History - II

NATIONAL LAW INSTITUTE UNIVERSITY

BHOPAL(MP)

TRIMESTER – VI
HISTORY-II
PROJECT
ON
AZAD HIND FAUJ

SUBMITTED TO:- SUBMITTED BY:-

DR. UDAY PRATAP SINGH CHAITANYA CHAUHAN
ASSO. PROFESSOR 2009BALLB(Hons) 28

TABLE OF CONTENT

1. INTRODUCTION

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2. BIRTH AND EARLY YEARS OF THE AZAD HIND FAUJ

3. BATTLES AND OPERATIONS OF THE INA
 Arakan Offensive
 Battle of Imphal  and  Battle of Kohima
 Battle of Pokoku  and  Battle of Meiktila and Mandalay
4. COLLAPSE OF THE FAUJ
 THE RED FORT TRIAL
5. IMPACT
6. BIBLIOGRAPHY

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I. INTRODUCTION:

Azad Hind Fauj, or Indian National Army (I.N.A for short) as it was known to the English
speaking world, was a force raised from Indian prisoners of war during World War II (1939-
45) to fight against the British. The hostilities had started with the German invasion of
Poland on 1 September 1939. The United Kingdom declared war against Germany,
and India, then ruled by the British, automatically joined in under the governor general`s
proclamation of 3 September 1939.
The aim of the army was to overthrow the British Raj in colonial India,
with Japanese assistance. Initially composed of Indian prisoners of war captured by Japan in
her Malayan campaign and at Singapore, it later drew volunteers from Indian
expatriate population in Malaya and Burma.
Initially formed in 1942 immediately after the fall of Singapore under Mohan Singh, the first
INA collapsed in December that year before it was revived under the leadership of Subhas
Chandra Bose in 1943 and proclaimed the army of Bose's Arzi Hukumat-e-Azad Hind (The
Provisional Government of Free India). This second INA fought along with the Imperial
Japanese Army against the British and Commonwealth forces in the campaigns
in Burma, Imphal and Kohima, and later, against the successful Burma Campaign of
the Allies. The end of the war saw a large number of the troops repatriated to India where
some faced trial for treason and became a galvanising point of the Indian Independence
movement.
After Indian independence, the ex-INA members, with some exceptions, were refused
service in the Indian Army. However, a number of notable members later became involved
in public life in India and in Southeast Asia.
The legacy of the INA is controversial given its associations with Imperial Japan, the course
of Japanese occupations in Burma, Indonesia and other parts of Southeast Asia, her alliance
with Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy, as well as Japanese war crimes and the alleged
complicity of the troops of the INA in these. Also, its relative insignificance in military terms,
it is obvious propaganda value to the Japanese, as well as wartime British
Intelligence propaganda of cowardice and stories that associated INA soldiers in
mistreatment of captured Allied troops, to some extent mires the history of the army.
However, after the war, the Red Fort trials of captured INA officers in India provoked
massive public outcries in support of their efforts to fight the Raj, eventually triggering
the Bombay mutiny in the British Indian forces. These events in the twilight of the Raj are
accepted to have played a crucial role in its hasty end.
The Azad Hind Fauj (INA) made significant contributions to the independence struggle of
India. It was as much a part of the movement as any other struggle carried out by the Indian
revolutionaries outside India. The large concentration of the Indian population in East Asia

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and the organisational structure of the INA have made it a unique experiment in the history
of the freedom struggle of any country. However, the differing perceptions subscribed to by
the Indian National Congress led by Mahatma Gandhi and the Provisional Government of
Azad Hind led by Subhas Chandra Bose have been blown out of proportion and the entire
movement has been propelled in contradictions and controversies. An endeavour has been
made in this book to present the role of Indian Independence League, Indian National Army
and the Provisional Government of Azad Hind in a proper perspective and to show that the
Gandhian Movement in India and the INA Movement in East Asia were complimentary to
each other having a common objective and sincerity of purpose--viz. Independence of India.

