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G.R. No. 187417. February 24, 2016.*

 
CHRISTINE JOY CAPIN-CADIZ, petitioner, vs. BRENT
HOSPITAL AND COLLEGES, INC., respondent.

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Petition for Review

on Certiorari; Rule 46, Section 3 of the Rules of Court states the
contents of a petition filed with the Court of Appeals (CA) under
Rule 65, viz., “the petition shall x  x  x indicate the material dates
showing when notice of the judgment or final order or resolution
subject thereof was received, when a motion for new trial or
reconsideration, if any, was filed and when notice of the denial
thereof was received.”—Rule 46, Section 3 of the Rules of Court
states the contents of a petition filed with the CA under Rule 65,
viz., “the petition shall x x x indicate the material dates showing
when notice of the judgment or final order or resolution subject
thereof was received, when a motion for new trial or
reconsideration, if any, was filed and when notice of the denial
thereof was received.” The rationale for this is to enable the CA to
determine whether the petition was filed within the period fixed
in the rules. Cadiz’s failure to state the date of receipt of the copy
of the NLRC decision, however, is not fatal to her case since the
more important material date which must be duly alleged in a
petition is

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*  THIRD DIVISION.

 
 
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VOL. 785, FEBRUARY 24, 2016 19

Capin-Cadiz vs. Brent Hospital and Colleges, Inc.

the date of receipt of the resolution of denial of the motion for

reconsideration, which she has duly complied with.

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Pleadings and Practice; Registry Receipts; What the rule

requires is that the registry receipt must be appended to the paper
being served. Clearly, mere indication of the registry receipt
numbers will not suffice.—The CA also dismissed the petition for
failure to attach the registry receipt in the affidavit of service.
Cadiz points out, on the other hand, that the registry receipt
number was indicated in the petition and this constitutes
substantial compliance with the requirement. What the rule
requires, however, is that the registry receipt must be appended
to the paper being served. Clearly, mere indication of the registry
receipt numbers will not suffice. In fact, the absence of the
registry receipts amounts to lack of proof of service. Nevertheless,
despite this defect, the Court finds that the ends of substantial
justice would be better served by relaxing the application of
technical rules of procedure. With regard to counsel’s failure to
indicate the place where the IBP and PTR receipts were issued,
there was substantial compliance with the requirement since it
was indicated in the verification and certification of non-forum
shopping, as correctly argued by Cadiz’s lawyer.
Labor Law; Termination of Employment; Disgraceful and
Immoral Conduct; Whether a conduct is considered disgraceful or
immoral should be made in accordance with the prevailing norms
of conduct, which, as stated in Leus v. St. Scholastica’s College
Westgrove, 748 SCRA 378 (2015), refer to those conducts which are
proscribed because they are detrimental to conditions upon which
depend the existence and progress of human society.—
Jurisprudence has already set the standard of morality with
which an act should be gauged — it is public and secular, not
religious. Whether a conduct is considered disgraceful or immoral
should be made in accordance with the prevailing norms of
conduct, which, as stated in Leus v. St. Scholastica’s College
Westgrove, 748 SCRA 378 (2015), refer to those conducts which
are proscribed because they are detrimental to conditions
upon which depend the existence and progress of human
society. The fact that a particular act does not conform to the
traditional moral views of a certain sectarian institution is not
sufficient reason to qualify such act as immoral unless it,
likewise, does not conform to public and secular standards. More
importantly, there must be substantial evidence to establish
that premarital

 
 

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Capin-Cadiz vs. Brent Hospital and Colleges, Inc.
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sexual relations and pregnancy out of wedlock is considered

disgraceful or immoral.
Same; Same; Same; As declared in Leus v. St. Scholastica’s
College Westgrove, 748 SCRA 378 (2015), “there is no law which
penalizes an unmarried mother by reason of her sexual conduct or
proscribes the consensual sexual activity between two unmarried
persons; that neither does such situation contravene[s] any
fundamental state policy enshrined in the Constitution.”—The
totality of the circumstances of this case does not justify the
conclusion that Cadiz committed acts of immorality. Similar to
Leus, Cadiz and her boyfriend were both single and had no legal
impediment to marry at the time she committed the alleged
immoral conduct. In fact, they eventually married on April 15,
2008. Aside from these, the labor tribunals’ respective conclusion
that Cadiz’s “indiscretion” “scandalized the Brent community” is
speculative, at most, and there is no proof adduced by Brent to
support such sweeping conclusion. Even Brent admitted that it
came to know of Cadiz’s “situation” only when her pregnancy
became manifest. Brent also conceded that “[a]t the time [Cadiz]
and Carl R. Cadiz were just carrying on their boyfriend-girlfriend
relationship, there was no knowledge or evidence by [Brent] that
they were engaged also in premarital sex.” This only goes to show
that Cadiz did not flaunt her premarital relations with her
boyfriend and it was not carried on under scandalous or
disgraceful circumstances. As declared in Leus, “there is no law
which penalizes an unmarried mother by reason of her sexual
conduct or proscribes the consensual sexual activity between two
unmarried persons; that neither does such situation contravene[s]
any fundamental state policy enshrined in the Constitution.” The
fact that Brent is a sectarian institution does not automatically
subject Cadiz to its religious standard of morality absent an
express statement in its manual of personnel policy and
regulations, prescribing such religious standard as gauge as these
regulations create the obligation on both the employee and the
employer to abide by the same.
Same; Management Prerogative; The doctrine of management
prerogative gives an employer the right to “regulate, according to
his own discretion and judgment, all aspects of employment,
including hiring, work assignments, working methods, the time,
place and manner of work, work supervision, transfer of
employees, layoff of workers, and discipline, dismissal, and recall
of employees.”—The doctrine of management prerogative gives an
employer the right to

 
 

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Capin-Cadiz vs. Brent Hospital and Colleges, Inc.

“regulate, according to his own discretion and judgment, all

aspects of employment, including hiring, work assignments,
working methods, the time, place and manner of work, work
supervision, transfer of employees, layoff of workers, and
discipline, dismissal, and recall of employees.” In this case, Brent
imposed on Cadiz the condition that she subsequently contract
marriage with her then boyfriend for her to be reinstated.
According to Brent, this is “in consonance with the policy against
encouraging illicit or common-law relations that would subvert
the sacrament of marriage.” Statutory law is replete with
legislation protecting labor and promoting equal opportunity in
employment. No less than the 1987 Constitution mandates that
the “State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas,
organized and unorganized, and promote full employment and
equality of employment opportunities for all.”
Same; Magna Carta for Women; Republic Act (RA) No. 9710
or the Magna Carta for Women protects women against
discrimination in all matters relating to marriage and family
relations, including the right to choose freely a spouse and to enter
into marriage only with their free and full consent.—With
particular regard to women, Republic Act No. 9710 or the Magna
Carta for Women protects women against discrimination in all
matters relating to marriage and family relations, including the
right to choose freely a spouse and to enter into marriage
only with their free and full consent. Weighed against these
safeguards, it becomes apparent that Brent’s condition is coercive,
oppressive and discriminatory. There is no rhyme or reason for it.
It forces Cadiz to marry for economic reasons and deprives her of
the freedom to choose her status, which is a privilege that inheres
in her as an intangible and inalienable right. While a marriage or
no-marriage qualification may be justified as a “bona fide
occupational qualification,” Brent must prove two factors
necessitating its imposition, viz.: (1) that the employment
qualification is reasonably related to the essential operation
of the job involved; and (2) that there is a factual basis for
believing that all or substantially all persons meeting the
qualification would be unable to properly perform the duties of
the job. Brent has not shown the presence of neither of these
factors. Perforce, the Court cannot uphold the validity of said
condition.

 
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Capin-Cadiz vs. Brent Hospital and Colleges, Inc.

