YESHIVAT HAR ETZION

ISRAEL KOSCHITZKY VIRTUAL BEIT MIDRASH (VBM)

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WOMEN AND HALAKHA

Rav Chaim Navon

For easy printing, go to:

www.vbm-torah.org/archive/womenandmitzvot/26womenandmitzvot.htm

Please pray for the safe return of

Yaakov Naphtali ben Rachel Devorah,
Gilad Michael ben Bat Galim,
Ayal Ben Iris Teshurah
and the chayalim who are risking their lives to ensure it.

SHIUR 26: WOMEN AND THE PESACH SEDER

I. MATZA

The Talmud states that women are obligated to eat matza at the
Pesach seder, even though it is a time-bound positive commandment, from
which women are generally exempt:

For Rabbi Eliezer said: “Women are obligated in [the commandment of]
eating matza by Torah law, as it is stated: ‘You shall eat no leavened
bread with it; [seven days shall you eat unleavened bread therewith]”
(Devarim 16:3). Whoever is subject to “You shall eat no leavened
bread” is subject to the [mitzva of] eating unleavened bread; and these
women, since they are subject to [the injunction of] “You shall eat no
leavened bread,” are [also] subject to “Arise, eat unleavened bread.”
(Pesachim 43b)

The Gemara establishes that there is a connection between the prohibition of

chametz and the obligation to eat matza. Women are forbidden to eat
chametz, as they are bound by all the negative commandments. Therefore,
they must also eat matza on the night of the seder. The prohibition of
chametz and the commandment to eat matza constitute a single unit.

II. THE PASCHAL OFFERING

The Gemara elsewhere addresses the question whether women are

obligated to bring the Paschal offering (Pesachim 91b). According to Rabbi
Yehuda and Rabbi Yose, we slaughter a Paschal offering for a woman
separately,1 whereas according to Rabbi Shimon we do not – she can join a
group of men and participate in their Paschal offering. The Gemara connects
1
This is only true for Pesach Rishon, the 15th day of Nissan, and not for Pesach Sheni, the
15th day of Iyyar.
Rabbi Yehuda's view to the position that a woman is obligated to bring a
Paschal offering. This is derived from the verse: “And if the household be too
little for a lamb, let him and his neighbor next to his house take it according
to the number of the souls; according to every man's eating shall you make
your count for the lamb” (Shemot 12:4). The neutral term “souls” includes both
men and women. Indeed, the Rambam (Hilkhot Korban Pesach 1:1) rules that
women are obligated in the Paschal offering just like men.

III. THE FOUR CUPS OF WINE

The Gemara asserts that women are obligated to drink four cups of
wine at the seder: “Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said: ‘Women are obligated in
these four cups [of wine], for they too were included in that miracle’”
(Pesachim 108a-b). The Gemara states this rule about another two rabbinic
time-bound positive commandments – reading Megillat Esther on Purim and
lighting candles on Chanuka. Rashi comments on the passage in Pesachim,
explaining that by virtue of righteous women the people of Israel were
redeemed from Egypt. But the Tosafot point out that this explanation is also
brought with respect to megilla reading, and there the expression “they too” is
inappropriate, as the miracle of Purim was performed principally through
Esther; her participation was not a marginal addition, as “they too” seems to
imply. The Tosafot therefore explain that in each of these three historical
instances, the women of Israel were exposed to the same danger as their
male counterparts.

IV. MAROR

The Posekim agree that women are also obligated in the mitzva to eat
maror (bitter herbs) at the seder, but it is not clear why this should be so. The
Arukh Ha-shulchan writes as follows:

Since [women] are obligated in matza, they are also obligated in the
Paschal offering and in maror, as they are compared one to the other.
As it is written: “They shall eat [the Paschal offering] with matzot and
maror.” Even though the obligation to eat maror nowadays is [only] by
Rabbinic law, nevertheless, whatever the Rabbis enacted, they
enacted similar to Scriptural law. Accordingly, they are obligated in all
the commandments of the night, as they are all one matter. And
furthermore, it was by virtue of righteous women that our forefathers
were redeemed from Egypt. Therefore, it is obvious that they are
obligated in all the commandments of the night, as they are all only
because of the redemption from Egypt. (Orach Chayyim 472:15)