The national movement grew even more strong after the formation of the Indian National
Army (INA), popularly known as the ‘Azad Hind Fauj’. A pioneering role in its formation was
taken by the Indian Independence League, an association formed by Rash Behari Bose.
General Mohan Singh was an important leader of this army. The army comprised largely of
Indian prisoners of war who were serving under the British and had been captured by the
Japanese during the war. Some Indians settled in South-east Asia also joined this army,
raising its strength to about forty-five thousand soldiers.

In AD 1943, the leadership of Azad Hind Fauj passed into the hands of Subhas Chandra Bose,
also called ‘Netaji’. He was a very popular leader especially among the youth. On 21 October
1943, he proclaimed the formation of the Provisional Government of Independent India in
Singapore. He went to the Andamans and hoisted the Indian flag there. In AD 1944, the
Azad Hind Fauj took part in the attack on the north-eastern parts of India to free the country
from British rule. Netaji also took the help of Japan to organize an anti-British revolt. His
slogans of ‘Delhi Chalo’ and ‘Jai Hind’ won many supporters to his cause. Women also joined
the army in large numbers. A separate women regiment called the Rani Jhansi Regiment
was created. It was led by Lakshmi Swaminathan.

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II. BIRTH AND EARLY YEARS OF THE AZAD HIND FAUJ:

Japan and Southeast Asia were major refuges for Indian nationalists living in exile before the
start of World War II. They were strong proponents of militant nationalism and influenced
Japanese policy significantly. Although Japanese intentions and policies with regards
to India were far from concrete at the start of the war, Japan had sent intelligence missions,
notably under Major I Fujiwara, into South Asia even before the start of the war to garner
support from the Malayan Sultans, overseas Chinese, the Burmese resistance and the Indian
movement. These missions were successful establishing contacts with Indian nationalists in
exile in Thailand and Malaya, supporting the establishment and organisation of the Indian
Independence League.
At the outbreak of World War II in South East Asia, 70,000 Indian troops were stationed
in Malaya. After the start of the war, Japan's spectacular Malayan Campaign had brought
under her control considerable numbers of Indian prisoners of war, nearly 55,000 after
the Fall of Singapore alone. The conditions of service within the British Indian Army as well
as the conditions in Malaya had fed dissension among these troops. From these troops,
the First Indian National Army was formed under Mohan Singh and received considerable
Japanese aid and support. It was formally proclaimed in September 1942 and declared the
subordinate military wing of the Indian Independence League in June that year. The unit was
dissolved in December 1942 and Singh was arrested and exiled toPulau Ubin after
apprehensions of Japanese motives with regards to the INA led to disagreements, distrust
and subsequently open hostility between Singh and the INA leadership on one hand, and
the league's leadership, most notable Rash Behari Bose and the Japanese military command
on the other. A large number of the initial volunteers chose to revert to prisoner of war
Status and a large number of these were subsequently sent to work in the Death Railway or
in New Guinea. From the end of December 1942 to February Rash Behari Bose struggled to
hold the INA together.
In a series of meetings between the INA leaders and the Japanese in 1943, it was decided to
cede the leadership of the IIL and the INA to Subhash Chandra Bose, since a number of the
officers and troops who had returned to POW camps, or had not volunteered in the first
place, made it known that they would be willing to join the INA only on the condition that it
was led by Bose.1 Bose had, at the start of the war in Europe, escaped from house arrest to
make his way to Germany, reaching Berlin on 2 April 1941. In Germany he convinced Hitler,
in a series of conferences, to support the cause of Indian Independence, 2 forming the Free
India Legion and the Azad Hind Radio By early 1943, Bose had turned his attention to
Southeast Asia. With its large overseas Indian population, it was recognised that the region
was fertile ground for establishing an anti-colonial force to fight the Raj. In January 1943,
the Japanese invited Bose to lead the Indian nationalist movement in East Asia. He accepted
1
Japan and the Indian National Army. by Joyce C Lebra
2
Axis War Makes Easier Task of Indians. Chandra Bose's Berlin Speech. Syonan Simbun, Domei