Same; Termination of Employment; Illegal Dismissals;

Backwages; Separation Pay; Generally, the computation of
backwages is reckoned from the date of illegal dismissal until
actual reinstatement. In case separation pay is ordered in lieu of
reinstatement or reinstatement is waived by the employee,
backwages is computed from the time of dismissal until the
finality of the decision ordering separation pay.—The Court also
finds that Cadiz is only entitled to limited backwages. Generally,
the computation of backwages is reckoned from the date of illegal
dismissal until actual reinstatement. In case separation pay is
ordered in lieu of reinstatement or reinstatement is waived by the
employee, backwages is computed from the time of dismissal until
the finality of the decision ordering separation pay. Jurisprudence
further clarified that the period for computing the backwages
during the period of appeal should end on the date that a higher
court reversed the labor arbitration ruling of illegal dismissal. If
applied in Cadiz’s case, then the computation of backwages should
be from November 17, 2006, which was the time of her illegal
dismissal, until the date of promulgation of this decision.
Nevertheless, the Court has also recognized that the
constitutional policy of providing full protection to labor is not
intended to oppress or destroy management. The Court notes that
at the time of Cadiz’s indefinite suspension from employment,
Leus was yet to be decided by the Court.
 
JARDELEZA, J., Concurring Opinion:
 
Labor Law; View that the values expressed in the Constitution
cannot be completely ignored in the just adjudication of labor
cases.—I agree with my esteemed colleague Justice Bienvenido L.
Reyes’ application of the doctrine in Leus v. St. Scholastica’s
College Westgrove, 748 SCRA 378 (2015). I take this opportunity
to contribute to the analysis for cases similar to this and Leus
where women’s fundamental rights are pitted against an
employer’s management prerogatives. While the ponencia views
the issue from the perspective of public and secular morality,
there is also a constitutional dimension to this case that should be
considered. This is a woman’s right to personal autonomy as a
fundamental right. The Constitution protects personal autonomy
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as part of the Due Process Clause in the Bill of Rights. Indeed, the
Bill of Rights cannot be invoked against private employers.
However, the values expressed in the Constitu-

 
 
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Capin-Cadiz vs. Brent Hospital and Colleges, Inc.

tion cannot be completely ignored in the just adjudication of

labor cases.
Same; Pregnancy Outside of Wedlock; View that in Christine
Joy’s case, her decision to continue her pregnancy outside of
wedlock is a constitutionally protected right. It is therefore not only
moral, it is also a constitutional value that this Court is duty-
bound to uphold.—Leus and the ponencia explain that in
determining whether a particular conduct may be considered as
immoral in the public and secular sense, courts must follow a two-
step process. First, courts must consider the totality of the
circumstances surrounding the conduct and second, courts must
assess these circumstances vis-à-vis the prevailing norms of
conduct or what society generally considers as moral. I propose
that in ascertaining whether the public holds a particular conduct
as moral, the Constitution is a necessary and inevitable guide.
The Constitution is an expression of the ideals of the society that
enacted and ratified it. Its bill of rights, in particular, is an
embodiment of the most important values of the people enacting a
Constitution. Values that find expression in a society’s
Constitution are not only accepted as moral, they are also
fundamental. Thus, I propose that in ascertaining whether an act
is moral or immoral, a due consideration of constitutional values
must be made. In Christine Joy’s case, her decision to continue
her pregnancy outside of wedlock is a constitutionally protected
right. It is therefore not only moral, it is also a constitutional
value that this Court is duty-bound to uphold.
Constitutional Law; Right to Liberty; View that jurisprudence
directs us to the conclusion that the constitutional right to liberty
does not merely refer to freedom from physical restraint. It also
includes the right to be free to choose to be, in the words of Justice
Fernando, a “unique individual.”—Jurisprudence directs us to the
conclusion that the constitutional right to liberty does not merely
refer to freedom from physical restraint. It also includes the right
to be free to choose to be, in the words of Justice Fernando, a
“unique individual.” This necessarily includes the freedom to
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choose how a person defines her personhood and how she decides
to live her life. Liberty, as a constitutional right, involves not just
freedom from unjustified imprisonment. It also pertains to the
freedom to make choices that are intimately related to a person’s
own definition of her humanity. The constitutional protection
extended to this right man-

 
 

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Capin-Cadiz vs. Brent Hospital and Colleges, Inc.

dates that beyond a certain point, personal choices must not

be interfered with or unduly burdened as such interference with
or burdening of the right to choose is a breach of the right to be
free.
Same; Same; Termination of Employment; Constructive
Dismissal; View that in constructively dismissing Christine Joy
and promising her reinstatement provided she marries her
boyfriend, Brent has breached not a mere statutory prohibition but
a constitutional right.—The Labor Code contains provisions
pertaining to stipulations against marriage. Specifically, Article
134 states that it is unlawful for employers to require as a
condition for employment or continuation of employment that a
woman employee shall not get married. This provision also
prohibits the dismissal of a woman employee by reason of her
marriage. This Court, in the case of Philippine Telegraph and
Telephone Company v. NLRC, 272 SCRA 596 (1997), has applied
this provision and found illegal the dismissal of a woman
employee because of a condition in her contract that she remains
single during her employment. Christine Joy’s case involves the
reverse, albeit the effect is as burdensome and as odious. In
constructively dismissing Christine Joy and promising her
reinstatement provided she marries her boyfriend, Brent has
breached not a mere statutory prohibition but a constitutional
right. While as I have already explained, there is jurisprudence to
the effect that the Bill of Rights cannot be invoked against a
private employer, Brent’s act of invoking the MRPS and the Labor
Code brings this case within the ambit of the Constitution. In
arguing that immorality is a just cause for dismissal under the
MRPS and the Labor Code, Brent is effectively saying that these
government issuances violate the constitutional right to personal
liberty and privacy. This interpretation cannot be countenanced.
The Constitution is deemed written into these government

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issuances and as such, they must be construed to recognize the

protection vested by the Bill of Rights.

PETITION for review on certiorari of the resolutions of the

Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
  Enriquez, Capin & Gaugano Law Offices for petitioner.

 
 

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Capin-Cadiz vs. Brent Hospital and Colleges, Inc.

  Go, Covarrubias, Acosta, Cubero & Associates Law

Offices for respondent.

REYES, J.:
 
This is a petition for review on certiorari1 under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court assailing the Resolutions dated July
22, 20082 and February 24, 20093 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 02373-MIN, which dismissed the
petition filed by petitioner Christine Joy Capin-Cadiz
(Cadiz) on the following grounds: (1) incomplete statement
of material dates; (2) failure to attach registry receipts; and
(3) failure to indicate the place of issue of counsel’s
Professional Tax Receipt (PTR) and Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) official receipts.
 
Antecedent Facts
 
Cadiz was the Human Resource Officer of respondent
Brent Hospital and Colleges, Inc. (Brent) at the time of her
indefinite suspension from employment in 2006. The cause
of suspension was Cadiz’s Unprofessionalism and
Unethical Behavior Resulting to Unwed Pregnancy. It
appears that Cadiz became pregnant out of wedlock, and
Brent imposed the suspension until such time that she
marries her boyfriend in accordance with law.
Cadiz then filed with the Labor Arbiter (LA) a complaint
for Unfair Labor Practice, Constructive Dismissal, Non-
Payment of Wages and Damages with prayer for
Reinstatement.4

_______________

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1  Rollo, pp. 14-49.

2   Penned by Associate Justice Elihu A. Ybañez, with Associate
Justices Romulo V. Borja and Mario V. Lopez, concurring; id., at pp. 64-
64A.  
3  Id., at pp. 65-67.
4  Id., at p. 50.

 
 

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Capin-Cadiz vs. Brent Hospital and Colleges, Inc.

