Doctrine of Self Help Article 429
1. People v. Narvaez
GR NO. L-33466 Apr 20,1983
Facts:
Narvaez shot Fleischer and Rubia when the latter started to destroy his fence that
resulted to the former to lost his temper and shot Fleisher with his shotgun. According to the
defendant, he received a letter terminating his contract for he was not able to pay his rent. He
was given 6 months to remove his house from the land but the destroying of his fence was
only 2 months after he received the letter. Narvaez then claims he killed in defense of his
person and property.
Issue:
Whether or not the accused can enjoy the mitigating circumstance of unlawful
aggression against property even after the default of lease agreements
Ruling:
Yes.
Where the landlord had given his tenant up to December 31, 1968 within which to
vacate the land, the former should have allowed the latter the peaceful enjoyment of the leased
and not fencedoff and chiselled the estate and house of the latter before the said time. In so
doing the landlord committed an unlawful aggression.
This was indeed aggression, not on the person of appellant, but on his property rights.
Conformably to the foregoing provisions, the deceased had no right to destroy or cause
damage to appellant‘s house, nor to close his accessibility to the highway while he was
pleading with them to stop and talk things over with him. The assault on appellant‘s property,
therefore, amounts to unlawful aggression as contemplated by law. There was an actual
physical invasion of appellant‘s property which he had the right to resist, pursuant to Article
429 of the Civil Code. Where there is incomplete self-defense the accused is entitled to a
penalty lower by one or two degrees.
2. Camarines Norte v. Quezon
GR NO. 80796 Oct 11, 2001
Facts:
Quezon Governor Eduardo Rodriguez and Mayor Julio Lim be cited in contempt of
court for causing the removal of the monument marker erected on the disputed boundary line
by the DENR. Pursuant to the 1922 EB decision.
Thereafter, Sec. Fulgencio Factoran, Jr. issued Special Order No. 1179 creating a
technical working group specifically tasked to make the delineation of the boundary separating
the two provinces. On January 1991, the DENR technical team informed Gov. Rodriguez
about the survey it would undertake. However, Prov. Secretary Vargas who is acting in behalf
of Gov. Rodriguez objected, but the said team proceeded with the survey; the team then
installed a monument marker on May 1991. Rodriguez and Lim caused the bulldozing and
removal of the boundary marker and averred that the removal is in accordance with Article
429 authorizing the owner or lawful possessor of a property to exclude any person from the
enjoyment and disposal thereof.
Issue:
Whether or not the 1989 Decision categorically declared valid and binding the 1922
EB decision upon the contending parties
Ruling:
Yes.
The DENR technical team was precisely created in compliance with the 1989 SC
Decision to conduct the survey.
Thus, the DENR technical team‘s authority is beyond question. From the above
disquisition, we hold that Rodriguez and Lim openly disobeyed our 1989 Decision when they
caused the removal of the monument marker installed by the DENR.
3. MWSS v. Act Theater
GR NO. 147076 Jun 17, 2004
Facts:
Four employees of the respondent Act Theater, Inc. were apprehended by members
of the Quezon City police force for allegedly tampering a water meter in violation of P.D. No.
401 and were subsequently criminally charged before the lower court.
On account of the incident, the respondent‘s water service connection was cutoff at
midnight, as a consequence, it filed a complaint for injunction with damages alleging thereof
that the petitioner acted arbitrarily, whimsically and capriciously, in cutting off the respondent‘s
water service connection without prior notice. Due to lack of water, the health and sanitation,
the respondent‘s patrons and the surrounding premises were adversely affected.
The petitioner insists that in cutting off the respondent‘s water service connection, the
petitioner merely exercised its proprietary right under Art. 429 of the Civil Code.
Issue:
Whether or not MWSS is justified in its act of disconnecting Act Theater‘s water supply
without prior notice, relying solely on Art. 429 of the Civil Code, thus, not liable for any
damages
Ruling:
No.
Petitioner, as the owner of the utility providing water supply to certain consumers
including the respondent, had the right to exclude any person from the enjoyment and disposal
thereof. However, the exercise of rights is not without limitations.
Having the right should not be confused with the manner by which such right is to be
exercised. Art. 19 sets the norms for the exercise of one‘s right. The petitioner failed to act
with justice and give the respondent what is due to it when the petitioner unceremoniously
cutoff the respondent‘s water service connection right.