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and left Germany on 8 February. After a three-month journey by submarine, and a short
stop in Singapore, he reached Tokyo on 11 May 1943, where he made a number of radio
broadcasts to the Indian communities, exhorting them to join in the fight for India’s
Independence.
On 15 February 1943, the Army itself was put under the command of Lt. Col. M.Z. Kiani. The
former ranks and badges were revived. A policy forming body was formed with the Director
of the Military Bureau, Lt. Col Bhonsle, in charge and clearly placed under the authority of
the IIL. Under Bhonsle served Lt. Col. Shah Nawaz Khan as Chief of General Staff, Major P.K.
Sahgal as Military Secretary, Major Habib ur Rahman as commandant of the Officers'
Training School and Lt. Col. A.C. Chatterji (later Major A.D. Jahangir) as head of
enlightenment and culture.
On 4 July 1943, two days after reaching Singapore, Subhash Chandra Bose assumed the
leadership of the IIL and the INA in a ceremony at Cathay Building. Bose's influence was
notable. His appeal not only re-invigorated the fledgling INA, which previously consisted
mainly of POWs, his appeals also touched a chord with the Indian expatriates in South Asia
as local civilians, without caste, creed and religion- ranging from barristers, traders to
plantation workers, including Khudabadi Sindhi Swarankar working as shop keepers – had
no military experience joined the INA, doubled its troop strength. 3
An Officers’ Training School for INA officers, led by Habib ur Rahman, and the Azad School
for the civilian volunteers were set up to provide training to the recruits. A youth wing of the
INA, composed of 45 Young Indians personally chosen by Bose and affectionately known as
the Tokyo Boys, were also sent to Japan’s Imperial Military Academy to train as fighter
pilots. Also, possibly the first time in Asia, and even the only time outside the USSR, a
women's regiment, the Rani of Jhansi regiment was raised as a combat force.
There were 45,000 Indian troops from Malaya captured and assembled in Singapore when
the Japanese captured it. Of these, about 5,000 refused to join the First INA. The INA at this
time had 40,000 recruits. The Japanese were prepared to arm 16,000. When the "first INA"
collapsed, about 4,000 withdrew. The Second INA, commanded by Subhash Chandra Bose,
started with 12,000 troops. Further recruitment of ex-Indian army personnel added about
8,000-10,000. About 18,000 Indian civilians enlisted during this time. In 1945, at the end of
the INA, it consisted of about 40,000 soldiers.

3
Historical Journey of the Indian National Army: http://www.s1942.org.sg/s1942/indian_national_army/revival.htm

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III. BATTLES AND OPERATIONS OF THE INA:

 Arakan Offensive:
In March 1944, the Japanese forces began its offensive into India's eastern frontier. The
plans for the offensive directed three divisions from Kawabe's Burma Area Army to initiate a
diversionary attack at Arakan and cover the southern coast while another two divisions
watched Stillwell and Chiang Kai Shek's forces in the north. In the centre, three divisions
from Mutaguchi's 15th army were push into Manipur to capture Imphal, scattering British
forces and forestalling any offensive movements against Burma. 4 The INA's Special Services
Group, redesignated as the "Bahadur Group" worked with the advanced Japanese units and
pathfinders in the opening stages of the Japanese offensive in the upper Burma region and
into Manipur. These were tasked to infiltrate through British lines and approach units
identified as consisting of significant Indian troops, and encourage them to defect. Fay
quotes British Intelligence sources to confirm that these units achieved some success in
these early stages. In early April a unit of the Bahadur Group, led by Col. Shaukat Malik,
broke through the British defences on 18 April 1944 to capture Moirang in Manipur. The
Azad Hind administration took control of this independent Indian territory. 5
Meanwhile, the 1st battalion of the INA's 1st Guerrilla regiment, lightly armed, was directed
to towards the south to participate in the diversionary attack. The unit left Rangoon in early
February at reach Prome. From Prome, the unit marched across the Chin Hills to reach
the Taungup and then up the coast to reach Akyab in early March. By this time the Arakan
offensive was nearing its end, and although it had been a successful diversion, Kawabe's
forces had failed to capture and destroy Messervy's 17th Indian Division. The 1st battalion
marched up the Kaladan river and by middle of March approached Kyauktaw, east of Mayu
peninsula. Subsequently, the unit progressed slowly but successfully against Commonwealth
African units before crossing the Burma-India border north of Akyab, occupying Mowdok
near Chittagong.