The words of the Arukh Ha-shulchan contain several novelties. First, he

argues that even the obligation of women regarding the Paschal offering –
which the Gemara connects to the verse, “according to the number of the
souls,” is connected to the analogy to the prohibition of chametz. According to
him, after the Gemara learns that women are obligated in the mitzva of eating
matza, it expands this obligation to include the Paschal offering and maror as
well.
 What about the duty to eat maror nowadays, which is only rabbinic?
The Arukh Ha-shulchan proposes two ways of understanding why women are
obligated in maror today. First: “Whatever the Rabbis enacted, they enacted
similar to Scriptural law.” That is to say, when the Rabbis instituted the mitzva
of maror, they established that its laws should be similar to the obligation of
maror which was in force during the time of the Temple. Women, who were
obligated in the mitzva of maror when it was a Torah obligation, are also
obligated in the mitzva now that it is mandated by Rabbinic decree alone.
Second, “they too were included in that miracle” – this rationale is relevant to
all the rabbinic obligations on the night of the seder.

The Arukh Ha-shulchan implies that these two rationales apply to other
mitzvot of the Seder night as well, such as the four cups. Apart from the
consideration that “they too were included in that miracle,” he mentions that all
the commandments of the night are “one matter.” If women are obligated to
eat matza, they are obligated in all the mitzvot performed that night. The
Rabbis enacted these mitzvot as part of a comprehensive system of
commandments to be observed on the night of the seder, and anyone who is
obligated to eat matza, etc., is also obligated in these rabbinic
commandments. There might have been room to distinguish between maror –
fundamentally a Torah obligation that is no longer applicable – and the four
cups – a rabbinic obligation at its core. Perhaps the analogy to matza applies
to maror, but it is difficult to include a fundamentally rabbinic mitzva with the
rest of the mitzvot, such that they all be considered “one matter.” In any event,
the Arukh Ha-shulchan does not make this distinction.

V. RELATING THE STORY OF THE EXODUS FROM EGYPT

The mitzva of sippur yetziat Mitzrayim, relating the story of the exodus
from Egypt, finds expression in the recitation of the Haggada. This mitzva is
incumbent upon women, but it is not clear whether their obligation is by Torah
law or by rabbinic enactment. The Sefer Ha-chinukh (commandment no. 21)
writes that women are obligated in this mitzva by Torah law. The Minchat
Chinukh expresses his surprise:

“This applies to males and females, etc.” In my opinion, this is a great

novelty. Why should this mitzva apply to women, seeing that it is a
time-bound positive commandment, from which women are exempt? …
Rambam (Hilkhot Avoda Zara 12:3) lists the time-bound positive
commandments in which women are obligated: kiddush, matza, the
Paschal offering, rejoicing on the Festivals, and hakhel. But he does
not count this. From where then does [the Chinukh] derive that women
are obligated in this mitzva? He learns that the reason is that they too
were included in that miracle, as with megilla reading and the four
cups. But the Tosafot already proved in several places that this only
creates a rabbinic obligation…
Women are certainly obligated by rabbinic law, as they are obligated in
the four cups and in Hallel on the night of the seder. (Minchat Chinukh,
commandment 21 [6])
The Minchat Chinukh argues that the Rambam does not mention that women
are obligated in the mitzva of telling the story of the exodus from Egypt. What
is more, in Hilkhot Avoda Zara (chap. 12), where the Rambam notes the six
time-bound positive commandments to which women are subject by Torah
law, he does not mention this mitzva. It should be noted, on the other hand,
that at the end of his listing of the positive commandments in his Sefer Ha-
mitzvot, the Rambam mentions those commandments from which women are
exempt. He implies that women are not exempt from the mitzva of telling the
story of the exodus from Egypt (mitzva no. 157). While this may seem like a
contradiction, it is certainly possible that the Rambam changed his position on
this point.

The Minchat Chinukh argues that, in any case, it is obvious that women
are obligated in the mitzva of telling the story of the exodus at least by
rabbinic decree, just as they are obligated to drink the four cups of wine. It
should be noted that theoretically one could have argued that women are not
at all obligated in the mitzva of telling the story of the exodus. Thus far, we
have seen mitzvot that are incumbent upon both men and women by Torah
law, e.g., eating matza (as both men and women are prohibited from eating
chametz); and we have also seen mitzvot in which both men and women are
obligated by rabbinic decree, e.g., the four cups (as “they too were included in
that miracle”). It may be that the factor of “they too were included in that
miracle” is only relevant to mitzvot that are fundamentally rabbinic in origin,
and not to mitzvot in which men are obligated by Torah law. If this is the case,
there is room to say that the mitzva of telling the story of the exodus falls into
neither of the two categories described above, and therefore women are
entirely exempt. As stated, however, not even the Minchat Chinukh raises
such a possibility.

