IX.

JOSEPHINE WEE v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 177384, December 8, 2009,
Second Division, DEL CASTILLO, J.:

The phrase "adverse, continuous, open, public, peaceful and in concept of owner," are mere conclusions of
law requiring evidentiary support and substantiation.

FACTS: Josephine Wee filed an Application for Registration of Title over a parcel of land
purchased from Julian Gonzales. Wee claimed that she and her predecessor-in-interest, Julian,
have been in open, continuous, public, peaceful and adverse possession of the land since June
12, 1945, as required by the Property Registration Decree. The Republic thru the Solicitor
General opposed the application asserting that Wee and her predecessor-in-interest cannot be in
possession and occupation of the subject property under the bona fide claim of ownership since
the subject land became part of alienable and disposable land only in 1982. They further aver
that Wee failed to prove that she undertook clear act of dominion and ownership over the land.

ISSUE: Whether or not Wee is entitled to the registration of land in his name based on open,
continuous, public, peaceful and adverse possession of the land in the concept of an owner.

RULING: NO. The phrase "adverse, continuous, open, public, peaceful and in concept of
owner," by which characteristics Wee describes his possession, are mere conclusions of law
requiring evidentiary support and substantiation. The burden of proof is on her, as applicant, to
prove by clear, positive and convincing evidence that the alleged possession was of the nature
and duration required by law. Bare allegations without more, do not amount to preponderant
evidence that would shift the burden of proof to the oppositor.

Unfortunately, Wee failed to prove that she and her predecessor-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the subject property under a
bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945. First, there is nothing in the records which
would substantiate her claim that Julian was in possession of the lot since 1945, other than their
bare allegations. In fact, the earliest tax declaration that was presented as declared by Julian was
only in 1957 – long after June 1945. It bears stressing too that Wee presented only five tax
declarations for a claimed possession and occupation of more than 45 years (1945-1993). This
type of intermittent and sporadic assertion of alleged ownership does not prove open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation. In any event, in the absence of
other competent evidence, tax declarations do not conclusively establish either possession or
declarant’s right to registration of title. Second, and more importantly, Wee was unable to
demonstrate that the alleged possession was in the concept of an owner, since she could not
point to any acts of occupation, development, cultivation or maintenance over the property. She
claims that because the property is planted with coffee, a fruit-bearing tree, it automatically
follows that the lot is cultivated, showing actual possession and occupation. However, Wee
failed to explain who planted the coffee, whether these plants are maintained or harvested or if
any other acts were undertaken by her or her predecessor-in-interest to cultivate the property.
And even if the Court assumes that the coffee was planted by Wee’s predecessor-in-interest,
"mere casual cultivation" of the land does not amount to exclusive and notorious possession
that would give rise to ownership.

XI.

GINA ENDAYA v. ERNESTO V. VILLAOS G.R. No. 202426, January 27, 2016, Second
Division, DEL CASTILLO, J.

A certificate of title has a superior probative value as against that of an unregistered deed of sale in
ejectment cases notwithstanding the fact that the latter has in its favor a juris tantum presumption of
authenticity and due execution.

FACTS: Petitioner and the other heirs of Atilano Villaos (hereinafter Atilano) filed before the
RTC a complaint for declaration of nullity of deeds of sale, recovery of titles, and accounting of
income of the Palawan Village Hotel (hereinafter PVH) against Respondent. The complaint in
the main said that the purported sale of the affected lots, from Atilano to respondent, was
spurious.

Subsequently, respondent filed an ejectment case with preliminary mandatory injunction

against petitioner Gina Endaya and Leny Rivera before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities
(MTCC). According to respondent, he bought from Atilano eight (8) parcels of land, including
those where PVH and WSH stood. Respondent then took possession of the lots and started to
manage and operate the said hotels. Upon taking possession of the said lots, he told petitioner
and the others who live in residential houses in the lots in question, to vacate the premises.
However, instead of leaving, petitioner even participated in a violent and unlawful takeover of
portions of PVH and WSH, thus, the filing of the ejectment case.

