.

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that the judicial or quasi-judicial power was exercised in an

arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or
personal hostility, or that the respondent judge, tribunal or
board evaded a positive duty, or virtually refused to
perform the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of law,
such as when such judge, tribunal or board exercising
judicial or quasi-judicial powers acted in a capricious or
whimsical manner as to be equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction.35
But, the remedies of certiorari and prohibition are
necessarily broader in scope and reach before this Court as
the writs may be issued to correct errors of jurisdiction
committed not only by a tribunal, corporation, board or
officer exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial
functions but also to set right, undo and restrain any act of
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction by any branch or instrumentality of the
Government, even if the latter does not exercise judicial,
quasi-judicial or ministerial functions. Thus, they are
appropriate remedies to raise constitutional issues and to
review and/or prohibit or nullify the acts of legislative and
executive officials.36
Here, it is beyond question that the JBC does not fall
within the scope of a tribunal, board, or officer exercising
judicial or quasi-judicial functions. Neither did it act in any
judicial or quasi-judicial capacity nor did it assume any
performance of judicial or quasi-judicial prerogative in
adopting the rotational scheme of Congress, which was the
reason for not counting the votes of the petitioner in its En
Banc deliberations last December 2 and 9, 2016. But,
despite this, its act is still not beyond this CourtÊs reach as
the same is correctible by certiorari if it is tainted with
grave abuse of discretion even if it is not exercising judicial
and quasi-judicial functions. Now, did the JBC abuse its
discretion in adopting the six-month rotational
arrangement and in not counting the

_______________

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35 Bordomeo v. Court of Appeals, supra note 29 at p. 289.

36 Supra note 34 at pp. 74-75.

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votes of the petitioner? This Court answers in the negative.

As correctly pointed out by the JBC, in adopting the said
arrangement, it merely acted pursuant to the Constitution
and the Chavez ruling, which both require only one
representative from Congress in the JBC. It cannot,
therefore, be faulted for simply complying with the
Constitution and jurisprudence. Moreover, said
arrangement was crafted by both Houses of Congress and
the JBC merely adopted the same. By no stretch of
imagination can it be regarded as grave abuse of discretion
on the part of the JBC.
With the foregoing, despite this CourtÊs previous
declaration that certiorari is the plain, speedy and
adequate remedy available to petitioner, still the same
cannot prosper for the petitionerÊs failure to prove that the
JBC acted with grave abuse of discretion in adopting the
rotational scheme.
On the propriety of mandamus. It is essential to the
issuance of a writ of mandamus that the applicant has a
clear legal right to the tiling demanded and it must be the
imperative duty of the respondent to perform the act
required. The burden is on the petitioner to show that
there is such a clear legal right to the performance of the
act, and a corresponding compelling duty on the part of the
respondent to perform the act. As an extraordinary writ,
it lies only to compel an officer to perform a
ministerial duty, not a discretionary one.37 A clear line
demarcates a discretionary act from a ministerial one. A
purely ministerial act is one which an officer or tribunal
performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner,
in obedience to the mandate of legal authority, without

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regard to or the exercise of his own judgment upon the

propriety or impropriety of the act done.38 On the other
hand, if the law imposes a duty upon a public officer

_______________

37 Villanueva v. Judicial and Bar Council, G.R. No. 211833, April 7,

2015, 755 SCRA 182, 198.
38 Partido ng Manggagawa v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No.
164702, March 15, 2006, 484 SCRA 671, 684.

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and gives him the right to decide how or when the duty
shall be performed, such duty is discretionary and not
ministerial. The duty is ministerial only when the
discharge of the same requires neither the exercise of
official discretion or judgment.39 Clearly, the use of
discretion and the performance of a ministerial act are
mutually exclusive. Further, the writ of mandamus does
not issue to control or review the exercise of discretion or to
compel a course of conduct.40
In the case at bench, the counting of votes in the
selection of the nominees to the judiciary may only be
considered a ministerial duty of the JBC if such votes were
cast by its rightful members and not by someone, like the
petitioner, who is not considered a member during the En
Banc deliberations last December 2 and 9, 2016. For during
the questioned period, the lawful representative of
Congress to the JBC is a member of the Senate and not of
the House of Representatives as per their agreed rotational
scheme. Considering that a member of the Senate already
cast his vote therein, the JBC has the full discretion not to
count the votes of the petitioner for it is mandated by both
the Constitution and jurisprudence to maintain that
Congress will only have one representative in the JBC. As

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the act of the JBC involves a discretionary one, accordingly,

mandamus will not lie.
On the application of Chavez as stare decisis in this case.
The petitioner strongly maintains that Chavez must be
revisited and reversed due to its unexecutability. But the
JBC insists that the arguments herein are mere rehash of
those in Chavez, hence, already barred by the doctrine of
stare decisis. Also, there is no cogent reason for ChavezÊs
reversal.
This Court takes another glance at the arguments in
Chavez and compares them with the present arguments of
the petitioner. A careful perusal, however, reveals that,
although

_______________

39 Mallari v. Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank, G.R. No.

157660, August 29, 2008, 563 SCRA 664, 671.
40 Supra note 37.

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the petitioner questioned the JBCÊs adoption of the six-

month rotational representation of Congress leading to the
non-counting of his votes in its En Banc deliberations last
December 2 and 9, 2016, the supporting arguments hereof
still boil down to the proper interpretation of Section 8(1),
Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution. Hence, being mere
rehash of the arguments in Chavez, the application of the
doctrine of stare decisis in this case is inevitable. More so,
the petitioner failed to present strong and compelling
reason not to rule this case in the same way that this Court
ruled Chavez.
As stated in the beginning of this ponencia, stare decisis
et non quieta movere is a doctrine which means to adhere to
precedents and not to unsettle things which are

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established. This is embodied in Article 8 of the Civil

Code of the Philippines which provides, thus:

ART. 8. Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the

Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the Philippines.

The doctrine enjoins adherence to judicial precedents

and requires courts in a country to follow the rule
established in a decision of the Supreme Court thereof.
That decision becomes a judicial precedent to be followed in
subsequent cases by all courts in the land. The doctrine is
based on the principle that once a question of law has
been examined and decided, it should be deemed
settled and closed to further argument. The same is
grounded on the necessity for securing certainty and
stability of judicial decisions, thus, time and again, the
court has held that it is a very desirable and necessary
judicial practice that when a court has laid down a
principle of law as applicable to a certain state of
facts, it will adhere to that principle and apply it to
all future cases in which the facts are substantially
the same. It simply means that for the sake of certainty, a
conclusion reached in one case should be applied to those
that follow if the facts are substantially the same, even
though the parties

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may be different. It proceeds from the first principle of

justice that, absent any powerful countervailing
considerations, like cases ought to be decided alike. Thus,
where the same questions relating to the same event have
been put forward by the parties similarly situated as in a
previous case litigated and decided by a competent court,
the rule of stare decisis is a bar to any attempt to relitigate
the same issue. The doctrine has assumed such value in

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our judicial system that the Court has ruled that

„[a]bandonment thereof must be based only on strong and
compelling reasons, otherwise, the becoming virtue of
predictability which is expected from this Court would be
immeasurably affected and the publicÊs confidence in the
stability of the solemn pronouncements diminished.‰
Verily, only upon showing that circumstances
attendant in a particular case override the great
benefits derived by our judicial system from the
doctrine of stare decisis, can the courts be justified
in setting aside the same.41
Here, the facts are exactly the same as in Chavez, where
this Court has already settled the issue of interpretation of
Section 8(1), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution. Truly,
such ruling may not be unanimous, but it is undoubtedly a
reflection of the wisdom of the majority of members of this
Court on that matter. Chavez cannot simply be regarded as
an erroneous application of the questioned constitutional
provision for it merely applies the clear mandate of the law,
that is, Congress is entitled to only one representative in
the JBC in the same way that its coequal branches are.
As this Court declared in Chavez, Section 8(1), Article
VIII of the 1987 Constitution is clear, categorical and
unambiguous. Thus, it needs no further construction or
interpretation. Time and time again, it has been repeatedly
declared by this Court that where the law speaks in
clear and categorical language, there is no room for
interpretation, only

_______________

41 Lazatin v. Desierto, G.R. No. 147097, June 5, 2009, 588 SCRA 285,
293-295.

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application.42 The wordings of Section 8(1), Article VIII of

the 1987 Constitution are to be considered as indicative of
the final intent of its Framers, that is, for Congress as a
whole to only have one representative to sit in the JBC.
This Court, therefore, cannot simply make an assumption
that the Framers merely by oversight failed to take into
account the bicameral nature of Congress in drafting the
same. As further laid down in Chavez, the Framers were
not keen on adjusting the provision on congressional
representation in the JBC as it was not in the exercise of
its primary function, which is to legislate. Notably, the JBC
was created to support the executive power to appoint, and
Congress, as one whole body, was merely assigned a
contributory nonlegislative function. No parallelism can be
drawn between the representative of Congress in the JBC
and the exercise by Congress of its legislative powers under
Article VI and constituent powers under Article XVII of the
Constitution. Congress, in relation to the executive and
judicial branches of government, is constitutionally treated
as another coequal branch in the matter of its JBC
representation.43
This Court cannot succumb to the argument that
Congress, being composed of two distinct and separate
chambers, cannot represent each other in the JBC. Again,
as this Court explained in Chavez, such an argument is
misplaced because in the JBC, any member of Congress,
whether from the Senate or the House of Representatives,
is constitutionally empowered to represent the entire
Congress. It may be a constricted constitutional authority,
but it is not an absurdity. To broaden the scope of
congressional representation in the JBC is tantamount to
the inclusion of a subject matter which was not included in
the provision as enacted. True to its constitutional
mandate, the Court cannot craft and tailor constitutional
provisions in order to accommodate all situations no

_______________

42 Barcellano v. Bañas, G.R. No. 165287, September 14, 2011, 657

SCRA 545, 554.
43 Supra note 4 at pp. 507-514.

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matter how ideal or reasonable the proposed solution may

sound. To the exercise of this intrusion, the Court
declines.44
While it is true that Section 8(1), Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution did not explicitly state that the JBC shall be
composed of seven members, however, the same is implied
in the enumeration of who will be the members thereof.
And though it is unnecessary for the JBC composition to be
an odd number as no tie-breaker is needed in the
preparation of a shortlist since judicial nominees are not
decided by a „yes‰ or „no‰ vote, still, JBCÊs membership
cannot be increased from seven to eight for it will be a clear
violation of the aforesaid constitutional provision. To add
another member in the JBC or to increase the
representative of Congress to the JBC, the remedy is not
judicial but constitutional amendment.
In sum, this Court will not overthrow Chavez for it is in
accord with the constitutional mandate of giving Congress
„a representative‰ in the JBC. In the same manner, the
adoption of the rotational scheme will not in any way
deprive Congress of its full participation in the JBC for
such an arrangement is also in line with that constitutional
mandate.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant
Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus is hereby
DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

Carpio, Peralta, Bersamin, Mendoza, Perlas-Bernabe,

Jardeleza, Caguioa and Tijam, JJ., concur.
Sereno, CJ., No part.
Leonardo-De Castro, Del Castillo, Martires and Reyes,
Jr., JJ., We join the dissent of J. Leonen.
Leonen, J., See Dissenting Opinion.