4. UCPB v. Basco
GR NO. 142688 Aug 31, 2004
Facts:
Respondent Basco had been employed with petitioner UCPB for 17 years and also
worked as an underwriter with Coco Life, a subsidiary of UCPB. Basco was terminated from
his employment with the bank for grave abuse of discretion and authority and breach of trust
as Bank Operations Manager and thereafter filed a complaint for illegal dismissal.
Thereafter, FVP HR Division, of UCPB issued a memorandum to its Security
Department instructing it not to allow respondent access to all bank premises. Basco then
went to petitioner‘s Makati branch to receive a check and deposit money for a friend.
Respondent pleaded that he be allowed to finish his transactions before leaving and
was allowed. Basco was motioned by a bank employee to get the check he was to receive but
the security guard tapped and prevented him from approaching. Due to tremendous
humiliation and embarrassment, respondent instituted this action for damages against
petitioner with the RTC.
Issue:
Whether or not that UCPB excessively exercised its right to self-help to the detriment
of Basco as a depositor
Ruling:
Yes.
The petitioners aver that UCPB has the right to prohibit the respondent from access to
all bank premises under Article 429.
The abuse of rights rule established in Article 19 of the Civil Code requires every
person to act with justice, to give everyone his due; and to observe honesty and good faith.
When right is exercised in a manner which discards these norms resulting in damage to
another, a legal wrong is committed for which the actor can be held accountable.
5. Villafuerte v. CA
GR NO. 134239 May 26, 2005
Facts:
The petitioner spouses Villafuerte operated a gasoline station, Peewees Petron
Powerhouse Service Station and General Merchandise on the premises of three adjoining lots
in Lucena City.
Appellants Edilberto de Mesa and Gonzalo Daleon acquired their respective lots
subject to the lease by Petrophil Corporation which had built thereon the gasoline. When the
lease of Petrophil Corporation expired, the Villafuertes successfully obtained a new lease on
the lot of Edilberto de Mesa, however, failed to do so with the Daleon‘s. Villafuertes, upon
expiration of lease contract with Edilberto de Mesa, the same was not renewed.
The spouses continued to operate their gasoline station and other businesses on the
lot of de Mesa despite the latter‘s demand to vacate. Edilberto de Mesa and Gonzalo Daleon,
with the aid of several persons and without the knowledge of the Villafuertes, caused the
closure of the latter‘s gasoline station by constructing fences around it. Villafuerte‘s countered
with a complaint for damages with preliminary mandatory injunction against both Edilberto de
Mesa and Gonzalo Daleon.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondents can invoke the doctrine of self-help
Ruling:
No.
Respondents could not invoke the doctrine of self-help reasoning that the doctrine finds
no application when occupation was effected through lawful means such as in this case where
petitioners‘ possession of the lots owned by private respondents was effected through lease
agreements.
Petitioners continued unauthorized occupation of private respondents‘ properties may
have been illegal, however, it was incumbent upon private respondents to abide by the
express provision of Article 536 of the Civil Code requiring recourse to the proper court prior
to ousting petitioners from their lot.
6. PB Com v. Trazo
GR NO. 165500 Aug 30, 2006
Facts:
Petitioner Philippine Bank of Communications (PBCOM), respondent Elenita B. Trazo
opened a payroll account with China Banking Corporation (CBC) to facilitate the payment of
her salaries and other monetary benefits from her employer.Petitioner Romeo G. dela Rosa,
PBCOM assistant vice-president, instructed CBC to credit all accounts under its payroll with
the medical and clothing subsidy for the year 1998. When Trazo resigned from PBCOM,
petitioner dela Rosa wrote William Lim, CBC senior assistant vice-president, authorizing CBC
to debit the amount from respondent Trazo’s current account.
Meanwhile, respondent Trazo drew checks against her current account but the checks
were dishonored by CBC due to insufficiency of funds, due to the debit from her current
account. Since PBCOM, through dela Rosa, had no authority to unilaterally order the debiting
of her current account and that CBC, through Lim, made such debit without her knowledge
and consent resulting in the dishonor of her checks, respondent Trazo instituted an action for
damages against PBCOM, dela Rosa, CBC, and Lim.
Issue:
Whether or not there was a violation of respondent Trazo’s property rights with respect
to her checking account
Ruling:
Yes.
In debiting the checking/current account of the plaintiff, without her knowledge, consent
and approval, defendants acted in a wanton, reckless and oppressive manner. Defendants
PBCOM and ROMEO G. DE LA ROSA had no cause nor reason to unilaterally order the
debiting of plaintiff’s account as it was her personal property and not of defendant PBCOM.
