PAYMENT OF FILING/DOCKET FEES-JURISDICTIONAL

RULING:
G.R. Nos. 175277 & 175285               September 11, 2013
UNICAPITAL, INC., UNICAPITAL REALTY, INC., and JAIME Propriety of the denial of Unicapital, et al.’s motion to
J. MARTINEZ, Petitioners,  dismiss and ancillary issues.
vs.
RAFAEL JOSE CONSING, JR., and THE PRESIDING The Court finds NO reversible error on the part of the CA in
JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF PASIG CITY, sustaining the RTC-Pasig City’s denial of Unicapital et al.’s
BRANCH 168, Respondents. motion to dismiss.

FACTS: Consing, Jr. filed a complaint, denominated as a Neither should Consing, Jr.’s failure to pay the required docket
Complex Action for Declaratory Relief and later amended to fees lead to the dismissal of his complaint. It has long been
Complex Action for Injunctive Relief before the RTC-Pasig City settled that while the court acquires jurisdiction over any case
against Unicapital, URI, PBI, Martirez, PBI General Manager only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fees, its non-
Mariano Martinez (Martinez), Dela Cruz and Does 1-20. payment at the time of the filing of the complaint does not
automatically cause the dismissal of the complaint provided
Accordingly, Consing, Jr. prayed that: (a) he be declared as a that the fees are paid within a reasonable
mere agent of Dela Cruz, and as such, devoid of any obligation period. Consequently, Unicapital, et al.’s insistence that the
to Unicapital, URI, and PBI for the transactions entered into stringent rule on non-payment of docket fees enunciated in the
concerning the subject property; (b) Unicapital, URI, and PBI case of Manchester Development Corporation v. CA should be
be enjoined from harassing or coercing him, and from speaking applied in this case cannot be sustained in the absence of
about him in a derogatory fashion; and (c) Unicapital, URI, and proof that Consing, Jr. intended to defraud the government by
PBI pay him actual and consequential damages in the amount his failure to pay the correct amount of filing fees. 
of ₱2,000,000.00, moral damages of at least ₱1,000,000.00,
exemplary damages of ₱1,000,000.00, all per month, reckoned As pronounced in the case of Heirs of Bertuldo Hinog v. Hon.
from May 1, 1999 and until the controversy is resolved, and Melicor:
attorney's fees and costs of suit.
Unicapital, URI, and Martinez (Unicapital, et al.) filed separate Plainly, while the payment of the prescribed docket fee is a
Motions to Dismiss Consing, Jr.’s complaint on the ground of jurisdictional requirement, even its non-payment at the time of
failure to state a cause of action. Moreover, Unicapital, et al. filing does not automatically cause the dismissal of the case,
posited that the RTC-Pasig City did not acquire jurisdiction as long as the fee is paid within the applicable prescriptive or
over the case given that Consing, Jr. failed to pay the proper reglementary period, more so when the party involved
amount of docket fees. demonstrates a willingness to abide by the rules prescribing
such payment.
PBI and its General Manager, Martinez (Unicapital and PBI, et
al.), sought the dismissal of Consing, Jr.’s complaint on the Thus, when insufficient filing fees were initially paid by the
ground that it does not state a cause of action. plaintiffs and there was no intention to defraud the government,
the Manchester rule does not apply.
The RTC-Pasig City denied the motions to dismiss, holding
that Consing, Jr.’s complaint sufficiently stated a cause of Indeed, while the Court acknowledges Unicapital, et al.'s
action for tort and damages pursuant to Article 19 of the Civil apprehension that Consing, Jr.'s "metered" claim for damages
Code. It ruled that where there is abusive behavior, a to the tune of around ₱2,000,000.00 per month may balloon to
complainant, like Consing, Jr., has the right to seek refuge a rather huge amount by the time that this case is finally
from the courts. It equally refused to dismiss the action on the disposed of, still, any amount that may by then fall due shall be
ground of non-payment of docket fees, despite Consing, Jr.’s subject to assessment and any additional fees determined
escalated claims for damages therein, as jurisdiction was shall constitute as a lien against the judgment as explicitly
already vested in it upon the filing of the original complaint. provided under Section 2, Rule 141 of the Rules.
Moreover, it resolved to apply the liberal construction rule as
regards the subject complaint’s verification and certification,
despite its improper wording, considering further that such GENERAL JURISDICTION – REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
defect was not raised at the first opportunity.
G.R. No. 121106               February 20, 2002
Unicapital and PBI, et al. moved for reconsideration which was, DURISOL PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner, 
however, denied by the RTC-Pasig City. vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. ADRIANO R. OSORIO, Judge,
The CA, in its Joint Decision, ruled that while the payment of RTC, Branch 171, Valenzuela, Metro Manila,
the prescribed docket fee is a jurisdictional requirement, its DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, MANILA
non-payment will not automatically cause the dismissal of the FERTILIZERS, INC., POLAR MINES AND DEVELOPMENT
case. In this regard, it considered that should there be any CORPORATION, SPOUSES ISABEL S. VILLARAMA and
deficiency in the payment of such fees, the same shall CONRADO D. VILLARAMA, SPOUSES MARIBEL
constitute a lien on the judgment award. Anent the substantive CABRALES and DANILO CABRALES, ROLANDO ANG
issues of the case, the CA concurred with the RTC-Pasig City SEE, SPOUSES ALEXANDER GABRIEL and MARILOU GO
that Consing Jr.'s complaint states a cause of action. GABRIEL and REMEDIOS REYES, respondents.