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44 Id., at pp. 515-518.

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Umali vs. Judicial and Bar Council

DISSENTING OPINION

LEONEN, J.:

This Court is once again tasked to reexamine our

interpretation of Article VIII, Section 8(1) of the
Constitution, previously the subject of this CourtÊs review
in Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council.1 In the aftermath of
Chavez, we see the absurd and unworkable effects of
having only one (1) representative of Congress within the
Judicial and Bar Council.
Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council2 sanctioned what
was clearly unintended by the Constitution: the periodic
disempowerment of one (1) legislative chamber. In doing so,
it weakens Congress itself as a bicameral constitutional
department. The subtraction of the critical one (1) vote that
determines who gets into the shortlist is achieved by
periodically disempowering one (1) chamber. From the time
Chavez was promulgated, significant facts have come to
light that justifies the abandonment of that precedent.
We must do so in this case.
This is a Petition for mandamus and certiorari filed by
Representative Reynaldo V. Umali (Representative Umali),
current Chair of the House of Representatives Committee
on Justice, questioning the six (6)-month rotational
representation arrangement of Congress adopted by the
Judicial and Bar Council pursuant to Chavez v. Judicial
and Bar Council,3 which was decided with finality on April
16, 2013. Petitioner claims that the current arrangement
unfairly deprives both chambers of Congress of its full

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participation in the Judicial and Bar Council.

An understanding of the process of appointment to the
judiciary, especially in its historical context, is important to

_______________

1 691 Phil. 173; 676 SCRA 579 (2012) [Per J. Mendoza, En Banc].
2 Id.
3 709 Phil. 478; 696 SCRA 496 (2013) [Per J. Mendoza, En Banc].

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Umali vs. Judicial and Bar Council

situate this CourtÊs proper interpretation of the current

provisions of the Constitution.
Before the creation of the Judicial and Bar Council, the
power to nominate and appoint members of the judiciary
was vested in the executive and legislative branches.
Title X, Article 80 of the Malolos Constitution provides:

TITLE X
The Judicial Power

Article 80. The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and the

Solicitor-General shall be chosen by the National Assembly in
concurrence with the President of the Republic and the Secretaries
of the Government, and shall be absolutely independent of the
Legislative and Executive Powers.

The 1935 Constitution similarly states:

ARTICLE VIII
Judicial Department

Section 5. The Members of the Supreme Court and all judges of

inferior courts shall be appointed by the President with the consent
of the Commission on Appointments.

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The promulgation of the 1973 Constitution, however,

vested the chief executive with both executive and
legislative powers. Vetting and appointing of members to
the judiciary became the sole prerogative of the President:

ARTICLE X
The Judiciary

Section 4. The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of

inferior courts shall be appointed by the President.

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Umali vs. Judicial and Bar Council

Hoping to unshackle the Republic from the abuses of

power during Martial Law but at the same time wanting to
insulate the process of judicial appointments from partisan
politics, the 1986 Constitutional Commission, through
Commissioner Roberto Concepcion, proposed the creation of
an independent body that would vet potential appointees to
the judiciary.4 This body would be represented by the
different stakeholders of the legal sector and would have
the mandate of preparing the list of potential judicial
appointees to be submitted to the President. The proposal
became what is now the Judicial and Bar Council. Article
VIII, Section 8 of the Constitution now provides:

ARTICLE VIII
Judicial Department

....
Section 8(1). A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under
the supervision of the Supreme Court composed of the Chief Justice
as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a
representative of the Congress as ex officio Members, a
representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired

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Member of the Supreme Court, and a representative of the private

sector.
(2) The regular members of the Council shall be appointed by the
President for a term of four years with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments. Of the Members first appointed, the
representative of the Integrated Bar shall serve for four years, the
professor of law for three years, the retired Justice for two years,
and the representative of the private sector for one year.
(3) The Clerk of the Supreme Court shall be the Secretary ex
officio of the Council and shall keep a record of its proceedings.

_______________

4 See Constitutional Commission, Records, Vol. I, Journal No. 29,

dated July 14, 1986.

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234 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Umali vs. Judicial and Bar Council

(4) The regular Members of the Council shall receive such

emoluments as may be determined by the Supreme Court. The
Supreme Court shall provide in its annual budget the
appropriations for the Council.
(5) The Council shall have the principal function of
recommending appointees to the Judiciary. It may exercise such
other functions and duties as the Supreme Court may assign to it.

Based on their understanding of the provision stating

that one (1) of its ex officio members would be „a
representative of Congress,‰ both the House of
Representatives and Senate sent representatives to the
Council. Representative Rogaciano A. Mercado sat as ex
officio member from December 10, 1987 to February 23,
1989 while Senator Wigberto E. Tañada sat as ex officio
member from March 2, 1988 to May 21, 1990.5 In a
previous case, however, this Court stated that membership

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in the Council would be altered only in 1994, stating that

before then, the House of Representatives and the Senate
would alternate its representation:

[F]rom the moment of the creation of the JBC, [Congress]

designated one representative to sit in the JBC to act as one of the
ex officio members. Perhaps in order to give equal opportunity to
both houses to sit in the exclusive body, the House of
Representatives and the Senate would send alternate
representatives to the JBC. In other words, Congress had only one
(1) representative.
In 1994, the composition of the JBC was substantially altered.
Instead of having only seven (7) members, an eighth (8th) member
was added to the JBC as two (2) representatives from Congress
began sitting in the JBC · one from the House of Representatives
and one from the Senate, with each having one-half (1/2) of a vote.
Then, curiously, the JBC En Banc, in separate meetings

_______________

5 <http://jbc.judi​ciary.gov.ph/index.php/about-the-jbc/jbc-officials>
(Last accessed March 6, 2017).

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Umali vs. Judicial and Bar Council

held in 2000 and 2001, decided to allow the representatives from

the Senate and the House of Representatives one full vote each.6

Curiously, the List found in Judicial and Bar CouncilÊs

website shows that since 1988, Congress has sent two (2)
representatives to the Council.
The practice of giving each member of Congress one (1)
full vote was questioned in 2012 in Chavez v. Judicial and
Bar Council.7
This Court, voting 7-2,8 stated that the Constitution
intended for the Judicial and Bar Council to only have

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seven (7) members; thus, only one (1) representative from

Congress must sit as an ex officio member. The dispositive
portion of the Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The current

numerical composition of the Judicial and Bar Council is declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The Judicial and Bar Council is hereby
enjoined to reconstitute itself so that only one (1) member of
Congress will sit as a representative in its proceedings, in
accordance with Section 8(1), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution.
This disposition is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.

_______________

6 Supra note 1 at p. 189; p. 587, citing List of JBC Chairpersons, Ex

Officio and Regular Members, Ex Officio Secretaries and Consultants,
issued by the Office of the Executive Officer, Judicial and Bar Council
and Minutes of the 1st En Banc Executive Meeting, January 12, 2000
and Minutes of the 12th En Banc Meeting, May 30, 2001.
7 Id.
8 Peralta, Bersamin, Villarama, Jr., Perez, Reyes, and Perlas-
Bernabe, JJ., concurred. Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, and
Sereno, JJ., no part, nominees to the CJ. position. Brion J., no part, on
leave. Abad, J., dissented. Del Castillo, J., joined the dissent of J. Abad.

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Upon Motion for Reconsideration, this Court, voting 10-

9
3, reiterated that „[i]n the [Judicial and Bar Council], any
member of Congress, whether from the Senate or the
House of Representatives, is constitutionally empowered to
represent the entire Congress.‰10
The Minutes of the July 29, 2013 Judicial and Bar
Council En Banc meeting reflect their actions after the case
was promulgated. Representative Niel C. Tupas, Jr.

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(Representative Tupas) informed the Council that pursuant

to Chavez, the House of Representatives and Senate agreed
that their representation would be on a six (6)-month
rotational basis, with Senator Aquilino „Koko‰ Pimentel III
(Senator Pimentel) representing Congress from July 1 to
December 31, 2013.11 The Minutes state:

[Congressman Tupas] said that in view of the decision of the

Supreme Court in April this year, the Speaker of the House of
Representatives and the Senate President authorized him and
Senator Pimentel, Chairperson of the Committee on Justice of the
Senate to discuss the matter of representation to the JBC. They
decided that the representation would be on a rotation basis. For
the first six (6) months, Senator Pimentel would be the one to
represent both Houses of Congress; and for the next six (6) months,
it would be he. In the absence of Senator Pimentel, Congressman
Tupas will automatically attend the meetings, and vice versa. He
cautioned that since it is quite difficult for both Houses to come up
with an agreement, it would not be good to assume that whenever
the

_______________

9 CJ. Sereno had no part as chair of JBC. Associate Justice Velasco,

Jr. had no part due to participation in Judicial and Bar Council.
Associate Justice Brion had no part. Associate Justices Carpio, Leonardo-
De Castro, Peralta, Bersamin, Villarama, Jr., Perez, Mendoza, Reyes,
and Perlas-Bernabe concurred. Associate Justice Abad, Del Castillo and
Leonen dissented.
10 Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council, supra note 3 at p. 494; p. 515.
11 Rollo, p. 45.

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Senate President or the Speaker of the House writes the JBC, it is

the decision of Congress. It should be a communication from both

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Houses. He then requested that he be furnished with copies of all

notices from the JBC even during the term of Senator Pimentel.
Chief Justice Sereno clarified that she received the Letter of
Senate President Drilon stating, among other things, that the
Speaker of the House and the Senate President agreed that Senator
Pimentel would be the one to represent Congress until December
31, 2013, but that in his absence it would be Congressman Tupas.
She assured both Congressman Tupas and Senator Pimentel that
they will both receive copies of all notices and information that are
being circulated among the JBC Members. She thanked
Congressman Tupas for personally informing the Council of the
agreement between the two Houses of Congress, thus giving a
higher level of comfort than it had already given.
Congressman Tupas mentioned that he was not aware that the
Senate President sent a letter. His assumption is that the
information would come from both Houses, not just from the
Senate. He thus came to the meeting to personally inform the JBC
of the agreement. He thanked the Chief Justice and asked for
permission to leave.
Senator Pimentel likewise requested that he also be furnished
with copies of all documents during the rotation of Congressman
Tupas. He then requested for a three-minute break, as he had some
matters to discuss with the Congressman before leaving.12

There was no showing of the presence of any resolution

from any of the legislative chambers that authorized or
ratified the practice.
From then on, it became the practice of the House of
Representatives to represent Congress in the Judicial and
Bar

_______________

12 Id.

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Council from January to June and for the Senate to

represent Congress from July to December.13
The present controversy arose from the En Banc
deliberations of the Judicial and Bar Council on December
2 and December 9, 2016, for the selection of nominees for
the vacancies of retiring Supreme Court Associate Justices
Arturo D. Brion and Jose P. Perez. On both occasions,
Representative Umali14 cast his votes. His votes, however,
were not counted due to the present rotational
representation arrangement. The votes were instead placed
in an envelope and sealed, „subject to any further
disposition as the Supreme Court may direct in a proper
proceeding.‰15
Representative Umali filed this present Petition16
praying that:

a. The JBCÊs denial of petitioner UmaliÊs vote as ex officio member

during the En Banc sessions on December 2 and 9, 2016, be
reversed and set aside;
b. The JBC be directed to count the votes of petitioner Umali as ex
officio member during the En Banc sessions on December 2 and
9, 2016;
c. The current six-month rotational representation of Congress by
the Senate and the House of Representatives in the JBC be
declared unconstitutional; and
d. The JBC be directed to revert back to its prior representational
arrangement where two representatives from Congress are
recognized and allowed to vote, or the status quo ante, prior to
the Chavez ruling, and in accordance with such specific
guidelines that the Supreme Court will promulgate to ensure full
and proper representation and voting by both

_______________

13 Id., at p. 260, Comment.

14 Id., at p. 6. Representative Umali is the current chair of the House
Committee on Justice.
15 Id., at p. 10.
16 Id., at pp. 3-40.