Denying that Atilano, during his lifetime, had executed deeds of sale involving the subject lots
in favor of respondent, petitioner stated that during the alleged execution of said deeds, Atilano
was no longer ambulatory and could no longer talk and give assent to the deeds of sale.
Petitioner also questioned the propriety of the ejectment case since according to her, they
already have filed Civil Case No. 4162 precisely to nullify the deeds of sale. The Court of
Appeals promulgated its decision affirming the ruling of the MTCC and RTC holding that the
MTCC simply took cognizance of the existence of the deeds of sale in favor of respondent
without passing judgment as to whether these deeds were valid or not.

Petitioner essentially insists that the MTCC and RTC should have resolved the issues of
ownership and validity of the deeds of sale despite the pendency of Civil Case No. 4162 because
these issues will settle the question of who between the parties has the better right of possession
over the subject properties; that it was error for the MTCC and RTC to declare that respondent
had the better right of possession based on the supposed deeds of sale in disregard of the
successional rights of the Atilano heirs.
ISSUE: Whether or not the certificate of title should be given more probative weight over an
unregistered deed of sale in resolving the issue of who has the better right to possess

RULING: YES. In resolving the issue of possession in an ejectment case, the registered owner of
the property is preferred over the transferee under an unregistered deed of sale. In the present
case, there is no dispute that petitioner is the holder of a Torrens title over the entire lot.
Respondents have only their notarized but unregistered Kasulatan sa Bilihan to support their
claim of ownership. Thus, even if respondents’ proof of ownership has in its favor a juris
tantum presumption of authenticity and due execution, the same cannot prevail over
petitioner’s Torrens title. It remains true that the registered owner is preferred to possess the
property subject of the unlawful detainer case. The age-old rule is that the person who has a
Torrens Title over a land is entitled to possession thereof.

While respondent has in his favor deeds of sale over the eight parcels of land, these deeds were
not registered; thus, title remained in the name of the owner and seller Atilano. When he died,
title passed to petitioner, who is his illegitimate child. This relationship does not appear to be
contested by respondent – in these proceedings, at least. Under Article 777 of the Civil Code,
“[t]he rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent.”
Thus, applying the principle enunciated in the above-cited cases, petitioner and her co-heirs
should have been favored on the question of possession, being heirs who succeeded the
registered owner of the properties in dispute. Clearly, the MTCC, RTC, and CA erred in ruling
in favor of respondent.

Besides, if there are strong reasons of equity, such as when the execution of the judgment in the
unlawful detainer case would result in the demolition of the premises such that the result of
enforcement would be permanent, unjust and probably irreparable, then the unlawful detainer
case should at least be suspended, if not abated or dismissed, in order to await final judgment in
the more substantive case involving legal possession or ownership. The facts indicate that
petitioner and her co-heirs have established residence on the subject premises; the fact that they
were given a long period of six months within which to vacate the same shows how deep they
have established roots therein. If they vacate the premises, serious irreversible consequences –
such as demolition of their respective residences – might ensue. It is thus more prudent to await
the outcome of Civil Case No. 4162.

XII.

UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v. PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, INC., G.R. No.
205951, July 4, 2016, Second Division, DEL CASTILLO, J.

A demand to pay prior to filing of the ejectment case is not one of the requisites in an ejectment case based
on a contract to sell.

FACTS: Petitioner is the owner of two parcels of land with improvements both covered by
Transfer Certificates of Title. Respondent was the former owner of the lots but it lost the same
by foreclosure to petitioner; nonetheless, it continued to occupy the same. Thereafter, petitioner
and respondent executed a Contract to Sell (hereafter Contract) covering the subject property
payable within seven years.

Respondent failed to fully pay the stipulated price in the contract to sell. This prompted the
petitioner to send a demand letter demanding to pay the remaining installments. This letter was
soon followed by a demand to vacate by the petitioner since the respondent did not heed the
first demand letter. Eventually, it led to the rescission of the Contract.

Subsequently, petitioner filed an ejectment case against respondent before the MTCC. The
MTCC dismissed the case. It reasoned that the demand to vacate prayed for is a consequence of
petitioner’s unilateral cancellation of the contract and are thus inextricably connected with
rescission. Thus, the MTCC has no jurisdiction over the case because it involves a breach of
contract and rescission of the contract to sell, matters which are cognizable by the RTC.

On appeal to the RTC, the case was likewise dismissed. The RTC held that the jurisdictional
requisite of demand to pay and vacate was not complied with by the petitioner because the
demand letter to vacate of the petitioner stated an alternative whether to renew the expired
lease contract of the respondent.