Ruling of the Labor Tribunals

 
5
In its Decision dated April 12, 2007, the LA found that
Cadiz’s indefinite suspension amounted to a constructive
dismissal; nevertheless, the LA ruled that Cadiz was not
illegally dismissed as there was just cause for her
dismissal, that is, she engaged in premarital sexual
relations with her boyfriend resulting in a pregnancy out of
wedlock.6 The LA further stated that her “immoral conduct
x x x [was] magnified as serious misconduct not only by her
getting pregnant as a result thereof before and without
marriage, but more than that, also by the fact that Brent is
an institution of the Episcopal Church in the Philippines
operating both a hospital and college where [Cadiz] was
employed.”7 The LA also ruled that she was not entitled to
reinstatement “at least until she marries her boyfriend,” to
backwages and vacation/sick leave pay. Brent, however,
manifested that it was willing to pay her 13th month pay.
The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
 
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered,
ordering [Brent] to pay [Cadiz] 13th month pay in the
sum of Seven Thousand Nine Hundred Seventy &
11/100 Pesos (P7,970.11).
All other charges and claims are hereby dismissed
for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.8

Cadiz appealed to the National Labor Relations

Commission (NLRC), which affirmed the LA decision in its
Resolution9 dated December 10, 2007. Her motion for
reconsidera-

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_______________

5   Rendered by Executive Labor Arbiter Rhett Julius J. Plagata; id., at

pp. 52-58.
6   Id., at pp. 55-56.
7   Id., at p. 56.
8   Id., at pp. 57-58.
9   Id., at pp. 59-61.

 
 
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Capin-Cadiz vs. Brent Hospital and Colleges, Inc.

tion having been denied by the NLRC in its Resolution10

dated February 29, 2008, Cadiz elevated her case to the CA
on petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
 
Ruling of the CA
 
The CA, however, dismissed her petition outright due to
technical defects in the petition: (1) incomplete statement
of material dates; (2) failure to attach registry receipts; and
(3) failure to indicate the place of issue of counsel’s PTR
and IBP official receipts.11 Cadiz sought reconsideration of
the assailed CA Resolution dated July 22, 2008 but it was
denied in the assailed Resolution dated February 24,
2009.12 The CA further ruled that “a perusal of the petition
will reveal that public respondent NLRC committed no
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction x  x  x holding [Cadiz’s] dismissal from
employment valid.”13
Hence, the present petition.
Cadiz argues that —
 
I
THE HONORABLE [NLRC] GRAVELY ABUSED
ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT HELD THAT [CADIZ’S]
IMPREGNATION OUTSIDE OF WEDLOCK IS A
GROUND FOR THE TERMINATION OF [CADIZ’S]
EMPLOYMENT.14
 
II
THE [NLRC] COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION WHEN IT UPHELD THE DISMISSAL

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OF [CADIZ] ON THE GROUND THAT THE INDEFI-

_______________

10  Id., at pp. 62-63.

11  Id., at pp. 64-64A.
12  Id., at pp. 65-67.
13  Id., at p. 67.
14  Id., at pp. 21-22.

 
 
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Capin-Cadiz vs. Brent Hospital and Colleges, Inc.

NITE SUSPENSION WAS VALID AND

REQUIRED [CADIZ] TO FIRST ENTER INTO
MARRIAGE BEFORE SHE CAN BE ADMITTED
BACK TO HER EMPLOYMENT.15
 
III
RESPONDENT [NLRC] GRAVELY ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION WHEN IT DENIED [CADIZ’S] CLAIM
FOR BACKWAGES, ALLOWANCES, SICK LEAVE
PAY, MATERNITY PAY AND MORAL AND
EXEMPLARY DAMAGES AND ATTORNEY’S
FEES.16
 
IV
THE [CA] MISPLACED APPLICATION OF THE
MATERIAL DATA RULE RESULTING TO GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT DISMISSED
THE APPEAL.17
 
Cadiz contends, among others, that getting pregnant
outside of wedlock is not grossly immoral, especially when
both partners do not have any legal impediment to marry.
Cadiz surmises that the reason for her suspension was not
because of her relationship with her then boyfriend but
because of the resulting pregnancy. Cadiz also lambasts
Brent’s condition for her reinstatement — that she gets
married to her boyfriend — saying that this violates the
stipulation against marriage under Article 136 of the Labor
Code. Finally, Cadiz contends that there was substantial

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compliance with the rules of procedure, and the CA should

not have dismissed the petition.18
Brent, meanwhile, adopts and reiterates its position
before the LA and the NLRC that Cadiz’s arguments are
irrational and out of context. Brent argues, among others,
that for Cadiz to limit acts of immorality only to
extramarital affairs is to

_______________

15  Id., at p. 28.
16  Id., at p. 36.
17  Id., at p. 38.
18  Id., at pp. 21-44.

 
 
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Capin-Cadiz vs. Brent Hospital and Colleges, Inc.

“change the norms, beliefs, teachings and practices of

BRENT as a Church institution of the x  x  x Episcopal
Church in the Philippines.”19
 
Ruling of the Court
 
Ordinarily, the Court will simply gloss over the
arguments raised by Cadiz, given that the main matter
dealt with by the CA were the infirmities found in the
petition and which caused the dismissal of her case before
it. In view, however, of the significance of the issues
involved in Cadiz’s dismissal from employment, the Court
will resolve the petition including the substantial grounds
raised herein.
The issue to be resolved is whether the CA committed a
reversible error in ruling that: (1) Cadiz’s petition is
dismissible on ground of technical deficiencies; and (2) the
NLRC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in
upholding her dismissal from employment.

Rules of procedure are mere

tools designed to facilitate the
attainment of justice
 

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In dismissing outright Cadiz’s petition, the CA found the

following defects: (1) incomplete statement of material
dates; (2) failure to attach registry receipts; and (3) failure
to indicate the place of issue of counsel’s PTR and IBP
official receipts.
Rule 46, Section 3 of the Rules of Court states the
contents of a petition filed with the CA under Rule 65, viz.,
“the petition shall x x x indicate the material dates showing
when notice of the judgment or final order or resolution
subject thereof was received, when a motion for new trial or
reconsideration, if any, was filed and when notice of the
denial thereof

_______________

19  Id., at pp. 86-87.

 
 
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Capin-Cadiz vs. Brent Hospital and Colleges, Inc.

was received.” The rationale for this is to enable the CA

to determine whether the petition was filed within the
period fixed in the rules.20 Cadiz’s failure to state the date
of receipt of the copy of the NLRC decision, however, is not
fatal to her case since the more important material date
which must be duly alleged in a petition is the date of
receipt of the resolution of denial of the motion for
reconsideration,21 which she has duly complied with.22
The CA also dismissed the petition for failure to attach
the registry receipt in the affidavit of service.23 Cadiz
points out, on the other hand, that the registry receipt
number was indicated in the petition and this constitutes
substantial compliance with the requirement. What the
rule requires, however, is that the registry receipt must be
appended to the paper being served.24 Clearly, mere
indication of the registry receipt numbers will not suffice.
In fact, the absence of the registry receipts amounts to lack
of proof of service.25 Nevertheless, despite this defect, the
Court finds that the ends of substantial justice would be
better served by relaxing the application

_______________

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20  Sara Lee Philippines, Inc. v. Macatlang, G.R. No. 180147, June 4,

2014, 724 SCRA 552, 573-574.
21   Id.; Barra v. Civil Service Commission, 706 Phil. 523, 526; 693
SCRA 563, 565-566 (2013).
22  See CA Rollo, p. 4.
23  Section 13, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court provides, in part:
If service is made by registered mail, proof shall be made by such
affidavit and the registry receipt issued by the mailing office. The registry
return card shall be filed immediately upon its receipt by the sender, or in
lieu thereof the unclaimed letter together with the certified or sworn copy
of the notice given by the postmaster to the addressee.
24   Fortune Life Insurance Company, Inc. v. Commission on Audit
(COA) Proper, G.R. No. 213525, January 27, 2015, 748 SCRA 286.
25   Government of the Philippines v. Aballe, 520 Phil. 181, 190; 485
SCRA 308, 318 (2006).