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members from the Senate and the House of Representatives, and

thereafter to recognize, accept and count the votes cast by the
petitioner Umali in all proceedings of the JBC.17

The Judicial and Bar Council was directed to file its

comment to the Petition. On February 6, 2017, the Office of
the Solicitor General submitted a Manifestation (in lieu of
Comment)18 entering its appearance for „[t]he Congress of
the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Senate
and the House of Representatives‰19 and „[acting] as the
PeopleÊs Tribune.‰20 On February 10, 2017, the Judicial and
Bar Council Executive Chair21 and its regular members22
filed its Comment23 on behalf of the Council.
Petitioner argues that Chavez v. Judicial and Bar
Council24 did not define the manner by which the Judicial
and Bar Council should be reconstituted and that no formal
resolution was issued by the Council to resolve the issue.
The Council instead adopted Representative TupasÊ
manifestation that the Senate and House of
Representatives agreed on a six (6)-month rotational
representation.25
Petitioner points out that Representative Tupas had
cautioned the Council that decisions of Congress should be
a communication of both houses. He argues that neither
Representative TupasÊ manifestation nor then Senate
President Franklin DrilonÊs (then Senate President Drilon)
letter con-

_______________

17 Id., at p. 33.
18 Id., at pp. 160-241.
19 Id., at p. 160.
20 Id.
21 Retired Associate Justice Angelina Sandoval-Gutierrez.
22 Jose V. Mejia, Maria Milagros N. Fernan-Cayosa, and Toribio E.

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Ilao, Jr.
23 Rollo, pp. 257-290.
24 Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council, supra note 1.
25 Rollo, pp. 15-16.

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240 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Umali vs. Judicial and Bar Council

ferring Senator PimentelÊs representation constitute a

plenary act of both Houses of Congress so the present
rotational representation cannot be adopted by the
Council.26
Petitioner asserts that allowing only one (1)
representative of Congress on the Council is „impractical,
absurd and unconstitutional.‰27 He explains that the
bicameral nature of Congress results in both houses having
different powers, functions, and decision-making processes.
Thus, any communication, action, or resolution from either
house should not be interpreted as binding on the whole
Congress. He points out that other than this CourtÊs
interpretation of Article VIII, Section 8(1),28 there is also no
provision in the Constitution that expressly mandates a
single representation of Congress to any political or
adjudicating body.29 The genuine and full representation of
Congress expresses the voice of the electorate to the
Judicial and Bar Council.30
Petitioner contends that the distinction between both
houses is recognized under the Constitution. He claims
that denying the House of RepresentativesÊ continuous
representation in the Council would be denying it of its
duty to screen and vote for the candidates for the eight (8)
Associate Justices of the Supreme Court who will
compulsorily retire from 2017 to 2019.31 The Senate would
also be deprived of its duty to

_______________

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26 Id., at p. 16.
27 Id., at pp. 16-17.
28 CONST., Art. VIII, Sec. 8(1) provides:
Section 8(1). A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the
supervision of the Supreme Court composed of the Chief Justice as ex
officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a representative of the
Congress as ex officio Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar, a
professor of law, a retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a
representative of the private sector.
29 Rollo, pp. 17-18.
30 Id., at p. 18.
31 Id., at p. 19. Under its current arrangement, the House of
Representatives represents Congress in the JBC from January to

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VOL. 832, JULY 25, 2017 241

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screen and vote for the two (2) vacant positions in the
Supreme Court in 2022.32 He cites as basis the vote for the
vacancies left by Associate Justices Perez and Brion that
was scheduled in December, which deprived petitioner of
his chance to vote.33
Petitioner asserts that the bicameral nature of Congress
requires both houses to observe interparliamentary
courtesies and were meant to represent different
constituencies. Because of the shift from National
Assembly to a bicameral Congress, Article VIII, Section
8(1) of the Constitution should be interpreted to allow
representatives from both chambers to fully participate and
vote in the Judicial and Bar Council.34 He maintains that
Article VIII, Section 8(1) was not plain and was
unambiguous because from 2001 until the promulgation of
Chavez, the Judicial and Bar Council allowed both the
House of Representatives and the Senate to be given one
(1) full vote each.35 He insists that a verba legis
interpretation of Article III, Section 8(1) would deny
Congress of its representation since neither chamber on its

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own can represent the entirety of Congress.36

Petitioner claims that allowing both the House of
Representatives and the Senate to represent Congress in
the Coun-

_______________

June while Senate represents Congress from July to December. Justice

Bienvenido Reyes retired on July 6, 2017 while Justice Mendoza retires
on August 13, 2017. Justice Velasco, Jr. retires on August 18, 2018 while
Justice Leonardo-De Castro retires on October 8, 2018. Justice Del
Castillo retires on July 29, 2019, Justice Jardeleza retires on September
26, 2019, Justice Bersamin retires on October 18, 2019 and Justice
Carpio retires on October 26, 2019. Two justices will retire in the first
half of 2019: Justice Martires retires on January 2, 2019 and Justice
Tijam retires on January 5, 2019.
32 Justice Peralta retires on March 27, 2022 while Justice Perlas-
Bernabe retires on May 14, 2022.
33 Rollo, p. 20.
34 Id., at p. 23.
35 Id., at p. 24.
36 Id., at pp. 27-28.

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242 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

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cil upholds the coequal representation of the three (3)

branches of the government. He explains that under the
present composition, there are actually three (3)
representatives from the judicial branch (the Chief Justice,
a retired Justice of the Supreme Court, and a member of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines) and three (3)
representatives of the executive branch (Secretary of
Justice, the professor of law, and the representative of the
private sector who are all presidential appointees).37 Thus,
he claims that continuing the present practice results in
the legislative department having a disproportionate

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representation in the constitutional body and diminishes

the integrity of the House of Representatives, which
represents the people.38
For these reasons, petitioner argues that the Judicial
and Bar Council committed grave abuse of discretion that
could be remedied through a writ of certiorari.39 He adds
that a writ of mandamus would also be proper to compel
the Judicial and Bar Council to accept and recognize the
votes he cast in the December 2 and 9, 2016 En Banc
sessions.40
Unlike in Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council,41 both the
House of Representatives and the Senate were able to
comment on the petition, through a Manifestation42 and
Consolidated Manifestation43 by the Office of the Solicitor
General.

_______________

37 Id., at pp. 29-30.

38 Id., at p. 30.
39 Id., at p. 15.
40 Id., at p. 16.
41 Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council, supra note 1.
42 Rollo, pp. 160-245. The Manifestation was verified by Senate
President Aquilino „Koko‰ Pimentel III and Speaker of the House
Pantaleon D. Alvarez.
43 Id., at pp. 425-432. The Counter-Manifestation attached a letter
from Senator Richard Gordon, the current Chair of the Senate
Committee on Justice and Senate representative to the Judicial and Bar
Council, signifying his assent to the Petition filed by Rep. Umali. This
Court likewise noted a Letter (id., at pp. 426-427) from Secre-

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The Office of the Solicitor General, for Congress, argues

that Chavez should be revisited due to its „unexecutability

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. . . arising from constitutional constraints.‰44 It explains

that the current practice „was arrived at in view of time
constraints and difficulty in securing the agreement of both
Houses.‰45 It likewise points out that since the Constitution
did not identify who should represent Congress in the
Judicial and Bar Council, the provision must be
harmonized to take into account the current bicameral
system.46
The Office of the Solicitor General contends that the
current rotational arrangement sets aside the inherent
dichotomy between the two (2) Houses of Congress and
violates the essence of bicameralism.47 It explains that
when the representatives of the Senate or the House of
Representatives vote for a certain judicial nominee, they
carry the interests and views of the group they represent. If
there is only one (1) member of Congress in the Council,
this vote would not be representative of the interests
represented by Congress as a whole.48
The Office of the Solicitor General maintains that no
member of Congress can represent all of Congress, which is
why Congress has always sent two (2) representatives to
the Council.49 It points out that the phrase „a
representative of Congress‰ in Article VIII, Section 8(1) is
qualified by the phrase „ex officio members‰ signifying that
the member in an ex offi-

_______________

tary of Justice Vitaliano N. Aguirre II stating that while he previously

signified his assent to the filing of the Judicial and Bar CouncilÊs
Comment, he found after further evaluation that „the arguments of the
representative of Mindoro in his petition to be impressed with merit.‰
44 Id., at p. 168.
45 Id., at p. 169.
46 Id., at p. 175.
47 Id., at p. 185.
48 Id., at pp. 186-187.
49 Id., at pp. 190-194.

244

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cio capacity must be qualified to represent the entirety of

Congress.50
The Office of the Solicitor General asserts that the
intent of the Judicial and Bar CouncilÊs composition is for
the representation to be collegial and to eliminate partisan
politics in the selection of members of the judiciary; thus,
„the focus is more on proper representation rather than
quantitative limitation.‰51 It asserts that when the framers
deliberated on Article VIII, Section 8(1), they were still of
the belief that legislature would be unicameral.52 If they
had intended for the Council to only have seven (7)
members, it would have specified the number, as it did in
other provisions of the Constitution.53 It contends that a
deadlock in the voting is not enough justification to
undermine the bicameral nature of the legislature since
voting in the Council is not decided by a „yes‰ or „no‰
vote.54
The Office of the Solicitor General likewise holds that
while the function of the Judicial and Bar Council may be
nonlegislative, the involvement of both Houses of Congress
is indispensable since each represents different
constituencies and would necessarily bring a unique
perspective to the CouncilÊs recommendation process.55 It
cites statistics from June 2016 to present showing that a
large number of appointments were made to the lower
courts at a time when the House of Representatives, which
represents sectors or local districts, was not able to
participate in the voting process.56

_______________

50 Id., at pp. 194-198.

51 Id., at p. 200.
52 Id., at p. 201.
53 Id., at pp. 207-209.
54 Id., at pp. 209-211.
55Id., at pp. 217-220.
56 Id., at pp. 224-225.