 Battle of Imphal  and  Battle of Kohima:

The Arakan offensive was intended to create a diversion for Mutaguchi's forces, while
drawing out and destroying as much of the British reserves as possible. In the centre,
Mutaguchi's 15th Army was to be the decisive factor in the Manipur Basin. As the battle
progressed Mutaguchi's 31st Division engaged the commonwealth forces at Kohima, while
the 15th Division was detailed to move down Kohima road to the North-west of Imphal. The
main force detailed to engage Imphal,the 33rd Division (the Yamamoto Force, led by
Yamamoto Tsunoru), however, was to approach from the south-east via the Tamu Road that
4
Fay, Peter W. (1993), The Forgotten Army: India's Armed Struggle for Independence, 1942-1945
5
http://www.hindustantimes.com/news/specials/Netaji/enlisting9.htm

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had been built by the Commonwealth forces earlier. The INA's four guerrilla regiments
(except for No.1 Battalion) were directed to Tamu road and detailed to push into India as
Imphal falls.
The 2nd and 3rd battalions, led by Col. Shah Nawaz Khan, crossed
the Chindwin at Kalewa and, after marching up the valley of the Myittha, reached the edge
of Chin Hills below Tiddim and Fort Whiteat the end of March. From this position, a unit of
the 2nd battalion moved to relieve Japanese forces at Falam while a second company
moved to Hakha. The 3rd battalion was meanwhile moved to Fort White-Tongzang area in
anticipation of fall of Messervy's forces that would allow it to receive possible volunteers, as
well as begin its advance into India.
Among the responsibilities of Khan's forces was the protection of the southern flank of
Mutaguchi's forces from Chin irregulars. From the bases at Falam and Hakha, Khan's forces
sent out forward patrols and laid ambushes, with some successes, for the
Chin guerrillas under the command of a British officer, taking a number of prisoners. In the
middle of May, a force under Khan's Adjutant, Mahboob "Boobie" Ahmed, attacked and
captured the hilltop fortress of Klang Klang. 6
With the Messervy's 17th Indians breaking out, however, the 3rd battalion could not be
employed in its original perceived role. It was at this time the unit, for whatever reasons,
was employed at repairing roads that is widely reported when discussing the INA's role in
the Japanese offensive. Learning of this development, an enraged Shah Nawaz ordered it
back to base.
With the offensive more or less stopped by mid-May in the face of fierce resistance from the
commonwealth forces, Khan's forces were redirected to engage Kohima. Khan moved across
the Japanese rear with the 3rd Battalion and portion of the 2nd. By the time he
reached Ukhrul however, Mutaguchi's 31st division had begun withdrawing from Kohima.
Khan decided to attack Imphal instead.
The 2nd Guerrilla Regiment, or the Gandhi Regiment as it was called, consisted of two
battalions. Led by Inayat Kiyani, it was directed along the axis of the 15th Army's offensive.
Like the 1st Guerrilla, it had crossed the Chindwin at Kalewa. From Kalewa, the 2nd Guerrilla
turned north to reach the vicinity of Tamu in late April. The INA high command was
informed at this time of the Yamamoto force's impending assault on the airfield at Palel. The
INA unit was still far away. Kiyani picked a force of three hundred under Maj. Pritam
Singh that could advance faster. Armed lightly and without machine guns, the unit was
directed to attack the airfield from the south while Japanese forces engaged the eastern
defences.
Pritam's unit was however, walked into an ambush laid by a detachment of Gurkhas. By the
end of the night, Pritam's unit made a number of counter-attacks. They were soon
reinforced by the rest of Kiani's men. The skirmish turned into bloody fight as the alerted
6
Fay, Peter W. (1993), The Forgotten Army: India's Armed Struggle for Independence, 1942-1945