 
 

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Capin-Cadiz vs. Brent Hospital and Colleges, Inc.

of technical rules of procedure.26 With regard to

counsel’s failure to indicate the place where the IBP and
PTR receipts were issued, there was substantial
compliance with the requirement since it was indicated in
the verification and certification of non-forum shopping, as
correctly argued by Cadiz’s lawyer.27
Time and again, the Court has emphasized that rules of
procedure are designed to secure substantial justice. These
are mere tools to expedite the decision or resolution of
cases and if their strict and rigid application would
frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, then it
must be avoided.28

Immorality as a just cause

for termination of employment
 
Both the LA and the NLRC upheld Cadiz’s dismissal as
one attended with just cause. The LA, while ruling that
Cadiz’s indefinite suspension was tantamount to a
constructive dismissal, nevertheless found that there was
just cause for her dismissal. According to the LA, “there
was just cause therefor, consisting in her engaging in
premarital sexual relations with Carl Cadiz, allegedly her
boyfriend, resulting in her becoming pregnant out of
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wedlock.”29 The LA deemed said act to be immoral, which

was punishable by dismissal under Brent’s rules and which
likewise constituted serious misconduct under Article
282(a) of the Labor Code. The LA also opined that since
Cadiz was Brent’s Human Resource Officer in charge of
implementing its rules against immoral conduct, she
should have been the “epitome of proper conduct.”30 The LA
ruled:

_______________

26  Panaga v. Court of Appeals, 534 Phil. 809, 816; 503 SCRA 676, 682
(2006).
27  See CA Rollo, p. 28.
28   Barroga v. Data Center College of the Philippines, 667 Phil. 808,
818; 652 SCRA 676, 685 (2011).
29  Rollo, p. 56.
30  Id.

 
 
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32 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Capin-Cadiz vs. Brent Hospital and Colleges, Inc.

[Cadiz’s] immoral conduct by having premarital

sexual relations with her alleged boyfriend, a former
Brent worker and her co-employee, is magnified as
serious misconduct not only by her getting pregnant
as a result thereof before and without marriage, but
more than that, also by the fact that Brent is an
institution of the Episcopal Church in the Philippines
x  x  x committed to “developing competent and
dedicated professionals x  x  x and in providing
excellent medical and other health services to the
community for the Glory of God and Service to
Humanity.” x x x As if these were not enough, [Cadiz]
was Brent’s Human Resource Officer charged with,
among others, implementing the rules of Brent
against immoral conduct, including premarital sexual
relations, or fornication x  x  x. She should have been
the epitome of proper conduct, but miserably failed.
She herself engaged in premarital sexual relations,
which surely scandalized the Brent community.
x x x.31
 
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The NLRC, for its part, sustained the LA’s conclusion.

The Court, however, cannot subscribe to the labor
tribunals’ conclusions.
Admittedly, one of the grounds for disciplinary action
under Brent’s policies is immorality, which is punishable
by dismissal at first offense.32 Brent’s Policy Manual
provides:

CATEGORY IV
 
In accordance with Republic Act No. 1052,33 the
following are just cause for terminating an
employment of an employee without a definite period:

_______________

31  Id.
32  Id.
33   An Act to Provide for the Manner of Terminating Employment
Without a Definite Period in a Commercial, Industrial, or Agricultural,
Establishment or Enterprise (approved on June 12, 1954), which has been
repealed by Presidential Decree No. 442 or the Labor Code of the
Philippines (effective November 1, 1974).

 
 
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VOL. 785, FEBRUARY 24, 2016 33

Capin-Cadiz vs. Brent Hospital and Colleges, Inc.

x x x x
2. Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by
the employee of the orders of his employer or
representative in connection with his work, such as,
but not limited to the following:
x x x x
b. Commission of immoral conduct or
indecency within the company premises, such as
an act of lasciviousness or any act which is
sinful and vulgar in nature.
c. Immorality, concubinage, bigamy.34

Its Employee’s Manual of Policies, meanwhile,

enumerates “[a]cts of immorality such as scandalous
behaviour, acts of lasciviousness against any person
(patient, visitors, coworkers) within hospital premises”35 as
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a ground for discipline and discharge. Brent also relied on

Section 94 of the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools
(MRPS), which lists “disgraceful or immoral conduct” as a
cause for terminating employment.36
Thus, the question that must be resolved is whether
Cadiz’s premarital relations with her boyfriend and the
resulting pregnancy out of wedlock constitute immorality.
To resolve this, the Court makes reference to the recently
promulgated case of Cheryll Santos Leus v. St. Scholastica’s
College Westgrove and/or Sr. Edna Quiambao, OSB.37
Leus involved the same personal circumstances as the
case at bench, albeit the employer was a Catholic and
sectarian educational institution and the petitioner,
Cheryll Santos Leus (Leus), worked as an assistant to the
school’s Director of

_______________

See National Labor Union v. Secretary of Labor, No. L-41459,

December 18, 1987, 156 SCRA 592.
34  NLRC Records (Vol. I), pp. 77-78.
35  Id., at p. 81.
36  Id., at p. 54.
37  G.R. No. 187226, January 28, 2015, 748 SCRA 378.

 
 
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34 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Capin-Cadiz vs. Brent Hospital and Colleges, Inc.

the Lay Apostolate and Community Outreach

Directorate. Leus was dismissed from employment by the
school for having borne a child out of wedlock. The Court
ruled in Leus that the determination of whether a conduct
is disgraceful or immoral involves a two-step process: first,
a consideration of the totality of the circumstances
surrounding the conduct; and second, an assessment of the
said circumstances vis-à-vis the prevailing norms of
conduct, i.e., what the society generally considers moral
and respectable.
In this case, the surrounding facts leading to Cadiz’s
dismissal are straightforward — she was employed as a
human resources officer in an educational and medical
institution of the Episcopal Church of the Philippines; she
and her boyfriend at that time were both single; they
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engaged in premarital sexual relations, which resulted into

pregnancy. The labor tribunals characterized these as
constituting disgraceful or immoral conduct. They also
sweepingly concluded that as Human Resource Officer,
Cadiz should have been the epitome of proper conduct and
her indiscretion “surely scandalized the Brent
38
community.”
The foregoing circumstances, however, do not readily
equate to disgraceful and immoral conduct. Brent’s Policy
Manual and Employee’s Manual of Policies do not define
what constitutes immorality; it simply stated immorality as
a ground for disciplinary action. Instead, Brent erroneously
relied on the standard dictionary definition of fornication
as a form of illicit relation and proceeded to conclude that
Cadiz’s acts fell under such classification, thus constituting
immorality.39
Jurisprudence has already set the standard of morality
with which an act should be gauged — it is public and
secular, not religious.40 Whether a conduct is considered
disgrace-

_______________

38  Rollo, p. 56.
39  NLRC Records (Vol. I), pp. 53-54.
40  Leus v. St. Scholastica’s College Westgrove, supra note 37.

 
 
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Capin-Cadiz vs. Brent Hospital and Colleges, Inc.

ful or immoral should be made in accordance with the

prevailing norms of conduct, which, as stated in Leus, refer
to those conducts which are proscribed because they are
detrimental to conditions upon which depend the
existence and progress of human society. The fact that
a particular act does not conform to the traditional moral
views of a certain sectarian institution is not sufficient
reason to qualify such act as immoral unless it, likewise,
does not conform to public and secular standards. More
importantly, there must be substantial evidence to
establish that premarital sexual relations and pregnancy
out of wedlock is considered disgraceful or immoral.41