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The Office of the Solicitor General also cites Aguinaldo

v. Aquino III57 to argue that in the review of the Judicial
and Bar CouncilÊs rules, it should also include a review of
the rule on CongressÊ representation on the Council.58
Respondent Judicial and Bar Council, on the other hand,
attests that the Petition should be dismissed since the
rotational scheme adopted by Congress is not the proper
subject of a petition for certiorari or mandamus. It
contends that the controversy does not involve the
CouncilÊs exercise of judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial
functions.59 It maintains that there was also no grave
abuse of discretion when it refused to count petitionerÊs
votes since this act was authorized by the Constitution and
Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council.60 It argues that the
CouncilÊs performance of its duties is discretionary; thus,
mandamus cannot be issued to control the performance of a
discretionary act.61
Respondent counters that the Petition is not the plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy since petitioner did not show
that he exerted all efforts to have his concern addressed by
Congress. It points out that it was Congress, not the
Council, which adopted the rotational scheme.62 Chavez
declared that the representation of Congress in the Council
would be for Congress to determine; thus, petitioner should
have first asked Congress to repudiate the rotational
scheme agreement.63 Respondent insists that the practice
and acquiescence of Congress to this arrangement operates
as an estoppel against any member of Congress to deny the
validity of this

_______________

57 G.R. No. 224302, November 29, 2016, 811 SCRA 304 [Per J.
Leonardo-De Castro, En Banc].

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58 Rollo, pp. 227-237.

59 Id., at pp. 262-263.
60 Id., at pp. 264-265.
61 Id., at pp. 268-269.
62 Id., at p. 265.
63 Id., at pp. 266-267.

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agreement.64 It also points out that petitioner has no locus

standi to file this Petition in his capacity as Chair of the
House of Representatives Committee on Justice absent any
resolution by the Senate and the House of Representatives
authorizing him to do so.65
Respondent likewise prays for the dismissal of the
Petition on the ground that petitionerÊs allegations are
mere rehashes of the arguments and dissents in Chavez
and are, thus, barred by the doctrine of stare decisis.66 It
insists that any issue on the interpretation of Article VIII,
Section 8(1) has already been settled in Chavez.67
Respondent reiterates the ruling in Chavez and argues
that the framers of the Constitution intended for the
Council to only have seven (7) members to provide a
solution when there is a stalemate in the voting.68 It insists
that Chavez has also settled the alleged „oversight and
technical omission‰ argued by petitioner when it stated
that the membership of Congress to the Council was not in
the interest of a certain constituency but in reverence to it
as the third branch of the government.69
Respondent argues that the grant of the Petition would
create an imbalance since Article VIII treats each ex officio
member as representing one (1) coequal branch of the
government.70 It maintains that even assuming that there
is an imbalance, it is not for this Court or the Council to
remedy the imbalance since the remedy lies in the
amendment of the constitutional provision.71

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_______________

64 Id., at p. 267.
65 Id., at pp. 269-271.
66 Id., at pp. 271-273.
67 Id., at pp. 273-275.
68 Id., at p. 276.
69 Id., at pp. 277-280.
70 Id., at pp. 280-281.
71 Id., at pp. 282-284.

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The case presents several procedural and substantive

issues. Procedurally, this Court is asked to determine first,
whether petitioner has the locus standi to file the Petition
in the absence of a resolution of both Houses of Congress
authorizing him for that purpose; second, whether the
Petition is the plain, speedy, and adequate remedy for
addressing the issue of the rotational representation
arrangement; and third, whether the doctrine of stare
decisis operates as a bar for petitioner to question the
ruling in Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council.
On the substantive issues, this Court is likewise asked
to determine, first, whether the current six (6)-month
rotational representation arrangement deprives Congress
of its full participation in the deliberations in the Judicial
and Bar Council; second, whether the Judicial and Bar
Council committed grave abuse of discretion in adopting a
six (6)-month rotational representation arrangement
absent a plenary action by both Houses of Congress; and
finally, whether the Judicial and Bar Council can be
compelled, by writ of mandamus, to count petitionerÊs votes
in the En Banc sessions of December 2 and 9, 2016.

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Every case brought to this Court must be filed by the

party having the standing to file the case. The definition of
legal standing is settled:

Locus standi is defined as „a right of appearance in a court of

justice on a given question.‰ In private suits, standing is governed
by the „real parties-in-interest‰ rule as contained in Section 2, Rule
3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. It provides that
„every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the
real party-in-interest.‰ Accordingly, the „real party-in-interest‰ is
„the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in
the suit or the party entitled to

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the avails of the suit.‰ Succinctly put, the plaintiff Ês standing is

based on his own right to the relief sought.72

Respondent contends that petitioner has no standing to

file this case absent a resolution from the House of
Representatives authorizing him to do so.73 It anchors its
argument on Philippine Constitutional Association v.
Enriquez,74 where this Court stated:

While the petition in G.R. No. 113174 was filed by 16 Senators,

including the Senate President and the Chairman of the Committee
on Finance, the suit was not authorized by the Senate itself.
Likewise, the petitions in G.R. Nos. 113766 and 113888 were filed
without an enabling resolution for the purpose.75

Respondent, however, failed to read the entirety of the

quoted portion. In Philippine Constitutional Association,
the procedural issue on standing was whether Senators
could question a presidential veto on an appropriations bill

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despite the absence of a Senate resolution authorizing

them to file the case. This Court, in addressing the issue,
first acknowledged that previous decisions have required
Senators to first submit a Senate resolution authorizing
the filing of the case. Nevertheless, this Court ruled that
members of Congress have standing to question any action
that impairs the CongressÊ powers and privileges,
regardless of whether there was a prior Congressional
resolution:

_______________

72 David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, 522 Phil. 705, 755-756; 489 SCRA 160,

216 (2006) [Per J. Sandoval-Gutierrez, En Banc], citing BlackÊs Law
Dictionary, p. 941, 6th ed., 1991; Rules of Court, Rule 3, Sec. 2; and
Salonga v. Warner Barnes & Co., 88 Phil. 125 (1951) [Per J. Bautista
Angelo, En Banc].
73 Rollo, pp. 269-271.
74 305 Phil. 546; 235 SCRA 506 (1994) [Per J. Quiason, En Banc].
75 Id., at p. 562; p. 519. See also Rollo, pp. 269-270.

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The legal standing of the Senate, as an institution, was

recognized in Gonzales v. Macaraig, Jr. . . . In said case, 23
Senators, comprising the entire membership of the Upper House of
Congress, filed a petition to nullify the presidential veto of Section
55 of the GAA of 1989. The filing of the suit was authorized by
Senate Resolution No. 381, adopted on February 2, 1989, and which
reads as follows:
Authorizing and Directing the Committee on Finance to
Bring in the Name of the Senate of the Philippines the Proper
Suit with the Supreme Court of the Philippines contesting the
Constitutionality of the Veto by the President of Special and
General Provisions, particularly Section 55, of the General
Appropriation Bill of 1989 (H.B. No. 19186) and for Other

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Purposes.
In the United States, the legal standing of a House of Congress
to sue has been recognized . . .
While the petition in G.R. No. 113174 was filed by 16 Senators,
including the Senate President and the Chairman of the Committee
on Finance, the suit was not authorized by the Senate itself.
Likewise, the petitions in G.R. Nos. 113766 and 113888 were filed
without an enabling resolution for the purpose.
....
We rule that a member of the Senate, and of the House of
Representatives for that matter, has the legal standing to question
the validity of a presidential veto or a condition imposed on an item
in an appropriation bill.
Where the veto is claimed to have been made without or in
excess of the authority vested on the President by the Constitution,
the issue of an impermissible intrusion of the Executive into the
domain of the Legislature arises . . .
To the extent the powers of Congress are impaired, so is the power
of each member thereof, since his office

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confers a right to participate in the exercise of the powers of that

institution . . .
An act of the Executive which injures the institution of Congress
causes a derivative but nonetheless substantial injury, which can be
questioned by a member of Congress . . . In such a case, any
member of Congress can have a resort to the courts.
Former Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando, as Amicus Curiae,
noted[:]
This is, then, the clearest case of the Senate as a whole or
individual Senators as such having substantial interest in the
question at issue. It could likewise be said that there was
requisite injury to their rights as Senators. It would then be
futile to raise any locus standi issue. Any intrusion into the
domain appertaining to the Senate is to be resisted. Similarly,

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if the situation were reversed, and it is the Executive Branch

that could allege a transgression, its officials could likewise
file the corresponding action. What cannot be denied is that a
Senator has standing to maintain inviolate the prerogatives,
powers and privileges vested by the Constitution in his
office.76 (Emphasis supplied; Citations omitted)

Every member of Congress has standing to question acts

which affect the powers, prerogatives, and privileges of
Congress. In Pimentel, Jr. v. Executive Secretary:77

_______________

76 Id., at pp. 562-564; pp. 519-520, citing Gonzales v. Macaraig, Jr.,

269 Phil. 472; 191 SCRA 452 (1990) [Per J. Melencio-Herrera, En Banc];
United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 551 F. 2d 384, 391 (1976);
Notes: Congressional Access to the Federal Courts, 90 Harvard Law
Review 1632 (1977); Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939); Holtzman v.
Schlesinger, 484 F. 2d 1307 (1973); and Kennedy v. Jones, 412 F. Supp.
353 (1976).
77 501 Phil. 303; 462 SCRA 622 (2005) [Per J. Puno, En Banc].

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As regards Senator Pimentel, it has been held that „to the extent
the powers of Congress are impaired, so is the power of each
member thereof, since his office confers a right to participate in the
exercise of the powers of that institution.‰ Thus, legislators have the
standing to maintain inviolate the prerogatives, powers and
privileges vested by the Constitution in their office and are allowed
to sue to question the validity of any official action which they claim
infringes their prerogatives as legislators. The petition at bar
invokes the power of the Senate to grant or withhold its
concurrence to a treaty entered into by the executive branch, in this
case, the Rome Statute. The petition seeks to order the executive

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branch to transmit the copy of the treaty to the Senate to allow it to

exercise such authority. Senator Pimentel, as member of the
institution, certainly has the legal standing to assert such authority
of the Senate.78 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

Here, petitioner, as a member of Congress and the Chair

of the House Committee on Justice, alleges that the
rotational representation arrangement adopted by
respondent Judicial and Bar Council impairs the
prerogative of Congress to have full representation within
the Council. Petitioner need not have the required House
resolution to file his Petition.
In any case, parties are vested by this Court with legal
standing when constitutional challenges have become
justiciable, consistent with this CourtÊs role in the
constitutional order. While the parties must first establish
their right to appear before us on a given question of law,
they must, more importantly, present concrete cases and
controversies. In this instance, the continuing problematic
application of Chavez vests petitioner, as the current
representative of the House to the Judicial and Bar
Council, with sufficient standing to raise this issue before
us.

_______________

78 Id., at pp. 312-313; pp. 631-632, citing Del Mar v. Philippine

Amusement and Gaming Corporation, 400 Phil. 307; 346 SCRA 485
(2000) [Per J. Puno, En Banc].