Whereas Article 19 provides for a cause of action for damages in cases when there is
no law violated, the act causing damage being within rights or duties of defendant, Article 20
furnishes a general sanction for violations of provisions of law which do not especially provide
their own sanction. The complaint clearly alleges a violation of respondent Trazo’s property
rights with respect to her checking account. Article 429 of the Civil Code provides that the
owner or lawful possessor of the thing has the right to exclude any person from the enjoyment
and disposal thereof.
7. Tan-Yap v. Patricio
A.M. No. MTJ-19-1925 June 3, 2019
Facts:
Complainant alleged that a private surveying company was tasked to conduct a
relocation survey by the trial court. Benigla questioned this finding claiming that the private
surveyor who conducted the survey was not a licensed geodetic engineer. He, thus, asked
the trial court to designate a surveyor from the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources but was denied, as well as in the Court of Appeals.
Sheriff IV Romeo C. Alvarez, Jr. (Sheriff Alvarez) and Process Server Edgar Dellava
(Process Server Dellava), went to the premises of the subject property for the final
implementation of the writ of execution, but were met by respondent judge who told them that
he would not allow the fencing of said subject properties. Respondent judge claimed that he
and his wife, Ruby Benigla Patricio (Ruby), actually own the adjoining lot, and not his father-
in-law, Benigla. Respondent judge threatened Sheriff Alvarez and his men if they were to
push through with the implementation of the writ of execution. Sheriff Alvarez and Process
Server Dellava, along with the men who were supposed to fence the properties, left the
premises.
Issue:
Whether or not the Doctrine of “Self-Help” is applicable in this case
Ruling:
No.
Respondent judge's reliance on Article 429 of the Civil Code is misplaced. The doctrine
of "self-help" enunciated in this article applies only when the person against whom the owner
has the right to use force (in order to exclude the former from the latter's property) is really an
"aggressor."
In this case, Sheriff Alvarez was not an aggressor, as indeed he could not have been
one, because as an officer or agent of the court, he was simply carrying out his official duty to
implement the writ of execution covering Lot Nos. 703 and 706. Respondent judge effectively
took the law into his own hands, when he stopped the implementation of the writ of execution
using threats and intimidation. Needless to say, he also clearly failed to accord due respect to
legal processes.
Remedies for Recovery of Possession
8. Paul P. Gabriel, Jr. Vs. Carmeling Crisologo
GR NO. 204626 June 9, 2014
Facts:
Respondent here alleged, among others, that she was the registered owner of two
parcels of land, covered by an Assessment of Real Property with updated payments of realty
taxes on the said properties.
That sometime in 2006, she discovered that petitioners Gabriel et al unlawfully entered,
occupied her properties by stealth, by force and without her prior consent and knowledge, and
constructed their houses thereon. Upon discovery of their illegal occupation, her daughter,
Atty. Carmelita Crisologo, and Isican personally went to the properties and verbally demanded
that petitioners vacate the premises and remove their structures thereon.
The petitioners begged and promised to buy the said properties for Php 3,500.00 per
square meter which she gave petitioners Gabriel et al time to produce the said amount, but
they reneged on their promise to buy them. Petitioners Gabriel et al refused to vacate the
subject properties despite several demands despite petitioners Gabriel et al full knowledge
that the subject premises they were occupying were titled properties. Crisologo then filed a
complaint for recovery of possession.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioners have the better right to possess the subject property over
Crisologo
Ruling:
No.
After a careful review of the records, the Court holds that Crisologo has a better right
of possession over the subject parcels of land.
The testimonial and documentary evidence on record prove that Crisologo has a
preferred claim of possession over that of petitioners. It cannot be denied that she bought the
subject properties from the previous owner in 1967, which was why the transfer certificates of
title were subsequently issued in her name. Records further show that she has been paying
the realty taxes on the said properties since 1969. She likewise appointed Isican as
administrator of the disputed lands. More importantly, there is no question that she offered to
sell to petitioners the portions of the subject properties occupied by them. Hence, she
deserves to be respected and restored to her lawful possession as provided in Article 539 of
the New Civil Code.
9. Fortunato Anzures, VS. Ventanilla
GR NO. 222297 July 09, 2018
Facts:
Respondents alleged, among others, that they were the owners of a residential house.