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The totality of the circumstances of this case does not

justify the conclusion that Cadiz committed acts of
immorality. Similar to Leus, Cadiz and her boyfriend were
both single and had no legal impediment to marry at the
time she committed the alleged immoral conduct. In fact,
they eventually married on April 15, 2008.42 Aside from
these, the labor tribunals’ respective conclusion that
Cadiz’s “indiscretion” “scandalized the Brent community” is
speculative, at most, and there is no proof adduced by
Brent to support such sweeping conclusion. Even Brent
admitted that it came to know of Cadiz’s “situation” only
when her pregnancy became manifest.43 Brent also
conceded that “[a]t the time [Cadiz] and Carl R. Cadiz were
just carrying on their boyfriend-girlfriend relationship,
there was no knowledge or evidence by [Brent] that they
were engaged also in premarital sex.”44 This only goes to
show that Cadiz did not flaunt her premarital relations
with her boyfriend and it was not carried on under
scandalous or disgraceful circumstances. As declared in
Leus, “there is no law which penalizes an unmarried
mother by reason of her sexual conduct or proscribes the
consensual sexual activity between two

_______________

41  Id.
42  Rollo, p. 22.
43  Id., at p. 88.
44  NLRC Records (Vol. II), p. 64.

 
 
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36 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Capin-Cadiz vs. Brent Hospital and Colleges, Inc.

unmarried persons; that neither does such situation

contravene[s] any fundamental state policy enshrined in
the Constitution.”45 The fact that Brent is a sectarian
institution does not automatically subject Cadiz to its
religious standard of morality absent an express statement
in its manual of personnel policy and regulations,
prescribing such religious standard as gauge as these
regulations create the obligation on both the employee and
the employer to abide by the same.46

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Brent, likewise, cannot resort to the MRPS because the

Court already stressed in Leus that “premarital sexual
relations between two consenting adults who have no
impediment to marry each other, and, consequently,
conceiving a child out of wedlock, gauged from a purely
public and secular view of morality, does not amount to a
disgraceful or immoral conduct under Section 94(e) of the
1992 MRPS.”47

Marriage as a condition
for reinstatement
 
The doctrine of management prerogative gives an
employer the right to “regulate, according to his own
discretion and judgment, all aspects of employment,
including hiring, work assignments, working methods, the
time, place and manner of work, work supervision, transfer
of employees, layoff of workers, and discipline, dismissal,
and recall of employees.”48 In this case, Brent imposed on
Cadiz the condition that she subsequently contract
marriage with her then boyfriend for her to be reinstated.
According to Brent, this is “in consonance

_______________

45  Leus v. St. Scholastica’s College Westgrove, supra note 37.

46   See Abbott Laboratories, Philippines v. Alcaraz, G.R. No. 192571,
July 23, 2013, 701 SCRA 682.
47  Leus v. St. Scholastica’s College Westgrove, supra.
48   Peckson v. Robinsons Supermarket Corporation, G.R. No. 198534,
July 3, 2013, 700 SCRA 668, 678-679, citing Rural Bank of Cantilan, Inc.
v. Julve, 545 Phil. 619, 624; 517 SCRA 17, 22 (2007).

 
 

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Capin-Cadiz vs. Brent Hospital and Colleges, Inc.

with the policy against encouraging illicit or common-

law relations that would subvert the sacrament of
marriage.”49
Statutory law is replete with legislation protecting labor
and promoting equal opportunity in employment. No less
than the 1987 Constitution mandates that the “State shall
afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized
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and unorganized, and promote full employment and

equality of employment opportunities for all.”50 The Labor
Code of the Philippines, meanwhile, provides:

Art. 136. Stipulation against marriage.—It shall

be unlawful for an employer to require as a condition
of employment or continuation of employment that a
woman employee shall not get married, or to stipulate
expressly or tacitly that upon getting married, a
woman employee shall be deemed resigned or
separated, or to actually dismiss, discharge,
discriminate or otherwise prejudice a woman
employee merely by reason of her marriage.
 
With particular regard to women, Republic Act No. 9710
or the Magna Carta of Women51 protects women against
discrimination in all matters relating to marriage and
family relations, including the right to choose freely a
spouse and to enter into marriage only with their
free and full consent.52
Weighed against these safeguards, it becomes apparent
that Brent’s condition is coercive, oppressive and
discriminatory. There is no rhyme or reason for it. It forces
Cadiz to marry for economic reasons and deprives her of
the freedom to choose her status, which is a privilege that
inheres in her

_______________

49  NLRC Records (Vol. I), p. 57.

50  Article XIII, Section 3.
51  Approved on August 14, 2009.
52  Section 19(b).

 
 
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38 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Capin-Cadiz vs. Brent Hospital and Colleges, Inc.

as an intangible and inalienable right.53 While a

marriage or no-marriage qualification may be justified as a
“bona fide occupational qualification,” Brent must prove
two factors necessitating its imposition, viz.: (1) that the
employment qualification is reasonably related to the
essential operation of the job involved; and (2) that

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there is a factual basis for believing that all or

substantially all persons meeting the qualification would
be unable to properly perform the duties of the job.54 Brent
has not shown the presence of neither of these factors.
Perforce, the Court cannot uphold the validity of said
condition.
Given the foregoing, Cadiz, therefore, is entitled to
reinstatement without loss of seniority rights, and payment
of backwages computed from the time compensation was
withheld up to the date of actual reinstatement. Where
reinstatement is no longer viable as an option, separation
pay should be awarded as an alternative and as a form of
financial assistance.55 In the computation of separation
pay, the Court stresses that it should not go beyond
the date an employee was deemed to have been
actually separated from employment, or beyond the
date when reinstatement was rendered impossible.56
In this case, the records do not show whether Cadiz already
severed her employment with Brent or whether she is
gainfully employed elsewhere; thus, the computation of
separation pay shall be pegged based on the findings that
she was employed on August 16, 2002, on her own
admission in her complaint that she was dismissed on
November 17, 2006, and that she was earning a salary of

_______________

53   See Philippine Telegraph and Telephone Company v. NLRC, 338

Phil. 1093; 272 SCRA 596 (1997).
54   Star Paper Corporation v. Simbol, 521 Phil. 364, 375; 487 SCRA
228, 242-243 (2006).
55  Bani Rural Bank, Inc. v. De Guzman, G.R. No. 170904, November
13, 2013, 709 SCRA 330, 349-350.
56   Bordomeo v. Court of Appeals, 704 Phil. 278, 300; 691 SCRA 269,
290 (2013).

 
 
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P9,108.70 per month,57 which shall then be computed at

a rate of one (1)-month salary for every year of service,58 as
follows:
 
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Monthly salary                                      P9,108.70

multiplied by number of years             x
in service (Aug 02 to Nov 06)                           4
                                                                P36,434.80
 
The Court also finds that Cadiz is only entitled to
limited backwages. Generally, the computation of
backwages is reckoned from the date of illegal dismissal
until actual reinstatement.59 In case separation pay is
ordered in lieu of reinstatement or reinstatement is waived
by the employee, backwages is computed from the time of
dismissal until the finality of the decision ordering
separation pay.60 Jurisprudence further clarified that the
period for computing the backwages during the period of
appeal should end on the date that a higher court reversed
the labor arbitration ruling of illegal dismissal.61 If applied
in Cadiz’s case, then the computation of backwages should
be from November 17, 2006, which was the time of her
illegal dismissal, until the date of promulgation of this
decision. Nevertheless, the Court has also recognized that
the constitutional policy of providing full protection to labor
is not intended to oppress or destroy management.62 The
Court notes that at the time of Cadiz’s indefinite
suspension from employment, Leus was yet to be decided
by the Court. Moreover, Brent was acting in good faith and
on its honest belief that Cadiz’s pregnancy out of wedlock
constituted immorality. Thus, fairness and equity dictate
that the award of back-

_______________

57  Rollo, p. 50.

58  Supra note 56.
59  Labor Code of the Philippines, Article 279.
60  Supra note 55.
61  Wenphil Corporation v. Abing, G.R. No. 207983, April 7, 2014, 721
SCRA 126, 144.
62  Victory Liner, Inc. v. Race, G.R. No. 164820, December 8, 2008, 573
SCRA 212, 221.