Unicapital, et al. sought reconsideration but the same was FACTS: Petitioner Durisol obtained industrial loans from
denied by the CA. Hence, the present petition. respondent Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP)
amounting to P1,213,000.00 and P2,698,800.00, respectively.
ISSUE: W/N the CA erred in upholding the RTC-Pasig City’s As security therefor, petitioner executed a mortgage on two
denial of Unicapital, et al.’s motion to dismiss. NO
parcels of registered land located in Polo (now Valenzuela), The CA rendered decision dismissing the petition for
Bulacan. annulment of judgment. Petitioner Durisol’s subsequent motion
for reconsideration was likewise denied for lack of merit.
After petitioner defaulted in the payment of the loans, DBP
instituted a petition for the extrajudicial foreclosure of Hence this petition.
mortgage.
ISSUES:
Petitioner’s president, Rene Knecht, borrowed from DBP the
two TCT’s purportedly to obtain new titles in accordance with 1. W/N the trial court had jurisdiction over the petition for
the approved subdivision plan of the properties. DBP agreed issuance of new duplicate owner’s certificate of title.
provided that the bank’s existing encumbrances, including the
mortgage, shall be annotated on all the new certificates of title. 2. W/N petitioner was estopped from challenging the court’s
lack of jurisdiction.
In the meantime, the foreclosure sale was held, wherein DBP
emerged as the highest bidder. The corresponding certificates 3. W/N the then CFI had no jurisdiction when the case was
of sale were issued to DBP. remanded to it by the then IAC because as a cadastral court,
the CFI had limited jurisdiction.
Petitioner, however, filed a complaint for annulment of the
extrajudicial foreclosure before the then Court of First Instance RULING:
(CFI) of Valenzuela, Bulacan. The CFI rendered judgment
upholding the validity of the foreclosure. Petitioner appealed to 1. YES. The first paragraph of Rule 47, Section 2, of the 1997
the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the decision of the CFI. Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
The decision of the Court of Appeals became final on April 30,
1975. Grounds for annulment.  — The annulment may be based only
on the ground of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction.
Contrary to its promise, however, petitioner never returned the
titles to the properties to DBP. Thus, despite having purchased At the outset, it should be stressed that in a petition for
the properties at the foreclosure sale, DBP was unable to annulment of judgment based on lack of jurisdiction, petitioner
register the property in its name. On February 25, 1977, DBP must show not merely an abuse of jurisdictional discretion but
instituted before the Court of First Instance of Valenzuela, an absolute lack of jurisdiction. Lack of jurisdiction means
Bulacan, Branch VIII, a petition for surrender of the owner’s absence of or no jurisdiction, that is, the court should not have
duplicate titles covering the foreclosed properties. taken cognizance of the petition because the law does not vest
it with jurisdiction over the subject matter. Jurisdiction over the
Petitioner filed its answer, raising the defenses that the petition nature of the action or subject matter is conferred by law.
fails to state a cause of action; that it had already paid its loans
to DBP; that it had a valid adverse claim on the properties The regional trial court, formerly the court of first instance, is a
covered by the 7 new titles; and that DBP’s action was barred court of general jurisdiction. All cases, the jurisdiction over
by laches and estoppel. DBP filed a reply alleging that which is not specifically provided for by law to be within the
petitioner failed to exercise its right of redemption of the jurisdiction of any other court, fall under the jurisdiction of the
properties which were sold at public auction after foreclosure of regional trial court. But the regional trial court is also a court of
the mortgage thereof. limited jurisdiction over, among others, cadastral and land
registration cases. All proceedings involving title to real
The trial court held and ordered Durisol through its President property, or specifically land registration cases, including its
and General Manager to surrender and deliver the 7 owner’s incidents such as the issuance of owner’s duplicate certificate
duplicate of TCT’s, all of Bulacan Registry, to the Clerk of of title, are matters cognizable by the regional trial courts. It
Court, or to the petitioner, within 5 days from receipt of the has been ruled that the regional trial courts have jurisdiction
resolution. over all actions involving possession of land, except forcible
entry and illegal detainer.
Respondent DBP, thus, filed a motion for execution, which was
granted. Subsequently, on motion of DBP, an Order was Respondent DBP, after petitioner’s president unjustly refused
issued directing the Register of Deeds of Bulacan to cancel the to comply with the directive of the trial court to surrender the 7
seven titles and to issue new ones in lieu thereof. Accordingly, certificates of title, filed a petition under Section 107 of the
new certificates of title were issued to DBP. Property Registration Decree (Presidential Decree No. 1529),
to wit:
Thereafter, DBP sold the lots to Manila Fertilizers, Inc. The
latter, in turn, sold the lots  to Polar Mines and Development Surrender of withheld duplicate certificates. --- Where it is
Corporation. On the other hand, one of the properties was also necessary to issue a new certificate of title pursuant to any
sold by DBP to respondent spouses Villarama, and to involuntary instrument which divests the title of the registered
respondents Rolando Ang See, Remedios Reyes, the spouses owner against his consent of where a voluntary instrument
Cabrales and the spouses Go Gabriel. cannot be registered by reason of the refusal or failure of the
holder to surrender the owner’s duplicate certificate of title, the
More than 4 years later, petitioner instituted before the CA a party in interest may file a petition in court to compel the
petition to annul the trial court’s decision and Resolution, surrender of the same to the Register of Deeds. The court,
alleging for the first time that the trial court had no jurisdiction after hearing, may order the registered owner or any person
over the case and prayed that the certificates of title issued in withholding the duplicate certificate to surrender the same, and
the names of all private respondents, except DBP, be annulled. direct the entry of a new certificate or memorandum upon such
surrender. If the person withholding the duplicate certificate is
not amenable to the process of the court, or if for any reason
the outstanding owner’s duplicate certificate cannot be
delivered, the court may order the annulment of the same as
well as the issuance of a new certificate of title in lieu thereof.
Such new certificate and all duplicates thereof shall contain a
memorandum of the annulment of the outstanding duplicate.