Later, by virtue of a Deed of Donation, petitioner and his wife Carolina donated a portion of
the land in favor of respondents. The house situated on said property constitutes a stumbling
block on the partition of the said property. Being the owners of the property, respondents
merely tolerated the occupation of the property by petitioner. While they demanded to vacate
the house to give way to the subdivision and partition of the property, the effort was to no avail.
Petitioner averred that he and his late spouse Carolina were the owners of the
residential house and that he was also the registered owner of the subject parcel of land,
having bought the same from Erlinda Ventanilla as evidenced by the Pagpapamana sa Labas
ng Hukuman na may Pagtalikod sa Bahagi ng Lupa at Bilihang Tuluyan sa Lupa.
Petitioner also denied the authenticity of the alleged deed of donation because at that
time, Carolina was mentally and physically incompetent to execute the same.
Issue:
Whether or not respondents have a cause of action to eject petitioner from the subject
property
Ruling:
No.
There are four (4) remedies available to one who has been deprived of possession of
real property. These are: (1) an action for unlawful detainer; (2) a suit for forcible entry; (3)
accion publiciana; and (4) accion reinvidicatoria.
The Court notes that respondents have recognized the co-ownership insofar as the
parcel of land is concerned when they alleged in their complaint for unlawful detainer their
intention to partition the same. They assert, however, exclusive ownership over the residential
house standing thereon by virtue of the deed of donation and extrajudicial settlement of estate.
The documentary evidence, however, shows that the parties are also co-owners of the
residential house. The parties, being co-owners of both the land and the building, the remedy
of the respondents is to file an action for partition.
Accion Publiciana
10. JUN MIRANDA, v. Mallari
GR NO. 218343 November 28, 2018
Facts:
Spouses Mallari filed a suit for recovery of possession against Jun Miranda (Miranda),
alleging that they conducted an inspection of the subject property after an annotation was
indicated in the certificate of title the certificate of sale. They discovered that the same was in
the possession of Miranda who claimed to be the owner thereof, having bought the property
from the Spouses Reyes.
Since they are claiming ownership and possession of the property, they prayed that
Miranda be ordered to vacate and to surrender the possession thereof to them. Miranda
denied all the material allegations in the Spouses Mallari's complaint. He averred that he is
already the owner of the subject property as he bought the same from the Spouses Reyes
despite that he failed to cause the registration of the sale as he lost the owner's copy of the
certificate of title.
Domiciano Reyes admitted that he and his now deceased wife, Carmelita, sold the
subject property to Miranda in 1996. He, however, claimed that he and his wife are no longer
liable to Miranda should the latter be ordered to surrender the possession and ownership of
the property to the Spouses Mallari.
Issue:
Whether or not Sps. Mallari has a better right to possession over the subject property
as against Miranda
Ruling:
No.
The Court holds that Miranda has a better right of possession over the subject property
having acquired ownership thereof prior to the levy on execution that Spouses Mallari had
caused to be made upon the subject property. Since ownership of the subject property had
been transferred to Miranda in 1996, it ceased to be owned by Spouses Reyes as early as
then. Not being owned by Spouses Reyes, the subject property could not therefore be made
answerable for any judgment rendered against them.
A judgment creditor or purchaser at an execution sale acquires only whatever rights
that the judgment obligor may have over the property at the time of levy. Thus, if the judgment
obligor has no right, title or interest over the levied property — as in this case — there is
nothing for him to transfer.
11. Heirs of Yusingco v. Busilak,
G.R. No. 210504 January 24, 2018
Facts:
Five separate (5) Complaints were filed by petitioners for accion publiciana and/or
recovery of possession against herein respondents and a certain Reynaldo Peralta. They
uniformly alleged in the said Complaints that: they are owners of three (3) parcels of land
which they inherited the lots from their predecessor-in-interest, Alfonso Yusingco. After the
war, petitioners discovered that the subject properties were occupied by several persons,
which prompted petitioners to file separate cases for accion reivindicatoria and recovery of
possession against these persons.
Pending these cases, herein respondents entered different portions of the same
properties and occupied them without the knowledge and consent of petitioners. Petitioners
were forced to tolerate the illegal occupation of respondents as they did not have sufficient
resources to protect their property at that time and also because their ownership was still being
disputed in the earlier cases filed. Subsequently, the cases which they earlier filed were
decided in their favor and they were declared the owners of the subject properties. Thereafter,
petitioners demanded that respondents vacate the said properties, but the latter refused.