 
 
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wages shall only be equivalent to one (1) year or

P109,304.40, computed as follows:
 
 
Monthly salary                                      P9,108.70
multiplied by one year                         x
or 12 months                                                        4
                                                                P36,434.80
 
Finally, with regard to Cadiz’s prayer for moral and
exemplary damages, the Court finds the same without
merit. A finding of illegal dismissal, by itself, does not
establish bad faith to entitle an employee to moral
damages.63 Absent clear and convincing evidence showing
that Cadiz’s dismissal from Brent’s employ had been
carried out in an arbitrary, capricious and malicious
manner, moral and exemplary damages cannot be
awarded. The Court nevertheless grants the award of
attorney’s fees in the amount of ten percent (10%) of the
total monetary award, Cadiz having been forced to litigate
in order to seek redress of her grievances.64
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The
Resolutions dated July 22, 2008 and February 24, 2009 of
the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 02373-MIN are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and a NEW ONE
ENTERED finding petitioner Christine Joy Capin-Cadiz to
have been dismissed without just cause.
Respondent Brent Hospital and Colleges, Inc. is hereby
ORDERED TO PAY petitioner Christine Joy Capin-
Cadiz:
(1) One Hundred Nine Thousand Three Hundred Four
Pesos and 40/100 (P109,304.40) as backwages;

_______________

63   Lambert Pawnbrokers and Jewelry Corporation v. Binamira, 639

Phil. 1, 15-16; 624 SCRA 705, 720 (2010).
64   Pasos v. Philippine National Construction Corporation, G.R. No.
192394, July 3, 2013, 700 SCRA 608, 631.

 
 
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(2) Thirty-Six Thousand Four Hundred Thirty-Four

Pesos and 80/100 (P36,434.80) as separation pay; and
(3) Attorney’s fees equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the
total award.
The monetary awards granted shall earn legal interest
at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the date of
the finality of this Decision until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
 

Velasco, Jr. (Chairperson), Peralta and Perez, JJ.,

concur.
Jardeleza, J., See Concurring Opinion.

CONCURRING OPINION
 
JARDELEZA, J.:
 
Liberty is a right enshrined in the Constitution.
However, as a testament to the impossibility of
determining what it truly means to be free, neither the
Constitution nor our jurisprudence has attempted to define
its metes and bounds. This case challenges this Court to
ascertain the extent of the protection of the right to liberty.
This Court is called to answer the question of how free a
woman is in this country to design the course of her own
life. The Constitution must be read to grant her this
freedom.
Petitioner Christine Joy Capin-Cadiz (Christine Joy)
worked as the Human Resources Officer of respondent
Brent Hospital and Colleges, Inc. (“Brent”). In the course of
her employment, she met and fell in love with another
Brent employee. Both Christine Joy and her boyfriend were
single and with no legal impediment to marry. While in the
relationship but before their marriage, Christine Joy
became pregnant with her boyfriend’s child. This prompted
Brent to issue an indefinite suspension against her. Brent
cited as a ground her unprofes-
 
 
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42 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

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sionalism and unethical behavior resulting to unwed

pregnancy. Brent also told Christine Joy that she will be
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reinstated on the condition that she gets married to her

boyfriend who was, at that time, no longer a Brent
employee. Christine Joy eventually married her boyfriend.
This notwithstanding, Christine Joy felt that Brent’s
condition that she get married first before it reinstates her
is unacceptable and an affront to the provision of the Labor
Code concerning stipulations against marriage.
Claiming that this indefinite suspension amounted to
constructive dismissal, Christine Joy filed a complaint for
illegal dismissal before the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC). The Labor Arbiter (LA) found that
while the indefinite suspension was indeed a constructive
dismissal, there was just cause for Brent to terminate
Christine Joy’s employment. According to the LA, this just
cause was that Christine Joy engaged in premarital sexual
relations with her boyfriend resulting in pregnancy out of
wedlock. The LA also ruled that she was not entitled to
reinstatement until she marries her boyfriend. Christine
Joy appealed the LA decision before the NLRC. The NLRC
affirmed the LA. Christine Joy then filed a special civil
action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
before the Court of Appeals. However, the CA dismissed
her petition on procedural grounds.
Brent and the labor tribunals argue that there was just
cause for Christine Joy’s dismissal because Brent’s Policy
Manual identifies acts of immorality as a ground for
disciplinary action. Brent also invokes Section 94 of the
Manual of Regulations for Private Schools (MRPS) which
lists disgraceful or immoral conduct as a ground for
terminating an employee.
I agree with my esteemed colleague Justice Bienvenido
L. Reyes’ application of the doctrine in Leus v. St.
Scholastica’s College Westgrove.1 I take this opportunity to
contribute to the

_______________

1  G.R. No. 187226, January 28, 2015, 748 SCRA 378.

 
 
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analysis for cases similar to this and Leus where

women’s fundamental rights are pitted against an
employer’s management prerogatives. While the ponencia
views the issue from the perspective of public and secular
morality, there is also a constitutional dimension to this
case that should be considered. This is a woman’s right to
personal autonomy as a fundamental right.
The Constitution protects personal autonomy as part of
the Due Process Clause in the Bill of Rights. Indeed, the
Bill of Rights cannot be invoked against private
employers.2 However, the values expressed in the
Constitution cannot be completely ignored in the just
adjudication of labor cases.
In this case, Brent’s reliance on laws and governmental
issuances justifies the view that the Constitution should
permeate a proper adjudication of the issue. Brent invokes
the MRPS to support Christine Joy’s dismissal. The MRPS
is a department order issued by the Department of
Education (DepEd) in the exercise of its power to regulate
private schools. It is thus a government issuance which the
DepEd is authorized to issue in accordance with law.
Further, the labor tribunals also invoke the Labor Code
which provides for the just causes for termination. The
Labor Code is a presidential decree and has the status of
law. The Constitution is deemed written into every law and
government issuance. Hence, in the application of laws and
governmental regulations, their provisions should not be
interpreted in a manner that will violate the fundamental
law of the land.
Further, the relationship between labor and
management is a matter imbued with public interest. The
Constitution accords protection to labor through various
provisions identifying the rights of laborers. This Court has
also persistently emphasized the constitutional protection
accorded to labor. In

_______________

2  Serrano v. NLRC, G.R. No. 117040, January 27, 2000, 323 SCRA
445.

 
 

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Philippine Telegraph and Telephone Company v.

NLRC,3 this Court held that the constitutional guarantee
of protection to labor and security of tenure are “paramount
in the due process scheme.”4 Thus, in that case, this Court
found that the employer’s dismissal of a female employee
because of her marriage runs afoul of the right against
discrimination afforded to women workers by no less than
the Constitution.5
Finally, Leus and the ponencia explain that in
determining whether a particular conduct may be
considered as immoral in the public and secular sense,
courts must follow a two-step process. First, courts must
consider the totality of the circumstances surrounding the
conduct and second, courts must assess these
circumstances vis-à-vis the prevailing norms of conduct or
what society generally considers as moral. I propose that in
ascertaining whether the public holds a particular conduct
as moral, the Constitution is a necessary and inevitable
guide. The Constitution is an expression of the ideals of the
society that enacted and ratified it. Its bill of rights, in
particular, is an embodiment of the most important values
of the people enacting a Constitution. Values that find
expression in a society’s Constitution are not only accepted
as moral, they are also fundamental. Thus, I propose that
in ascertaining whether an act is moral or immoral, a due
consideration of constitutional values must be made. In
Christine Joy’s case, her decision to continue her pregnancy
outside of wedlock is a constitutionally protected right. It is
therefore not only moral, it is also a constitutional value
that this Court is duty-bound to uphold.
It is within this framework of analysis that I view the
issue in this case.