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The Office of the Solicitor General, however, may have

been confused when it filed its Manifestation (in Lieu of
Comment). It stated before this Court that the

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Manifestation is filed by „[t]he Congress of the Republic of

the Philippines, represented by the Senate and the House
of Representatives, through the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) who in this case acts as the PeopleÊs
Tribune.‰79
It is unclear whether the Office of the Solicitor General
intends to represent Congress or to act as the PeopleÊs
Tribune.
The Office of the Solicitor GeneralÊs mandate is to
„represent the Government of the Philippines, its agencies
and instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any
litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the
services of a lawyer.‰80
Thus, as a general rule, the Office of the Solicitor
General represents the Philippine government in all legal
proceedings. The rule has exceptions, such as when it takes
an adverse position and acts as the „PeopleÊs Tribune.‰ In
Pimentel, Jr. v. Commission on Elections:81

True, the Solicitor General is mandated to represent the

Government, its agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and
agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter
requiring the services of a lawyer. However, the Solicitor General
may, as it has in instances take a position adverse and contrary to
that of the Government on the reasoning that it is incumbent upon
him to present to the court what he considers would legally uphold
the best interest of the government although it may run counter to a
clientÊs position.
....

_______________

79 Rollo, p. 160.
80 1987 ADM. CODE, Book IV, Title III, Chapter 12, Sec. 35.
81 352 Phil. 424; 289 SCRA 586 (1998) [Per J. Kapunan, En Banc].

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As we commented on the role of the Solicitor General in cases

pending before this Court:
This Court does not expect the Solicitor General to waver
in the performance of his duty. As a matter of fact, the Court
appreciates the participation of the Solicitor General in many
proceedings and his continued fealty to his assigned task. He
should not therefore desist from appearing before this Court
even in those cases he finds his opinion inconsistent with the
Government or any of its agents he is expected to represent.
The Court must be advised of his position just as well.82
(Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

Gonzales v. Chavez83 further explains:

Indeed, in the final analysis, it is the Filipino people as a

collectivity that constitutes the Republic of the Philippines. Thus,
the distinguished client of the OSG is the people themselves of
which the individual lawyers in said office are a part.
....
Moreover, endowed with a broad perspective that spans the legal
interests of virtually the entire government officialdom, the OSG
may be expected to transcend the parochial concerns of a particular
client agency and instead, promote and protect the public weal.
Given such objectivity, it can discern, metaphorically speaking, the

_______________

82 Id., at pp. 431-432; pp. 594-595, citing Section 1 of Presidential

Decree No. 478; Section 35, Chapter 12 of the Administrative Code of
1987; Orbos v. Civil Service Commission, 267 Phil. 476; 189 SCRA 459
(1990) [Per J. Gancayco, En Banc]; and Martinez v. Court of Appeals, 307
Phil. 592; 237 SCRA 575 (1994) [Per CJ. Narvasa, Second Division].
83 282 Phil. 858; 205 SCRA 816 (1992) [Per J. Romero, En Banc].

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panoply that is the forest and not just the individual trees. Not
merely will it strive for a legal victory circumscribed by the narrow
interests of the client office or official, but as well, the vast concerns
of the sovereign which it is committed to serve.84

The Office of the Solicitor General is not prohibited from

taking a position adverse from that of the Judicial and Bar
Council. Its representation would be on behalf of the
Filipino people, instead of a particular government
instrumentality.
Its representation in this case, however, is contradictory.
It intends to represent Congress, a government
instrumentality, and act as the PeopleÊs Tribune; that is, it
will be taking a position contrary to that of a government
instrumentality. Obviously, the Office of the Solicitor
General cannot represent both at the same time.
Nevertheless, considering that the Office of the Solicitor
General manifested that it would not be representing the
Judicial and Bar Council as mandated and will instead be
taking an adverse position, this Court will presume that it
intends to act as the PeopleÊs Tribune.
In future cases, however, the Office of the Solicitor
General should be more cautious in entering its appearance
to this Court as the PeopleÊs Tribune to prevent further
confusion as to its standing.

II

Respondent claims that the Petition is not the plain,

speedy, and adequate remedy for questioning the rotational
representation arrangement adopted by Congress.85
A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court primarily requires that there must be no appeal, or
any other

_______________

84 Id., at pp. 889-891; pp. 845-847.

85 Rollo, p. 265.

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plain, speedy, and adequate remedy available before filing

the petition:

Section 1. Petition for certiorari.·When any tribunal,

board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions has acted without or in excess of its or his
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified
petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with
certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling
or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or
officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and
justice may require.
The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true
copy of the judgment, order or resolution subject thereof,
copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and
pertinent thereto, and a sworn certification of non-forum
shopping as provided in the third paragraph of Section 3,
Rule 46. (Emphasis supplied)

Citing the rule on exhaustion of administrative

remedies, respondent contends that the Petition is not the
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy since petitioner should
have first asked Congress to repudiate the rotational
representation agreement.86
This rule, however, applies to administrative agencies,
not to Congress. Respondent fails to cite any provision of
law or Congressional rule that requires petitioner to have
his concern addressed by Congress before filing a petition
with this Court.
There is also a time element to be considered that would
allow the direct resort to this Court. In Diocese of Bacolod
v. Commission on Elections,87 we stated that „a direct

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resort to this court is allowed when there are genuine

issues of constitu-

_______________

86 Id., at pp. 266-267.

87 751 Phil. 301; 747 SCRA 1 (2015) [Per J. Leonen, En Banc].

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tionality that must be addressed at the most immediate

time.‰88 We further recognized that „[e]xigency in certain
situations would qualify as an exception for direct resort to
this [C]ourt.‰89
Under the Constitution, the President only has 90 days
from the vacancy to appoint members of the Supreme
Court. Thus, the Judicial and Bar Council must be able to
submit its list of nominees before the running of the period.

Article VIII
Judicial Department
....
Section 4(1). The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief
Justice and fourteen Associate Justices. It may sit En Banc or in its
discretion, in divisions of three, five, or seven Members. Any
vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence
thereof.

This 90-day period is mandatory. Failure to comply is

considered a culpable violation of the Constitution. In De
Castro v. Judicial and Bar Council:90

[T]he usage in Section 4(1), Article VIII of the word shall · an

imperative, operating to impose a duty that may be enforced ·
should not be disregarded. Thereby, Section 4(1) imposes on the
President the imperative duty to make an appointment of a Member

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of the Supreme Court within 90 days from the occurrence of the

vacancy. The failure by the President to do so will be a clear
disobedience to the Constitution.91 (Emphasis in the original,
citation omitted)

_______________

88 Id., at p. 331; p. 45.

89 Id., at p. 334; p. 48.
90 629 Phil. 629; 615 SCRA 666 (2010) [Per J. Bersamin, En Banc].
91 Id., at p. 692; pp. 737-738, citing Dizon v. Encarnacion, 119 Phil.
20; 9 SCRA 714 (1963) [Per J. Concepcion, En Banc].

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Admittedly, petitionerÊs prayer to have his vote counted

in the December 2 and 9, 2016 En Banc Meetings has
already become moot with the appointments of Associate
Justice Samuel R. Martires and Associate Justice Noel G.
Tijam.92 Nevertheless:

Th[is] Court will decide cases, otherwise moot, if: first, there is a
grave violation of the Constitution; second, the exceptional
character of the situation and the paramount public interest is
involved; third, when the constitutional issue raised requires
formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and
the public; and fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet evading
review.93 (Citation omitted)

An erroneous interpretation of a constitutional provision

would be considered a grave violation of the Constitution.
Judicial appointments are likewise of paramount public
interest. This case will also settle, once and for all, the
issue on the interpretation of Article VIII, Section 8(1).
This issue will once again arise considering that two (2)
more justices are set to retire this year.94 There is, thus, a

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limited amount of time for petitioner to question the lists of

nominees submitted by respondent to the Office of the
Presi-

_______________

92 Associate Justice Martires was appointed on March 2, 2017 vice

Associate Justice Perez while Associate Justice Tijam was appointed on
March 8, 2017 vice Associate Justice Brion. Judicial and Bar Council, see
Newly-appointed Judges/Justices, Judicial and Bar Council,
<http://jbc.iudiciary.gov.ph/index.php/announcements/ newly-appointed>
(Last accessed July 25, 2017).
93 Belgica v. Ochoa Jr., 721 Phil. 416, 508; 710 SCRA 1, 93 (2013)
[Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, En Banc], citing Mattel, Inc. v. Francisco, 582
Phil. 492; 560 SCRA 504 (2008) [Per J. Austria-Martinez, Third Division]
and Constantino v. Sandiganbayan (First Division), 559 Phil. 622; 533
SCRA 205 (2007) [Per J. Tinga, Second Division].
94 Associate Justice Bienvenido Reyes retired on July 6, 2017 while
Associate Justice Mendoza will retire on August 13, 2017.

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dent. A direct resort to this Court would be warranted

under the circumstances.

III

Respondent argues that this Petition is barred by the

doctrine of stare decisis95considering that the
interpretation of Article VIII, Section 8(1) has already been
settled in Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council.96
The principle of stare decisis is derived from the Latin
maxim „stare decisis et non quieta movere‰; that is, „it is
best to adhere to decisions and not to disturb questions put
at rest.‰97 Its function is to ensure certainty and stability in
the legal system.98 Ruling by precedent is meant to assure

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the public of the courtÊs objectivity.99 Stare decisis provides

the public with a reasonable expectation that courts will
rule in a certain manner given a similar set of facts.
Courts, however, are cautioned against „blind adherence
to precedents.‰100 Decisions of this Court previously found
to have been valid may become impractical, contrary to law,
or even unconstitutional. It then becomes the duty of this
Court to abandon that decision:

The principle of stare decisis does not mean blind adherence to

precedents. The doctrine or rule laid down, which has been followed
for years, no matter how sound

_______________

95 Rollo, pp. 271-273.

96 Id., at pp. 273-275.
97 Tung Chin Hui v. Rodriguez, 395 Phil. 169, 177; 340 SCRA 765,
772 (2000) [Per J. Panganiban, Third Division], citing Vasan, R.S., Latin
Words and Phrases for Lawyers, p. 227.
98 Id.
99 See Concurring Opinion of J. Leonen in Belgica v. Ochoa, Jr.,
supra note 93 at p. 677; p. 297.
100 Tan Chong v. Secretary of Labor, 79 Phil. 249, 257 (1947) [Per J.
Padilla, En Banc].