Issue:
Whether or not the final and executory decisions rendered in a previous accion
reivindicatoria, finding petitioners to be the lawful owners of the subject properties, are binding
upon respondents
Ruling:
Yes.
The Court finds no cogent reason to depart from the findings and conclusions of the
MTCC, as affirmed by the RTC, that respondents are mere intruders or trespassers who do
not have a right to possess the subject lots. Thus, the Court adopts the discussion of the
MTCC on the matter, to wit:
It was indeed revealing that while professing that the lots are public land, the
defendants never bothered to apply under any of the legal modes of acquiring land of the
public domain for the portion occupied by them. Obviously, their physical possession of the
premises was not under claim of ownership or in the concept of an owner. Hence, the
defendants' possession cannot ripen into ownership by prescription as claimed by them. They
are intruders, plain and simple, without any right of possession to be protected.
The evidence showed that the defendant's [herein respondents'] entry into and
possession of the disputed premises was illegal from the beginning and remain to be so until
the present.
12. Tuazon v. Tuazon
G.R. No. 200115 August 1, 2018
FACTS:
Petitioners alleged in the complaint that: (1) they were the prior and actual lawful
possessors and bonafide claimants of a parcel of land located in East Bajac-Bajac, Olongapo
City from 1968 up to the present; (2) they also stated that Respondents Lydia Tuazon (Lydia)
and Anunciacion Tuazon (respondents) unlawfully occupied and withheld physical possession
of a portion of the said land; (3) despite repeated demands to vacate the premises,
respondents refused to do so, forcing petitioners to refer the matter to the barangay for
resolution; and (4) the parties failed to amicably settle the matter.
Respondents alleged that Lydia and her three sisters, now deceased, owned the
subject parcel of land in common, having purchased it using their own funds. Petitioners filed
an accion reivindicatoria filed against respondents Lydia and Asuncion Tuazon in the RTC.
RTC granted the complaint. It ruled that petitioners have established their possessory rights
over the property. The CA, however reversed the appeal, it observed that while the complaint
was captioned as an accion reivindicatoria, the cause of action, based on the facts alleged in
the complaint and the evidence introduced, is actually one for accion publiciana or for recovery
of possession.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners' cause of action has prescribed.
RULING:
Yes.
Petitioners were declared therein as the sole purchasers of the possessory right over
the property under a deed of transfer of possessory right executed in 1968.
The SC also agreed with the CA that the action has prescribed and that petitioners
have already lost their real right of possession at the time of the filing of the complaint on
October 14, 2003. Petitioners' claim that the prescriptive period for the action should be 30
years is misplaced.
Article 1141 of the Civil Code explicitly states that real actions over immovables
prescribe after 30 years, without prejudice to what is established for the acquisition of
ownership and other real rights by prescription. Since the action before us is one of accion
publiciana, which seeks recovery of the real right of possession, Article 1141 must be read in
relation to established rules on prescription governing the real right of possession. Article 555
(4) of the Civil Code provides that, "the real right of possession is not lost till after the lapse of
ten years." It is for this reason that we have time and again ruled that the remedy of accion
publiciana is no longer available after the lapse of 10 years from dispossession.
Right of the owner Article 430
13. Spouses Custodio v. CA
GR NO. 116100 Feb 9, 1996
Facts:
A parcel of land with a two-door apartment was owned by Mabasa in which the property
is surrounded by other immovables. When Mabasa bought the land, there were tenants who
were occupying the property, and there were supposed two different passageways. Mabasa
went to see the premises after one of the tenants vacated, he saw that there had been built
an adobe fence in the apartment in the first passageway that made it narrower. The Santoses
first constructed the said adobe fence. Defendant Morato then constructed her own adobe
fence and even extended said fence that entirely closed the said passage way. The remaining
tenants vacated thereafter.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA erred in awarding damages to Custodios and Santoses
Ruling:
Yes.
A person sustains actual damage, that is, harm or loss to his person or property,
without sustaining any legal injury, that is, an act or omission which the law does not deem an
injury, the damage is regarded as damnum absque injuria. Although there was damage, there
was no legal injury. Contrary to the claim of private respondents, petitioners could not be said
to have violated the principle of abuse of right. It is within the right of petitioners, as owners,
to enclose and fence their property.
The proper exercise of a lawful right cannot constitute a legal wrong for which an action
will lie, although the act may result in damage to another, for no legal right has been invaded.