_______________

3  G.R. No. 118978, May 23, 1997, 272 SCRA 596.

4  Id., at p. 604.
5  Id., at p. 605.

 
 
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Due Process and the Consti-

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tutional Right to Personal

Liberty and Privacy
 
Section 1 of Article III of the Bill of Rights provides that
no person shall be deprived of liberty without due process
of law. The concept of the constitutional right to liberty
accepts of no precise definition and finds no specific
boundaries. Indeed, there is no one phrase or combination
of words that can capture what it means to be free. This
Court, nevertheless, as early as the case of Rubi v.
Provincial Board of Mindoro,6 explained that liberty is not
merely freedom from imprisonment or restraint. This
Court, speaking through Justice George Malcolm, said —
 
Civil liberty may be said to mean that measure of
freedom which may be enjoyed in a civilized
community, consistently with the peaceful enjoyment
of like freedom in others. The right to liberty
guaranteed by the Constitution includes the right to
exist and the right to be free from arbitrary personal
restraint or servitude. The term cannot be dwarfed
into mere freedom from physical restraint of the
person of the citizen, but is deemed to embrace the
right of man to enjoy the faculties with which he has
been endowed by his Creator, subject only to such
restraints as are necessary for the common welfare.
As enunciated in a long array of authorities including
epoch-making decisions of the United States Supreme
Court, liberty includes the right of the citizen to be
free to use his faculties in lawful ways; to live and
work where he will; to earn his livelihood by any
lawful calling; to pursue any avocation, and for that
purpose, to enter into all contracts which may be
proper, necessary, and essential to his carrying out
these purposes to a successful conclusion. The chief
elements of the guaranty are the right to contract, the
right to choose one’s employment, the right to labor,
and the right of locomotion.

_______________

6  39 Phil. 660 (1919).

 
 
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In general, it may be said that liberty means the

opportunity to do those things which are ordinarily
done by free men.7
 
In Morfe v. Mutuc,8 this Court held that the
constitutional right to liberty includes the concept of
privacy. Quoting US Supreme Court Justice Louis
Brandeis, this Court explained that the right to be let alone
is “the most comprehensive of rights and the right most
valued by civilized men.”9 Justice Enrique Fernando, in his
ponencia, even went a step further and adopted the ruling
in the US Supreme Court case Griswold v. Connecticut.10
He said that the right to privacy is “accorded recognition
independently of its identification with liberty.”11 He also
added that “[t]he concept of liberty would be emasculated if
it does not likewise compel respect for his personality as a
unique individual whose claim to privacy and interference
demands respect.”12
Ople v. Torres13 reveals how this Court has come to
recognize privacy as a component of liberty under the Due
Process Clause and as a constitutional right arising from
zones created by several other provisions of the
Constitution. Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, for this Court,
explained that privacy finds express recognition in Section
3 of Article III of the Constitution which speaks of the
privacy of communication and correspondence. He further
stated that there are other facets of privacy protected
under various provisions of the Constitution such as the
Due Process Clause, the right against unreasonable
searches and seizures, the liberty of abode and

_______________

7   Id., at p. 705; citations omitted, emphasis in the original.

8   Morfe v. Mutuc, No. L-20387, January 31, 1968, 22 SCRA 424.
9   Id., at p. 442.
10  381 U.S. 479 (1965).
11  Morfe v. Mutuc, supra at p. 444.
12  Id., at p. 442.
13  G.R. No. 127685, July 23, 1998, 293 SCRA 141.

 
 
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of changing the same, the right of association and the

right against self-incrimination.
Jurisprudence directs us to the conclusion that the
constitutional right to liberty does not merely refer to
freedom from physical restraint. It also includes the right
to be free to choose to be, in the words of Justice Fernando,
a “unique individual.”14 This necessarily includes the
freedom to choose how a person defines her personhood and
how she decides to live her life. Liberty, as a constitutional
right, involves not just freedom from unjustified
imprisonment. It also pertains to the freedom to make
choices that are intimately related to a person’s own
definition of her humanity. The constitutional protection
extended to this right mandates that beyond a certain
point, personal choices must not be interfered with or
unduly burdened as such interference with or burdening of
the right to choose is a breach of the right to be free.
In the United States, whose Constitution has heavily
influenced ours, jurisprudence on the meaning of personal
liberty is much more detailed and expansive. Their
protection of the constitutional right to privacy has covered
marital privacy, the right of a woman to choose to
terminate her pregnancy and sexual conduct between
unmarried persons.
In Griswold v. Connecticut,15 the US Supreme Court
held that privacy is a right protected under the US
Constitution. Griswold explained that the US
Constitution’s Bill of Rights creates zones of privacy which
prevents interference save for a limited exception. Thus,
Griswold invalidated a statute which criminalizes the sale
of contraceptives to married persons, holding that marital
privacy falls within the penumbra of the right to privacy
under the US Constitution’s Bill of Rights.

_______________

14  Supra note 8.

15  Griswold v. Connecticut, supra note 10.

 
 
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Eisenstadt v. Baird16 extended this right to privacy to

unmarried persons. In this case, the US Supreme Court
also held invalid a law prohibiting the distribution of
contraceptives to unmarried persons. Einstadt explained
that “[i]f the right of privacy means anything, it is the right
of the individual, married or single, to be free from
unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so
fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether
to bear or beget a child.”17
In the celebrated case Roe v. Wade,18 the US Supreme
Court again explored the concept of the constitutional right
to privacy. In this case, the US Supreme Court affirmed
that while the US Constitution does not expressly mention
a right to privacy, its provisions create such zones of
privacy which warrant constitutional protection. Roe added
to the growing jurisprudence on the right to privacy by
stating that prior US Supreme Court cases reveal that
“only personal rights that can be deemed ‘fundamental’ or
‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,’ are included in
this guarantee of personal privacy. They also make it clear
that the right has some extension to activities relating to
marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships,
and [child rearing] and education.”19 In Roe, the US
Supreme Court held that the constitutional right to privacy
also encompasses a woman’s choice whether to terminate
her pregnancy.
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey,20
which affirmed the essential ruling in Roe, added to this
discussion on the right to privacy. The US Supreme Court
repeated that the constitutional right to privacy means a
protection from interference so that people, married or
single, may be free to make the most intimate and personal
choices of a lifetime. These choices, which are central to
personal dignity and

_______________

16  405 U.S. 438 (1972).

17  Id., at p. 454; citations omitted.
18  410 U.S. 113 (1973).
19  Id., at pp. 153-154; citations omitted.
20  505 U.S. 833 (1992).

 
 
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Capin-Cadiz vs. Brent Hospital and Colleges, Inc.

autonomy, are also central to the protection given under

the Fourteenth Amendment of the US Constitution, the
American Constitutional law equivalent of our Due Process
Clause. Affirming that a woman has the right to choose to
terminate her pregnancy as a component of her right to
privacy, Planned Parenthood stated that “[t]he destiny of
the woman must be shaped to a large extent on her own
conception of her spiritual imperatives and her place in
society.”21
The US Supreme Court also ruled that the right to
privacy includes sexual conduct between consenting adults.
Thus, in Lawrence v. Texas,22 the US Supreme Court
invalidated a law criminalizing sodomy. Lawrence held
that “[t]he petitioners are entitled to respect for their
private lives. The State cannot demean their existence or
control their destiny by making their private sexual
conduct a crime. Their right to liberty under the Due
Process Clause gives them the full right to engage in their
conduct without intervention of the government.”23
The right to privacy as a component of personal liberty
in the Due Process Clause also includes the freedom to
choose whom to marry. This was the import of the US
Supreme Court’s ruling in Loving v. Virginia24 which
invalidated a law prohibiting interracial marriages. This
was also one of the essential rulings in Obergefell v.
Hodges25 which held same-sex marriage as constitutional.
I propose that our reading of the constitutional right to
personal liberty and privacy should approximate how
personal liberty as a concept has developed in the US as
adopted in our jurisprudence.