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it may be, if found to be contrary to law, must be abandoned. The

principle of stare decisis does not and should not apply when there
is conflict between the precedent and the law. The duty of this
Court is to forsake and abandon any doctrine or rule found to be in
violation of the law in force.101

Similarly, in De Castro v. Judicial and Bar Council:102

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The Court, as the highest court of the land, may be guided but is
not controlled by precedent. Thus, the Court, especially with a new
membership, is not obliged to follow blindly a particular decision
that it determines, after reexamination, to call for a rectification.
The adherence to precedents is strict and rigid in a common-law
setting like the United Kingdom, where judges make law as binding
as an Act of Parliament. But ours is not a common-law system;
hence, judicial precedents are not always strictly and rigidly
followed. A judicial pronouncement in an earlier decision may be
followed as a precedent in a subsequent case only when its
reasoning and justification are relevant, and the court in the latter
case accepts such reasoning and justification to be applicable to the
case. The application of the precedent is for the sake of convenience
and stability.103 (Citations omitted)

Whenever this Court renders its decisions, the intended

effects of those decisions to future cases are taken into
consideration. The changing membership of the bench
likewise contributes to the evolution of this CourtÊs stand
on certain issues and cases. Ruling by precedent, thus,
requires more than a mechanical application:

_______________

101 Id.
102 632 Phil. 657; 618 SCRA 639 (2010) [Per J. Bersamin, En Banc].
103 Id., at p. 686; pp. 658-659, citing Limketkai Sons Milling, Inc. v.
Court of Appeals, 330 Phil. 171; 261 SCRA 464 (1996) [Per J. Francisco,
Third Division] and Calabresi, A Common Law for the Age of Statutes,
Harvard University Press, p. 4 (1982).

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[T]he use of precedents is never mechanical.

Some assumptions normally creep into the facts established for

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past cases. These assumptions may later on prove to be inaccurate

or to be accurate only for a given historical period. Sometimes, the
effects assumed by justices who decide past cases do not necessarily
happen. Assumed effects are given primacy whenever the spirit or
intent of the law is considered in the interpretation of a legal
provision. Some aspect of the facts or the context of these facts
would not have been fully considered. It is also possible that
doctrines in other aspects of the law related to a precedent may
have also evolved.
In such cases, the use of precedents will unduly burden the
parties or produce absurd or unworkable outcomes. Precedents will
not be useful to achieve the purposes for which the law would have
been passed.104 (Citations omitted)

There is also a need to abandon decisions „when this

Court discerns, after full deliberation, that a continuing
error in the interpretation of the spirit and intent of a
constitutional provision exists.‰105 Assuring the public of
stability in the law and certainty of court actions is
important. It is, however, more important for this Court to
be right. Thus, it becomes imperative for this Court to
reexamine previous decisions to avoid continuing its error:

_______________

104 Concurring Opinion of J. Leonen in De Castro v. Judicial and Bar

Council, supra note 90 at p. 678; p. 298, citing Ting v. Velez-Ting, 601
Phil. 676; 582 SCRA 694 (2009) [Per J. Nachura, Third Division];
Dissenting Opinion of J. Puno in Lambino v. Commission on Elections,
536 Phil. 1, 281; 505 SCRA 160, 310 (2006) [Per J. Carpio, En Banc];
Separate Opinion of Justice Imperial in Philippine Trust Co. and Smith,
Bell & Co. v. Mitchell, 59 Phil. 30, 41 (1933) [Per J. Malcolm, En Banc],
and Lazatin v. Desierto, 606 Phil. 271; 588 SCRA 285 (2009) [Per J.
Peralta, Third Division].
105 Id., citing Urbano v. Chavez, 262 Phil. 374, 385; 183 SCRA 347,
358 (1990) [Per J. Gancayco, En Banc].

261

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The rule of stare decisis is entitled to respect. Stability in the law

. . . is desirable. But idolatrous reverence for precedent, simply as
precedent, no longer rules. More important than anything else is
that the court should be right. And particularly is it not wise to
subordinate legal reason to case law and by so doing perpetuate
error when it is brought to mind that the views now expressed
conform in principle to the original decision and that since the first
decision to the contrary was sent forth there has existed a
respectable opinion of nonconformity in the court. Indeed, on at
least one occasion has the court broken away from the revamped
doctrine, while even in the last case in point the court was as evenly
divided as it was possible to be and still reach a decision.106

Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council was not a

unanimous decision of this Court. Vigorous dissents
accompanied not only the main decision but also the
resolution on the motion for reconsideration. This Petition
precisely assails ChavezÊs outcome and its effect on the
diminished representation of Congress in the vetting
process of judicial nominees. Rather than dismiss this case
on the basis of stare decisis, it would be more prudent for
this Court to revisit Chavez in order to settle the issue.

IV

The doctrine of Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council107

must be abandoned and revised.
Under the Constitution, Congress is bicameral in
nature. It consists of two (2) chambers: the Senate and the
House of Representatives. Article VI, Section 1 provides:

_______________

106 Philippine Trust Co. and Smith, Bell & Co. v. Mitchell, supra note
104.
107 Chavez v. Judicial Bar and Council, supra notes 1 and 3.

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ARTICLE VI
The Legislative Department

Section 1. The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of

the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of
Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the people by the
provision on initiative and referendum. (Emphasis supplied)

The Constitution considers both chambers as separate

and distinct from each other. The manner of elections,
terms of office, and organization of each chamber is
provided for under separate provisions of the Constitution.
Senators are „elected at large by the qualified voters of
the Philippines.‰108 Members of the House of
Representatives are elected by their respective legislative
districts109 or through the party-list system.110 The
differing nature of its elections affects the scope of its
representation. Senators represent a national constituency
while the House of Representatives represents only a
particular legislative district or marginalized and
underrepresented sector.
A SenatorÊs term of office is for six (6) years111 while the
term of office of a Member of the House of Representatives
is for three (3) years.112
Each chamber chooses its own officers.113 Each chamber
promulgates its own rules of procedure.114 Each chamber
maintains separate Journals.115 Each chamber keeps
separate

_______________

108 CONST., Art. VI, Sec. 2.

109 Id., Sec. 5(1).
110 Id., Sec. 5(2).

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111 Id., Sec. 4.

112 Id., Sec. 7.
113 Id., Sec. 16.
114 Id., Sec. 16(1).
115 Id., Sec. 16(4), par. (1).

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Records of its proceedings.116 Each chamber disciplines its

own members.117 Each chamber even maintains separate
addresses.118 There is no mechanism that would allow the
two (2) chambers to represent the other:

There is no presiding officer for the Congress of the Philippines, but

there is a Senate President and a Speaker of the House of
Representatives. There is no single journal for the Congress of the
Philippines, but there is a journal for the Senate and a journal for
the House of Representatives. There is no record of proceedings for
the entire Congress of the Philippines, but there is a Record of
proceedings for the Senate and a Record of proceedings for the
House of Representatives. The Congress of the Philippines does not
discipline its members. It is the Senate that promulgates its own
rules and disciplines its members. Likewise, it is the House that
promulgates its own rules and disciplines its members.
No Senator reports to the Congress of the Philippines. Rather, he
or she reports to the Senate. No Member of the House of
Representatives reports to the Congress of the Philippines. Rather,
he or she reports to the House of Representatives.
Congress, therefore, is the Senate and the House of
Representatives. Congress does not exist separate from the Senate
and the House of Representatives.
Any Senator acting ex officio or as a representative of the Senate
must get directions from the Senate. By constitutional design, he or
she cannot get instructions from the House of Representatives. If a
Senator represents the Congress rather than simply the Senate,
then he or she must be open to amend or modify the instructions

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given to him or her by the Senate if the House of RepresentativesÊ

instructions are different. Yet, the Con-

_______________

116 Id., Sec. 16(4), par. (2).

117 Id., Sec. 16(3).
118 The House of Representatives is located in Quezon City while the
Senate is located in Pasay City.

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stitution vests disciplinary power only on the Senate for any

Senator.
The same argument applies to a Member of the House of
Representatives.
No Senator may carry instructions from the House of
Representatives. No Member of the House of Representatives may
carry instructions from the Senate. Neither Senator nor Member of
the House of Representatives may therefore represent Congress as
a whole.119

Thus, there is no Member of Congress that can

represent all of Congress. Congress is represented by both
the Senate and the House of Representatives. The
Constitution itself provides for only one (1) instance when
both chambers must vote jointly:

ARTICLE VII
Executive Department

....
Section 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all
armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary,
he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion, when

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the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty
days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the
Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. Within forty-
eight hours from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension
of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the President shall
submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress. The
Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its
Members in regular or special session, may revoke such
proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside
by the President. Upon the initiative of the

_______________

119 Dissenting Opinion of J. Leonen in Chavez v. Judicial and Bar

Council, supra note 3 at pp. 503-504; pp. 524-525.

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President, the Congress may, in the same manner, extend such

proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined by the
Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safely
requires it. (Emphasis supplied)

In Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council,120 this Court,

however, ruled that Congress is only entitled to one (1) seat
in the Judicial and Bar Council, pursuant to its
interpretation of Article VIII, Section 8(1) of the
Constitution. Article VIII, Section 8(1) provides:

ARTICLE VIII
Judicial Department
....
Section 8(1). A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under
the supervision of the Supreme Court composed of the Chief Justice
as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a
representative of the Congress as ex officio Members, a

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representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired

Member of the Supreme Court, and a representative of the private
sector. (Emphasis supplied)

A verba legis interpretation of Article VIII, Section 8(1)

of the Constitution leads to an ambiguity and disregards
the bicameral nature of Congress. Chavez presumes that
one (1) member of Congress can vote on behalf of the entire
Congress.
It is a basic rule of statutory construction that
constitutional provisions must be harmonized so that all
words are operative. Thus, in Civil Liberties Union v.
Executive Secretary:121

It is a well-established rule in constitutional construction that no

one provision of the Constitution is to be separated from all the
others, to be considered alone,

_______________

120 Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council, supra note 1.

121 272 Phil. 147; 194 SCRA 317 (1991) [Per CJ. Fernan, En Banc].

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but that all the provisions bearing upon a particular subject are to
be brought into view and to be so interpreted as to effectuate the
great purposes of the instrument. Sections bearing on a particular
subject should be considered and interpreted together as to
effectuate the whole purpose of the Constitution and one section is
not to be allowed to defeat another, if by any reasonable
construction, the two can be made to stand together.
In other words, the court must harmonize them, if practicable,
and must lean in favor of a construction which will render every
word operative, rather than one which may make the words idle and
nugatory.122 (Emphasis provided, citations omitted)

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Civil Liberties Union also instructs us that

constitutional interpretation should depend on the
understanding of the people adopting it, rather than how
the framers interpreted it:

While it is permissible in this jurisdiction to consult the debates

and proceedings of the constitutional convention in order to arrive
at the reason and purpose of the resulting Constitution, resort
thereto may be had only when other guides fail as said proceedings
are powerless to vary the terms of the Constitution when the
meaning is clear. Debates in the constitutional convention „are of
value as showing the views of the individual members, and as
indicating the reasons for their votes, but they give us no light as to
the views of the large majority who did not talk, much less of the
mass of our fellow citizens whose votes at the polls gave that
instrument the force of fundamental law. We think it safer to
construe the constitution from what appears upon its face.‰ The
proper interpretation therefore depends more on how it was
understood by the people adopting it than in the framer[sÊ]
understanding thereof.123 (Emphasis provided, citations omitted)

_______________

122 Id., at p. 162; pp. 330-331.

123 Id., at pp. 169-170; pp. 337-338.

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Resort to the records of the Constitutional Commission

to discern the framersÊ intent must always be with the
understanding of its context and its contemporary
consequences.124 Records show that Article VIII, Section
8(1) was approved by the Constitutional Commission on
July 19, 1986.125 On July 21, 1986, the Commission voted
to amend the proposal of a unicameral „National Assembly‰

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to a bicameral „Congress.‰126
The change of legislative structure led Commissioner
Christian Monsod on July 30, 1986 to remark:

Last week, we voted for a bicameral legislature. Perhaps it is

symptomatic of what the thinking of this group is, that all the
provisions that were being drafted up to that time assumed a
unicameral government.127

On October 8, 1986, the Article on the Judiciary was

reopened to introduce amendments to the proposed
Sections 3, 7, 10, 11, 13, and 14 only.128 The entire Article
on the Legislature, meanwhile, was approved on October 9,
1986.129 By October 15, 1986, the Constitution was
presented to the President of the Constitutional
Commission, Cecilia Muñoz Palma.130

_______________

124 Dissenting Opinion of J. Leonen in Chavez v. Judicial and Bar

Council, supra note 3 at p. 501; p. 522.
125 Constitutional Commission, Records, Vol. I, Journal No. 34, dated
July 19, 1986.
126 Id., Journal No. 35, dated July 21, 1986, which reads in part with
22 Members voting for a unicameral system and 23 Members voting for
bicameralism, the Body approved the proposal for a bicameral
legislature.
127 Constitutional Commission, Records Vol. II, p. 434, dated July 30,
1986.
128 Id., Journal No. 102, dated October 7 and 8, 1987.
129 Constitutional Commission, Records Vol. III, Journal No. 103
dated October 9, 1986.
130 Constitutional Commission, Records Vol. V, Journal No. 109 dated
October 15, 1986.