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British forces reinforced and called up air and artillery support. After two days of failed
counter-attacks and taking heavy losses, Kiani withdrew. The unit suffered nearly two
hundred casualties in the assault.7 The 2nd Guerrilla was never able to participate in further
attacks up the Tamu road after this. It was subsequently tasked to cover the left flank of the
Yamamoto force, in the rough countries of the south. Through June, the unit maintained
aggressive patrols south of Palel-Tamu road, mounting raids and laying ambushes against
the by now advancing British forces. It started withdrawing with the Japanese in late June.
The 3rd Guerrilla, or the Azad regiment, was under the command of Col. Gulzara Singh. The
unit marched from Yeu through the Kabaw valley to arrive near Tamu in late May, by which
time, the offensive was petering out. The unit was tasked to cover the right flank of the
Yamamoto force. The unit stayed with the Yamamoto force, covering its right flank, and
began retreating with it when it began withdrawing in mid-July.
The 4th Guerrilla, or the Nehru regiment, left Malaya the last among the INA's 1st division,
and never made it to the Chindwin.
The initial successes in upper Burma, the engagements at Kohima, and the encirclement of
Imphal was a key factor in convincing the INA that the offensive was succeeding. The
forward HQ of the INA was moved to Maymyo, in anticipation of moving into Indian
territory and taking charge of these as they fell.

  Battle of Pokoku  and  Battle of Meiktila and Mandalay:

As the allied Burma campaign began the following year, however, the INA remained
committed to the defence of Burma, and was a part of the Japanese defensive deployments.
The second division, tasked with the defence of Irrawaddy and the adjoining areas around
Nangyu, was instrumental in opposing Messervy's 7th Indian Division when it attempted to
cross the river at Pagan and Nyangyu during Irrawaddy operations. Later, during the Battles
of Meiktila and Mandalay, the 2nd division was instrumental in denying the British 17th
Division the area around Mount Popa that would have exposed the Flank of Kimura's forces
attempting to retake Meiktila and Nyangyu. Ultimately however, the division was
obliterated. As the Japanese situation became precarious, Azad Hind withdrew
from Rangoon with Ba Maw's government and the Japanese forces for Singapore along with
the remnants of the first division and the Rani of Jhansi Regiment. Nearly 6000 troops
amongst the surviving units of the Army remained in Rangoon under A.D
Loganathan surrendered as Rangoon fell, and helped keep order till the allied forces entered
the city. The only Indian territory that the Azad Hind govt controlled were the Indian
territories that fell during the Imphal offensive, and the islands of Andaman and Nicobar.
However, the latter two were bases for the Japanese Navy, and the navy never really fully
relinquished control. Enraged with the lack of administrative control, the Azad Hind
Governor, Lt. Col Loganathan later relinquished his authority to return to the Government's
7
Fay, Peter W. (1993), The Forgotten Army: India's Armed Struggle for Independence

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headquarters in Rangoon. The Japanese forces is said to have carried out torture on
thousands of local inhabitants during the occupation, and some historians apportion the
blame to Subhas Bose's provisional government.

VI. COLLAPSE OF THE FAUJ:

THE RED FORT TRIAL:

At the conclusion of the war, the government of British India brought some of the captured
INA soldiers to trial on treason charges. The prisoners would potentially face the death
penalty, life imprisonment or a fine as punishment if found guilty. It was initially believed by
Auchinleck that no less than twenty death penalties were likely to be confirmed. Between
November 1945 and May 1946, approximately ten courts-martial were held. The first of
these, and the most celebrated one, was the joint court-martial of Colonel Prem
Sahgal, Colonel Gurubaksh Singh Dhillon and Major General Shah Nawaz Khan held in a
public trial at the Red Fort, Delhi, British India. The then Advocate General of India, Sir
Naushirwan P Engineer was appointed the counsel for the prosecution. Nearly all the
defendants in the first trial were charged with Waging war against the King-Emperor (the
charge of treason did not exist in theIndian Army Act, 1911) as well as torture, murder and
abettment to murder. The three defendants were defended by the INA Defence
Committee formed by the Congress and include legal luminaries of India of the time
including Jawaharlal Nehru, Bhulabhai Desai, Kailashnath Katju[Asaf Ali] and others. The
trials covered arguments based on Military Law, Constitutional Law, International Law,
and Politics and much of the initial defence was based on the argument that they should be
treated as prisoners of war as they were not paid mercenaries but bona fide soldiers of a
legal government, the Provisional Government of Free India, or the Arzi Hukumate Azad
Hind, "however misinformed or otherwise they had been in their notion of patriotic duty
towards their country" and as such they recognized the free Indian state as their sovereign