_______________

21  Id., at p. 853.

22  539 U.S. 558 (2003).
23  Id., at p. 579.
24  388 U.S. 1 (1967).
25  576 U.S. __ (2015).

 
 
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Capin-Cadiz vs. Brent Hospital and Colleges, Inc.

At the heart of this case are two rights that are essential
to the concept of personal liberty and privacy, if they are to
be given any meaning at all. Brent’s act of dismissing
Christine Joy because of her pregnancy out of wedlock,
with the condition that she will be reinstated if she marries
her then boyfriend, unduly burdens first, her right to
choose whether to marry, and second, her right to decide
whether she will bear and rear her child without marriage.
These are personal decisions that go into the core of how
Christine Joy chooses to live her life. This Court cannot
countenance any undue burden that prejudices her right to
be free.

The Right to Choose Marriage

 
The Labor Code contains provisions pertaining to
stipulations against marriage. Specifically, Article 134
states that it is unlawful for employers to require as a
condition for employment or continuation of employment
that a woman employee shall not get married. This
provision also prohibits the dismissal of a woman employee
by reason of her marriage. This Court, in the case of
Philippine Telegraph and Telephone Company v. NLRC,26
has applied this provision and found illegal the dismissal of
a woman employee because of a condition in her contract
that she remains single during her employment. Christine
Joy’s case involves the reverse, albeit the effect is as
burdensome and as odious.
In constructively dismissing Christine Joy and
promising her reinstatement provided she marries her
boyfriend, Brent has breached not a mere statutory
prohibition but a constitutional right. While as I have
already explained, there is jurisprudence to the effect that
the Bill of Rights cannot be invoked against a private
employer, Brent’s act of invoking the MRPS and the Labor
Code brings this case within the ambit of the Constitution.
In arguing that immorality is a just cause

_______________

26  Philippine Telegraph and Telephone Company v. NLRC, supra note

3.

 
 
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Capin-Cadiz vs. Brent Hospital and Colleges, Inc.

for dismissal under the MRPS and the Labor Code,

Brent is effectively saying that these government issuances
violate the constitutional right to personal liberty and
privacy. This interpretation cannot be countenanced. The
Constitution is deemed written into these government
issuances and as such, they must be construed to recognize
the protection vested by the Bill of Rights.
As I have already discussed, the rights to personal
liberty and privacy are embodied in the Due Process Clause
and expounded by jurisprudence. These rights pertain to
the freedom to make personal choices that define a human
being’s life and personhood. The decision to marry and to
whom are two of the most important choices that a woman
can make in her life. In the words of the US Supreme Court
in Obergefell “[n]o union is more profound than marriage,
for it embodies the highest ideals of love, fidelity, devotion,
sacrifice, and family. In forming a marital union, two
people become something greater than once they were.”27
The State has no business interfering with this choice.
Neither can it sanction any undue burden of the right to
make these choices. Brent, in conditioning Christine Joy’s
reinstatement on her marriage, has effectively burdened
her freedom. She was forced to choose to lose her job or
marry in order to keep it. By invoking the MRPS and the
Labor Code, Brent is, in effect, saying that this kind of
compelled choice is sanctioned by the State. Contrary to
this position, the State cannot countenance placing a
woman employee in a situation where she will have to give
up one right (the right to marry as a component of personal
liberty and privacy) for another (the right to employment).
This is not the kind of State that we are in. Nor is it the
kind of values that our Constitution stands for.

_______________

27  Obergefell v. Hodges, supra note 25.

 
 
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The Right to Bear and Rear

a Child outside of Marriage
 
The Labor Code prohibits the discriminatory act of
discharging a woman on account of her pregnancy.28 Brent,
in constructively dismissing Christine Joy because of her
pregnancy, violated this prohibition. Brent, however,
attempts to evade this prohibition by claiming that it was
not the mere fact of Christine Joy’s pregnancy that caused
her dismissal. Rather, according to Brent, it is her
pregnancy outside of wedlock that justified her termination
as immorality is a just cause under the MRPS and the
Labor Code. In doing so, Brent not only violated the law, it
even went further and asked the labor tribunals and the
judiciary to lend an interpretation to the Labor Code and
the MRPS that disregards the Constitution.
Christine Joy has the right to decide how she will rear
her child. If this choice involves being a single mother for
now or for good, no law or government issuance may be
used to interfere with this decision. Christine Joy, and all
other women similarly situated, should find refuge in the
protection extended by the Constitution.
The Constitution highlights the value of the family as
the foundation of the nation.29 Complementary to this, the
Family Code of the Philippines provides that marriage is
the foundation of the family.30 Indeed, our laws and
tradition recognize that children are usually reared and
families built within the confines of marriage. The
Constitution and the laws, however, merely express an
ideal. While marriage is the ideal starting point of a family,
there is no constitutional or statutory provision limiting
the definition of a family or preventing any at-

_______________

28  Labor Code, Art. 135.

29  Constitution, Art. XV, Sec. 1.
30  Family Code, Art. 1.

 
 
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tempt to deviate from our traditional template of what a

family should be.
In other jurisdictions, there is a growing clamor for laws
to be readjusted to suit the needs of a rising class of women
—single mothers by choice.31 These countries are faced
with the same predicament that Brent confronted in this
case — their rules have lagged behind the demands of the
times. Nevertheless, in our jurisdiction, the Constitution
remains as the guide to ascertain how new situations are to
be dealt with. In Christine Joy’s case, the Constitution tells
us that her right to personal liberty and privacy protects
her choice as to whether she will raise her child in a
marriage. Brent, in dismissing Christine Joy because of her
pregnancy outside of wedlock, unduly burdened her right to
choose. Again, the MRPS and the Labor Code cannot be
used to justify Brent’s acts. These government issuances
respect the Constitution and abide by it. Any contrary
interpretation cannot be countenanced.
In my proposed reading of the constitutional right to
personal liberty and privacy, Christine Joy and other
women similarly situated are free to be single mothers by
choice. This cannot be curtailed in the workplace through
discriminatory policies against pregnancy out of wedlock.
The Constitution allows women in this country to design
the course of their own lives. They are free to chart their
own destinies.
 
Constitution and Public Secular Morality
 
I finally propose that in applying the two-tier test in
Leus and in the ponencia, the Constitution should be
considered as a gauge of what the public deems as moral.
In this case, there is a constitutionally declared value to
protecting the right to

_______________

31  See Kelly, Fiona, Autonomous Motherhood and the Law: Exploring
the Narratives of Canada’s Single Mothers by Choice, 28 Can. J. Fam. L 63
(2013).

 
 
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choose to marry and the right to be a single mother by

choice. This is our people’s determination of what is moral.
Thus, in the incisive analysis of Justice Reyes, whenever
this right to choose is involved, the Constitution compels us
to find that the act is constitutionally protected, and as
such, is necessarily moral in the public and secular sense.
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to grant the Petition.

Petition granted, resolutions reversed and set aside.

Notes.—There is no doubt that Garcia and Guevarra

had, and appears to still have, an illicit relationship while
the latter is still legally married. Such a relationship is
highly frowned upon, especially when court employees are
involved because they are expected to maintain moral
righteousness and uprightness in their professional and
private conduct to preserve the integrity and dignity of the
courts of justice. (Garcia vs. Buencamino, 738 SCRA 80
[2014])
The rule is that whenever the filing of a motion or
pleading is not done personally, the date of mailing (by
registered mail), as indicated by the post office on the
envelope or the registry receipt, is considered as the date of
filing. (Raza vs. Daikoku Electronics Phils., Inc., 764 SCRA
132 [2015])
 
 
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