14. Aneco v. Landex
GR NO. 165952 Jul 28, 2008
Facts:
A parcel of land was owned by Fernandez Hermanos Development, Inc. which was
consisted of 39 lots in which were initially intended to be developed into subdivision lots and
secured a permit for the purpose. FHDI then sold the 17 lots to Aneco and the 22 lots to
Landex.
In the Deed of Sale between FHDI and Aneco, the former manifested its intention not
to continue with the subdivision project, and undertook to file the necessary manifestation
thereon with the proper agency and to assist Aneco in the consolidation of titles of the
subdivided lots. Landex built a walled fence on its property. Intending to continue with the
subdivision project commenced by FHDI and relying on the permit secured by the latter for
the purpose, Aneco then filed an injunction to stop the completion of this walled fence.
Issue:
Whether or not Landex be stopped from building a fence on its own property in this
case
Ruling:
No.
At the time of the sale of the property from FHDI to Aneco, the latter fully knew of the
intention of the former not to continue with the subdivision project. In fact, this intention was
stated in the Deed of Sale. Moreover, under this Deed, FHDI obliged itself to file the necessary
manifestation thereon with the proper agency and to assist Aneco in the consolidation of titles
of the subdivided lots. Hence, the continued use of apparent easement provided in Article 624
not apply in this case as the property ceased to be a subdivision lot and was reverted to an
ordinary lot at the time of sale.
The right to fence flows from the right of ownership. As owner of the property, Landex
may fence this property subject only to the limitations provided by law.
15. Heirs of Limense v. De Ramos
GR NO. 152319 Oct. 28, 2009
FACTS:
TCT No. 40043, which covered Lot No. 12-C, was issued in the name of its co-owners
Catalina, Isabel and Salud. Thereafter, TCT No. 96886 was issued in the name of Joaquin
Limense covering the very same area of Lot No. 12-C. Joaquin Limense, wanted to build a
hollow block fence on his property however he cannot initatiate the construction because a
substantial portion of respondent’s building is encroached upon Limense’s property.
Limense then instituted a Complaint against respondents for removal of obstruction
and damages. Likewise, he prayed that the RTC issue an order directing respondents to
remove the portion which illegally encroached upon his property. CA dismissed the appeal
and affirmed in toto the decision of the RTC, accordingly, TCT No. 96886, issued in the name
of Joaquin Limense, was spurious because the Lozada sisters never disposed of the said
property covered by TCT No. 40043. The CA further ruled that a co-ownership existed over
Lot No. 12-C between petitioners and respondents.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that a co-ownership existed over Lot No. 12-C
between the petitioners and respondents.
RULING:
Yes.
TCT No. 96886 is of dubious origin, as TCT No. 40043 does not appear to have been
disposed of by Catalina, Isabel and Salud Lozada, is improper and constitutes an indirect
attack on TCT No. 96886. As we see it, TCT No. 96886, at present, is the best proof of Joaquin
Limense’s ownership over Lot No. 12-C.
The CA erred in ruling that respondents and petitioners co-owned Lot No. 12-C, as
said lot is now registered exclusively in the name of Joaquin Limense. Due to the foregoing,
Joaquin Limense, as the registered owner of Lot 12-C, and his successors-in-interest, may
enclose or fence his land or tenements by means of walls, ditches, live or dead hedges, or by
any other means without detriment to servitudes constituted thereon. However, although the
owner of the property has the right to enclose or fence his property, he must respect servitudes
constituted thereon.
16. North Greenhills v. Morales
G.R. No. 222821, August 9, 2017
Facts:
Atty. Morales is a resident of North Greenhills Subdivision in San Juan City. His house
is located alongside Club Filipino Avenue and adjacent to McKinley Park, an open
space/playground area owned and operated by NGA. On the other hand, NGA is the
undisputed owner of the park. It has acquired ownership thereof through a donation made by
the original owner, Ortigas &. Co. Ltd.
NGA started constructing a pavilion or kiosk and Atty. Morales filed on July 23, 2003 a
complaint before the HLURB for the demolition of the pavilion . Atty. Morales alleged that for
a period spanning 33 years, he had an open, access to the subdivision park through his side
door that having such access to the park was one of the considerations why he purchased the
lot.
Issue:
Whether or not CA erred in upholding respondent Atty. Moralres’ access to Mckinley
Park, effectively constituting an easement of right of way.
Ruling:
Yes.