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and not the British sovereign. Those charged later only faced trial for torture and murder or
abettment of murder.
These trials attracted much publicity, and public sympathy for the defendants who were
perceived as patriots in India. The Indian National Congress and the Muslim League both
made the release of the three defendants an important political issue during the agitation
for independence of 1945-6. Beyond the concurrent campaigns of noncooperation and
nonviolent protest, this spread to include mutinies and wavering support within the British
Indian Army. This movement marked the last major campaign in which the forces of the
Congress and the Muslim League aligned together; the Congress tricolor and the green flag
of the League were flown together at protests. In spite of this aggressive and widespread
opposition, the court martial was carried out, and all three defendants were sentenced to
deportation for life. This sentence, however, was never carried out, as the immense public
pressure of the demonstrations and riots forced Claude Auchinleck, Commander-in-Chief of
the Indian Army, to release all three defendants. Within three months, 11,000 soldiers of
the INA were released after cashiering and forfeiture of pay and allowance. On the
recommendation of Lord Mountbatten of Burma, and agreed by Nehru, as a precondition
for Independence the INA soldiers were not re-inducted into the Indian Army.

V. IMPACT:
The INA's impact on the war and on British India after the war has been analysed in detail.
The INA's role in military terms is considered to be relatively insignificant, given its small
numerical strength, lack of heavy weapons (it utilised captured British and Dutch arms
initially), relative dependence on Japanese logistics and planning as well as its lack of
independent planning. Shah Nawaz claims in his personal memoirs that the INA was a very
potent and motivated force. Fay however, reinforces the argument that the INA was
relatively less significant in military terms. Its special services group played a significant part
in halting the First Arakan Offensive while still under Mohan Singh's command. The
propaganda threat of the INA, coupled with the lack of concrete intelligence on the unit
early after the fall of Singapore made it a potent threat to Allied war plans in South East
Asia. It threatened to destroy the Sepoy's loyalty in the British Indian Army and in fact was
significant and successful enough during the First Arakan Offensive for the British
intelligence to begin the Jiffs campaign as well as engage in campaign to improve morale
and preserve the loyalty of the sepoy to consolidate and prepare for defense of Manipur.
These measures included imposing newsban on Bose and the INA that was not lifted till four
days after the fall of Rangoon two years later.8