The term "court" in the above-quoted section refers to Courts

of First Instance, now Regional Trial Courts, as provided in
Section 2 of the Property Registration Decree.

Even assuming arguendo that the regional trial court had no

jurisdiction over the surrender of duplicate title, petitioner can
no longer raise this ground after having actively participated in
the prosecution of the case. A judgment rendered by a trial
court for alleged lack of jurisdiction cannot be considered void
where the party who has the right to challenge it failed to do so
at the first instance. In the case at bar, petitioner did not raise
the defense of lack of jurisdiction in its answer to respondent
DBP’s petition for surrender of owner’s duplicate certificate.
Neither did petitioner file any motion to dismiss on this ground.
On the contrary, petitioner raised the affirmative defenses of
failure to state a cause of action and payment. To be sure, a
court’s lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter and the
failure of the complaint to state a cause of action are distinct
and separate grounds for dismissal of a case.

As stated, petitioner actively participated in the course of the

proceedings both in the trial court and in the appellate court. In
its motion for reconsideration, petitioner assailed the merits of
the decision without raising any argument pertaining to lack of
jurisdiction of the trial court. When the case was elevated to
the IAC and when the case was remanded to the trial court,
petitioner did not allege lack of jurisdiction. In its motion for
reconsideration of the trial court’s order directing the issuance
of new certificates of title, petitioner again failed to raise the
ground of lack of jurisdiction.

2. YES. Indeed, it was only two decades after the institution of

the case at bar, when the issue of lack of jurisdiction was first
raised. However, it is already too late since the judgment had
already attained finality, considering that more than four years
have elapsed without any action from petitioner.

Rule 47, Section 3 expressly provides that a petition for

annulment of judgment based on lack of jurisdiction must be
filed before it is barred by laches or estoppel. Hence, it has
been held that while jurisdiction over the subject matter of a
case may be raised at any time of the proceedings, this rule
presupposes that laches or estoppel has not supervened. 

Here, the principle of estoppel lies. Hence, a party may be

estopped or barred from raising the question of jurisdiction for
the first time in a petition before the Supreme Court when it
failed to do so in the early stages of the proceedings.

3. The CFI had jurisdiction. It should be noted, however, that

when the CFI took cognizance of the remanded case, the
distinction between the CFI acting as a land registration court
with limited jurisdiction, on the one hand, and a CFI acting as
an ordinary court exercising general jurisdiction, on the other
hand, has already been removed with the effectivity of the
Property Registration Decree (PD 1529). The amendment was
aimed at avoiding multiplicity of suits. The change has
simplified registration proceedings by conferring upon the
designated trial courts the authority to act not only on
applications for "original registration" but also "over all petitions
filed after original registration of title, with power to hear and
determine all questions arising from such applications or
petition."