i.
Student Name:
Michelle C. Llaneta-Villamora
ii. Complete Case Title Citation:
The United States v. Frank Tupasi Molina, G. R. No. L-9878, December 24, 1914.
iii. Statement of the Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner incurred criminal liability in violating regulation,
prescribe by an executive officer in conformity with a statute.
iv. Complainant’s Arguments:
In accordance with the requirements of said law, the Director of Constabulary
prepared an examination manual, prescribing at the same time rules for conducting
examinations, which examination manual was approved by the Secretary of
Commerce and Police, and thereby was given the force of law. Said manual
prescribed a form in blank, known as "Municipal Form No. 11," which form each
applicant was required to fill, in order to be permitted to take said examination. Said
application required the applicant to swear to the facts stated therein. We have,
therefore, a law that authorizes the administration of an oath in the present case.
The regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular department
must be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and for the sole purpose of
carrying into effect its general provisions. By such regulations, of course, the law
itself cannot be extended. So long, however, as the regulations relate solely to
carrying into effect the provisions of the law, they are valid. A violation of a
regulation prescribed by an executive officer of the Government in conformity with
and based upon a statute authorizing such regulation, constitutes an offense and
renders the offender liable to punishment in accordance with the provisions of law.
v. Respondent’s Argument:
Defendant argued that the purpose of Act No 1697 was not intended to cover
cases like the present case. He averred that said Act was an Act only authorizing the
appointment of commissioners to make official investigators, fixing their powers, for
the payment of witness fees, and for the punishment of perjury in official
investigations.
vi. Instruction Learned:
Act No. 2169 of the Philippine Legislature, is an Act to provide for the
reorganization, government, and inspection of municipal police of the municipalities
or provinces and sub provinces organized under Act No. 83. Said Act further provides
that, subject to the approval of the Secretary of Commerce and Police, the Director of
Constabulary shall prepare general regulations for the good government, discipline,
and inspection of the municipal police, "compliance wherewith shall be obligatory for
all members of the organization." Said Act further provides for an examining board
for the municipal police. It further provides that, subject to the approval of the
Secretary of Commerce and Police, the Director of Constabulary shall prepare an
examination manual, prescribing, at the same time, suitable rules for the conduct of
the examination. One of the requisites stated in Section 9 of said act is that “to be
eligible for examination, a candidate shall have no criminal record.”
Act No. 1697 is a regulation adopted under legislative authority in harmony with
the provisions of the law. Section 3 of said Act was a provision punishing the crime
of perjury generally. (U.S. vs. De Chaves, 14 Phil. Rep., 565).
Decision of the Court:
The decision of the lower court was affirmed and the defendant was charged for
the crime of perjury.
vii. Ratio:
The Court is of the opinion that whoever makes a statement or subscribes a
document, under the circumstances mentioned in said section 3, which is false and
which he, at the time he makes the same does not believe to be true, is guilty of the
crime of perjury. In other words, under the circumstances mentioned in said section,
if one swears positively that a fact is true, which he does not believe to be true, and it
turns out that it is false, he is guilty of the crime of perjury. No one should swear
positively that a fact is true or subscribe a document asserting that the facts stated
therein are true, unless he at least believes that they are true at the time he takes such
oath or subscribes such document. It can scarcely be believed that the defendant in
the present case believed that the answer to said question No. 5 was true. He must
have signed or answered said question not only believing that it was not true, but, in
fact, signed the same knowing that the answer was false.