8
Japan and the Indian National Army. by Joyce C Lebra

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Later, during the Japanese U-GO offensive towards Manipur in 1944, it played a crucial and
successful role in the diversionary attacks in Arakan as well as in the Manipur Basin itself
where it fought with Mutaguchi's 15th Army. It qualified itself well in the Battles in Arakan,
Manipur, Imphal, and later during the withdrawal through Manipur and Burma. Later,
during the Burma Campaign, it did play a notable role in the Battles
of Irrawaddy and Meiktilla especially in the latter, supporting the Japanese offensive and
tying down British troops. Fay also notes the published accounts of several veterans,
including that of William Slim that portrays INA-troops as incapable fighters and
untrustworthy, and points out the inconsistencies and conflicts between the different
accounts to conclude that intelligence propaganda as well as institutional bias may have
played a significant part in the portrayed opinions.
It is however noted that the INA did indeed suffer a number of notable incidences of
desertion. Fay notes the significant ones amongst these were not during the offensives into
Manipur and the subsequent retreat through Burma, when incidences of desertion did
occur but at a far smaller numbers than the fourteenth army told its troops. The significant
desertions, Fay notes, occurred around the Battles at Irrawaddy and later around Popa.
During the fall of Rangoon, 6000 INA troops manned the city to maintain order before allied
troops entered the city. Nevertheless, Fay argues, the INA was not significant enough to
militarily beat the British Indian Army, and was moreover aware of this and formulated its
own strategy of avoiding set-piece battles, garnering local and popular support within India
and instigating revolt within the British Indian army to overthrow the Raj. Moreover,
the Forward Bloc underground within India had been crushed well before the offensives
opened in the Burma-Manipur theatre, depriving the army of any organised internal
support.
It was however, the INA trials that attracted more attention in India than the war time
activities of the unit, and coupled to the decisions to hold the first trial in public, these
became a rallying point for the independence movement from Autumn 1945, so much so
that the release of INA prisoners and suspension of the trials came to be the dominant
political campaign in precedence over the campaign for Freedom. Newspaper reports
around November 1945 reported executions of INA troops, which deteriorated already
volatile situations. Opposition to the trial of the officers for treason became a major public
and political campaign, and the very opening of the first trial saw violence and series of riots
in a scale later described as sensational. It also saw a campaign that defied communal
barriers.
Increasingly violent confrontations broke out between the police and the mass rallies being
held all over India, culminating in public riotings in support of the INA men. The Raj also
observed with increasing disquiet and unease the spread of pro-INA sympathies within the
troops of the British Indian forces. In February 1946, while the trials were still going on, a
general strike ratings of the Royal Indian Navy rapidly deteriorated into a mutiny,
incorporating ships and shore establishments of the RIN throughout India,

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from Karachi to Bombay and from Vizag to Calcutta. Amongst the rallying cries of the ratings

the central one was the INA trials and slogans invoking Subhas Bose. Significantly, the
mutiny received massive militant public support. At some places, NCOs in the British Indian
Army started ignoring orders from British superiors. In Madras and Pune, the British
garrisons had to face revolts within the ranks of the British Indian Army. Another Army
mutiny took place at Jabalpur during the last week of February 1946, soon after the Navy
mutiny at Bombay. British troops suppressed this by force, using bayonets. It lasted about
two weeks. After the mutiny, about 45 persons were tried by court martial. 41 were
sentenced to varying terms of imprisonment or dismissal. In addition, a large number were
discharged on administrative grounds.
Later historians have pointed out that the INA trials and its after effects brought the decisive
shift in British policy. The viceroy's journal describes the autumn and Winter 1945-45 as
"The Edge of a Volcano". Intelligence reports at the time noted widespread public interest
and sympathy that turned into what has been described as "Patriotic Fury" that was beyond
the communal barriers in India at the time. Particularly disturbing for the British, was the
overt and public support for the INA by the soldiers of the Indian army. In addition, the use
of Indian troops for the restoration of Dutch and French rule in Vietnam and Indonesia also
fed growing resentment within the forces. The Raj had every reason to fear a revival of
the Quit Indian movement, especially given the Congress rhetoric preceding the
elections. and rapidly realised that the Indian army, unlike in 1942, could not be used to
suppress such a movement owing largely to nationalistic and political consciousness in the
forces which was ascribed to the INA. Some historians cite Auchinleck's own assessment of
the situation to suggest this shortened the Raj by at least fifteen to twenty years.
The political effects of the INA trials was enormous and were felt around India as late as
1948, much to the chagrin of the then Indian government. Clement Attlee, the then British
Prime Minister, reflecting on the factors that guided the British decision to relinquish the Raj
in India, is said to have cited the effects of the INA and Bose's activities on the British Indian
Army and the Bombay Mutinyas being the most important.
After the war ended, the story of the INA and the Free India Legion was seen as so
inflammatory that, fearing mass revolts and uprisings—not just in India, but across its
empire—the British Government forbade the BBC from broadcasting their story.

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History - II

VI. BIBLIOGRAPHY:

i) http://www.hindustantimes.com
ii) Historical Journey of the Indian National Army:
http://www.s1942.org.sg/s1942/indian_national_army
iii) The Forgotten Army: India's Armed Struggle for Independence, 1942-1945
iv) http://www.netaji.org/

v) Japan and the Indian National Army. by Joyce C Lebra

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