VI. HALLEL

The Minchat Chinukh considers it obvious that women are obligated to

recite Hallel on the night of the seder (by rabbinic decree). He refers to the
Tosafot in Sukka:

The implication here is that women are exempt from Hallel on Sukkot
and Shavuot, the reason being that it is a time-bound positive
commandment. Even though with respect to Hallel on the night of the
seder, the Gemara in Arvei Pesachim (108a) implies that [women] are
obligated in the four cups, and presumably the four cups were only
instituted so that Hallel and the Haggada should be recited over them –
the Hallel of Pesach is different, as it comes for the miracle, and they
too were included in that miracle. But here it is not recited over a
miracle. (Tosafot, Sukka 38a)

The Tosafot assert that if women are obligated in the mitzva of the four cups,
they are apparently also obligated in the Hallel that is recited on the night of
the seder, for “presumably the four cups were only instituted so that Hallel and
the Haggada should be recited over them.” Why should women be obligated
in the Hallel recited on the night of the seder but not in the Hallel recited on
Sukkot and Shavuot? The Tosafot explain that the Hallel recited on the night
of the seder is exceptional, “as it comes for the miracle, and they too were
included in that miracle.”

What is the meaning of the distinction between the Hallel recited on

Sukkot and the Hallel recited on the night of the seder? R. Yitzchak
Soloveitchik (Chiddushei Maran Riz Ha-Levi, Hilkhot Chanuka 3:6)
distinguishes between the Hallel recited on all the various occasions, which is
recited as a “reading,” and the Hallel recited on the night of the seder, which is
recited as a “song.” Hallel is usually recited as part of the prayer service. But
on the night of the seder, it is an excited response to deliverance from
affliction. “In each and every generation a person is obligated to see himself
as if he left Egypt” (Pesachim 116b). A person who has just left Egypt
responds to the salvation of his people from slavery by singing Hallel.
Therefore, on the night of the seder, Hallel is recited at night, a phenomenon
not found on any other occasion. And, therefore, women are exempt from the
Hallel recited on the various holidays, but they are obligated in the Hallel
recited on the night of the seder, as it is a show of thanksgiving for the
miracle, and “they too were included in that miracle.”

VII. RECLINING

The ruling of the Shulchan Arukh is straightforward: “Women too are

obligated in the four cups and in all the commandments that apply that night”
(Orach Chayyim 472:14). Indeed, thus far we have seen that women are
obligated in all the mitzvot related to the seder. The only question is whether
they are obligated by Torah law or by rabbinic decree. There is, however, one
rabbinic commandment regarding which the role of women is unclear, namely,
the mitzva of reclining.

The Gemara in Pesachim (108a) states: “A woman in her husband's

[house] need not recline, but if she is a woman of importance she must
recline.” The words “in her husband's [house]” did not appear in the texts
available to the Rishonim, and therefore it is reasonable to assume that we
are dealing with an addition that was inserted into the Gemara, and that
comprises sort of an explanation: When is a woman exempt from reclining?
When she is in her husband's house.

The Rosh writes that we find among the Rishonim two different
explanations of this law, and that there is a practical difference between them:

A woman need not recline. The Rashbam explains: “Because of

reverence for her husband, to whom she is beholden.” According to
this, a widow or a divorcee must recline. The She'iltot De-Rav Achai
writes that it is not the manner of women to recline. According to this, a
widow and a divorcee are also [exempt], but as for an important
woman, it is her manner to recline. (Rosh, Pesachim, chap. 10, no. 20)
The Rashbam explains that a woman does not recline because she is
beholden to her husband. The She'iltot writes that it is not the manner of a
woman to recline. The practical difference is whether or not a single woman
must recline. They both agree (following the Gemara) that an important
woman must recline, but for different reasons: The Rashbam would say that
an important woman feels free and is not subject to her husband, whereas the
She'iltot would argue that it is the way of an important woman, in contrast to
other women, to recline.