The CA, on appeal, found that the original Contract to Sell was transformed into a lease contract
after the subsequent failure of the respondent to pay on the first demand letter. Thus, under the
new lease contract, all the petitioner did was to demand for vacation, and there seems to be no
demand to pay. This prompted the CA to dismiss the case since demand to pay and vacate must
concur.

Petitioner essentially argues that since the contract to sell was already rescinded, it was no
longer required to make a demand for payment prior to filing an ejectment suit. Furthermore,
since its ejectment case is anchored not on failure to pay rent, but on violation of the contract to
sell, no demand for payment was required.

ISSUE: Whether or not demand to pay was necessary despite the rescission of the Contract to
Sell.

RULING: NO, demand to pay is not necessary in this case.

An ejectment case is not limited to lease agreements or deprivations of possession by force,

intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth. It is as well available against one who withholds
possession after the expiration or termination of his right of possession under an express or
implied contract, such as a contract to sell.

It was plainly erroneous for the lower courts to require a demand to pay prior to filing of the
ejectment case. This is not one of the requisites in an ejectment case based on petitioner’s
contract to sell with respondent. The full payment of the purchase price in a contract to sell is a
positive suspensive condition whose nonfulfillment is not a breach of contract, but merely an
event that prevents the seller from conveying title to the purchaser; in other words, the
nonpayment of the purchase price renders the contract to sell ineffective and without force and
effect.

XIII.

LIMITED AND EXPANDED CONCEPT OF A BUILDER IN GOOD FAITH

Limited Concept of a Builder in Good Faith

Under Article 448 of the New Civil Code, a person who builds in good faith on the land of
another is deemed a builder in good faith. Good faith under Article 448 consists in the honest
belief of the builder that the land he is building on is his or that by some title he has a right to
build thereon, and his ignorance of any defect or flaw in his title (Rosales v. Castellort, 472 SCRA
144). It implies honesty of intention, and freedom from knowledge of circumstances which
ought to put the builder upon inquiry (Philippine National Bank v. De Jesus, 411 SCRA 557).

Thus, a builder in good faith acts under an honest belief that he has a claim of title of
ownership (Alburo v. Villanueva, 7 Phil. 227).

Expanded Concept of a Builder in Good Faith

In some special cases, the Supreme Court has used Article 448 by recognizing good faith
beyond the limited definition, to wit:

Del Campo v. Abesia, 160 SCRA 379

One whose house, despite having been built at the time he was still co-owner, overlapped
with the land of another was considered as a builder in good faith

Boyer-Roxas v. Court of Appeals, 211 SCRA 470

In cases wherein a builder had constructed improvements with the consent of the owner,
he is deemed a builder in good faith.

Sarmiento v. Agana, 129 SCRA 122

Builders who relied on the consent of another whom they have mistakenly believed in
good faith to be the owner of the land are builders in good faith.

Javier v. Javier, 7 Phil. 261

A son who built his house on a land with the knowledge and consent of his father to
whom belonged the land, the former is considered as a builder in good faith.

In all these cases the builder in good faith proceeded with the knowledge, tolerance,
consent, or permission of the owner.
However, it should be noted that the concept of a builder in good faith under Article 448
does not apply where one’s interest in the land is merely that of a holder such as a mere
lessee under a rental contract (Balucaneg v. Francisco, 122 SCRA 498) or an agent or a
usufrucutary (Macasaet v. Macasaet, 439 SCRA 625). The rationale for the rule is that their
occupancy of the premises continues only during the life of the lease or sub-lessees, as the
case may be.

XIX.

IRON CURTAIN RULE

An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestado from the legitimate children and
relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the same
manner from the illegitimate child (Art. 992, NCC).

As a rule, representation takes place only in favor of legitimate descendants. However,

Article 992 of the New Civil Code has modified this rule. The rule now is representation by
illegitimates is allowed if the person who is to be represented is himself an illegitimate. The
law has placed an iron curtain between the legitimate and illegitimate members of the
family.

Thus, an illegitimate child cannot succeed the legitimate relatives of his father or mother in
cases of intestate succession; however, this prohibition does not apply in cases of testate
succession. In other words, an illegitimate child cannot succeed the legitimate relatives of his
father or mater ab intestado.