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The chronology of events shows that the provision on the

composition of the Judicial and Bar Council had been
passed at a time when the framers were still of the belief
that there was to be a unicameral legislature. Thus,
Section 8(1) provides for only „a representative‰ instead of
„representatives.‰
However, Section 8(1) must also be interpreted according
to the understanding of the people who ratified it.
Historically, both the Senate and the House of
Representatives sent their members to sit in the Judicial
and Bar Council:131

Ex Officio Members Representing the Senate, Congress:

_______________

131 List of Former and Incumbent JBC Chairpersons, Ex Officio and

Regular Members, Ex officio Secretaries, Consultants and Officers (from
1987 to date), Judicial and Bar Council,
<http://jbc.judiciary.gov.ph/index.php/about-the-jbc/jbc-officials> (Last
accessed July 25, 2017).

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Ex Officio Members Representing the House of

Representatives, Congress:

+ROGACIANO M. 10 December 1987 to 23 February

MERCADO 1989
ISIDRO C. ZARRAGA 31 July 1989 to 12 August 1992
PABLO P. GARCIA 26 August 1992 to 8 March 1995
ISIDRO C. ZARRAGA 28 June 1995 to 30 June 1998
ALFREDO E. ABUEG 31 July 1998 to 29 November 2000
+HENRY P. LANOT 14 December 2000 to 30 June 2001
ALLAN PETER S.CAYETANO 8 August 2001 to 3 March 2003
MARCELINO C. LIBANAN 4 March 2003 to 8 August 2003
SIMEON A. DATUMANONG 9 August 2004 to 30 June 2007
MATIAS V. DEFENSOR, JR. 8 August 2007 to 30 June 2010
NIEL C. TUPAS, JR. 29 July 2010 to 30 June 2013

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1 January 2014 to 30 June 2014

1 January 2015 to 30 June 2015
REYNALDO V. UMALI 3 August 2016 to date

From the promulgation of the Constitution, Congress

already recognized that „a representative of Congress‰ can
only mean one (1) representative from each chamber. This
interpretation was so prevalent that from 2001, each
member from the Senate and the House of Representatives
was given one (1) full vote.132 This is the representation of
Congress contemplated in the Constitution.
The current practice of alternate representation not only
diminishes CongressÊ representation. It negates it.133
When a Senator sits in the Council, he or she can only
represent the Senate. Likewise, when a Member of the
House of Representatives sits in the Council, he or she can
only represent the House of Representatives. Congress is
not represented at all in this kind of arrangement.

_______________

132 See Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council, supra note 1.

133 See Dissenting Opinion of J. Leonen in Chavez v. Judicial and
Bar Council, supra note 3 at p. 506; p. 528.

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The composition of the Judicial and Bar Council is

representative of the constituencies and sectors affected by
judicial appointments. Hence, practicing lawyers,
prosecutors, the legal academe, members of the Bench, and
the private sector are represented in the Council.
Members of Congress are the only officials within the
Judicial and Bar Council that are elected. The rest of the
officials are appointed by the President. Thus, their
membership within the Council is the only genuine

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representation of the People. Their input in the possible

candidates to the judiciary is as invaluable as that of a
member of the legal academe or that of the private sector.
The antecedents of this case only serve to highlight the
absurd results wrought by Chavez. In 2013, then
Representative Tupas approached the Judicial and Bar
Council to personally inform it of the agreed representation
between the Senate and the House of Representatives.
When told by Chief Justice Sereno that she had already
received a letter from then Senate President Drilon
informing the Council of the agreed representation,
Representative Tupas replied that he was not aware of the
letter:

[Congressman Tupas] said that in view of the decision of the

Supreme Court in April this year, the Speaker of the House of
Representatives and the Senate President authorized him and
Senator Pimentel, Chairperson of the Committee on Justice of the
Senate to discuss the matter of representation to the JBC. They
decided that representation would be on a rotation basis. For the
first six (6) months, Senator Pimentel would be the one to represent
both Houses of Congress; and for the next six (6) months, it would
be [him]. In the absence of Senator Pimentel, Congressman Tupas
will automatically attend the meetings, and vice versa. He cautioned
that since it is quite difficult for both Houses to come up with an
agreement, it would not be good to assume that whenever the Senate
President or the Speaker of the House writes the JBC, it is the
decision of Congress. It should be a commu-

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nication from both Houses. He then requested that he be furnished

with copies of all notices from the JBC even during the term of
Senator Pimentel.
Chief Justice Sereno clarified that she received the Letter of the
Senate President Drilon stating, among other things, that the

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Speaker of the House and the Senate President agreed that Senator
Pimentel would be the one to represent Congress until December
31, 2013, but that in his absence it would be Congressman Tupas.
She assured both Congressman Tupas and Senator Pimentel that
they will both receive copies of all notices and information that are
being circulated among the JBC Members. She thanked
Congressman Tupas for personally informing the Council of the
agreement between the two Houses of Congress, thus giving a
higher level of comfort than it had already given.
Congressman Tupas mentioned that he was not aware that the
Senate President sent a letter. His assumption is that the
information would come from both Houses, not just from the Senate.
He thus came to the meeting to personally inform the JBC of the
agreement. He thanked the Chief Justice and asked for permission
to leave.
Senator Pimentel likewise requested that he also be furnished
with copies of all documents during the rotation of Congressman
Tupas. He then requested for a three-minute break, as he had some
matters to discuss with the Congressman before leaving.134
(Emphasis supplied)

There is no office or officer in Congress that can

represent both chambers. Representative Tupas recognized
this difficulty and cautioned the Council that it should
never presume that one (1) chamber can speak for the
entire Congress. He proved this point when he told the
Council that he was unaware of any letter sent by the
Senate President.
Chavez forces one (1) chamber of Congress to arrogate
upon itself all the powers, prerogatives, and privileges of
the entire

_______________

134 Rollo, p. 259.

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Congress in the Judicial and Bar Council. This is contrary

to its bicameral nature.
When members of Congress sit in the Judicial and Bar
Council, it may be with the instruction of their respective
chambers, as Representative Tupas demonstrated in the
July 23, 2013 En Banc Meeting. Their votes may likewise
be constrained by resolutions and actions of the
Congressional Committees they represent. They do not just
represent themselves. They are „representatives of
Congress‰ „ex officio.‰135
Of the two (2) chambers in Congress, the House of
Representatives represent constituencies on a more local
scale. As pointed out by the Office of the Solicitor General,
current voting patterns of the Council shows that a large
number of appointees were for the lower courts:136

Court/Tribunal Number of Appointees

Supreme Court 1
Court of Appeals 0
Legal Education Board 1
Sandiganbayan 1
Court of Tax Appeals 1
Ombudsman 0
Lower Courts 38

Chavez deprives Congress its opportunity to fully

represent its constituencies, whether at the national or at
the local level.
The purported reasons for having only one (1)
representative of Congress to the Council are illusory.

_______________

135 See Dissenting Opinion of J. Leonen in Chavez v. Judicial and

Bar Council, supra note 3 at p. 507; p. 534.
136 Rollo, p. 224.

273

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Chavez stated that Congress should be represented in

the Council by only one (1) member „not because it was in
the interest of a certain constituency, but in reverence to it
as a major branch of government.‰137
Within the Council, the Executive is represented by the
Secretary of Justice, considered as the alter ego of the
President. The Judiciary is represented by the Chief
Justice. Congress, however, operates through a Senate and
a House of Representatives. Two (2) separate and distinct
chambers cannot be represented by a single individual.
Chavez also implied that the framers intended for the
CouncilÊs membership to be seven (7), not eight (8).
Article VIII, Section 8(1), however, does not provide a
numerical count for its membership unlike in other the
provisions of the Constitution.138 Increasing the CouncilÊs
member-

_______________

137 Supra note 3 at p. 491; p. 512.

138 See the following constitutional provisions:
Article VI
....
Section 2. The Senate shall be composed of twenty-four Senators who
shall be elected at large by the qualified voters of the Philippines, as may
be provided by law.
Section 5(1). The House of Representatives shall be composed of not
more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by
law[.]
....
Section 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each
have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective
Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members,
three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by
the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate
or the House of Representatives, as the case may be[.]
Section 18. There shall be a Commission on Appointments consisting of
the President of the Senate, as ex officio Chairman, twelve Senators and

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twelve Members of the House of

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274 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Umali vs. Judicial and Bar Council

ship to eight (8) would not violate the provisions of the

Constitution.

_______________

Representatives, elected by each House on the basis of proportional

representation from the political parties and parties or organizations
registered under the party-list system represented therein.
....
Article VIII
....
Section 4(1). The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice
and fourteen Associate Justices. It may sit En Banc or in its discretion,
in divisions of three, five, or seven Members . . .
Article IX
....
B. The Civil Service Commission
Section 1(1). The civil service shall be administered by the Civil Service
Commission composed of a Chairman and two Commissioners . . .
C. The Commission on Elections
Section 1(1). There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a
Chairman and six Commissioners . . .
D. Commission on Audit
Section 1(1). There shall be a Commission on Audit composed of a
Chairman and two Commissioners.
....
Article XI
....
Section 11. There is hereby created the independent Office of the
Ombudsman, composed of the Ombudsman to be known as Tanodbayan,
one overall Deputy and at least one Deputy each for Luzon, Visayas, and
Mindanao. A separate Deputy for the military establishment may

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likewise be appointed.
Article XIII
....
Section 17 . . .
(2) The Commission [on Human Rights] shall be composed of a
Chairman and four Members who must be natural-born citizens of the
Philippines and a majority of whom shall be members of the Bar.