The Me’iri follows the Rashbam, adding another halakhic ramification:

A woman need not recline, because a woman is not free in the

presence of her husband. But if she is an important woman, she must
recline, as there is nothing servile in her marriage. [As for an ordinary
woman,] when she is not in her husband's presence, it would seem that
she must recline. (Meiri, Pesachim 108a)

The Meiri argues that a woman is exempt from reclining because “a woman is
not free in the presence of her husband.” In light of this, he reaches the
conclusion that a woman's exemption from reclining only applies when she is
in her husband's presence. This is similar to a parallel statement from the
same passage in Pesachim, which posits that a disciple in his teacher's
presence is exempt from reclining because of his reverence for his teacher.

A third explanation appears, among other places, in the words of

Rabbeinu Manoach in his commentary on the Rambam:

If she is an important woman – that is, if she has no husband and she
is the mistress of the house, she must recline. Alternatively, if she is
important with respect to her handiwork, a God-fearing woman, the
daughter of the great Torah scholars of the generation, and she has
the praises of a woman of valor, this woman… even if she has a
husband, she must recline. Alternatively, you can explain: “She need
not recline” – since she is busy with cooking and preparing the food,
they exempted her from reclining, just as they exempted her from time-
bound positive commandments. But an important woman, who has
male servants and maidservants who take care of food matters and
she sits idle – she must recline. (Rabbeinu Manoach, Hilkhot Chametz
U-matza 7:5)

Rabbeinu Manoach understands that a woman's exemption is connected to

the extent of her obligation to her husband. In light of this, he proposes two
possible explanations of the expression “important woman”: (1) a woman who
has no husband and (2) an impressive woman, in practical or spiritual terms,
who does not nullify herself with respect to her husband.

But then Rabbeinu Manoach proposes another explanation: A woman's

exemption is connected to the fact that she is busy preparing the food.
Consequently, an “important woman” is one who need not involve herself in
preparing and serving the food, as she has servants who do that in her place.
In light of this novel explanation, it is clear that such a woman would be
obligated to recline.

The Mordechai cites, in the name of the Tosafot, a novel position with
important practical ramifications in this context: “If she is an important woman,
she must recline. The Tosafot explain that all of our women are important and
they are required to recline” (Addendum to Arvei Pesachim). It follows that,
due to changing societal norms, a woman’s exemption from reclining may no
longer be relevant. If a woman’s exemption from reclining resulted from her
“subjugation” to her husband, then it may be that women today should recline
because they are no longer regarded as being subject to their husbands. If
their exemption resulted from the need to prepare the meal, we can say that
today a woman's involvement in preparing the meal no longer requires that
she be absent from the meal itself.

The Shulchan Arukh and the Rema rule:

A woman need not recline, unless she is an important woman.

Rema: All of our women are considered important (Mordechai); but

they are not accustomed to recline, as they rely on the words of the
Ra’avya, who writes that today there is no need [for anyone] to recline.
(Orach Chayyim 472:4)

There is room to discuss whether, in the time of the Mordechai, women

actually reclined, or perhaps even then they were not accustomed to do so. In
any event, it is clear that in the time of the Rema – as today – many women
were not accustomed to recline. But in light of the Mordechai's ruling that all of
our women are considered important, it is difficult to understand why women
are not particular about reclining.

In this context, the Rema mentions the Ra’avya, who maintains that in
our time, nobody is required to recline – neither men nor women. Why? In the
days of Chazal, reclining represented the normal way of sitting at a
distinguished meal, but in our day that is no longer the case. The Rema
argues that women are not accustomed to recline, even though they are all
considered important women, because they rely on the Ra’avya, who
exempts everybody from reclining in our time. The Rema's explanation seems
very forced, as the Ra’avya does not distinguish between women and men;
why then should only women rely on his position?

The Vilna Gaon, in his commentary, mentions the rationale of the

She'iltot, that the Gemara exempts woman from reclining because they are
not accustomed to recline all year long. According to this, it can be argued
that today, even important women are not accustomed to recline all year long,
and therefore they should not recline at the seder. This might be the basis for
distinguishing between men and women. Regarding men, it was established
that they are obligated to recline. According to most Posekim (except for the
Ra’avya), this is a binding law that does not depend on one’s personal
custom. But as for women, it was established from the outset that their
obligation depends on their custom (for, unlike men, already then most
women were not accustomed to recline). As a result, a woman’s obligation to
recline depends on the custom of each generation.

In practice, many women today are not accustomed to recline. But

there are different customs regarding the matter, and some women indeed
recline at the seder, just as men do.

(Translated by David Strauss)