Under the Civil Code, NGA, as owner of the park, has the right to enclose or fence his
land or tenements by means of walls, ditches, live or dead hedges, or by any other means
without detriment to servitudes constituted thereon. It also has a right to exclude others from
access to, and enjoyment of its property. NGA's legal right to block the access door is beyond
doubt. Courts have no business in securing the access of a person to another property absent
any clear right on the part of the latter.
The CA essentially violated the right of NGA. Atty. Morales never introduced any
evidence that he had acquired any right by prescription or by agreement or legal easement to
access the park through his side door. Moreover, he never claimed that his side door was his
only access to the park. He has other means and, being adjacent to the park, going through
other means is not cumbersome.
Article 434
17. VSD Realty v. Uniwide
GR NO. 170677 Oct 24, 2012
Facts:
VSD Realty and Development Corporation (VSD) filed a complaint for annulment of
title and recovery of possession of property against respondents Uniwide Sales, Inc. and
Dolores Baelio with the RTC. VSD alleged that it is the registered owner of a parcel of land,
wherein VSD purchased the said property from Felisa Bonifacio.
On the other hand, Baelio countered that the subject property was bequeathed to her
through a will by her adoptive mother as approved by the probate court. Thereafter, she
entered into a Contract of Lease with respondent Uniwide. As a consequence of the lease
agreement, Uniwide constructed in good faith a building worth at least P200,000.00 on the
said property.
Issue:
Whether or not VSD is entitled to recovery of possession of the subject property
Ruling:
Yes.
Article 434 of the Civil Code provides that to successfully maintain an action to recover
the ownership of a real property the person who claims a better right to it must prove two (2)
things: first, the identity of the land claimed, and second, his title thereto. With regards to the
first requisite, in an accion reinvindicatoria the person who claims that he has a better right to
the property must first fix the identity of the land he is claiming by describing the location, area
and boundaries thereof.
In a case decided by the Supreme Court it held that it bears stress that in an action to
recover real property; this requirement is based on two (2) reasons: first, it is possible that
neither the plaintiff nor the defendant is the true owner of the property in dispute, and second,
the burden of proof lies on the party who substantially asserts the affirmative of an issue for
he who relies upon the existence of a fact should be called upon to prove that fact. Hence, it
is entitled to recover possession of the property from respondents.
18. Heirs of Spouses Sotes v. Estaca
G.R. No. 211849 December 3, 2018
Facts:
Petitioner Santiago Sotes purchased a land from Atanacio Pernia and was covered by
a Deed of Absolute of Sale. Santiago claims that he purchased another lot from Atanacio’s
son. Respondent Estaca also executed another Deed of Sale with Arsenio.
Sps. Sotes then demanded from respondents the execution of a proper deed of
conveyance for the transfer in their name. Sps. Sotes however, claimed that they are the
rightful owners of the disputed property. Respondents also explained that Santiago occupied
the disputed property only as a tenant thereof.
Issue:
Whether or not Sps Sotes proves by preponderance of evidence the identity of the
land claimed and their title thereto.
Ruling:
No.
In action to recover ownership, the person who claims a better right to the disputed
property must prove two (2) things: first, the identity of the land claimed; and second, his title
thereto. This means that the claimant must first fix the identity of the land he is claiming by
describing the location, area and boundaries thereof. After having sufficiently identified the
property subject of the case, the claimant must then prove his title over the disputed area. The
rule is that a party can claim a right of ownership only over the parcel of land that was the
object of the deed.
The second requirement in an action to recover property under Article 434 of the Civil
Code pertains to proof of the claimant's title. In the instant case, aside from the questionable
Deeds of Sale presented, the Spouses Sotes did not submit any evidence proving their title
over the land. Their claim that they have been paying taxes over the disputed property does
not work in their favor, as it is an elementary rule that the payment of taxes does not in itself
prove ownership of the land. Neither does their claim of possession vest ownership unto them,
considering that they merely occupied the property as tenants thereof.
19. Conje v. Spouses Tsamoudakis
G.R. No. 184220 July 24, 2019
Facts:
Petitioners, Conje and the Samares, are the heirs of brothers Roberto and Catalino
Samares and a rightful owners of a Cadastral Lot. They further alleged that this parcel of land
formed part of a larger estate.
Petitioners alleged that the land was declared for taxation purposes in the name of
Rodrigo Abapo who then sold the land to the Respondents Sps. Tsamoudakis. Petitioners
filed a case for recovery of ownership against the respondents.
Respondents testified that Abapo has produced the necessary documents to show his
legal title to said property. Abapo also presented Deed of Sale and Tax Declaration.