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Chavez also insisted that the Council should have an

odd-number representation so that one (1) member could
function as a tie-breaker.
Judicial nominees, however, are not decided by a „yes‰ or
„no‰ vote. The Council submits to the President a list of at
least three (3) potential nominees who garnered a plurality
of the votes. Some nominees may even have the same
number of votes, and the Council will still include all of
those names in the shortlist.
The shortlist dated December 2, 2016 for the vacancy of
Associate Justice Perez contained the following names:139

 REYES, Jose Jr. C.

1.  - 7 votes
2. BRUSELAS, Apolinario Jr. D. - 5 votes
3. DIMAAMPAO, Japar B. - 5 votes
4. MARTIRES, Samuel R. - 5 votes
5. REYES, Andres Jr. B. - 4 votes

The shortlist dated December 9, 2016 for the vacancy of

Associate Justice Brion contained the following names:140
 CARANDANG, Rosmari D.
1.  - 6 votes
2. BRUSELAS, Apolinario Jr. D. - 5 votes
3. REYES, Jose, Jr. C. - 5 votes
4. DIMAAMPAO, Japar B. - 4 votes
5. LAZARO-JAVIER, Amy C. - 4 votes
6. TIJAM, Noel G. - 4 votes
7. VENTURA-JIMENO, Rita Linda S. - 4 votes

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_______________

139 Shortlist of Nominees dated December 2, 2016, Judicial and Bar

Council, <http://jbc.judiciary.gov.ph/announcements/2016/Shortlist_SC-
Perez_12-2-16.pdf> (Last accessed July 25, 2017).
140 Shortlist of Nominees dated December 9, 2016, Judicial and Bar
Council, <http://jbc.judiciary.gov.ph/announcements/2016/Shortlist_SC-
Brion_12-9-16.pdf> (Last accessed July 25, 2017).

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Umali vs. Judicial and Bar Council

As demonstrated, no tie-breaker was needed in the

preparation of the shortlist. Insisting that the composition
of the Council should be an odd number is unnecessary.
The Council will still be able to discharge its functions
regardless of whether it is composed of seven (7) or eight
(8) members.

Respondent Judicial and Bar Council, however, did not

commit grave abuse of discretion when it adopted the six
(6)-month rotational representation arrangement.
Grave abuse of discretion is defined as:

[S]uch capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is

equivalent to lack of jurisdiction . . . , or, in other words, where the
power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of
passion or personal hostility, and it must be so patent and gross as
to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to
perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.141
(Citations omitted)

Respondent Judicial and Bar Council was merely

implementing a prior decision of this Court when it refused
to count petitionerÊs votes. A relevant portion of the

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ChavezÊs, fallo states:

The Judicial and Bar Council is hereby enjoined to reconstitute

itself so that only one (1) member of Congress will sit as a
representative in its proceedings, in accordance with Section 8(1),
Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution.142

_______________

141 Alafriz v. Nable, 72 Phil. 278, 280 (1941) [Per J. Moran, First
Division], citing Santos v. Province of Tarlac, 67 Phil. 480 (1939) [Per J.
Moran, En Banc] and Tavera-Luna, Inc. v. Nable, 61 Phil. 340 (1939) [Per
J. Laurel, En Banc].
142 Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council, supra note 1 at p. 209; p.
609.

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The method of reconstitution was left to the discretion of

the Judicial and Bar Council, in recognition of its status as
an independent constitutional body. The Council, in turn,
implemented Chavez by requiring that Congress provide it
with only one (1) representative. In the July 23, 2013 En
Banc Meeting, Representative Tupas relayed the
instructions of the House of Representatives. Then Senate
President Drilon sent the instructions of the Senate
through a letter to the Chief Justice. Both the Senate and
the House of Representatives did not offer any other type of
representation that may have been agreed upon. The
Council, therefore, was merely complying with the directive
in Chavez. In De Castro v. Judicial and Bar Council:143

Judicial decisions assume the same authority as a statute itself

and, until authoritatively abandoned, necessarily become, to the
extent that they are applicable, the criteria that must control the
actuations, not only of those called upon to abide by them, but also
of those duty-bound to enforce obedience to them.144

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These events, however, highlight the inevitable difficulty

in implementing ChavezÊs interpretation of Article VIII,
Section 8(1). There is no one (1) office in Congress that
could provide the Council with one (1) representative. The
Council has no authority to order Congress to jointly
convene for the determination of its sole representative.
Thus, the Council would only be able to implement what is
practicable, that is, whatever arrangement the
Congressional representatives may have agreed upon.
Considering that the Congressional representatives have
not yet manifested to the Council that it was considering
another type of arrangement, the Council could not have
been faulted for refusing to count petitionerÊs votes

_______________

143 De Castro v. Judicial and Bar Council, supra note 90.

144 Id., at p. 686; p. 727, citing Caltex (Philippines), Inc. v. Palomar,
124 Phil. 763; 18 SCRA 247 (1966) [Per J. Castro, En Banc].

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Umali vs. Judicial and Bar Council

at a time when Senate was representing Congress in the

Council.
The Office of the Solicitor General likewise requests that
this Court take up the matter of rotational representation
in the review of the CouncilÊs rules in Aguinaldo v. Judicial
and Bar Council.145
In Aguinaldo, the new rules and practices of the Judicial
and Bar Council were docketed as a separate
administrative matter to be discussed at a future time.146
This case, however, is a matter of constitutional
interpretation. There is, thus, no need to direct the Judicial
and Bar Council to review its own rules to allow for the
interpretation of this constitutional provision.

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VI

The Judicial and Bar Council could have been compelled

by a writ of mandamus to count petitionerÊs votes in the En
Banc sessions of December 2 and 9, 2016.
Mandamus is provided for under Rule 65, Section 3 of
the Rules of Court:

Section 3. Petition for Mandamus.·When any tribunal,

corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the
performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty
resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes
another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which
such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person
aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court,
alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be
rendered commanding the respondent, immediately or at some
other time to be specified by the

_______________

145 Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council, supra note 57.

146 Id., at p. 371.

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Umali vs. Judicial and Bar Council

court, to do the act required to be done to protect the rights of the

petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained by the petitioner by
reason of the wrongful acts of the respondent.

Mandamus may issue to compel the performance of a

ministerial duty. It cannot be issued to compel the
performance of a discretionary act. In Metro Manila
Development Authority v. Concerned Residents of Manila

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Bay:147

Generally, the writ of mandamus lies to require the execution of

a ministerial duty. A ministerial duty is one that „requires neither
the exercise of official discretion nor judgment.‰ It connotes an act
in which nothing is left to the discretion of the person executing it.
It is a „simple, definite duty arising under conditions admitted or
proved to exist and imposed by law.‰ Mandamus is available to
compel action, when refused, on matters involving discretion, but
not to direct the exercise of judgment or discretion one way or the
other.148 (Citations omitted)

The difference between a discretionary act and a

ministerial act is settled:

The distinction between a ministerial and discretionary act is

well delineated. A purely ministerial act or duty is one which an
officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed
manner, in obedience to the mandate of a legal authority, without
regard to or the exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety or
impropriety of the act done. If the law imposes a duty upon a public
officer and gives him the right to decide how or when the duty shall
be performed, such duty is discretionary and not

_______________

147 595 Phil. 305; 574 SCRA 661 (2008) [Per J. Velasco, Jr., En Banc].
148 Id., at p. 316; pp. 670-671, citing Angchangco, Jr. v. Ombudsman,
335 Phil. 766; 268 SCRA 301 (1997) [Per J. Melo, Third Division]; BlackÊs
Law Dictionary, 8th ed., 2004; Lamb v. Phipps, 22 Phil. 456, 490 (1912)
[Per J. Johnson, First Division].

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280 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Umali vs. Judicial and Bar Council

ministerial. The duty is ministerial only when the discharge of the

same requires neither the exercise of official discretion or

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judgment.149 (Citation omitted)

The determination of the qualifications and fitness of

judicial applicants is discretionary on the part of the
Judicial and Bar Council.150 A writ of mandamus cannot be
issued to compel the council to withdraw a list originally
submitted and to add other nominees that have not
previously qualified.151
De Castro v. Judicial and Bar Council,152 however,
states that a writ of mandamus may be issued to compel
the Council to comply with its constitutional mandate to
submit a list of nominees to the President before the 90-day
period to appoint:

The duty of the JBC to submit a list of nominees before the start
of the PresidentÊs mandatory 90-day period to appoint is
ministerial, but its selection of the candidates whose names will be
in the list to be submitted to the President lies within the discretion
of the JBC. The object of the petitions for mandamus herein should
only refer to the duty to submit to the President the list of nominees
for every vacancy in the Judiciary, because in order to constitute
unlawful neglect of duty, there must be an unjustified delay in
performing that duty. For mandamus to lie against the JBC,
therefore, there should be an unexplained delay on its part in
recommending nominees to the Judiciary, that is, in submitting the
list to the President.153 (Citation omitted)

_______________

149 De Castro v. Judicial and Bar Council, supra note 90 at pp. 706-
707; p. 753, citing Espiridion v. Court of Appeals, 523 Phil. 664; 490
SCRA 273 (2006) [Per J. Corona, Second Division].
150 See Dissenting Opinion of J. Leonen in Jardeleza v. Judicial and
Bar Council, 741 Phil. 460, 641; 733 SCRA 279, 464 (2014) [Per J.
Mendoza, En Banc].
151 Id.
152 De Castro v. Judicial and Bar Council, supra.
153 Id., at p. 706; p. 752, citing Nery v. Gamolo, 446 Phil. 76; 397
SCRA 110 (2003) [Per J. Quisumbing, Second Division]; Musni v.

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The Judicial and Bar Council has the ministerial duty to

count the votes of all its members. Petitioner, as the Chair
of the House of Representatives Committee on Justice,
should be considered a regular ex officio member of the
Council, and his votes in the December 2 and 9, 2016 En
Banc Meetings should have been counted. This relief,
however, has already become moot in light of the recent
appointments to this Court. In future deliberations,
however, the Judicial and Bar Council should have the
ministerial duty to separately count the votes of both
Congressional representatives in the Council.
Accordingly, I vote to GRANT the Petition. The doctrine
in Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council154 must be
ABANDONED and the Judicial and Bar Council must be
DIRECTED to separately count the votes of both
Congressional representatives in the Council in its En
Banc deliberations.

Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus dismissed.

Notes.·A moot and academic case is one that ceases to

present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening
events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no
practical value. (Gunsi, Sr. vs. Commissioners, The,
Commission on Elections, 580 SCRA 70 [2009])
The Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) has been tasked to
screen aspiring judges and justices, among others, making
certain that the nominees submitted to the President are
all qualified and suitably best for appointment. (Jardeleza
vs. Sereno, 733 SCRA 279 [2014])

··o0o··

_______________

Morales, 373 Phil. 703; 315 SCRA 85 (1999) [Per J. Panganiban, Third
Division].

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154 Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council, supra notes 1 and 3.

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