Respondents have traced the said title through series of conveyances.
Issue:
Whether or not Petitioner has the right of ownership over the property contested.
Ruling:
No.
Petitioners failed to present sufficient evidence of their ownership of the property
through extraordinary acquisitive prescription. The action petitioners filed int the MCTC for the
recovery of ownership of the property is an accion reinvidicatoria under Article 434 of the Civil
Code. In order to succeed, Article 434 provides, “In an action to recover, the property must be
identified and the plaintiff must rely on the strength of his title and not on the weakness of the
defendant’s whether petitioners have presented evidence to prove their ownership of the
properties in question.
In this case, the court held that petitioners failed to meet the required burden of proof.
In an attempt to prove their ownership of the property, petitioners alleged that they are the
heirs of Roberto Samares through intestate succession and proceeded to attack respondents’
and their predecessors-in-interest’s title over the property.
Rights of Accession What owner owns Article 437
20. NPC v. Ibrahim
GR NO. 168732 Jun 29, 2007
Facts:
Lucman G. Ibrahim, in his personal capacity and in behalf of his co-heirs instituted an
action against petitioner National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR) for recovery of possession
of land and damages, claiming that they were the owners of several parcels of land.
NAPOCOR, through alleged stealth and without respondents‘ knowledge and prior
consent, took possession of the sub-terrain area of their lands and constructed therein
underground tunnels. The existence of the tunnels was only discovered sometime in July 1992
by respondents and then later confirmed on November 13, 1992 by NAPOCOR itself through
a memorandum. On September 19, 1992, respondent Omar Maruhom requested the Marawi
City Water District for a permit to construct and/or install a motorized deep well in Lot 3 but his
request was turned down because the construction of the deep well would cause danger to
lives and property.
Issue:
Whether or not respondents are entitled to just compensation hinges upon who owns
the sub- terrain area occupied by petitioner
Ruling:
Yes.
The ownership of land extends to the surface as well as to the subsoil under it. It is a
well-known principle that the owner of a piece of land has rights not only to its surface but also
to everything underneath and the airspace above it up to a reasonable height. Respondents
are clearly entitled to the payment of just compensation.
This is so because in this case, the nature of the easement practically deprives the
owners of its normal beneficial use. Respondents, as the owners of the property thus
expropriated, are entitled to a just compensation which should be neither more nor less,
whenever it is possible to make the assessment, than the money equivalent of said property.
21. PLDT v. Citi Appliance M.C. Corp.,
G.R. No. 214546 October 9, 2019
FACTS:
Respondent Citi Appliance owns a parcel of land in Cebu City. Citi Appliance decided
to construct a commercial building however it requires to make a deep excavation to lay the
foundation of the parking lot. In the process of excavation, it discovered PLDT’s telephone
lines, cables, and manholes underground. These encroached in Citi Appliance’s property,
preventing it from excavating the land; respondent Citi Appliance wrote a demand letter to
Petitioner PLDT that it remove the underground telephone lines, cables, and manholes, or to
should the parking exemption fee; Citi Appliance made a final demand on PLDT however
PLDT still refused to comply.
Respondent Citi Appliance filed a complaint for ejectment against PLDT, in its Answer,
Petitioner PLDT alleged that its telephone lines, cables, and manholes did not encroach on
Citi Appliance’s property as they were properly positioned alongside and underneath a public
sidewalk. PLDT then argued that the area in question was part of public domain, it being a
sidewalk. Assuming that the property did not belong to Citi Appliance, PLDT averred that it
had the right of eminent domain.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the subterranean portion of a titled property is included in the rights of
the surface owner.
RULING:
Yes.
Rights over lands are indivisible. It is well-settled that the owner of a parcel of land has
rights not only to the land’s surface, but also to everything underneath the airspace above it
up to a reasonable height. Article 437 of the Civil Code States: Art. 437. The owner of a parcel
of land is the owner of its surface and of everything under it, and he can construct thereon any
works or make any plantations and excavations which he may deem proper, without detriment
to servitudes and subject to special laws and ordinances. He cannot complain of the
reasonable requirements of aerial navigation.
In this case, the existence of petitioner PLDT’s cables affected the right of the surface
owner to make use of its right to possess. This can be considered a burden, which may be
removed by forcible entry or unlawful detainer actions. As to petitioner’s assertion of its right
of eminent domain, this court finds that this claim cannot be properly resolve in a complaint
for forcible entry or unlawful detainer.
